THE 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR 


WRITTEN   BY 


NORTH  AXD  SOUTH. 


ORIGINALLY   PUBLISHED    IN    THE 


PHILADELPHIA  WEEKLY  TIMES. 


THE  TIMES  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

THE  TIMES  BUILDING, 

CORNER  OF  CHESTNUT  AND  EIGHTH  STREETS. 

1879. 


ENTERED,  ACCORDING  TO  ACT  OF  CONGRESS,  IN  THE  YEAR  1878,  BY 

THE  TIMES  PUBLISHING  COMPANY, 
i  THE  OFFICE  OF  THE  LIBRARIAN  OF  CONGRESS,  AT  WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


PREFACE. 


In  presenting  to  the  public  THE  AXXALS  OF  THE  WAR, 
the  publishers  do  not  assume  to  offer  only  that  which  is  thor 
oughly  reliable  as  chapters  in  the  history  of  tJic  most  thrilling 
and  bloody  drama  of  the  century,  but  it  is  assumed  that  in  no 
way  can  the  truth  of  history  be  so  nearly  ascertained  as  by 
the  statements  of  the  leading  actors  themselves.  The  series 
of  contributions  contained  in  this  volume  were  furnished  as 
special  articles  for  THE  PHILADELPHIA  WEEKLY  TIMES,  with 
the  view  of  correcting  many  of  the  grave  errors  of  the  hastily 
compiled,  heedlessly  imperfect,  and  strongly  partisan  histories 
which  appeared  during  and  soon  after  the  close  of  the  war. 

The  fierce  passions  which  attend  civil  war  arc  un equaled 
in  any  conflicts  between  separate  peoples,  and  the  advanced 
intelligence,  the  community  of  interest,  the  common  pride  of 
past  achievements,  and  the  long  maintained  brotherhood 
through  generations,  all  intensified  the  bitterness  of  our  inter 
necine  strife.  A  war  so  gigantic,  enduring  for  four  long 
years,  so  costly  in  blood  and  treasure,  and  reaching  almost 
every  household  with  its  sore  bereavements,  could  not  but 
inflame  the  bitterest  passions  and  resentments,  obliterate  re 
collections  of  virtue  in  each  other  s  foes,  and  direct  all  the 
agencies  of  power  to  color  the  causes  and  events  of  the  war  to 
harmonize  with  the  prejudices  which  ruled  North  and  South. 

It  was  to  correct  as  far  as  possible  the  pages  of  the 
future  history  of  the  war  of  the  late  rebellion,  that  the  con 
tributions  herein  given  were  solicited,  and  they  have  all  been. 

o  •"•  ^  ^  o  v-y 
^  /  Xo7 


ii  PREFACE. 

written  with  the  view  of  attaining  that  purpose.  Already 
many  of  the  leading  actors  of  the  war  Jiave  passed  away. 
Lincoln  fell  by  the  assassin's  hand  just  when  he  had  achieved 
the  final  victory  for  the  Union,  lamented  by  those  who  were 
then  his  foes  as  keenly  as  by  the  loyal  men  who  so  bravely 
sustained  him  ;  and  of  his  original  cabinet  but  two  members 
survive.  Stanton,  the  great  War  Minister,  has  gone  to  his 
final  account ;  Mead  and  Lee,  who  met  the  shock  of  decisive 
battle  at  Gettysburg^  now  sleep  in  the  "City  of  the  Silent;" 
and  hundreds  of  others,  who  were  conspicuous  in  civil  coun 
cils  and  on  the  sanguinary  field,  are  in  their  eternal  rest. 
Official  sources  of  reliable  information  have  perished  in  a 
multitude  of  instances,  and  the  country  is  to-day  without  a 
single  trustworthy  history  of  the  greatest  struggle  in  the 
records  of  any  modern  civilization. 

THE  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR  furnish  the  most  valuable 
contributions  to  the  future  historian  which  have  yet  been  given 
to  the  world.  They  are  far  from  being  perfect ;  but  they 
have  elicited  the  truth  to  a  degree  that  no  other  means  could 
have  accomplished.  They  are  from  the  pens  of  a  number  of 
the  most  honored,  intelligent  and  impartial  of  the  immediate 
actors  in  the  scenes  they  portray.  They  embrace  in  the  list 
of  authors  men  of  high  rank  in  military  circles  on  both  sides, 
and  statesmen  and  historians  of  great  trust  and  attainments, 
who  favored  the  cause  of  both  the  Blue  and  the  Gray.  That 
they  are  entirely  free  from  prejudice  or  from  the  coloring 
that  all  must  accept  in  describing  momentous  events  with 
vvhich  they  were  interwoven  by  every  inspiration  of  devotion 
and  ambition,  is  not  to  be  pretended;  but  that  they  are  written 
in  integrity  of  purpose,  and  that  they  give  the  substance  of 
the  truth,  can  be  justly  claimed  for  them.  Coming  as  they  do 


PREFACE.  iii 

from  soldiers  and  civilians  of  both  sides,  presenting  the  same 
battles  and  the  same  results  from  entirely  different  stand 
points,  they,  of  necessity,  often  proffer  antagonistic  conclusions; 
but  the  freedom  of  expression  from  the  opposing  heroes,  has 
enabled  the  intelligent  and  impartial  student  to  arrive  as 
nearly  at  the  exact  truth  as  history  can  ever  attain.  The 
Confederate  story  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  has  never  been 
accurately  given  to  tJie  world  until  it  was  done  by  the  various 
contributions  to  THE  PHILADELPHIA  WEEKLY  TIMES,  and 
now  herein  reproduced,  commencing  with  the  exhaustive  nar 
rative  of  General  Longstrcet.  That  publication  has  led  to 
a  multitude  of  explanatory  articles  from  the  highest  South- 
crn  military  authorities,  until  tJie  whole  truth  is  now,  for  the 
first  time,  presented  for  the  future  historian  of  tJie  war. 

Nor  do  THE  AXXALS  OF  THE  WAR  limit  their  interest 
to  the  details  of  military  history,  the  mancruvrcs  of  armies,  or 
the  mere  achievements  of  the  sword.  77iey  present  tJie  most 
entertaining  and  instructive  chapters  of  many  of  the  countless 
incidents  of  a  great  war,  which  will  be  gratefully  preserved  by 
a  people  justly  proud  of  tJieir  heroism  in  tJtcir  homes,  at  their 
altars,  and  in  their  multitude  of  trials  outside  of  I  he  flame  of 
battle.  Of  the  many  narratives  gathered  in  this  volume,  none 
will  be  of  more  enduring  interest  and  profit  to  the  general 
reader,  North  and  SoutJi,  than  the  records  of  social  life,  the 
individual  and  untitled  heroism  displayed  by  men,  women  and 
children  in  the  sad  drama  that  yet  lingers  in  every  memory. 
Not  only  in  the  great  conflicts  of  armies,  but  in  all  the  efforts 
summoned  by  the  necessities  of  desolating  strife,  there  arc  chap 
ters  of  history  herein  given  which  tell  of  the  grandeur  oj  the 
whole  American  people ;  of  their  c 021  rage  in  war ;  of  their 
beneficence  in  peace ;  of  -their  devotion  to  home  and  country  ;  oj 


iv  PREFACE. 

t 

their  completed  circle  of  attributes,  which  ^mited  again  under 
one  constitution,  one  supreme  national  authority,  and  looking 
to  one  destiny,  make  them  the  noblest  people  of  the  earth. 

The  sword  has  been  sheathed  between  the  North  and  the 
South ;  the  banners  of  the  Blue  and  of  the  Gray  have  been 
furled;  the  dead  of  the  conflict  have  sacred  sepulchre ;  flowers 
bloom  for  the  now  peaceful  warriors  as  they  sleep  side  by  side 
in  their  mingled  dust ;  monuments  dot  the  hillsides  and 
plains  where  the  battle  once  raged,  telling  of  the  matchless 
heroism  of  American  soldiers.  Federal  and  Confederate 
chieftains  sit  in  the  same  Senate  and  House  as  national  law 
makers ;  in  the  same  cabinet  of  Presidential  advisers,  and 
heroes  of  both  armies  represent  the  reunited  Republic  in 
foreign  lands.  Peace  has  spread  her  silver  wings  over  the 
desolation  and  bereavements  of  the  terrible  conflict,  and  Liberty 
and  Law  are  the  declared  attributes  of  free  government  for  all 
classes,  conditions  and  races  amongst  us.  Of  such  a  country 
and  such  a  people  the  truth  of  history  must  be  the  grandest 
eulogy,  and  THE  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR  will  be  the  most  wel 
come  of  eulogiums,  because  the  most  faithful  record  of  their 

achievements. 

A.  KM. 

PHILADELPHIA,  January,  1879, 


CONTENTS. 


W  TTII    ILL  US  Tli  AT  10  XS . 


PAGE. 

A  CAMPAIGN  WITH  SHARPSHOOTERS— BY  OAPTAIX  JOHN  D.  YOUNG,  267 

A  RUSE  OF  WAR— BY  CAPTAIN  JOHN  SCOTT 380 

CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  ARMIES— BY  H.  V.  REDFIELD 357 

CONFEDERATE  NEGRO  ENLISTMENTS— BY  EDWAKD  SPENCER  ....  536 
DEATH  OF  GENERAL  JOHN  H.  MORGAN— BY  II.  V.  REDFIELD  ...  614 
FIRE,  SWORD,  AND  THE  HALTER— BY  GENERAL  Jl  D.  IMBODEN  ....  169 
FLIGHT  AND  CAPTURE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS— BY  J.  H.  EEAGAN  .  147 
P^GENERAL  MEADE  AT  GETTYSBURG— BY  COLONEL  JAMES  C.  P.IDDLE  .  205 
GENERAL  REYNOLDS'  LAST  BATTLE— BY  MAJOnMos.  G.  ROSENGAETEN,  60 
GENERAL  STUART  IN  CAMP  AND  FIELD— BY  COLONEL  J.  E.  COOKE  .  665 
GREGG'S  CAVALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG— BY  MAJOR  J.  E.  CARPEXTER  .  527 
HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN— BY  MAJ.  GEN.  WILSOX  .  554 
LEE  AND  GRANT  IN  THE  WILDERNESS— BY  GENERAL  C.  M.  WILCOX,  485 

LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA— BY  GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET 414 

LEE'S  WEST  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN— BY  GENERAL  A.  L.  LOXG  ....  82 
MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  RAID— BY  GENERAL  BASIL  W.  DUKE  .  241 
MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  RAID— BY  COLONEL  J.  E.  M'GowAX  .  750 

MR.  LINCOLN  AND  THE  FORCE  BILL— BY  Hox.  A.  R.  BOTELER  ....  220 

/ 
t-     ON  THE  FIELD  OF  FREDERICKSBURG— BY  Hox.  D.  WATSON  ROWE  .  257 

RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  REYNOLDS— BY  GENERAL  T.  F.  M'CoY,  384 

SOME  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GRANT— BY  S.  H.  M.  BYERS 342 

STONEWALL  JACKSON  AND  HIS  MEN— BY  MAJOR  H.  KYD  DOUGLAS  .  642 
STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN— BY  COL.  WM.  ALLAN  -  724 

THE  BALTIMORE  RIOTS— BY  FREDERIC  EMORY 775 

THE  BATTLE  OF  BEVERLY  FORD— BY  COLONEL  F.  C.  NEWHALL  .        .  134 


ii  CONTENTS. 

PACK. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  FLEETWOOD— BY  MAJOR  A.  B.  M'CLELLAN 392 

THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH— BY  COLONEL  WILLS  DE  HASS 677 

THE  BLACK  HORSE  CAVALRY— BY  COLONEL  JOHN  SCOTT 590 

THE  BURNING  OF  CHAMBERSBURG— BY  GENERAL  JOHN  M'CAUSLAND,  770 
THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PENNSYLVANIA— BY  COLONEL  W.  II.  TAYLOR  .  .  305 
THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG— BY  MAJ.  GEN.  ALFRED  PLEASONTON,  447 
THE  CAPTURE  OF  MASON  AND  SLIDELL— BY  R.  M.  HUNTER,  ....  794 
THE  CAREER  OF  GENERAL  A.  P.  HILL— BY  HON.  WM.  E.  CAMERON  .  693 
THE  DALTON— ATLANTA  OPERATIONS— BY  GEN.  Jos.  E.  JOHNSTON  .  330 
THE  DRAFT  RIOTS  IN  NEW  YORK— BY  MAJOR  T.  P.  M'ELRATH  ...  286 

THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS— BY  JUDGE  ROBERT  OULD 32 

THE  FAMOUS  FIGHT  AT  CEDAR  CREEK— BY  GEN.  A.  B.  NETTLETON  .  654 
THE  FIRST  ATTACK  ON  FORT  FISHER— BY  BENSON  J.  LOSSING,  LL.D  .  228 

THE  FIRST  CAVALRY— BY  CAPTAIN  JAMES  H.  STEVENSON 634 

THE  FIRST  GREAT  CRIME  OF  THE  WAR— BY  MAJ.  GEN.  W.  B.  FRANKLIN,  72 
THE  FIRST  IRON-CLAD  MONITOR.— BY  HON.  GIDEON  WELLES  ....  17 
THE  FIRST  SHOT  AGAINST  THE  FLAG— BY  MAJ.  GEN.  S.  W.  CRAWFORD,  319 
THE  LAST  CONFEDERATE  SURRENDER— BY  LIEUT.  GEN.  R.  TAYLOR,  67 
THE  MISTAKES  OF  GETTYSBURG— BY  GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET  .  610 
THE  MORALE  OF  GENERAL  LEE'S  ARMY— BY  REV.  J.  W.  JONES,  D.D  .  191 

THE  "  OLD  CAPITOL  "  PRISON— BY  COLONEL  N.  T.  COLBY 502 

THE  RIGHT  FLANK  AT  GETTYSBURG— BY  COL.  WM.  BROOKE-RAWLE,  467 
THE  SIEGE  OF  MORRIS  ISLAND— BY  GENERAL  W.  W.  H.  DAVIS  ...  95 
THE  UNION  CAVALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG— BY  MAJ.  GEN.  D.  M'M.  GREGG,  372 
THE  UNION  MEN  OF  MARYLAND— BY  HON.  W.  H.  PURNELL,  LL.  D  .  .404 
THE  WAR'S  CARNIVAL  OF  FRAUD— BY  COLONEL  HENRY  S.  OLCOTT  .  705 
TORPEDO  SERVICE  IN  CHARLESTON  HARBOR— BY  GEN.  BEAUREGARD,  513 
UNION  VIEW  OF  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS— BY  GEN.  R.  S.  NORTHCOTT,  184 
VAN  DORN,  THE  HERO  OF  MISSISSIPPI— BY  MAJ.  GEN.  D.  H.  MAURY,  460 

VICKSBURG  DURING  THE  SIEGE— BY  EDWARD  S.  GREGORY Ill 

WAR  AS  A  POPULAR  EDUCATOR— BY  JOHN  A.  WRIGHT 160 


THE  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 


THE  FIRST  IRON-CLAD  MONITOR. 


BY  TION.  GIDEOX  WELLES. 


THE  Navy  of  the  United 
States,  at  tlie  commencement 
of  Mr.  Lincoln's  administra 
tion,  was  feeble,  and  in  no  con 
dition  for  belligerent  opera 
tions.  Most  of  the  vessels  in 
commission  were  on  foreign 
service  ;  only  three  or  four,  and 
they  of  an  inferior  class,  were 
available  for  active  duty. 
Neither  the  retiring  adminis 
tration  nor  Congress  seemed  to 
have  been  aware  of  the  actual 
condition  of  public  affairs,  or 
to  have  apprehended  serious 
difficulty.  7s  o  preparations 

had  been  made  for  portentous  coming  events.  The  assault  upon  Sum- 
ter,  followed  by  proclamations  to  blockade  the  whole  coast,  from  the 
Chesapeake  to  the  Ilio  Grande,  a  distance  of  more  than  three  thou 
sand  miles,  necessitated  prompt  and  energetic  action  by  the  Navy 
Department,  to  make  the  blockade  effectual.  Steps  were  immedi 
ately  taken  to  tit  out  and  put  in  commission  every  naval  vessel,  and 
to  secure  and  arm  every  suitable  vessel  that  could  be  procured  from 
the  merchant  service.  Commerce  and  the  shipping  interest  were, 
for  a  time,  so  paralyzed  by  the  war  that  a  large  number  of  excellent 
vessels  were  purchased  on  terms  highly  advantageous  to  the  govern 
ment.  There  was,  in  fact,  an  extraordinary  pressure,  by  owners, 
to  induce  the  Navy  Department  to  take  not  only  good,  but  old 
vessels,  such  as  were  not,  from  their  size  or  defects,  adapted  to 
the  service  required.  Large  and  expensive  steamers,  thrown  out  of 
employment,  were  tendered,  at  almost  any  price,  by  parties  in  interest, 
who,  desirous  to  assist  the  government  in  that  emergency,  as  well  as 
to  get  rid  of  their  steamers,  were  actuated  by  patriotic  as  well  as 
interested  motives.  The  Vanderbilt,  the  Baltic,  the  Illinois,  and 
2  (17) 


18  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAE. 

other  steamers  of  immense  tonnage,  costing  a  large  amount  to 
purchase,  in  the  first  instance,  and  which  would  have  been  a  great 
expense  to  move  and  keep  afloat.  Vessels  wholly  unfit,  from  their 
great  draught,  to  perform  blockade  duty  on  our  shallow  coast,  were 
urged  upon  the  Department,  which  declined  to  purchase  them,  and 
was  soundly  berated  for  declining.  Economy  and  efficiency  required 
a  smaller  and  different  class  of  vessels.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
wu*  compelled  to  act  without  legislative  authority  or  appropriation, 
and  without  funds,  he,  on  his  own  responsibility,  entered  into  contract 
for  thirty  gunboats,  each  of  about  five  hundred  tons. 

The  Government  was  wholly  destitute  of  iron-clad  steamers  or 
floating  batteries ;  little  interest  had  been  given  the  subject,  but  the 
attention  of  Congress  was  invited  thereto,  at  the  extra  session  in  July. 
The  suggestions  of  the  Secretary  wTere  approved,  and  an  act  was 
passed  on  the  third  of  August,  placing  at  the  disposal  of  the  Navy 
Department  one  and  a-half  millions  of  dollars,  to  carry  his  recom 
mendation  into  effect.  On  the  seventh  of  August  an  advertisement 
was  issued,  inviting  plans  and  proposals  for  armed  vessels.  On  the 
next  day,  the  eighth  of  August,  a  board  of  naval  officers  was  appointed 
to  receive  and  report  upon  the  plans  which  might  be  submitted 
within  twenty-five  days. 

Commodore  Joseph  Smith,  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Yards  and 
Docks,  was  the  senior  officer  and  chairman  of  this  Board,  and  with 
him  were  associated  Commodore  Hiram  Paulding  and  Captain  Charles 
II.  Davis.  All  were  officers  of  merit,  but  Commodore  Smith,  in 
addition  to  great  nautical  and  civil  experience,  possessed  a  singularly 
mechanical  and  practical  mind.  On  him  devolved,  ultimately,  the 
chief  responsibility  and  supervision  of  the  execution  of  the  plans 
adopted.  My  personal  relations  and  acquaintance  with  him  were  not 
only  friendly,  but  I  may  say  intimate.  We  were  each  made  Chief  of 
a  Naval  Bureau,  in  the  spring  of  1846,  and  from  the  acquaintance 
then  first  commenced,  I  had  confidence  in  his  ability  and  intelligence, 
which  was  increased  when,  fifteen  years  later,  I  was  called  to  preside 
over  the  Navy  Department,  where  he  had  remained  on  continuous 
duty.  I  had,  therefore,  whenever  required,  the  benefit  of  his  counsel 
and  judgment 

Before  the  limit  of  twenty-five  days  for  receiving  proposals  for 
iron-clads  expired,  I  went  to  Hartford,  which  place  I  had  not  revisited 
after  leaving,  in  February,  on  Mr.  Lincoln's  invitation  to  become  a 
member  of  his  Cabinet.  While  at  Hartford,  Mr.  Cornelius  S. 
Bushnell  laid  before  me  a  model,  invented  by  John  Ericsson,  for  a 
turreted  vessel,  or  floating  battery,  which  impressed  me  favorably,  as 


THE  FIRST  IRON-CLAD  MONITOR.  10 

possessing  some  extraordinary  and  valuable  features,  tending  to  the 
development  of  certain  principles,  then  being  studied,  -for  our  coast 
and  river  blockade,  involving:  a  revolution  in  naval  warfare.  The 

O 

twenty-live  days  for  receiving  proposals  had,  I  think,  expired  ;  but  I 
was  so  interested  in  this  novel  proposition  that  I  directed  Mr. 
Bushnell  to  proceed  immediately  to  Washington,  and  submit  the 
model  to  the  Board  for  examination  and  report.  But,  deeming  the 
subject  of  great  importance,  and  fearing  the  Board  would  be  restrained 
by  the  limit  of  twenty-five  days,  I  immediately  followed,  and  arrived 
in  Washington  almost  as  soon  as  Mr.  Bushnell  with  the  model. 

Seventeen  plans  for  armored  vessels  were  submitted,  and  propo 
sitions  made,  by  different  parties,  for  their  construction.  Three  of 
them  received  a  favorable  report,  among  them  Ericsson's  turret  vessel, 
with  guns  of  immense  calibre,  which,  when  built,  was  called,  by 
his  request,  the  "Monitor." 

A  contract  for  this  vessel  was  made  and  signed  on  the  fourth  of 
October,  ISdl.  It  was  stipulated  that  she  should  be  complete  in  all 
her  parts  and  appurtenances  ;  should  have  a  speed  of  eight  knots  per 
hour,  with  security  or  successful  working  of  the  turret  and  guns,  with 
safety  to  the  A'cssel  and  the  men  in  the  turrets,  and  "that  said  vessel 
and  equipments,  in  all  respects,  shall  be  completed  and  ready  for  sea 
in  one  hundred  days  from  the  date  of  this  indenture.*'  It  was  agreed 
by  the  Xavy  Department,  that  the  Government  should  pay  therefor 
$275,000,  in  payments  of  $50,OoO,  with  the  usual  reservation  of  25 
per  cent,  as  the  work  progressed,  and  that  the  final  payment  should 
be  made  after  tests,  satisfactory  to  the  Xavy  Department,  but  which 
tests  should  be  within  ninety  days  after  she  was  turned  over  to  the 
Government. 

Unfortunately  for  the  design  of  the  Xavy  Department,  and, 
perhaps,  for  the  country,  there  was  delay  on  the  part  of  the  con 
tractors.  Instead  of  completing  and  delivering  the  vessel  as  stipulated, 
in  one  hundred  days,  which  would  have  been  in  January,  she  was  not 
turned  over  to  the  Government  until  the  third  of  March — forty  days 
later  than  was  agreed  upon  and  expected.  This  delay  of  forty  days 
defeated  an  arrangement  which  the  Xavy  Department  originally 
designed,  if  successful,  should  be  a  satisfactory  test  of  the  capabilities 
of  this  extraordinary  vessel.  That  test  may  now  be  stated. 

The  steamship  "Merrimac,"  a  naval  vessel,  which  the  rebels 
scuttled  and  sunk  the  day  previous  to  the  abandonment  of  the  Xavy 
Yard  at  Norfolk,  they  subsequently  raised  and  took  into  the  dry-dock, 
where  she  was  being  repaired  and  clothed  with  iron  armor,  when  the 
contract  for  the  "  Monitor  "  was  made.  We,  of  course,  felt  great  solici- 


20  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

tude  in  regard  to  this  proceeding  of  the  rebels,  not  lessened  by  the  fact 
that  extraordinary  pains  were  taken  by  them  to  keep  secret  from  us 
their  labors  and  purposes.  Their  efforts  to  withhold  information, 
though  rigid,  were  not  wholly  successful,  for  we  contrived  to  get 
occasional  vague  intelligence  of  the  work  as  it  progressed.  When 
the  contract  for  the  "Monitor"  was  made,  in  October,  with  a  primary 
condition  that  she  should  be  ready  for  sea  in  one  hundred  days,  the 
Navy  Department  intended  that  the  battery  should,  immediately  after 
reaching  Hampton  Roads,  proceed  up  Elizabeth  river  to  the  Navy 
Yard  at  Norfolk,  place  herself  opposite  the  dry-dock,  and  with  her 
heavy  guns  destroy  both  the  dock  and  the  "  Merrimac."  This  was  our 
secret.  The  "  Monitor  "  could  easily  have  done  what  was  required,  for 
her  appearance  at  Norfolk  would  have  been  a  surprise.  But  the 
hundred  days  expired,  weeks  passed  on,  and  the  "Monitor"  was  not 
ready. 

Late  in  February,  a  negro  woman,  who  resided  in  Norfolk,  came 
to  the  Navy  Department  and  desired  a  private  interview  with  me. 
She  and  others  had  closely  watched  the  work  upon  the  "  Merrimac," 
and  she,  by  their  request,  had  come  to  report  that  the  ship  was  nearly 
finished,  had  come  out  of  the  dock,  and  was  about  receiving  her 
armament.  The  woman  had  passed  through  the  lines,  at  great  risk 
to  herself,  to  bring  me  the  information,  and,  in  confirmation  of  her 
statement,  she  took  from  the  bosom  of  her  dress  a  letter  from  a  Union 
man,  a  mechanic  in  the  Navy  Yard,  giving  briefly  the  facts  as  stated 
by  her.  This  news,  of  course,  put  an  end  to  the  test,  which  had  been 
originally  designed,  of  destroying  the  "  Merrimac "  in  the  dry-dock ; 
but  made  us  not  less  anxious  for  the  speedy  completion  of  the  battery. 

The  capitalists  who  were  associated  with  Mr.  Ericsson  in  the 
contract  for  the  "  Monitor,"  even  though  delinquent  as  to  time,  are 
entitled  to  great  credit  for  what  they  did,  although,  in  addition  to 
patriotic  impulses,  it  was  with  them  a  business  transaction,  for  which 
they  claimed  and  received  consideration  in  subsequent  contracts.  But, 
while  acknowledging  their  merits,  injustice  should  not  be  done  to 
others. 

The  "  Monitor  "  was  one  of  the  early,  and,  it  may  be  said,  one  of 
the  most  prominent  practical  developments  of  what  may  be  called  the 
American  idea  evolved  by  our  civil  war,  which  has  wrought  a  change 
in  naval  warfare — that  of  concentrating  the  weight  of  metal  in  the 
smallest  possible  compass,  and  presenting  the  slightest  possible  target 
to  an  enemy.  In  the  single  shot  of  a  fifteen-inch  gun  is  compressed 
a  weight  of  metal  equal  to  a  whole  broadside  of  our  old  wooden  ships, 
which,  with  their  lofty  bulwarks  standing  many  feet  out  of  water, 


THE  FIEST  IF,  ON-CLAD  MONITOR.  21 

presented  a  magnificent  mark  for  the  heavy  ordnance  of  a  floating  and 
almost  submerged  "Monitor"  batter y  to  perforate.  Whatever  pa 
triotic  or  money-making  motives  may  have  actuated  or  influenced  the 
contractors,  they  were  but  the  agents  or  instruments  of  the  Xavy 
Department  in  developing  certain  principles  relative  to  ordnance 
and  armament — assault  and  resistance— which  it  had  a  purpose  to 
accomplish. 

In  Ericsson's  invention  there  was  an  advance  made,  an  incipient 
step  taken  toward  the  great  object  which  naval  intelligence  and  naval 
experts  were  studying  in  the  early  days  of  our  civil  Avar.  The  in 
ventive  genius  and  skill  of  our  countrymen  made  rapid  and  great 
proficiency  in  the  work  before  them.  Their  improved  ordnance  and 
their  turret  vessels  compelled  a  change  in  naval  tactics,  and  wrought 
such  a  revolution  in  naval  operations  as  has  added  greatly  to  the; 
security  of  our  coast  defences,  and  probably  put  an  end  to  ocean  con 
flicts  between  immense  squadrons  like  those  of  Trafalgar  and  the 
Xile.  Xo  large  fleet  of  armored  steamers  will  cross  the  sea  to  attack 
us,  and  a  single  "Monitor,"  with  its  fifteen-inch  guns,  would  make 
havoc  with  a  squadron  of  wooden  ships  under  canvas.  I>ut  the  Xavy 
Department  and  its  experts,  who  took  the  responsibility  of  these 
innovations,  encountered  opposition  until  their  innovations  proved 
successful ;  when  contractors  who  had  been  employed,  and  party  poli 
ticians  who  had  ends  to  subserve,  sought  to  appropriate  to  themselves 
the  credit,  denied  the  Department  any  merit,  and  utterly  ignored  its 
ingenious  and  scientific  assistants. 

It  was  asserted  <>n  the  floor  of  Congress,  as  late  as  1  SOS,  by 
General  Benjamin  F.  lUitler,  one  of  the  leading  and  most  influential 
politicians  of  that  day  :  u  I  desire  to  say  here,  that  the  country  is  under 
the  greatest  obligations  to  a  member  of  this  House,  a  member  from 
Xew  York,  who  advanced  the  money  and  paid  the  entire  expenses  out 
of  his  own  funds  in  order  to  get  the  "Monitor'1  built,  which  met  the 
"Merrimac"  in  Hampton  Koads." 

Mr.  John  .V.  Oriswold,  the  gentleman  alluded  to,  a  wealthy  iron 
master,  and  one  of  the  contractors  for  the  "  Monitor,"  was  then  a 
member,  and  at  the  time  this  declaration  was  made  was  a  candidate  for 
the  oflice  of  Governor  of  Xew  York.  lie  not  only  quietly  listened, 
without  any  attempt  to  correct  what  he  knew  to  be  the  mis-statement 
of  General  Butler,  but  a  paper  published  at  his  place  of  residence, 
and  of  which  I  was  informed  he  was  a  part  owner,  repeated  many 
times  the  averment,  and  asserted  that  Mr.  Griswold  and  his  associates 
"  built  the  original  "  Monitor  "  at  their  own  risk,  having  agreed  not  to 
call  upon  the  Government  for  remuneration  until  the  vessel  had  been 


22  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

tested  in  action.  Strong  in  faith,  receiving  but  a  negative  support 
from  the  Navy  Department,  they  completed  the  "  Monitor  "  at  their 
own  cost." 

These  misstatements,  repeated  and  exaggerated  by  others,  in 
newspaper  paragraphs  and  sensational  lectures,  to  miscellaneous 
crowds,  as  well  by  extreme  partisans  in  Congress  and  out,  found 
listeners  and  readers.  They  served  to  create  false  impressions  and 
to  make  false  history.  Truth  and  justice  to  others  demand  correction. 

The  project  of  attempting  in  this  country  the  construction  of 
iron-clad  vessels  and  heavy  ordnance  originated  in  the  Navy  Depart 
ment  in  1861,  and  the  "Monitor"  plan,  invented  by  Ericsson,  was 
adopted  by  naval  officers,  with  the  approval  of  the  Navy  Depart 
ment,  within  three  months  after  the  lirst  recommendation  of  the 
Department  was  made.  This  was  before  the  ironmaster  and  capi 
talists  who  contracted  for  the  battery  were  known  to  the  Department 
that  awarded  the  contract. 

Instead  of  advancing  the  money  and  paying  the  entire  expense 
out  of  his  own  funds,  as  stated  by  General  Butler,  payments  were 
promptly  made  by  the  Navy  Department  to  Mr.  Griswold  and  his 
associates,  as  rapidly,  at  least,  as  the  work  progressed,  and  was  certi 
fied  to  by  the  supervising  agent  of  the  Department ;  there  being  an 
interval  of  only  fifteen  or  twenty  days  between  each  payment,  as  will 
be  seen  by  the  following  from  the  official  record : 

1861.— November  15,  first  payment,  $50,000,  less  25  per  cent.    ......  $37,500 

December  3,  second  payment,  $50,000,  less  25  per  cent.    ....  37,500 

December  17,  third  payment,  $50,000,  less  25  per  cent 37,500 

1862.— January  3,  fourth  payment,  $50,000,  less  25  per  cent 37,500 

February  6,  fifth  payment,  $50,000,  less  25  cent 37,500 

March  3,  sixth  payment,  $25,000,  less  25  per  cent 18,750 

March  14,  last  payment,  reservations .  68,750 

Total $275,000 

Save  reservations,  which  were  made  in  all  cases  of  vessels  built 
by  contract,  the  last  payment,  on  the  completion  of  the  battery,  was 
on  the  3d  of  March,  and,  as  time  was  precious  and  pressing,  she  was 
hastily  commissioned,  officered,  manned,  supplied,  and  left  New  York 
for  Hampton  Roads  three  days  after,  on  the  6th  of  March. 

Intense  anxiety  was  naturally  felt  by  the  officials  in  the  Navy 
Department,  who  knew  and  appreciated  the  importance  of  the  occa 
sion,  and  the  responsibility  depending  on  them  for  the  success  of  this 
vessel  in  her  voyage,  and  in  her  power  and  fighting  qualities  after  she 
should  reach  her  destination.  Many  naval  officers  hesitated  to  give 
the  experiment  their  indorsement.  Some  of  the  best  engineers  and 


THE  FIRST  IRON-CLAD  NOXITOR.  23 

naval  constructors  in  the  service  expressed  tlieir  want  of  confidence 
in  the  craft,  and  declared  it  would  prove  a  failure.  It  was  predicted 
that  she  could  not  float,  that  she  would  plunge  to  the  bottom  when 
launched,  and  that  to  send  her  to  Hampton  Roads  would  be  reckless 
ness  amounting  to  crime.  As  mentioned  by  me  on  another  occasion, 
it  was  the  misfortune  of  the  Navy  Department  to  encounter  hostility 
and  forebodings  of  failure  with  every  improvement  made  during  the 
war,  and  often  from  those  of  whom  encouragement  and  support  might 
have  reasonably  been  expected.  A  constant  succession  of  struggles 
against  prejudices,  ignorance  and  fixed  habits  and  opinions  was  the 
fate  of  the  Department  at  every  step  which  was  taken  in  the  extraor 
dinary  exigencies  of  the  war,  and  the  voyage  and  fighting  qualities  of 
the  "Monitor"  Aye  re  now  to  be  proved. 

Full  confidence  Avas  felt  in  her  commander,  Worden — Avho  had 
just  returned  from  a  captivity  of  several  months  at  Montgomery — his 
subordinates,  and  the  small  but  selected  and  gallant  crew  Avho  were 
embarked  in  this  experiment.  So  great  Avas  the  interest  that  the 
Assistant  Secretary,  Mr.  Fox,  Lieutenant  Wise,  of  the  Ordnance 
Bureau,  and  some  members  of  my  family,  left  Washington  on  Satur 
day,  the  8th  of  March,  for  Fortress  Monroe,  to  meet  and  greet  the 
"Monitor"  on  her  arrival.  Doubts  Avere  entertained  and  freely  ex 
pressed  whether  the  battery  could  perform  the  voyage. 

On  Sunday  morning,  the  IKh  of  March,  while  at  the  Xavy 
Department,  examining  the  dispatches  received,  Mr.  Watson,  Assist 
ant  Secretary  of  War,  hastily  entered  Avith  a  telegram  from  General 
Wool,  at  Fortress  Monroe,  stating  that  the  "Merrimae''  had  come 
down  from  Norfolk  the  preceding  day,  attacked  the  fleet  in  Hampton 
Roads,  and  destroyed  the  "Cumberland"  and  "Congress.1'  Appre 
hensions  Avere  expressed  by  General  Wool  that  the  remaining  vessels 
would  be  made  victims  the  folloAving  day,  and  that  the  Fortress  itself 
Avas  in  danger,  for  the  "Merrimac"  Avas  impenetrable,  and  could  take 
Avhat  position  she  pleased  for  assault.  I  had  scarcely  read  the  telegram 
when  a  message  from  the  President  requested  my  immediate  attend 
ance  at  the  Executive  Mansion.  The  Secretary  of  War,  on  receiving 
General  Wool's  telegram,  had  gone  instantly  to  the  President,  and  at 
the  same  time  sent  messages  to  the  other  Cabinet  officers,  while  the 
Assistant  Secretary  came  to  me.  I  went  at  once  to  the  White  House. 
Mr.  Seward  and  Mr.  Chase,  with  Mr.  Stanton,  Avere  already  there, 
had  read  the  telegram,  and  were  discussing  the  intelligence  in  much 
alarm.  Each  inquired  what  had  been,  and  what  could  be  done,  to 
meet  and  check  this  formidable  monster,  which  in  a  single  brief 
visit  had  made  such  devastation,  and  would,  herself  uninjured, 


24  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

repeat  her  destructive  visit  with  still  greater  havoc,  probably,  while 
we  were  in  council. 

I  stated  that  I  knew  of  no  immediate  steps  that  could  be  taken ; 
that  Commodore  Goldsborough,  who  was  in  command  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Squadron,  had  reputation  for  ability  and  skill ;  but  that  he, 
on  whom  we  relied,  was  not  at  Hampton  Roads  at  this  critical  junc 
ture,  but  in  the  sounds  of  North  Carolina.  There  were,  however, 
other  and  perhaps  as  capable  officers  as  Goldsborough  on  the  station, 
with  some  of  the  best  and  most  powerful  vessels  in  the  navy,  but 
judging  from  the  dispatch  of  General  Wool,  they  could  be  of  little 
avail  against  this  impregnable  antagonist.  I  had  expected  that  our 
new  iron-clad  battery,  which  left  New  York  on  Thursday,  would 
have  reached  the  Roads  on  Saturday,  and  my  main  reliance  was 
upon  her.  We  had,  however,  no  information,  as  yet,  of  her  arrival. 
General  Wool  made  no  allusion  to  her  in  his  telegram,  which,  it 
happened,  was  the  first  received  over  the  line  that  had  been  com 
pleted  from  Fortress  Monroe  only  the  preceding  evening,  but  as  we 
now  had  telegraphic  communication,  I  momentarily  expected  a 
dispatch  from  Mr.  Fox,  or  the  senior  naval  officer  on  the  station. 

Mr.  Stanton,  impulsive,  and  always  a  sensationalist,  wTas  terribly 
excited,  walked  the  room  in  great  agitation,  and  gave  brusque  utter 
ances,  and  deprecatory  answers  to  all  that  was  said,  and  censured 
everything  that  had  been  done  or  was  omitted  to  be  done.  Mr. 
Seward,  usually  buoyant  and  self-reliant,  overwhelmed  with  the  in 
telligence,  listened  in  responsive  sympathy  to  Stanton,  and  was  greatly 
depressed,  as,  indeed,  were  all  the  members,  who,  in  the  meantime, 
had  arrived,  with  the  exception  of  Mr.  Blair,  as  well  as  one  or  two 
others — naval  and  military  officers — among  them,  Commander  Dahl- 
gren  and  Colonel  Meigs. 

"The  'Merrimac,'"  said  Stanton,  who  was  vehement,  and  did 
most  of  the  talking,  "  will  change  the  whole  character  of  the  war ;  she 
will  destroy,  seriatim,  every  naval  vessel ;  she  will  lay  all  the  cities  on 
the  seaboard  under  contribution.  I  shall  immediately  recall  Burn- 
side  ;  Port  Royal  must  be  abandoned.  I  will  notify  the  Governors  and 
municipal  authorities  in  the  North  to  take  instant  measures  to  protect 
their  harbors."  It  is  difficult  to  repeat  his  language,  which  was 
broken  and  denunciatory,  or  to  characterize  his  manner,  or  the  panic 
under  which  he  labored,  and  which  added  to  the  apprehension  of 
others.  He  had  no  doubt,  he  said,  that  the  monster  was  at  this  mo 
ment  on  her  way  to  Washington,  and,  looking  out  of  the  window, 
which  commanded  a  view  of  the  Potomac  for  many  miles,  "not 
unlikely  we  shall  have  a  shell  or  cannon-ball  from  one  of  her  guns 


THE  FIRST  IRON-CLAD  MONITOR.  25 

in  the  "\Vhite  House  before  we  leave  this  room."  Most  of  Stanton's 
complaints  were  directed  to  me,  and  to  me  the  others  turned — not 
complainingly,  but  naturally  for  information  or  suggestion  that  might 
give  relief.  I  had  little  to  impart,  except  my  faith  in  the  untried 
"Monitor"  experiment,  which  we  had  prepared  for  the  emergency ;  an 
assurance  that  the  "  Merrimac,"  with  her  draught,  and  loaded  with  iron, 
could  not  pass  Kettle  Bottom  Shoals,  in  the  Potomac,  and  ascend  the 
river  and  surprise  us  with  a  cannon-ball;  and  advised  that,  instead  of 
adding  to  the  general  panic,  it  would  better  become  us  to  calmly  con 
sider  the  situation,  and  inspire  confidence  by  acting,  so  far  as  we  could, 
intelligently,  and  with  discretion  and  judgment.  Mr.  Chase  approved 
the  suggestion,  but  thought  it  might  be  well  to  telegraph  (iovernor 
Morgan  and  Mayor  Opdvke,  at  Xew  York,  that  they  might  be  on 
their  guard.  Stanton  said  he  should  warn  the  authorities  in  all  the 
chief  cities.  I  questioned  the  propriety  of  sending  abroad  panic 
missives,  or  adding  to  the  alarm  that  would  naturally  be  felt,  and  said 
it  was  doubtful  whether  the  vessel,  so  cut  down  and  loaded  with 
armor,  would  venture  outside  of  the  Capes;  certainly,  she  could  not, 
with  her  draught  of  water,  get  into  the  sounds  of  North  Carolina  to 
disturb  Burnside  and  our  forces  there;  nor  was  she  omnipresent,  to 
make  general  destruction  at  Xew  York,  Boston,  Port  Royal,  etc.,  at 
the  same  time;  that  there  would  be  general  alarm  created  ;  and  re 
peated  that  my  dependence  was  on  the  "Monitor,"  and  my  confidence 
in  her  great.  "AVhat,"  asked  Stanton,  "is  the  size  and  strength  of 
this  '•  Monitor  ?"'  1  low  many  guns  does  she  carry  '"  AVhen  I.  replied 
two,  hut  of  large  calibre,  he  turned  away  with  a  look  of  mingled 
amazement,  contempt,  and  distress,  that  was  painfully  ludicrous.  Mr. 
Seward  said  that  my  remark  concerning  the  draught  of  water  which 
the  "Merrimac"  drew,  and  the  assurance  that  it  was  impossible  for  her 
to  get  at  our  forces  under  Burnside,  afforded  him  the  first  moment  of 
relief  and  real  comfort  he  had  received.  It  was  his  sensitive  nature 
to  be  easily  depressed,  but  yet  to  promptly  rally  and  catch  at  hope. 
Turning  to  Stanton,  he  said  we  had,  perhaps,  given  away  too  much 
to  our  apprehensions,  lie  saw  no  alternative  but  to  wait  and  hear 
what  our  new  battery  might  accomplish. 

Stanton  left  abruptly  after  Seward's  remark.  The  President 
ordered  his  carriage,  and  went  to  the  Xavy  Yard  to  see  what  might 
be  the  views  of  the  naval  officers. 

Returning  to  my  house  a  little  before  twelve  o'clock,  I  stopped 
at  St.  John's  Church,  and  called  out  Commodore  Smith,  to  whom  I 
communicated  the  tidings  we  had  received,  and  that  the  "Congress," 
commanded  by  his  son,  Commander  Joseph  Smith,  had  been  sunk. 


26  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

"  The  '  Congress '  sunk  !"  he  exclaimed,  at  the  same  time  buttoning  up 
his  coat,  and  looking  me  calmly  and  steadily  in  the  face ;  "  then  Joe 
is  dead."  I  told  him  this  did  not  follow ;  the  officers  and  crew  doubt 
less  escaped,  for  the  shore  was  not  distant.  "  You  don't  know  Joe," 
said  the  veteran  father,  "  as  well  as  I  do ;  he  would  not  survive  his 
ship."  And  he  did  not ;  but,  mortally  wounded,  perished  with  her. 

Most  of  the  Cabinet  met  again  that  sad  Sunday  at  the  White 
House,  but  not  by  appointment.  A  little  time  and  reflection  had 
brought  a  more  calm  and  resolute  feeling.  Stanton,  whose  alarm 
had  not  subsided,  said  he  had  telegraphed  to  the  North  to  take  care 
of  themselves ;  asked  what  I  proposed  to  do  to  check  the  "  Merri- 
mac,"  and  prevent  her  from  reaching  Washington.  I  replied,  nothing 
more  till  I  knew  more.  I  told  him  she  could  not  get  over  Kettle 
Bottom  Shoals  and  come  to  Washington ;  thought  we  ought  not  to 
be  frightened ;  not  to  make  a  general  panic,  but  act  deliberately,  and 
with  a  knowledge  of  what  was  best. 

He  spoke  out  with  some  fierceness,  as  if  he  thought  my  remarks 
were  intended  for  him,  and  said  he  had  no  expectation  of  any  formi 
dable  resistance  from  any  little  vessel  of  two  guns  against  a  frigate 
clothed  with  iron,  nor  much  confidence  in  naval  officers  for  such  a 
crisis.  If  not  old  fogies,  their  training  was  not  for  this  state  of 
things.  He  would  soon  have  good  sailors  from  the  merchant  service, 
and  had  sent  for  Yanderbilt  to  come  to  Washington,  and  intended  to 
consult  him.  Yanderbilt,  he  said,  had  large  steamers,  was  a  man  of 
resources  and  great  energy,  and  his  opinion  would  be  more  valuable 
than  that  of  any  other  person.  He  also  proposed  to  make  preparations 
to  put  a  stop  to  the  "  Merrimac's  "  coming  to  Washington  by  obstruct 
ing  the  channel  of  the  river,  and  wished  that  he  might  have  Dahlgren, 
who  was  in  command  of  the  Navy  Yard,  to  consult  with.  To  this  I 
assented,  but  objected  to  any  obstructions  to  navigation. 

At  a  late  hour,  I  received  a  telegram  from  Mr.  Fox,  stating  that 
the  "Monitor"  had  reached  Hampton  Roads  a  little  before  midnight 
of  the  8th,  and  had  encountered  and  driven  off  the  "  Merrimac."  The 
submerged  telegraph  cable,  which  had  been  completed  from  Fortress 
Monroe  to  Cherrystone  the  preceding  evening,  parted  on  Sunday 
evening,  and  further  communication  ceased  at  this  highly  interesting 
crisis  until  the  arrival  of  the  mail,  via  Baltimore,  on  Monday. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  narrate  the  particulars  of  the  conflict, 
which  has  been  so  well  and  accurately  detailed  in  the  official  reports 
of  the  officers,  and  are  matters  of  record,  and  were  published  in  the 
day  and  time  of  that  remarkable  encounter.  Other  and  generally 
unpublished  facts  and  incidents  are  here  mentioned. 


THE  FIRST  IE  ON-CLAD  MONITOR.  27 

On  the  evening  of  that  memorable  Sunday,  I  received  from 
Dahlgren,  who  was  in  command  of  the  JSTavy  Yard,  a  message,  stating 
that  he,  and  all  the  force  he  could  command,  were  employed  in 
loading  and  preparing  the  boats  which  had  been  sent  to  the  yard, 
lie  supposed  by  my  order  and  with  my  approval,  although  he  had 
received  no  word  from  me.  I  replied  that  I  had  purchased  no  boats, 
given  no  orders,  and  that  if  I  rightly  apprehended  the  object  and 
intention  of  the  work  in  which  he  was  engaged,  I  did  not  approve  it. 
When  I  called  on  the  President  the  next  morning,  Stanton  was 
already  there,  stating  some  grievance,  and,  as  I  entered,  he  turned  to 
me  and  inquired  my  reason  for  countermanding  his  orders,  lie 
proceeded  to  state  that  lie  had  directed  the  purchase  of  all  the  boats 
that  could  be  procured  in  Washington,  Georgetown  and  Alexandria, 
which  were  being  laden  with  stone  and  earth,  under  the  direction  of 
Colonel  Meigs  and  Dahlgren,  with  a  view  of  sinking  them  at  Kettle 
Bottom  Shoals,  some  fifty  miles  or  more  below,  in  order  to  prevent 
the  ascension  of  the  "•  Merrimac."  That  while  the  officers  whom  he  had 
detailed,  he  supposed  with  my  approval,  were  actively  engaged,  they 
had  been  suddenly  stopped  by  an  order  from  me  to  Dahlgren.  He 
was  still  complaining  when  Dahlgren,  and  I  believe  Meigs  also,  came 
in,  and  I  then  learned  that  great  preparations  had  been  made  to 
procure  a  fleet  of  boats,  which  were  to  be  sunk  at  Kettle  Bottom,  to 
protect  Washington.  I  objected,  and  said  I  would  rather  expend 
money  to  remove  obstacles  than  to  impede  navigation;  that  the  navy 
had  labored  through  the  fall  and  winter  to  keep  open  this  avenue  to 
the  ocean  ;  that  the  army  had  not  driven  the  rebels  from  the  Virginia 
shore,  nor  assisted  us  in  this  work,  though  they  had  been  greatly 
benefited  by  our  efforts  in  the  transportation  of  their  supplies,  forage, 
etc. ;  that  to  our  shame  there  was  but  a  single  railroad  track  to  the 
Capital,  though  we  had  here  an  army  of  more  than  one  hundred 
thousand  to  feed,  and  that  I  should  not  consent  to  take  any  of  the 
naval  appropriation  to  cut  off  water  communication,  unless  so  ordered 
by  the  President ;  but  should  protest  against  obstructing  the  channel 
of  the  river.  Our  conversation  was  very  earnest,  and  the  President 
attentively  listened,  but  with  an  evident  inclination  to  guard  in  every 
way  against  the  "Merrimac,"  but  yet  unwilling  to  interrupt  ocean 
communication,  so  essential  to  Washington.  Giving  the  interview  a 
pleasant  turn,  he  said  that  it  was  evident  that  Mars  not  only  wanted 
exclusive  control  of  military  operations,  (Stanton  had  manifested 
much  dissatisfaction  with  McClellan  as  General-in-Chief,)  but  that  he 
wanted  a  navy,  and  had  begun  to  improvise  one.  Having  already 
got  his  fleet,  the  President  thought  he  might  as  well  be  permitted  to 


28  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

finish  his  work,  but  he  must  not  destroy  communication  on  the 
Potomac,  or  cripple  Neptune.  The  boats  purchased  might  be  loaded 
and  sent  down  the  river,  but  not  sunk  in  the  channel  until  it  was 
known  that  the  "  Merrimac  "  had  entered  the  river,  or  was  on  its  way 
hither.  Whatever  expense  was  incurred  must  be  defrayed  by  the 
War  Department.  "With  this  understanding,  Dahlgren  was  author 
ized  to  supervise  and  assist  Stanton's  squadron. 

In  addition  to  his  fleet  of  canalboats,  scowboats  and  other 
craft,  Cornelius  Yanderbilt,  who  owned  several  large  steamers,  a 
man  of  well-known  energy  and  enterprise,  was  invited  by  Stanton  to 
Washington  for  consultation  and  advice.  lie  was  informed  that  the 
egress  of  the  "  Merrimac"  must  be  prevented,  and  the  vessel  destroyed 
whenever  she  appeared;  that  the  War  Department  did  not  rely 
upon  the  "  Monitor,"  but  proposed  to  stop  and  destroy  her  independent 
of  the  navy,  and  that  he  had  more  confidence  in  the  capability,  sug 
gestions  and  prowess  of  individuals  like  Yanderbilt,  who  depended 
on  their  own  resources,  than  on  naval  officers,  who  were  circum 
scribed  by  their  education,  and  trained  to  a  particular  service.  lie 
concluded  by  asking  the  great  steamboat  chief  if  he  could,  in  any 
way,  destroy  or  overcome  the  "Merrimac." 

Gratified  with  the  summons,  and  complimented  by  the  confi 
dence  expressed  in  his  superior  ability  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
Vanderbilt  responded  that  he  could  destroy  the  "  Merrimac,"  and  was 
ready  to  do  so,  but  he  wanted  the  "  Monitor"  out  of  the  way,  and  must 
be  permitted  to  do  the  work  subject  to  no  control  of  naval  officers, 
or  any  interference  from  them,  or  from  naval  vessels.  If  they 
would  all  get  out  of  the  way,  he  would  run  down  the  "Merrimac" 
with  his  big  ship  Vanderbilt.  The  employment  of  this  great  ship 
corresponded  w4th  Stanton's  ideas  of  power  and  force.  He  was 
delighted,  and  went  with  Yanderbilt  to  the  President,  who  assented 
to  the  scheme,  but  was  unwilling  to  dispense  with  the  "  Monitor," 
which  had  done  so  well,  and  suggested  that  an  encounter  of  the 
large  wooden  steamer  with,  the  armored  ship  might  result  in  the 
destruction  of  the  Yanderbilt  instead  of  the  "  Merrimac."  In  that 
event  a  good  sale  would  be  made  of  the  Yanderbilt,  and  the  Govern 
ment  might  be  compelled  to  pay  largely  for  the  experiment,  without 
being  benefited.  Yanderbilt  replied  that  he  would  take  the  risk; 
that  he  was  anxious  to  assist  the  Government ;  that  he  had  already 
offered  his  vessel  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  on  his  own  terms,  and 
would  have  given  her  to  him,  but  the  Secretary  wouldn't  take  her; 
he  would  make  a  present  of  her  to  the  President,  requiring,  how 
ever,  that  the  engineers  and  employes  on  board  should  be  retained 


THE  FIRST  IRON-CLAD  MONITOR.  29 

at  present  wages.  Pleased  with  the  suggestion  that  the  "Merrimac" 
might  be  run  down,  and  thus  a  double  security  provided  against  her, 
not  only  the  Yanderbilt,  but  the  Baltic,  and  one  or  two  other  large 
merchant  steamers  were  chartered,  and  stationed  in  Hampton  Roads. 

These  immense  vessels,  lofty  and  grand,  were  anchored  near 
Fortress  Monroe,  where  they  remained  for  two  months,  at  no  small 
expense,  awaiting  the  appearance  of  the  "  Merrimac,"  but  no  opportu 
nity  occurred  to  run  her  down.  That  vessel  in  her  conflict  with  the 
"  Monitor'1  sustained  serious  injury,  and  her  officers,  dread  ing  more  the 
novel  craft  which  she  had  encountered  on  the  IHh  of  March  than  the 
large  wooden  steamers,  never  again  descended  Elizabeth  river  to  the 
Roads. 

In  the  early  part  of  May,  the  President,  accompanied  by  Secre 
taries  Chase  and  Stanton,  took  a  steamer  to  visit  Fortress  Monroe  and 
the  army  under  McCMellan,  then  on  the  York  peninsula. 

While  descending  the  Potomac  the  attention  of  the  party  was 
directed  to  a  string  of  boats  nearly  a  mile  in  length  on  the  Maryland 
shore,  some  fifty  miles  below  "Washington.  Inquiry  was  made  as  to 
the  object  of  such  an  immense  collection  of  miscellaneous  water  craft. 
The  pilot  said  lie  believed  they  were  put  there  to  oppose  the  "Merri 
mac,"  but  the  little  "Monitor"  had  taken  care  of  her.  "  ( )li !  "  said 
the  President,  pointing  to  the  boats  which  lined  the  shore,  "that  is 
Stanton' s  navy  ;  that  is  the  squadron  that  Welles  would  have  nothing 
to  do  with,  and  about  which  he  and  Stanton  had  the  dispute.  It  was 
finally  decided,  I  believe,  that  the  War  Department  might  have  a 
fleet  of  its  own  to  tight  the  "Merrimac,"  and  there  it  is.  AVe  were 
all  a  little  scared  at  that  time.  Mr.  AVelles  felt  bad  enough,  but  was 
not  enough  scared  to  listen  to  Stanton's  scheme  of  blockading  the 
river;  said  the  fleet  of  boats  would  be  useless,  and,  if  used,  worse 
than  useless." 

Stanton,  who  was  a  little  disconcerted  by  the  President's  levity, 
said  he  had  believed  it  was  best  to  provide  for  an  emergency,  and 
should  the  "Merrimac"  now  attempt  to  come  up  the  river,  the  boats 
which  he  had  procured  and  loaded  might  be  found  to  answer  a  useful 
purpose  in  protecting  Washington. 

"Your  emergency/'  said  Mr.  Lincoln,  "reminds  me  of  a  circum 
stance  which  took  place  in  Illinois.  AVe  had  on  our  circuit  a  respect 
able  lawyer  named  B ,  noted  for  a  remarkable  development  of  his 

breast,  the  glands  being  enormous,  more  protuberent  than  those  of 
many  females.  In  a  conversation  which  took  place  among  the  lawyers 
at  one  of  the  hotels,  there  was  a  discussion  regarding  the  singular 
development  which,  in  a  man,  was  almost  a  deformity,  and  could  be 


30  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  no  possible  use.  B controverted  this,  and  said  that,  supposing 

he  were  to  be  cast  away  upon  an  uninhabited  island,  with  no  other 
human  being  but  a  nursing  infant,  for  which  he  would  have  to  pro 
vide.  In  such  an  emergency,  he  had  no  doubt  Providence  would 
furnish,  through  him,  nourishment  for  the  child."  This  he  said, 
remarked  the  President,  "  with  as  much  apparent  sincerity  as  Stanton 
showed  when  he  urged  a  navy  composed  of  canalboats  to  stop  the 
"  Merrhnac."  I  think  B 's  paps  to  nurse  an  infant  will  be  as  ser 
viceable,  and  required  about  as  soon,  as  Stanton's  fleet  to  fight  and 
keep  back  an  iron  frigate.  The  preparation  for  an  anticipated  emer 
gency,  which  is  about  as  likely  to  occur  in  one  case  as  the  other,  is 
very  striking." 

Mr.  Chase  related  to  me  this  incident,  which  was  afterwards,  at 
his  request,  repeated  by  the  President  in  the  presence  of  others,  to 
the  great  annoyance  of  Mr.  Stanton,  who  never  enjoyed  the  anec- 
dotical  humors  of  the  President  if  at  his  expense. 

The  "  Merrimac  "  was,  a  few  days  thereafter — on  the  10th  of  May, 
while  the  President  and  party  were  at  Fortress  Monroe — abandoned 
and  destroyed  by  the  rebels  themselves.  The  large  steamers  that  had 
awaited  her  advent,  at  an  expense  of  several  hundred  thousand  dollars, 
were  discharged,  with  the  exception  of  the  Yanderbilt,  which  remained 
a  white  elephant  in  the  hands  of  the  War  Department.  Eventually, 
she  was  turned  over  to  the  navy,  that  had  declined  to  purchase 
and  did  not  want  her.  She  was  too  large  for  blockade  service,  but, 
as  she  was  to  be  employed,  the  Navy  Department  sent  her  off  on  an 
unsuccessful  cruise  for  the  "Alabama,"  under  a  very  capable  com 
mander,  at  a  cost  to  the  Government  of  more  than  one  thousand 
dollars  per  day,  without  result.  The  War  Department  had  paid  two 
thousand  dollars  per  day  to  her  owner  for  her  use. 

In  giving  this  magnificent  vessel  to  the  Government,  Mr.  Yan 
derbilt  performed  a  magnificent  and  patriotic  act,  for  which  he 
received  and  deserved  the  thanks  of  Congress;  but  it  was  to  the 
Government  a  costly  present.  The  Quartermaster  General,  on  a  call 
from  Congress  in  1865,  reported  that  "previous  to  her  presentation 
to  the  government,"  the  War  Department  had  paid  for  her  services 
three  hundred  and  three  thousand  five  hundred  and  eighty-nine  dol 
lars  and  ten  cents  ($303,589.10).  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  on  a 
similar  call  from  Congress  in  1868,  reported  that  the  Xavy  Depart 
ment  had  expended  over  four  hundred  thousand  dollars  ($400,000)  in 
repairing  the  Yanderbilt,  and  that  a  further  outlay  of,  at  least,  half  a 
million  dollars  would  be  then  required  to  fit  her  for  service  ;  that  she 
was  at  Mare  Island,  used  for  berthing  and  messing  the  men  detailed 


THE  FIEST  IRON-CLAD  MONITOR.  31 

to  take  care  of  the  ships  in  ordinary.  So  that  this  ship,  donated  to  the 
Government  to  run  down  the  "Merrimac,"  if  the  "Monitor"  would 
get  ont  of  the  way,  was,  without  accomplishing  that  object,  an  ex 
pense  to  the  Government  of  three  times  the  original  cost  of  the 
k<  Monitor/' 

I  mention  these  facts,  not  to  detract  from  the  merit  of  Cornelius 
Vknderbilt's  patriotic  gift,  but  to  exemplify  the  greater  value  of  the 
little  u  Monitor'"  of  John  Ericsson  for  naval  purposes,  and  the  reason 
why  the  Xavy  Department  declined  to  purchase  the  Yanderbilt, 
Illinois,  and  other  immense  steamers  that  were  pressed,  by  influential 
persons,  by  the  press,  and  by  interested  parties,  upon  the  Xavy 
Department  and  the  Government.  The  "War  Department,  taking  a 
different  view,  bought  the  Illinois  for  four  hundred  thousand  dollars 
($-iOO,000).  The  Illinois,  by  the  way,  has  never  had  a  day's  sea-ser 
vice  since  the  War  Department  purchased  her,  and  will  never  pass 
Sandy  I  look. 

The  u  Monitor,"  which  rendered  such  gallant  service  to  the 
country,  and  was  the  progenitor  of  a  class  of  vessels  that  is  to  be  found 
in  the  navy  of  almost  every  maritime  nation,  was  foundered  on  the 
30th  of  December,  1 802,  in  a  storm  off  Cape  Ilatteras. 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS. 


BY   JUDGE   KOBEKT    OULD. 


I  KNOW  it  is  a  very  difficult 
matter  for  one  who  was  an 
active  participant  in  any  of 
the  affairs  of  our  late  war,  to 
divest  himself  of  prejudice  or 
partisanship  in  giving  an  ac 
count  or  history  of  the  same. 
Perhaps  I  am  as  liable  as 
most  men  to  these  disturbing 
influences ;  but  I  hope  not  to 
the  extent  of  causing  me  to 
distort  and,  still  less,  to  fal 
sify  the  facts  of  the  case. 
While  in  this  communication 
I  have  presented  the  matter 
of  the  exchange  of  prisoners, 
and  the  troubles  attendant  thereon,  from  a  Confederate  standpoint,  I 
have  yet  sought  to  be  accurate.  I  trust  I  have  not  been  unfair.  I 
think  I  can  safely  say  that  I  can  support  everything  herein  stated  as 
a  fact  by  abundant  testimony,  Federal  as  well  as  Confederate.  As  to 
the  conclusions,  which  I  have  drawn  from  these  facts,  I  submit  them 
to  the  impartial  judgment  of  your  readers,  hoping  that  the  lapse  of 
years  has  been  sufficient  to  enable  them  to  be  in  that  frame  of  mind. 
Previous  to  July,  1862,  no  formal  or  permanent  cartel  of 
exchange  had  been  adopted  by  the  belligerent  parties  to  our  great 
civil  war.  Before  that  time  it  is  true  that  there  had  been  many 
captures  by  either  side ;  but  the  prisoners  had  either  been  exchanged 
man  for  man  or  officer  for  officer  of  equal  grade,  or  had  been  released 
on  parole  by  the  respective  governments,  or  by  commanders  in  the 
field. 

On  the  22d  of  July,  1862,  a  cartel  of  exchange  was  drawn  up 
and  signed  by  General  John  A.  Dix  and  General  D.  II.  Hill, 
representing  the  respective  belligerents.  By  its  terms,  "  all  prisoners 
of  war  were  to  be  discharged  on  parole  in  ten  days  after  their 

(32) 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  33 

capture,  and  the  prisoners  then  held,  and  those  thereafter  taken, 
were  to  he  transported  to  the  points  mutually  agreed  upon,  at  the 
expense  of  the  capturing  party.  The  surplus  prisoners  on  one  side  or 
the  other,  who  were  not  exchanged,  were  not  to  he  permitted  to  take  up 
arms  until  they  were  exchanged  under  the  provisions  of  the  cartel. 
Each  party,  upon  the  discharge  of  prisoners  of  the  other  party,  was 
authorized  to  discharge  an  e<jual  number  of  their  own  officers  and 
men  from  parole,  furnishing,  at  the  same  time  to  the  other  party,  a 
list  of  their  prisoners  discharged,  and  of  their  own  officers  and  men 
relieved  from  parole ;  thus  enabling  each  party  to  relieve  from  parole 
such  of  their  own  officers  and  men  as  the  party  might  choose."*  The 
cartel  provided  that  its  stipulations  and  provisions  should  be  "of 
binding  obligation  during  the  continuance  of  the  war,  it  matters  not 
which  party  may  have  the  surplus  of  prisoners/5  Its  ninth  and 
closino*  article  was  in  these  words:  "And  in  case  anv  misunder- 

1"^  * 

standing  shall  arise  in  regard  to  any  clause  or  stipulation  in  the  fore 
going  articles,  it  is  mutually  agreed  that  such  misunderstanding  shall 
not  interrupt  the  release  of  prisoners  on  parole,  as  herein  provided, 
but  shall  be  made  the  subject  of  friendly  explanation,  in  order  that 
the  object  of  this  agreement  may  neither  be  defeated  or  postponed/' 
The  cardinal  idea  of  the  cartel  was  that  all  prisoners  should  be 
clelircMl  within  ten  days  after  capture,  and  if  the  adversary  party 
had  an  equal  number  in  its  hands,  then  an  cxdicuif/e  as  to  such  should 
take  place,  so  that  each  set  could  at  once  take  up  arms.  If  one  side 
held  an  excess  of  prisoners,  they  were  still  to  be  delivered  within  ten 
days  after  capture,  but  that  excess  was  to  be  considered  as  being  on 
parole,  and  not  to  be  returned  to  military  duty  until  their  equivalents 
were  given,  and  they  thereby  declared  exchanged.  Thus  the  cartel 
required  all  prisoners  to  be  released,  though  they  were  not  exchanged. 
Exchanges  could  never  take  place  except  upon  equivalents;  releases 
or  deliveries  on  parole  could.  AVhen  one  of  the  belligerents  could 
not  furnish  equivalents  for  all  the  officers  and  men  delivered,  the 
excess  remained  on  parole,  and  could  not  take  up  arms  until  the  debt 
was  paid.  As  discharged  and  released  men  were  not  necessarily 
exchanged,  the  cartel  provided  that  declarations  of  exchange  might 
be  made  from  time  to  time,  and  reserved  to  each  side  the  right  of 
making  such  declarations,  whenever  it  released  from  captivity  or 
parole,  an  equal  number  of  the  adversary's  officers  and  men.  It  is 
important,  also,  to  observe  that  there  were  two  kinds  of  paroles — those 
given  on  the  battle-field,  when  the  parties  were  there  released,  and 
those  given  by  the  parties  who  were  delivered  at  the  points  designated 
in  the  cartel. 


34  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

I  have  been  thus  particular  in  these  explanations,  that  the 
nomenclature  herein  used  may  be  fully  understood.  Aiken's 
Landing,  on  James  river,  a  place  about  thirty  miles  distant  by  water 
from  Richmond,  and  Yicksburg,  were  the  first  places  selected  for  the 
delivery  of  the  prisoners  of  both  belligerents.  At  the  former  place  I 
met  General  Lorenzo  Thomas,  the  first  Federal  agent  of  exchange,  in 
August,  1862.  Not  appreciating  the  magnitude  of  the  work  before 
us,  we  began  to  exchange  officers  by  name,  one  for  another.  That 
method  was,  however,  very  soon  abandoned  for  the  more  expeditious 
one  of  exchange  by  grade,  or  by  equivalent  in  mass.  Our  first  duty 
was  to  compute  the  paroles  held  by  each  side,  and  to  declare  ex 
changes  so  far  as  equivalents  could  be  furnished.  That  computation 
left  quite  a  balance  of  paroles  in  Confederate  hands — that  is,  after  all 
the  Confederates,  who  had  been  captured  and  paroled,  were  declared 
exchanged,  it  was  found  there  was  an  excess  of  Federal  prisoners,  for 
whom  the  United  States  could  furnish  no  equivalents.  Of  course 
that  excess  continued  to  remain  on  parole  until,  from  time  to  time, 
equivalents  were  furnished.  This  state  of  affairs,  so  far  as  captures 
and  paroles  were  concerned,  continued  until  July,  1863,  when  the 
disasters  at  Gettysburg  and  Yicksburg  occurred.  Yet,  during  that 
time,  deliveries  of  Federal  prisoners  were  made  as  fast  as  transporta 
tion  was  furnished.  Indeed,  more  than  once  the  United  States 
authorities  wrere  urged  to  forward  greater  facilities  for  their  removal. 

After  Yicksburg  and  Gettysburg  the  situation  became  changed, 
and  the  excess  was  thrown  on  the  Federal  side.  From  that  day  began 
the  serious  troubles  of  the  exchange  question,  ending  finally  in  the 
cessation  of  all  deliveries,  except  in  special  cases.  It  is  true  that 
differences  of  interpretation  of  the  cartel  had  existed  before  that 
time,  and  it  is  also  true  that  there  had  been  mutual  complaints  and 
charges  of  bad  faith — such  as  refusing  to  deliver  officers  and  men  who 
had  been  declared  exchanged.  I  had  frequently  complained  that 
Confederate  officers  and  men  had  been  detained,  sometimes  in  irons 
and  close  confinement  under  false  or  frivolous  charges  ;  that  enlisted 
men  had  been  treated  as  guerrillas  or  bushwhackers,  and  that  re 
cruiting  officers,  regularly  commissioned  and  in  uniform,  had  been 
executed  as  spies ;  yet  exchanges  up  to  that  time  went  on  without 
very  serious  difficulty.  Complications  of  these  kinds  could  generally 
be  managed  by  threatened  retaliation. 

The  practice  of  the  agents  of  exchange  up  to  May,  1863,  had 
been  to  recognize  paroles  taken  upon  the  battle-field,  even  though 
the  parties  thereto  were  not  kept  for  some  time  in  the  possession  of 
the  capturing  party,  or  delivered  at  the  points  designated  in  the 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  35 

cartel.  In  that  month,  however,  I  was  notified  that  a  new  rule  had 
been  adopted  by  the  Federal  authorities,  contained  in  their  General 
Orders  Xos.  59  and  100  of  the  year  1803,  which  provided  that  no 
paroles,  unaccompanied  by  continued  possession  and  actual  delivery 
at  the  points  designated  in  the  cartel,  would  be  recognized.  An 
exception  was  made  where  paroles  were  taken  in  pursuance  of  an 
agreement  between  the  commanders  of  two  opposing  armies.  .But 
while  these  general  orders  invalidated  all  paroles  not  coming  within 
the  description,  they  distinctly  declared  that  if  a  parole  should 
be  given  under  different  circumstances,  and  the  United  States  did 
not  approve  of  the  same,  "  the  paroled  officer  must  return  into 
captivity." 

On  the  Tth  of  July,  1803,  I,  was  notified  of  another  General 
Order,  Xo.  2<>7,  dated  July  3,  1803,  declaring  (hat  'kall  captures 
must  be  reduced  to  actual  possession,  and  all  prisoners  of  war  must 
be  delivered  at  the  place  designated,  there  to  be  exchanged  or 
paroled  until  exchange  can  be  effected."  This  general  order,  how 
ever,  did  not  contain  the  provision  of  the  others,  that  the  paroled 
officer,  if  he  gave  an  unauthorized  parole,  should  return  into  cap 
tivity.  All  three  of  these  general  orders,  however,  purported  t<>  bo 
declarations  of  the  laws  of  war,  inconsistent  as  they  were  with  each 
other.  The  civilians  of  the  AVar  Department  seem  to  have  been 
under  the  belief  that  they  could  make  and  unmake  the  laws  of  war 
to  suit  emergencies. 

The  application  of  these  general  orders  to  the  facts  connected 
with  exchanges  produced  the  first  serious  difficulty.  It  may  be  that 
the  position  taken  by  the  United  States  authorities  in  these  general 
orders  was  strongly  supported  by  the  language  of  the  cartel,  which 
required  "all  prisoners  of  war  to  be  discharged  on  parole  in  ten 
days  after  their  capture,  and  the  prisoners  now  held,  and  those  here 
after  taken,  to  be  transported  to  the  points  mutually  agreed  upon, 
at  the  expense  of  the  capturing  party."  But  the  practice  of  both 
sides,  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  up  to  May,  18G3,  had  been 
otherwise.  Each  had  claimed  paroles  which  had  been  given  where 
the  persons  captured  had  been  set  at  liberty  at  once.  Each  had 
recognized  the  validity  of  such  paroles  held  by  the  adverse  party. 
Moreover,  it  was  contended  by  me  that  the  cartel  did  not  touch  in 
any  way  the  question  of  the  validity  of  paroles  ;  that  it  was  designed 
to  apply,  so  far  as  delivery  was  concerned,  only  to  such  prisoners  as 
were  in  captivity,  or  "held"  by  either  party,  to  such  as  were  in 
military  depots  and  prisons,  to  such  as  had  been  removed  from  the 
battle-field  or  place  of  capture,  and  reduced  into  actual  possession — 


36  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

that  it  left  the  force  and  effect  of  military  paroles,  and  the  respect 
which  should  be  paid  to  them,  to  be  determined  by  the  usages  of 
war,  and  that  it  did  not  prevent  a  wounded  officer  or  man  from 
entering  into  a  stipulation  not  to  take  up  arms  until  unchanged,  as 
a  condition  of  his  release,  when  it  might  be  his  life  would  be  at 
serious  risk  if  he  did  not  make  the  contract.  I  contended  that  the 
cartel  nowhere  denied  the  right  of  any  soldier,  whether  wounded  or 
not,  to  bind  his  government  by  his  military  obligation,  when  he  was 
in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  I  will  give  one  of  a  large  number,  as  a 
specimen  of  the  military  paroles  to  which  I  refer.  It  is  that  of 
Colonel  Roy  Stone,  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-ninth  Penn 
sylvania  Volunteers,  captured  at  Gettysburg : 

"  I,  the  subscriber,  a  prisoner  of  war,  captured  near  Gettysburg,  Pa.,  do  give 
my  parole  of  honor  not  to  take  up  arms  against  the  Confederate  States,  or  to  do 
any  military  duty  whatever,  or  to  give  any  information  that  may  be  prejudicial  to 
the  interests  of  the  same,  until  regularly  exchanged.  This  parole  is  unconditional? 
and  extended  to  a  wounded  officer  for  the  sake  of  humanity,  to  save  a  painful  and 
tedious  journey  to  the  rear.  ROY  STONE, 

"  Colonel  149th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers." 

Other  paroles  declared  that  if  they  were  not  recognized  by  the 
Federal  authorities,  the  parties  would  report  at  Richmond  as  pris 
oners  of  war  within  a  certain  number  of  days,  or  that  they  would 
not  take  up  arms  until  exchanged,  even  if  they  were  required  to  do 
so  by  their  government. 

While  the  views  of  the  Confederate  Government  were  such  as 
I  have  represented,  it  was  not  disposed  to  risk  the  continuance  of 
the  cartel  by  insisting  upon  them.  It  agreed  to  ignore  the  previous 
practice  as  a  rule  for  the  future,  insisting,  however,  that  the  paroles 
which  had  been  given  on  both  sides  previous  to  the  date  of  the 
communication  of  the  general  orders  to  me,  to  wit,  23d  of  May, 
1863,  should  be  held  to  be  valid.  Accordingly,  on  the  24th  of 
August,  1863,  I  made  the  following  proposal  to  the  Federal  agent : 
"  I  propose  that  all  paroles  on  both  sides  heretofore  given,  shall  be 
determined  by  the  general  orders  issued  by  the  War  Department  of 
the  United  States,  to  wit :  Ko.  49,  Xo.  100,  and  !No.  207,  of  this 
year,  according  to  their  respective  dates,  and  in  conformity  to  Para 
graph  131  of  General  Order  100,  so  long  as  said  paragraph  was  in 
force.  If  this  proposition  is  not  acceptable,  I  propose  that  the 
practice  heretofore  adopted  respecting  paroles  and  exchanges  be 
continued.  In  other  words,  I  propose  that  the  whole  question  of 
paroles  be  determined  by  the  general  orders  of  the  United  States, 
according  to  dates,  or  that  it  be  decided  by  former  practice." 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  37 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  matter  of  the  dates  of  the  respective 
general  orders  was  very  material,  because  General  Orders  Xo.  49 
and  Xo.  100  declared  that  if  a  parole  was  not  approved,  the  party 
giving  it  was  bound  to  return  and  surrender  himself  as  a  prisoner  of 
war.  General  Order  Xo.  49  contained  also  this  language,  to  wit : 
"His  own  government  cannot  at  the  same  time  disown  his  own  en 
gagement,  and  refuse  his  return  as  a  prisoner."  I  then  thought  and 
still  think  these  were  honest  words.  The  date  of  General  Order  Xo. 
49  was  February  28th,  1803,  that  of  General  Order  Xo.  100  was  April 
24th,  18(13,  and  that  of  General  Order  Xo.  207  was  July  3d,  18(13. 

It  thus  appears  that  the  Confederate  Government  was  willing 
to  recede  from  former  practice,  and  only  insisted  that  the  matter  of 
paroles  on  both  sides  should  be  determined  by  the  United  States 
general  order  in  force  when  the  paroles  were  given.  AVas  not  this 
fair?  Ought  it  not  to  have  been  acceptable  to  the  United  States? 
Yet  they  did  not  consent.  It  may  be  asked  why?  It  was  because, 
according  to  the  express  provision  of  General  Orders  Xos.  49  and 
100,  it  became  the  duty  of  the  parties  who  had  been  paroled  while 
these  orders  were  in  force,  to  return  into  captivity  if  their  govern 
ment  disapproved  of  their  paroles.  To  avoid  that  result,  the  Federal 
agent  insisted  that  General  Order  207,  dated  July  3d,  18(13,  should 
be  deemed  to  be  retroactive,  and  control  paroles  which  were  given 
before  it  was  in  existence.  The  Confederates  had  captured  and 
paroled  a  large  number  of  prisoners  in  the  months  of  March,  April, 
May  and  June,  and,  by  virtue  of  general  orders  in  force  at  those 
dates,  if  the  paroles  were  not  recognized,  it  became  the  duty  of  the 
paroled  parties  to  return  into  captivity.  I  knew  very  well  that  there 
would  be  no  such  return,  and  that  the  Federal  Government  would 
recognize  the  validity  of  their  paroles,  rather  than  send  its  officers 
and  men  back  into  captivity.  To  escape  the  dilemma  of  recognizing 
the  paroles,  or  sending  the  officers  and  men  back  into  captivity, 
neither  of  which  the  Federal  authorities  intended  to  do,  they  were 
forced  into  the  absurd  position  that  General  Order  Xo.  2o7,  which 
recognized  neither  paroles  or  a  return  into  captivity,  should  be 
deemed  to  be  in  force  before  it  had  any  existence. 

As  an  illustration  in  this  connection  of  what  strange  things  are 
done  in  time  of  war,  I  refer  to  a  Court  of  Inquiry,  the  official  pro 
ceedings  of  which  are  found  in  the  Army  and  J¥avy  Official  Gaz<.'tte, 
under  date  of  July  14th,  1803.  The  court  was  convened  on  June 
30th,  1803,  to  determine  whether  Major  Duane  and  Captain  Michler, 
who  had  been  captured  and  paroled  on  the  28th  of  June,  1803,  by 
General  Stuart,  should  be  placed  on  duty  without  exchange,  or  be 


38  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

returned  to  the  enemy  as  prisoners  of  war.  The  general  order  then 
in  force,  in  its  131st  paragraph,  declared  that  "  if  the  government 
does  not  approve  of  the  parole,  the  paroled  officer  must  return  into 
captivity."  Yet  the  court  found  that  the  government  was  free  to 
place  those  officers  on  duty  without  having  been  exchanged,  and  gave 
as  its  reason  that  I  had  been  notified  that  such  paroles  would  not  be 
recognized.  But  the  court  forgot  to  state  that  along  with  that  noti 
fication  came  another,  that  "the  paroled  officer  must  return  into 
captivity,"  and  that  the  United  States  Government  could  not  "  at  the 
same  time  disown  his  (the  officer's)  engagement,  and  refuse  his 
return  as  a  prisoner." 

While  I  am  dealing  with  incidents,  I  will  give  another.  On 
March  9th,  1863,  that  terrible  soldier,  General  Robert  Schenck, 
issued  a  General  Order  No.  15,  requiring  all  officers  and  men  who 
who  had  been  captured  and  released  on  parole  in  his  department, 
and  particularly  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  but  who  had  not  been 
declared  exchanged,  to  return  to  duty  on  penalty  of  being  considered 
deserters.  The  general  order  of  the  United  States  then  in  force  was 
No.  49,  to  the  provisions  of  which  I  have  already  referred.  At  the 
time  of  Schenck's  order  and  afterward,  the  Federal  agent  was 
charging  against  me  and  receiving  credit  for  captures  and  paroles 
similar  to  those  thus  repudiated.  It  is  due  to  Colonel  Ludlow,  Agent 
of  Exchange  at  the  time,  to  say  that  when  this  matter  was  brought  to 
his  attention,  he  declared  that  Schenck's  action  was  without  proper 
authority,  and  that  I  should  have  credit  for  such  as  reported  for  duty 
under  the  order.  But  it  is  just  as  true  that  I  was  never  informed  of 
any  who  did  return,  nor  was  I  given  any  credit  on  that  account. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  for  me  to  state  that  I  utterly  refused  to 
agree  to  any  arrangement  by  which  a  general  order  of  the  United 
States  War  Department  should  be  construed  as  being  in  force  before 
it  was  issued,  or  that  paroles  given  in  May  or  June  should  be  deter 
mined  by  an  order  made  in  the  following  July.  I  thought  I  had 
conceded  enough  when  I  agreed  to  reverse  a  practice  followed  by 
both  sides  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  without  objection,  and 
abide  by  the  orders  made  by  the  adversary,  according  to  their  date. 

As  soon  as  I  discovered  the  purpose  of  the  Federal  agent  in 
respect  to  the  paroles  held  by  me,  I  notified  him  that  so  long  as  he 
refused  to  recognize  the  validity  of  the  paroles  held  by  the  Con 
federate  authorities,  and  especially  the  paroles  given  in  Tennessee 
and  Kentucky  shortly  after  the  adoption  of  the  cartel  and  before  the 
date  of  the  general  orders,  that  he  need  not  send  any  officers  with  the 
expectation  of  receiving  as  equivalents  only  those  who  were  in  cap- 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  30 

tivity.  I  closed  my  letter  to  him  in  these  words :  "  If  captivity, 
privation  and  misery  are  to  be  the  fate  of  officers  on  both  sides 
hereafter,  let  God  judge  between  us.  I  have  struggled  in  this 
matter  as  if  it  had  been  a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  me.  I  am 
heartsick  at  the  termination ;  but  I  haye  no  self -reproaches." 

The  inevitable  effect  of  the  new  rule  insisted  upon  by  the 
Federal  agent,  besides  ignoring  the  tens  of  thousands  of  yalid  paroles 
held  by  the  Confederates,  would  have  been  to  confine  exchanges  to 
the  officers  and  men  who  were  in  captivity,  leaving  the  excess  in 
prison.  Even  if  the  Confederates  had  not  have  had  any  paroles  to 
offer  as  equivalents  for  deliveries,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  adverse 
party,  under  the  cartel,  to  make  the  deliveries  and  wait  for  equiva 
lents.  ]>ut,  in  addition  to  this  violation,  the  course  of  the  Federal 
agent  in  refusing  to  accept  yalid  paroles  as  equivalents  made  a  case 
of  aggravation  which  could  not  to  be  tolerated.  So  resolute  were 
the  Confederate  authorities  in  this  respect  that  when  some  of  their 
officers  were  sent  to  City  Point  to  be  exchanged  only  for  officers 
who  were  in  confinement,  they  refused  to  receive  them  on  such  con 
dition,  and  they  were  carried  back  to  Fortress  Monroe. 

I  have  said  that  I  believe  that  the  course  pursued  by  the  Federal 
authorities  in  relation  to  the  paroles  held  by  the  Confederates  was 
the  chief  and  special  cause  of  the  suspension  of  the  cartel.  It  was 
not  a  case  for  retaliation.  The  difficulty  could  not  be  obviated  or 
cured  even  by  that  violent  remedy.  I  know  there  were  other 
hindrances  in  the  way  of  a  full  observance  of  the  cartel;  but  these, 
singly  or  altogether,  were  trivial  in  comparison.  General  Hitchcock, 
Commissioner  of  Exchange,  in  his  report  to  Mr.  Stanton,  in  Xoveui- 
ber,  1S(>5,  lays  stress  on  the  action  of  Mr.  I)  ay  is  and  the  Confederate 
Congress  in  relation  to  officers  in  command  of  negro  troops,  and 
cites  that  as  the  chief  cause  of  the  disruption  of  the  cartel.  l>ut  no 
officer  of  the  Federal  army,  (hiring  the  progress  of  the  war,  was  ever 
punished  in  any  way  for  commanding  or  leading  negro  troops,  though 
the  Confederates  had  in  captivity  many  such.  They  were  always 
treated  as  other  Federal  officers,  and,  like  them,  delivered  for  exchange 
or  released  on  parole.  The  Confederate  law  which  authorized  the 
delivery  of  negro  soldiers  to  the  authorities  of  the  State  in  which 
they  were  captured  was  never  enforced,  and  was,  even  in  those  days, 
considered  as  legislation  in  t^rrorcm.  It  did  not  present  any  practi 
cal  difficulty,  though,  doubtless,  it  would  if  it  had  been  executed. 
General  Hitchcock  and  others  made  very  good  use  of  this  Confederate 
legislation  in  continually  thrusting  it  forward  as  an  excuse  for  Fed 
eral  breaches  of  the  cartel.  It  was  the  theme  for  not  a  little  "  high 


40  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

rhetoric."  Another  reason  given  by  General  Hitchcock  for  the 
failure  on  the  part  of  the  Federal  authorities  to  deliver  prisoners 
according  to  the  terms  of  the  cartel,  was  that  I  had  imduly  and 
improperly  declared  to  be  exchanged  Confederate  soldiers  who  had 
been  released  on  parole,  but  not  exchanged.  ^Nothing  could  be  more 
untrue.  In  the  first  place,  the  difficulty  in  the  way  of  delivery  and 
exchange  of  prisoners  had  occurred  long  before  any  alleged  obnoxious 
notice  of  exchange  on  my  part  had  ever  appeared.  The  ground 
taken  by  the  Federal  authorities  in  relation  to  paroles,  and  under 
which  deliveries  would  only  be  made  where  equivalents  of  officers 
and  men  in  actual  confinement  would  be  furnished,  was  long  anterior 
to  any  declaration  of  exchange  on  my  part  to  which  exception  was 
ever  taken.  General  Hitchcock  and  others  had  certain  purposes  in 
view,  and  he  and  they  used  my  notes  of  exchange  just  as  they 
employed  the  Federal  general  orders.  They  also  were  made  to  be 
retroactive,  and  were  held  up  as  the  proximate  cause  of  occurrences 
which  happened  long  before  their  birth. 

It  would  be  a  curious  matter  to  trace  the  history  of  the  notices 
of  exchange  which  each  side  issued  during  the  progress  of  the  war. 
I  wish  I  had  the  space  to  do  so.  I  can  only  notice  one  calumny  of 
many  in  this  connection.  General  Hitchcock,  in  his  before-men 
tioned  report,  charges  that  I  made  a  declaration  of  exchange 
with  a  view  to  the  coming  battles  of  Chickamaiiga  and  Chat 
tanooga,  and  that  many  of  the  prisoners  paroled  by  General 
Grant  and  General  Banks,  at  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson,  partici 
pated  in  said  battles  without  having  been  duly  exchanged.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  crowd  more  untruths  in  one  sentence.  The 
declaration  of  exchange  to  which  General  Hitchcock  refers,  was 
fairly,  honestly  and  properly  made.  The  cartel,  by  its  express 
terms,  gave  me  authority  to  make  it.  I  had,  in  my  possession  at 
the  time,  more  valid  paroles  of  Federal  officers  and  men  than  were 
an  equivalent  for  the  exchange  which  I  then  declared.  Moreover, 
between  that  declaration  of  exchange  and  the  preceding  one,  I  had 
delivered  at  City  Point,  then  the  agreed  point  of  delivery,  some  ten 
or  twelve  thousand  Federal  prisoners.  The  declaration  was  not 
only  expressly  authorized  by  the  cartel,  but  was  in  the  strictest 
accordance  with  the  common  practice  of  the  Federal  Agent  of 
Exchange.  Besides,  not  one  of  the  officers  or  men  declared  to  be 
exchanged  at  that  time  was  in  the  battles  to  which  General  Hitch 
cock  refers ;  though  if  they  had  been,  they  would  have  been  there 
rightfully. 

It  has  been  frequently  stated  as  an  excuse  for  the  refusal  of  the 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  41 

Federal  authorities  to  deliver  all  prisoners  of  war  held  by  them,  and 
that  if  it  had  "been  done,  when  they  had  the  surplus,  the  excess 
would  have  been  put  in  the  Held  by  the  Confederates.  This  is 
another  of  General  Hitchcock's  imputations.  Nothing  could  be 
inure  untrue,  either  as  to  intention  or  fact.  There  was  no  more 
reason  for  such  a  stigma  than  there  was  for  a  similar  charge  against 
the  United  States  when  the  excess  of  prisoners  was  held  by  the 
Confederates.  Yet  the  fear  that  such  a  course  might  be  pursued 
did  not  restrain  the  Confederate  authorities  from  delivering  all 
prisoners  in  their  hands  when  they  held  an  excess;  and  that,  too, 
after  they  were  informed  of  General  Schenck's  aforesaid  general 
order. 

It  was  the  practice  of  my  office  to  make  a  careful  computation 
of  paroles  and  deliveries,  and  on  that  basis  to  declare  exchanges.  In 
no  one  instance,  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  its  close,  was  any 
declaration  of  exchange  made  which  was  not  just  in  every  particular, 
and  fully  warranted  by  the  facts.  In  no  one  case  did  I  ever  discharge 
Confederates  from  their  parole  until  I  had  oifered  valid  equivalents 
to  the  United  States. 

After  deliveries  were  broken  off,  I  did  not  abandon  the  hope 
that  there  would  be  a  return  to  the  main  features  of  the  cartel. 
From  that  time  I  kept  the  offer  open  that  officers  and  men  should 
be  released,  the  excess  on  one  side  or  the  other  to  be  on  parole,  and 
that  the  validity  of  all  paroles  should  be  determined  by  the  general 
orders  of  the  United  States  War  Department,  according  to  dates. 
The  Confederate  Government  stood  ready  and  indeed  anxious  at  all 
times  to  accept  these  terms.  Whenever  I  pressed  them  upon  the 
Federal  agents,  and  that  was  very  frequently,  I  was  met  with 
homilies  on  Mr.  Davis"  message  and  my  unjustifiable  (so-called) 
declarations  of  exchange. 

At  length  I  was  forced  into  the  conviction  that  the  persons  who 
had  the  control  of  the  matter  did  not  desire  exchanges  or  mutual 
deliveries  of  prisoners  on  any  terms — that  they  believed  that  such 
deliveries  were  unwise  in  a  military  point  of  view — that  they  had 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  a  soldier  was  more  valuable  to  the 
Confederacy  than  he  was  to  the  United  States.  I  do  not  mean  by 
that  to  say  that  they  or  anybody  else  thought  that  a  Confederate 
soldier  was  better  or  braver  than  a  Union  soldier,  but  simply  that  in 
the  then  condition  of  affairs  the  United  States  could  better  afford 
the  absence  of  a  soldier  from  the  field  than  the  Confederacy. 
Perhaps,  also,  some  of  these  persons  thought  it  would  not  be  an 
unwise  military  expedient  to  quarter  fifty  thousand  men  upon 


42  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

States  drifting  into  actual  want.  Perhaps,  too,  some  of  them 
thought  that  the  story,  real  or  exaggerated,  of  the  sufferings  of 
the  prisoners  would  "fire  the  Northern  heart."  Be  all  this  as 
it  may,  I  suppose  no  one  is  prepared  to  challenge  the  suspension  of 
the  cartel  as  an  unwise  military  expedient  in  a  Federal  point  of 
view.  In  other  aspects  of  the  case  it  was  not  quite  so  clever. 

In  the  early  spring  of  1864,  still  desirous  of  restoring  the  cartel, 
even  with  modifications  if  they  were  pressed,  I  determined  to  invoke 
the  aid  of  General  B.  F.  Butler,  having  learned  that  it  would  not  be 
disagreeable  to  him  to  have  an  interview.  General  Butler  some 
months  before  that  time  had  been  appointed  Federal  Agent  of  Ex 
change.  The  Confederate  Government  very  unwisely,  as  I  then 
thought,  and  now  think,  had  refused  to  recognize  him  as  an  agent  of 
exchange,  or  to  hold  any  intercourse  with  him  as  such.  About  the 
time  of  his  appointment  he  sent  a  detachment  of  prisoners,  requiring, 
however,  a  return  delivery  of  a  like  number  of  such  as  were  in  con 
finement.  Lest  the  United  States  Government  might  suppose  from 
the  refusal  of  the  Confederate  authorities  to  recognize  General  Butler 
as  an  agent  of  exchange,  that  they  did  not  desire  the  full  restoration 
of  the  cartel,  I  expressed  in  writing  to  General  Mulford  their  readi 
ness  to  resume  and  to  deliver  all  prisoners,  the  excess  to  be  on  parole ; 
but  refusing  any  other  arrangement,  and  notifying  him  that  unless 
this  was  the  distinct  understanding,  no  deliveries  would  be  made.  I 
delivered  at  the  same  time  to  General  Mulford  more  prisoners  than 
he  brought,  notifying  him  that  I  accepted  his  delivery  as  in  earnest 
that  such  was  the  understanding  of  the  Federal  Government.  I  con 
cluded  my  letter  to  him  by  saying,  that  "in no  event  can  we  consent 
that  the  general  release  of  prisoners,  so  distinctly  required  by  the 
cartel,  shall  be  evaded  by  partial  deliveries.  Accepting  the  present 
delivery  as  a  step  toward  a  general  exchange  on  the  principles  of  the 
cartel,  I  trust  I  may  be  permitted  to  express  the  hope  that  deliveries 
on  the  basis  above  indicated,  will  be  continued  until  all  the  troops  in 
confinement  on  both  sides  are  released." 

The  date  of  this  letter  was  December  2Tth,  1863.  Some  two  or 
three  months  afterward,  I  had  a  reason  to  believe  that  General  Butler 
held  views  favorable  to  the  restoration  of  the  cartel,  though  in  the 
interval  of  these  dates  very  few  deliveries  were  made,  and  I  had  no 
official  information  frhat  a  general  release  would  take  place.  But  I 
was  confident  that  General  Butler  and  I  could  discuss  controverted 
questions  in  better  temper  than  General  Meredith,  the  Federal  Agent 
of  Exchange,  and  myself  had  manifested.  Moreover,  the  information 
which  I  had  from  time  to  time  received  as  to  his  interference  in  be- 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  43 

half  of  prisoners  confined  at  Point  Lookout,  still  more  emboldened 
me.  I  then  "believed,  and  now  believe,  that  Point  Lookout  was  more 
humanely  governed  than  any  other  prison  depot  from  Fort  Warren 
to  Western  Missouri.  It  may  perhaps  astonish  some  people  when  I 
say  that  of  all  the  persons  having  control  of  matters  pertaining  to 
exchanges  whom  I  encountered,  he  was  the  fairest  and  the  most 
truthful.  The  distance  between  him  and  Hitchcock  in  these  respects 
was  almost  infinite. 

I  went  to  Fortress  Monroe  on  a  fiag-of-truce  steamer,  and  was 
received  by  General  Butler  with  great  courtesy.     I    remained   there 

t/  O  V 

three  days,  during  which  we  had  protracted  discussions.  lie  ex 
pressed  himself  in  the  general  in  favor  of  the  cartel,  though  in  a 
mere  military  point  of  view  he  thought  it  was  a  disadvantage  to  the 
United  States.  To  some  of  the  provisions  of  the  cartel  he  expressed 
very  decided  objections.  We  mutually  yielded  our  opposing  views, 
and  at  length  there  remained  but  one  matter  upon  which  we  could 
not  agree,  and  that  was  negro  slaves.  There  was  no  ditl'erence  be 
tween  us  as  to  Xorthern  negro  soldiers  or  even  the  free  negro  soldier 
of  the  South.  I  agreed  that  both  of  these  classes  should  be  deemed 
proper  subjects  of  exchange.  Put  I  contended  if  Southern  soldiers 
recaptured  their  former  slaves  that,  under  the  just  postliminii,  they 
had  the  right  to  hold  them  in  their  former  state ;  that  under  our 
Constitutions,  Confederate  and  State,  slaves  were  recognized  as  prop 
erty,  and  on  recapture  followed  the  rule  of  all  property,  and  reverted 
to  their  former  condition.  I  held  that  an  edict  of  emancipation  pro 
mulgated  by  a  hostile  power  did  not  defeat  the  rights  of  the  owner, 
when  the  slave  came  back  into  his  possession  by  recapture.  General 
Butler,  on  the  other  hand,  while  admitting  that  under  the  Constitu 
tion  and  laws  of  the  Southern  States,  slaves  were  property  while 
under  the  dominion  of  their  masters,  contended  that  if  they  fied  from 
them  and  sought  the  protection  of  the  L^nited  States,  and  were  then 
clothed  with  freedom,  that  then  if  recaptured  by  their  masters,  they 
were  taken  as  freemen,  and  not  as  slaves.  Availing  myself  of  his 
admission  that  slaves  were  property  under  our  Constitutions  and  laws, 
I  asked  him  whether,  if  he  emancipated  Confederate  horses  and  de 
clared  that  their  backs  should  never  again  be  desecrated  by  saddle  or 
harness,  such  an  edict  would  extinguish  the  former  owner's  rights  on 
recapture.  He  did  not  answer  the  question.  Perhaps  he  did  not 
find  it  easy. 

I  wish  I  had  space  to  give  the  discussion  more  at  length.  In 
the  course  of  it,  General  Butler  let  fly  a  good  many  expressions 
which  certainly  did  not  lack  vigor,  if  they  were  objectionable  on 


44  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

other  grounds.  I  soon  found  that  we  could  not  agree  upon  the 
topic ;  and,  therefore,  I  sought  to  flank  the  difficulty.  I  suggested 
that  it  was  very  unwise  for  us  to  reject  the  paper  about  which  we 
had  agreed  in  every  other  respect,  because  we  disagreed  about  one 
item — that  the  new  cartel  might  be  silent  as  to  recaptured  slaves, 
leaving  to  the  United  States  the  right  to  resort  to  such  measures  of 
retaliation,  if  they  were  not  released,  as  was  practiced  in  the  case  of 
white  soldiers,  when  they  were  improperly  .detained.  I  urged  that  a 
difficulty  about  the  release  of  slaves,  who  did  not  form  one-fiftieth 
part  of  the  prisoners,  should  not  prevent  the  exchange  of  others — 
that  when  Streight's  men  were  detained  on  our  side,  or  Morgan's 
men  on  his,  exchanges  were  not  stopped  thereby,  and  that  it  was 
hardly  fair  to  have  one  rule  for  the  white  man  and  a  better  one  for 
the  black.  At  length,  General  Butler  assented  to  this  view,  and  so 
we  constructed  a  new  cartel,  which  settled  the  old  points  of  dispute, 
but  was  silent  as  to  such  soldiers  as  were  slaves  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  wrar.  The  position  which  I  had  all  along  maintained  in  relation 
to  paroles  was  unhesitatingly  accepted  by  General  Butler. 

When  the  paper  was  prepared,  I  suggested  that  it  be  signed  by 
us,  signifying  that  I  wTas  authorized  to  do  so  on  the  part  of  the 
Confederate  Government.  But  General  Butler  said  he  was  not 
authorized  to  do  so,  and  would  be  compelled  to  send  it  to  the  "War 
Department,  at  Washington,  for  approval,  which  he  hoped  and 
believed  it  would  receive.  When  I  expressed  my  readiness  to  sign 
the  paper,  he  pleasantly  observed  that  the  Confederate  authorities 
had  always  shown  their  good  sense  in  leaving  measures  to  the 
judgment  of  those  who  knew  most  about  them ;  but  that  though  he 
was  the  commander  of  a  department,  he  had  not  the  power  to  bind 
the  United  States  to  the  instrument,  strange  as  that  might  appear. 
I  have  reason  to  believe  that  General  Butler  urged  the  adoption  of 
the  new  cartel  with  good  faith  and  zeal.  It  was  transmitted  by  the 
War  Department  to  General  Grant,  then  in  front  of  Petersburg,  for 
his  approval  or  rejection.  It  is  well  known  to  the  country  what  his 
action  was.  General  Butler,  in  his  report  to  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  states  that  General  Grant  communicated  his 
rejection  to  him,  giving  in  substance  as  his  reason  that  Sherman 
would  be  overwhelmed  and  his  own  position  on  the  James  endan 
gered.  Over  one  hundred  thousand  officers  and  men  were,  at  or 
about  that  time,  in  confinement  on  both  sides,  the  United  States 
holding  quite  a  large  majority. 

When  this  effort  to  renew  exchanges  failed,  so  anxious  were 
the  Confederate  authorities  to  have  some  plan  of  relief  adopted,  that 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  45 

they  instructed  me  to  abate  our  just  demands  and  accede  to  the  offer 
more  than  once  made  by  the  Federal  Agent  of  Exchange,  to  exchange 
officer  for  officer,  and  man  for  man.  As  the  United  States  held  the 
majority,  this  plan  of  operation  would  have  released  all  the  Federal 
prisoners,  while  a  large  number  of  Confederates  would  still  have 
remained  in  captivity. 

Accordingly,  on  the  10th  of  August,  1804,  I  addressed  the 
following  letter  to  General  Mulford,  Assistant  Agent  of  Exchange: 

"You  have  several  times  proposed  to  me  to  exchange  the  prisoners  respec 
tively  held  by  the  two  belligerents,  officer  for  officer,  and  man  for  man.  The  same 
offer  has  also  been  made  by  other  officials  having  charge  of  matters  connected  with 
the  exchange  of  prisoners.  This  proposal  has  heretofore  been  declined  by  the  Con 
federate  authorities,  they  insisting  upon  the  terms  of  the  cartel,  which  required  the 
delivery  of  the  excess  on  either  side  on  parole.  In  view,  however,  of  the  very  large 
number  of  prisoners  now  held  by  each  party,  and  the  suffering  consequent  upon 
their  continued  confinement,  I  now  consent  to  the  above  proposal,  and  agree  to 
deliver  to  you  the  prisoners  held  in  captivity  by  the  Confederate  authorities,  pro 
vided  you  agree  to  deliver  an  equal  number  of  Confederate  officers  and  men.  As 
equal  numbers  are  delivered  from  time  to  time,  they  will  be  declared  exchanged. 
This  proposal  is  made  with  the  understanding  that  the  officers  and  men  on  both 
sides  who  have  been  longest  in  captivity  will  be  first  delivered,  where  it  is 
practicable. 

"I  shall  be  happy  to  hear  from  you  as  speedily  as  possible,  whether  this 
arrangement  can  be  carried  out.1' 

The  delivery  of  this  letter  was  accompanied  with  a  statement 
of  the  mortality  which  was  hurrying  so  many  Federal  prisoners  at 
Anderson vi lie  to  the  grave. 

On  the  22d  of  August  following,  not  having  heard  anything  in 
response,  I  addressed  a  communication  to  General  Hitchcock,  United 
States  Commissioner  of  Exchange,  covering  a  copy  of  the  foregoing 
letter  to  General  Mulford,  and  requesting  an  acceptance  of  my  pro 
posal.  Xo  answer  was  received  to  either  of  these  letters,  nor  were 
they  ever  noticed,  except  that  General  Mulford,  on  the  31st  of 
August  of  the  same  year,  informed  me  in  writing  that  he  had  no 
communication  on  the  subject  from  the  United  States  authorities, 
and  that  he  was  not  authorized  to  make  any  answer. 

General  Butler,  in  his  speech  at  Hamilton,  Ohio,  after  the  close 
of  the  war,  as  it  is  reported  in  the  newspapers,  in  referring  to  this 
offer  of  mine  to  exchange  officer  for  officer,  and  man  for  man,  thus 
leaving  a  large  excess  in  Federal  hands,  said:  "I  wrote  an  argument, 
offensively  put,  to  the  Confederate  Commissioner,  so  that  he  could 
stop  all  further  offers  of  the  exchange.  I  say  nothing  about  the 
policy  of  this  course ;  I  offer  no  criticism  of  it  whatever ;  I  only  say 
that  whether  it  be  a  good  or  a  bad  policy,  it  was  not  mine,  and  that 


4:6  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

my  part  of  it  was  wholly  in  obedience  to  orders  from  my  commanding 
officer,  the  lieutenant  general."  So  that  it  seems  that  even  offers  of 
exchange  from  the  Confederates  had  become  disagreeable  and 
annoying,  and  were  met  offensively  to  put  a  stop  to  them. 

This  statement  of  General  Butler  is  substantially  repeated  by 
him  in  his  report  to  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
which  he  concludes  by  saying,  that  he  was  compelled  to  make 
the  exposition  "  so  that  it  might  be  seen  that  these  lives  were  spent 
as  a  part  of  the  system  of  attack  upon  the  rebellion,  devised  by  the 
wisdom  of  the  general-in-chief  of  the  armies  to  destroy  it  by  deple 
tion,  depending  upon  our  superior  numbers  to  win  the  victory 
at  last."  Xor  wrere  these  the  only  statements  made  by  General 
Butler  in  relation  to  these  matters.  In  his  speech  at  Lowell  on  the 
28th  of  January,  1865,  after  referring  to  the  conference  held  at 
Fortress  Monroe  between  himself  and  me,  he  said  :  "  I  reported  the 
points  of  agreement  between  myself  and  the  rebel  agent  to  the  Sec 
retary  of  War,  and  asked  for  power  to  adjust  the  other  questions  of 
difference,  so  as  to  have  the  question  of  enslaving  negro  soldiers 
stand  alone,  to  be  dealt  with  by  itself ;  and  that  the  whole  power  of 
the  United  States  should  be  exerted  to  do  justice  to  those  who  had 
fought  the  battles  of  the  country,  and  been  captured  in  its  service. 
The  whole  subject  was  referred  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  the 
lieutenant  general  commanding,  who  telegraphed  me  on  the  14th  of 
April,  1864,  in  substance  :  '  Break  off  all  negotiations  on  the  subject 
of  exchange  till  further  orders.'  And,  therefore,  all  negotiations 
were  broken  off,  save  that  a  special  exchange  of  sick  and  wounded  on 
either  side  went  on.  On  the  20th  of  April  I  received  another 
telegram  of  General  Grant,  ordering  i  not  another  man  to  be  given 
to  the  rebels.'  To  that  I  answered  on  the  same  day  :  '  Lieutenant 
General  Grant's  instructions  shall  be  implicitly  obeyed.  I  assume 
that  you  do  not  mean  to  stop  the  special  exchange  of  the  sick 
and  wounded  now  going  on.'  To  this  I  received  a  reply  in  sub 
stance  :  '  Do  not  give  the  rebels  a  single  able-bodied  man.'  From 
that  hour,  so  long  as  I  remained  in  the  department,  exchanges 
of  prisoners  stopped  under  that  order,  because  I  could  not  give  the 
rebels  any  of  their  able-bodied  soldiers  in  exchange.  By  sending  the 
sick  and  wounded  forward,  however,  some  twelve  thousand  of  our 
suffering  soldiers  were  relieved,  being  upwards  of  eight  thousand 
more  than  we  gave  the  rebels.  In  August  last,  Mr.  Ould,  finding 
negotiations  were  broken  off,  and  that  no  exchanges  were  made, 
wrote  to  General  Hitchcock,  the  Commissioner,  at  Washington,  that 
the  rebels  were  ready  to  exchange,  man  for  man,  all  the  prisoners 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  47 

held  by  them,  as  I  had  proposed  in  December.  Tnder  the  instruc 
tions  of  the  lieutenant  general  I  wrote  to  Mr.  Ould,  a  letter,  which 
has  been  published,  saying:  'Do  yon  mean  to  give  np  all  your 
action,  and  revoke  all  your  laws  about  black  men  employed  as 
soldiers  ?'  These  questions  were  therein  argued  justly,  as  I  think, 
not  diplomatically,  but  obtrusively  and  demonstratively,  not  for  the 
purpose  of  furthering  exchange  of  prisoners,  but  for  the  purpose 
of  preventing  and  stopping  the  exchange,  and  furnishing  a  ground 
on  which  we  could  fairly  stand.  I  am  now  at  liberty  to  state  these 
facts,  because  thev  appear  in  the  correspondence  on  the  subject  of 
exchange,  now  on  the  public  files  of  Congress,  furnished  by  the  War 
Department  upon  resolution.  I  am  not  at  liberty  to  state  my 
opinions  as  to  the  correctness  and  propriety  of  this  course  of  action 
of  the  lieutenant  general  in  relation  to  exchanges,  because,  as  it  is 
not  proper  to  utter  a  word  of  condemnation  of  any  act  of  my  supe 
riors,  I  may  not  even  applaud  where  I  think  them  right,  lest,  not 
applauding  in  other  instances,  such  acts  as  I  may  mention  would 
imply  censure.  I  only  desire  that  the  responsibility  of  stopping 
exchanges  of  prisoners,  be  it  wise  or  unwise,  should  rest  upon  the 
lieutenant  general  commanding,  and  not  on  me.  I  have  carried  the 
weight  of  so  grave  a  matter  for  nine  months,  and  now  propose,  tis  the 
facts  are  laid  before  Congress  and  the  country,  not  to  carry  any 
longer  any  more  of  it  than  belongs  to  me." 

It  would  be  a  curious  study  to  compare  these  statements  of  a 
Federal  general  with  General  Hitchcock's  report  of  the  same  matters. 
I  have  not  the  space  to  do  so  here,  and  must  content  myself  in  using 
General  Butler  as  my  proof  that  the  reason  why  niy  aforesaid  letter 
to  General  Hitchcock  was  not  answered  was  not  that  it  was  not 
received  or  not  considered,  but  that  policy  prevented  it.  But,  as  the 
same  policy  would  not  allow  a  direct  refusal  to  accede  to  such  terms, 
my  letter,  instead  of  receiving  a  reply,  was  met  by  an  "argument 
offensively  put,"  from  another  person,  who,  doubtless,  was  much 
more  capable  of  making  it  than  General  Hitchcock.  Silence  covered 
Hitchcock,  while  General  Butler,  in  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the 
lieutenant  general,  fulminated  "obtrusively  and  demonstratively— 
not  for  the  purpose  of  furthering  exchange  of  prisoners,  but  for  the 
purpose  of  preventing  and  stopping  the  exchange."  Heaven  knows 
that  Hitchcock  had  virus  enough  to  perform  that  service  "  offensively  " 
to  the  last  degree  ;  but  the  managers  seem  to  have  thought,  and,  doubt 
less,  correctly,  he  had  a  lack  of  other  essential  qualifications.  There 
is  another  noteworthy  fact  disclosed  in  this  confession  of  General 
Butler.  It  appears  that  these  maligned  Confederates  delivered  eight 


48  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

thousand  more  sick  and  wounded  prisoners  to  him  than  they  received. 
Is  it  necessary  to  go  behind  this  pregnant  fact  to  show  any  other  proof 
that  the  Confederates  were  ready  to  agree  to  any  fair  system  of 
exchange  ?  Even  upon  a  plan  injurious  to  them  and  violative  of 
the  terms  of  the  cartel,  they  delivered  an  excess  of  eight  thousand 
prisoners  in  a  comparatively  short  space  of  time.  Indeed,  the  whole 
operation  had  become  so  monstrously  wrong  that  General  Butler, 
under  the  instincts  of  self-preservation,  proposed  to  "stand  from 
under,"  and  declined  to  carry  the  burden  any  longer.  Before,  how 
ever,  he  came  to  that  conclusion,  it  began  to  be  seriously  feared  that 
the  Confederates,  in  their  anxiety  to  secure  exchanges  on  any  terms, 
would  agree  to  the  Federal  demand  about  the  delivery  and  exchange 
of  their  own  slaves,  and^in  apprehension  of  that  result,  we  have  it 
on  the  authority  of  General  Butler  himself  that  he  and  General 
Grant  conferred  together  as  to  how  exchanges  were  to  be  prevented 
in  that  event.  "What  result  their  ingenuity  reached  we  are  not 
informed.  The  Confederates  never  gave  an  opportunity  for  dis 
closure,  as  they  maintained  their  position  on  the  slave  question  to 
the  end. 

Not  having  been  able  to  obtain  any  answer  to  my  letter  to 
General  Hitchcock,  I  made  another  move  in  August,  1861,  the 
actual  result  of  which  staggers  belief.  Under  the  instructions  of  the 
Confederate  authorities,  I  offered  to  the  United  States  their  sick  and 
wounded  without  requiring  any  equivalents.  I  tendered  ten  or 
fifteen  thousand  of  this  class,  to  be  delivered  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Savannah  river,  assuring  the  Federal  agent  that  if  the  number  for 
which  he  might  send  transportation  could  not  be  readily  made  up 
from  the  sick  and  wounded  at  Andersonville  and  elsewhere,  I  would 
supply  the  deficiency  with  well  men.  Although  this  offer  was  made 
in  the  summer  of  1864,  transportation  was  not  sent  to  the  Savannah 
river  until  about  the  middle  or  last  of  November,  and  then  I  deliv 
ered  as  many  prisoners  as  could  be  transported  with  the  means  at 
hand,  some  thirteen  thousand  in  number,  among  whom  were  more 
than  five  thousand  well  men.  It  has  been  asserted  that  no  such  offer 
was  made  in  August,  1864,  and  that  the  first  proposal,  looking  to 
anything  like  a  general  delivery  of  the  sick  and  wounded,  was  first 
made  by  the  United  States,  in  October,  1864,  and  that  the  delivery 
at  Savannah  was  in  consequence  of  this  last-mentioned  movement. 
General  Butler  so  asserted  on  the  floor  of  the  House  of  Representa 
tives,  on  the  17th  of  Jujy,  186T,  when  the  question  of  an  inquiry 
into  the  treatment  of  Confederate  soldiers  in  Northern  prisons  was 
under  discussion.  He  is  mistaken.  The  offer  in  August  was  made 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  49 

to  General  Mulford,  and  l>y  him  communicated  to  the  Federal 
authorities.  If  anybody  disputes  it,  I  appeal  to  him  for  proof. 

More  than  once  I  urged  the  mortality  at  Andersonville  as  a  rea 
son  for  haste,  yet  there  was  delay  from  August  until  Xovember  in 
sending  transportation  for  the  sick  and  wounded,  for  whom  no 
equivalents  were  asked.  It  was  during  that  interval  that  the  largest 
proportionate  mortality  occurred  at  Andersonville.  Although  the 
terms  of  mv  offer  did  not  require  the  Federal  authorities  to  deliver 
any  equivalents  for  the  ten  or  fifteen  thousand  I  promised,  yet  some 
thirty-live  hundred  sick  and  wounded  Confederate  prisoners  were 
delivered  at  that  time,  I  can  call  upon  every  Federal  and  Confed 
erate  officer  and  man  who  saw  that  cargo  of  living  death,  and  who  is 
familar  witli  the  character  of  the  deliveries  made  by  the  Confederate 
authorities,  to  bear  witness  that  none  such  was  ever  made  by  the 
latter,  even  when  the  very  sick  and  desperately  wounded  alone  were 
requested.  For  on  two  occasions  at  least  in  1S04,  such  men  were 
specially  asked  for,  hospital  boats  were  sent,  and  particular  request 
was  made  for  those  who  were  so  desperately  sick  that  it  would  be 
doubtful  whether  they  would  survive  a  removal  a  few  miles  down 
James  river.  Accordingly,  Confederate  hospitals  in  Richmond  were 
searched  for  the  worst  cases,  and  after  they  were  delivered  they  were 
taken  to  Annapolis,  Congress  was  invited  to  inspect  them,  and  for 
the  benefit  of  those  who  did  not  see  them  thev  were  photographed 
as  specimens  of  Confederate  barbarity,  and  illustrations  of  the  manner 
in  which  Fnion  soldiers  were  treated  in  the  ordinary  Southern  prisons. 
The  photographs  of  the  sick  and  diseased  men  at  Annapolis  were 
terrible  indeed,  but  the  misery  they  portrayed  was  surpassed  at 
Savannah. 

In  the  winter  of  1804-05,  General  Grant  took  control  of  matters 
relating  to  exchanges,  and  my  correspondence  on  that  subject  took 
place  with  him.  The  result  was  the  delivery  of  a  large  number  of 
prisoners  on  both  sides,  chiefly  during  the  months  of  February  and 
March,  18<)5,  too  late  for  the  returned  Confederate  soldiers  to  be  of 
any  service  to  a  cause  which,  even  before  those  dates,  had  become 
desperate.  These  deliveries  were  officer  for  officer  according  to 
grade,  and  man  for  man,  the  excess  remaining  in  captivity.  The 
deliveries  made  by  the  Confederates  were  made  at  several  points, 
east  and  west,  as  fast  as  possible,  and  their  equivalents  were  received 
in  James  river.  In  carrying  out  his  agreements  and  arrangements 
with  me,  I  found  General  Grant  to  be  scrupulously  correct.  lie 
never  deviated  in  the  slightest  from  his  contracts. 

On  the  occupation  of  Richmond  I  followed  General  Lee's  army 
4 


50  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

to  Appomatox  Court  House,  and  was  there  at  the  surrender.  I  of 
fered  my  parole  to  General  Grant  who  generously  declined  to  subject 
me  even  to  parole,  saying  that  he  did  not  consider  an  officer  of  the 
Exchange  Bureau  subject  to  capture.  He  gave  me  a  passport  and 
escort  to  Richmond,-  when  he  learned  it  was  my  purpose  to  return  to 
that  place.  Upon  my  return  to  Richmond  I  set  about  closing  up  the 
affairs  of  the  Exchange  Bureau,  knowing  that  the  end  had  come. 
At  the  expiration  of  about  ten  days,  while  thus  engaged,  I  was 
arrested  by  order  of  Mr.  Secretary  Stanton  and  thrown  into  prison. 
His  order  was  special  that  I  should  be  put  in  close  confinement. 
Seven  years  before  that  I  had  a  professional  collision  with  Mr. 
Stanton  in  the  trial  of  Daniel  E.  Sickles  for  the  murder  of  Philip 
Barton  Key.  I  was  then  United  States  District  Attorney  for  the 
District  of  Columbia,  and  he  was  one  of  the  defendant's  counsel.  I 
had  occasion  during  the  course  of  the  trial,  after  gross  and  repeated 
provocation,  to  denounce  his  conduct,  and  to  charge  that  he  had  been 
imported  into  the  case  to  play  the  part  of  a  bully  and  a  bruiser.  He 
had  not  forgotten  this  occurrence,  even  after  the  lapse  of  so  many 
years,  and  took  his  revenge  in  the  manner  indicated.  Of  the 
hundreds  of  thousands  engaged  in  the  war  on  the  Confederate  side, 
I  was  the  only  one  who  held  an  office  by  the  express  consent  of  the 
United  States.  The  cartel  provided  that  each  side  should  appoint 
an  Agent  of  Exchange.  I  was  not  only  thrown  into  prison,  but 
was  indicted  for  treason  in  Underwood's  court — treason  in  filling  an 
office  to  which,  and  to  the  incumbency  of  which  by  myself,  the 
United  States  had  assented.  All  my  official  papers,  including  those 
delivered  to  me  by  the  Federal  Agents  of  Exchange,  were  seized 
and  taken  away.  I  did  save  my  letter-book  alone,  which  I  prize 
very  highly,  if  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  show  the  malignant 
falsehoods  of  certain  publications,  some  of  them  official,  which  pur 
port  to  give  the  correspondence  of  my  office.  I  include  in  this  list 
House  Document  Ko.  32,  Second  Session,  Thirty-eighth  Congress, 
which  pretends  to  show  the  correspondence  of  the  Agents  of  Ex 
change  on  both  sides,  but  which  does  not  rise  even  to  the  dignity  of 
a  travesty.  My  house  was  also  searched,  and  my  private  papers 
taken.  A  military  commission  sat  on  me  to  find  out  whether  any 
charges  could  be  brought  against  me,  or  sustained,  if  brought. 
After  two  weeks'  incubation,  during  which  they  examined  witnesses 
ngsiinst  me,  while  I  was  not  allowed  to  be  present,  the  commission 
reported  that  they  could  find  nothing  against  me,  but  much  to  my 
credit ;  and  thereupon,  after  two  months'  confinement,  I  was  released. 
I  have  thus  given  the  more  prominent  incidents  connected  with 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  FRISONEES.  51 

the  exchange  question,  and  especially  the  matters  that  led  to  a  sus 
pension  of  the  cartel.  In  narrating  them,  I  have,  as  far  as  I  well 
could,  presented  them  in  chronological  order,  that  they  might  he 
better  grasped.  There  are  some  other  matters  connected  with  ex 
changes  which,  though  minor  in  importance,  may  he  of  interest. 

One  of  the  earliest  difficulties  connected  with  the  cartel  was 
the  matter  of  the  arrest  and  detention  of  non-combatants.  General 
Pope,  who  proclaimed  that  his  headquarters  were  in  the  saddle,  a 
thing  which  most  people  would  have  believed  without  that  informa 
tion  from  him,  on  the  23d  of  July,  1802,  one  day  after  the  adoption 
of  the  cartel,  issued  a  general  order  directing  the  arrest  of  all  disloyal 
male  citizens  within  the  Federal  lines,  or  within  their  reach  in  the 
rear.  Those  who  would  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United 
States,  and  furnish  sufficient  security  for  its  observance,  could  remain 
unmolested;  but  those  who  refused  were  to  be  removed  from  their 
homes,  and  if  found  again  within  the  lines,  or  at  any  point  in  the 
reai1,  they  were  to  be  "considered  spies  and  subjected  to  the  extreme 
rigor  of  militarv  law/'  In  pursuance  of  this  and  other  orders, 
peaceable,  non-combatant  citizens  of  the  Confederate  States,  espe 
cially  men  of  mature  age,  engaged  in  the  pursuit  of  their  ordinary 
avocations,  were  arrested  and  thrown  into  prison  or  sent  from  their 
homes.  This  was  frequently  done  during  the  march  of  the  Federal 
forces  through  the  Confederate  States,  and,  it  may  be,  in  some  cases 
under  circumstances  which  justified  the  arrest.  .But  our  complaint, 
prolonged  through  the  war,  was  loud  that  when  the  invading  army 
retired  from  the  neighborhood  where  the  arrest  was  made,  the  non- 
combatants  were  not  released  from  imprisonment.  This  practice 
forced  upon  the  Confederates  a  partial  system  of  retaliation,  and 
accordingly,  upon  the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania  by  General  Fee, 
some  fifty  non-combatants  of  that  State  and  Maryland  were  captured 
and  brought  to  Richmond.  Moreover,  some  persons  of  well-known 
Union  sentiments  within  the  Confederate  States  were  arrested  and 
confined  in  Castle  Thunder.  These  circumstances  provoked  a  long 
correspondence  between  the  respective  Agents  of  Exchange.  I 
sought  as  earnestly  as  I  could  to  establish  a  rule  which  would  pre 
vent  the  arrest  or  incarceration  of  civilians  on  either  side.  I  main 
tained  that  the  capture  of  non-combatants  in  the  general  was  illegal 
and  contrary  to  the  usages  of  civilized  warfare,  and  only  excused  the 
arrest  of  the  Pennsylvanians  on  the  ground  of  retaliation,  after  the 
failure  of  all  other  means  of  prevention.  To  show  clearly  and 
officially  what  were  the  actual  views  of  the  Confederate  Government 
in  this  matter,  I  quote  the  material  part  of  a  letter  which,  on  the 
31st  of  October,  1863,  I  addressed  to  General  S.  A.  Meredith : 


52  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

"More  than  a  year  ago,  recognizing  the  injustice  of  the  arrest  of  non- 
combatants,  I  submitted  the  following  proposition  to  the  Federal  authorities,  to 
wit :  That  peaceable,  non-combatant  citizens,  of  both  the  United  States  and  the 
Confederate  States,  who  are  not  connected  with  any  military  organization,  shall  not 
be  arrested  by  either  the  United  States  or  Confederate  armies  within  the  territory 
of  the  adverse  party.  If  this  proposition  is  too  broad,  let  the  only  exception  be  the 
case  of  a  temporary  arrest  of  parties  within  army  lines,  where  the  arresting  party 
has  good  reason  to  believe  that  their  presence  is  dangerous  to  the  safety  of  the 
army,  from  the  opportunity  afforded  of  giving  intelligence  to  the  enemy.  It  is  to 
be  understood,  however,  in  the  latter  case,  the  arrest  is  to  cease  as  soon  as  the  reason 
for  making  it  ceases,  in  the  withdrawal  of  the  army,  or  for  any  other  cause.  This 
proposal  is  understood  to  include  such  arrests  and  imprisonments  as  are  already  in 
force.  Although  this  proposition,  so  reasonable  and  humane  in  its  terms,  has  been 
before  your  Government  for  more  than  a  year,  it  has  never  been  accepted.  I  now 
again  invite  your  attention  to  it.  If  it  does  not  suit  you,  I  will  thank  you  to 
suggest  any  modification.  I  am  willing  to  adopt  any  fair  and  reciprocal  rule  that 
will  settle  this  matter  on  principle.  It  must,  however,  be  settled  by  rule.  It  can 
not,  with  any  safety,  be  determined  by  { special  cases.' " 

The  Federal  authorities  never  did  accede  to  these  terms,  or 
agree  to  the  adoption  of  any  common  rule  on  the  subject.  And  yet 
General  Hitchcock,  in  his  report,  says  that  "  the  rebels  inaugurated 
a  system  of  seizing  unoffending  citizens  of  the  United  States  and 
subjecting  them  to  maltreatment  in  various  ways,  in  order  to  effect 
a  particular  object,  which  became  apparent  when  a  demand  was 
made  for  their  release ;"  and  asserts  that  the  aforesaid  agreement  on 
the  subject,  which  the  Confederates  sought  to  obtain,  "would  have 
been  a  virtual  acknowledgment  of  the  independence  of  the  rebel 
government,  and  would  have  foreclosed  all  proceedings  of  the  United 
States  against  all  persons  whomsoever  engaged  in  the  crime  of  treason 
and  rebellion."  General  Hitchcock,  it  seems,  did  not  stop  to  inquire 
whether  the  same  argument,  if  there  was  any  force  in  it,  could  not 
just  as  easily  have  been  urged  against  the  adoption  of  any  cartel. 
But  the  pretension  that  the  rebels  "inaugurated"  the  system  of 
seizing  unoffending  citizens  is  too  bald  for  anybody's  credence. 
This  extract  from  Hitchcock's  report,  however,  discloses  one  thing, 
which  was  really  the  prime  cause  of  all  the  difficulties  connected 
with  the  detention  and  exchange  of  prisoners,  civil  and  military,  to 
wit :  an  unwillingness  to  recognize  the  equality  of  the  belligerents. 
Pray,  how,  upon  any  other  theory  than  that  of  equality,  can  a  cartel 
be  framed  or  executed  ? 

On  the  2()th  of  July,  1863,  General  John  II.  Morgan  and  his 
command  were  captured.  They  were  carried  to  Cincinnati,  and 
from  thence,  by  General  Burnside's  order,  he  and  twenty-eight  of 
his  officers  were  sent  to  the  penitentiary  at  Columbus,  where  they 
were  shaved  and  their  hair  cut  very  close  by  a  negro  convict.  They 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  53 

were  then  marched  to  the  bath-room  and  scrubbed,  and  thence  to 
their  cells.  Seven  days  afterward  forty-two  more  of  General  Mor 
gan's  officers  were  sent  from  Johnson's  Island  to  the  penitentiary, 
and  subjected  to  the  same  indignities.  On  the  o<Jth  of  July,  lN>:j? 
I  was  informed  by  the  Federal  agent  of  exchange.  General  Mere 
dith,  "that  General  John  II.  Morgan  and  his  officers  will  be  placed 
in  close  confinement,  and  held  as  hostages  for  the  members  of  ( 'olonel 
Streight's  command."  I  replied,  on  the  1st  of  August,  that  Colonel 
Streighfs  command  was  treated  exactly  as  were  other  officers.  On 
the  ^Sth  of  August  I  wrote  another  letter,  asking  the  Federal  Agent 
whether  he  wished  Colonel  Streight  to  be  shaved  and  put  in  a  felon's 
cell,  and  surest  ing.  if  he  did,  that  the  Federal  authorities  were 
pursuing  exactly  the  course  to  secure  that  result.  To  that  letter 
1  received  the  following  ivplv,  which  I  will  give  entire,  as  some 
thing  of  a  portrait  of  the  man  I  was  dealing  with: 

FORTRESS  MONROE,  September  ,')0th,  !>(;:{. 
Hon.  Robert  Ould,  Agent  of  E.>'c}i(tut/e:  Richmond,  I'd.: 

SIR: — Hud  I  succeeded,  after  waiting  thirty  hours,  iu  obtaining  an  interview 
Avith  yon,  when  I  was  last  at  City  Point,  I  had  intended  to  explain  to  you  that  the 
United  States  authorities  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  treatment  that  (lenrral 
Morgan  and  his  command  received  when  imprisoned  at  Columbus.  Such  treat 
ment  was  wholly  unauthorized. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  A.  MEREDITH, 

Brijrmlior  Gviienil  ami  Cununissituirr  l'»r  Exchange. 

A  few  days  after  the  receipt  of  this  letter.  General  Meredith 
informed  me  that  General  Morgan  and  his  officers  were  he-Id  for 
others  than  "the  members  of  Colonel  Streight's  command/'  He 
showed  me  a  letter  from  General  Hitchcock,  in  which  the  same 
statement  was  made.  Tims  it  appeals  that  I  was  tirst  notified  that 
General  Morgan  and  his  officers  would  be  placed  in  close  confine 
ment  for  the  members  of  Streight's  command — then  two  months 
afterward  I  was  informed  that  the  United  States  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  treatment  that  General  Morgan  and  his  command  received 
— and  then  I  was  told  that  General  Morgan  and  his  officers  were 
not  held  for  the  members  of  Colonel  Streight's  command.  Yet, 
during  all  this  time,  and  for  a  long  time  afterward,  General  Morgan 
and  his  officers  were  continued  in  the  penitentiary,  and  compelled 
to  suffer  all  the  indignities  of  felon  life.  It  taxes  credulity  too 
much  to  believe  that  the  United  States  were  not  responsible  for  the 
treatment  they  received,  sent  there  as  they  were  by  General  Burn- 
side,  and  kept  there  by  the  United  States  AVar  Department. 


54  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

While  on  the  subject  of  Morgan's  command,  it  may  not  be 
inappropriate  to  relate  an  incident  which  furnishes  a  dark  chapter 
in  the  history  of  paroles,  and  serves  to  show  the  times  upon  which 
the  country  had  then  fallen  My  authority  is  a  letter  from  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  Alston,  of  Morgan's  command,  to  the  Confederate 
Secretary  of  War.  On  the  5th  of  July,  1863,  General  Morgan 
captured  the  command  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Charles  II.  Hanson, 
at  Lebanon,  Kentucky.  The  latter  requested  that  he  and  his  com 
mand  be  paroled,  pledging  his  personal  honor  that  he  not  only 
would  observe  it,  but  would  see  that  every  other  one  to  whom  the 
privilege  was  extended  should  observe  it ;  and  further,  that  if  he 
should  be  ordered  back  into  service,  he  would  report  to  General 
Morgan  at  some  point  within  the  Confederate  lines.  Colonel  Han 
son  and  his  command  were  paroled,  and  as  a  return  for  this  favor, 
three  days  after,  a  portion  of  his  command  thus  paroled  actually 
captured  a  part  of  General  Morgan's  force.  Lietenant  Colonel 
Hanson  himself,  a  few  days  after  his  capture  under  the  circum 
stances  detailed,  was  ordered  to  Louisville  to  do  provost  duty.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  find  in  the  annals  of  war  a  parallel  to  this. 

Colonel  Straight  and  his  officers  were  detained  in  Richmond,  on 
allegations  from  the  highest  authority  in  Alabama,  charging  him  and 
his  officers  with  grave  offenses  as  well  against  the  laws  of  that  State 
as  the  usages  of  civilized  warfare.  I  informed  the  Federal  Agent,  in 
response  to  an  inquiry  from  him,  that  they  were  detained  "  until 
proper  inquiries  can  be  made  and  the  facts  ascertained,  when  a 
determination  will  be  made  by  the  Confederate  Government  whether 
they  come  within  the  obligations  of  the  cartel  as  prisoners  of  war,  or 
are  to  be  dealt  with  as  criminals  against  the  laws  of  war  and  the 
State."  The  right  of  the  Confederate  Government  to  detain  and  try 
Colonel  Straight  and  his  officers  was  distinctly  recognized  by  the 
LTnited  States  in  their  General  Order,  No.  100.  The  59th  paragraph 
of  that  order  declared  that  "  a  prisoner  of  war  remains  answerable  for 
his  crimes  committed  against  the  captor's  army  or  people,  committed 
before  he  was  captured,  and  for  which  he  has  not  been  punished  by 
his  own  authorities."  Moreover,  the  United  States  had  claimed  and 
exercised  the  right  of  holding  many  Confederate  officers  on  the 
merest  suspicion,  without  trial  or  proceedings  of  any  sort  against 
them.  Yet,  when  the  Confederates  retained  Colonel  Straight  and 
his  officers,  on  charges  preferred  by  the  highest  authority  in 
Alabama,  and  in  accordance  with  Federal  practice  and  general 
order,  a  great  outcry  was  made. 

Frequent  applications  were  made  for  special  exchange — that  is, 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  55 

for  the  exchange  of  a  particular  officer  for  another  particularly 
named.  I  set  mv  face  against  this  system  from  the  beginning, 
whether  the  application  came  from  one  side  or  the  other.  Fathers 
and  mothers  and  sisters  frequently  besought  me  with  tears  to  give 
their  kindred  the  benefit  of  a  special  exchange;  but  I  was  obdurate 
to  the  last.  Sometimes  they  would  appreciate  my  reason,  and 
<ro  awav  satisfied,  but  in  the  large  majority  of  cases,  knowing  only 
the  bitterness  of  their  own  hearts,  they  thought  hardly  of  me.  There 
were  many  objections  to  special  exchanges.  The  system  at  best,  was 
favoritism.  It  was  not  right  or  fair  to  pursue  a  policy,  which  would 
put  one  prisoner  in  a  more  favorable  position  than  another  of  equal 
merit.  Moreover,  it  gave  the  opportunity  to  the  belligerent  pro 
posing  such  an  exchange,  to  select  a  valuable  officer  in  the  enemy's 
hands,  and  give  for  him  one  very  worthless,  or  what  was  worse,  one 
who  had  been  tampered  with.  But  my  chief  objection  was,  that  if 
all  those  whom  the  Fnited  States  particularly  desired  were  specially 
exchanged,  the  Confederate  Government  would  have  none  in  cap 
tivity  who  could  bring  any  pressure  to  bear  in  favor  of  a  general 
exchange.  So  resolute  was  1  in  this  matter  that,  with  the  approval 
of  the  Confederate  Government,  in  one  case  I  sent  back  a  Confed 
erate  officer  who  came  to  secure  a  special  exchange,  and  in  other 
cases  I  refused  to  send  the  designated  Federal  officers,  and  gave  other 
equivalents. 

The  prisoners  on  both  sides,  when  delivered,  were  always  wel 
comed  to  their  respective  nags  with  almost  wild  delight;  but  other 
wise  it  was  not  often  that  anything  happened  to  break  the  common 
routine.  The  Federal  prisoners  were  generally  put  on  board  a 
steamer  at  Richmond,  and  then  carried  some  thirty  miles  down  the 
James  river  and  transferred  to  the  flag-of-truce  boat  "New  York." 
Once  or  twice  they  were  marched  a  shorter  distance.  They  would 
generally  meet  a  returning  body  of  Confederate  prisoners;  and  from 
the  manner  in  which  the  two  parties  met  and  fraternized,  no  one 
would  have  supposed  that  they  were  enemies,  or  believed  in  the 
doctrine  of  prize  cases.  Sometimes  they  sang,  in  turn,  their  respec 
tive  camp  songs,  and  both  sides  would  greet  any  good  hit  with 
uproarious  merriment.  I  recollect  one  occasion  when  this  amuse 
ment  was  kept  up  for  hours,  to  the  delight  of  all,  each  set  of 
prisoners  having  several  capital  voices,  with  an  apparently  exhaust- 
less  variety  of  songs,  in  which  the  names  of  all  the  notables  of  both 
armies,  and  especially  Stonewall  Jackson's,  figured. 

There  was  one  incident  in  the  course  of  deliveries  which  was 
:juite  dramatic,  though  very  painful  to  one  of  the  parties — a  Perm- 


56  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

sylvania  colonel.  In  the  beginning  of  the  war,  surgeons  were 
regarded  as  non-combatants,  and  not  subject  to  detention  on  either 
side.  A  difficulty,  however,  arose  between  the  two  governments 
about  one  Dr.  Rucker,  who  was  held  in  confinement  on  the  charge 
of  murder,  and  other  high  crimes.  The  United  States  demanded  his 
release,  and  failing  to  secure  it,  put  Dr.  Green,  a  Confederate  sur 
geon,  in  confinement  in  retaliation.  This  led  to  the  detention  of  all 
surgeons  on  both  sides.  I  made  vigorous  efforts  to  restore  the  old 
practice,  and  at  length  succeeded.  Accordingly,  a  day  wTas  fixed  for 
the  delivery  of  all  surgeons  on  both  sides  at  City  Point,  and  all  the 
Federal  surgeons  were  directed  to  be  sent  from  the  Libby  and  put 
on  board  the  flag-of -truce  steamer.  I  accompanied  the  party.  When 
we  were  nearing  the  steamer  "New  York,"  I  perceived  that  a  signal 
wras  flying  for  me  to  come  to  the  shore  with  my  boat.  I  did  so,  and 
found  there  a  communication  stating  that  Colonel  Harry  White, 
commanding  one  of  the  Pennsylvania  regiments,  had  disguised  him 
self  as  a  surgeon  and  was  then  on  board  my  boat.  I  immediately 
directed  the  prisoners  to  be  drawn  up  in  line  on  the  shore  and  made 
them  an  address,  in  which  I  recounted  the  efforts  I  had  made  to 
secure  the  immunity  of  their  class,  and  stated  that  an  officer  of  the 
line,  not  entitled  to  exchange  or  release,  was  among  them,  disguised 
as  a  surgeon.  I  then  raised  my  voice  and  shouted  :  "  Colonel  Harry 
White,  come  forth."  lie  stepped  in  front  at  once,  and  in  a  few 
words  claimed  that  he  had  the  right  to  resort  to  any  stratagem  to 
effect  his  release.  I  replied  that  I  was  not  there  to  dispute  or  affirm 
what  he  said,  but  that  he  must  return  to  Richmond  under  arrest.  It 
was  a  heavy  blow  to  him,  struck  at  the  moment  when  he  was 
sanguine  of  his  liberty.  Two  minutes  more  would  have  placed 
him  on  the  "New  York,"  where  he  would  have  been  safe,  even 
if  his  disguise  had  been  there  detected.  He  had  been  a  long  time 
in  captivity,  and  extraordinary  efforts  had  been  made  to  secure 
for  him  a  special  exchange.  He  had  been  elected  as  a  Republican 
to  the  Pennsylvania  Senate,  which,  without  him,  was  equally 
divided  between  the  war  and  anti-war  parties.  His  presence 
was  needed  to  effect  an  organization  and  working  majority  in  that 
body.  I  had  learned  these  facts  from  more  than  one  quarter,  and 
was  not  disposed  to  assist  in  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  the  war  party. 
I  was  under  no  duty  to  release  Colonel  White,  as  the  exchange  of 
officers  had  ceased.  So  obstinate  was  I,  that  when  the  Federal  Agent 
offered  me  a  major  general  and  several  officers  of  lower  grade  for 
him,  I  declined  to  accept.  I  might  have  speculated  to  great  advan 
tage  on  him  if  I  had  been  so  disposed,  and  the  situation  in  Pennsyl- 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  57 

vania  would  liave  warranted  it.  If  every  officer  and  man  had  been 
a  Harry  White,  there  never  would  have  been  any  difficulty  about 
exchanges.  Indeed,  if  the  anxiety  manifested  about  him  had  been 
distributed,  instead  of  making  him  the  reservoir  of  all,  it  would 
have  been  better  for  a  good  many  people.  "  Great  is  Diana  of  the 
Ephesians." 

Colonel  White's  was  by  no  means  the  only  case  of  false  person 
ation  during  the  war.  The  late  Secretary  of  War  was  exchanged  as 
a  private  or  non-commissioned  officer,  there  being  a  difficulty  about 
the  exchange  of  officers  at  the  time  of  his  capture.  Once  when  a 
body  of  Confederate  chaplains  was  to  be  delivered,  an  army  officer 
assumed  the  name  of  one  who  was  on  the  list,  but  who  was  too  sick 
to  be  sent,  and  came  with  the  parsons  as  one  of  them  to  Fortress 
Monroe.  They  were  put  on  board  the  "Xe\v  York,"  early  in  the  morn 
ing,  to  be  brought  up  the  James  river.  General  Mulford,  the  cour 
teous  flag-of-tmce  officer,  knowing  the  cloth  of  his  prisoners  and 
supposing  that  they  would  desire  to  have  prayers  before  breakfast, 
offered  for  that  purpose  a  .Bible  to  one  of  the  party,  and,  as  accident 
would  have  it,  gave  the  book  to  our  army  friend,  who  was  the  onlv 
bogus  chaplain  in  the  lot.  To  have  declined  would  have  exposed 
him  to  suspicion,  if  not  detection.  Although  not  a  professor  of 
religion  he  boldly  took  the  book  and  read  a  chapter.  Then  kneeling 
with  his  comrades  he  began  the  Lord's  Prayer,  and,  as  the  story  goes, 
broke  down  in  the  middle! 

I  have  named  the  person  with  whom  I  was  brought  in  contact 
as  Confederate  Agent  of  Exchange.  I  found  Colonel  Ludlow  to  be 
courteous  and  just  when  he  was  allowed  to  follow  his  own  instincts 
or  judgment.  I  believe  he  was  removed  because  he  desired  to  be 
just,  and  I  paid  him  officially  that  compliment  when  he  was  relieved 
to  give  place  to  a  supple  tool.  General  Mulford  was  a  flower  of 
chivalry  and  standing  toast  with  Confederate  prisoners,  officers  and 
men.  From  the  date  of  the  cartel  to  the  close  of  the  war  he  dis 
charged  the  responsible  duties  of  flag-of-truce  officer  and  Assistant 
Agent  of  Exchange  with  consummate  address  and  always  with  a 
courteous  spirit.  He  was  a  genuine  lover  of  fair  play.  He  never 
told  me  a  lie,  or  told  one  on  me.  I  wish  in  my  heart  I  could  say 
the  same  as  to  all  the  others.  He  was  as  kind  to  our  prisoners  as  if 
he  had  been  a  natural  brother  to  each  one  of  them.  If  he  could 
have  had  the  power  to  adjust  and  settle,  there  never  would  have 
been  any  trouble.  He  was  tied  by  others  who  did  not  feel  as  he  did. 
I  hope  I  will  do  him  no  harm  by  this  inadequate  testimonial  to  his 
virtues. 


58  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

General  Sullivan  A.  Meredith,  of  Philadelphia,  followed  Colonel 
Ludlow  as  Federal  agent  of  exchange.  At  my  first  interview  with 
him  I  strongly  suspected  that  he  had  been  sent  to  break  off  exchanges, 
instead  of  furthering  them.  I  was  convinced  of  it  afterward.  He 
abounded  in  all  the  qualities  which  would  make  him  useful  on  just 
such  a  service.  He  was  coarse,  rude,  arrogant,  and  so  unacquainted 
with  the  matters  committed  to  his  charge,  that  it  was  difficult  to 
transact  any  business  with  him. 

General  Hitchcock,  whom  I  never  saw  during  the  war,  had  his 
headquarters  at  Washington.  He  styled  himself  u  Commissioner  for 
the  Exchange  of  Prisoners."  What  his  precise  function  was  I  never 
was  able  to  learn ;  for  while  he  was  Commissioner  at  Washington, 
there  was  always  a  Federal  Agent  of  Exchange  somewhere  else. 
How  far  the  authority  of  each  extended,  or  how  far  one  was  subor 
dinate  to  the  other,  or  how  far  one  could  refuse  what  the  other 
allowed,  or  deny  what  the  other  said,  never  clearly  appeared.  I 
suppose  that  both  could  be  put  to  valuable  uses,  "  each  after  his  kind." 
As  far  as  I  could  gather,  Hitchcock  seems  to  have  been  a  sort  of 
Tycoon  of  exchanges,  solemnly  sitting  in  Washington  to  superintend 
matters  about  which  he  knew  little  or  nothing,  if  his  report  is  to  be 
believed.  He  never  condescended  to  write  to  me,  though  I  did  more 
than  once  to  him,  not  having  any  special  fear  of  his  august  sacred- 
ness.  One  of  these  letters,  which  he  ought  to  have  answered,  and 
for  his  failure  so  to  do,  he  deserves  to  be  impaled  upon  the  wrath  of 
mankind,  I  will  give.  Oh !  what  weltering  woe  and  wretchedness  it 

would  have  saved. 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  January  24th,  1864. 
Major  General  E.  A.  Hitchcock,  Agent  of  Exchange: 

SIR  : — In  view  of  the  present  difficulties  attending  the  exchange  and  release  of 
prisoners,  I  propose  that  all  such,  on  each  side,  shall  be  attended  by  a  proper  number 
of  their  own  surgeons,  who,  under  rules  to  be  established,  shall  be  permitted  to  take 
charge  of  their  health  and  comfort. 

I  also  propose  that  these  surgeons  shall  act  as  commissaries,  with  power  to 
receive  and  distribute  such  contributions  of  money,  food,  clothing  and  medicines  as 
may  be  forwarded  for  the  relief  of  prisoners.  I  further  propose  that  these  surgeons 
be  selected  by  their  own  governments,  and  that  they  shall  have  full  liberty  at  any 
and  all  times,  through  the  Agents  of  Exchange,  to  make  reports  not  only  of  their 
own  acts,  but  of  any  matters  relating  to  the  welfare  of  the  prisoners. 
Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

ROBERT  OULD, 

Agent  of  Exchange. 

It  gives  me  no  pleasure  to  write  these  things  ;  nor  do  I  seek  to 
bring  myself  unduly  forward  in  this  matter.  I  wish  the  cup  could 
pass  from  me.  But  the  official  position  I  occupied  during  the  war 


THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  59 

seems  to  require  that  I  should  step  to  the  front  to  vindicate  the  truth 
of  history,  when  false  statements,  official  and  unofficial,  are  so  rife. 
It  is  not  done  in  the  interest  of  hate,  nor  to  revive  sectional  contro 
versy,  HOY  to  inflame  the  now  subsiding  passions  of  war.  Least 
of  all  do  I  desire  to  put  any  stigma  upon  the  people  of  the  Xorth. 
The  sins  which  were  committed  were  those  of  individuals,  and  they 
were  few  in  number.  I  believe  a  true  understanding  of  the  facts 
in  connection  with  the  exchange  of  prisoners  and  their  treatment, 
instead  of  increasing  any  feeling  of  hate  between  the  Xorth  and 
South  would  tend  to  allay  it.  It  would  then  be  seen  that  the  sections 
were  not  to  be  blamed — that  the  people  on  both  sides  were  not  justly 
amenable  to  reproach — that  honor,  integrity,  and  Christian  civiliza 
tion  reigned  Xorth  and  South,  and  that  our  civil  war,  though  neces 
sarily  harsh  and  cruel  in  its  general  aspect,  was  illustrated  by  high 
and  shining  examples  of  moderation,  kindness,  good  faith,  generosity, 
and  knightly  courtesy. 

o         «/  «/ 


GENEEAL  REYNOLDS  LAST  BATTLE. 


BY   MAJOR   JOSEPH    G.    ROSENGARTEN. 


GETTYSBTJRG  has  become  a 
consecrated  name,  and  among 
all  the  long  array  of  those  who 
fell  there,  John  Fulton  Rey 
nolds  will  forever  stand  ont 
foremost.  A  soldier  by  pro 
fession,  he  won  a  reputation 
that  gave  promise  of  achieve 
ment,  not  fully  realized  by 
reason  of  his  early  death.  A 
native  of  Pennsylvania,  it  was 
eminently  fitting  that  he 
should  lead  the  van  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  when 
it  hurried  to  the  defense  of 
the  State  in  which  he  was 

born.  Singularly  beloved  by  his  comrades  in  the  army,  from  his 
West  Point  days,  through  his  campaigns  in  Florida,  his  services  on 
the  frontier,  his  life  upon  the  Plains,  he  was  admired  by  his  volunteer 
soldiers,  and  by  the  great  number  of  civilians  with  whom  he  was 
brought  into  intimate  relationship  in  the  two  campaigns  in  Pennsyl 
vania  and  Maryland,  in  which  he  was  prominently  engaged.  Free 
from  any  personal  ambition,  he  devoted  himself  to  his  duty  in  every 
post  in  which  he  was  placed,  and  he  won  the  confidence  alike  of 
subordinates  and  superiors,  so  that  his  name  was  constantly  suggested 
for  the  very  highest  command.  His  modest  preference  for  Meade 
as  the  chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  when  Hooker  was  relieved, 
no  doubt  brought  Reynolds  to  the  spot  where  he  found  his  death ; 
but  it  was  characteristic  of  his  life,  and  he  undoubtedly  preferred  to 
serve  in  the  immediate  command  of  the  lesser  body  of  troops,  that 
he  might  inspire  them  with  his  own  example  of  courage,  rather  than 
to  take  upon  himself  responsibilities  without  adequate  power.  Im 
petuous  without  rashness,  rapid  without  haste,  ready  without 
heedlessness,  he  liked  better  to  be  at  the  head  of  a  compact  corps 
than  to  command  a  scattered  army. 

In  no  instance  of  the  many  supplied  by  West  Point,  was  there 
(60) 


GENERAL  REYNOLDS'  LAST  BATTLE.  61 

a  better  example  than  that  of  Reynolds  of  the  wonderful  effects  of  a 
West  Point  training  upon  a  characteristic  American  mind.  II  ere  was  a 
lad  taken  from  a  modest  family,  brought  up  in  a  country  town,  grown 
into  manhood  at  West  Point,  sent  to  Florida,  then  from  point 
to  point  through  the  West,  slowly  earning  his  promotion,  recognized 
as  a  good  soldier,  and  so  good  a  disciplinarian,  that  even  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  he  was  appointed  to  duty  at  West  Point,  and 
soon  after  assigned  to  the  slow  business  of  organizing  one  of  the 
new  regular  regiments,  then  given  a  brigade  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Reserves,  and  from  that  moment  showing  himself  master  of  the  art 
of  war,  and  rapidly  rising  to  the  height  of  every  new  command,  of 
every  novel  duty,  of  every  fresh  demand  upon  his  military  skill  and 
resources.  It  was  his  brigade  that  first  smelled  powder  at  Draines- 
ville  ;  it  was  his  division  that  made  the  stoutest  resistance  on  the 
Peninsula,  and  his  imprisonment  at  Richmond  after  his  capture, 
ended  onlv  in  time  to  find  him  sent  to  Pennsylvania  to  organize  and 
command  the  hasty  levies  of  militiamen,  brought  together  to  resist 
the. raid  of  1S02.  lie  thoroughly  inspired  his  subordinates  with  his 
own  zeal,  and  the  men  who  served  under  him  felt  that  unconscious 
and  irresistible  strength,  which  comes  from  a  commander  fully 
competent  to  his  work,  ready  to  do  it  with  whatever  forces  are 
given  him,  and  able  to  command  success  from  every  opportunity. 
That  task  done,  lie  led  the  division  which,  at  the  second  J>ull  Run, 
held  its  own  against  overwhelming  odds,  and  helped  to  save  the- 
army.  His  corps  won  the  only  success  at  Fredericksbnrg,  and  in 
the  operations  that  ended  so  disastrously  at  Chancellorsville,  Reynolds 
took  a  leading  and  always  prominent  part.  In  all  the  intrigues  of 
the  army,  and  the  interference  of  the  politicians  in  its  management, 
he  silently  set  aside  the  tempting  offers  to  take  part,  and  served  his 
successive  commanders  with  unswerving  loyalty  and  zeal  and  faith. 
When  the  Gettysburg  campaign  was  inaugurated,  he  Avas  as 
signed  to  the  command  of  the  three  corps,  his  own,  the  First,  Sickles' 
Third  and  Howard's  Eleventh,  and  led  the  left  wing  in  its  rapid 
passage  through  the  country  that  lay  in  front  of  Washington,  pro 
tecting  it  from  the  armies  that  moved  up  in  the  sheltered  valleys, 
feeling  them  through  the  gaps,  offering  them  battle,  crossing  the 
Potomac  and  following  and  seeking  to  engage  Lee's  forces  wherever 
they  could  be  found.  In  the  midst  of  this  energetic  and  unceasing 
action,  came  the  sudden  order  relieving  Hooker  from  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  it  is  a  tradition  of  Reynold,-;1 
Corps  that  the  post  was  offered  to  him,  that  he  made  the  accepting  of 
it  conditional  upon  being  left  absolutely  free  and  untrammeled  from 


62  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

any  interference  or  supervision  from  Washington ;  that  being 
denied,  he  was  asked  who  ought  to  have  the  command,  and  said  that 
Meade  was  the  man,  and  it  was  to  his  persuasion  and  the  promise  of 
his  aid,  that  Meade  yielded.  He  was  with  Meade  at  Frederick  when 
the  order  assigning  Meade  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  came,  and  during  the  brief  hours  of  that  summer  night  he 
aided  Meade  in  working  out  the  plan  which  ended  in  Gettysburg. 
It  was  characteristic  of  the  man  that  from  that  momentous  interview, 
he  rushed  to  the  front  and  swooped  down  on  a  poor  German  cavalry 
general,  safely  ensconced  in  a  Maryland  border  village,  sending  in 
as  dispatches  from  his  scouts  and  his  own  observations  reports  made 
up  of  the  rumors  published  in  the  newspapers.  The  poor  German 
was  soon  sent  to  the  rear,  never  more  to  be  heard  of,  and  a  trusty 
soldier  put  in  his  place,  while  Reynolds  hurried  on  to  concentrate 
his  forces  and  secure  the  combined  strength  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  for  the  great  struggle  that  was  at  hand. 

Reynolds  knew  Buford  thoroughly,  and  knowing  him  and  the 
value  of  cavalry  under  such  a  leader,  sent  them  through  the  mountain 
passes  beyond  Gettysburg  to  find  and  feel  the  enemy.  The  old  rule 
would  have  been  to  keep  them  back  near  the  infantry,  but  Reynolds 
sent  Buford  on,  and  Buford  went  on,  knowing  that  wherever  Rey 
nolds  sent  him,  he  was  sure  to  be  supported,  followed,  and  secure. 
It  was  Buford  who  first  attracted  Reynolds'  attention  to  the  concen 
tration  of  roads  that  gave  Gettysburg  its  strategic  importance,  and 
it  was  Reynolds  who  first  appreciated  the  strength  and  value  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  and  the  plateau  between  that  point  and  Round  Top, 
as  the  stronghold  to  be  secured  for  the  concentration  of  the  scattered 
corps  and  as  the  place  where  Meade  could  put  his  army  to  meet  and 
overthrow  the  larger  body  he  was  pursuing.  Together  they  found 
Gettysburg  and  made  it  the  spot  upon  which  the  Union  forces  won 
a  victory  that  was  bought  with  his  among  the  precious  lives  lost 
there.  Buford  and  Reynolds  were  soldiers  of  the  same  order,  and 
each  found  in  the  other  just  the  qualities  that  were  most  needed  to 
perfect  and  complete  the  task  intrusted  to  them.  The  brilliant 
achievement  of  Buford,  with  his  small  body  of  cavalry,  up  to  that 
time  hardly  appreciated  as  to  the  right  use  to  be  made  of  them,  is 
but  too  little  considered  in  the  history  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 
It  was  his  foresight  and  energy,  his  pluck  and  self-reliance,  in  thrust 
ing  forward  his  forces  and  pushing  the  enemy,  and  thus  inviting, 
ahnost  compelling  their  return,  that  brought  on  the  engagement  of 
the  first  of  July. 

Buford  counted  on  Reynolds'  support,  and  he  had  it  fully,  faith- 


GENERAL  REYNOLDS'  LAST  BATTLE.  63 

fully,  and  energetically.  Reynolds  counted  in  turn  on  having  within, 
his  roach  and  at  his  immediate  service  at  least  the  three  corps  that 
belonged  to  him,  and  there  can  he  little  question  that  if  they  had 
been  up  as  promptly  as  he  was  in  answer  to  Buford' s  call,  the  line  he 
had  marked  out  would  have  been  fully  manned  and  firmly  held, 
while  Meade's  concentration  behind  Gettysburg  would  have  gone  on 
easily,  and  the  whole  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  have  done 
briefly  and  effectually  what  was  gained  only  at  the  end  of  three  days 
of  hard  fighting,  with  varying  successes  that  more  than  once  threat 
ened  to  turn  against  ns,  and  the  loss  on  our  side  would  have  been  so 
much  less  that  the  pursuit  of  Lee's  forces  could  have  been  made 
promptly  and  irresistibly.  It  is  not,  however,  given  to  all  men  to  be 
of  the  same  spirit,  and  the  three  corps  that  were  under  Reynolds 
followed  his  orders  in  a  very  different  way  from  that  in  which  he 
always  did  his  work.  AVhen  he  got  Buford's  demand  for  infantry 
support  on  the  morning  of  the  first,  it  was  just  what  Reynolds  expec 
ted,  and  with  characteristic  energy,  he  went  forward,  saw  Buford, 
accepted  at  once  the  responsibility,  and  returning  to  find  the  leading 
division  of  the  First  Corps  (Wads worth's),  took  it  in  hand,  brought 
it  to  the  front,  put  it  in  position,  renewed  his  orders  for  the  rest  of 
the  corps,  assigned  the  positions  for  the  other  divisions,  sent  for  his 
other  corps,  urged  their  coming  with  the  greatest  speed,  directed  the 
point  to  be  held  by  the  reserve,  renewed  his  report  to  Meade  that 
Buford  had  found  the  place  for  a  battle,  and  that  he  had  begun  it, 
then  calmly  and  coolly  hurried  some  fresh  troops  forward  to  till  a 
gap  in  his  lengthening  lines,  and  as  he  returned  to  find  fresh  divisions, 
fell  at  the  first  onset. 

The  suddenness  of  the  shock  was  in  itself,  perhaps,  a  relief  to 
those  who  were  nearest  to  Reynolds.  In  the  full  flush  of  life  and 
health,  vigorously  leading  on  the  troops  in  hand,  and  energetically 
summoning  up  the  rest  of  his  command,  watching  and  even  leading 
the  attack  of  a  comparatively  small  body,  a  glorious  picture  of  the 
best  type  of  military  leader,  superbly  mounted,  and  horse  and  man 
sharing  in  the  excitement  of  the  shock  of  battle,  Reynolds  was,  of 
course,  a  shining  mark  to  the  enemy's  sharpshooters.  He  had  taken 
his  troops  into  a  heavy  growth  of  timber  on  the  slope  of  a  hill-side, 
and,  under  their  regimental  and  brigade  commanders,  the  men  did 
their  work  well  and  promptly.  Returning  to  join  the  expected 
divisions,  he  was  struck  by  a  Minnie  ball,  fired  by  a  sharpshooter 
hidden  in  the  branches  of  a  tree  aniost  overhead,  and  killed  at  once ; 
his  horse  bore  him  to  the  little  clump  of  trees,  where  a  cairn  of  stones 
and  a  rude  mark  on  the  bark,  now  almost  overgrown,  still  tells  the 


64:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

fatal  spot.  The  battle  went  on  in  varying  fortune,  and  so  long  as 
the  influence  of  his  orders  that  had  inspired  men  and  officers  could 
still  he  felt,  all  went  well ;  hut  when  the  command  had  heen  changed 
by  the  successive  arrival  of  generals  who  outranked  each  other,  what 
there  was  of  plan  could  hardly  be  made  out,  and  the  troops  of  the 
First  Corps,  without  reinforcements  and  worn  out  and  outnumbered, 
fell  back  at  first  with  some  show  of  order,  and  then  as  best  they 
could,  to  find  shelter  in  the  lines  pointed  out  by  Reynolds  for  the 
concentration  of  his  fresh  troops.  Thus  even  after  his  death,  his 
military  foresight  had  provided  for  the  temporary  defeat,  which 
prepared  the  way  for  the  great  victory. 

It  is  a  striking  proof  of  the  discipline  he  had  taught  his  own 
corps,  that  the  news  of  the  death,  although  it  spread  rapidly  and 
that  at  a  time  when  the  inequality  of  numbers  became  apparent, 
produced  no  ill  effect,  led  to  no  disorder,  changed  no  disposition  that 
he  had  directed,  and  in  itself  made  the  men  only  the  more  eager  to 
carry  out  his  orders.  At  the  moment  that  his  body  was  taken  to 
the  rear,  for  his  death  was  instantaneous,  two  of  his  most  gallant 
staff  officers,  Captain  Riddle  and  Captain  Wadsworth,  in  pursuance 
of  his  directions,  effected  a  slight  movement  which  made  prisoners 
of  Archer's  Brigade,  so  that  the  rebel  prisoners  went  to  the  rear 
almost  at  the  same  time,  and  their  respectful  conduct  was  in  itself 
the  highest  tribute  they  could  pay  to  him  who  had  thus  fallen. 
While  his  body  lay  in  the  little  house  on  the  Emmetsburg  road, 
which  he  had  passed  in  such  full  life  only  a  few  short  hours  before, 
Major  Baird,  his  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  was  practically  carrying 
out  his  orders  in  the  disposition  of  the  troops  as  they  came  up,  and 
General  Ilofmann,  whose  Fifty-sixth  Pennsylvania  had  made  the 
first  onset,  was  supported  by  Wadsworth,  himself  in  the  far  front, 
until  other  regiments  could  be  deployed  and  the  line  taken.  From 
the  extreme  left,  where  Colonel  Chapman  Biddle,  in  charge  of  the 
brigade,  and  Colonel  Alexander  Biddle,  in  immediate  command  of 
the  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-first  Pennsylvania,  which  withstood 
the  shock  of  attack  quite  without  support  and  literally  in  air,  that  is, 
with  no  troops  or  even  natural  or  artificial  cover  to  protect  their 
exposed  flank,  to  the  extreme  right,  where  the  Eleventh  Corps  was 
at  last  put  in  position,  the  First  Corps  was  deployed  in  thin  ranks. 
Reynolds  had  counted  on  having  the  Third  Corps  well  in  hand  to 
extend  his  line  to  the  left,  but  it  was  late  in  starting,  late  in  moving, 
lost  its  way  and  got  far  out  into  the  hostile  lines,  and  got  back  only 
by  Humphrey's  skill  and  readiness,  and  long  before  they  were  on 
the  field,  Reynolds'  dead  body  was  on  its  way  to  a  place  of  safety. 


GENERAL  REYNOLDS'  LAST  BATTLE.  05 

"While  the  battle  waged  in  the  woods  in  front  of  the  Seminary, 
and  the  overwhelming  forces  came  out  from  behind  the  ridges  that 
had  sheltered  them  from  sight,  Reynolds'  aides  and  messengers  were 
busy  bringing  to  Meade  news  of  the  conflict,  looking  for  Howard  to 
urge  forward  his  corps,  and  hunting  up  Sickles  to  put  him  on  the 
right  mid.  Bnford  was  busy,  too,  in  making  his  little  cavalry  force, 
with  its  few  batteries  of  horse  artillery,  serve  to  support  in  turn  the 
infantry,  which  had  come  forward  at  his  demand,  and  thus  lengthening 
out  the  hours  of  the  battle  before  the  troops  came  up.  It  was 
Reynolds  who  had  pointed  out  Cemetery  Hill  as  the  key  of  the 
position,  on  Avhich  he  saw  that  Meade  must  tight  to  win,  arid  while 
some  of  the  horse  batteries,  shattered  and  badly  used  up,  went  into 
position  there,  his  body  lay  dead  and  stark  in  a  little  house  at  the 
foot  of  the  hill.  It  was  only  after  the  arrival  of  the  head  of  Howard's 
command  that  Schurz  took  his  division  out  to  support  the  right  of 
the  First  Corps,  and  the  other  division  took  its  place  as  a  reserve  on 
Cemetery  Hill,  and  after  Reynolds'  stall'  had  communicated  his  last 
orders  to  Doubleday  and  Howard,  who  in  turn  succeeded  to  the 
command,  that  the  necessity  arose  of  providing  a  safe  and  suitable 
place  for  the  care  of  the  sacred  dust.  In  the  midst  of  the  turning 
tide,  when  it  was  feared  that  the  day  was  lost,  the  positions  turned, 
and  stragglers  began  to  pour  in  from  the  front,  an  ambulance  started 
oil'  with  Reynolds'  body,  in  charge  of  his  faithful  and  gallant  orderly, 
and  one  or  two  others.  Soon  after  leaving  the  town  behind,  Hancock 
met  the  little  cortege,  and  it  was  stopped  to  give  him  the  last  news 
of  the  day,  while  on  the  arrival  at  Meade' s  headquarters,  in  the  midst 
of  sincere  expressions  of  dee})  sorrow  and  an  overwhelming  loss, 
time  was  taken  to  explain  to  Meade,  and  Warren,  and  Hunt,  and 
William.-,  and  Tyler,  all  that  could  serve  to  explain  the  actual  con 
dition  of  aifairs,  the  real  state  of  the  case,  the  advantages  of  the 
position,  the  need  of  troops  and  the  necessity  of  moving  immediately 
to  the  front. 

As  Meade  went  off  in  that  direction,  the  little  group  carried  on 
their  sacred  burden  until  the  railroad  was  reached.  From  that 
point  to  Baltimore  was  a  comparatively  easy  journey,  and  then 
came  the  sad,  slow  move  to  Philadelphia  and  Lancaster,  where,  at 
last,  on  the  Fourth  of  July,  when  the  army  of  the  Potomac  had 
been  declared  the  victor  on  the  field  of  Gettysburg,  Reynolds  was 
buried  in  the  tranquil  cemetery,  where  he  lies  in  the  midst  of  his 
family,  near  the  scenes  of  his  own  childhood,  and  on  the  soil  of  his 
native  State,  in  whose  defense,  and  in  the  service  of  the  cause  of 
the  Union,  he  had  given  up  his  life.  The  record  of  his  career 
5 


66  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

would  not  be  complete  without  an  expression  of  regret  that  due 
justice  was  not  done  his  services  and  his  memory  by  those  who  best 
knew  both — his  immediate  commander,  and  those  in  authority  at 
Washington.  Yet,  in  spite  of  the  brief  and  imperfect  record  that 
has  been  made,  his  name  is  still  affectionately  cherished  by  his  old 
comrades  of  the  regular  army ;  by  all  who  served  with  him  in  his 
successive  commands ;  by  the  veterans  of  his  own  First  Corps ;  by 
the  volunteers  and  militia  who  felt  his  force  and  will  and  military 
qualities,  even  in  their  brief  term  of  service  under  him.  To  their 
united  loyal  efforts  and  assistance,  and  to  the  persistent  energy  of  a 
few  of  his  old  officers,  is  due  the  statue  of  Reynolds ;  noble  it  stands 
on  Cemetery  Hill,  looking  over  Gettysburg,  and  out  beyond  to  the 
long  line  of  wooded  country  through  which  he  moved  with  his 
troops,  and  to  the  little  knoll  where  he  fell  in  the  very  front,  and 
almost  at  the  first  onset.  It  is  right  that  his  memorial  should  thus 
command  the  field,  for  his  influence  made  itself  felt  through  the 
long  days  of  that  great  battle,  and  its  final  success  was  largely  due 
to  the  plans  he  had  made  and  the  operations  he  had  conducted. 

The  history  of  Gettysburg  yet  remains  to  be  written.  So  barren 
is  the  official  record  that  a  very  gallant  officer  of  the  old  First  Corps 
said  once  that  he  often  wondered  if  he  had  really  been  there,  for  he 
looked  in  vain  at  the  official  reports  for  any  mention  of  his  com 
mand,  and  yet  Dick  Coulter  was  never  in  action  without  leaving  his 
mark.  There  have  been  hot  and  angry  disputes,  and  an  amount  of 
angry  recrimination  and  plain  talk  between  very  prominent  general 
officers  as  to  their  respective  shares  in  the  credit  of  the  battle,  and 
there  have  been  learned  essays  on  the  strategy  and  grand  tactics  of 
the  operations  that  made  part  of  the  campaign  of  Gettysburg,  by 
men  who  never  set  a  squadron  in  the  field,  but  the  whole  story  still 
remains  to  be  told.  Perhaps  the  Count  of  Paris  may  put  the  record 
straight,  for  his  history  of  our  great  civil  war  seems  likely  to  be  the 
best,  and  to  serve  as  the  last  resort,  beyond  which  there  will  be  no 
appeal.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  subject  is  one  that  ought  to  be  prop 
erly  and  exhaustively  treated,  and  it  would  be  well  if  the  entire  and 
complete  set  of  official  reports  from  officers  of  all  grades  and  arms 
of  service  engaged  in  the  battle,  could  be  published  from  the 
archives  at  "Washington.  If  we  cannot  get  an  official  history  of  the 
war,  such  as  the  German  and  French  staff  have  already  supplied  for 
their  campaign,  let  us  have  at  least  the  sources  of  history,  the  reports 
that  give  the  story  as  it  was  told  at  the  time.  Reynolds  is  in  no  need 
of  posthumous  fame,  but  the  country  ought  to  know  what  such  a 
man  did,  and  then  it  could  the  better  judge  of  what  it  lost  in  a  life 
so  prematurely  cut  short  in  its  service. 


THE  LAST  CONFEDERATE  SURRENDER. 


BY    LIEUTENANT    GENERAL    RICHARD    TAYLOR. 


To  WRITE  an  impartial  and 
unprejudiced  account  of  ex 
citing  contemporary  events 
has  always  been  a  difficult 
task.  More  especially  is  tin's 
true  of  civil  strife,  which,  like 
all  "family  jars/'  evolves  a 
peculiar  flavor  of  bitterness. 
]>ut  slight  sketches  of  minor 
incidents,  by  actors  and  eye 
witnesses,  may  prove  of  ser 
vice  to  the  future  writer,  who 
undertakes  the  more  ami  >itious 
and  severe  duty  of  historian. 
The  following  memoir  ±><>uf 
scrvlr  has  this  object. 
Tn  the  summer  of  1S(54-,  after  the  close  of  the  lied  river  cam 
paign,  I  was  ordered  to  cross  the  Mississippi,  and  report  my  arrival 
on  the  east  bank  by  telegraph  to  Richmond.  All  fhe  fortiiied  posts 
on  the  river  were  held  by  the  Federals,  and  the  intermediate  portions 
of  the  stream  closely  guarded  by  gunboats  to  impede  and,  as  far  as 
possible,  prevent  passage.  This  delayed  the  transmission  of  the 
order  above-mentioned  until  August,  when  I  crossed  at  a  point  just 
above  the  mouth  of  the  lied  river.  On  a  dark  night,  in  a  small 
canoe,  with  horses  swimming  alongside,  I  got  over  without  attracting 
the  attention  of  a  gunboat,  anchored  a  short  distance  below.  Wood- 
ville,  Wilkinson  county,  Mississippi,  was  the  nearest  place  in 
telegraphic  communication  with  Richmond.  Here,  in  reply  to 
a  dispatch  to  Richmond,  I  was  directed  to  assume  command  of  the 
Department  of  Alabama,  Mississippi,  etc.,  with  headquarters  at 
Meridian,  Mississippi,  and  informed  that  President  Davis  would,  at 
an  early  day,  meet  me  at  Montgomery,  Alabama.  The  military 
situation  was  as  follows :  Sherman  occupied  Atlanta,  Hood  lying 
some  distance  to  the  southwest :  Farrajnit  had  forced  the  defenses  of 

"  o 

(67J 


C8  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Mobile  bay,  capturing  Fort  Morgan,  etc.,  and  the  Federals  held 
Pensacola,  but  had  made  no  movements  into  the  interior. 

Major  General  Maury  commanded  the  Confederate  forces 
garrisoning  Mobile  and  adjacent  works,  with  Commodore  Farrand, 
Confederate  Navy,  in  charge  of  several  armed  vessels.  Small  bodies 
of  troops  were  stationed  at  different  points  through  the  department, 
and  Major  General  Forrest,  with  his  division  of  cavalry,  was  in  the 
Northeast  Mississippi.  Directing  this  latter  officer  to  move  his 
command  across  the  Tennessee  river,  and  use  every  effort  to 
interrupt  Sherman's  communications  south  of  Nashville,  I  proceeded 
to  Mobile  to  inspect  the  fortifications ;  thence  to  Montgomery, 
to  meet  President  Davis.  The  interview  extended  over  many 
hours,  and  the  military  situation  was  freely  discussed.  Our  next 
meeting  was  at  Fortress  Monroe,  where,  during  his  confinement,  I 
obtained  permission  to  visit  him.  The  closing  scenes  of  the  great 
drama  succeeded  each  other  with  startling  rapidity.  Sherman 
marched,  unopposed,  to  the  sea.  Hood  was  driven  from  Nashville 
across  the  Tennessee,  and  asked  to  be  relieved.  Assigned  to  this 
duty  I  met  him  near  Tupelo,  North  Mississippi,  and  witnessed  the 
melancholy  spectacle  presented  by  a  retreating  army.  Guns,  small- 
arms  and  accoutrements  lost,  men  without  shoes  or  blankets,  and  this 
in  a  winter  of  unusual  severity  for  that  latitude.  Making  every 
effort  to  re-equip  this  force,  I  suggested  to  General  Lee,  then  com 
manding  all  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy,  that  it  should  be  moved 
to  the  Carolinas,  to  interpose  between  Sherman's  advance  and  his 
(Lee's)  lines  of  supply,  and,  in  the  last  necessity,  of  retreat.  The 
suggestion  was  adopted,  and  this  force  so  moved.  General  Wilson, 
with  a  well-appointed  and  ably-led  command  of  Federal  cavalry, 
moved  rapidly  through  North  Alabama,  seized  Selma,  and,  turning 
east  to  Montgomery,  continued  into  Georgia. 

General  Canby,  commanding  the  Union  armies  in  the  South 
west,  advanced  up  the  eastern  shore  of  Mobile  bay  and  invested 
Spanish  Fort  and  Blakely,  important  Confederate  works  in  that 
quarter.  After  repulsing  an  assault,  General  Maury,  in  accordance 
with  instructions,  withdrew  his  garrisons,  in  the  night,  to  Mobile, 
and  then  evacuated  the  city,  falling  back  to  Meridian,  on  the  line 
of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railway.  General  Forrest  was  drawn  in 
to  the  same  point,  and  the  little  army,  less  than  eight  thousand  of 
all  arms,  held  in  readiness  to  discharge  such  duties  as  the  waning 
fortunes  of  the  "cause"  and  the  honor  of  its  arms  might  demand. 

Intelligence  of  Lee's  surrender  reached  us.  Staff  officers  from 
Johnston  and  Sherman  came  across  the  country  to  inform  Canby 


THE  LAST  CONFEDERATE  SURRENDER.  fiQ 

and  myself  of  their  "•convention."  Whereupon  an  interview  was 
arranged  between  us  to  determine  a  course  of  action,  and  a  place 
selected  ten  miles  north  of  Mobile,  near  the  railway.  Accompanied 
by  a  staff  officer.  Colonel  William  M.  Levy  (now  a  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Louisiana),  and  making  nse  of  a  "'hand  car,''  I  reached 
the  appointed  spot,  and  found  General  Canby  with  a  large  escort, 
and  many  stai?  and  other  officers.  Among  these  I  recognized  some 
old  friends,  notably  General  Canby  himself  and  Admiral  James 
Palmer.  All  extended  cordial  greetings.  A  few  moments  of  pri 
vate  conversation  witli  Canby  led  to  the  establishment  of  a  truce,  to 
await  further  intelligence  from  the  Xorth.  Forty-eight  hours'  notice 
was  to  be  given  by  the  party  desiring  to  terminate  the  truce.  We 
then  joined  the  throng  of  officers,  and  although  every  one  present 
felt  a  deep  conviction  that  the  last  hour  of  the  sad  strui^le 
approached,  no  allusion  was  made  to  it.  Subjects  awakening  memo 
ries  of  the  past,  when  all  were  sons  of  a  loved,  united  country,  were, 
as  bv  the  natural  selection  of  go:>d  breeding,  chosen.  .V  bountiful 
luncheon  was  so;>n  spread,  and  I  was  invited  to  partake  of  pan's, 
champagne-frappe,  and  other  "delights,"  which,  to  me,  had  lon^ 
been  as  lost  arts.  As  we  took  our  seats  at  the  table,  a  military  band 
in  attendance  commenced  playing  "  Hail  Columbia."  Excusing  him 
self,  General  Canbv  walked  to  the  door.  The  music  ceased  for  a 
moment,  and  then  the  strain  of  "Dixie"  was  heard.  Old  Kroissart 
records  no  gentler  act  of  "courtesie."  Warmly  tliankinir  General 
Canby  for  his  delicate  consideration,  I  asked  for  "Hail  Columbia," 
and  proposed  we  should  unite  in  the  hope  that  our  Columbia  would 
soon  be,  once  more,  a  happy  land.  This  and  other  kindred  senti 
ments  were  duly  honored  in  "frappe,"  and,  after  much  pleasant 
intercourse,  the  party  separated. 

The  succeeding  hours  were  filled  with  a  grave  responsibility, 
which  could  not  be  evaded  or  shared.  Circumstances  had  appointed 
me  to  watch  the  dying  agonies  of  a  cause  that  had  fixed  the  attention 
of  the  world.  To  my  camp,  as  the  last  refuge  in  the  storm,  came 
many  members  of  the  Confederate  Congress.  These  gentlemen 
were  urged  to  go  at  once  to  their  respective  homes,  and,  by  precept 
and  example,  teach  the  people  to  submit  to  the  inevitable,  obey  the 
laws,  and  resume  the  peaceful  occupations  on  which  society  depends. 
This  advice  was  followed,  and  with  excellent  effect  on  public 
tramjuility. 

General  Canby  dispatched  that  his  government  disavowed  the 
Johnston-Sherman  convention,  and  it  would  be  his  duty  to  resume 
hostilities.  Almost  at  the  same  instant  came  the  news  of  Johnston's 


70  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAE. 

surrender.  There  was  no  room  for  hesitancy.  Folly  and  madness 
combined  would  not  have  justified  an  attempt  to  prolong  a  hopeless 
contest. 

General  Canby  was  informed  that  I  desired  to  meet  him  for  the 
purpose  of  negotiating  a  surrender  of  my  forces,  and  that  Commo 
dore  Farrand,  commanding  the  armed  vessels  in  the  Alabama  river, 
desired  to  meet  Hear  Admiral  Thatcher  for  a  similar  purpose. 
Citroiiville,  some  forty  miles  north  of  Mobile,  was  the  appointed 
place;  and  there,  in  the  early  days  of  May,  1865,  the  great  war 
virtually  ended. 

After  this,  no  hostile  gun  was  fired,  and  the  authority  of  the 
United  States  was  supreme  in  the  land.  Conditions  of  surrender 
were  speedily  determined,  and  of  a  character  to  soothe  the  pride  of 
the  vanquished — officers  to  retain  side-arms,  troops  to  turn  in  arms 
and  equipments  to  their  own  ordnance  officers,  so  of  the  quarter 
master  and  commissary  stores;  the  Confederate  cotton  agent  for 
Alabama  and  Mississippi  to  settle  his  accounts  with  the  Treasury 
Agent  of  the  United  States ;  muster-rolls  to  be  prepared,  etc. ; 
transportation  to  be  provided  for  the  men.  All  this  under  my  con 
trol  and  supervision.  Here  a  curious  incident  may  be  mentioned. 
At  an  early  period  of  the  war,  when  Colonel  Albert  Sidney  Johnston 
retired  to  the  south  of  the  Tennessee  river,  Isham  G.  Harris,  Governor 
of  Tennessee,  accompanied  him,  taking,  at  the  same  time,  the  coin 
from  the  vaults  of  the  State  Bank  of  Tennessee,  at  Nashville.  This 
coin,  in  the  immediate  charge  of  a  bonded  officer  of  the  bank,  had  occa 
sioned  much  solicitude  to  the  Governor  in  his  many  wanderings. 
He  appealed  to  me  to  assist  in  the  restoration  of  the  coin  to  the  bank. 
At  my  request,  General  Canby  detailed  an  officer  and  escort,  and  the 
money  reached  the  bank  intact. 

The  condition  of  the  people  of  Alabama  and  Mississippi  was  at 
this  time  deplorable.  The  waste  of  war  had  stripped  large  areas  of 
the  necessaries  of  life.  In  view  of  this,  I  suggested  to  General  Can- 
by  that  his  troops,  sent  to  the  interior,  should  be  limited  to  the 
number  required  for  the  preservation  of  order,  and  be  stationed  at 
points  where  supplies  were  more  abundant.  That  trade  would  soon 
be  established  between  soldiers  and  people — furnishing  the  latter  with 
currency,  of  which  they  were  destitute — and  friendly  relations  pro 
moted.  These  suggestions  were  adopted,  and  a  day  or  two  thereafter, 
at  Meridian,  a  note  was  received  from  General  Canby,  inclosing 
copies  of  orders  to  Generals  Granger  and  Steele,  commanding  army 
corps,  by  which  it  appeared  these  officers  were  directed  to  call  on  me 
for,  and  conform  to,  advice  relative  to  movements  of  their  troops. 


THE  LAST  CONFEDERATE  SURRENDER.  71 

Strange,  indeed,  must  sncli  confidence  appear  to  statesmen  of  the 
"  bloody-shirt "  persuasion.  In  due  time,  Federal  stafi'-offieers  reached 
my  camp.  The  men  were  paroled  and  sent  home.  Public  property 
was  turned  over  and  receipted  for,  and  this  as  orderly  and  quietly  as 
in  time  of  peace  between  officers  of  the  same  service. 

What  years  of  discord,  bitterness,  injustice  and  loss  would  not 
our  country  have  been  spared,  had  the  wounds  of  war  healed  "by 
first  intention"  under  the  tender  ministrations  of  the  hands  that 
fought  the  battles  ?  But  the  task  was  allotted  to  ambitious  partisans, 
most  of  whom  had  not  heard  the  sound  of  a  gun.  As  of  old,  the 
Lion  and  the  Bear  fight  openly  and  sturdily — the  stealthy  Fox  carries 
off  the  prize. 


THE  FIRST  GREAT  CRIME  OF  THE  WAR. 


BY    MAJOR    GENERAL    W.    B.    FRANKLIN. 


NEARLY  sixteen  years  ago  the 
country  was  wrenched  to -its 
centre  by  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run.  This  battle  was  the 
climax  of  a  campaign,  under 
taken  at  the  dictation  of  a 
clique  in  the  press  led  by  the 
New  York  Tribune,  and  in 
the  then  excited  state  of 
public  feeling,  the  spirit 
awakened  against  the  ap 
parent  inaction  at  Washington 
was  enough  to  override  the 
President,  the  Secretaries,  and 
the  General-in-Chief.  The 
facts  that  75,000  militia  should 
have  been  called  out  nearly  three  months  before,  and  that  a  large 
number  of  them  were  encamped  near  Washington,  that  they  had,  so 
far,  struck  no  blow  for  its  defense  (although  their  presence  alone  was 
ample  defense),  that  few,  if  any,  had  been  killed,  and  that  the  rebels 
were  in  force  at  Manassas,  defying  these  defenders  to  come  forward, 
were  so  flagrant  and  preposterous,  that  their  mere  presentation  broke 
down  all  military  caution  and  conservatism,  and  the  "  On  to  Rich 
mond  "  cry  forced  the  Bull  Run  campaign  on  the  country,  with  all 
its  sequence  of  disaster  and  depression,  and  the  mixed  feelings 
of  shame,  and  grief,  and  rage,  which  swept  over  the  country  like 
a  whirlwind.  The  Bull  Run  fight  had  one  good  result  for  our  side, 
and,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  only  one.  It  taught  our  people  to  be  a 
little  patient,  and  not  to  expect  the  army  to  be  ready  to  move  next 
week.  The  disaster  which  came  upon  us  in  July,  when  thirty 
thousand  three  months'  men,  whose  terms  of  enlistment  would  expire 
in  a  few  days,  commanded  by  general  officers,  not  one  of  whom  had 
been  in  action  in  a  grade  higher  than  that  of  captain,  were  hurried 
forward  to  defeat,  would  certainly  have  come  upon  us  in  September, 

(72) 


THE  FIRST  GREAT  CRIME  OF  THE  WAR.  73 

when  hundreds  of  thousands  of  recruits  would  have  begun  to  gather 
in  the  Eastern  and  Western  camps  of  instruction,  which  General 
Scott  had  intended  to  form.  The  same  feelings  that  urged  us  on  to 
Bull  Him  in  July  would  have  sent  forward  a  larger  and  quite 
an  undisciplined  an  army  at  a  later  day,  and  the  outcry  would  have 
been  all  the  louder,  as  the  force  was  greater  in  number,  no  matter  if 
they  were  only  enlisted  yesterday.  So  I  have  no  doubt  that  Bull 
Hun  was  not  an  unmixed  evil,  but  that  Providence  may  have  so 
overruled  in  our  favor  that  the  infliction,  of  this  defeat  of  a  small 
army,  depressing  as  it  was,  may  have  saved  us  from  severer  defeat 
two  months  afterward,  ^so  thanks,  however,  to  those  who  brought 
on  the  campaign.  In  any  event,  the  people  were  more  patient,  and 
afterward  Lore  delays,  which  they  could  not  understand,  with  a 
noLle  and  self -sacrificing  spirit. 

So  it  happened  that  the  first  step  taken  by  the  dazed  adminis 
tration,  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Hun,  was  to  order  to  Washington, 
in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  young  General 
McClellan,  who  had  been  so  far  the  only  general  upon  whose 
banners  victory  for  the  cause  had  perched,  lie  at  once  began  a 
system  of  organization  and  distribution  of  troops,  of  purchase  of 
material  of  war,  of  recommendations  of  generals  to  important  com 
mands  East,  West  and  South,  of  the  erection  of  field  fortifications, 
which  to  complete  involved  a  long  time,  longer  far  than  was  sus 
pected  by  the  administration  or  the  people,  lie  and  his  subordi 
nates  worked  day  and  night  to  perfect  his  system,  and  worked  ably 
and  with  good  effect.  One  day  in  August,  shortly  after  his  arrival 
at  Washington,  he,  General  Blair,  and  myself  were  together  in  a 
room  in  the  seven  buildings  then  occupied,  I  believe,  as  the  head 
quarter  offices.  General  McClellan  stated  to  General  Blair,  who 
Avas  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  certain  matters  upon  which  he  was  anxious  that 
the  committee  should  act  favorably  and  speedily.  General  Blair 
promised  that  the  matter  should  be  settled  at  once  as  General 
McClellan  wished  to  have  it,  and  then  said  in  effect,  "General, 
anything  that  you  indicate  as  necessary  shall  always  be  acted  upon 
favorably  by  our  committee,  and  if  you  do  not  feel  that  you  are 
to-day  king  of  this  country,  you  do  not  appreciate  your  position." 
Although  the  saying  was  impulsive  and  extravagant,  it  nevertheless 
indicated  the  honest  feelings  of  the  speaker,  and  was  a  type  of  the 
sentiments  of  a  great  number  of  people  then  gathered  in  Wash 
ington.  But  the  fall  wore  away,  and  no  movement  of  the  great 
army  collected  in  front  and  rear  of  Washington  was  made. 


74  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

About  the  1st  of  November,  the  country  again  began  to  get 
impatient  that  no  forward  movement  was  begun  by  any  of  the 
armies,  but  in  the  East  this  impatience  was  intensified  against  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  Bull  Run  was  forgotten,  and  the  facts  that 
the  enemy  had  once  made  his  appearance  on  Munson's  Hill,  that  the 
Potomac  was  virtually  closed,  and  that  we  had  met  with  a  disaster  at 
Ball's  Bluff,  were  always  present.  But  the  great  fact  of  all  was, 
there  wrere  more  than  one  hundred  thousand  soldiers  about  Wash 
ington.  Although  these  men  were  generally  raw  troops  who  had 
never  heard  a  hostile  gun,  and  were  daily  improving  in  drill  and 
discipline  and  physique,  there  was  a  feeling  in  Washington  and  in 
the  country  generally  that  they  ought  to  be  pushed  forward  into 
Virginia  at  all  hazards.  This  feeling,  considering  the  small  amount 
of  military  knowledge  among  the  people  and  the  enormous  expendi 
ture  then  going  on,  wTas  not  singular,  but  it  was  nevertheless  one  that 
did  harm,  and  was  used  by  a  set  of  politicians  who  had  just  come 
up,  and  who  have  remained  up  ever  since,  to  excite  the  administra 
tion  and  the  country  against  the  management  of  the  army. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  fall  Lieutenant  General  Scott  asked  to 
be  retired,  and  his  request  was  granted.  General  McClellan  was 
then  made  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army,  and  at  once  became 
responsible  for  the  movements  and  organization  of  all  of  the  forces 
East  and  West.  He  determined,  therefore,  to  carry  out  a  plan  as  to 
the  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  he  had  studied 
long,  and  which,  independent  of  political  and  financial  considerations, 
commends  itself  to  every  military  mind  as  the  very  best  for  making 
a  campaign  against  Richmond  at  that  time.  After  events  demon 
strated  the  wisdom  of  this  plan.  In  few  words,  the  plan  was  to  move 
the  whole  Army  of  the  Potomac,  except  a  force  sufficient  for  the 
defense  of  Washington  to  the  vicinity  of  a  place  named  Urbana,  on 
the  Rappahannock,  and  from  this  point  as  a  base,  to  advance  upon 
Richmond.  But  this  involved  a  delay  until  spring,  and  as  soon  as  it 
became  generally  known  that  there  was  to  be  this  delay,  as  its  cause 
was  not  known,  the  most  strenuous  efforts  were  made  by  Congress 
and  the  press  to  find  out  what  was  contemplated.  Generals  com 
manding  divisions  who  were  known  to  be  in  General  McClellan's 
confidence,  were  examined  by  Congressional  committees  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  finding  out  wThat  he  intended  to  do.  On  one  occasion,  in 
December,  I  think,  I  was  examined  before  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War.  I  was  asked  whether  I  knew  General 
McClellan's  plans,  and  T  answered  in  the  affirmative.  I  was  then 
asked  to  divulge  them,  and  replied  that  I  would  prefer  to  wait  until 


THE  FIRST  GREAT  CRIME  OF  THE  WAR.  75 

I  could  confer  with  him,  he  being  then  dangerously  ill,  and  that  my 
information  was  confidential.  The  committee  then  lost  all  interest 
in  me,  and  the  remainder  of  the  time  was  taken  up  by  Hon.  Andrew 
Johnson,  then  a  member  of  the  committee,  who  demonstrated  that  a 
force  of  50,000  men  ought  to  be  detached  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  marched  through  Leesburg,  thence  southwest  through  "West 
Virginia,  so  as  to  reach  and  set  free  from  the  rebels  East  Tennessee. 
The  matter  of  transportation  and  provisions  in  a  march  through  such 
a  country  was  below  the  attention  of  the  committee,  and  any  sug- 
o-estion  looking  to  difficulty  in  that  direction  was  considered  as  an 

f""!1  O  v 

indication  of  Fabian  policy. 

General  McClellan's  position  during  this  period  was  one  of  great 
difficulty  and  delicacy,  lie  had  determined  upon  a  plan  of  campaign 
which  involved  a  delay  of  movement  of  the  armies  until  spring. 
The  delay  being  misunderstood,  his  enemies,  who,  in  some  noted 
cases,  pretended  to  be  his  best  friends,  quietly  insinuated  that  he  was 
not  the  man  for  the  position.  The  duties  of  his  command  were 
excessively  harassing,  and  the  undercurrent  of  detraction  began  to 
come  to  the  surface,  and  make  itself  felt  in  the  administration,  lie 
attended  the  funeral  of  General  Lander,  who  died  in  March,  and 
was  buried  in  Washington.  Telling  me  about  the  funeral  on  the 
next  day,  he  said  that  when  he  saw  Lander's  face  in  the  coffin,  looking 
so  calm  and  peaceful,  and  thought  of  the  troubles  he  was  then  having, 
and  was  to  have  thereafter,  he  regretted  that  he  was  not  lying  there 
instead  of  Lander.  These  were  the  detiant  and  insubordinate  feelings 
of  the  General-in-Chief. 

At  length  he  was  taken  sick  with  typhoid  fever,  and  for  a  long 
time  he  was  on  the  border  of  death.  His  sickness  gave  his  enemies 
an  opportunity  which  they  were  not  slow  to  embrace ;  and  vilifica 
tion  and  detraction  increased,  so  that,  at  last,  the  President  even 
began  to  think  that  something  ought  to  be  done  to  conciliate  public 
opinion,  by  making  an  effort  to  start  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  even 
if  it  had  to  move  without  the  commanding  general.  .During  this 
time  the  troops  lay  cpiietly  in  camp.  They  were  well  clothed  and 
fed,  and,  in  general,  enjoyed  the  life.  The  weather  and  ground 
were  not  fit  for  drill,  and  the  roads  were  too  bad  for  marching.  At 
long  intervals,  and  until  General  McClellan  was  taken  sick,  large 
reviews  broke  the  monotony  of  the  life;  but  it  was,  nevertheless, 
very  dull.  The  discipline  improved  visibly,  and  the  long  quiet 
fostered  the  feeling  of  comradeship  and  reliance  upon  each  other, 
which,  to  a  great  extent,  makes  the  difference  between  the  recruit 
and  the  old  soldier.  Glee  and  minstrel  and  amateur  theatrical  clubs 


76  AXNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

were  formed,  and  performances  were  given  by  the  men,  and  the 
army  on  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac  lived  its  own  life  as  if  it 
were  hundreds  of  miles  away  from  Washington,  as  many  of  its 
members  devoutly  wished  it  was.  The  men  learned  many  old- 
soldier  tricks.  One  of  these  was  reported  to  me  by  a  colonel  of  my 
division,  with  an  air  of  great  disgust.  Some  of  his  companies  lived 
in  huts  built  by  themselves.  The  huts  were  two  in  number,  on  both 
sides  of  the  company  parade  ground — half  of  the  company  sleeping 
in  each  hut.  At  reveille  some  dozen  of  the  men  would  turn  out, 
and  when  the  roll  was  called  the  remainder  would  answer  to  their 
names  from  their  beds  in  the  huts,  and  stay  in  bed  until  breakfast 
time.  But,  although  the  army  was  improving,  the  nervousness  of 
the  administration  and  Congress,  caused  by  the  delay  and  the  alarm 
ing  sickness  of  General  McClellan,  continually  increased. 

On  Friday  evening,  January  10th,  1862,  I  received  a  dispatch 
from  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  informing  me  that  the  Presi 
dent  wished  to  see  me  at  eight  o'clock  that  evening,  if  I  could  safely 
leave  my  command.  I  went  to  Washington,  and  arrived  at  the 
White  House  at  eight  o'clock.  I  was  received  in  a  small  room  in 
the  northeast  corner  of  the  house,  and  found  the  President,  Secre 
taries  Seward  and  Chase,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  and 
General  McDowell.  The  President  was  in  great  distress  over  the 
condition  of  the  country.  He  complained  that  he  was  abused  in 
Congress  for  the  military  inaction ;  that,  notwithstanding  the  enor 
mous  amount  of  money  which  had  been  spent,  nothing  was  doing 
East  or  West;  that  there  was  a  general  feeling  of  depression  on 
account  of  the  inaction ;  and  that,  as  he  expressed  it,  the  bottom 
appeared  to  be  falling  out  of  everything.  He  was  exceedingly  sorry 
for  the  sickness  of  General  McClellan.  He  was  not  allowed  to  see 
him  to  talk  over  military  matters,  and  he  wanted  to  produce  some 
concerted  action  between  Generals  Halleck  and  Buell,  who  did  not 
appear  to  pull  together.  He  could,  of  course,  do  nothing  with  the 
Western  armies ;  they  were  out  of  his  reach ;  but  he  thought  that 
he  could,  in  a  very  short  time,  do  something  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  if  he  were  allowed  to  have  his  own  way,  and  had  sent  for 
General  McDowell  and  me  so  that  he  might  have  somebody  to  talk 
to  on  the  subject.  In  fact,  he  wanted,  he  said,  to  borrow  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  from  General  McClellan  for  a  few  weeks,  and  wanted 
us  to  help  him  as  to  how  to  do  it.  He  complained  of  the  rise  of 
gold,  of  the  unreasonableness  of  Congress,  of  the  virulence  of  the 
press,  and,  in  general,  told  us  all  that  depressed  him,  in  a  plain,  blunt 
way  that  was  touching  to  a  degree.  Mr.  Seward  told  us  that  an 


THE  FIEST  GREAT  CRIME  OF  THE  WAR.  77 

Englishman  whom  he  had  sent  into  the  enemy's  lines  had  returned, 
giving  him  information  of  the  number  of  rebel  troops  at  Centreville, 
Richmond,  Norfolk,  etc. ;  and  I  inferred  that  Johnston,  who  com 
manded  at  Centreville,  could  have  raised  about  75,000  men  to  meet 
any  attack  which  we  might  make  within  a  moderate  time. 

Mr.  Chase  said  very  little,  but  what  he  did  say  left  it  plainly  to 
l>e  inferred  that  he  thought  that  the  army  ought  to  be  moved  at  once. 
General  McDowell  said  that,  in  his  opinion,  the  army  ought  to  be 
formed  into  army  corps,  and  that  a  vigorous  movement  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Centreville  would  enable  us,  be  thought,  to  get  into  position 
by  which  we  could  cut  the  enemy's  lines  of  communication,  and  that 
by  the  use  of  the  railroad  from  Alexandria,  and  the  connection  of  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  "Road  with  those  south  of  the  river  by  a  railroad 
over  the  Long  Bridge,  large  wagon  trains  would  be  avoided,  lie, 
however,  did  not  know  how  long  a  time  would  be  required  to  get 
ready  to  make  the  movement  which  he  advocated.  I  said  that  I  was 
ignorant  of  the  things  necessary  to  enable  me  to  form  a  judgment 
on  the  subject,  only  knowing  my  own  division,  which  was  ready  for 
the  Held.  That  I  thought  that  the  proper  disposition  to  make  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  to  transport  it  by  the  easiest  and  quickest 
route  to  York  river,  to  operate  against  Richmond,  leaving  force 
enough  to  prevent  any  danger  to  Washington. 

The  Assistant  Secretary  of  "War  thought  that  the  transportation 
of  this  force  in  a  reasonable  time  would  be  a  very  difficult  work.  As 
General  McDowell  and  I  both  felt  too  ignorant  of  the  proper  state 
of  the  supply  departments  to  justify  us  in  speaking  any  more  definitely, 
it  was  determined  by  the  President  that  the  same  party  should  meet 
on  the  next  evening  at  the  same  time,  and  that  General  McDowell 
and  [  should  in  the  meantime  get  all  the  information  from  the  chiefs 
of  the  various  staff  departments  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  to 
their  status  with  regard  to  a  movement  of  the  army  within  a  short 
time.  So  on  Saturday  we  met  in  the  morning,  and  went  to  all  of 
the  chiefs  of  the  staff  departments,  and  obtained  from  them  such 
information  as  to  their  departments  as  they  could  give  us.  "We  learned 
from  Mr.  Chase  the  destination  of  Burnside's  expedition,  which,  until 
then,  had  been  unknown  to  us,  and  he  relieved  our  minds  as  to  the 
apparent  impropriety  of  our  obtaining  information  from  the  chiefs 
of  the  stall'  departments  without  the  authority  of  the  commanding 
general,  by  reminding  us  that  as  we  were  acting  by  the  direct  orders 
of  the  President,  we  ought  to  execute  those  orders.  He  also  told  us 
what  was  McClellan's  plan  of  operations  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
In  the  evening  we  again  met  at  the  White  House.  The  party  of 


78  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  evening  before  were  there  with  the  addition  of  Judge  Blair,  the 
Postmaster  General.  General  McDowell  read  a  paper  embodying 
our  joint  views,  which  were  in  substance,  that  if  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  to  be  moved  at  once,  it  would  be  better  to  march  it  into 
Virginia  than  to  transport  it  by  vessels.  General  McDowell  was, 
however,  in  favor  of  the  immediate  movement  into  Virginia.  I  was 
not.  Just  here  the  presence  of  Judge  Blair  was  felt.  lie  strongly 
opposed  any  movement  toward  Centreville  at  that  time,  denounced 
it  as  bad  strategy,  said  that  a  second  Bull  Run  would  occur,  and 
strenuously  and  ably  advocated  the  movement  to  the  Peninsula  by 
transports.  Mr.  Seward  and  Judge  Chase  were  of  opinion  that  a 
victory  over  the  enemy  was  what  was  required,  whether  gained  in 
front  of  Washington  or  further  South,  and  that  our  difficulties  would 
probably  be  as  great  on  the  Peninsula  as  they  would  be  at  Centreville. 
I  thought  that  the  President,  who  said  little,  was  much  impressed  by 
what  Judge  Blair  said,  and  he  adjourned  the  meeting  until  three 
o'clock  the  next  day,  directing  General  McDowell  and  myself  to  see 
the  Quartermaster  General  in  the  meantime  as  to  water  transportation 
for  the  army. 

On  Sunday  General  McDowell  and  I  saw  General  Meigs,  the 
Quartermaster  General.  He  thought  that  a  month  or  six  weeks 
would  be  required  to  collect  the  water  transportation  necessary  for 
the  movement  of  the  army.  Some  of  us  were  gathered  at  three 
o'clock  for  the  ordered  meeting.  Suddenly  Mr.  Seward  hurried  in, 
threw  down  his  hat  in  great  excitement,  and  exclaimed,  "Gentlemen, 
I  have  seen  General  McClellan,  and  lie  is  a  well  man.  I  think  that 
this  meeting  would  better  adjourn."  A  general  discussion  was 
entered  upon  as  to  what  was  the  best  course  to  pursue  with  regard 
to  the  army,  and  it  was  understood  that  we  would  meet  again 
on  Monday,  at  one  o'clock,  when  General  McClellan  would  be 
present.  On  Monday,  January  13th,  at  one  o'clock,  the  same  party 
was  gathered  at  the  President's.  General  McClellan  shortly  afterward 
appeared,  looking  exceedingly  pale  and  weak.  The  President 
explained,  in  an  apologetic  way,  why  he  had  called  General  McDowell 
and  me  to  these  conferences,  and  asked  General  McDowell  to  explain 
the  proposed  plan  of  operations.  General  McDowell  did  so,  he  and 
I  differing  slightly  as  to  the  time  of  commencement  of  the  movement 
from  our  front.  In  answer  to  some  statement  from  General 
McDowell  as  to  the  delicate  position  in  which  we  were  placed, 
General  McClellan  stated  that  we  were,  of  course,  entitled  to  our 
opinions.  I  stated  that  in  giving  my  opinion  as  to  the  Peninsula 
movement,  I  knew  that  my  judgment  coincided  with  General 


THE  FIRST  GEEAT  CRIME  OF  THE   WAR.  79 

McClellan's.  General  McDowell  stated  that  he  was  in  ignorance  of 
any  plan  of  General  McClellan's.  The  President  went  over  the 
subject  of  discussion  in  a  general  way,  and  then  there  was  a  silence. 
It  was  broken  by  Governor  Chase,  who  asked  General  McClellan 
if  lie  had  any  objection  to  telling  the  persons  there  assembled  what 
his  plan  for  the  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was.  After 
a  long  silence  the  General  made  a  few  general  remarks,  and  ended  by 
saying  to  the  President  that  he  knew  when  his  plans  had  hitherto 
been  told  to  the  Cabinet  that  they  had  leaked  out,  and  he  would 
therefore  decline  to  divulge  them  now,  unless  the  President  would 
order  him  so  to  do.  Then  there  was  another  long  silence,  and  the 
President  broke  it  by  asking  the  General  if  he  had  matured  a  plan 
for  the  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  General 
answered  that  he  had.  After  another  silence  the  President  said, 
u  Then,  General,  I  shall  not  order  you  to  give  it."  During  this  time 
Governor  Chase,  General  McDowell  and  I  were  standing  in  one  of 
the  window  embrasures.  When  General  McClellan  declined  to  give 
his  plans  to  the  meeting,  Governor  Chase*  said  to  us,  '"Well,  if  that 
is  Mac's  decision,  he  is  a  ruined  man/'  The  President  then  adjourned 
the  meeting,  and  this  episode  was  over.  About  a  fortnight  after 
this  time  the  President  ordered  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  move 
forward  on  or  before  February  22d,  to  take  Manassas.  This  order 
was  countermanded  early  in  February,  and  toward  the  end  of  the 
month  orders  were  given  to  collect  the  transportation  necessary  to 
move  the  army  by  water. 

On  the  sth  of  March  I  was  ordered  to  repair  to  headquarters. 
Assembled  there  were  the  General-in-chief,  the  Engineer  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  all  of  the  division  commanders,  except 
General  Hooker,  who  was  represented  by  General  Naglee.  General 
McClellan  submitted  to  us  his  plan  for  the  movement  of  the  army, 
and  then  left  us  to  ourselves.  Upon  the  question  of  approval  of  his 
plan  the  vote  was,  I  think,  nine  for  approval  to  three  against  it, 
although  it  has  been  reported  as  eight  to  four.  I  believed  then,  and 
still  believe,  that  the  main  object  of  the  meeting  was  to  obtain  a  con 
demnation  of  the  plan  by  the  subordinate  generals.  Immediately 
after  this  meeting  we  were  informed  that  the  President  wished  to  see 
us.  "We  went  to  the  White  House,  and  found  there  the  President 
and  Secretary  of  "War.  They  knew  the  result  of  our  meeting. 


*  In  thinking  over  this  matter.  I  find  that  I  cannot  be  positive  whether  it  was 
Governor  Chase  or  Judge  Blair  who  was  with  General  McDowell  and  me,  and 
made  this  remark.  It  was  one  of  them,  however. 


80  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Each  one  of  us  was  asked  in  turn  by  the  Secretary  of  War  our  opinion 
of  the  time  required  to  transfer  the  army  to  its  new  base.  The  gen 
eral  opinion  was  that  a  month  would  be  required,  and  each  was  asked 
by  the  Secretary  whether  he  was  willing  to  have  this  suffering 
country  wait  a  month  longer  before  a  blow  was  inflicted  upon  the 
enemy.  We  were  then  asked  in  turn  whether  we  thought  the  army 
ought  to  be  organized  into  army  corps  or  not.  We  unanimously 
answered  that  we  thought  it  ought  to  be  so  organized.  The  President 
then  informed  us  that  he  deferred  his  opinion  as  to  the  proper  method 
of  moving  the  army  to  ours.  He  asked  us  to  use  all  our  energies  to 
help  the  country  out  of  its  great  dangers,  and  ended  by  saying  to  us, 
"If  you  are  faithful  to  me,  I,  on  my  part,  will  be  faithful  to  you." 
He  then  said  that  he  should  form  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  into 
four  army  corps,  and  knowing  but  little  of  the  capacities  of  the  gen 
erals  suitable  for  the  command  of  these  corps,  should  assign  the 
commands  according  to  rank.  The  meeting  was  then  dismissed. 

General  Johnston  having  evacuated  his  position  at  Centreville 
on  the  8th  of  March,  the  army  was  immediately  moved  to  Fairfax 
Court-House.  Here  the  assignment  to  corps  was  made,  and  my 
division  was  assigned  to  General  McDowell's  corps.  Shortly  after 
ward,  about  the  middle  of  March,  we  returned  to  a  position  in  front 
of  Alexandria  to  await  transportation.  It  was  determined  that  the 
bulk  of  the  army  should  be  landed  at  Fortress  Monroe,  and  move  up 
the  Peninsula  between  the  York  and  James  rivers,  and  that  General 
McDowell's  corps  should  land  on  the  north  side  of  the  York  river. 
By  this  plan  a  force  of  over  80,000  men  would  have  been  on  the 
Peninsula,  and  a  corps  of  nearly  30,000  men  would  have  been  on  the 
north  side  of  the  York  river,  in  position  to  turn  Yorktown.  The  result 
of  carrying  out  this  plan  would  have  been  that  Yorktown  would 
have  been  evacuated  without  a  siege,  the  Williamsburg  battle  would 
not  have  taken  place,  and  the  whole  army  would  have  concentrated 
in  front  of  Richmond  in  a  few  days  after  McDowell's  corps  would 
have  joined — without  serious  loss.  Communication  would  have  easily 
been  kept  up  between  the  two  banks  of  the  river  by  the  squadron 
under  Captain  Missroon,  which  was  then  in  the  river.  This 
arrangement  required  that  General  McDowell's  corps  should  move 
last,  and  General  McClellan,  with  his  headquarters,  left  Alexandria 
on  April  1st,  he  supposing  that  nothing  could  occur  to  change  that 
arrangement. 

On  the  3d  of  April  I  was  ordered  to  embark  my  division.  About 
eleven  o'clock  in  the  evening  I  received  orders  to  move  part  of  the 
division  on  the  next  day,  and  to  call  at  headquarters  for  further 


THE  FIRST  GREAT  CRIME  OF  THE  WAR.  81 

instructions.  Going  at  once  to  the  War  Department  I  found  General 
McDowell  and  General  Wadsworth  there.  General  McDowell 
informed  me  that  the  Secretary  of  War  had  told  him  about  an  hou; 
before  that  General  McClellan  intended  to  work  by  strategy  and  not 
by  fighting,  and  that  he  should  not  have  another  man  from  his  depart 
ment ;  that  all  of  the  enemies  of  the  administration  centred  around 
him,  and  the  Secretary  accused  him  of  having  political  aspirations. 
Also,  that  lie  had  not  left  the  number  of  troops  to  defend  Washington 
that  the  President  required — in  other  words,  that  he  had  disobeyed 
the  President's  orders.  General  McDowell  remonstrated  against  the 
step  which  was  about  to  be  taken,  arguing  that  if  General  McClellan 
had  political  aspirations  they  would  be  forwarded  by  the  very  course 
which  the  administration  was  taking  in  this  case,  lie  used  all  of 
the  arguments  which  he  could  bring  to  bear,  to  convince  the  Secre 
tary  that  he  was  making  a  mistake  in  ordering  the  detachment  of  his 
corps.  The  result  was,  General  McDowell's  corps  was  detached  from 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  was  marched  to  Catlett's  Station,  on 
the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad,  where  it  could  do  no  possible, 
good.  General  McClellan's  plan  of  turning  Yorktown,  by  the  move 
ment  of  McDowell's  corps  on  the  north  bank  of  the  York  river,  was 
utterly  destroyed.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  forced  to  stay  a 
whole  month  on  the  Peninsula  uselessly,  to  make  the  expensive  and 
abortive  siege  of  Yorktown,  to  tight  the  blood v  battle  of  Williams- 
burg;  and  the  capture  of  Richmond,  which  in  all  human  probability 
would  have  been  made  in  the  month  of  May,  had  General  Mc(  'lellan's 
plan  been  carried  out,  was  deferred  for  three  years. 

Thus  was  consummated  the  first  great  crime  of  the  war.  An 
army  of  nearly  one  hundred  thousand  men  which  had  been  in 
preparation  for  more  than  six  months,  was  despatched  to  deal  the 
enemy  a  deadly  blow,  under  the  general  who  had  organized  it,  and 
was  beloved  by  it,  and  who  was  unanimously  recognized  by  soldiers 
and  civilians  as  its  proper  commander.  Before  he  had  been  absent 
forty-eight  hours,  his  largest  corps,  commanded  by  his  second  in 
command,  containing  more  than  one-fourth  of  his  army,  assigned  to 
a  service  which  was  vital  to  the  success  of  his  campaign,  was  detached 
from  his  command,  without  consultation  with  him  and  without  his 
knowledge,  I  do  not  know  whether  the  perpetrators  of  this  crime 
were  punished  for  it  in  this  life  ;  but  the  ghastly  account  of  bloodshed 
in  Virginia  for  the  next  three  years  shows  that  the  innocent  country 
was  punished,  in  a  way  that  will  be  remembered  by  widows  and 
orphans  for  a  generation. 


LEE'S  WEST  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


BY   GENEEAL   A.   L.  LONG. 


BEFORE  proceeding  with  the 
operations  in  Northwestern 
Virginia,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  glance  at  the  condition  of 
that  section,  and  the  previous 
military  operations  that  had 
been  carried  on  within  its 
limits.  This  section  of  Vir 
ginia  did  not  cordially  coin 
cide  in  the  ordinance  of  seces 
sion  that  had  been  passed  by 
the  State  Convention,  inas 
much  as  a  considerable  part 
of  its  inhabitants  were  op 
posed  to  secession,  or,  in  other 
words,  were  Unionists.  A 
large  number,  however,  of  its  most  influential  citizens  were  ardent 
Southern  supporters;  and  there  was,  also,  an  intermediate  class, 
indifferent  to  politics,  which  was  ready  to  join  the  party  which  might 
prove  the  strongest.  Besides,  it  soon  became  apparent  that  the  Bal 
timore  and  Ohio  Railroad  was  destined  to  exercise  an  important 
influence  on  military  movements ;  therefore,  this  section  became  an 
object  of  interest  to  both  sides.  At  first,  the  Confederate  Colonel 
Porterfield  was  sent  with  a  few  companies  to  operate  on  the  Balti 
more  and  Ohio  Railroad ;  but  this  force  was  too  small,  and  illy 
provided  with  the  essentials  for  service,  so  that  it  could  effect 
nothing.  Shortly  afterward,  General  Robert  Garnett  was  sent  by 
the  Confederate  authorities  to  seize  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail 
road,  and  to  confirm  the  Northwestern  Virginians  in  their  allegiance 
to  the  State.  Garnett,  with  a  force  of  about  five  thousand  men, 
reached  the  railroad  in  June,  and  occupied  Laurel  Hill.  About  the 
same  time,  General  McClellan  crossed  the  Ohio  into  Northwestern 
Virginia,  with  the  view  of  gaining  the  adherence  of  its  inhabitants 
to  the  Federal  Government,  and  to  protect  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
(82) 


LEE'S  WEST  VIRGINIA   CAMPAIGN.  83 

Railroad.  Having  a  greatly  superior  force,  he  made  it  his  first 
object  to  attack  Garnett  before  that  general  could  be  reinforced 
(Colonel  Pegram,  with  a  considerable  detachment,  being  defeated 
by  General  Ilosecrans,  with  a  part  of  McClellan's  force),  and  was 
obliged  to  retreat,  in  order  to  save  the  rest  of  his  little  army. 
McClellan  pursued,  and  overtaking  the  rear  guard  at  Carriers  Ford, 
a  skirmish  ensued,  in  which  Garnett  was  killed.  Colonel  Starke, 
aide-de-camp,  relates  that,  soon  after  Garnett  fell,  McClellan  arrived 
on  the  ground,  and  recognizing  in  the  prostrate  form  of  his  adver 
sary  an  old  acquaintance,  he  dismounted,  and,  with  the  true  heart  of 
a  soldier,  bending  over  the  body  of  a  comrade  and  friend  of  better 
days,  lie  did  not  attempt  to  conceal  his  emotion.  uPoor  Garnett!' 
he  exclaimed,  "has  it  come  to  this  T'  Every  facility  was  allowed 
for  the  proper  disposition  of  the  body. 

McClellan  was  always  distinguished  for  courtesy  and  kindness 
to  those  whom  the  chances  of  war  placed  in  his  power.  The  Adju 
tant  General,  Captain  Corley,  assisted  by  other  members  of  Garnett's 
staff,  safely  continued  the  retreat,  and  was  mainly  instrumental  in 
placing  the  army  in  safety.  I  will  here  relate  an  adventure  of  De 
Lagrel,  connected  with  Garnett's  defeat,  which  exhibited  great 
courage,  endurance  and  address.  De  Lagrel  was  an  old  army  officer, 
and  commanded  the  artillery  of  Pegram's  detachment.  "\Vhen 
attacked  by  TJoseerans  at  Rich  Mountain,  he  fought  his  guns  with 
great  gallantry  and  effect.  His  men  behaved  well  until  the  enemy 
began  to  close  in  upon  them;  they  then  tied,  leaving  De  Lagrel 
almost  alone.  Undaunted  by  the  desertion  of  his  men,  he  served  a 
gun  himself  until  disabled  by  a  severe  wound.  Then,  amid  the 
confusion  of  a  defeat,  he  escaped  to  a  laurel  thicket  near  by,  in  which 
he  concealed  himself  until  the  enemy  had  disappeared.  He  then 
found  shelter  under  the  roof  of  a  friendly  mountaineer.  His  kind 
host  and  hostess  concealed  and  attended  him  until  his  wound  was 
healed  and  his  strength  restored.  He  then  determined  to  join  the 
Confederate  forces,  which  had  again  entered  Northwestern  Virginia; 
but  to  do  so  it  was  necessary  to  pass  through  the  Federal  liness.  To 
accomplish  this,  he  concluded  to  assume  the  character  of  a  moun 
taineer,  being  supplied  by  his  host  with  a  herder's  garb,  with  the 
exception  of  shoes.  Then,  with  a  well-tilled  wallet  over  his  shoulder 
and  a  staff  in  his  hand,  he  bid  adieu  to  his  kind  friends  and  launched 
forth  into  the  mountains.  After  wandering  among  them  for  several 
days,  he  fell  in  with  the  Federal  pickets.  On  being  questioned  by 
them,  he  so  well  sustained  the  character  he  had  assumed  that  all  the 
pickets  were  easily  passed,  until  he  reached  the  last  outpost  that 


84:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

separated  him  from  his  friends.  Here  he  was  more  strictly  exam 
ined  than  he  had  hitherto  been,  but  by  his  wit  fully  sustained  the 
character  he  had  adopted,  and  was  told  to  continue  his  way ;  but, 
just  as  he  was  about  to  depart,  one  of  the  guards  observed  his  boots, 
which,  though  soiled  arid  worn,  still  exhibited  signs  of  a  fashionable 
make.  Upon  this  the  examination  was  renewed,  and,  with  all  his 
ingenuity,  he  could  not  escape  detection;  his  boots  had  betrayed 
him.  These  traitors  were  drawn  off,  and  in  the  leg  of  one  the  name 
of  "  De  Lagrel "  was  found,  and  he  was  at  once  recognized  as  the 
officer  whose  disappearance  at  Rich  Mountain  had  led  to  so  much 
inquiry.  He  was  sent  a  prisoner  of  war  to  the  Federal  headquarters, 
where  he  was  courteously  received. 

The  defeat  of  General  Gamett  left  McClellan  in  undisputed 
possession  of  all  Northwestern  Virginia.  In  order  to  secure  his 
acquisition  he  strongly  occupied  some  of  the  principal  mountain 
passes,  and  took  other  measures  for  its  permanent  occupation.  A 
few  days  later  the  total  defeat  of  McDowell  at  Bull  Run  considerably 
changed  the  order  of  things.  McClellan  was  called  to  take  the  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  greater  part  of  his  forces 
was  withdrawn,  leaving  only  a  few  thousand  men  to  hold  North 
western  Virginia.  The  result  of  McClellan's  success  in  that  quarter 
proved  to  be  of  much  greater  importance  than  was  at  first  appre 
hended,  by  disheartening  its  loyal  inhabitants  and  encouraging  the 
doubtful  or  indifferent  to  give  their  adhesion  to  the  Federal  Govern 
ment.  The  Confederate  authorities,  being  aware  of  the  importance 
of  Western  Virginia  at  that  time,  both  in  a  political  and  military 
point  of  view,  determined  to  send  them  a  force  sufficiently  strong  to 
re-occupy  and  retain  possession  of  it.  There  had  been  assembled  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Staunton  five  or  six  thousand  men  for  the  pur 
pose  of  reinforcing  General  Garnett.  These  troops  were  ordered  to 
advance,  on  the  15th  of  July,  under  the  command  of  General  Henry 
R.  Jackson,  on  the  Parkersburg  turnpike,  to  re-enter  Western 
Virginia,  and  to  occupy  some  convenient  position  until  the  remainder 
of  the  forces  intended  to  operate  in  that  quarter  should  arrive. 
Loring,  whom  we  have  seen  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Army 
of  Northwestern  Virginia,  was  an  officer  of  considerable  reputation. 
He  had  served  with  distinction  in  the  Mexican  war,  had  subsequently 
become  colonel  of  a  regiment  of  mounted  rifles,  and  for  several  years 
prior  to  his  resignation  had  commanded  the  Department  of  New 
Mexico,  where  he  acquired  an  experience  in  mountain  service.  His 
appointment,  therefore,  gave  general  satisfaction.  His  staff  was  com 
posed  chiefly  of  experienced  officers — Colonel  Carter  Stevenson, 


LEE'S  WEST  VIRGINIA   CAMPAIGN.  S5 

Adjutant  General;  Major  A.  L.  Long,  Chief  of  Artillery;  Captain 
Corley,  Chief  Quartermaster;  Captain  Cole,  Chief  Commissary; 
Lieutenant  Matthews,  Aide-de-camp,  and  Colonel  Starks,  volunteer 
Aide-de-camp  ;  and,  as  the  country  was  full  of  enthusiasm  on  account 
of  the  recent  victory  at  Manassas,  he  was  about  to  enter  upon  his 
new  field  of  operations  under  the  most  favorable  auspices. 

General  Loring,  accompanied  by  his  staff,  left  Richmond  on  the 
22d  of  July,  the  day  after  the  battle  and  victory  of  Manassas.  On 
the  24th  he  arrived  at  Monterey,  a  small  village  about  sixty  miles 
west  of  Staunton;  there  he  found  Jackson,  who  informed  him  that 
on  arriving  at  the  Greenbrier  river  he  had  found  Cheat  Mountain 
Pass  so  strongly  occupied  by  Federals  that  he  deemed  it  inadvisable 
to  attempt  to  carry  it  by  a  direct  attack.  So  he  retired,  leaving 
Colonel  Edward  Johnston,  with  the  Twelfth  Georgia  Regiment  and 
Anderson's  Battery  to  occupy  the  Alleghany  Mountain  Pass,  and 
posting  Rust's  Arkansas  Regiment  and  Baldwin's  Virginia  Regiment 
in  convenient  supporting  distance  of  Johnston,  established  himself 
at  Monterey,  with  Fulkerson's  and  Scott's  Virginia  Regiments,  the 
First  Georgia  Regiment  (Colonel  Ramsey's),  Major  Jackson's  Cavalry, 
and  Shoemaker's  Battery.  Having  heard  of  a  Pass  about  forty  miles 
west,  near  Iluntersville,  by  which  Cheat  Mountain  might  be  turned, 
he  sent  Colonel  Gilliam,  with  his  own  Virginia  Regiment  and  Colonel 
Lee's  Sixth  Xorth  Carolina  Regiment,  being  a  force  of  about  two 
thousand  men,  to  occupy  this  Pass,  and  had  ordered  the  remaining 
troops  intended  for  the  Army  of  Northwestern  Virginia  to  proceed 
direct  from  Staunton  to  Iluntersville.  This  was  the  condition  of 
affairs  when  General  Loring  arrived  at  Monterey  and  assumed  com 
mand.  He  remained  several  days  in  the  neighborhood  of  Monterey, 
examining  the  condition  of  the  troops  and  reconnoitering  the  position 
of  the  enemy  on  Cheat  Mountain.  Cheat  Mountain  Pass  is  a  narrow 
gap  near  the  top  of  the  mountain,  whose  natural  strength  had  been 
greatly  increased  by  the  art  of  engineers  since  its  occupation  by  the 
Federals.  It  was  approachable  from  the  east  only  by  the  Parkersburg 
turnpike,  which,  ascending  the  rugged  side  of  the  mountain,  enters 
this  narrow  defile  and  winds  its  way  through  it  for  nearly  a  mile 
before  it  begins  the  western  descent. 

The  Federals  finding  this  Pass  unoccupied,  and  foreseeing  the 
importance  the  Parkersburg  turnpike  would  be  to  the  Confederates 
in  their  attempt  to  re-occupy  West  Virginia,  seized  it  and  fortified 
it,  and  now  held  it  with  a  force  of  about  twenty-five  hundred  men ; 
the  remainder  of  the  Federal  force  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Beverly,  a 
village  a  few  miles  west  of  Cheat  river.  General  Loring,  having 


86  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

satisfied  himself  that  a  direct  attack  on  Cheat  Mountain  Pass  was 
impracticable,  and  that  there  was  no  force  of  the  enemy  near  the 
west  base  of  the  Cheat  Mountain  except  that  at  Beverly,  determined 
to  take  command  of  the  force  which  had  been  ordered  to  rendezvous 
at  Iluntersville,  and  advance  by  the  Pass  that  Colonel  Gilliam  had 
been  directed  to  occupy,  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  position  on  Cheat 
Mountain.  He  therefore  directed  General  Jackson  to  advance  his 
whole  force,  which  at  this  time  amounted  to  six  thousand  men,  to 
the  Greenbrier  river  and  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  co-operate  when 
the  advance  was  made  from  Iluntersville,  and  then  proceeded  to  that 
place  to  make  arrangements  for  the  proposed  movement.  When 
General  Loring  arrived  at  Iluntersville,  about  the  1st  of  August,  he 
found  already  there  Maney's,  Hatten's,  and  Savage's  Tennessee 
Regiments,  Campbell's  Virginia  Regiment,  a  battalion  of  Virginia 
regulars,  four  hundred  strong,  commanded  by  Colonel  Munford, 
Major  "W.  II.  F.  Lee's  squadron  of  cavalry,  and  Marye's  and  Stanley's 
batteries  of  artillery.  Colonel  Gilliam  was  at  Valley  Mountain  Pass, 
fifteen  miles  west  of  Huntersville,  with  two  regiments,  and  two  other 
regiments.  Burk's  Virginia  and  Colonel  -  — 's  Georgia  Regiment 
were  en  route  from  Staunton.  The  force  of  Loring  on  the  Ilunters 
ville  line  amounted  in  round  numbers  to  eight  thousand  five  hundred 
effective  men.  The  General's  staff  were  particularly  active  in  their  ef 
forts  to  prepare  for  a  speedy  advance.  Colonel  Stevenson,  Adjutant 
General,  and  Captains  Corley  and  Cole,  Chief  Quartermaster  and  Com 
missary,  being  experienced  officers,  rendered  valuable  service  in  orga 
nizing  the  troops  and  in  collecting  transportation  and  supplies.  Major 
A.  L.  Long,  in  addition  to  his  duties  as  Chief  of  Artillery,  had  assigned 
him  those  of  Inspector  General.  The  troops  were  well  armed  and 
equipped,  all  of  them  were  accustomed  to  the  use  of  arms,  and  many 
were  expert  marksmen,  and  a  large  proportion  had  received  military 
instruction  in  the  various  volunteer  companies  of  which  they  had 
been  members.  The  troops  were  in  fine  spirits,  and  desired  nothing 
more  than  to  be  led  against  the  enemy.  It  was  obvious  to  all  those 
about  the  General  that  the  success  of  the  proposed  movement  depended 
upon  its  speedy  execution.  It  was  impossible  that  the  occupation  of 
V  alley  Mountain  by  a  force  as  large  as  that  of  Gilliam  could  escape 
the  observation  of  the  Federals,  and  its  position  would  expose  the 
design  of  the  Confederates.  Delay  would  enable  the  Federals  to 
sc'ixe  all  the  important  Passes  on  the  route,  and  fortify  them  so 
strongly  that  they  would  effectually  arrest  the  advance  of  any  force. 
.Not withstanding  the  great  value  of  time  in  the  execution  of  the 
movement  contemplated  by  General  Loring,  he  seemed  to  regard  the 


LEE'S  WEST  VIRGINIA   CAMPAIGN.  87 

formation  of  a  depot  of  supplies  at  Iluntersville,  and  the  organization 
of  a  supply  train,  as  a  matter  of  first  importance.  He  appeared  to 
overlook  the  fact  that  the  line  from  Iluntersville  to  Beverly,  only 
forty  miles  long,  was  to  be  only  temporary;  for  so  soon  as  Cheat 
Mountain  Pass  was  opened  he  would  draw  his  supplies  from  Staunton 
over  the  Parkersburg  turnpike,  and  also,  that  the  country  along  his 
line  abounded  in  beef  and  grain. 

While  General  Loring  was  preparing  to  advance,  we  will  take  a 
view  of  affairs  in  other  quarters.  After  the  withdrawal  of  McClellan, 
General  Rosecrans  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Department 
of  Western  Virginia.  At  the  same  time  a  large  portion  of  the  troops 
in  that  department  were  withdrawn  for  the  defense  of  the  capital. 
The  Federal  force  in  Western  Virginia,  at  the  time  General  Loring 
assumed  command  of  the  Army  of  Northwestern  Virginia,  was  only 
about  six  or  seven  thousand  men  ;  about  half  of  which,  under  the 
command  of  General  Reynolds,  occupying  the  ("heat  Mountain  Pass. 
The  other  portion,  commanded  by  General  Cox,  was  designed  for 
operations  on  the  line  of  the  Ivanawha.  General  Rosecrans  was  one 
of  the  most  energetic  and  skilful  of  the  Federal  commanders.  As 
soon  as  he  found  himself  in  command  of  the  Department  of  Western 
Virginia  he  set  about  increasing  his  force  and  strengthening  his 
position.  General  Rosecrans,  taking  advantage  of  the  political 
disaffection  among  the  Western  Virginians,  obtained  many  recruits, 
which,  with  recruits  from  other  quarters  rapidly  increased  his  force. 
The  Confederate  authorities  in  the  meantime  being  informed  of  the 
advance  of  General  Cox  to  the  Kanawha,  sent  a  force  of  about  live 
thousand  men  to  oppose  him,  under  the  command  of  General  Floyd, 
and  appointed  General  Robert  E.  Lee  to  the  command  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  Western  Virginia.  He  had  displayed  such  remarkable  admin 
istrative  ability  in  the  organization  of  the  Virginia  troops  that  he 
was  retained  at  the  head  of  the  Confederate  Military  Bureau  to  the 
time  of  his  appointment  to  the  command  of  the  Department  of 
Western  Virginia.  Although  aware  of  the  difficulties  to  be  met 
with  in  a  country  like  Western  Virginia,  whose  mountains,  and  more 
than  half  of  whose  inhabitants  were  in  hostile  array  on  the  side  of  a 
powerful  adversary,  he  unflinchingly  accepted  it,  and  entered  upon 
his  arduous  task  with  no  other  feelings  than  those  for  the  good  of  his 
country.  When  General  Lee  arrived  at  Iluntersville  he  found  General 
Loring  busily  engaged  forming  his  depot  of  supplies  and  organizing 
his  transportation  train.  Several  days  had  already  elapsed,  and  several 
days  more  would  be  necessary  before  he  could  complete  his  prepara 
tions  for  an  advance.  The  arrival  of  General  Lee  at  Huntersville,  as 


88  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

commander  of  the  department,  took  General  Loring  by  surprise. 
Having  been  his  superior  in  rank  in  the  old  army,  he  could  not  suppress 
a  feeling  of  jealousy.  General  Lee  was  accompanied  by  his  aides-de 
camp,  Colonel  John  A.  Washington  and  Captain  Walter  II.  Taylor. 
After  remaining  several  days  at  Huntersville  without  gaining  any  posi 
tive  information  from  General  Loring  in  regard  to  the  time  of  his 
probable  advance,  he  proceeded  to  join  Colonel  Gilliam  at  Valley 
Mountain.  He  took  with  him  Major  Lee's  cavalry,  not  as  an  escort,  but 
for  the  purpose  of  scouting  and  reconnoitering.  It  had  now  been  eight 
or  ten  days  since  Colonel  Gilliam  first  arrived  at  Valley  Mountain  Pass. 
At  that  time  he  learned  from  the  inhabitants  and  his  scouts  that  the 
road  to  Beverly  was  unoccupied.  But  within  the  last  day  or  two,  a 
force  of  the  Federals  had  advanced  within  less  than  a  mile  of  his 
front,  and  then  retired.  General  Lee  at  once  busied  himself  about 
gaining  information  respecting  the  position  of  the  enemy.  He  soon 
learned  that  the  Federals  had  taken  possession  of  a  strong  Pass,  ten 
miles  in  front  of  Valley  Mountain,  and  were  actively  engaged  in 
fortifying  it.  When  General  Loring  arrived,  about  the  12th  of 
August,  the  Federals  had  been  reinforced,  and  this  position  had  been 
so  greatly  strengthened  that  General  Lee  deemed  it  unadvisable  to 
attempt  a  direct  attack,  so  the  only  course  now  to  be  pursued  was  to 
gain  the  Federal  flank  or  rear,  and  strike  them  when  they  least 
expected  an  attack. 

General  Lee  had  been  distinguished  in  the  Mexican  war  as  a 
reconnoitering  officer,  and  General  Scott  had  been  mainly  indebted 
to  his  bold  reconnoissance  for  the  brilliant  success  of  his  Mexican 
campaigns.  Hank  and  age  had  not  impaired  the  qualities  that  had 
formerly  rendered  him  so  distinguished.  He  brought  them  with  him 
to  the  mountains  of  Virginia.  There  was  not  a  day  when  it  was 
possible  for  him  to  be  out,  that  the  General,  with  either  Colonel 
Washington  or  Captain  Taylor,  might  not  be  seen  crossing  the 
mountains,  climbing  over  rocks  and  crags,  to  get  a  view  of  the 
Federal  position.  Ever  mindful  of  the  safety  of  his  men,  he  would 
never  spare  himself  toil  or  fatigue  \vhen  seeking  the  means  to  prevent 
unnecessary  loss  of  life.  By  way  of  illustrating  his  boldness  as  a 
reconnoitering  officer,  I  will  relate  an  anecdote  told  me  by  Captain 
Preston,  Adjutant  of  the  Forty-eighth  Virginia  Regiment  (Colonel 
Campbell's).  The  regiment  being  on  picket,  seeing  three  men  on  an 
elevated  point  about  half  a  mile  in  advance  of  the  line  of  pickets, 
and  believing  them  to  be  Yankees,  he  asked  his  colonel  to  let  him 
capture  them.  Permission  being  obtained,  and  selecting  two  men 
from  a  number  of  volunteers  who  had  offered  to  accompany  him,  he 


LEE'S  WEST  VIRGINIA   CAMPAIGN.  89 

set  forth  to  capture  the  Federal  scouts.  Dashing  through  the  brush 
wood,  and  over  the  rocks,  he  suddenly  burst  upon  the  unsuspecting 
trio,  when  lo !  to  his  amazement,  General  Lee  stood  before  him. 

To  add  to  the  difficulties  of  a  campaign  in  the  mountains,  the 
rainy  season  set  in ;  it  began  to  rain  about  the  middle  of  August, 
and  continued  without  much  cessation  for  several  weeks ;  in  the 
meantime,  the  narrow  mountain  roads  became  saturated  and  softened, 
so  that  the  passage  of  heavy  trains  of  wagons  soon  rendered  them 
almost  impassable ;  while  the  wet  weather  lasted,  any  movement  was 
simply  impossible.  The  troops  being  new,  and  unaccustomed  to 
camp  life,  began  to  suffer  from  all  the  camp  diseases.  Typhoid  fever, 
measles,  and  homesickness  began  to  spread  among  them,  so  that  in 
the  course  of  a  few  weeks  nearly  one-third  of  the  army  was  rendered 
hnrs  fie  combat  bv  sickness.  Amid  this  accumulation  of  difficulties 
General  Lee  preserved  his  equanimity  and  cheerfulness:  his  chief 
aim  now  was  to  ameliorate,  as  much  as  possible,  the  sufferings  of  his 
men.  During  this  period  of  inactivity  General  Lee  was  exerting 
himself  to  find  a  practicable  route  leading  to  the  rear  of  Client 
Mountain  Pass,  the  route  by  which  General  Loring  proposed  to  reach 
it  being  now  effectually  closed.  The  possession  of  the  Pass  was  of 
great  importance  to  the  Confederates,  as  the  Parkersburg  turnpike 
was  the  principal  line  over  which  operations  could  be  successfully 
carried  on  in  Northwestern  Virginia.  Individual  scouts  were  em 
ployed,  both  from  among  the  well-affected  inhabitants  and  the  enter 
prising  young  soldiers  of  the  army ;  Lieutenant  Lewis  Randolph,  of  the 
Virginia  State  Regulars,  was  particularly  distinguished  for  the  bold 
ness  of  his  reconnoissances.  About  the  25th  of  September,  General 
Jackson  reported  to  General  Loring  that  Colonel  Rust  had  made  a 
reconnoissance  to  the  rear  of  Cheat  Mountain  Pass,  and  had  discov 
ered  a  route,  though  difficult,  by  which  infantry  could  be  led.  Soon 
after,  Colonel  Rust  reported  in  person  and  informed  General  Lee  of 
the  practicability  of  reaching  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  position  on 
Cheat  Mountain,  from  which  a  favorable  attack  could  be  made,  and 
requested  the  General  that,  in  case  his  information  was  favorably 
considered,  to  be  allowed  to  lead  the  attacking  column,  to  consist  of 
his  regiment  and  such  other  troops  as  the  General  might  designate. 
Another  route  was,  in  the  meantime,  discovered,  leading  along  the 
western  side  of  Cheat  Mountain,  by  which  troops  could  be  conducted 
to  a  point  on  the  Parkersburg  turnpike,  about  two  miles  below  the 
Federal  position  in  the  Pass.  This  being  the  information  that 
General  Lee  had  been  most  desirous  of  obtaining,  he  determined  to 
attack  the  enemy  without  further  delay.  The  opposing  forces  were 


90  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

at  tins  time  about  equal  in  numbers.  Loring' s  force  was  now  six 
thousand,  General  Jackson's  about  five  thousand  strong.  General 
Reynold's  force  had  been  increased  to  about  eleven  thousand  men ; 
of  these,  two  thousand  were  on  Cheat  Mountain,  about  five  thousand 
in  position  on  the  Lewisburg  road  in  front  of  General  Loring.  The 
remainder  of  General  Reynold's  force  was  held  in  reserve  near  the 
junction  of  the  Parkersburg  turnpike  and  the  Lewisburg  road. 

General  Lee  determined  to  attack  on  the  morning  of  the  28th 
of  September.  The  plan  was  that  Colonel  Rust  should  gain  the 
rear  of  the  Federal  position  by  early  dawn,  and  begin  the  attack. 
General  Anderson,  with  two  Tennessee  regiments  from  Loring's 
command,  was  to  support  him ;  while  General  Jackson  was  to  make 
a  diverson  in  front.  Cheat  Mountain  Pass  being  carried,  General 
Jackson,  with  his  whole  force,  was  to  sweep  down  the  mountain  and 
fall  upon  the  rear  of  the  other  Federal  positron ;  General  Donaldson, 
with  two  regiments,  was  to  gain  a  favorable  position  for  attacking 
the  enemy  on  the  Lewisburg  road,  in  flank  or  rear ;  and  Loring  was 
to  advance,  by  the  main  road,  on  the  Federal  front.  In  case  of 
failure,  Anderson  and  Donaldson  were  to  rejoin  Loring,  and  Rust 
was  to  find  his  way  back  to  Jackson.  The  troops  gained  their  des 
ignated  positions  with  remarkable  promptness  and  accuracy  in  point 
of  time,  considering  the  distance  and  the  difficulties  to  be  overcome. 
Colonel  Rust's  attack  on  Cheat  Mountain  was  to  be  the  signal  for 
the  general  advance  of  all  the  troops.  It  was  anxiously  expected, 
from  early  dawn,  throughout  the  day.  On  every  side  was  continu 
ously  heard,  "  What  has  become  of  Rust  ? "  "  Why  don't  he  attack  ? " 
"  Rust  must  have  lost  his  way."  The  Tennesseeans,  under  Anderson, 
became  so  impatient  that  they  requested  to  be  led  to  the  attack  with 
out  waiting  for  Rust ;  but  General  Anderson  thought  that  he  must 
be  governed  by  the  letter  of  his  instructions,  and  declined  granting 
the  request  of  his  men.  Thus  we  see  a  plan  that  offered  every  pros 
pect  of  success  come  to  naught  by  the  failure  of  a  subordinate  officer 
to  come  up  to  the  expectations  of  his  commander.  Anderson  and 
Donaldson,  finding  that  their  situation  was  becoming  critical — being 
liable  to  discovery,  and  being  between  two  superior  forces — rejoined 
General  Loring  on  the  29th.  On  the  same  day,  Colonel  Rust  reported 
in  person  his  operations,  which  amounted  to  this :  he  heard  nothing 
of  General  Anderson ;  his  heart  failed  him ;  he  passed  the  day 
watching  the  Federals,  and  then  retired.  When  Colonel  Rust  ren 
dered  his  report,  General  Lee,  perceiving  the  deep  mortification  he 
felt  at  the  great  blunder  he  had  committed,  permitted  him  to  rejoin 
his  regiment.  A  council  of  war  was  then  held,  in  which  it  was 


LEEJS  WEST  VIRGINIA   CAMPAIGN.  91 

decided  that  the  position  of  the  Federals  was  too  strong  to  be  attacked 
in  front  with  any  reasonable  prospect  of  success,  and  that  a  Hank 
attack  was  now  out  of  the  question,  inasmuch  as  the  Federals  had 
been  aroused  by  the  discovery  of  the  danger  which  had  so  recently 
threatened  them ;  so  the  troops  were  ordered  to  resume  their  former 
positions.  During  the  operations  just  related,  there  had  been  but 
little  skirmishing,  and  the  Confederate  loss  had  been  slight.  One 
circumstance,  however,  occurred  which  cast  a  gloom  over  the  whole 
army.  Colonel  J.  A.  Washington,  while  making  a  recomioissance, 
fell  into  an  ambuscade,  and  was  killed.  lie  had,  by  his  soldierly 
qualities  and  high  gentlemanly  bearing,  gained  the  esteem  of  all. 
Too  much  praise  cannot  be  bestowed  upon  the  troops  fur  their 
courage  and  patient  endurance  in  this  campaign  ;  and  Colonels  Burk, 
Gilliam,  Campbell,  Lee,  Munford,  Maney,  I  fatten  and  Savage  were 
worthy  of  the  gallant  fellows  that  it  had  fallen  to  their  lot  to  com 
mand. 

We  will  now  examine  into  the  condition  of  affairs  on  the  line  of 
the  Kanawha.  General  Floyd  entered  the  Kanawha  Valley  in  August. 
General  Cox  was  then  near  Charleston.  After  some  maiH'iivring, 
Floyd  fell  back  to  the  junction  of  the  Xew  river  and  the  Gauley,  where 
he  was  joined  by  General  Wise.  Floyd's  force  now  numbered  1  >et ween 
eight  and  ten  thousand  men.  Being  uncertain  whether  ( 'ox  would  ad 
vance  up  the  Xew  river  line  or  upon  that  of  the  Gauley,  he  posted  a 
force,  under  Wise,  on  the  Xew  river  line,  while  he  occupied  a  favorable 
position  on  the  Gauley.  At  Carnifax's  Ferry,  Floyd  and  Wise  were 
in  easy  supporting  distance  of  each  other;  but  there  was  no  cordiality 
between  them.  About  the  loth  of  September,  General  Floyd,  seeing 
that  it  was  the  evident  intention  of  Koseeraiis  to  attack  him,  ordered 
Wise  to  his  support,  which  order  Wise  failed  to  obey,  and  Floyd  was 
left  to  receive  alone  the  attack  of  a  greatly  superior  force,  which, 
however,  he  succeeded  in  repulsing  with  considerable  loss;  but, 
being  still  unsupported  by  Wise,  he  was  obliged  to  retire.  Among 
the  casualties  on  the  side  of  the  Confederates,  General  Floyd  received 
a  painful  wound  in  the  arm.  General  Wise  having  finally  joined 
Floyd,  they  fell  back  to  a  position  on  the  James  river  and  Kanawha 
turnpike,  near  the  Hawk's  Xest. 

About  the  last  of  September  General  Itosecrans,  having  rein 
forced  Cox,  took  command  in  person  and  advanced  on  the  James 
River  and  Kanawha  turnpike,  gradually  pushing  back  Floyd  and 
Wise  in  the  direction  of  Lewisburg,  it  being  his  intention  to  turn 
the  Confederate  position  on  A' alley  Mountain  and  the  Greenbrier 
river.  Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  011  the  line  of  the  Kanawha 


92  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

at  the  close  of  the  Valley  Mountain  campaign.  General  Lee, 
perceiving  that  the  operations  on  the  Kanawha  were  not  progressing 
favorably,  determined  to  take  control  of  affairs  in  that  quarter  him 
self.  He,  therefore,  directed  Loring  to  detach  Gilliam  with  his  own 
regiment  (the  battalion  of  State  Regulars)  and  a  section  of  artillery 
to  occupy  Yalley  Mountain  Pass,  and  proceed  with  the  remainder  of 
his  force  to  reinforce  General  Floyd.  General  Lee  arrived  at  Meadow 
Bluff  about  the  7th  of  October,  where  he  found  Floyd.  Meadow 
Bluff  is  a  small  village  near  the  eastern  base  of  Sewell  Mountain. 
Floyd  had  proposed  making  a  stand  there,  but  "Wise  had  halted  on 
the  top  of  the  mountain,  five  miles  in  rear,  where  he  had  determined 
to  fight.  The  hostility  that  had  previously  existed  between  the  two 
generals  had  not  been  diminished  by  the  affair  at  Carnif ax's  Ferry ; 
the  arrival  of  General  Lee  was,  therefore,  fortunate,  as  it  most  probably 
prevented  a  disaster,  since  Rosecrans  was  advancing,  and  would  have 
been  able  to  strike  both  Wise  and  Floyd  in  detail.  General  Lee 
found  General  Wise  occupying  the  eastern  crest  of  Sewell  Mountain ; 
being  satisfied  with  the  position,  he  determined  to  hold  it,  and  give 
battle  to  Rosecrans  if  he  persisted  in  advancing.  So  he  ordered 
Floyd  to  return  and  support  Wise.  General  Lee  had  barely  time  to 
complete  his  arrangements  when  Rosecrans  appeared  on  the  opposite 
crest.  Each  army  now  occupied  a  mountain  crest  nearly  parallel, 
separated  by  a  gap  or  depression  forming  a  notch  in  the  mountain 
about  a  mile  wide,  over  which  it  was  difficult  to  pass  except  by  the 
James  River  and  Kanawha  turnpike,  which  crosses  it.  Both  positions 
were  naturally  very  strong.  The  Confederate  force  being  greatly 
inferior  to  that  of  the  Federals,  and  General  Rosecrans  having 
assumed  the  offensive,  General  Lee  naturally  expected  to  be  attacked 
before  Loring  could  come  up ;  he,  therefore,  actively  employed  his 
skill  as  an  engineer  in  adding  to  the  natural  strength  of  his  position. 
Rosecrans,  discovering  the  formidable  preparations  of  the  Con 
federates,  prudently  f orebore  attacking  them.  The  arrival  of  General 
Loring,  on  the  9th,  placed  General  Lee's  force  almost  on  an  equality 
with  that  of  the  Federals. 

The  force  of  General  Lee  now  amounted  to  about  fifteen  thou 
sand  men.  The  troops  were  in  fine  spirits,  and  anxious  to  be  led  to 
the  attack ;  but  the  General,  ever  mindful  of  the  safety  of  his  men, 
restrained  their  ardor.  On  one  occasion,  when  several  of  the  com 
manders  were  urging  an  attack,  he  remarked :  "  I  know,  gentlemen, 
you.  could  carry  the  enemy's  lines ;  but  we  cannot  spare  the  brave 
men  who  would  lose  their  lives  in  doing  it.  If  General  Rosecrans 
does  not  attack  us,  we  will  find  a  way  to  reach  him  that  will  not  cost 


LEEJS  WEST  VIRGINIA   CAMPAIGN.  93 

us  so  dearly."  After  waiting  several  days  for  General  Rosecrans  to 
attack,  lie  began  to  make  preparations  for  a  flank  movement  to  gain 
Rosecrans'  rear,  who  no  longer  manifested  a  disposition  to  continue 
the  aggressive.  General  Floyd  and  others,  who  had  a  good  knowl 
edge  of  the  routes  in  the  vicinity  of  Sewell  Mountain,  reported  to 
General  Lee  a  practicable  route  for  artillery  and  infantry  leading 
about  ten  miles  to  the  rear  of  the  Federal  position.  Upon  this 
information,  he  conceived  the  plan  of  sending  a  column  of  live  thou 
sand  men  by  this  route  at  night,  and  at  dawn  to  fall  upon  the  Federals' 
rear  while  a  strong  demonstration  was  being  made  in  front.  Had 
this  plan  been  executed,  it  would  most  likely  have  been  successful ; 
but  General  Rosecrans  escaped  the  trap  by  a  night  retreat.  Great 
was  the  disappointment  of  the  troops  when  they  discovered  that  the 
Federals  had  retired,  and  the  prospects  of  a  battle  had  vanished.  As 
soon  as  the  retreat  of  the  Federals  was  discovered,  pursuit  was  ordered  ; 
but  General  Lee  soon  perceived  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  over 
take  General  Rosecrans  and  bring  him  to  a  successful  engagement 
in  the  rough,  mountainous  country  through  which  he  was  retreating; 
and,  not  wishing  to  harass  his  troops  unnecessarily,  ordered  them  to 
return  to  their  several  positions,  and  Rosecrans  was  allowed  to  pursue 
his  retreat  unmolested  to  the  Kanawha.  General  Lee  knew  that, 
with  the  bravery  of  his  troops,  and  the  strength  of  his  position,  he 
could  repel  any  attack  that  the  Federals  could  make;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  he  attacked  them  in  their  position,  the  result,  even  if 
successful,  would  be  attended  with  great  loss.  He,  therefore,  deter 
mined  to  give  Rosecrans  every  opportunity  to  attack  before  taking 
the  offensive  himself,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  Rosecrans  prevented 
by  abandoning  his  own  plans  and  retreating. 

The  season  was  now  so  far  advanced  that  it  was  impossible  to 
continue  active  operations  in  Western  Virginia.  Snow  had  already 
fallen,  and  the  roads  had  become  almost  impassible.  General  Lee 
therefore  determined  to  withdraw  the  troops  from  Sewell  Mountain. 
About  the  1st  of  November  the  different  columns  were  sent  to  their 
various  destinations.  The  campaign  had  been  pronounced  a  failure. 
The  press  and  the  public  were  clamorous  against  him.  Tso  one 
stopped  to  inquire  the  cause  or  examine  into  the  difficulties  that  sur 
rounded  him.  LTpoii  him  alone  were  heaped  the  impracticability  of 
mountains,  the  hostility  of  the  elements,  and  the  inefficiency  and 
captiousness  of  subordinate  commanders.  The  difficulties  to  be 
encountered  in  Western  Virginia  were  so  great,  and  the  chances  of 
success  so  doubtful  (as  had  been  shown  by  the  recent  operations  in 
that  quarter),  that  the  Confederate  authorities  abandoned  the  idea  of 


94  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

its  further  occupation.  Therefore,  the  greater  part  of  the  troops  that 
had  been  serving  in  Western  Virginia  were  ordered  where  their  ser 
vices  would  be  more  available,  and  General  Lee  was  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  Department  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia  and  Florida. 
While  the  operations  on  Big  Sewell  were  in  progress,  General 
Reynolds  made  a  descent  from  Cheat  Mountain  and  attacked  the 
Confederate  position  on  the  Greenbrier.  This  attack  was  promptly 
met  by  General  H.  R.  Jackson,  and  repulsed  w;ith  considerable  loss. 
Soon  after  his  return  to  Huntersville,  General  Loring  was  instructed 
to  report  to  General  T.  J.  Jackson  (Stonewall  Jackson),  then  com 
manding  in  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  to  participate  in  a  contemplated 
winter  campaign.  About  the  same  time  I  received  orders  from  the 
War  Office  to  report  to  General  Lee  in  the  Department  of  South 
Carolina,  Georgia  and  Florida. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  MORRIS  ISLAND. 


BY    GENERAL    W.    W.    II.    DAVIS. 


THE  siege  of  Morris  Island 
has  passed  into  history.  The 
wearisome  day  and  nights  in 
the  trenches,  with  shovel  and 
rifle,  under  the  plunging  lire 
of  the  enemy's  batteries,  and 
the  repeated  assaults  of  almost 
impregnable  earthworks,  are 
numbered  among  the  past 
events  of  our  late  wonderful 
war.  Morris  Island  is  a  sandy 
waif  of  the  sea,  lying  on  the 
west  side  of  the  outer  harbor 
of  Charleston,  and  stretching 
three  miles  from  north  to 
south.  It  varies  in  width 
from  two  or  three  hundred  yards  to  a  few  feet  at  the  narrowest  part. 
A  ridge  of  sand-hills  run  parallel  with  the  beach,  just  out  of  reach  of 
the  tidal-line  on  the  east;  while  on  the  west  it  slopes  into  marshes, 
two  miles  wide,  and  intersected  by  a  labyrinth  of  water-courses,  which 
separates  it  from  James  Island.  At  a  few  points  the  tide  breaks 
entirely  across  it.  It  is  an  island  of  fine  white  sand. 

A  watchful  enemy  had  carefully  guarded  this  approach  to 
Charleston,  where  the  late  rebellion  had  its  birth.  A  strong  earth 
work,  known  as  Battery  Gregg,  had  been  erected  on  Cumming's 
Point,  at  the  north  end  of  the  island,  mounting  four  ten-inch 
columbiads  and  one  ten-inch  mortar.  This  battery  had  been  used  in 
the  siege  of  Fort  Sumter,  in  April,  1801;  but  the  work  had  been 
altered  and  strengthened,  and  some  of  its  guns  now  pointed  down 
the  island.  About  the  narrowest  part  of  the  island,  where  Vincent's 
creek  approaches  the  sea,  was  erected  Battery  "Wagner,  on  which  were 
mounted  sixteen  guns  and  mortars,  most  of  them  of  heavy  calibre. 
This  was  one  of  the  strongest  earthworks  ever  built,  and  gave  evidence 
of  the  highest  order  of  engineering  ability.  The  bomb-proof  would 


96  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

accomodate  a  garrison  of  fourteen  hundred  men,  and  was  strong 
enough  to  resist  the  heaviest  shot  and  shell.  It  was  flanked  on  the 
west  by  Vincent's  creek  and  the  marshes,  on  the  east  by  the  sea,  and 
had  a  wet  ditch.  It  could  only  be  approached  in  front  over  ground 
that  was  completely  swept  by  its  guns.  The  guns  of  Gregg  took  it 
in  reverse,  while  those  of  the  enemy's  batteries  on  James  and  Sulli 
van's  Islands  took  it  both  in  reverse  and  flank.  The  barbette  guns 
of  Sumter  commanded  it  by  a  plunging  fire,  and  threw  shells  a  mile 
beyond.  The  operations  were  carried  on  along  a  narrow  strip  of  land 
less  than  one-half  the  front  of  the  work,  a  thing  of  rare  occurrence  in 
besieging  a  strong  work ;  while  it  differed  from  most  operations  of 
the  kind,  in  the  fact  that  both  parties  had  communication  with  the 
sea.  A  more  difficult  problem  than  the  reduction  of  Battery  Wag 
ner  has  seldom  been  presented  to  the  engineer  for  solution.  The 
enemy  had  also  constructed  detached  batteries  in  the  sand-hills  lower 
down  the  island,  which,  with  those  previously  mentioned,  commanded 
the  approaches  to  it  from  all  quarters.  On  the  south  end  of  the 
island  was  a  long  rifle-pit  to  guard  against  a  landing  from  boats. 
Directly  south  of  Morris  lies  Folly  Island,  separated  from  it  by  an 
inlet  of  the  sea  three  hundred  yards  wide.  Its  general  features  are 
the  same,  except  that  it  is  covered  by  a  heavy  growth  of  timber,  well 
calculated  to  conceal  preliminary  operations.  On  the  west  Folly 
Island  is  separated  from  James  Island  by  a  narrow  stream  and  a 
continuation  of  the  marshes  that  bound  Morris  Island  on  that  side. 

After  the  failure  of  the  attack  on  Fort  Sumter,  in  April,  the 
government  determined  to  place  Brigadier  General  Quincy  A. 
Gillmore  in  charge  of  the  operations  about  to  be  renewed  against 
the  defenses  before  Charleston.  At  the  time  he  was  at  the  head  of 
a  division  in  the  field  in  Kentucky.  lie  was  called  to  Washington. 
After  listening  to  the  views  of  the  administration  and  fully  under 
standing  their  wishes,  he  agreed  to  accomplish  three  things,  if  placed 
in  command  of  the  land  operations,  viz.:  possess  and  hold  the  south 
end  of  Morris  Island,  reduce  Fort  Wagner,  and  destroy  Sumter  for 
offensive  purposes.  The  Secretary  of  the  I^avy  gave  him  to  under 
stand  that  if  these  things  were  accomplished,  the  iron-clads  would 
go  in  and  finish  what  remained  to  be  done  in  the  capture  of 
Charleston. 

General  Gillmore  reached  Hilton  Head  on  the  12th  of  June, 
1863,  at  which  time  we  had  a  small  force  on  Folly  Island,  holding  it 
as  a  base  of  future  operations.  The  General  immediately  proceeded 
hither  to  examine  the  situation.  From  the  jungles  on  the  north 
end  of  the  island  he  looked  across  the  inlet  on  to  the  sand-hills  of 


THE  SIEGE  OF  MORRIS  ISLAND.  97 

Morris,  crowned  with  Confederate  guns.  From  where  he  stood 
Sumter  was  in  plain  view,  lie  saw  everything  with  the  eye  of  a 
practical  engineer,  and  decided  at  a  glance  where  to  erect  his  batteries, 
and  the  use  he  would  make  of  them.  Xecessity  compelled  their 
erection  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  a  vigilant  enemy;  discovery 
would  defeat  the  enterprise.  The  engineers  were  immediately  set 
to  work,  and  a  dense  thicket  served  to  conceal  our  operations.  The 
laborers,  materials,  guns,  and,  in  fact,  everything  used  in  constructing 
the  batteries,  were  taken  to  the  front  at  night.  The  greater  part  of 
the  work  was  done  under  lire,  for  the  enemy  suspected  we  had  a 
force  at  the  head  of  the  island,  and  they  shelled  it  continually. 
Troops  Avere  landed  under  cover  of  the  darkness,  and  before  the 
morning  dawned  they  were  concealed  in  the  timber  and  bushes,  and 
the  transports  that  brought  them  were  sent  to  sea  again.  The  island 
was  carefully  picketed  to  prevent  the  enemy's  spies  landing  to  discover 
what  we  were  doing. 

In  twenty  davs  the  batteries  were  finished,  mounting  forty-eight 

«,  ^  c">  «,  <* 

guns  and  mortars,  with  all  the  appliances  of  bomb-proofs,  magazines, 
etc.,  and  each  piece  supplied  with  two  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition. 
So  well  had  all  our  movements  been  concealed  from  the  enemy  that 
he  did  not  dream  of  the  existence  of  our  batteries  until  they  opened 
lire  upon  him.  The  assault  was  made  on  Morris  Island  the  morning 
of  the  !<>th  of  July.  It  was  a  combined  attack  by  infantry  in  boats, 
consisting  of  General  Strong's  Brigade,  and  a  heavy  cannonade  from 
our  batteries.  The  infantry  embarked  during  the  night  of  the  Oth, 
on  Folly  river,  and  at  daylight  in  the  morning  lay  in  Light  House 
Inlet,  off  the  southwestern  point  of  the  island.  General  Truman  B. 
Seymour  came  into  the  batteries  just  before  daylight,  impatient  for 
the  bombardment  to  open.  The  night  before,  the  brush  in  front  of 
the  1  mtteries  had  been  cut  away,  and  the  embrasures  opened.  Seymour 
asked  the  officer  in  command  of  the  three  thirty-pounder  Parrotts 
on  the  right  if  he  could  see  a  certain  gun  of  the  enemy  mounted 
among  the  sand-hills  distinctly  enough  to  take  aim  at  it  On  the 
officer  replying  in  the  negative  the  General  called  a  party  of  engineers 
to  shovel  the  sand  away  from  the  embrasure  Day  broke  before 
they  had  finished,  and  the  General  remarking,  '•  It  will  never  do  to 
let  them  get  the  first  fire,"  called  in  the  engineers,  and  directed  the 
officer  to  "blaze  away."1  Immediately  the  quiet  of  the  morning  was 
broken  by  the  roar  of  artillery.  The  infantry  moved  up  about  the 
same  time,  and  in  a  little  while  effected  a  landing,  and  carried  the 
enemy's  rifle-pits.  General  Strong,  in  his  anxiety  to  land,  stepped 
overboard  in  seven  feet  of  water;  but  this  mishap  did  not  prevent 
7 


98  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

him  mounting  a  Confederate  horse,  without  saddle,  and  barefooted, 
and  join  in  the  pursuit  of  the  foe.  His  patriotism  received  the 
double  baptism  of  fire  and  water.  The  reveille  had  just  sounded  in 
the  enemy's  camp,  and  they  had  turned  out  for  roll-call,  when  our 
shot  and  shell  went  tearing  through  their  ranks.  Officers  and  men 
were  killed  before  they  had  time  to  dress.  The  iron-dads  crossed 
the  bar  at  daylight,  and  after  we  had  effected  a  landing,  they  moved 
up  and  rolled  their  ponderous  shells  over  the  island.  At  the  Beacon 
Ilouse  our  troops  came  within  reach  of  the  guns  of  "Wagner,  when  a 
halt  was  made,  and  some  intrenchments  thrown  up.  The  day  was 
intensely  hot,  and  the  troops  were  completely  prostrated.  Our  loss 
was  small.  Thus  had  General  Gillmore  redeemed  his  first  pledge. 
At  this  period  in  the  operations  a  fatal  mistake  was  made.  Fort 
Wagner  should  have  been  immediately  assailed,  and  would  then  have 
fallen  into  our  hands  without  much  opposition.  The  assault  wTas 
delayed  until  the  next  day,  when  we  were  repulsed  with  considerable 
loss.  While  these  operations  were  going  on,  a  division  of  troops 
was  sent  over  to  James  Island  to  engage  the  enemy's  attention  in 
that  direction,  where  a  spirited  action  was  fought  on  the  IGth  of 
July,  in  which  the  Federal  forces  were  victorious. 

The  failure  of  the  attack  on  the  llth  satisfied  General  Gillmore 
that  siege  operations  must  be  commenced  against  Wagner.  Ground 
was  broken  on  the  night  of  the  13th,  and  the  work  was  pushed  with 
such  vigor  that  the  first  parallel,  at  the  distance  of  thirteen  hundred 
and  fifty  yards,  was  completed  on  the  17th.  It  mounted  twenty-five 
rifled  guns  and  mortars.  An  assault  was  arranged  for  twilight  the 
next  evening,  and  two  additional  brigades  were  added  to  our  forces. 
During  the  day  our  batteries,  in  conjunction  with  the  navy,  kept  up 
a  warm  cannonade  on  the  fort,  and  by  4  P.  M.  the  enemy's  guns 
were  silenced.  The  troops  chosen  for  the  assault  were  the  brigades 
of  Seymour,  Strong  and  Putnam,  the  whole  under  the  command  of 
General  Seymour.  They  moved  up  the  beach  about  sundown,  and 
advanced  upon  the  work  in  deployed  lines.  At  the  distance  of 
nearly  a  mile,  the  enemy  opened  upon  them  with  shot  and  shell, 
which  they  changed  to  grape,  canister  and  musketry  at  closer 
range.  The  troops  steadily  advanced  in  spite  of  this  iron  and  leaden 
hail,  with  scores  of  men  falling,  killed  and  wounded,  at  every  step. 
A  portion  of  them  reached  the  ditch  and  mounted  the  parapet,  and 
seized  and  held  that  part  of  the  work  near  the  salient  for  some  time, 
but,  after  a  fierce  struggle  for  the  mastery,  were  compelled  to  retire, 
leaving  the  killed  and  wounded  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The 
assault  was  bravely  made,  and  the  repulse  bloody.  Our  loss  footed 


THE  SIEGE  OF  MORRIS  ISLAND.  99 

up  1,517.  The  attack  was  a  direct  one,  the  situation  of  the  work 
being  such  that  no  feint  or  diversion  could  be  made.  The  guns  of 
the  enemy  swept  every  foot  of  the  ground  our  men  marched  over. 
When  they  left  the  ditch  for  the  parapet  they  were  met  by  the  bayo 
net,  and  nearly  every  other  missile  and  weapon  that  is  used  on  such 
occasions.  The  gunners  were  driven  from  the  curtain,  and  many  of 
the  garrison  sought  safety  in  the  bomb-proof.  The  fort  was  within 
an  ace  of  being  ours ;  but  we  were  driven  back.  There  comes  the 
old  story  that  somebody  failed  to  support  the  advance  at  the  proper 
time  ;  but  here  the  responsibility  ends. 

Tliis  repulse  caused  a  modification  in  the  plan  of  operations. 
By  possessing  Wagner  the  works  on  dimming' s  Point  would  have 
fallen  of  their  own  weight ;  whence  it  would  be  an  easy  matter  to 
bombard  Sumter.  General  Gillmore  was  now  convinced  that  Wag 
ner  was  too  strong  to  be  taken  by  assault,  and  could  only  be  reduced 
by  regular  siege.  As  the  guns  of  Sumter  would  be  a  great  annoyance 
to  the  men  in  the  trenches,  commanding  them  by  a  plunging  lire,  he 
determined  to  destroy  that  fortress  over  the  head  of  Wagner.  This 
was  contrary  to  the  usual  course  of  military  engineering,  but  neces 
sity  compelled  its  adoption.  The  distance  at  which  the  breaching 
batteries  had  to  be  erected  was  unprecedented,  and  the  task  was 
pronounced  impracticable.  jS^one  but  the  boldest  engineer  would 
have  undertaken  the  work.  Beauregard  assured  his  troops  that 
Sumter  could  not  be  breached  until  after  Wagner  had  been  reduced  • 
but  Gillmore  thought  differently,  and  bent  all  his  energies  to  make 
good  the  faith  that  was  in  him. 

The  engineers  commenced  work  on  the  night  of  the  25th  of 
July,  and  by  the  10th  of  August  the  batteries  were  completed. 
They  were  eight  in  number — the  nearest  one  being  thirty-four  hun 
dred  yards  from  Sumter,  and  the  farthest  forty-two  hundred  and 
thirty-five  yards.  Seven  of  these  batteries  bore  the  distinctive  names 
of  Brown,  Rosecrans,  Meade,  Hayes,  Reno,  Stevens,  and  Strong, 
mounting  the  following  guns,  viz. :  one  three-hundred-pounder,  six 
two-hundred-pounders,  nine  one-hundred-pounders,  two  eighty-four- 
pounder  Whitworth,  two  thirty  and  four  twenty-pounders;  all 
Parrotts  except  two  guns,  and  the  whole  of  them  rifled.  Xever 
before  had  such  a  weight  of  metal  been  directed  against  any  fortress 
in  one  attack  since  the  art  of  war  began.  Those  who  have  not 
engaged  in  such  operations  can  have  only  a  faint  idea  of  the  labor 
and  fatigue  attending  the  construction  of  the  batteries  and  mounting 
the  guns.  The  three-hundred-pounder  gave  great  trouble  before  it 
was  got  into  position.  It  was  transported  more  than  a  mile  from 


100  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  dock,  through  deep  sands,  and  across  semi-marsh  overflowed  by 
the  tide.  It  broke  down  three  sling-carts.  It  was  about  a  week  on 
the  way,  and  in  the  daytime  it  was  covered  with  brush  and  weeds 
to  conceal  it  from  the  enemy.  Not  only  were  the  batteries  mostly 
built,  but  all  the  guns  were  mounted,  at  night.  Most  of  the  work 
was  done  under  fire. 

At  this  period  there  sprang  into  existence  a  battery  built  in  the 
marsh  between  Morris  and  James  Islands,  which  has  become  famous 
as  the  "  Swamp  Angel,"  and  as  such  will  go  down  to  history.  Its 
construction  was  early  determined  upon,  and  the  suggestion,  we 
believe,  was  that  of  Colonel  Serrell,  commanding  the  New  York 
Volunteer  Engineers.  It  wras  expected  that  shells  thrown  from  it 
would  reach  the  city  and  probably  cause  the  enemy  to  evacuate.  The 
spot  chosen  was  almost  a  mile  from  Morris  Island,  and  nearly  on  a 
line  between  what  were  known  as  the  "  left  batteries  "  and  Charleston, 
on  the  edge  of  a  deep  creek  that  served  as  a  wet  ditch.  On  recon- 
iioitering  the  locality  it  was  found  that  a  pole  could  be  run  down 
sixteen  feet  anywhere  thereabouts  before  coming  to  bottom.  The 
active  part  of  the  work  was  assigned  to  a  lieutenant  of  engineers  who, 
when  shown  where  the  battery  was  to  be  built,  pronounced  the  tiling 
impracticable.  The  colonel  replied  that  the  project  was  practicable, 
and  the  battery  must  be  built  on  the  spot  selected.  The  officer  was 
directed  to  call  for  anything  he  might  deem  necessary  for  the  work. 
The  next  day  he  made  a  requisition  on  the  quartermaster  for  one 
hundred  men,  eighteen  feet  high,  to  wade  through  mud  sixteen  feet 
deep,  and  immediately  called  on  the  surgeon  of  his  regiment  and 
inquired  if  he  could  splice  the  men  if  furnished.  This  piece  of 
pleasantry  cost  the  lieutenant  his  arrest,  and  the  battery  was  built  by 
men  of  ordinary  stature.  A  heavy  foundation  of  pine  logs  was  laid 
in  the  mud,  on  which  the  battery  was  built  entirely  of  sand-bags. 
The  timber  was  hauled  several  miles  from  Folly  Island.  The  bags 
were  filled  with  sand  on  the  island  and  taken  to  the  battery  in  boats. 
All  the  work  was  done  at  night,  for  the  eyes  of  a  watchful  enemy 
were  upon  all  our  movements.  They  knew  we  were  at  some  mis 
chief  so  far  out  on  the  marsh,  but  did  not  realize  the  truth  until  they 
looked  across  one  bright  morning  and  saw  that,  like  Jonah's  gourd,  a 
battery  had  grown  up  in  the  night.  It  was  commenced  on  the  4th 
and  completed  -on  the  19th  of  August.  The  sand-bags  cost  five 
thousand  dollars.  The  battery  was  mounted  with  a  two  hundred- 
pounder  Parrott,  and  great  labor  was  required  to  put  it  in  position. 
It  was  hauled  to  the  edge  of  the  marsh,  where  it  was  embarked  on  a 
raft  in  the  creek,  and  thus  floated  down  to  the  battery.  The  distance 


THE  SIEGE  OF  MORRIS  ISLAND.  101 

from  Charleston  was  eight  thousand  eight  hundred  yards,  and  the 
gun  was  tired  at  an  elevation  of  thirty-live  degrees.  The  strain  on 
it  was  such  that  it  burst  at  the  thirty-fourth  discharge. 

The  "Greek  tire/'  of  which  so  much  was  said,  was  one  of  the 
great  humbugs  of  the  war.  Nothing  of  the  kind  was  used  during  the 
siege.  Three  shells  tilled  with  pieces  of  ordinary  port-tire  were  tired 
into  the  city  of  Charleston;  but  everything  beyond  this  was  due  to 
the  fancy  of  newspaper  correspondents.  The  distinctive  name  of 
"  Swamp  Angel"  is  said  to  have  been  suggested  by  Sergeant  Feller,  of 
the  2s  ew  York  Volunteer  Engineers. 

Meanwhile,  the  enemy  had  not  been  idle.  We  contended  against 
a  foe  as  brave  and  vigilant  as  ourselves,  and  they  taxed  every  resource 
of  the  profession  to  repel  us.  They  erected  new  batteries  on  James 
Island  to  take  us  in  Hank,  and  strengthened  those  on  Sullivan.  They 
mounted  new  guns  to  match  our  superior  weight  of  metal  as  far  as 
possible.  The  range  of  one  of  our  guns  was  tried  on  Sumter  on  the 
liith  of  August.  The  shell  struck  the  parapet  and  knocked  down  a 
quantity  of  bricks,  which  fell  on  a  steamer  lying  alongside,  and  broke 
off  her  smoke-stack. 

The  regular  bombardment  was  opened  on  Sumter  at  sunrise  on 
the  17th,  and  continued  without  cessation,  from  day  to  day,  until  the 
23d.  At  the  same  time  the  iron-dads  moved  up  and  took  part  ;  the 
monitor  batteries  "Passaic"  and  "  Patapsco"  directing  their  tire  at  the 
fort,  while  the  others  engaged  AVagner.  AVhen  the  tiring  ceased  on 
the  i!'>d,  the  fort  was  practically  destroyed  for  all  offensive  purposes. 
The  barbette  guns  were  dismounted  and  buried  up  in  the1  debris. 
The  gorge-wall  and  sea-face  were  so  badly  breached  that  in  many 
places  the  arches  of  the  casemates  were  exposed.  The  lines  were 
entirely  destroyed,  and  it  appeared  a  shapeless  mass  of  brick  and 
mortar.  Our  batteries  were  occasionally  reopened  until  the  1st 
of  September,  when  the  first  bombardment  terminated.  In  this 
time  we  threw  six  thousand  two  hundred  and  fifty  projectiles,  of 
which  two  thousand  one  hundred  and  sixty-five  were  solid  shot 
and  four  thousand  and  eighty-five  percussion  shell.  They  were 
of  the  calibre  of  one,  two  and  three  hundred-pounders.  The  enemy 
replied  feebly  to  our  fire,  and  did  but  little  damage.  The  sight  was 
a  fine  one ;  the  artillery  practice  as  good  as  ever  was  seen.  The 
scream  of  the  shot  and  shell,  as  they  took  their  course  to  the  devoted 
fortress  was  fearful,  and  every  hit  was  followed  by  a  cloud  of  brick 
and  dust  thrown  into  the  air.  The  fire  of  the  land  batteries  was 
continuous,  with  reliefs  of  artillerists  for  the  guns.  On  the  last  day 
of  the  bombardment  the  "  Ironsides "  and  monitors  took  an  active 


102  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

part.  The  correspondent  of  the  Mobile  Tribune  gave  an  interesting 
account  of  the  situation  of  the  garrison  of  Siunter  at  this  period. 
He  said: 

The  "Ironsides"  and  monitors  commenced  a  terrific  bombardment.  A  fog 
protected  them  from  the  guns  of  Moultrie.  Sumter,  having  only  two  ten-inch  and 
one  eleven-inch  gun  left  on  barbette,  could  only  fire  an  occasional  shot  to  show  life. 
For  seven  hours,  at  close  range,  the  fleet  hurled  shot  and  shell  into  the  work. 
Striking  the  wall  near  the  parapet,  loose  bricks  were  thrown  up  in  columns,  and 
fell  in  showers  around  the  gunners  and  around  the  work.  Walls  were  ploughed 
through,  casemates  filled  with  sand,  and  the  shells  passed  across  the  parade,  striking 
the  interior  wall  of  the  west  magazine,  containing  powder  enough  to  destroy  the 
fort  and  garrison.  One  shell  struck  the  ventilator  and  exploded.  It  filled  the 
magazine  with  smoke.  Another  more  successful  shot  and  all  would  have  been  lost. 
It  was  an  anxious  moment,  but  the  fort  was  held.  Gradually  the  morning 
dawned.  The  fog  lifted,  and  Fort  Moultrie  opened  fire  on  the  ships.  Instead  of 
continuing  their  fire  at  this  critical  period  the  fleet  withdrew,  and  the  danger  was 
removed.  The  object  was  now,  in  the  unsafe  condition  of  the  fort,  to  get  rid  of  the 
powder.  It  depended  on  time  and  the  movements  of  the  fleet.  Had  the  fleet  renewed 
the  attack  the  business  might  have  been  done.  The  fleet  delayed  !  Night  after  night 
the  powder,  ten  thousand  pounds,  was  moved  in  barrels,  under  the  enemy's  guns. 
Only  eight  hundred  pounds  were  left ;  the  crisis  ivas  passed. 

While  the  batteries  were  being  erected  and  their  guns  directed 
against  Sumter,  the  engineers  pushed  operations  against  Wagner, 
which  they  approached  with  steady  and  toilsome  pace.  On  the 
night  of  the  23d  of  July  the  second  parallel  was  opened  six  hundred 
yards  nearer  the  fort.  Here  was  our  strongest  position,  defensive  as 
well  as  offensive.  In  this  parallel,  it  will  be  remembered,  was 
mounted  some  of  the  guns  that  breached  Sumter,  and  batteries  were 
erected  there  mounting  fifteen  other  guns  and  mortars.  Here  was 
built  a  store  magazine  that  contained  a  supply  of  powder  for  all 
the  contiguous  batteries,  and  a  small  splinter-proof  contained  an 
army  telegraph  instrument  to  communicate  with  headquarters. 
Here  was  the  "headquarters"  of  the  trenches,  where  the  general 
and  field  officer  of  the  day  remained  when  on  duty  at  the  front ;  and 
from  this  point  the  details  for  guards  and  fatigue  in  the  trenches 
were  sent  to  their  respective  localities.  On  the  top  of  the  magazine 
a  soldier  was  stationed  to  watch  the  firing  of  the  enemy's  batteries, 
and  when  he  pronouncd  the  significant  words,  "Johnson,  cover!" 
or  "  Simpkins,  cover ! "  every  one  sought  the  friendly  shelter  of  the 
neighboring  sand-bags.  In  front  of  the  parallel  was  constructed  a 
wire  entanglement  to  trip  up  assailing  parties  in  the  dark.  Firing 
was  resumed  between  the  enemy's  batteries  and  our  own  on  the  25th, 
and  there  were  numerous  casualties.  On  the  night  of  the  26th  a  shell 
from  James  Island  burst  amid  a  fatigue  party  mounting  a  gun,  and 
wounded  twentv-one  men. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  MORRIS  ISLAND.  103 

The  third  parallel,  four  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  Wagner, 
was  opened  on  the  9th  of  August.  The  approaches  were  pushed 
forward  as  rapidly  as  possible,  sometimes  by  the  full,  and  at  other 
times  by  the  flying,  sap.  The  fourth  parallel  was  opened  on  the  "2"2\ 
within  three  hundred  yards  of  the  fort.  Immediately  in  front  was  a 
sand  ridge  where  the  enemy's  sharpshooters  were  stationed,  from 
which  they  constantly  annoyed  our  men  in  the  trenches.  To  take  it 
was  a  necessity,  for  while  they  held  it  the  approaches  could  not  be 
advanced.  On  the  night  of  the  20th  a  dash  was  made  at  it  with  the 
bayonet,  when  it  was  taken,  with  seventy  prisoners.  The  alarm 
opened  the  guns  of  Wagner,  and  brought  a  shower  of  grape,  which 
killed  and  wounded  a  few  of  our  men.  Shovels  were  placed  in  the 
hands  of  the  prisoners,  who  were  obliged  to  dig  for  shelter  from  their 
own  people.  The  tifth  parallel  was  opened  the  same  night,  within 
two  hundred  yards  of  Wagner.  This  was  the  most  advanced  parallel. 
Beyond  this  point  the  approaches  were  simply  zig-zags,  making  sharp 
angles  with  each  other,  and  thus  the  engineers  crept  gradually  up  to 
the  work  until  the  counterscarp  was  crowned  on  the  night  of  the  Oth 
of  September. 

The  next  day  after  the  ridge  was  taken  the  enemy  made  one  of 
those  fatal  shots  sometimes  witnessed  in  siege  operations.  The 
Eighty-fifth  Pennsylvania  Regiment  was  the  guard  in  the  trenches. 
There  had  not  been  much  firing  during  the  day,  and  in  consequence 
the  men  became  careless.  Xine  soldiers  of  this  regiment  were  sitting 
in  a  little  area,  without  the  cover  of  the  trenches,  when  toward 
evening  a  single  mortar  shell  was  fired  from  James  Island.  Slowly 
it  described  the  usual  curve  of  such  projectiles,  and  coming  to  the 
earth,  fell  and  exploded  in  the  midst  of  the  party.  Seven  were  killed 
outright,  and  the  two  others  so  badly  wounded  that  they  died  in  a 
short  time.  The  members  of  their  bodies,  clothing,  equipments  and 
broken  guns  were  scattered  in  all  directions.  The  nearer  the  ap 
proach  to  the  fort  the  more  difficult  and  dangerous  became  the 
operations.  The  enemy  kept  up  an  incessant  fire  day  and  night,  and 
the  low  trenches  afforded  poor  shelter  to  the  troops  guarding  them. 
The  engineers  and  fatigue  parties  were  almost  entirely  without 
protection.  The  enemy  had  planted  the  ground  immediately  in 
front  of  the  fort  with  torpedoes,  which  increased  the  danger;  a  num 
ber  were  digged  up  and  destroyed,  while  others  exploded  with  fatal 
effect  to  our  men.  The  ground  was  literally  sown  with  them  ;  they 
were  buried  just  beneath  the  surface,  and  so  arranged  with  a  plunger 
that  they  would  explode  on  being  trod  upon.  Their  presence  was 
rather  turned  to  our  advantage,  for  they  prevented  a  sortie  from  the 
enemy. 


104  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Immediately  we  had  secured  a  lodgment  on  Morris  Island,  a 
party  of  boat  infantry  was  organized  to  patrol  the  creeks  and  water 
courses  that  lie  between  this  island  and  James,  to  prevent  the  landing 
of  the  spies  and  scouts  of  the  enemy.  The  enemy  employed  a  sim 
ilar  force,  and  occasionally  these  boat  pickets  had  an  encounter  upon 
the  water.  Two  attempts  were  made  to  surprise  Battery  Gregg,  by 
a  night  attack  in  boats,  which,  if  successful,  would  compel  the 
garrison  of  Wagner  to  surrender.  The  enemy  discovered  the  ap 
proach  of  our  boats,  and  both  attempts  were  failures.  In  one  of 
these  the  commanding  officer  of  the  expedition  called  for  a  volunteer 
to  blow  up  the  magazine — one  who  "  feared  neither  man  nor  devil " 
— when  Sergeant  Rosenberger,  a  fine  young  soldier  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fourth  Pennsylvania  Regiment,  stepped  forward  and 
offered  to  apply  the  match. 

Sumter  out  of  the  question,  every  energy  was  directed  to 
the  reduction  of  Wagner,  which  alone  stood  in  the  way  of  our 
possessing  the  whole  of  Morris  Island.  The  siege  operations  dragged 
their  slow  length  along.  Day  after  day  and  night  after  night  our 
brave  men  digged  and  guarded  in  the  trenches,  subject  to  a  galling 
fire.  The  enemy  clung  to  their  stronghold  with  great  tenacity,  for 
it  was  then  considered  the  gateway  to  Charleston.  They  met  us 
with  a  sternness  and  courage  worthy  of  a  better  cause.  It  was  Greek 
pitted  against  Greek.  The  extreme  heat  of  the  weather  and  the 
excessive  fatigue  were  rapidly  wearing  down  the  men,  while  their 
constant  exposure  to  death  in  the  trenches  was  more  dreaded  than 
open  combat.  Only  those  who  have  experienced  it  know  how  it  tries 
the  nerves  of  men  to  lie  in  a  narrow  trench  with  the  thermometer  at 
120  degrees,  exposed  to  a  heavy  fire,  or,  while  thus  situated,  to  ply 
the  shovel.  The  casualties  were  numerous ;  the  sick  list  was  largely 
on  the  increase — some  of  the  regiments  having  more  than  half  their 
men  unfit  for  duty.  We  had  already  lost  three  thousand  of  our 
brave  fellows  on  that  narrow  sand  bank.  The  burial  of  the  dead  was 
constantly  going  on,  and  at  last  became  so  frequent  that  music  was 
prohibited  at  soldiers'  funerals.  At  this  period  the  medical  inspector 
of  the  department  reported  that  unless  Wagner  should  soon  fall  the 
troops  would  not  be  in  a  condition  to  further  prosecute  the  siege ; 
and  that  a  third  assault  wrould  be  more  economical  of  life  than  a 
continuance  of  the  present  operations. 

The  night  attack  in  boats  on  Battery  Gregg  having  failed,  it  became 
evident  that  Wagner  must  be  stormed,  if  taken  at  all,  and  this  was 
resolved  upon.  The  time  fixed  for  the  assault  was  Monday  morning, 
the  7th  of  September.  Operations  were  pushed  against  the  enemy 


THE  SIEGE  OF  MORRIS  ISLAND.  105 

as  vigorously  as  possible.  The  garrison  was  harassed  day  and 
night.  To  prevent  them  repairing  damages  at  night  a  powerful 
calcium  light  was  turned  upon  the  ramparts,  which  made  them  as 
light  as  day — thus  blinding  the  enemy,  while  it  enabled  our  men  to 
see  what  was  going  on.  Our  sharpshooters  were  so  numerous  and 
so  close  to  the  fort,  that  the  enemy  were  kept  from  their  gnus. 
Our  trenches  were  widened  and  deepened  to  hold  the  troops  for  the 
assault,  and  the  light  mortars  were  taken  forward  and  mounted  on 
the  advanced  parallels.  The  final  bombardment  was  opened  on  the 
fort  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  September,  and  continued  more 
than  forty  hours  without  cessation.  At  the  same  time  the  iron-clad 
frigate  "Xew  Ironsides"  moved  up  within  a  thousand  yards,  and 
opened  upon  it  with  her  heavy  broadsides.  The  air  was  tilled  with 
shells  bursting  in  and  over  the  fort,  which  drove  every  living  thing 
from  sight.  The  garrison  was  compelled  to  seek  shelter  beneath 
their  impenetrable  bomb-proofs.  The  island  and  the  sea  fairly 
trembled  under  the  discharge  of  artillery.  At  night  the  spectacle 
was  grand,  for  the  heavens  seemed  alive  with  the  tiery  projectiles  as 
thev  iiew  to  their  destination.  During  the  last  thirty-six  hours  of 
the  bombardment  the  admitted  loss  of  the  enemy  was  one  hundred 
and  twenty-live,  in  spite  of  all  their  means  of  protection. 

At  eight  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  tJtli  of  September  the 
commander  of  the  troops  selected  for  the  assault  of  the  next 
morning  met  General  Gillmore  in  council.  The  troops  chosen 
consisted  of  two  brigades  and  two  regiments.  The  two  regiments 
were  to  assail  the  sea  bastion  from  the  trenches,  spike  the  guns  that 
swept  the  beach,  and  secure  the  entrance  to  the  bomb-proofs.  The 
two  brigades  were  to  pass  the  sea  bastions,  and,  while  one  was 
to  assault  the  fort  in  the  rear,  the  other  was  to  form  across  the 
island,  to  prevent  reinforcements  coming  down.  The  troops  were  to 
be  concealed  in  the  trenches;  the  signal  of  the  attack  was  to  be  the 
raising  of  the  American  flag  on  the  surf  battery,  when  they  were  to 
rush  out  by  the  nearest  parallel  to  the  assault.  The  batteries  were 
to  continue  their  tire  to  the  latest  moment.  Our  final  instructions 
arrived  at  midnight,  and  each  regimental  and  brigade  commander 
was  furnished  with  a  drawing  of  the  fort.  The  troops  were  to  be 
under  anus  at  half-past  one  o'clock,  so  as  to  take  their  place  in  the 
trenches  before  daylight.  The  hour  of  assault  was  fixed  at  nine 
o'clock  A.  M.  Brigadier  General  Terry  was  placed  in  command  of 
the  troops,  and  had  charge  of  the  assault. 

The  night  was  an  anxious  one  to  all  who  were  to  participate  in 
the  work  of  the  morrow.  Many  important,  but  unpleasant,  offices 


106  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

have  to  be  performed  before  one  is  prepared  to  enter  the  "  eminent 
deadly  breach,"  and  there  was  but  little  time  allowed  for  them. 
The  troops  were  aroused  soon  after  midnight,  and  by  the  hour 
designated  were  under  arms  on  the  beach.  The  men  carried  a 
canteen  of  water  each,  and  a  few  crackers  in  their  haversacks.  Two 
hundred  men  carried  shovels  in  addition  to  their  arms  and  equip 
ments.  The  regiments  report  at  the  place  of  rendezvous,  and  the 
column  is  soon  formed.  Although  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the 
enemy,  everything  w^as  done  in  the  quietest  manner.  The  com 
mands  were  given  in  that  low  tone  of  voice  that  marks  the  approach 
of  danger.  The  morning  was  bright  with  moonlight ;  there  was 
hardly  a  breath  of  air  stirring,  and  the  quieted  sea  broke  in  gentle 
murmurs  on  the  sandy  shore.  In  view  of  what  was  to  come,  a  marked 
solemnity  impressed  everything.  While  waiting  to  move  forward  an 
undefined  rumor  reached  us  that  a  deserter  had  come  in  and  stated 
that  the  fort  had  been  evacuated ;  but  as  it  could  not  be  traced  to  any 
reliable  source  it  was  considered  a  camp  story.  At  two  o'clock  we 
moved  up  to  what  w^as  thought  to  be  a  bloody  morning's  work.  At 
the  Beacon  House  a  halt  was  ordered.  After  waiting  some  time  we 
were  joined  by  General  Terry,  who  announced  that  the  fort  had  been 
evacuated  between  nine  and  ten  the  night  before,  and  that  we  were 
marching  to  a  bloodless  victory.  The  enemy  retired  by  way  of 
Cumming's  Point  in  boats,  a  few  of  them  only  falling  into  the  hands 
of  our  boat  infantry.  Captain  Walker,  of  the  Kew  York  Volunteer 
Engineers,  pulled  up  some  of  the  pallisading  around  the  fort  about 
ten  o'clock,  most  likely  while  the  evacuation  was  going  on.  The 
first  man  to  enter  the  work  was  a  sergeant  of  the  Thirty-ninth  Illinois, 
wTho  is  said  to  have  volunteered  to  go  in  alone  to  see  if  the  enemy 
had  gone.  Upon  his  return  a  few  troops  entered  and  took  undisputed 
possession. 

The  announcement  that  the  enemy  had  left  was  received  with 
satisfaction.  Three  thousand  hearts  beat  happier.  However  ardent 
a  soldier  may  be  in  the  cause  he  fights  for,  he  feels  no  chagrin  and 
mortification  when  the  enemy  yields  him  a  triumph  not  purchased 
by  blood.  The  pen  of  the  romancer  may  wrrite  about  the  disappoint 
ment  because  there  were  no  enemy  to  fight,  and  the  untried  soldier 
imagine  it,  but  he  who  breasts  the  bullets  and  the  storm  does  not 
participate  in  this  unnatural  feeling.  The  troops  inarched  up  to  the 
head  of  the  island  under  a  cross-fire  from  the  batteries  on  James  and 
Sullivan's  Islands.  On  the  return  I  went  into  Wagner,  and  never 
before  saw  a  place  in  such  universal  ruin.  Everything  but  the  sand 
was  knocked  to  pieces;  guns  dismounted,  carriages  broken,  and 


THE  SIEGE  OF  MOEEIS  ISLAND.  107 

wagons  smashed  up.  The  commissary  building  was  literally  reduced 
to  splinters.  The  impenetrable  bomb-proof  was  the  salvation  of  the 
garrison.  The  tilth  was  in  keeping  with,  the  ruin  that  prevailed ;  and 
the  heap  of  unburied  dead  without  the  sally-port  showed  how  hasty 
had  been  the  flight  of  the  enemy.  The  troops  returned  to  their 
camp  about  sunrise.  The  night  of  the  7th  Admiral  Dahlgren  made 
an  attack  upon  JSumter  in  boats  manned  by  sailors  and  marines  from 
the  fleet.  It  was  anticipated  and  repulsed.  The  next  day  an  action 
took  place  between  the  iron-clad  fleet  and  the  enemy's  batteries  on 
Sullivan's  Island,  which  was,  probably,  the  severest  naval  engagement 
that  ever  took  place  in  America.  The  enemy  opened  with  a  hundred 
guns  of  heavy  calibre,  but  before  the  day  was  closed  they  had  all  been 
silenced.  The  '"  Xew  Ironsides,"'  commanded  by  that  noble  old  sailor, 
Commodore  Rowan,  played  a  giant's  part  in  the  light.  Another 
bombardment  would  have  given  us  the  island,  but  the  Commodore 
was  not  permitted  to  renew  the  action  in  the  morning,  and  the  time 
given  the  enemy  to  strengthen  his  batteries  rendered  them  quite 
impregnable. 

The  engineers  were  immediately  set  to  work  erecting  strong 
batteries  at  the  head  of  Morris  Island  for  offensive  and  defensive 
purposes.  Our  guns  at  Cumming's  Point  were  a  mile  and  a  half 
from  Forts  Johnston  and  Moultrie,  and  within  less  than  a  mile  of 
Sumter ;  and  from  Charleston,  as  the  bird  flies,  more  than  three  miles. 
By  the  17th  of  November  our  batteries  erected  against  the  city  were 
in  such  state  of  completeness  that  lire  was  opened  and  thirteen  shells 
were  thrown  into  Charleston  from  a  thirty-pounder  Parrott.  The 
next  day  a  one  hundred-pounder  was  opened  from  near  the  same 
point,  which  threw  fourteen  shells  into  the  city.  From  that  hour  to 
its  surrender  the  firing  was  continued  on  this  doomed  city  ;  at  periods 
of  several  nights  in  succession  a  shell  was  dropped  into  it  every  flve 
minutes.  One  of  the  thirty-pounders  had  a  remarkable  life.  It  was 
one  of  the  two  flrst  that  opened  upon  the  city,  and  was  fired  at  an 
elevation  of  forty-two  degrees.  Day  and  night  it  continued  to  hurl  the 
missiles  of  destruction  until  the  night  of  the  10th  of  March,  when  it 
gave  up  the  ghost  at  the  four  thousand  six  hundred  and  fifteenth 
round.  This  was  the  flrst  gun  of  this  class  and  calibre  that  had  been 
known  to  burst,  and  I  challenge  the  history  of  artillery  to  show  equal 
endurance  in  any  other  gun.  There  were  fired  from  it  one  hundred 
and  thirty-eight  thousand  four  hundred  and  fifty  pounds  of  iron,  and 
it  burned  one-sixth  as  much  powder.  Down  to  the  time  of  which  I 
write,  the  19th  of  March,  there  had  burst  in  our  operations  twenty- 
three  heavy  guns,  of  which  one  was  a  three  hundred-pounder,  five 


108  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

were  two  hundred-pounders,  and  seventeen  one  hundred-pounders, 
and  in  only  a  single  instance  was  injury  done  to  the  artillerists.  The 
amount  of  labor  performed  during  the  siege  operations  was  enormous. 
I  have  no  means  of  giving  that  done  by  the  whole  army,  and  can 
only  speak  of  my  own  immediate  command.  The  little  brigade 
which  I  had  the  honor  to  command,  and  which  never  had  much  over 
one  thousand  men  for  detail,  performed  nearly  an  hundred  thousand 
days  and  nights  of  duty.  The  trenches,  parallels,  splinter-proofs  and 
batteries  constructed  measured  about  eight  miles  in  length.  Think 
of  the  days  and  nights  of  toil,  and  labor,  and  danger,  that  fashioned 
these  eight  miles  of  moving  sand  into  strong  defenses,  and  how  often 
their  earthen  walls  were  bathed  in  the  blood  of  the  trusty  soldier ! 

Numerous  interesting  incidents  happened  during  the  siege.  The 
night  we  broke  ground  to  erect  a  heavy  battery  between  Wagner 
and  Gregg  there  occurred  an  event  which  seemed  to  be  a  Providential 
punishment  of  those  who  avoided  their  duty.  The  working  party 
was  •  in  charge  of  Captain  Pratt,  of  the  Fifty-fifth  Massachusetts 
Volunteers.  After  he  had  placed  the  first  relief  on  duty  he  walked 
out  to  the  beach ;  he  saw  there  two  soldiers  sitting  in  a  large  hole 
made  by  one  of  the  enemy's  shells.  Upon  being  asked  who  they 
were,  they  replied  that  they  belonged  to  the  second  relief.  He 
suspected  they  were  shirking  duty,  and  kept  them  in  mind.  The 
Captain  again  -walked  out  to  the  beach,  after  the  second  relief  had 
been  placed  on  duty,  and  found  the  same  men  sitting  in  the  shell 
hole,  who  failed  to  recognize  him  in  the  dark.  He  repeated  his 
inquiry,  and  was  told  they  belonged  to  the  first  relief  that  had  just 
come  off  duty.  Almost  at  the  same  moment  he  looked  across  the 
harbor  toward  Fort  Moultrie,  for  he  was  on  the  beach  facing  it,  and 
saw  a  mortar  shell  rise  from  the  fort.  Knowing  the  range  was  taken 
for  his  working  party,  he  stepped  to  one  side  and  watched  the 
flight  of  this  messenger  of  death.  lie  saw  it  rise  high  in  the  air; 
the  fuse  twinkling  like  a  moving  star;  describe  the  usual  curve,  and 
fall  to  the  earth  a  short  distance  from  him.  Upon  going  to  the  spot 
he  found  that  it  had  fallen  into  the  hole  where  the  two  were  sitting 
and  killed  them  both.  They  died  shirking  their  duty,  with  a  lie  on 
their  lips. 

Soon  after  we  took  Battery  Gregg  there  happened  a  very  sad 
accident.  A  captain  of  a  Maine  regiment,  who  was  a  member  of  a 
court-martial,  and  not  engaged  in  the  operations,  went  to  the  front 
one  afternoon  to  have  a  good  view  of  Charleston.  He  stood  alone 
on  the  top  of  the  bomb-proof  at  Gregg,  in  plain  sight  of  the  enemy's 
batteries  on  James  Island,  a  mile  and  a  half  distant.  A  rebel 


THE  SIEGE  OF  HOEEIS  ISLAND.  109 

gunner  in  Fort  Johnston  trained  a  gnu  on  him  and  fired.  The  aim 
was  unerring,  and  the  shell  cut  him  in  two. 

About  the  same  time,  while  a  party  of  the  One  Hundred 
and  Fourth  Pennsylvania  Volunteers  were  asleep  at  night  in  the 
bomb-proof  of  Gregg,  a  shell  lired  from  James  Island  entered 
the  door  and  exploded,  killing  and  wounding  seven.  Many  tilings 
likewise  occurred  that  were  amusing.  One  day  a  small  negro 
hoy  was  leading  a  horse,  hitched  to  a  cart,  up  to  the  head  of  the 
island  ;  Moultrie  paid  her  respects  to  the  young  African,  and,  a  large 
shell  bursting  near  him,  killed  his  horse,  knocking  the  head  off  of  it, 
leaving  the  boy  unharmed,  with  the  bridle  in  his  hand. 

The  siege  of  Morris  Island,  or,  as  it  will  be  known  in  history, 
"The  operations  against  the  defenses  before  Charleston,"  is,  in 
many  respects,  one  of  the  most  wonderful  in  military  annals.  Tn 
the  future  the  student  of  military  science  will  study  it  with  marked 
attention  and  interest.  Here  was  first  developed  the  power  of  the 
modern  long-range  gun,  and  the  experiments  proved  the  Parrott 
rifled  projectile  to  be  superior  to  any  other  in  the'  world.  Instead  of 
battering  down  Avails  of  masonrv  at  the  distance  of  a  few  hundred 
yards,  Gillmore  taught  the  world  that  American  guns  could  do  it 
nearly  three  miles.  "Whoever  before  heard  of  a  first-class  fortification 
being  destroyed  over  the  head  of  intermediate  works,  two  miles 
removed  from  it?  And  where  do  we  find  a  city  bombarded  from  a 
battery  that  was  five  miles  distant  \  This  was  the  first  operation  in 
modern  times,  on  land,  where  guns  of  a  heavier  calibre  than  the 
one  hundred-pounder  were  used  to  any  extent.  It  introduced  the 
two  hundred  and  three  hundred-pounder  rifle,  never  before  used  in 
siege  operations,  and  demonstrated  their  great  superiority  over 
every  other  arm  in  use.  It  was  all  that  was  required  to  make 
the  United  States  the  first  nation  in  the  world  in  all  things  that 
pertain  to  the  art  of  war. 

That  part  of  the  operations  devoted  to  Sumter  opened  a  new 
chapter  in  military  engineering.  Hitherto  batteries  to  breach  Avails 
of  masonry  had  seldom,  if  ever,  been  erected  one  mile  from  the 
place  to  be  battered  down,  and  a  gun  that  carried  a  projectile  that 
weighed  sixty-four  pounds  was  the  heaviest  metal  used.  In  the  days 
of  Tauban,  in  his  time  the  first  military  engineer  in  the  world,  and 
almost  the  father  of  the  present  system  of  permanent  fortification,  as 
well  as  the  system  of  attack  and  defense  of  fortified  places,  it  was 
laid  down  as  a  rule  that  the  first  parallel  should  not  be  opened  at  a 
greater  distance  than  six  hundred  yards  from  the  salient  angle  of  the 
covered  way.  "With  him  it  was  customary  to  establish  breaching 


110  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

batteries  on  the  glacie.  General  Gillmore  overturned  the  theories 
and  practice  of  the  schools,  and  set  at  naught  the  teachings  of 
the  oldest  masters.  lie  erected  his  breaching  batteries  miles  away 
from  the  point  of  attack,  and  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances 
did  not  wish  to  approach  nearer  than  a  mile  before  he  let  the  enemy 
feel  the  weight  of  his  metal.  He  looked  upon  the  old  forty-twos 
and  sixty-fours  as  discarded  engines  of  war,  fit  to  be  laid  up  as 
"braised  monuments,"  but  no  longer  to  figure  in  war's  active 
operations.  He  chose  instead  the  new  projectiles  of  Parrott,  and 
hurled  at  this  proud  fortress  of  the  sea  shot  and  shell  that  weighed 
two  and  three  hundred  pounds  each.  His  operations  astonished 
both  friend  and  foe.  Then,  again,  "Wagner  was  approached 
over  ground  much  less  in  width  than  the  front  of  the  work,  a  thing 
very  unusual,  if  not  almost  entirely  unknown.  A  narrow  sand 
ridge,  bounded  on  each  side  by  the  sea,  and  only  a  few  hundred  feet 
across  in  its  widest  part,  was  all  the  space  to  develop  the  trenches 
and  parallels.  There  was  another  peculiarity  in  these  operations ; 
the  communications  of  both  parties  were  open  to  the  rear,  and  could 
not  be  interfered  with.  When  the  history  of  the  war  comes  to  be 
written,  General  Gillmore  will  be  pronounced  its  foremost  engineer, 
and  his  operations  on  Morris  Island  considered  one  of  its  most 
creditable  performances. 


VICKSErEG  DURING  THE  SIEGE. 


BY    EDWAEU    S.    GREGORY. 


Ox  January  24th,  1802,  a  fleet 
bearing  the  united  forces  of 
Generals  Grant  and  Sherman, 
descending  the  Mississippi 
from  Memphis,  appeared  be 
fore  the  "terraced  city  of  the 
hills  v — the  name  given  Yicks 
burg,  according  to  local  tra 
dition,  by  Daniel  Webster. 
The  disastrous  experiment 
made  in  the  previous  Decem 
ber  by  General  Sherman — 
of  approaching  the  town  on 
the  Yazoo  line — was  not  re 
peated.  The  troops  were  dis 
embarked  on  the  west  bank 
of  the  river,  and  began  to  dig  a  canal  across  the  isthmus  which  the 
great  bend  of  the  river  opposite  Yicksburg  makes ;  the  original  idea 
of  which  scheme  of  isolation  had  occurred  to  General  Williams  the 
year  before.  Demonstrations  in  other  directions  were  not  neglected, 
meanwhile,  ^ine  gunboats,  carrying  4,000  men,  in  March  made  a 
move  down  the  Tallahatchie,  but  were  repulsed  by  General  Loring 
at  Fort  Pemberton.  General  Pemberton,  in  command  of  the 
Department  of  Mississippi,  was  induced  for  a  while  to  think  that 
the  city  was  in  no  immediate  danger,  and  that  a  large  part  of 
General  Grant's  army  had  been  sent  to  join  Rosecrans.  He  soon 
had  occasion  to  alter  his  mind  in  this  connection,  and  the  troops 
which  he  had  dispatched  to  General  Bragg,  at  Chattanooga,  were 
promptly  withdrawn. 

Early  in  April,  a  new  plan  of  campaign  was  adopted  by  General 
Grant.  He  struck  work  on  the  canal.  His  new  scheme  was  to 
march  his  troops  down  on  the  west  bank  of  the  river  to  some  suitable 
point  below  Yicksburg,  and  throw  them  over  in  transports  that  were 
to  pass  the  batteries  under  veil  of  night.  Already,  in  March,  the 

(111) 


112  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

"Hart-ford"  and  "Albatross,"  of  Farragut's  squadron,  had  passed 
the  Port  Hudson  guns.  On  the  night  of  April  16th,  a  Federal  fleet 
of  gunboats  and  three  transports,  towing  barges,  ran  by  the  batteries 
at  Yicksburg  and  moored  at  Hard  Times,  La.  (thirty  miles,  say, 
below  the  city),  where  the  forces  had  arrived.  On  the  night  of  the 
22d  six  more  transports  and  barges  followed.  The  damage  done  by 
the  Confederate  artillerists  on  these  two  occasions  summed  up  as 
follows :  One  transport  sunk,  one  burned,  six  barges  rendered  unser 
viceable.  "We  shall  hear  more  fully  of  these  feats  hereafter.  The 
rigor  of  the  game  began  when,  on  the  29th  of  April,  Admiral  Porter 
opened  the  guns  of  his  ships  on  the  Confederate  intrenchments  at 
Grand  Gulf,  the  Thirteenth  Corps  (McClernand's)  being  held  in 
readiness  to  cross  over  when  these  were  silenced.  At  sunset  the 
guns  were  still  vocal,  and  General  Grant  determined  to  land  at 
Bruinsburg,  which  was  ten  or  twelve  miles  lower  down.  Gun 
boats  and  transports  gave  the  batteries  the  slip  at  night  in  numbers 
sufficient  to  ferry  over  a  division  at  a  time.  More  than  twenty 
vessels  of  different  descriptions  had  then  passed  the  Confederate 
fortifications. 

On  April  30th  the  four  divisions  of  McClernand's  corps  crossed, 
and  on  the  1st  of  May  moved,  and  in  brief  time  encountered  the 
Confederate  command  of  General  Bowen,  consisting  of  the  brigades 
of  Green  and  Tracy,  four  miles  from  Port  Gibson.  The  Con 
federates  were  choice  men,  and  fought  gallantly  against  great  odds ; 
but  on  the  next  day  General  Bowen  was  forced  out  of  Port  Gibson, 
and  retired  across  the  suspension  bridge  of  the  Bayou  Pierre  to 
Grand  Gulf.  His  stay  here  was  transient,  seeing  that  his  flank  was 
almost  immediately  turned.  On  the  3d  he  marched  to  Ilankinson's 
Ferry,  on  the  Big  Black,  and  there  met  Loring  and  his  division,  sent 
from  Jackson  by  Pemberton,  whose  headquarters  were  at  Edwards' 
Depot.  On  the  30th  of  April,  General  Sherman,  commanding  the 
Fifteenth  Corps,  after  a  slight  feint  on  Haines'  Bluff,  on  the  Yazoo, 
returned  to  Milliken's  Bend  and  proceeded  to  the  main  body.  On 
the  8th,  the  three  corps  met  at  Willow  Spring,  where  McClernand 
and  McPherson  (commanding  the  Seventeenth  Corps)  had  been  wait 
ing  since  the  3d.  On  the  same  day  they  advanced,  on  parallel  roads, 
northeast;  but  the  Thirteenth  shortly  turned  off  toward  Edwards' 
Depot ;  while  the  Seventeenth,  followed  by  the  Fifteenth,  kept  their 
faces  toward  Jackson.  The  latter  column,  on  the  12th,  encountered 
the  single  brigade  of  Gregg  at  Raymond  and  drove  it  away — not  till 
after  a  stout  resistance.  McPherson  then  moved  on  Clinton — a 
station  on  the  railroad  ten  miles  west  of  Jackson — interposing 


VICKSBURG  DURING  THE  SIEGE.  113 

between  Yicksburg  and  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  (who  had 
arrived  in  Jackson  on  the  13th  and  assumed  command),  and  break 
ing  the  line  of  Confederate  coummuni  cations. 

Prior  to  his  departure  from  Tnllahoma  for  the  scene  of  war, 
General  Johnston  had  sent  an  order  to  General  Pemberton  in  these 
words  :  '"  If  Grant's  army  crosses  [the  Mississippi],  unite  all  your 
forces  to  beat  him.  Success  will  give  von  back  what  yon  abandoned 
to  win  it."  One  dispatch  had  been  received  from  General  Pem 
berton,  bearing  date  the  12th,  and  beginning:  4k  The  enemy  is 
apparently  moving  in  heavy  force  toward  Edwards'  Depot,  on 
Southern  Railroad."  The  "movable  army''  of  Pemberton,  con 
sisting  of  the  divisions  of  P>owen  and  Loring,  which  had  come  up 
from  Grand  Gulf,  and  Stevenson,  who  was  detached  from  the  gar 
rison  of  Yicksburg,  leaving  the  two  divisions  of  Forney  and  M.  L. 
Smith  in  loro,  was  now  at  Edwards'  Depot,  eighteen  miles  east  of 
Yicksburg;  and  headquarters  were  at  Bovina,  a  station  some  four 
miles  west. 

On  the  13th,  General  Johnston  sent  a  dispatch  to  the  AVar 
Department  in  these  words:  "1  arrived  this  evening,  finding  the 
enemy  in  force  between  this  place  and  General  Pemberton.  I  am 
too  7<tfi'"  These  were  ominous  words.  Through  Captain  Yerger  he 
dispatched  that  order  to  General  Pemberton  which  lias  been  the1 
bone  of  contention  in  all  the  subsequent  discussions  on  the  responsi 
bility  of  failure.  It  directed  the  latter  to  come  up,  if  practicable, 
on  the  rear  of  McPherson  at  Clinton  at  once.  k'  All  the  strength 
yon  can  quickly  assemble  should  be  brought.  Time  is  all  important." 
This  was  put  into  Pemberton's  hands  at  T  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  14th.  He  answered  at  once,  signifying  his  purpose  to  obey, 
though  he  did  not  think  his  force  justified  attacking.  But  immedi 
ately  he  summoned  a  council  of  war,  to  which  the  question  was 
submitted  for  discussion,  and  a  majority  of  the  major  generals 
present  sustained  the  execution  of  the  order ;  others  said  kk  nay.'' 
General  Pemberton  concluded  that  he  would  obey  the  order  in  this 
wise :  lie  would  set  off  for  Clinton,  which  was  twelve  miles  east,  by 
moving  on  Dillon's,  which  was  eight  miles  south.  By  this  route  he 
might  break  the  communications  of  the  enemy,  and  force  them  to 
attack.  If  his  luck  was  good,  he  might  proceed  to  Clinton,  or  else 
take  advantage  of  any  improved  posture  of  affairs  that  the  move 
ment  might  bring  about.  On  the  morning  of  the  15th,  the  three 
divisions  set  out  on  their  march,  being  compelled  to  make  a  tedious 
detour  because  of  the  destruction  by  flood  of  a  bridge  over  Baker's 
creek,  which  runs  a  little  east  of  Edwards'  Depot,  in  a  southwesterly 
8 


11 4:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

course,  to  the  Big  Black  river.  That  such  was  to  be  his  mode  of 
obeying  the  order,  General  Pemberton  had  written  General  John 
ston,  in  a  note  dated  the  14th,  at  5  P.M. ;  which  contained,  however, 
no  reference  to  the  council  of  war.  It  was  part  of  the  tragedy  of 
errors  which  the  whole  campaign  illustrated,  that  this  answer  reached 
General  Johnston  before  the  note  previously  sent. 

Meanwhile,  no  grass  was  growing  under  Sherman's  feet.  On 
the  14th,  Johnston,  hearing  that  the  Fifteenth  Corps  was  twelve 
miles  from  Jackson,  on  the  Raymond  road,  and  that  both  it  and 
McPherson  were  moving  on  Jackson,  sent  out  one  brigade  to  meet 
each  corps,  and  evacuated  the  city,  which  was  promptly  entered. 
McClernand,  who  had  been  near  Edwards'  Depot,  having  received 
orders  to  that  effect,  joined  the  main  body  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Jackson,  out  of  which  General  Johnston  had  marched  with  his  little 
army,  then  6,000  at  most,  toward  Clinton,  twenty  odd  miles  north. 
Ascertaining  the  Federal  concentration,  he  dispatched  an  order  to 
Pemberton  on  the  same  day,  informing  him  of  the  situation  of 
affairs  and  the  disposition  of  forces,  and  asking  if  he  could  not  close 
their  communications  with  the  river,  and  above  all  beat  them  if  for 
want  of  supplies  they  were  compelled  to  fall  back.  It  was  part  the 
second  of  this  tragedy  of  errors  that  Pemberton  received  this  com 
munication  not  till  after  the  battle  of  Baker's  creek,  when  too  late  to 
affect  his  action. 

The  battle  of  Baker's  creek  happened  in  this  wise :  When  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  on  the  15th,  received  General  Pemberton's  second 
note  of  the  day  before,  disclosing  his  designs  on  Dillon's,  Johnston 
instantly  replied  that  "  the  only  mode  by  which  we  could  unite  was 
his  [Pemberton's]  moving  directly  to  Clinton  and  informing  me 
[Johnston],  that  I  might  meet  him  there  with  6,000  men."  Hardly 
had  Pemberton  got  well  clear  of  Baker's  creek  when  this  order 
reached  him.  He  reversed  his  columns  and  prepared  to  obey  it 
promptly,  and  dispatched  a  courier  so  to  inform  General  Johnston. 
Just  at  this  point  a  new  factor  appears,  in  the  shape  of  Grant,  who 
had  heard  in  Jackson  of  Pemberton's  designs  to  attack  him  piece 
meal,  and  who  had  conceived  the  design  of  reversing  the  operation. 
McPherson,  McClernand,  Blair  and  Hovey  were  ordered  on  the  15th 
to  march  to  Bolton's  Depot,  eight  miles  east  of  Edwards'  Depot. 
Returning  to  Edwards'  Depot,  General  Pemberton  formed  his  line 
of  battle — remaining,  General  Johnston  contends,  for  five  hours  in 
front  of  a  single  Federal  division,  which  he  might  have  crushed. 
Battle  was  delivered  by  Grant  on  the  16th,  with  all  his  force.  The 
Confederate  resistance  was  spirited,  but  unavailing.  General  Pern- 


VICKSBUEG  DURING  THE  SIEGE.  115 

bertoii  lays  the  blame  of  defeat  on  Loring,  wlio  declined  to  reinforce 
the  Confederate  left.  For  this  same  inaction  General  Loring  is 
equally  praised  by  Johnston.  The  Held  was  lost,  and  Loring,  after 
guarding  the  retreat  of  the  army  across  the  creek,  and  seeing  the 
bridge  burned,  moved  out  by  a  wide  detour  and  joined  General 
Johnston  with  his  division.  Xext  day  the  Federals,  crossing  Baker's 
creek  on  pontoon  bridges,  renewed  the  battle  at  the  Big  Black  river, 
east  of  which  Pemberton  had  stationed  Bowen,  while  Stevenson  was 
bivouacked  on  the  other  side.  The  Confederates  were  disheartened 
and  divided,  and  the  tight  soon  became  a  flight.  Eighteen  Confed 
erate  cannon  were  captured.  The  remnant  of  Bowen's  command 
was  conducted  from  the  Held  by  Stevenson.  Grant  followed  swiftly, 
and  the  pickets  of  the  advance  were  before  Vicksburg  on  the  18th. 
On  the  next  day  the  investment  was  complete. 

On  the  17th,  Johnston,  marching  his  two  brigades  on  the  road 
from  Livingston  to  Edwards'  received  Pemberton's  account  of  events, 
including  the  council  of  war  on  the  14th,  and  the  battle  at  Baker's 
creek.  The  action  at  the  river  was  progressing  at  the  moment  of 
General  Pemberton's  latest  communication.  Hearing  immediately 
afterward  of  the  abandonment  of  the  Big  Black,  General  Johnston 
orders  Pemberton:  k*  If  Ilaines'  Bluff  is  untenable,  Vicksburg  is  of 
no  value  and  cannot  be  held.  Evacuate  Vicksburg,  if  not 

too  late,  retreating  to  the  northeast."  Expecting  that  this  order  was 
obeyed,  Johnston  marches  to  the  northwest  to  meet  the  garrison. 
On  the  18th  he  received  a  dispatch  from  Pemberton,  at  Vicksburg, 
announcing  his  retreat  into  the  intrenchments,  and  adding  that  the 
order  of  evacuation  had  been  submitted  to  a  council  of  war,  and 
while  it  was  holding  the  enemy's  guns  opened.  "I  have  decided  to 
hold  Vicksburg  as  long  as  possible.  I  still  conceive  it  to  be  the  most 
important  point  in  the  Confederacy."  Johnston  answers  Pemberton 
encouraging  him  to  hold  out — "I  am  trying  to  get  together  a  force 
to  help  you  " — and  orders  Gardner  to  evacuate  P<  >rt  II  udson.  Before 
this  order  could  be  repeated  Port  Hudson  was  invested  by  the  whole 
force  from  Baton  Rouge.  Thus  far  the  preliminary  narrative,  which 
has  been  condensed  to  the  exclusion  of  many  important  points — 
among  them  the  discussion  between  General  Johnston  and  the 
administration  as  to  the  authority  of  the  former  over  the  army  in 
Tennessee  to  order  reinforcements  from  it  to  Mississippi.  How  far 
results  were  affected  and  responsibility  fixed  by  these  disagreements, 
and  that  between  the  generals  in  the  field,  may  be  considered  on  a 
later  page. 

It  may  be  well  credited  that  the  garrison  and  the  populace  had 


116  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

not  been  indifferent  while  these  great  actions  sped.  That  a  crisis 
impended,  every  man  and  woman  felt ;  and  that  the  odds  were  greatly 
against  us  was  equally  evident.  Still  the  people  would  not  harbor 
the  thought  of  defeat,  and  they  were  equally  unprepared  for  the 
siege.  The  city  had  been  bombarded  once  before  ;  an  ordeal  invoked 
by  the  defiant  reply  of  the  mayor  speaking  for  the  citizens,  when  S. 
P.  Lee  demanded  their  surrender  after  the  fall  of  New  Orleans. 
When,  therefore,  the  sudden  unfolding  of  a  ball  of  dense  white 
smoke  in  the  sky  above  them  gave  sign  on  the  18th  that  the  enemy 
had  arrived,  the  fact  did  not  frighten  the  brave  community,  however 
much  it  may  have  surprised  them.  At  first  the  depressing  shadow 
of  exclusion,  with  constant  peril  of  death  and  the  corrosion  of  anxiety 
and  of  imminent  famine,  was  relieved  by  the  excitement  of  battle  ; 
for  on  the  19th  and  20th  sharp  attacks  were  made  on  the  lines,  which 
were  repulsed  with  great  slaughter  of  the  Federal  column.  The 
novelty  of  the  situation  sustained  the  spirits  of  the  people  still  longer, 
and  their  courage  was  never  dimmed.  But  the  sickness  of  hope 
deferred  was  of  gradual  growth,  while  the  sordid  conditions  of  life, 
made  necessary  by  the  exigencies  and  exposure  which  were  incident 
to  the  siege,  had  their  own  sad  effects  of  steady  and  hard  attrition. 
Just  how  and  by  what  distinct  stages  a  "  city  full  of  stirs — a  tumult 
uous  city — a  joyous  city,"  such  as  the  Jerusalem  of  the  prophet's 
vision,  takes  on  itself  the  aspect  of  a  camp  or  a  trench,  devoid  of  the 
attendants  of  home  and  ease,  and  marked  by  every  feature  of  war's 
worst  exactions  and  destructions,  nothing  short  of  a  diary  of  contem 
poraneous  experience  could  describe.  It  answers  the  purpose  of  a 
picture  to  select  any  period  when  the  siege  was  well  advanced  and 
distinctly  charactered;  when  the  life  of  the  people  had  become 
adapted  to  it,  and  when  the  full  consequences  of  such  abnormal 
influences  were  developed. 

I  have  spoken  of  the  element  of  danger.  The  Federals  fought 
the  garrison  in  part,  but  the  city  mainly.  Even  the  fire  on  the  lines 
was  not  confined  to  them  in  its  effects,  for  hardly  any  part  of  the 
city  was  outside  the  range  of  the  enemy's  artillery  from  any  direction 
except  the  south.  Shot  from  opposite  quarters  might  have  collided 
above  the  city.  But  the  city  was  a  target  in  itself,  and  was  hit  every 
time.  Just  across  the  Mississippi,  a  few  days  after  the  lines  were  closed, 
seven  eleven-  and  thirteen-iiich  mortars  were  put  in  position  and  trained 
directly  on  the  homes  of  the  people ;  and  if  any  one  of  them  was 
silent  from  that  time  till  the  white  flag  was  raised  any  longer  than 
was  necessary  to  cool  and  load  it,  I  fail  to  recall  the  occasion. 
Twenty-four  hours  of  each  day  these  preachers  of  the  Union  made 


VICKSBURG  DURING  THE  SIEGE.  117 

their  touching  remarks  to  the  town.  All  night  long  their  deadly 
hull  of  iron  dropped  through  roofs  and  tore  up  the  deserted  and 
denuded  streets.  It  was  a  feature  of  their  practice  that  early  in  the 
night  their  favors  would  be  addressed  to  one  part  of  the  city,  and 
afterward  changed  so  as  to  reach  the  cases  of  persons  in  other  parts 
who  had  gone  to  bed  in  fancied  security.  Those  who  could  forget 
the  deadly  design  and  properties  of  these  missiles  might  admire  every 
night  the  trail  which  they  made  across  the  western  heavens ;  rising 
steadily  and  shiningly  in  great  parabolic  curves,  descending  with 
ever-increasing  swiftness,  and  falling  with  deafening  shriek  and 
explosion;  hurling  in  many  a  radius  their  ponderous  fragments.  It 
is  believed  by  the  expert  that  a  mortar  shell  is  the  most  demoralizing 
agency  of  war.  Throughout  the  war  the  Confederates  had  the 
same  horror  of  them  that  the  other  side  felt  for  masked  batteries  and 
Black  Horse  cavalry.  For  forty  days  and  nights,  without  interval, 
the  women  and  children  of  Yicksburg  took  calmly  and  In-lively  the 
iron  storm  which,  in  less  volume  and  in  a  few  minutes,  turned  back 
the  victorious  column  of  Beauregard  from  Pittsburg  Landing.  They 
wreaked  their  worst  and  utmost  on  the  town,  bringing  out  the  most 
vicious  of  all  war's  aspects.  That  the  ordinary  atmosphere  of  life, 
the  course  of  conversation,  the  thread  of  every  human  existence  took 
in  for  nearly  two  months  the  momently  contingency  of  these  mes 
sengers  of  thunder  and  murder,  is  past  ordinary  comprehension. 
How  many  of  them  came  and  burst,  nobody  can  have  the  least  idea. 
An  account  says  that  on  June  2-2(1  15o,noo  shells  fell  inside  of  the 
city;  but  this  was  probably  an  exaggeration.  They  became  at  last 
such  an  ordinary  occurrence  of  daily  life  that.  I  have  seen  ladies 
walk  quietly  along  the  streets  while  the  shells  burst  above  them, 
their  heads  protected  meanwhile  by  a  parasol  held  between  them 
and  the  sun. 

Nothing  was  spared  by  the  shells.  The  churches  fared  especially 
severely,  and  the  reverend  clergy  had  narrow  escapes.  The  libraries 
of  the  llev.  Dr.  Lord,  of  the  Episcopalian,  and  of  Rev.  Dr.  Ilutherford, 
of  the  Presbyterian  church,  were  both  invaded  and  badly  worsted. 
One  Baptist  church  had  been  rendered  useless  for  purposes  of  worship 
by  the  previous  shelling.  But  what  mattered  churches,  or  any  sacred 
place,  or  sacred  exercise  at  such  a  time  ?  There  was  nothing  more 
striking  about  the  interior  of  the  siege  than  the  breaking  down  of 
the  ordinary  partition  between  the  days  of  the  week,  as  well  as  the 
•walls  which  make  safe  and  sacred  domestic  life.  During  those  long 
weeks  there  was  no  sound  or  summon  of  bell  to  prayer.  There  was 


118  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

no  song  of  praise.*     The  mortars  had  no  almanac,  and  the  mortars 
kept  at  home  a  perpetual  service  of  fast  and  humiliation. 

I  have  spoken  of  the  wretched  expedients  to  which  families 
resorted  in  the  hope  of  safety.  Yicksburg  hangs  on  the  side  of  a 
hill,  whose  name  is  poetical — the  Sky  Parlor.  On  it  thousands  of 
people  assembled  to  see  the  great  sight  when  the  Federal  ships  went 
by  on  the  night  of  the  16th  of  April ;  at  which  time  the  houses  of 
De  Soto  were  kindled  on  the  other  side,  lending  a  lurid  background 
to  the  dark  shadows  of  the  boats,  wrhile  the  fire  of  the  batteries  made 
the  river  a  mirror  of  flame !  But  the  Sky  Parlor  was  reserved  for 
other  uses.  Its  soil  was  light  and  friable,  and  yet  sufficiently  stiff  to 
answer  the  purpose  of  excavation.  Wherever  the  passage  of  a  street 
left  the  face  of  the  hill  exposed,  into  it  and  under  it  the  people 
burrowed,  making  long  ranges  and  systems  of  chambers  and  arches 
within  which  the  women  and  young  took  shelter.  In  them  all  the 
offices  of  life  had  to  be  discharged,  except  that  generally  the  cooking- 
stove  stood  near  the  entrance,  opportunity  to  perform  upon  it  being 
seized  and  improved  during  the  shells'  diversions  in  other  quarters. 
Sometimes  the  caves  were  strengthened  by  pillars  and  wooden  joists, 
and  beds  and  furniture  were  crowded  in  them.  Whether  they  were 
really  effective  as  against  the  largest  shells  dropped  directly  above, 
I  cannot  tell.  Stories  were  told,  more  than  once  during  the  siege, 
of  people  who  had  been  buried  alive  by  the  collapse  of  caves ;  but 
they  probably  were  not  true.  They  made  good  shelter  against  the 
flying  fragments  of  the  bombs,  and  this  was  no  small  matter.  It 
was  rather  a  point  of  honor  among  men  not  to  hide  in  these  places, 
which  were  reserved  for  the  women  and  children.  Under  all  circum 
stances  of  difficulty,  the  modesty  of  these  was  supported  in  the 
half-exposed  life  of  the  caves  with  a  pathos  which  affected  me 
more  deeply  than  any  other  circumstance  of  the  siege.  Another 
refuge  of  a  few  young  ladies  in  the  neighborhood  of  General  Smith's 
headquarters,  which  had  been  a  bank,  was  a  vault  in  its  cellar.  One 
night,  wrhen  more  than  a  dozen  of  them  wrere  huddled  in  it,  a  shell 
struck  the  brick  arch  squarely  and  burst  the  same  moment.  Xone 
of  the  pieces  penetrated;  but  would  the  whole  bomb  have  gone 
through,  was  the  question.  And  suppose  it  had,  and  had  then  burst  ? 
I  believe  the  vault  was  never  again  occupied  by  the  ladies.  Con 
sidering  the  constant  danger  and  the  many  narrow  escapes,  it  is  a 
great  wronder  that  the  casualties  among  the  non-combatants  were  so 


*  Rev.  Dr.  Lord  states  that  there  were  regular  Sunday  morning  services  at  the 
Episcopal  and  Catholic'  churches  during  the  siege. 


VICKSBURG  DURING  THE  SIEGE.  119 

few.  I  know  of  but  one,  and  that  was  not  fatal ;  the  loss  of  an  arm 
by  Mrs.  Major  Reid,  while  bringing  her  children  under  shelter  from 
a  sudden  storm  of  shells.  There  were  doubtless  others,  but  I  have 
sought  in  vain  to  obtain  the  facts  and  names.  Inside  and  outside 
the  lines  there  were  many  exaggerated  stories  in  this  connection. 
One  of  the  mortalities  published  was  that  of  Mrs.  General  Pemberton, 
who  was  at  Gainesville,  Alabama,  the  while. 

II  ow  these  people  subsisted  was  another  wonder.  The  straits 
to  which  the  garrison  were  reduced  are  known,  in  part.  "After  the 
tenth  day  of  the  siege,1'  says  the  report  of  General  (Stephen  1).  Lee, 
"the  men  lived  on  about  half  rations,  and  less  than  that  toward  the 
close."  The  ration  has  been  described  to  consist  of  one-<[iiarter 
pound  of  bacon,  one-half  pound  of  beef,  five-eighths  quart  of  meal, 
beside  an  allowance  of  peas,  rice,  sugar,  and  molasses.  Of  this,  anon. 
The  citizens  must  have  had  less  ;  and  where  they  got  that  from  was  a 
mystery.  Business,  of  course,  was  suspended.  There  were  some 
stores  that  had  supplies,  and  at  these  prices  climbed  steadily  in  a 
manner  suggestive  of  the  prophecy  of  Jerusalem's  undoing.  A  barrel 
of  flour  at  last  came  to  sell  for  one  thousand  dollars — an  immense 
figure  then  ;  but  worse  than  the  figure  were  the  two  later  facts — that 
nobody  had  the  money  and  then  nobody  had  the  flour.  Some  people 
eked  out  their  supplies  by  cooking  the  tender  sprouts  of  the  common 
cane,  of  which  there  was  an  immense  u  brake"  just  below  Yicksburg. 
I  have  reason  to  believe  that  few  applications,  and  these  only  by  the 
poorest  people,  were  made  to  the  military  powers  for  help  throughout 
all  this  trial.  Sympathy  and  patriotism  must  have  improvised  a 
practical  communism.  The  cruise  and  barrel  had  a  little  dust  and 
unction  to  the  last. 

How  about  the  mule  meat  ?  everybody  will  inquire,  while  rations 
are  being  treated.  ]><>th  horse  and  mule  meat  were  extensively  sam 
pled  during  the  siege,  though  not  in  the  way  that  by  many  mav  be 
imagined.  On  account  of  the  want  of  provender  nearly  all  the  horses 
of  the  garrison  were  turned  out  of  the  lines,  and  as  the  other  side 
could  not  safely  take  them  unless  they  strayed  within  reach,  many  of 
them  were  killed  by  the  cross-fire.  Early  in  the  siege,  when  some 
of  the  men  complained  of  the  scanty  ration,  General  M.  L.  Smith,  I 
believe,  who  had  seen  the  thing  done  on  the  Plains,  issued  a  circular 
to  his  brigades,  recommending  that  the  experiment  of  horse  meat  be 
tried  to  piece  out  supplies.  I  was  on  hand  that  very  evening,  when 
somebody,  waiting  till  dark,  slid  over  the  works  and  cut  a  steak  out 
of  a  horse  that  had  been  shot  that  day  beneath  them.  It  was  cooked 
at  General  Vaughn's  tire,  and  everybody  tasted  a  little ;  but  the  flesh 


120  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

was  coarse  and  nobody  hungered  for  any  more.  Some  of  tlie  soldiers 
did  like  it  and  eat  it ;  not  to  speak  of  rats  and  other  small  deer  wliieli 
the  Louisianians,  being  Frenchmen,  were  said  to  prepare  in  many 
elegant  styles  for  the  table.  When  Pembertoii  was  thinking  about 
forcing  his  way  out,  he  had  half  a  dozen  fellows,  men  who  looked 
like  Mexicans  or  Indians,  cutting  mule  meat  at  the  old  depot  of  the 
Southern  Railroad,  and  jerking  it  over  slow  fires  to  make  it  handy 
and  lasting.  One  morning,  for  trial,  I  bought  a  pound  of  mule  meat 
at  this  market,  and  had  it  served  at  breakfast  for  the  mess.  There 
was  no  need  to  try  again.  On  the  day  of  the  surrender,  and  only 
then,  a  ration  of  mule  meat  was  actually  issued ;  but  nobody  need 
eat  it,  as  General  Grant  issued  abundant  supplies  of  the  best  that  his 
army  had. 

Another  expedient,  amiably  intended  by  General  Pemberton 
to  reinforce  his  commissariat,  became  unhappily  famous  at  the 
time  by  the  name  of  pea  bread.  It  has  been  mentioned  that  part  of 
the  siege  ration  was  the  common  stock  pea.  It  occurred  to  the 
General,  or  to  some  profound  commissary,  that  this  could  be  ground 
up  and  mixed  with  meal  and  issued  as  the  "  staff  of  life."  But  the 
scheme  did  not  succeed  for  the  best  of  reasons,  to  wit:  that  the 
meal  part  was  cooked  an  hour  or  so  before  the  pea  part  got  well 
warmed.  The  effects  on  the  human  system  of  a  hash  composed  of 
corn  bread  and  rare  pea  bread  combined,  may  probably  be  imagined, 
without  any  inquiry  of  the  doctors.  From  that  time  the  soldiers 
had  their  peas  and  meal  served  them  at  separate  courses. 

One  great  trouble  in  the  trenches,  not  so  great  in  the  town,  was 
the  scarcity  and  bad  quality  of  the  water.  The  use  of  the  cisterns, 
on  which  the  people  in  that  country  have  to  rely,  was  confined  to 
the  citizens  necessarily ;  and  the  drink  of  the  soldiers  had  to  be 
hauled  in  barrels  from  the  river.  It  was  muddy  and  warm, 
and  not  wholesome  for  many  reasons,  and  caused  many  of  the 
disorders  which  prevailed  with  effects  so  fatal.  As  to  spirituous 
drinks,  I  believe  the  city  was  as  bare  of  them  as  Murphy  himself 
could  wish.  Even  Louisiana  rum,  the  poison  that  had  once  been  so 
abundant,  withdrew  its  consolations  from  the  beleaguered  city.  Of 
ice,  also,  there  was  never  a  pound  in  the  city  during  all  the  war. 

A  state  of  siege  fulfils,  in  more  ways  than  would  be  imagined  by 
the  uninitiated,  all  that  is  involved  in  the  suspension  of  civilization. 
Its  influences  survive ;  its  appliances  vanish.  The  broader  lines  of 
the  picture  have  been  drawn;  the  instant  danger,  the  hovering  death, 
the  troglodyte  existence,  the  discomfort,  hunger,  exposure.  These 
are  things  which  affect  the  needs  of  life ;  but  to  them  men  become 


VICKSBURG  DURING  THE  SIEGE.  121 

more  easily  habituated  than  to  the  absence  of  many  really  dis 
pensable  comforts  and  pleasures.  I  have  said  all  partitions  were 
broken  clown — as  completely  as  in  that  valley  residence  of  a 
Revolutionary  general  of  Virginia,  in  which  the  apartments  assigned 
to  his  guests  were  indicated  by  chalk  lines  upon  the  floor.  Home 
was  a  den  shared  with  others,  perhaps  with  strangers.  All  of  the 
invasions  into  normal  restraints  and  sanctities  that  this  implied  was 
known,  perhaps,  only  to  those  who  could  not  undress  to  rest 
or  change  their  clothing  except  by  arrangement.  That  people 
had  to  wait  on  themselves  was  a  matter  of  course,  and  by  comparison 
a  minor  hardship.  It  has  been  said  there  was  no  business,  no  mails, 
no  open  stores,  no  hotels,  or  places  of  congregation  and  discourse; 
no  passage  of  vehicles,  no  social  pastimes,  no  newspapers,  no  voice 
of  the  Sabbath  bell.  AVhen  the  weight  of  anxiety  that  rested  on  the 
hearts  of  the  people  is  duly  reckoned,  and  with  it  the  total  lack  of 
all  means  by  which  anxiety  is  usually  diverted  and  the  tension 
of  thought  relieved,  it  is  a  great  wonder  that  many  did  not  become 
insane.  That  they  did  not,  gives  another  proof  of  the  heroic 
texture  of  the  beleaguered  population. 

It  is  not  quite  true  that  there  were  no  papers.  Three  copies  of 
the  Citizen  were  published  by  Mr.  John  J.  Shannon,  an  old 
gentleman,  in  whom,  however,  there  was  no  lack  of  ardor  and 
courage.  The  "Whig  office  was  burned  just  before  the  siege,  and 
the  Citizens  quarters  were  struck  by  the  shells  time  and  again,  its 
type  scattered,  its  floors  rlindered;  but  the  semi-occasional  issue 
was  continued  to  the  last.  It  was  printed  on  the  back  of  wall-paper, 
and  its  circulation  was  limited.  Sometimes  papers  were  handed 
across  the  lines  and  sent  to  headquarters  and  afterward,  by  regular 
grade,  through  the  circle  of  headquarter  attaches.  Every  one 
was  worn  to  a  frazzle,  though  the  news  it  contained  was  not 
generally  of  a  kind  to  encourage  perusal.  In  this  state  of  suspended 
animation,  it  is  really  wonderful  how  people  continued  to  drag  out 
their  endurance  from  one  hopeless  day  to  another.  Perhaps  the 
very  vigilance  they  had  to  exercise  against  the  shells  and  the 
activity  necessary  to  avoid  them,  kept  the  besieged  alive.  Every  day, 
too,  somebody  would  start  or  speed  a  new  story  of  deliverance  from 
without,  that  stirred  up,  although  for  a  fitful  season  only,  the  hearts 
bowed  down  by  deep  despair.  Xow  it  was  E.  Kirby  Smith,  and  now 
Joe  Johnston,  who  was  at  the  gates.  The  faith  that  something 
would  and  must  be  done  to  save  the  city  was  desperately  clung  to 
till  the  last.  It  probably  never  had  dee])  roots  in  the  reason  of  the 
generals,  the  men  in  the  lines,  or  the  people.  But  at  such  times  men 


122  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

do  not  reason.  The  hand  of  Fate  seems  to  rest  upon  them.  Pow 
erless  to  resist  the  tide  of  events,  their  only  refuge  is  in  the 
indulgence  of  a  desperate  hope,  whose  alternative  is  despair  and 
madness. 

There  were,  it  is  true,  occasional  breaks  in  the  heavy  monotone 
of  time  and  things.  One  of  these  was  the  sinking  of  the  gunboat 
"  Cincinnati,"  on  May  26th.  With  notable  audacity  this  vessel 
attempted  to  run  suddenly  upon  and  close  with  the  batteries  at  the 
north  end  of  the  city,  which  were  manned  by  a  gallant  command  of 
Tennesseeans,  and  constituted  the  protection  of  the  garrison's 
extreme  left  wing.  As  soon  as  she  began  steaming  down  the  river, 
and  even  before  she  had  passed  the  bend,  the  "  Cincinnati "  became 
the  target  of  a  concentrated  and  powerful  cannonade,  which  was 
made  none  the  less  steady  and  effective  by  the  Federals'  own  heavy 
fire.  Before  she  readied  the  middle  of  the  stream  it  was  evident 
that  her  vitals  were  wounded.  Reversing  her  course,  she  steamed 
heavily  up  the  current,  but  only  succeeded  in  running  ashore  on  tlio 
west  bank,  a  little  above  the  extremity  of  the  isthmus.  Forty  of 
her  people  had  been  killed  or  hurt.  The  glory  of  this  victory  was 
short-lived,  seeing  that  the  heavy  rifle  d-guns  of  the  steamer  were 
promptly  removed  from  her  decks  and  remounted  near  the  spot  of 
the  wreck.  They  were  her  avenging  spirits ;  if  not  doing  more 
damage,  certainly  causing  more  fear,  by  the  intense  and  hideous  hiss 
of  their  conical  balls'  passage  and  explosion  than  even  the  heaviest 
of  the  smooth-bore  mortars  effected. 

A  great  fire  broke  out  on  the  night  of  June  6th — the  Federal 
accounts  say  caused  by  the  explosion  of  their  shells.  There  was 
nothing  to  do  except  to  remove  the  articles  of  value  from  the  houses 
within  its  range.  A  great  crowd  collected,  notwsthstanding  the 
concentration  of  the  mortar  fire ;  and  yet  there  were  no  remembered 
casualties.  The  whole  block  was  burned,  of  course,  arid  the  wonder 
is  only  one. 

On  the  21st  of  June,  a  mine  constructed  in  McPherson's  front 
was  sprung  under  that  part  of  the  Confederate  line  occupied  by 
Ilebert's  Brigade  of  Louisianians — immediately  under  the  Thirty- 
first  Regiment,  I  believe.  The  mine  was  a  failure,  and  the  truthful 
chroniclers  of  the  time  report  did  more  harm  to  the  diggers  than 
the  under-dug.  Ilebert's  men  had  their  revenge,  too,  on  the  troops 
that  had  been  moved  up  close  to  take  advantage  of  the  panic  that 
did  not  ensue;  among  other  things,  rolling  down  on  their  heads 
boombs  with  fuses  cut  short,  which  barely  had  time  to  leave  the 
Confederates'  hands  before  they  burst. 


VICKSBURG  DURING  THE  SIEGE.  123 

A  Lynchburg  man  performed,  late  in  the  siege,  a  feat  never 
heretofore  recorded,  and  of  courage  worthy  of  the  honest  Irish  blood 
that  flowed  in  his  veins.  Major  Mike  Council,  having  resigned  his 
commission  in  a  Memphis  regiment  as  having  passed  the  age  of 
service,  undertook  to  convoy  a  large  purchase  of  sugar  from  some 
where  in  Louisiana  to  its  owner  in  Virginia.  lie  had  maneuvred  it 
as  far  as  Vicksburg,  and  there  the  siege  settled  on  it.  After  awaiting 
its  issue  from  week  to  week,  being  satisfied  that  he  could  accomplish 
no  good  by  remaining,  and  was  only  one  more  month  to  be  fed  out 
of  next  to  nothing,  Major  Council  decided  to  make  his  escape,  lie 
intimated  his  purpose  to  the  numerous  Virginians  in  the  city,  and  to 
other  friends,  and  received  from  these  a  great  budget  of  letters, 
which  was  all  his  load.  Waiting  for  a  stormy  night,  he  laid  himself 
flat  in  the  bottom  of  a  dug-out,  just  large  enough  to  hold  him,  and 
was  pushed  out  to  take  the  chances  of  the  Mississippi's  arrowy 
current,  lie  drifted,  by  good  luck,  between  the  gunboats  and  the 
guard-boats  around  them,  and  late  next  day  was  swept  by  a  turn  of 
the  stream  to  the  east  bank  near  Rodney,  and  struggled  through 
swamps  and  across  bayous  to  Arm  Jirnm.  Borrowing  somebody's 
mule  (on  what  terms  history  is  silent),  he  made  his  way  painfully 
across  the  country  to  the  nearest  station  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
Railroad,  whence  he  took  cars  for  Mobile.  His  letters  we're  mailed, 
and  a  six  weeks'  brain  fever  was  the  penalty  paid  for  his  hardihood. 
!Not  many  letters  have  seemed  to  come  so  nearly  out  of  the  grave  as 
did  these  missives  to  their  astonished  recipients. 

Other  people  went  and  came  between  the  garrison  and  the  world 
outside.  Others  started  who  never  reached  their  destination  ;  some 
were  captured  and  some  deserted.  General  Johnston  had  ten  dis 
patches  from  Pemberton  during  the  siege,  but  the  number  received 
from  him  was  smaller.  How  these  messengers  made  their  way  in 
and  out  I  have  no  means  of  knowing;  perhaps  through  the  woods, 
and  between  the  intricate  system  of  hills  and  vales  that  surround  the 
city,  and  perhaps  in  disguise  as  citizens  of  the  country.  One  of  the 
deserters  was  a  youth  named  Douglass,  a  native  of  Illinois,  who  had 
lived  several  years  in  Texas,  and  was  supposed  to  be  ''loyal" — our 
way.  It  was  he  who  refreshed  the  correspondents  with  the  news 
that  Mrs.  Pemberton  (in  Alabama)  had  been  killed  by  a  mortar  shell. 
There  were  reports  from  time  to  time  of  the  flitting  of  Lamar 
Fontaine,  one  of  the  numerous  poets  for  whom  the  authorship  of 
"All  Quiet  Along  the  Potomac  To-Night"  is  claimed,  between  the 
garrison  and  the  outside  woild.  I  do  not  know  if  they  were  true 
or  not. 


124:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Once  in  a  while  authentic  information,  from  official  sources,  of 
the  enemy's  proceedings  reached  General  Pemberton  in  a  way  they 
did  not  suspect.  Just  prior  to  the  siege  the  alphabet  of  the  Federal 
Signal  Corps  was  communicated  to  Captain  Maxwell  T.  Davidson, 
the  very  valuable  officer  in  command  of  the  Signal  Corps  of  M.  L. 
Smith's  Division,  from  the  Bureau  at  Richmond,  and  was  required 
to  be  committed  to  memory  by  his  men.  It  may  be  said,  apropos, 
that  we  always  had  the  Federal  alphabet  during  the  war;  and  I 
suppose  they  had  ours.  The  Confederate  signal  station  on  the 
Devil's  Backbone,  a  high  hill  running  along  the  river  to  the  north 
of  the  city,  commanded  a  Federal  signal  station  on  the  isthmus,  and 
every  motion  of  its  flags  and  lamps  was  readily  seen  by  the  officer 
in  charge  of  the  former — an  alert  and  intelligent  Creole  named 
Mathew  JJ.  Asbury.  Asbury  made  the  watching  of  the  Federal 
flags  the  business  of  his  life,  and  hardly  every  missed  a  communica 
tion  of  those  exchanged  between  General  Grant  and  Admiral  Porter. 
By  this  means  the  first  intelligence  of  Banks'  attack  upon  and  repulse 
from  the  works  of  Port  Hudson  was  received  and  communicated  to 
headquarters.  A  more  noticeable  feat  remained  to  be  achieved  by 
the  gallant  Louisianian.  After  Pemberton's  last  proposition  was 
submitted  to  Grant,  there  elapsed  an  interval  during  which  its  fate 
was  uncertain.  The  bombardment  was  still  suspended.  This  was 
the  night  of  July  3d,  and  an  ominous  and  awful  quiet  reigned  over 
all  the  scene — less  welcome,  no  doubt,  to  the  hearts  of  many  than 
the  utmost  fury  of  the  bombardment.  Suddenly  the  lamps  flashed, 
and  then  began  swinging,  and  their  message  was  traced  letter  by 
letter  and  word  by  word — not  only  by  the  eyes  for  which  it  was 
designed,  but  by  others,  if  possible,  more  keen  and  eager.  It  said, 
in  effect,  to  Admiral  Porter  (being  sent  by  the  general  in  command), 
that  a  council  of  the  generals  was,  in  the  main,  opposed  to  the  parol 
ing  of  the  surrendered  garrison,  and  thought  it  would  be  better  to 
send  the  whole  party  North ;  but  that  he,  General  Grant,  had  ruled 
otherwise,  on  the  principle  that  the  garrison  was  probably  demoral 
ized  enough  to  spread  the  same  feeling  wherever  they  went  in  the 
South ;  and  that  he  could  not  spare  sufficient  guards  and  transports 
to  send  them  to  Northern  prisons,  because  their  absence  would  inter 
fere  with  his  proposed  advance  into  the  country.  (I  do  not  pretend 
to  give  the  words.)  Asbury  mounted  a  horse  and  dashed  into  town, 
and  found  a  grave  council  of  generals  in  silent  session  at  Pemberton's 
headquarters,  awaiting  the  verdict.  With  intense  feeling  he  laid 
before  them  the  intercepted  dispatch  which  fulfilled  their  hopes  or 
their  fears.  AVith  never  a  word  more  the  council  of  war  broke  up — 


VICKSBURG  DURING  THE  SIEGE.  125 

the  stroke  had  fallen.  "When  the  garrison  marched  out,  Captain 
Davidson  concealed  the  sheets  containing  all  the  dispatches  inter 
cepted  during  the  siege  between  his  cap  and  its  lining,  but  lost  them 
in  after  years,  and  was  unable  to  respond  to  my  desire  to  have  their 
very  language  for  this  paper. 

The  Signal  Corps  headquarters  in  the  city  was  a  room  in  the 
court-house,  and  its  station  was  the  cupola  of  the  same.  The  court 
house  was  set  on  the  highest  point  of  the  town,  and  the  cupola 
formed  the  most  prominent  feature  of  its  river  facade,  except,  per 
haps,  the  soaring  light  spire  and  gold  cross  of  the  Catholic  church, 
which  was,  I  believe,  never  defaced  by  the  tire  of  the  enemy. 
Whether  this  was  chance  or  intention  is  another  study.  I  suspect 
Porter's  Pats  and  Mikes  didn't  want  to  hurt  it.  Far  otherwise  with 
the  Temple  of  Justice.  The  Federal  papers  say  it  was  the  general 
centre  of  their  tire,  and  so  say  I,  who  was  in  it.  The  building  and 
grounds  were  struck  twenty-four  times  or  more,  and  yet  but  one 
shell  was  fatal  in  its  etfects.  That  came  at  midnight,  crushing 
through  the  roof,  and,  passing  below  to  the  marble  pavement  of  the 
ground  floor,  exploded  and  thing  two  pour  fellows  against  the  wall 
with  such  mutilation  that  their  mothers  would  not  have  known  their 
dead  darlings.  They  were  Mississippi  militiamen.  Their  comrades 
above  suffered  only  less  cruelly.  The  heavy  shell  passing  through 
the  court-room,  which  was  packed  with  sleeping  men,  struck  squarely 
a  massive  iron  railing  that  inclosed  the  seats  of  the  lawyers  and  wit 
nesses,  and  scattered  its  fragments  on  every  hand.  Legs  were  broken, 
heads  crushed — all  manner  of  injury  inflicted.  This  one  shell  killed 
and  disabled  fourteen  men  ;  and,  by  strange  fatality,  two  more  men 
of  those  who  went  out  to  bury  the  two  first  killed,  lost  their  lives  on 
their  way  to  the  graveyard.  This  inclosure,  also — the  beautiful  City 
Cemetery — was  riddled  by  the  plunging  shot.  That  was,  doubtless, 
an  accident  of  war.  It  was  charged  that  the  Federals  did  fire  on  the 
Marine  Hospital,  which  was  full  of  wounded  men,  and  over  which 
the  yellow  fiag  was  hoisted.  It  was  struck  frequently,  and  wounded 
men  wounded  anew;  but  whether  by  aim  or  accident  I  do  not  know. 

Xo  history  of  the  siege  would  be  complete  without  some  detailed 
allusion  to  the  ceaseless  generation  of  sensational  reports  within  and 
without  the  city,  both  Xorth  and  South.  Considering  the  fertility 
of  inventions  then  displayed,  it  is  a  wonder  that  the  coming  Ameri 
can  novel  has  never  come.  There  may  have  been  something  in  the 
sulphurous  atmosphere  more  favorable  to  the  stimulation  of  genius 
than  belongs  to  the  ordinary  environment.  Munchausen  was  prosaic 
to  the  fellows  who  wrote  and  talked  and  were  believed  at  that  time. 


126  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

The  Richmond  papers  pathetically  complained  of  the  "  telegraphic 
genius  at  Jackson."  The  telegraphic  geniuses  at  Young's  Point  and 
Milliken's  Bend  were  far  greater  masters  of  the  art  of  fiction.  I  will 
mention  a  case  that  preceded  the  investment.  On  the  3d  of  May, 
the  tug  Sturgis,  with  two  barges,  loaded  with  400,000  rations  and 
medical  supplies,  was  ordered  to  pass  the  batteries,  and  tried  to  do 
so,  carrying  a  picked  guard.  The  late  A.  D.  Richardson,  represent 
ing  the  New  York  Tribune,  Junius  Henri  Browne,  of  the  Times, 
and  somebody  else  of  the  World,  volunteered  for  the  passage.  At 
12.45  the  tug  was  exploded  by  the  batteries'  fire,  several  men  killed, 
others  drowned,  and  the  Scribes  and  Pharisees,  clinging  to  bales  of 
hay,  with  which  the  barges  were  fortified,  drifted  to  land,  were 
picked  up  and  conveyed  to  a  room  in  the  court-house  with  other 
victims.  They  were  treated  as  handsomely  as  circumstances  allowed, 
and  Richardson,  in  particular,  a  hearty  fellow,  made  almost  too  good 
an  impression,  for  he  was  so  thoroughly  full  of  faith  in  the  resources 
of  the  Union  and  in  the  approaching  downfall  of  Jeff  Davis,  that 
he  cast  a  shadow  of  doubt  over  some  young  Confederates'  breasts. 
They  were  all  soon  exchanged,  going  home  by  way  of  Richmond. 
They  saw  a  few  things  from  the  windows  of  jails  and  cars,  and 
wrote  to  their  papers  from  Fortress  Monroe  most  astonishing  letters, 
containing  revelations  which  they  could  hardly  have  been  possessed 
of,  unless  they  were  members  of  the  Cabinet  of  Mr.  Davis. 

Another  correspondent  of  the  Tribune  essayed  to  describe  the 
passage  of  eight  gunboats  on  the  16th.  He  was  evidently  not  so 
venturesome  as  Richardson,  and  his  picture  reads  as  those  pictures 
look  of  shipwrecks,  which  no  soul  survives,  in  the  illustrated  papers, 
"  by  our  special  artist."  His  coquetry  with  truth  consisted  in  de 
scribing,  as  a  mysterious  and  dreadful  beacon  that  rose  out  of  the 
earth  at  Vicksburg,  the  homely  burning  of  some  shanties  in  De  Soto, 
which  were  set  on  fire  to  assist  the  aim  of  the  artillery.  The  scene 
was  terrific,  and,  no  wonder,  took  on  it  for  this  correspondent  a 
supernatural  expression.  But  the  wrar  maps  that  were  published 
were  the  greatest  feats — quite  distancing  the  creations  of  Ptolemy 
and  Psalmanazar.  The  Herald  had  one  representing  "  rebel  batteries 
in  the  streets,"  "rebel  redoubts"  on  the  same,  " masked  batteries " 
lying  around  loose,  a  tall  signal  station  whose  architect  was  the  artist, 
and  the  Marine  Hospital  at  the  wrong  end  of  the  town.  And  every 
day  some  new  version  of  victory  thrilled  across  the  wires.  One 
hundred  women  were  killed  the  first  day,  w^as  one  statement ;  a 
woman  and  two  children  fell  at  the  first  fire,  said  another.  General 
C.  C.  Auger  telegraphed,  on  the  23d  of  May,  that  "  deserters  report 


VICKSBURG  DURING  THE  SIEGE.  127 

that  General  Pembertou  has  been  hanged  by  his  own  men  !  "  3,600 
shells  lodged  in  the  town  in  one  hour,  said  somebody  else.  ( )ne 
paper  gave  a  detailed  statement  of  the  amputation  of  General  Sher 
man's  leg.  Another  said  "the  citizens  demand  the  surrender  of 
Yicksburg,  and  Pemberton  refuses  !  "  Another  said  Pemberton  had 
answered  with  profane  violence  the  charge  of  his  men  shooting  pois 
oned  balls.  In  the  citv  the  reports  took  shape  mainly  with  reference 
to  the  supposed  movements  of  Johnston  and  E.  X.  Smith.  One  day 
the  forces  had  gone  to  Memphis,  to  cut  Grant  oft'  from  his  supplies, 
a  report  that  provoked  a  poem  from  a  gallant,  gay  boy  named 
Cannon  (afterward  killed),  which  had  this  refrain : 

"Damn  Memphis  and  strategy — Vicksburg's  the  place, 
Arid  I  am,  dear  Joseph,  your  Camion,  in  haste/' 

Xext  time  it  was  Milliken's  Bend  that  had  been  captured  (there  was 
a  fight  there).  And  then  Kirbv  Smith  had  crossed  the  river  at 
Natchez,  and  had  a  division  at  Young's  Point.  And  so  on,  over  and 
over,  like  the  dreams  of  fever.  General  Johnston  appears,  from  his 
dispatches,  to  have  really  believed  that  assistance  could  be  expected 
from  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department  ;  a  strange  delusion  which 
might  even  appear,  in  the  minds  of  the  prejudiced,  an  attempt  to 
transfer  the  responsibility  of  events.  One  of  the  rumors  that  some 
how  reached  us  in  Yicksburg  was  that  Yirginia  had  elected  a  Union 
State  ticket,  and  was  making  ready  to  desert  the  Confederate  cause. 
The  joke  of  this  story  consists  in  the  circumstance  that  Governor 
William  Smith,  known  as  "Extra  Billy,"  bravest  of  soldiers  and 
staunchest  of  rebels,  headed  the  ticket  described  as  "  Union/' 

In  order  that  the  circumstances  under  which  the  surrender  was 
finally  made,  and  the  train  of  events  which  served  to  make  it  inevit 
able  may  be  fairly  judged,  I  condense  the  dispatches  exchanged 
between  Generals  Johnston  and  Pemberton  after  the  siege  began. 
The  first  of  the  series  has  been  given.  On  Mny  25th,  General 
Johnston  wrote  that  he  was  coming,  and  asked  Pemberton  what 
route  he  ought  to  take.  On  the  20th  he  wrote  that  he  was  too  late 
to  save  Yicksburg,  but  would  assist  in  saving  the  garrison.  On  June 
3d,  Pemberton  wrote  that  he  had  heard  nothing  from  Johnston  since 
May  20th  ;  that  the  man  bringing  musket-caps  had  been  captured,  and 
that  he  hopes  General  Johnston  will  move  on  the  north  of  Jackson 
road.  On  the  7th.  Johnston  again  wants  to  know  how  co-operation 
can  be  effected.  On  the  same  clay  Pemberton  writes  of  the  enemy's 
intrenching,  the  good  spirits  of  the  men,  and  that  he  had  twenty 
days'  provisions.  On  the  10th,  Pemberton  says  the  enemy  is 


128  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

bombarding  night  and  day  with  seven  mortars  and  artillery,  and  that 
he  is  losing  many  officers  and  men.  lie  will  hold  ont  while  he  has 
anything  to  eat.  Activity  is  urged  by  General  Pemberton  in  a 
dispatch  of  the  15th. 

On  June  14th  and  loth,  General  Johnston  writes  Pemberton 
that  he  can  only  hope  to  save  the  garrison,  and  asks  for  the  details 
of  a  plan  of  co-operation.  He  also  holds  out  the  hope  of  General 
Dick  Taylor's  reinforcing  the  outside  army  with  8,000  men  from 
Richmond,  La,  On  the  21st,  Pemberton  suggested  as  his  plan  that 
Johnston  should  move  at  night  to  the  north  of  the  railroad  while  he 
marched  by  the  Warrenton  road,  by  Hankinson's  ferry,  to  which 
Johnston  was  to  send  two  brigades  of  cavalry  and  two  batteries. 
Snyder's  Bluff  was  also  suggested  as  his  objective  point.  By  verbal 
message  General  Pemberton  said  the  army  for  his  relief  ought  not 
to  be  less  than  40,000  men.  General  Johnston  asserts  that  his  force 
never  amounted  to  more  than  two-thirds  of  this  minimum.  On  the 
22d,  however,  he  still  engages  to  make  a-  trial,  but  recommends  that 
General  Pemberton  cross  the  Mississippi  river  rather  than  surrender. 
On  that  date,  General  Pemberton  asked  General  Johnston  to  treat  with 
Grant  for  the  surrender  of  the  place  without  the  troops.  On  the  27th, 
General  Johnston  declines  to  negotiate,  and  makes  another  flourish  of 
Kirby  Smith.  No  other  dispatches  were  received.  After  dispatching 
Pemberton  that  he  would  advance  to  see  what  could  be  done  on  the 
7th  of  July,  he  examines  the  country  to  the  north  of  the  railroad,  and 
is  satisfied  that  nothing  can  be  effected.  When  he  has  just  begun 
the  like  examination  of  the  southern  line,  he  hears  on  the  4th  of  the 
surrender  of  the  town  and  its  defenders.  General  Johnston  was 
again  too  late. 

On  the  3d,  the  white  flag  went  up  for  a  parley.  The  first 
proposition  of  General  Pemberton,  which  was  delivered  by  Major 
General  Bowen  and  Colonel  Montgomery,  suggested  that  the  terms 
of  surrender  should  be  left  for  decision  to  three  commissioners  on 
either  side.  General  Grant,  courteously  receiving  the  flag-of -truce, 
made  answer,  rejecting  the  proposal  of  commissioners  as  unnecessary, 
and  suggesting  a  personal  conference  with  the  general  of  the  defense, 
whose  gallantry  and  stubbornness  he  highly  lauded.  At  three  o'clock 
P.  M.  the  two  commanders  met  in  what  is  described  by  some  corres 
pondent,  who,  perhaps,  never  saw  the  place,  as  "  a  small  vale,  where 
the  apricots  and  fig-trees  had  bloomed  in  happier  times."  The  same 
correspondent  says  the  two  men  had  been  personal  friends  in  the 
same  "  happier  times."  Certainly  the  bearing  of  General  Grant  was 
all  that  magnanimity  and  the  sympathy  of  the  brave  could  inspire. 


VU-KSBURU  DUE  I  SO    THE  SIEGE.  ls><) 

General  Pemberton's  proposition,  however,  that  the  men  should 
march  out,  was  met  with  the  blunt  qualification,  "nut  except  as 
prisoners  of  war."  After  the  conference  between  the  generals, 
Grant's  ultimatum  was  sent  by  General  Logan  and  Lieutenant  Colo 
nel  Wilson.  Pemberton's  proposed  amendments  were  that  the  men 
should  stack  arms  and  march  out,  and  that  the  rights  of  the  citizens 
should  be  guaranteed.  Grant  rejected  the  amendments,  contending 
that  every  officer  and  man  should  be  paroled  over  his  own  signature, 
and  lie  would  not  be  restricted  with  respect  to  the  citizens,  lie 
allowed  each  soldier,  however,  to  carry  his  private  kit,  the  officers 
their  side-arms,  and  the  field  officers  their  horses.  These  terms  were 
accepted,  and  the  white  flag  remained  on  the  works. 

The  suspension  of  the  firing  had  prepared  the  minds  of  the  men 
and  citizens  for  the  event  which  many  had  long  perceived  to  be 
written  in  the  book  of  Fate.  Yet  was  there  great  reaction  and  great 
sorrow  when  the  iron  crown  of  the  Mississippi,  a  fortress  maiden  as 
Namur  and  defiant  as  Ghazi  Schumla,  became  the  enemy's  prize. 
During  the  night  many  officers  went  wandering  sadly  around  the 
town,  taking  a  last  look  at  its  honorably  scarred  homes  and  ploughed 
streets,  and  making  farewell  to  the  heroic  citizens  whom  they  knew. 
A  load  was  no  doubt  lifted  from  the  hearts  of  the  surrendered  ;  but 
a  new  load,  that  seemed  even  heavier,  was  deposited  in  its  place. 
What  feeling  the  people  had,  made  no  public,  demonstration;  for 
they  prudently  returned  to  their  homes,  and  made  the  best  shift  that 
the  time  allowed,  reserving  their  sorrow  for  their  own  home-circles. 
When  the  poor  wasted  garrison  rose  out  of  the  long  imprisonment 
of  the  trenches  to  stack  the  weapons  they  had  used  so  well,  many 
reeled  and  staggered  like  drunken  men  from  emaciation  and  from 
emotion,  and  wept  like  children  that  all  their  long  sacrifice  was 
unavailing. 

To  Logan's  Division  was  assigned  the  duty  of  taking  possession 
of  the  captured  town.  The  boys  in  blue  entered  by  the  north  end 
of  Cherry  street,  and  made  a  grand  procession  as  they  stepped  by  in 
extended  line,  their  flags  waving,  their  officers  glittering  in  full  uni 
form,  and  the  air  torn  with  the  glad  shouts  that  went  up  from 
victorious  throats.  Logan  himself  stood  on  the  east  portico  of  the 
court-house  and  looked  with  swelling  pride  and  profound  gratifica 
tion  on  the  scene  so  picturesque  and  historic.  lie  dropped  some 
emphatic  exclamations  as  to  the  jov  it  gave  him  to  hear  the  boys 
cheer.  By-the-by,  the  fact  has  never  been  published,  but  is  no  less 
true,  that  a  company  of  Illinois  soldiers,  on,  tJn}  Southern  xi</<\  once 
constituted  part  of  the  Yicksburg  garrison,  though  it  went  to  pieces 
9 


130  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

long  before  the  siege.  Some  of  their  unassigned  officers — I  well 
recollect  one  named  Parker — may  still  have  been  there. 

In  the  main,  nay,  almost  without  exception,  during  the  five  days 
occupied  by  the  paroling  of  the  garrison,  the  Federal  army  of  pos 
session  conducted  itself  in  an  exemplary  manner.  The  men  who 
had  leave  to  go  over  the  city  expressed  the  greatest  curiosity  as  to 
the  caves  and  other  objects  of  interest,  and  were  mad  to  lay  hands 
on  relics.  The  wall-paper  copies  of  the  Citizen  were  in  great 
demand.  A  general  officer,  who,  I  think,  was  Grant,  accompanied 
by  a  full  suite,  some  of  whom  were  full  of  other  exhilerations  than 
success,  went  up  to  the  cupola  of  the  court-house,  and  when  they 
came  back,  the  staff  were  vociferously  chanting  the  "  Star  Spangled 
Banner,"  and  brandishing  as  a  trophy  an  old  signal  flag  that  had 
been  carelessly  left  there.  I  well  remember  the  silent  general  in 
the  midst  of  them,  who  must  have  been  Grant.  During  all  this  time 
I  heard  but  two  phrases  of  offense  to  the  Confederates,  and  one  of 
these  offenders  was  a  drunken  newsboy,  selling  copies  of  Harper* & 
Weekly r,  whose  front  page  was  garnished  with  a  picture  of  B call's 
execution.  The  other,  an  officer,  walking  up  the  iron  stairway  of 
the  court-house,  and,  noticing  the  name  of  the  Cincinnati  maker 
moulded  on  it,  damned  the  impudence  of  the  people  who  thought 
they  could  whip  the  United  States  when  they  couldn't  even  make 
their  own  staircases. 

The  paroling  of  the  men  in  duplicate  was  rapidly  effected  by 
means  of  printed  forms  and  a  full  staff  of  clerks,  who  filled  in  the 
names  and  commands  of  the  soldiers  and  officers.  One  of  these 
duplicates  was  retained  by  the  prisoner,  the  other  for  the  govern 
ment  by  the  paroling  officials.  The  examination  of  knapsacks  made 
on  the  lines  was  carelessly  done,  and  with  many  apologies,  by  officers 
who  seemed  to  be  ashamed  of  the  service.  During  the  five  days  full 
rations  had  been  issued  by  the  commissaries  of  General  Grant  to  the 
whole  garrison,  sick  and  well,  the  whole  amounting  to  thirty-one 
thousand  people,  of  wrhom  but  eighteen  thousand  were  effective. 
They  consisted  mainly  of  hard-tack  and  rich  Western  bacon;  and 
many  a  Confederate  can  say,  on  the  conscience  of  his  stomach,  that 
he  never  ate  anything  that  tasted  better. 

The  armies  parted  with  mutual  good  will,  as  is  the  case  with 
f  oemen  who  are  worthy  of  each  others'  steel.  But  the  discontent  of 
the  disarmed  captives  began  to  gather  volume,  and  to  speak  in  no 
bated  breath,  very  soon  after  the  lines  were  passed.  The  march, 
owing  to  the  feeble  state  of  the  men,  was  very  painful  and  tedious. 
Jackson  was  left  to  the  north,  and  th.e  column's  first  sight  of  streets 


VICKSBUBG  DURING   THE  SIEGE.  131 

was  when,  after  four  days,  the  town  of  Brandon,  ten  miles  east  of 
Jackson,  was  reached.  It  had  been  generally  supposed  by  the  men 
that  their  paroles  gave  them  the  right  to  go  home  as  soon  as  they 
could  get  there,  and  without  restrictions.  Many  had  already  deserted 
to  the  Trans-Mississippi,  despite  the  aid  of  Federal  guard-boats  to 
check  the  stream.  But  when,  at  Brandon,  it  was  learned  that  the 
cars  would  not  receive  them  to  take  them  home,  and  that  they  were 
to  march  to  Enterprise,  and  there  go  into  parole  camp,  their  indigna 
tion  burst  all  bounds.  Efforts  were  made,  by  moving  the  switch,  to 
throw  the  trains,  on  which  General  Johnston  was  removing  supplies 
from  Jackson,  from  the  track;  and  the  officers  had  to  draw  and 
threaten  to  use  their  side-arms  before  the  mob  could  be  subdued. 
One  man  got  up  in  the  plaza  of  Brandon  and  offered  to  be  one  of 
fifty  to  go  and  hang  Pemberton,  the  traitor.  What  further  befell 
these  mad  patriots  I  cannot,  as  a  spectator,  narrate,  for  a  sick  leave 
enabled  me  to  depart  on  the  last  train  from  Jackson  that  went  east- 
riding  to  Enterprise  on  the  top  of  a  freight  car,  at  the  end  of  a  long 
train,  and  exposed  to  worse  risk,  I  believe,  for  those  forty  miles  than 
even  in  the  Yicksburg  court-house.  I  ought  to  remark  that  one 
pleasing  feature  of  the  march  through  Mississippi  was  the  habit 
which  women  and  children  had  of  coming  out  to  the  fences  and 
inquiring  what  made  us  surrender  Yicksburg. 

The  demoralization  of  the  garrison  extended  beyond  the  State. 
At  Demopolis  the  guard  of  the  provost  marshal  came  down  to  the 
wharf  to  stop  the  prisoners  who  had  gotten  so  far,  and  to  put  them 
in  parole  camp  at  that  point.  The  prisoners  attacked  them,  broke 
through  the  line,  and  flung  some  of  them  into  the  gutter.  They 
soon  yielded  to  reason,  however,  and  surrendered  their  paroles  to 
the  provost  marshal.  And  this  was  the  last  I  saw  of  the  ill-starved 
garrison  until,  at  Enterprise,  Mr.  Davis  told  them  that  Bragg  would 
pave  Itosecrans'  way  in  gold  if  he  (Bragg)  could  get  the  Federal 
general  to  attack  him  on  Lookout  Mountain — with  more  of  the  same 
sort;  and  where  Johnston,  following,  spoke  more  to  the  point,  in 
saying :  "  Soldiers !  I  hope  to  see  you  soon,  with  arms  in  your  hands, 
in  the  presence  of  the  enemy ! " 

Who  was  to  blame  ?  The  answer  is,  everybody — nobody.  There 
were  great  adverse  odds  to  begin  with.  General  Grant,  according  to 
Badeau,  had  130,000  men  at  his  disposal  with  which  to  effect  the 
reduction  of  Yicksburg;  while  the  effectives  of  Johnston  and  Pem 
berton  combined — and  they  were  never  combined — never  reached  one- 
third  that  number.  General  Johnston  was  too  sick  when  he  arrived 
at  Jackson  to  take  command  in  the  field  ("^Narrative,"  page  187),  an 


132  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

illness  which  "  infected  the  very  life-blood  of  our  enterprise,"  like 
the  Earl  of  Northumberland's.  General  Johnston  covers  the  whole 
ground  in  saying  of  General  Pemberton,  "His  design  and  objects 
and  mine  are  founded  on  exactly  opposite  military  principles." 
General  Johnston  was  not  in  accord  with  the  Richmond  government, 
and  General  Pemberton  was  not  in  accord  with  General  Johnston. 
Those  whom  God  had  put  asunder,  man  had  joined  together. 
Mistaking  and  mistrusting  each  other,  neither  one  did  as  well  as  he 
might  have  done  without  the  other.  General  Pemberton  thought 
the  objective  of  the  campaign  was  to  save  Vicksburg,  or  make 
a  fight  for  it,  and  in  this  was  supported  by  the  administration. 
General  Johnston  thought  the  safety  of  the  army  was  the  first 
consideration,  that  the  enemy  might  still  be  confronted,  no  matter 
what  position  he  might  gain.  Each  accuses  the  other  of  slowness, 
and  each,  probably,  is  right.  General  Pemberton,  brave  man,  stout 
fighter,  doubtless,  and  faithful  to  the  South  as  any  native  son — a 
fidelity  never  doubted  by  the  intelligent  among  his  men — was 
deliberate,  slow  of  assuming  responsibilities,  perhaps  not  equal  to  the 
movement  and  management  of  large  bodies,  and  utterly  devoid  of 
personal  magnetism.  What  character  General  Johnston  has  as  a 
soldier,  history  has  already,  in  part,  decided.  In  military  resources 
perhaps  no  captain  of  the  South  excelled  him ;  but  at  Jackson  he 
was  flustered  by  a  responsibility  suddenly  assumed,  and  for  which 
his  mind  was  not  schooled ;  between  which  and  the  discharge  of 
duties  well  grasped  in  advance,  there  is  the  same  difference  as 
between  "two  o'clock  in  the  morning  courage,"  and  the  ordinary 
daring  of  the  soldier  who  obeys  orders  and  feels  the  contact  of  his 
comrade's  elbow. 

General  Pemberton  is  said  to  have  felt  keenly  the  injustice 
done  him  with  respect  to  the  fall  of  Vicksburg.  At  one  time  during 
the  siege,  when  some  exaggerated  victoiy  was  reported  in  Richmond, 
the  press  almost  smothered  him  with  laurels.  The  Dispatch  said 
that  Beauregard  and  Lee  had  both  urged  his  promotion,  and  that 
Johnston  had  fairly  begged  for  him  to  be  his  chief-of-staff !  But 
public  sentiment  told  a  different  tale  when  failure  befel  his  army. 
Assigned  to  command  of  the  artillery  around  Richmond,  he  was 
greeted  with  jeers  by  the  men  as  he  rode  down  the  lines.  Ever 
since  the  war  General  Pemberton  is  said  to  have  felt  most  deeply 
the  odium  attaching  to  him  as  the  man  who  surrendered  Yicksburg 
and  sundered  the  South.  It  is  a  curious  fact  that  no  portrait  of  him 
appears  among  Confederate  collections.  I  never  saw  him  in  person, 
but  I  do  him  the  bare  justice  of  recording  my  own  conviction  that 


VICKSBURG  DURING  THE  SIEGE.  133 

his  fealty  to  the  cause  which  lie  espoused  was  beyond  all  peradven- 
tnre  of  suspicion  ;  that  he  did  the  very  best  he  could ;  that  he  acted 
in  accordance  with  his  orders  from  Richmond;  and  that  he  departed 
no  further  from  his  immediate  orders  than  did  General  Loring  from 
Ms  at  Edwards'  Depot,  an  act  of  independence  for  which  General 
Johnston  warmly  lauds  the  latter. 

The  effect  of  the  surrender,  North  and  South,  was  immense. 
At  Washington  Mr.  Seward,  in  response  to  a  serenade,  was  ready  to 
swear  that  even  old  Virginia  would  soon  be  asking  forgiveness  on 
her  knees.  He  never  saw  Virginia  in  that  posture;  but  it  may  be 
doubted  whether,  after  Vicksburg  and  the  twin  tragedy  of 
Gettysburg,  there  was  ever  any  vital  hope  in  the  Southern  heart 
except  among  the  soldiers.  The  army  kept  its  high  crest  and  stern 
front  to  the  last,  and  died  only  with  annihilation;  but  many  a 
Vicksburg  prisoner,  gone  home,  spread  the  tale  of  disaster  and  the 
influence  of  dismay  among  simple  folk  whose  faith  never  rallied. 
There  were  desperate  battles  afterward,  and  occasional  victories,  but 
their  light  only  rendered  deeper  the  advancing  and  impending 
shadow  of  ultimate  failure.  The  world  is  familiar  with  the  story. 
Magnifying,  as  they  deserve  to  be,  the  heroism  of  the  garrison,  and 
the  community  of  Vickslmrg,  and  the  ''vindictive  tenacity "  with 
which  Pemberton  held  it  till  the  last  spark  of  hope  had  faded,  I 
believe  that  the  surrender  was  the  stab  to  the  Confederacy  from 
which  it  never  recovered  ;  and  that  no  rational  chance  of  its  triumph 
remained  after  the  white  flag  flew  on  the  ramparts  of  the  terraced 
city,  and  the  dumb  guns  around  it  no  longer  spoke  defiance  to  its  foes. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BEVERLY  FOED. 


BY    COLONEL    F.    C.    NEWHALL. 


THE  interest  excited  by  Gen 
eral  D.  McM.  Gregg's  narra 
tive  of  the  operations  of  the 
Union  cavalry  in  the  Get 
tysburg  campaign,  has  been 
stimulated  by  the  narrative 
of  Major  McClellan,  the  Ad 
jutant  General  of  the  Cavalry 
of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia;  and  this  latter  ac 
count,  as  a  pendant  to  the 
former,  affords  an  opportu 
nity  to  emphasize  the  fact 
that  the  Gettysburg  campaign 
was  opened  actively  in  Vir 
ginia,  when  General  Pleason- 
ton's  command  crossed  the  Rappahannock  river,  on  the  morning  of 
the  9th  of  June,  1863,  at  Kelly's  and  Beverly  fords,  and  engaged 
the  command  of  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart.  The  influence  of  that 
day's  encounter  on  the  great  campaign  which  it  inaugurated,  lias 
never  been  fully  understood  or  appreciated  by  the  public,  and  Major 
McClellan  has  done  well  to  draw  renewed  attention  to  this  eventful 
action.  It  is  proper  to  recognize  and  applaud  the  magnanimous  and 
soldierly  vein  pervading  his  narrative,  where  all  the  merit  is  awarded 
to  the  Northern  cavalry  which  the  most  enthusiastic  trooper  among 
them  could  possibly  lay  claim  to,  and  one  could  not  reasonably 
expect  from  a  Southern  source  such  hearty  and  striking  commenda 
tion.  "What  he  says  of  the  causes  of  the  decline  of  the  Southern 
cavalry  in  numbers  and  efficiency,  is  deserving  of  generous  considera 
tion,  and  to  his  excuses  in  their  behalf  may  well  be  added — what  he 
refrains  from  saying — that  laboring  under  many  disadvantages,  un 
known  to  our  more  favored  soldiers,  their  efforts  to  maintain  them 
selves  in  the  field  were  in  keeping  with  the  patient  courage  and 
self-sacrificing  spirit  which  marked  the  conduct  of  the  Southern 
troops,  meriting,  in  a  military  sense,  the  admiration  of  the  world. 
(134) 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BEVERLY  FORD.  135 

Before  passing  to  the  field  to  which  Major  McClellan  has 
mainly  confined  himself,  I  may,  for  historical  purposes,  be  allowed 
to  say,  in  reply  to  one  of  his  preliminary  remarks,  that,  however  it 
may  have  been  on  his  side,  the  entire  strength  of  the  cavalry  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  not  concentrated  at  Trevilian  Station, 
Virginia,  in  June,  18(U.  We  had  but  two  divisions  there  (Torbert's 
and  Gregg's),  Wilson's  having  remained  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  near  James  river.  Fair-minded  troopers  on  our  side  call 
the  fierce  engagement  between  Sheridan  and  Wade  Hampton  at 
Trevilian  a  drawn  battle.  It  was  fought  in  a  densely-wooded 
country,  very  remote  from  our  main  army  and  from  any  base  of 
supply.  The  object  of  our  expedition  was  to  effect  a  junction  with 
Hunter  near  Gordonsville ;  but  Hunter  was  not  at  Gordonsville, 
nor  near  there,  when  we  reached  Trevilian  Station,  and  no  tidings 
could  be  had  of  him.  He  was  over  the  hills  and  far  away,  marching 
directly  from  us  instead  of  to  a  junction  with  us,  and  as  we  had  no 
plans  independent  of  him,  we  had  no  alternative  but  to  rejoin  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  when  he  could  not  be  found.  A  crow  could 
scarcely  find  subsistence  in  the  country  about  Trevilian  Station  ;  we 
were  encumbered,  after  two  days'  hard  fighting,  with  many  wounded 
and  prisoners;  we  were  far  from  our  base,  with  ammunition  and 
rations  nearly  expended.  We  voluntarily  withdrew  from  Hampton's 
front,  and  withdrew  at  night  as  a  matter  of  common  discretion  ;  but 
we  remained  within  easy  reach  of  his  lines  the  next  day,  and  went 
comfortably  into  camp.  Day  after  dav,  through  the  heat  and  dust, 
camping  regularly  at  night,  we  continued  our  long  march  to  James 
river,  hampered  with  weary  and  foot-sore  prisoners,  and  a  long  train 
of  wagons  and  carts,  mostly  filled  with  wounded;  but  we  went 
unvexed  by  General  Hampton  until  he  came  again  close  under  the 
wing  of  Lee's  army.  We  regard  the  two  days'  fight  as  a  drawn 
battle,  and  we  think  there  is  something  rather  fine  in  the  aspect  of 
our  troopers  stalking  through  so  many  miles  of  hostile  territory 
directly  afterward,  unimpeded  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  who  were 
close  at  hand,  and  had  us  somewhat  at  a  disadvantage.  P>ut  we 
freely  admit  anything  that  anybody  can  say  of  the  expedition,  as  to 

V  I/O  V  V  V  -i 

its  futility,  barrenness  and  general  worthlessness,  of  which  we  were 
conscious  and  heartily  tired  long  before  we  saw  the  end  of  it. 

The  battle  of  Beverly  Ford,  as  we  call  it,  or  of  Fleetwood,  as 
General  Stuart  styled  it,  is  interesting  in  the  first  place,  because  it 
was  the  first  occasion  when  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
went  into  action  as  a  body.  The  cavalry  had  been  organized  by 

General  Hooker  into  a  corps  under  Stoneman  durin<r  the  winter  of 

i  t~> 


136  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

1862—63,  and  Stoneman  had  commanded  the  greater  part  of  it  as  a 
unit  in  the  field  during  his  celebrated  but  entirely  fruitless  raid  in 
the  Chancellorsville  campaign ;  but  there  had  been  no  fighting — 
simply  long  marches  in  rain  and  mud,  and  much  loss  of  sleep. 
General  Stoneman,  naturally  of  an  anxious  habit  of  mind,  was 
unfitted  by  temperament,  as  well  as  by  bodily  suffering,  for  inde 
pendent  operations  remote  from  the  main  army.  After  the  return 
from  the  raid  he  was  unjustly  held  to  blame  for  a  share  in  the 
Chancellorsville  failure,  and  General  Pleasonton  succeeded  to  the 
command  of  the  cavalry  corps.  Since  the  opening  of  the  war  there 
had  been  more  or  less  fighting,  scouting  and  picketing,  by  our 
cavalry,  in  which  the  men  had  borne  themselves  well,  although, 
acting  as  they  did  for  the  most  part  in  small  detachments,  no  material 
results  were  impressed  on  the  public  mind ;  but  the  good  effects  of 
the  experience  already  had  by  the  regiments  in  their  isolated  service 
were  at  once  apparent  when  the  corps  was  called  together.  General 
Stoneman,  and  then  General  Pleasonton,  on  assuming  command  of 
the  whole,  found  an  efficient  body  of  troops  ready  to  hand,  and  not 
a  mass  of  crude  material  to  be  moulded  into  form  before  it  should 
be  fit  for  the  field.  Neither  Stoneman,  Pleasonton,  nor  Sheridan, 
is  entitled  to  a  very  large  share  of  credit  for  the  excellent  material 
wliicli  the  cavalry  corps  afforded  and  the  excellent  wrork  it  was  able 
to  do.  No  one  man  can  fairly  lay  claim  to  a  chief  share  in  its  devel 
opment  ;  it  was  self -developed,  in  a  difficult  country  of  woods, 
marshes  and  stone  walls,  where  each  regiment's  daily  experience  was 
a  daily  lesson  learned  and  improved,  and  to  name  all  who  contributed 
to  the  efficiency  of  the  corps  would  be  to  name  not  only  all  those 
from  time  to  time  in  high  command,  but  also  many  brave  and  intelli 
gent  regimental  field  officers,  company  commanders  and  enlisted 
men.  "Sheridan's  Cavalry,"  which  broke  on  the  world  with  the 
results  of  the  final  campaign  against  Lee,. was  just  as  good  cavalry 
before  Sheridan  became  connected  with  it.  To  give  no  other 
example,  when  the  service  rendered  by  General  Buford  on  the  first 
day  of  Gettysburg  comes  to  be  understood  and  appreciated,  it  will 
be  seen  that  he  and  his  command  had  then  but  little  to  learn  of  skill, 
courage  and  adaptability ;  and  all  the  earlier  operations  of  the  Gettys 
burg  campaign,  beginning,  as  I  have  said,  w^ith  the  battle  of  Beverly 
Ford,  and  continuing  along  the  east  flank  of  the  Blue  Ridge  to  the 
Potomac,  were  quite  as  creditable  to  the  spirit  and  capacity  of  our 
cavalry  as  the  world-famous  campaign  from  Petersburg  through 
Dinwiddie  Court-IIouse,  Five  Forks  and  Sailors'  Creek  to  Appo- 
mattox.  The  success  of  Sheridan's  cavalry  in  the  latter  campaign 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BEVERLY  FORD.  137 

created  a  revolution  in  the  ideas  of  European  officers,  who  recognized 
a  new  feature  in  war.  But  it  is  not  to  the  point  that  our  fame  is 
less  in  the  former  than  in  the  latter  campaign,  and  it  should  not  he 
lost  si<j;ht  of  that,  on  the  9th  of  June,  18(13,  the  cavalry  of  Lee's  army 
was  in  its  prime;  it  was  never  seen  afterward  in  equal  glory. 

Pleasonton's  movement  across  the  Rappahannock  that  day  was 
in  fact  a  reconnoissance  in  force  to  ascertain  for  General   Hooker's 
information   to   what    extent    the   rumors   were   true   that    Lee   was 
en  route  across  the  Blue  .Ridge  to  the  Slienandoali  Valley,  and  so  no 
doubt  to  the  Potomac  and  beyond.     Hooker's  army  was  in   the  old 
camps  opposite   Fredericksburg,  to  which  he  had   retired   after  the 
fidwn  of  Chancellors  ville.     Lee's  troops  had  been  encamped  behind 
Culpepper    Court-House,    along    the    Rapidan,    as    well    as    in    the 
neighborhood  of  Fredericksburg;  but  it  was  now  known  that  a  part 
of  his  army  was  already  in  motion  in  a  dangerous  direction,  and  it 
was    also    known    that     Stuart    was    accumulating    his    cavalry    at 
Culpepper  Court-House,  if  he  had  not  already  set  out  in  advance  of 
Lee's  infantry.     Culpepper  Court-House  is  some  ten  miles  south  of 
the  river,  and  there  was   no  expectation   on   General    Pleasonton's 
part  of  encountering  Stuart's  troopers  immediately  on  crossing  the 
fords   of   the   Rappaliannock.     Indeed,   as   Major  McClellan   states, 
Stuart's  advance  to  the  river  was  simultaneous  with  our  own.     As 
we  silently  encamped  on  the  north  bank  on  the  pleasant  evening  of 
the  8th  of  June,  and  had  to  be  content  with  cold  suppers,  because 
General    Pleasonton   would    permit   no    camp-fires   to   be   lighted, 
Stuart's  men  made  their  bold  bivouac  on  the  southern  shore  of  the 
river  so  confidently  that,  as  Major  McClellan  informs  us,  there  was 
nothing    but    a    picket    between   Beverly    ford,   and    four   batteries 
of  horse  artillery  parked  but  a  short  distance  in  the  rear.     General 
Pleasonton,  having  no  reason  to  expect  the  presence  of  the  enemy 
in  force  this  side  of  Culpepper  Court-House,  his  plan  contemplated 
a  movemert  of  at  least  two  columns  on  Brandy  Station,  an  inter 
mediate  point   on   the   Orange   and   Alexandria  Railroad,   between 
Culpepper  and  the  Rappaliannock.     The   Orange  and  Alexandria 
Railroad  crosses  the  river  at  Rappaliannock  Station.     Beverly  ford 
is,  perhaps,  a  mile  and  a  half  above,  and  Kelly's  ford  some  four 
miles  below  the  railroad,  and  for  the  purposes  of  his  reconnoissance 
General  Pleasonton  determined  to  pass  his  troops  over  both  these 
fords.     The  consequences  of  this  plan  proved  to  be  to  some  extent 
unfortunate,  because,  when  the  river  was  crossed  on  the  morning  of 
the   Utli,   and    the  troops    became   engaged,    the   operations   of    the 
widely -severed    connections   were    independent   of    each    other,   and 


138  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

could  not,  at  that  distance,  in  a  wooded  and  irregular  country, 
be  brought  promptly  into  harmony.  This  state  of  affairs,  purely 
accidental  and  unexpected  as  it  was,  reflects  no  blame  on  General 
Pleasonton  ;  but  it  is  noteworthy  how  often,  in  war,  operations  from 
a  common  centre  outward  are  better  advised  than  by  the  contrary 
method.  Concentration  of  troops  is  often  so  difficult  of  attainment 
when  the  links  of  connection  are  once  lost.  A  conspicuous  example 
of  this  truth  has  been  lately  brought  to  mind  by  Dr.  Lambdin's 
admirable  narrative  read  at  the  Centennial  celebration  of  the  battle 
of  Germantown,  and  even  now  one  can  but  feel  sorry  for  General 
Washington  as  a  soldier — thinking  of  him  in  the  fog  before  Chew's 
house,  with  Sullivan  and  Wayne  groping  in  front,  and  no  tidings  as 
yet  of  Greene  on  the  Limekiln  road,  and  Armstrong  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Wissahickon.  If  he  had  spread  his  battle-fan  outward  from  his 
centre  on  the  turnpike,  unfolding  it  as  he  advanced,  perhaps  no  one 
would  have  inquired  a  century  after  why  the  good  people  of 
Germantown  wished  to  commemorate  a  defeat.  Be  that  as  it  may, 
General  Pleasonton  was  destined  to  reap  some  of  the  occasional 
disadvantages  of  a  broken  military  chain.  The  force  dispatched  to 
Kelly's  ford  was  composed  of  Gregg's  and  Duffie's  cavalry,  and  a 
small  brigade  of  infantry,  perhaps  fifteen  hundred  men,  commanded 
by  the  gallant  General  David  Russell,  who  was  subsequently  killed 
in  the  battle  of  the  Opequan,  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  The  force 
to  cross  at  Beverly  ford  was  accompanied  by  General  Pleasonton  in 
person,  and  was  composed  of  Buford's  cavalry  and  a  small  brigade 
of  infantry,  commanded  by  General  Adelbert  Ames,  afterward 
greatly  distinguished  in  leading  the  successful  assault  on  Fort 
Fisher,  and  notorious  later  on  as  the  "carpet-bag"  Governor  of 
Mississippi.  To  effect  the  contemplated  junction  near  Brandy 
Station,  the  Beverly  ford  column  would  bear  to  the  left,  the  Kelly's 
ford  column  to  the  right — the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad 
lying  between  them  as  they  marched.  As  an  aide-de-camp  to 
General  Pleasonton,  it  was  my  fortune  to  be  thrown  with  the 
Beverly  ford  column,  and  all  that  I  saw  of  what  occurred  after  the 
crossing  of  the  river,  on  the  morning  of  the  9th,  was  connected  with 
the  operations  on  the  right. 

It  was  not  yet  dawn  when  General  Pleasonton  rode  to  the  river 
bank  at  Beverly  ford.  The  atmosphere  at  that  hour  was  very  hazy, 
and  the  group  of  officers  assembled  near  the  General  were  half 
hidden  from  each  other  by  the  mist.  General  Buford  was  there, 
with  his  usual  smile.  He  rode  a  gray  horse,  at  a  slow  walk  generally, 
and  smoked  a  pipe,  no  matter  what  was  going  on  around  him,  and  it 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BEVERLY  FORD.  139 

was  always  reassuring  to  see  him  in  the  saddle  when  there  was  any 
chance  of  a  fight.  General  Pleasoiiton's  staff  was  partly  composed 
of  men  who  became  distinguished.  The  Adjutant  General  was  A. 
J.  Alexander,  of  Kentucky,  a  very  handsome  fellow,  who  Avas  after 
ward  a  brigadier  general  with  Thomas  in  the  West.  Among  the 
aides  was  Captain  Farnsworth,  Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry,  Avho  so 
distinguished  himself  in  the  coming  battle,  and  in  the  subsequent 
operations  south  of  the  Potomac,  that  he  was  made  a  brigadier 
general,  and  with  that  rank  fell  at  Gettysburg  at  the  head  of  a 
brigade  of  cavalry  which  he  had  commanded  but  a  few  days. 
Another  aide  was  the  brilliant  Custer,  then  a  lieutenant,  whose 
career  and  lamented  death  there  is  no  need  to  recall.  Another 
was  Lieutenant  11.  S.  Mclvenzie,  of  the  engineers,  now  General 
Mclvenzie  of  well-won  fame — the  youngest  colonel  of  the  regular 
army;  and  still  another  was  ITlric  Dahlgren.  General  Pleasonton 
had  certainly  no  lack  of  intelligence,  dash  and  hard-riding  to  rely 
on  in  those  about  him.  Colonel  B.  F.  Davis,  Eighth  Xew  York 
Cavalrv,  in  advance,  led  his  brigade  across  the  river  while  the  light 
was  still  dim.  He  fell  in  a  moment,  mortally  wounded,  on  the 
further  bank,  and  should  be  remembered  with  special  honor,  for  he 
was  a  Southern  man,  and  a  graduate  of  West  Point.  He  was  called 
"Grimes''  Davis  by  all  his  army  friends,  and  was  the  beau  ideal  of 
a  cavalry  officer.  His  most  famous  exploit  was  his  escape  with  his 
command  from  Harper's  Ferry,  when  Miles,  led  on  by  treason  or 
infatuation,  abandoned  all  the  grand  surrounding  hills  to  the  enemy, 
without  a  struggle,  and  awaited  his  own  inevitable  surrender  in  the 
basin  below,  although  it  was  written  before  him,  in  characters 
mountain-high,  that  Harper's  Ferry  cannot  be  defended  except  on 
Bolivar,  London  and  Maryland  Heights. 

Colonel  Davis'  troops  had  now  no  sooner  emerged  from  the 
river  at  Beverly  ford,  where  the  water  was  scarcely  stirrup-dee}), 
than  they  encountered  the  enemy's  pickets,  to  whom  they  were, 
doubtless,  an  astounding  apparition  from  the  fog.  Pift'l  paff !  went 
the  carbines,  and  our  troops  on  this  side  pressed  on  faster,  the 
narrowness  of  the  ford  road  and  of  the  ford  itself  compelling  them 
to  move  in  column  of  fours.  Major  McClellan  describes  the  alarm 
and  confusion  existing  among  Stuart's  exposed  artillery  and  trains 
while  Colonel  Davis  pushed  his  advance  rapidly  toward  their  camp. 
In  his  eagerness  to  profit  by  the  surprise,  he  rashly  rode  with  his 
skirmishers,  if  not  in  front  of  them,  and  was  shot  by  a  soldier  on 
foot,  who  sprang  from  behind  a  tree  in  the  edge  of  the  first  wood. 
He  was  borne  back  in  a  blanket  just  as  General  Pleasonton  gained 


MO  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  southern  bank  of  the  river;    and  in  a  moment  more  we  met 
some   men  carrying  Captain  George  A.   Forsyth,  Eighth  Illinois 
Cavalry,  who  was  shot  through  the  thigh.     This  able  and  daring 
officer  has  since  become  renowned  as  an  aide-de-camp  of  General 
Sheridan  throughout  his  campaigns  in.  Virginia,  and  as  the  hero  of 
the  most  remarkable  fight  with  Indians  on  the  plains  of  which  there 
is  any  record.     Forsyth  reported  a  sharp   fight  at  the   front,  and 
expressed  great  regret  that  he  had  not  been  wounded  at  sundown 
instead  of  at  sunrise.     Meantime  the  reserve  brigade  of  cavalry  had 
passed  on  to  join  in  the  melee,  the  sounds  of  which  were  now 
formidable  in  front,  while  shells  came  flying  from  our  right  and 
demanded   attention.      The   reserve    brigade,   which   included   the 
regular  regiments  and  the  Sixth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  was  soon 
hotly  engaged  charging  the  enemy's  line,  which  had  taken  position 
near   St.   James'    Church,  as  described  by  Major  McClellan.     St. 
James'  Church  was  a  modest  sanctuary,  suggesting  the  time  when 
"  the  woods  were  the  first  churches,"  and  it  lay  directly  on  the  road 
toward    Brandy   Station,    our    rendezvous   with   the   Kelly's    ford 
column.     The  Sixth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  attacking  the  enemy's 
troopers  on  the  plateau  near  the  church,  met  wTith  a  tremendous  fire 
from  artillery  on  the  flank,  and  was  compelled  to  fall  back  with 
heavy  loss  of  officers  and  men,  including  Major  Robert  Morris,  in 
command  of  the  regiment,  whose  horse  fell  with  him,  and  he  was 
taken  prisoner.     The  regulars,  part  of  whom  charged  at  the  same 
time,  or  a  moment  later,  fared  better,  on  the  whole,  but  were  brought 
to  a  stand  still;  and  meantime  our  right,  nearer  to  the  river,  was 
seriously  threatened,  endangering  our  possession  of  Beverly  ford. 
Ames'  infantry  was  ordered  to  replace  the  reserve  brigade  in  the 
woods  below  St.  James'  Church,  which  they  did  without  any  serious 
fighting,  and  the  reserve  brigade  was  sent  to  the  open  fields  on  our 
right,  where  the  enemy,  dismounted,  had  secured  a  line  of  stone 
walls,  with  artillery  on  the  higher  ground  behind  them.     Some  guns 
of  ours  were  unlimbered  on  a  knoll  a  short  distance  from  the  ford, 
commanding  the  fields  into  which  the  reserve  brigade  was  moving, 
and  a  lively  duel  was  immediately  begun  with  the  opposing  artillery, 
while  General  Pleasonton  took  to  the  knoll  for  a  post  of  observation, 
regardless  of  the  enemy's  shells,  which  flew  like  a  flock  of  pigeons 
past  our  battery.     On  the  lower  ground  in  front  very  sharp  skir 
mishing  ensued,  our  men  in  turn  adopting  the  stone-wall  manoeuvre. 
There  was  no  word  as  yet  of  the  Kelly's  ford  column,  and   our 
own  progress  toward  Brandy  Station  had  been  greatly  delayed;  but 
nothing  could  be  done  to  get  on  faster  until  our  right  wras  relieved 
from  the  pressure  of  the  enemy  toward  Beverly  ford. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BEVERLY  FORD.  Ul 

As  soon,  therefore,  as  General  Buford  had  everything  arranged 
to  his  satisfaction,  he  ordered  the  reserve  brigade  to  advance,  and 
ground  was  quickly  gained  on  our  right  from  wall  to  Avail,  and  from 
knoll  to  knoll,  the  enemy  abandoning  all  their  positions  threatening 
the  ford,  and  retiring  up  the  open  fields  beyond  the  woods,  on  a  line 
parallel  with  the  position  of  their  troops  at  St.  James'  Church.  The 
ground  over  which  they  passed  is  rolling,  and  admirably  adapted  for 
cavalrv  movements.  A  conspicuous  object  in  landscape  was  a  large 
brick  house,  to  which  the  whirligig  of  war  brought  ns  for  a  head 
quarters  in  the  following  winter,  and  on  reaching  this  house,  to 
follow  the  direction  of  the  enemy's  retreat,  our  men  bore  to  the  left, 
and  still  advanced  through  open  country,  a  ridge  of  high  open  ground 
on  their  right,  and  woods  for  the  most  part  on  their  left.  Leaving 
General  Buford  to  push  on  as  rapidly  as  possible,  General  Pleasonton 
now  rode  to  St.  James'  Church,  where  all  was  quiet,  with  no  enemy 
in  sight.  Toward  Brandy  Station  a  high  hill  confronted  us,  shutting 
oil'  all  view  in  that  direction,  but  Buford's  success  now  made  it  possi 
ble  to  resume  the  march,  which  was  about  to  be  done,  when  General 
Greufg  rode  into  our  lines  from  the  left,  reporting  the  results  of  the 
operations  of  the  Kelly's  ford  column,  so  far  as  he  was  himself  aware 
of  them.  1  have  no  reason  to  question  the  entire  accuracy  of  Major 
McClellan's  spirited  account  of  these,  and  it  is  confirmed  from  various 
other  trustworthy  sources.  Before  reaching  Brandy  Station,  ( Colonel 
.DufHe  had  turned  to  his  left,  hoping  to  accomplish  something  in  the 
enemy's  rear.  Xear  Stevcnsburg  he  encountered  a  force  of  cavalrv, 
which  was  charged — the  First  Massachusetts  and  Third  Pennsylvania 
Cavalry  in  advance — and  driven  through  and  beyond  Stevensburg  in 
disorder,  as  Major  McClellan  himself  avows,  with  all  possible  candor. 
Here  Colonel  Duftie  paused,  distrusting,  no  doubt,  his  isolation  from 
the  main  body  of  the  Kelly's  ford  column.  General  Gregg  had 
advanced  directly  upon  Brandy  Station  without  opposition,  and 
thence  to  the  kk  Fleetwood  hill/'  where  Stuart  made  hasty  prepara 
tions  to  receive  him.  Fleetwood  hill  is  a  ridge  of  ground,  half  a 
mile  from  Brandy  Station,  toward  the  Ilappahannock,  and  west  of 
the  railroad.  St.  James'  Church  is  on  the  river  side  of  the  hill,  and 
Buford  was  now  working  his  way  up  to  it  from  that  side  also  ;  hence 
while  the  Beverly  ford  column  was  approaching  it  from  one  side, 
Gregg  had  been  moving  on  it  from  the  other,  neither  column  having 
knowledge,  however,  of  the  other's  movements,  whereby  Stuart 
escaped  the  consequences  supposed  to  arise  from  being  between  two 
tires.  The  disadvantage  of  operations  from  without  inward,  to 
which  I  have  alluded,  is  here  made  manifest  on  our  side,  while  Stuart 


142  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

by  his  own  position  and  the  nature  of  our  disjointed  attack,  was 
enabled  to  concentrate  his  force  within  a  very  limited  field  on  and 
near  Fleetwood  hill,  permitting  a  swift  reinforcement  of  the  most 
endangered  points,  his  men  fighting,  as  it  were,  back  to  back,  while 
ours  were  so  widely  scattered.  Gregg  gained  this  hill  and  the  house 
that  surmounted  it,  and  a  fierce  fight  was  brought  on,  writh  charges 
and  counter-charges,  at  the  end  of  which  Gregg  found  himself 
overmatched,  and  withdrew  to  the  low  ground  again,  losing  as  he 
fell  back  three  pieces  of  artillery,  after  a  desperate  effort  to  save 
them,  as  Major  McClellan  describes. 

It  would,  perhaps,  have  been  better  if  General  Gregg,  post 
poning  his  attack,  had  borne  to  his  right  from  Brandy  Station  until 
he  came  into  connection  with  the  Beverly  ford  column,  but  he  could 
not  certainly  know  this  at  the  time,  and  seeing  an  opportunity  to  attack 
the  enemy  in  front  of  him  he  availed  himself  of  it  like  the  good 
soldier  that  he  was.  It  was  after  his  own  repulse  that  he  was  rejoined 
by  Colonel  Duffie,  and  meantime  the  enemy  were  pouring  infantry 
into  Brandy  Station  by  railroad  from  Culpepper  Court-House,  intro 
ducing  a  new  but  not  unexpected  element  to  General  Pleasonton's 
consideration.  "When  Gregg  reported  all  this  to  General  Pleasonton 
at  St.  James'  Church,  all  that  was  necessary  to  the  purposes  of 
General  Hooker  had  been  fully  accomplished;  the  information 
required  had  been  secured  with  unmistakable  accuracy  from  personal 
observation  and  from  the  official  documents  captured  on  the  field,  as 
related  by  Major  McClellan.  There  was  nothing  to  demand  any 
further  effort  on  General  Pleasonton's  part,  and  in  view  of  the 
approach  of  the  enemy's  infantry  he  determined  to  recross  the  river 
without  further  delay.  He  ordered  General  Gregg  to  retire  by  way 
of  Rappahannock  Station  with  the  whole  of  the  Kelly's  ford  column, 
thus  bringing  those  troops  within  supporting  distance  of  the  other 
column  on  its  return  to  Beverly  ford.  General  Gregg  left  us  to 
comply  with  this  order,  and  it  is  only  necessary  to  say  further  in 
regard  to  his  column  that  it  was  not  molested  on  its  march  to 
Rappahannock  Station,  and  that  it  crossed  the  river  there  in  safety, 
accompanied  by  Russell's  Brigade  of  Infantry,  which,  as  a  precaution 
ary  measure  to  protect  the  lower  fords,  had  hugged  the  river  bank  all 
day,  and  so  far  as  I  know  had  not  exchanged  shots  with  the  enemy 
at  all.  General  Pleasonton  at  the  same  time  began  the  withdrawal 
of  the  cavalry  and  infantry  from  St.  James'  Church,  and  as  it  hap 
pened  that  I  was  dispatched  by  him  with  orders  to  General  Buford 
to  give  up  his  attack  and  retire  to  Beverly  ford,  I  am  able  to  speak 
positively  as  to  the  last  events  of  the  day  on  our  right. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BEVERLY  FORD.  143 

When  I  had  been  last  with  General  Buford,  he  had  just  passed 
the  brick  house  which  I  spoke  of  as  being  a  landmark  in  the  open 
fields  above  Beverly  ford,  on  our  right,  and  bearing  then  to  his  left, 
was  advancing.     The  ground  in  front  of  him  was  open  for  a  long 
distance,  as  I  have  described,  and  had  the  appearance  of  a  valley, 
flanked  as  it  was  by  a  ridge  on  one  hand  and  woods  on  the  other. 
On  arriving  now  at  the  brick  house,  I  saw  Buford' s  troops  engaged 
on  high  ground  at  the  extreme  end  of  the  valley,  in  the  edge  of  a 
wood,  and  I  should  say  some  two  miles  or  more  from  the  river,    lie 
was  entirely  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the  command  with  Pleasonton 
and  Gregg ;  but  paying  no  undue  attention  to  that  fact,  was  fighting 
straight  on.     As  I  rode  rapidly  up  the  valley,  I  met  with  a  stream 
of  wounded  men  flowing  to  the  rear,  and  the  rattle  of  carbines  in 
front  was  incessant.     On  reaching  the  plateau  at  the  end   of  the 
valley,  I  found  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Regulars  massed  in  column, 
mounted,  on  the  open  hillside,  suffering  somewhat  from  the  enemy's 
lire  from  the  woods  at  the  top  of  the  hill  on  their  front  and  right, 
but  not  replying.     They  were  perfectly  firm  and  steady  in  the  ranks, 
and  under  no  pressure  whatever,  waiting  apparently  for  orders  to 
advance.     I  inquired  for  General  Buford,  but  could  not  learn  where 
he  was,  and  though  it  seemed  hardly  possible  that  he  should  be  in 
the  midst  of  the  fierce,  almost  hand-to-hand  fight,  which  was  raging 
in  the  edge  of  the  woods,  he  had  to  be  found,  and  I  could  see  neither 
him  nor  any  of  his  staff  in  the  open.     It  was  but  a  few  yards  nip  the 
hill  to  the  troops  who  were  actually  engaged,  and  as  I  rode  among 
them  I  found  myself  with  my  own  regiment,  the  Sixth  .Pennsylvania 
Cavalry,  and  at  that  moment  the  adjutant,  Lieutenant  Rudolph  Ellis, 
was  severely  wounded,  and  turned  his  horse  down  the  hill.     I  said  a 
word  to  him,   and  was  then  immediately  confronted  by   Captain 
Wesley  Merritt,  commanding  the  Second  Regulars,  who  was  dashing 
through  the  woods  without  a  hat,  having  just  lost  it  by  a  sabre  cut. 
lie  was  rewarded  for  his  conspicuous  gallantry  on  this  day,  and  soon 
became  a  brigadier  general ;  then,  like  Ouster,  a  major  general  in 
good  time,  and  one  of  the  ablest  and  best  of  our  cavalry  commanders 
to  the  end  of  the  war. 

Of  Merritt  and  Ellis  and  a  dozen  more,  I  inquired  in  vain  for 
General  Buford.  ISTo  one  knew  anything  of  him,  but  the  fight  went 
on  briskly  all  the  same.  Hurrying  back  then  to  the  troops  in  the 
open,  I  reported  to  Major  Whiting,  of  the  Second  Regulars,  the 
senior  officer  present  with  the  brigade,  that  I  had  a  pressing  order 
from  General  Pleasonton  for  General  Buford  to  retire  at  once,  but 
he  could  not  be  found,  and  I  asked  Major  Whiting  if  lie  would 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

accept  the  order  and  act  on  it.  This  he  declined  to  do  ;  but  at  that 
moment  I  caught  sight  of  a  group  of  officers  on  a  bare  hill  to  the 
left  and  in  front  of  Major  Whiting's  position,  and  galloping  there, 
found  General  Bnford  with  his  staff.  I  informed  him  of  General 
Pleasonton's  order,  and  as  he  proceeded  to  cany  it  into  effect,  I 
remained  with  him  long  enough  to  see  that  he  had  no  difficulty  in 
withdrawing,  and  that  as  his  troops  fell  back  they  were  permitted  to 
go  in  peace.  On  returning  to  General  Pleasonton,  wlio  was  en  route 
to  Beverly  ford  with  the  troops  from  St.  James'  Church,  and  no 
enemy  in  pursuit,  I  was  ordered  to  post  a  regiment  of  Ames' 
infantry  on  the  skirt  of  the  woods  below  the  red  brick  house,  in 
case  of  need  for  Buford's  support ;  but  Buford  came  along  serenely 
at  a  moderate  walk,  and  this  infantry  regiment  had  no  occasion  to 
fire  a  shot,  the  pursuit  of  Buford  by  the  enemy  being  a  mere 
following,  as  if  for  observation.  The  greater  part  of  the  troops 
from  St.  James'  Church  were  by  this  time  safely  recrossed  at  Bev 
erly  ford  to  the  north  bank  of  the  Kappahannock,  and  the  head  of 
Buford's  column  had  nearly  reached  the  river ;  a  few  moments  later, 
when  the  First  Regulars,  who  had  been  absent  all  day  from  the  fig] it 
on  some  detached  duty,  came  plunging  through  the  ford  from  the 
northern  side  to  offer  their  services  if  needed.  General  Pleasonton 
ordered  Captain  Lord,  commanding  the  regiment,  to  cover  the  ford 
until  Buford's  column  and  the  last  of  the  infantry  had  passed  the 
river;  and  in  obedience  to  this  order,  Captain  Lord  deployed  his 
whole  regiment  as  mounted  skirmishers  on  a  long  line,  which  had 
for  its  centre  the  knoll  where  our  artillery  had  been  posted  in  the 
morning.  The  sun  had  now  set,  but  there  was  a  mellow  light  on 
the  fields,  and  the  figures  of  Lord's  troopers  stood  boldly  out  against 
the  background  of  yellow  sky  above  the  horizon.  Occasionally  the 
dust  would  fly  from  the  ground  between  the  horses  where  a  bullet 
struck,  and  there  was  a  scattering  fire  kept  up  by  Lord's  regiment, 
but  he  did  not  lose  a  man.  Meantime  our  guns  were  unlimbered  on 
the  bluff  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  awaiting  the  enemy's 
appearance,  and  at  this  commanding  point  a  large  group  of  officers 
was  gathered,  including  General  Pleasonton  and  all  his  staff,  who 
watched  with  interest  the  closing  scene  of  the  long  clay's  action  of 
Beverly  ford.  There  could  not  be  a  prettier  sight,  and  it  was  often 
recalled  among  us.  The  river  flowed  beneath  us  ;  as  far  as  we  could 
see  to  right  and  left  on  the  southern  bank  no  living  object  was 
visible ;  the  plain  and  woods  in  front  of  us  were  growing  misty,  but 
the  burnished  and  glowing  horizon  threw  everything  on  high  ground 
into  wonderful  relief.  Where  the  skirmishers  of  Lord's  undulating 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BEVERLY  FOED.  145 

line  rose  to  the  crest  of  the  knoll,  we  could  see  even  their  features 
when  turned  in  profile.  The  commands  were  all  by  bugle,  and  the 
notes  came  to  us  distinctly  from  the  skirmish  line  until,  no  other 
troops  of  ours  remaining  on  that  side,  the  rally  was  sounded,  and 
then  the  retreat,  and  the  regiment  trotted  down  to  the  ford  and 
crossed  it,  entirely  unmolested  by  the  enemy,  who,  if  they  advanced 
to  the  river  at  all,  were  lost  to  us  in  the  twilight  and  darkness  which 
soon  came  on.  Considering  the  distance  from  the  river  to  which 
our  troops  had  penetrated,  and  that  the  various  columns,  widely 
separated  though  they  were,  withdrew  from  their  advanced  positions 
and  recrossed  the  Rappahannoek  without  the  slightest  interruption 
from  the  enemy,  I  feel  justified  in  denying  that  we  were  ''driven 
across  the  river,"  although  it  was  so  reported  by  General  Lee  to  the 
authorities  at  Richmond. 

I  have  not  attempted  to  dispute  with  Major  McClcllan  as  to  the 
numbers  in  action,  for  such  an  argument  is  always  unprofitable.  A\re 
had  all  our  available  cavalry,  and  so  had  Stuart;  and  no  doubt  the 
numbers  opposed  were  very  nearly  equal,  though  on  neither  side  was 
the  full  force  seriously  engaged  at  one  time,  while  on  both  sides  the 
moral  cil'ect  of  infantry  supports  was  the  principal  benefit  derived 
from  that  source.  There  is  no  question  that  the  action  began  in 
mutual  surprise,  in  the  sense  of  unexpectedness.  Regarding  the 
operations  of  the  Kelly's  ford  column,  and  the  occurrences  in  front 
of  St.  James'  Church,  there  is  no  dispute;  and  it  is  only  by  implica 
tion  that  Major  McClellan  ascribes  Ruford's  sudden  withdrawal  from 
our  right  to  an  actual  repulse.  On  this  point,  following  Major 
McClellaii's  example  in  other  instances,  I  have  thought  it  proper  to 
speak  from  my  personal  knowledge.  Military  history  could  not 
expect  an  easier  task  than  to  reconcile  our  narratives;  and  it  is  only 
with  a  view  to  historic  accuracy  that  I  have  denied  the  general  terms 
of  the  official  reports  on  his  side  that  we  were  "driven  across  the 
river;"  a  statement  which,  being  incorrect,  may  as  well  be  corrected. 
The  objects  hoped  to  be  gained  by  the  reconnoissance  were  for  once 
fully  realized.  The  incidental  fighting  was  very  creditable  to  both 
sides,  and  it  is  simply  a  matter  of  fact,  from  which  I  argue  nothing, 
that  the  nature  of  the  fight  was  on  our  side  more  difficult  than  on 
Stuart's.  The  progress  of  the  engagement  brought  him  constantly 
into  better  position,  enabling  him  to  concentrate  his  troops  within  a 
very  limited  area  around  Flcetwood  hill,  while  ours  were  operating 
from  opposite  points  of  the  compass.  If  there  was  a  sense  of  victory 
remaining  with  Stuart's  men,  it  was  natural  on  their  seeing  our  men 
withdraw  to  the  fords  and  recross  the  river;  but  there  was  not  the 
10 


146  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

slightest  sense  of  defeat  on  our  side  at  nightfall,  and  the  ultimate 
effects  of  the  engagement  were  overwhelmingly  in  our  favor. 

The  results  of  the  battle  of  Beverly  ford  were  manifold.  It 
provided  information  which  enabled  General  Hooker  to  move  in 
good  time  to  keep  pace  with  Lee's  army  of  invasion  en  route  to 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania ;  it  chilled  the  ardor  of  Stuart's  men, 
delaying  his  march,  and,  in  fact,  ruinjng  his  plans,  which  had  soared 
high ;  it  enabled  General  Pleasonton  to  anticipate  him  on  the  east  flank 
of  the  Blue  Ridge  as  he  marched  toward  the  Potomac,  and  to  hold 
him  in  check  by  the  well-fought  battles  of  Aldie,  Middleburg  and 
Upperville,  on  the  17th,  19th  and  21st  of  June,  until  Hooker's  main 
army,  followed  by  our  cavalry,  was  north  of  the  river,  causing  sub 
sequent  bewilderment  and  anxiety  to  General  Lee  throughout  the 
campaign  to  the  very  eve  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  In  his  official 
report  General  Lee  declares  that  on  the  27th  of  June,  while  his  own 
army  was  at  Chambersburg,  "  no  report  had  been  received  that  the 
Federal  army  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  the  absence  of  the 
cavalry  rendered  it  impossible  to  obtain  accurate  information," 
though  at  this  date  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  already  at  Fred 
erick  City,  Maryland.  Again  he  says:  "By  the  route  Stuart 
pursued  the  Federal  army  was  interposed  between  his  command  and 
our  main  body.  The  march  toward  Gettysburg  was  conducted  more 
slowly  than  it  would  have  been  had  the  position  of  the  Federal  army 
been  known."  And,  again,  he  mournfully  reports:  "It  had  not 
been  intended  to  fight  a  general  battle  at  such  a  distance  from  our 
base,  unless  attacked  by  the  enemy;  but,  finding  ourselves  unex 
pectedly  confronted  by  the  Federal  army,  it  became  a  matter  of 
difficulty  to  withdraw  through  the  mountains  with  our  large  trains." 
All  this  gain  for  our  side  and  loss  for  General  Lee  sprang  directly 
from  the  battle  of  Beverly  ford  and  the  consequent  cavalry  opera 
tions  on  the  eastern  flank  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  south  of  the  Potomac. 
It  would  be  difficult  to  find  in  history  the  record  of  a  cavalry  battle 
or  any  battle  of  similar  numbers  on  each  side  so  fruitful  of  immediate, 
decisive  results. 


FLIGHT  AND  CAPTURE  OF  JEFFERSON  DA  VIS. 


BY    HON.    JOHN    II.    REAGAN. 


ON  my  return  home,  after  an" 
absence  of  a  month,  I  find 
your  letter  of  July  17th,  in 
closing  a  communication  from 
General  James  IF.  Wilson  to 
the  Philadelphia  WEEKLY 
TIMES,  headed  "  Jefferson 
Davis'  Flight  from  Rich 
mond."  You  asked  me  to 
H  "  •  '-\  inform  you  how  much  truth 

t«^Bi^^H^^A .  ^ 

there  is  in  the  statement  of 
General  Wilson,  and  say  that 
you  desire  my  answer  for 
'publication,  and  request  me 
to  make  it  full.  My  answer 
is  at  your  disposal,  and  may 
be  published  or  not,  as  you  think  best.  I  will  answer  this  article  as 
well  as  1  can  remember  the  facts  at  this  date,  and  those  which  are 
material,  so  far  as  they  come  to  my  knowledge,  were  doubtless  so 
impressed  on  my  mind  by  the  deep  interest  of  the  occasion  that  they 
will  not  be  forgotten.  I  have  in  the  outset  to  say  that  General 
Wilson  must  have  written  his  statement  from  information  derived 
from  others,  as  he  could  not  personally  have  known  the  facts  about 
which  he  writes;  and  that  he  has  either  adopted  the  fanciful  fiction 
of  others,  who  know  as  little  of  the  real  facts  as  himself,  or  he  has 
been  egregiously  imposed  on.  I  have  read  the  slip  you  send  me 
twice  carefully  over;  and  if  there  is  a  single  truth  in  it,  outside  of 
the  great  historical  facts  incidentally  referred  to,  of  the  fall  of 
Richmond  and  the  surrender  of  General  Lee,  I  have  not  discovered 
it.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  made  up  of  statements  which  are  utterly 
void  of  truth.  I  will  call  attention  to  some  of  them. 

The  statement  has  been  made  by  General  Wilson,  as  it  has  been 
made  in  many  other  newspaper  articles,  that  "  On  the  first  Sunday 
in  April,  1865,  while  seated  in  St.  Paul's  church,  in  Richmond, 

(147) 


148  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Jefferson  Davis  received  a  telegram  from  Lee  announcing  the  fall  of 
Petersburg,  the  partial  destruction  of  his  army,  and  the  immediate 
necessity  of  flight."  On  that  point  I  make  this  statement :  "  On 
the  Sunday  referred  to,  I  went  by  the  War  Department  on  my  way 
to  church.  When  at  the  department  I  was  informed  of  two 
dispatches  just  received  from  General  Lee,  stating  briefly  the 
circumstances  which  made  it  necessary  for  him  to  withdraw  his 
army  from  its  position  in  front  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg  at 
seven  o'clock  that  evening,  and  that  it  would  be  necessary  for  the 
government  archives  and  public  property  to  be  removed  at  once. 
On  receiving  this  intelligence,  not  knowing  that  Mr.  Davis  had 
already  received  it,  I  walked  toward  his  residence,  which  was  a  few 
hundred  yards  off,  to  confer  with  him  about  it,  and  on  the  way  met 
him  and  Governor  Lubbock,  of  his  staff.  We  three  then  walked  on 
to  the  Executive  office.  He  then  assembled  his  Cabinet,  and  sent 
for  the  Governor  of  Virginia  and  the  Mayor  of  Richmond.  Direc 
tions  were  then  given  to  prepare  the  public  archives  for  removal, 
and  measures  were  considered  and  directions  given  to  secure,  as  far 
as  practicable,  good  order  and  safety  to  persons  and  property  in  the 
city  until  it  should  be  surrendered.  In  this  paper  it  is  also  said  that, 
"Although  he  (Mr.  Davis)  could  not  have  been  entirely  unprepared 
for  this  intelligence,  it  appears  that  he  did  not  receive  it  with  self- 
possession  or  dignity,  but  with  tremulous  and  nervous  haste  ;  like  a 
weak  man  in  the  hour  of  misfortune,  he  left  the  house  of  worship 
and  hurried  home,  where  he  and  his  more  resolute  wife  spent  the 
rest  of  the  day  in  packing  their  personal  baggage."  And  it  is 
added  that,  "  Those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  personal  character 
of  Mrs.  Davis  can  readily  imagine  with  what  energy  and  determina 
tion  she  must  have  prepared  her  family  for  flight,"  etc.  And  that, 
"They  may  believe,  too,  that  although  heartsick  and  disgusted, 
there  was  nothing  irresolute  or  vacillating  in  her  actions." 

I  would  express  my  surprise,  if  I  could  be  surprised  now  by 
anything  of  this  kind,  that  such  a  statement  should  come  from  any 
respectable  source.  Now,  the  truth  is,  Mr.  Davis  did  not,  "with 
tremulous  and  nervous  haste,  hurry  home  to  his  more  resolute  wife." 
From  where  I  met  him  he  went  directly  to  the  Executive  office, 
where  he  remained  nearly  all  day,  and,  if  I  remember  right,  a  part 
of  the  night,  looking  after  and  giving  directions  in  relation  to  public 
affairs,  and  seeming  to  take  no  notice  of  his  private  matters.  He  did 
not  go  to  where  his  wife  was,  or  act  wTith  her  in  preparing  for  flight ; 
for  neither  she  nor  their  children  were  in  Richmond,  or  had  been 
for  three  or  four  weeks  before  that  time.  And  I  am  sure  there  is 


FLIGHT  AND  CAPTURE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS.  149 

no  man  who  saw  Mr.  Davis  on  that  trying  occasion  but  was  impressed 
with  his  calm  and  manly  dignity,  his  devotion  to  the  public  interest, 
and  his  courage.  It  is  apparent  that  one  object  of  this  statement  is 
to  try  to  produce  the  impression  that  Mr.  Davis,  in  the  hour  of 
extreme  peril,  had  forgotten  his  great  office  and  trust,  and  descended 
to  the  care  of  his  personal  baggage  while  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  was  dissolving;  and  that  another  of  its  objects  was  to  show 
that,  on  this  great  occasion,  he  was  irresolute,  tremulous,  nervous, 
and  wanting  in  self-possession  and  dignity.  Nothing  could  be 
further  from  the  truth  ;  and  I  venture  the  statement  that  there  is 
no  one  who  saw  him  then,  or  who  knew  his  character,  who  would 
not  unhesitatingly  contradict  such  a  statement ;  and  I  venture  the 
further  suggestion  that  neither  of  these  charges  will  ever  be  sus 
tained,  nor  will  any  attempt  ever  be  made  to  sustain  them  by  any 
legitimate  or  trustworthy  evidence,  and  that  no  man  will  make  such 
charges  who  has  respect  for  truth  and  a  just  regard  for  his  own 
reputation.  It  is  just  for  me  to  say  that  early  in  the  war  Mr.  Davis 
allowed  all  his  property  to  be  destroyed  or  carried  away  from  where 
it  was  in  Mississippi  without  making  any  effort  to  save  it,  and  the 
fact  was  then  noted  as  an  evidence  of  his  entire  unselfishness.  It  is 
further  said  in  this  paper  that,  "At  nightfall  everything  was  in 
readiness.  Even  the  gold  still  remaining  in  the  Treasury,  not  exceed 
ing  in  all  $-40,000,  was  packed  away  among  the  baggage,"  etc,  If 
it  is  meant  by  this  statement  simply  that  the  money  in  the  Treasury, 
gold  and  all,  was  taken  with  the  archives  and  public  property  away 
from  Richmond  by  the  proper  department  officers,  the  statement  is 
correct ;  but  if  it  is  meant  by  this  insidious  form  of  a  statement  to 
be  understood  that  this  or  anv  other  public  money  was  taken  from 
Richmond  in  Mr.  Davis'  baggage,  then  the  statement  is  wholly 
untrue. 

It  is  also  said  in  this  paper,  when  speaking  of  the  train  which 
carried  Mr.  Davis  and  other  officers  from  Richmond,  that,  "  This 
train,  it  is  said,  was  one  which  had  carried  provisions  to  Amelia 
Court-House  for  Lee's  hard-pressed  and  hungry  army,  and  having 
been  ordered  to  Richmond,  had  taken  these  supplies  to  that  place, 
where  they  were  abandoned  for  a  more  ignoble  freight."  This 
whole  paragraph  is  ridiculously  absurd.  Xo  supplies  were  then 
being  carried  from  the  South  toward  Richmond — I  mean  after  Lee's 
retreat  began.  And  it  was  a  train  of  passenger,  and  not  of  freight 
cars,  which  carried  the  persons  referred  to,  and  was  provided  for  the 
express  purpose  of  carrying  them  off.  General  Wilson  also  says : 
"It  is  stated,  upon  what  appears  good  authority,  that  Davis  had, 


150  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

many  weeks  before  Lee's  catastrophe,  made  the  careful  and  exacting 
preparations  for  his  escape,  discussing  the  matter  fully  with  his 
Cabinet  in  profound  secrecy,  and  deciding  that,  in  order  to  secure 
the  escape  of  himself  and  his  principal  officers,  the  '  Shenandoah ' 
should  be  ordered  to  cruise  off  the  coast  of  Florida  to  take  the  fugi 
tives  aboard.  These  orders  were  sent  to  the  rebel  cruiser  many 
days  before  Lee's  lines  were  broken,"  etc.  If  the  writer  believed 
he  had  respectable  authority  for  so  important  a  statement,  why  did 
he  not  advise  his  readers  what  his  authority  was?  No  such  question, 
nor  any  other  question  as  to  the  means  of  escape,  or  as  to  instructions 
to  the  "  Shenandoah  "  to  facilitate  such  an  escape,  was  ever  considered 
by  the  Cabinet ;  nor,  so  far  as  I  know  or  believe,  was  any  such  ques 
tion  considered  or  discussed  with  any  member  of  the  Cabinet.  I  do 
not  believe  that  any  such  subject  was  considered  or  discussed  by  Mr. 
Davis  or  any  member  of  his  Cabinet  at  any  time,  before  or  after  the 
surrender  of  General  Lee.  JS'or  do  I  believe  that  any  man  who 
regards  his  reputation  for  truth  will  allow  himself  to  be  given  as 
authority  for  this  statement. 

In  confirmation  of  this  view,  I  may  state  that  when  Mr.  Davis 
was  informed  that  General  Sherman  would  allow  him  to  leave  the 
United  States  on  a  United  States  vessel,  with  whoever  or  whatever 
he  pleased  to  take  with  him,  his  reply  was  that  he  would  do  no  act 
which  would  place  him  under  obligations  to  the  Federal  Government, 
and  that  he  would  not  leave  Confederate  soil  while  there  was  a 
Confederate  regiment  on  it.  I  referred  to  this  afterward  in 
conversation  with  Mr.  Davis,  and  he  told  me  I  would  remember 
that  he  was  one  of  the  Senators  who  refused  to  vote  the  honors  of 
the  United  States  Senate  to  General  Ivossuth,  and  that  his  reason  was 
that  Kossuth  abandoned  Hungary,  and  left  an  army  behind  him. 
I  may  also  mention  that  after  this  General  Breckenridge  and  myself 
proposed  that  we  should  take  what  troops  we  had  with  us  and  go 
westward,  crossing  the  Chattahoochie  between  Atlanta  and  Chatta 
nooga,  and  get  as  many  of  them  across  the  Mississippi  as  we  could, 
and  in  the  meantime  keep  up  the  impression  that  Mr.  Davis  was 
with  us,  and  for  him  to  go  to  the  coast  of  Florida  and  cross  to  Cuba, 
and  charter  a  vessel  under  the  English  flag  and  go  to  Brownsville, 
Texas,  and  thence  return  and  meet  us  to  the  west  of  the  Mississippi. 
He  refused  to  assent  to  this  plan,  on  the  ground  that  he  would  not 
abandon  Confederate  soil.  I  ought  to  add  that  we  were  influenced 
to  make  this  suggestion,  because  we  thought  him  so  exhausted  and 
enfeebled  that  we  did  not  think  he  could  make  the  trip  by  land  to 
where  it  was  hoped  to  embody  the  troops  west  of  the  Mississippi. 


FLIGHT  AND   CAPTURE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS,  151 

I  know,  too,  that  it  was  Mr.  Davis'  purpose  to  try  to  get  to  the  west 
of  the  Mississippi  before  our  troops  were  disbanded,  and  to  get 
together  as  many  as  we  could,  he  hoped  sixty  or  eighty  thousand, 
and  place  them  where  they  and  their  horses  could  be  subsisted  on 
the  beef  and  grass  of  Texas,  and  where  they  could  not  be  flanked  by 
railroads  and  navigable  rivers,  and  there  to  try  and  hold  out  for 
better  terms  than  unconditional  surrender. 

From  all  this  it  will  be  seen  how  absurdly  untrue  the  statement 
of  General  AVilson  is.  The  following  passage  is  found  in  his  paper: 
"When  Davis  and  his  companions  left  Richmond,  in  pursuance  of 
this  plan,  they  believed  that  Lee  could  avoid  surrender  only  a  short 
time  longer.  A  few  days  thereafter  the  news  of  this  expected 
ealamnity  reached  them,  when  they  turned  their  faces  again  toward 
the  south.  ]>recken ridge,  the  Secretary  of  "War,  was  sent  to  confer 
with  Johnston,  but  found  him  only  in  time  to  assist  in  drawing  up 
the  terms  of  his  celebrated  capitulation  to  Sherman.  The  intelligence 
of  this  event  caused  the  rebel  chieftain  to  renew  his  flight,  but  while 
hurrying  onward  some  fatuity  induced  him  to  change  his  plans,  and 
to  adopt  the  alternative  of  trying  to  push  through  to  the  southwest," 
etc.  I  have  answered  so  much  of  this  as  refers  to  the  supposed  plan 
of  escape.  The  writer  seems  to  have  been  in  the  same  predicament 
as  many  others  have  been,  who  have  sought  to  force  or  to  make  facts 
to  suit  fanciful  theories.  Mr.  Davis  and  his  Cabinet  were  not,  when 
they  left  Richmond,  laboring  under  the  belief  that  General  Lee 
could  avoid  surrendering  only  a  short  time.  It  was  still  hoped  at 
that  time  that  Generals  Lee  and  Johnston  might  be  able  to  unite 
their  armies  at  some  point  between  the  armies  of  Generals  Grant  and 
Sherman,  and  turn  upon  and  defeat  one  of  them,  and  take  their 
chances  for  defeating  the  other  by  lighting  them  in  detail.  If  I  knew 
then  where  the  "  Shenandoah  "  was,  I  have  now  forgotten,  and  I 
certainly  never  heard  the  subject  mentioned  of  an  intended  or 
desired  escape  from  the  country  by  her. 

I  think  I  am  entirely  safe  in  saying  that  neither  Mr.  Davis  nor 
any  member  of  his  Cabinet  contemplated  leaving  the  country  when 
we  left  Richmond,  but  two  of  them  afterward  determined  to  do  so. 
And  I  do  not  believe  that  Mr.  Davis  or  any  other  member  of  his 
Cabinet  afterward  desired  to  leave  the  country.  Mr.  Trenholm, 
prostrated  by  a  long  and  dangerous  illness,  resigned  his  position  as 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  while  we  were  on  our  way  south,  and 
went  to  his  home.  Mr.  Mallory,  Secretary  of  the  Xavy,  and  Mr. 
Davis,  Attorney  General,  went  to  their  homes,  and  all  of  them 
remained  there  until  put  under  arrest  by  the  authority  of  the 


152  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

United  States.  Mr.  Davis  and  myself  were  captured  while  endeav 
oring  to  make  our  way  to  the  west  of  the  Mississippi  for  the  purpose 
of  continuing  the  struggle  there,  if  practicable,  long  enough  to  get 
better  terms.  General  Breckenridge  was  not  sent  to  confer  with 
General  Johnston  as  soon  as  Mr.  Davis  heard  of  the  surrender  of 
General  Lee,  if  that  is  what  the  writer  means  to  assert.  Mr.  Davis 
and  his  Cabinet  remained  at  Danville,  Virginia,  for  several  days 
after  being  informed  of  the  surrender  of  General  Lee,  and  then  went 
to  Greensboro',  North  Carolina,  where  they  remained  a  week  or  two. 
It  was  after  we  had  left  Greensboro'  for  Charlotte,  North  Carolina, 
and  had  gone  as  far  as  Lexington,  in  that  State,  that  Mr.  Davis 
received  a  dispatch  from  General  Johnston,  requesting  him  to  send 
him  assistance  in  his  negotiations  with  General  Sherman.  General 
Breckenridge  and  myself  were  then  sent  back  by  him  to  join 
General  Johnston  at  his  headquarters,  near  Hillsboro',  and  to  aid  him 
in  his  negotiations.  This  was  done  at  this  time,  and  at  the  suggestion 
of  General  Johnston,  and  not  as  soon  as  Mr.  Davis  heard  of  the 
surrender  of  General  Lee,  as  supposed  by  General  Wilson.  Much  as 
Mr.  Davis,  no  doubt,  respected  and  esteemed  General  Breckenridge, 
it  is  not  true  that  he  confided  his  hopes  to  him,  or  to  any  other  single 
person.  What  is  said  by  General  Wilson  about  the  "  last  council  of 
the  Confederacy,"  is,  no  doubt,  a  fancy  sketch,  intended  to  round  up 
handsomely  tins  fiction,  unrelieved  by  a  single  fact. 

If  the  writer  of  this  paper  is  Major  General  Wilson,  who  was  in 
command  at  Macon,  Georgia,  when  we  were  captured,  I  shall  regret 
that  he  has  allowed  himself  to  be  the  author  of  such  a  paper,  as  I 
felt,  and  still  feel,  under  obligations  to  him  for  a  personal  favor 
when  I  was  passing  that  place.  When  we  reached  Macon,  where  we 
remained  a  few  hours,  we  were  informed  that  Mr.  Davis  and  Mr. 
Clay,  of  Alabama,  who  were  there,  would  be  sent  on  to  Washington 
City,  and  that  I  and  the  other  prisoners  were  to  remain  there.  At 
my  own  request,  I  saw  General  Wilson,  and  applied  to  him  to  have 
the  order  so  modified  as  to  allow  me  to  go  on  with  Mr.  Davis.  I 
based  this  request  on  the  ground  that  Mr.  Davis  was  worn  down  by 
his  labors,  and  in  feeble  health ;  that  I  was  the  only  member  of  his 
Cabinet  with  him,  and  I  hoped  to  be  of  some  service  to  him ;  and  as 
we  had  been  together  through  the  conflict,  I  desired  to  share  his 
fortunes  whatever  they  might  be.  After  some  remarks  by  him  about 
the  danger  I  would  invoke  on  myself,  and  my  reply  that  I  had  fully 
considered  all  that,  he  said  that  he  would  see  if  the  order  could  not 
be  changed,  and  before  we  left  there  we  were  notified  that  we  were 
all  to  go  together.  While  I  regretted  that  some  others  were  sent  on, 
I  was  grateful  to  him  for  the  favor  done  me. 


FLIGHT  AND  CAPTURE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS.  153 

Since  writing  the  foregoing  the  Philadelphia  WEEKLY  TIMES, 
of  July  7th,  has  been  put  in  my  hands,  which  contains  what  I  suppose 
to  be  the  whole  of  General  Wilson's  letter.  Much  of  it  appears  to 
be  an  account  of  military  orders  and  of  military  operations  with 
which  he  was  connected,  and  about  which  I  have  no  personal  knowl 
edge.  What  I  wrote  above  had  only  reference  to  the  portion  of  his 
letter  which  was  then  before  me  (the  first  two  paragraphs  of  it),  and 
has  no  reference  to  what  he  afterward  says  about  military  operations 
His  paper  is  long  and  I  have  not  leisure  now  to  review  it  fully.  I 
will  say,  however,  that  he  is  in  error  as  to  many  of  his  statements  of 
facts,  and  as  to  many  of  his  conclusions  in  that  part  of  his  letter 
which  was  not  before  me  when  I  wrote  the  foregoing  pages.  For 
instance:  "lie  says  that  after  he  was  advised  by  General  Sherman 
of  the  armistice  which  was  entered  into  between  him  and  General 
Johnston,  and  that  one  of  its  provisions  was,  'that  neither  party 
should  make  any  change  of  troops  during  the  continuance  of  the 
armistice,' "  he  proceeds  with  this  further  statement :  u  Having 
heard  from  citizens,  however,  that  Davis,  instead  of  observing  the 
armistice,  was  making  his  way  toward  the  south  with  an  escort,  I 
took  possession  of  the  railroads  and  sent  scouts  in  all  directions  in 
order  that  I  might  receive  timely  notice  of  his  movements."  He 
then  confesses  to  having  violated  the  terms  of  the  armistice,  but 
excuses  himself  by  saying  that  lie  had  heard  from  citizens  that  Mr. 
Davis  was  violating  it  by  going  south  with  an  escort.  lie  says  the 
first  he  heard  of  the  armistice  was  from  Generals  Cobb  and  Smith, 
at  Mncon,  Georgia,  on  the  20th  day  of  April.  That  after  that  he 
was  advised  of  its  existence  by  General  Sherman,  and  that  it  was 
"intended  to  apply  to  my  [General  Wilson's]  command."  He  also 
says  that  in  a  short  time  he  was  informed  by  General  Sherman,  by 
telegram,  of  the  termination  of  hostilities,  and  surrender  of  General 
Johnston,  on  the  27th  of  April.  Xow  the  armistice  was  agreed  to 
on  the  isth  of  April,  and  on  the  24th  of  April  General  Sherman 
notified  General  Johnston  it  would  terminate  in  forty-eight  hours, 
leaving  the  parties  bound  by  its  terms  until  the  26th  of  April.  Mr. 
Davis  was  at  Charlotte  when  the  treaty  and  armistice  was  agreed  to. 
He  remained  there  under  the  terms  of  the  armistice  until  the  not'ice 
of  its  termination  was  given  ~by  General  Sherman,  and  until  the 
expiration  of  the  forty-eight  hours,  when  it  was  finally  terminated, 
and  did  not  leave  there  until  he  learned  of  the  surrender  of  General 
Johnston,  u'Jiich  took  place  on  the  27M  of  April. 

General  Wilson  says:  "The  first  direct  information  of  Mr. 
Davis'  movements  reached  me  on  the  23d  of  April,  from  a  citizen, 


154  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

now  a  prominent  lawyer  and  politician  of  Georgia,  who  had  seen 
him  at  Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  only  three  or  four  days  before,  and 
had  learned  that  he  was  on  his  way,  with  a  train  and  escort  of  cavalry, 
to  the  south."  This  citizen  may  have  seen  Mr.  Davis  at  the  time 
named  at  Charlotte.  But  if  he  did,  he  saw  him  halted  there,  awaiting 
the  result  of  the  negotiations  with  General  Sherman,  and  afterward 
the  termination  of  the  armistice,  until  the  27th  or  28th  of  April, 
with  perfect  good  faith  and  honor,  and  not  violating  a  solemn 
engagement,  always  binding  on  the  true  soldiers  and  honorable  men, 
as  General  Wilson  confesses  he  was,  after  he  had  been  notified  by 
General  Sherman  that  the  armistice  was  binding  on  him.  And  this 
violation  of  faith  was  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  Mr.  Davis  was  then 
struggling  with  defeat  and  disaster,  environed  on  all  sides  by  two 
overwhelming  forces  of  a  victorious  army;  while  General  "Wilson, 
by  his  own  statement,  knew  these  facts,  and  had  the  game  all  in  his 
own  hands,  and  would  have  been  in  no  danger  of  losing  any  of  his 
advantages  by  acting  in  good  faith.  I  leave  him  and  his  readers  to 
determine  whether  he  was  justified  in  such  a  breach  of  faith  by  idle 
rumors,  which  he  has  since  had  ample  time  and  opportunity  to  know 
were  untrue,  as  the  whole  history  of  this  affair  has  long  since  been 
within  his  reach.  There  is  a  statement  in  General  Wilson's  letter 
which  is  important  only  as  showing  how  the  most  minute  facts  can 
be  mis-stated,  where  the  error  can  by  any  means  cast  discredit  on 
Mr.  Davis.  He  states,  in  substance,  that  the  ferryman,  where  wre 
crossed  the  Ocmulgee  river,  had  told  Colonel  Harnden  that  we  had 
crossed  the  river  about  one  o'clock  in  the  morning.  This,  it  may 
have  been  supposed,  would  produce  the  belief  that  we  were  in 
precipitate  flight.  Now  the  truth  is  we  reached  that  river  -just  at 
dusk,  and  crossed  it  before  it  was  fully  dark,  and  that  Mr.  Davis  had 
made  his  regular  rides  since  leaving  Washington,  Georgia,  in  the 
day  and  rested  at  night,  with  the  single  exception  of  having  rode 
across  the  country,  north  of  the  Ocmulgee  river,  a  part  of  one  night, 
to  reach  and  protect  his  family,  whom  he  had  not  seen  for  several 
weeks,  against  threatened  evil.  There  is  one  other  statement  made 
by  General  Wilson  which  is  so  gross  a  perversion  of  the  truth  that  I 
must  quote  it  at  length  and  state  what  did  occur.  He  says: 
"  Shortly  after  the  recognition  of  Mr.  Davis  by  his  captors,  Colonels 
Pritchard  and  llarnden  rode  up  to  where  the  group  were  standing. 
Davis,  recognizing  them  as  officers,  asked  which  of  them  was  in 
command.  As  these  officers  were  lieutenant  colonels  of  different 
regiments,  belonging  to  different  brigades  of  different  divisions,  and 
had,  therefore,  probably  never  before  met,  except  casually,  much 


FLIGHT  AND   CAPTURE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS.  155 

less  compared  dates  of  commission,  they  were  somewhat  taken  aback 
at  the  question,  and  hesitated  what  answer  to  make.  Whereupon  Mr. 
Davis  upbraided  them  witli  ignorance,  reproached  them  with  unchiv- 
alrous  conduct  in  hunting  down  women  and  children,  and  finally  de 
clared  with  the  air  and  manners  of  a  braveo,  that  they  could  not  have 
caught  him  but  for  his  desire  to  'protect  his  women  and  children.' 
'I  low  would  you  have  prevented  it,  Mr.  Davis?'  said  Colonel 
Pritchard.  '  Why,  sir,  I  could  have  fought  you  or  eluded  you.'  '  As 
for  fighting  us,  we  came  prepared  for  that,'  replied  the  Colonel;  'it 
would  have  saved  us  some  trouble,  and,  doubtless,  you  a  good  deal ; 
but  as  for  eluding  us,  I  don't  think  your  garb  is  very  well  adapted  to 
rapid  locomotion.1 "" 

In  relation  to  this  statement  I  wish  to  say,  with  whatever  of 
emphasis  I  can  give  my  words,  that  I  was  present  at  the  time  Mr. 
Davis  and  Colonel  Pritchard  recognized  each  other,  as  was  also  Gov 
ernor  Lubbock,  and  that  there  is  not  one  truth  stated  in  this  whole 
paragraph.  Colonel  Pritchard  did  not  come  up  for  some  time  after 
Mr.  Davis  was  made  a  prisoner.  When  he  rode  up  there  was  a  crowd, 
chiefly  of  Federal  soldiers,  around  Mr.  Davis.  lie  was  standing  and 
dressed  in  the  suit  he  habitually  wore.  lie  turned  toward  Colonel 
Pritchard  and  asked:  "Who  commands  these  troops?"  Colonel 
Pritchard  replied,  without  hesitation,  that  he  did.  Mr.  Davis  said  to 
him  :  "  You  command  a  set  of  thieves  and  robbers.  They  rob  women 
and  children.'1  Colonel  Pritchard  then  said  :  kv  Mr.  Davis,  you  should 
remember  that  you  are  a  prisoner."  And  Mr.  Davis  replied  :  "  I  am 
fully  conscious  of  that.  It  would  be  bad  enough  to  be  the  prisoner  of 
soldiers  and  gentlemen  I  am  still  lawful  game,  and  would  rather 
be  dead  than  be  your  prisoner/'  I  have  often  since  thought  and 
spoken  of  this  scene  and  colloquy.  I  cannot  have  forgotten  the 
substance  of  it.  I  think  I  repeat  very  nearly,  or  quite  the  words 
used.  Xot  one  word  was  said  by  Mr.  Davis  about  fighting  or  eluding 
our  pursuers.  Xot  one  word  .  was  said  by  Colonel  Pritchard  about 
saving  any  trouble.  Xot  one  word  was  said  about  Mr.  Davis'  garb, 
for  there  was  nothing  in  his  dress  or  appearance  to  call  for  such  a 
remark.  Xot  one  word  was  said  by  Mr.  Davis  about  ''protecting 
his  women  and  children/'  lie  only  pointed  to  the  fact  that  they 
were  being  robbed.  I  doubt  if  Colonel  Ilarnden  had  then  reached 
where  we  were ;  but  of  this  I  do  not  profess  to  know.  I  only  know 
that  a  few  moments  before  his  men  were  fighting  Colonel  Pritchard's, 
on  the  north  side  of  the  creek,  near  which  we  had  camped,  and  that 
few  or  none  of  the  men  from  the  other  side  of  the  creek  had  then 
reached  us.  And  I  do  not  think  General  Wilson  can  have  had  the 


156  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

authority  of  Colonel  Pritchard  for  this  statement,  for  he  knows  the 
facts  as  they  are,  and  I  cannot  think  would  falsify  them  in  this  way. 

Was  this  miserable  falsehood  about  Colonel  Pritchard  saying  to 
Mr.  Davis,  "  I  don't  think  your  garb  is  very  well  adapted  to  rapid 
locomotion,"  intended  to  form  another  link  in  the  chain  of  evidence 
to  show  that,  when  captured,  Mr.  Davis  was  disguised  as  a  woman  ? 
Is  it  to  be  quoted  by  the  next  person  who  may  write  an  article 
revamping  this  despicable  slander,  as  additional  and  conclusive 
evidence  that  he  was  so  disguised,  and  made  conclusive  by  the  fact 
that  Colonel  Pritchard  so  called  attention  to  this  disguise  in  the 
midst  of  the  assemblage  then  around  Mr.  Davis  ?  Outside  of  those 
who  robbed  the  ladies  and  children,  and  those  who  rummaged  among 
their  wrappings,  as  this  writer  describes,  I  cannot  believe  there  was 
one  man  in  those  two  commands  base  enough  to  allow  himself  to  be 
made  the  author  of  this  false  statement.  I  will  not  go  through  the 
disgusting  details  of  falsehoods  by  which,  in  cold  blood,  twelve  years 
after  the  war,  when  sensational  statements  and  the  bitterness  of 
passion,  and  even  the  wish  by  falsehood  to  wrong  an  enemy,  should 
have  died  away,  General  Wilson  revamps  and  remodels  the  story  of 
Mr.  Davis'  disguise.  I  will  only  make  this  statement  as  to  what  then 
occurred  to  show  that  if  Mr.  Davis  had  sought  to  disguise  himself 
he  could  not  have  done  so  for  want  of  time,  and  the  facts  show  that 
it  was  impossible  for  him  to  have  conceived  and  executed  a  plan  of 
disguise.  I  was  not  immediately  with  him  when  we  were  attacked. 
Governor  Lubbock,  Colonel  Johnston,  Colonel  Wood,  and  myself  had 
slept  under  a  tree,  something  like  a  hundred  yards  from  where  Mr. 
Davis  and  his  family  camped.  We  went  into  camp  before  nightfall 
the  evening  before,  and  had  no  fears  of  the  presence  of  an  enemy. 
We  were  misled  as  to  our  security  for  the  time  being  by  the  follow 
ing  facts :  We  were  getting  well  south  in  Georgia,  with  a  view  to 
turn  Macon  and  Montgomery  and  pass  through  the  piney  wood 
country  to  the  south  of  these  cities,  where  the  population  was  more 
sparse,  and  where  the  roads  were  not  so  much  frequented.  We 
were  to  cross  the  Ocmulgee  river  below,  where  it  could  be  forded, 
and  where  there  were  not  many  ferries.  On  approaching  that  river 
we  expected  to  encounter  trouble,  if  the  Federal  authorities  knew 
the  course  we  were  traveling.  In  this  event  we  supposed  the  ferries 
would  be  guarded.  When  we  crossed  the  river,  about  dusk,  we 
found  no  opposition,  and,  at  the  same  time,  learned  that  there  was  a 
considerable  cavalry  force  at  Ilawkinsville,  twenty-three  miles  up  the 
river  from  where  we  crossed  it. 

Learning  that  this  force  was  so  near,  and  seeing  that  the  ferries 


FLIGHT  AND  CAPTURE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS.  157 

were  not  guarded,  we  concluded  our  course  was  not  known  at  that 
time,  and  traveled  rather  slowly  the  succeeding  day,  and  went  into 
camp,  early  in  the  evening  before  we  were  captured,  with  the  under 
standing  from  Mr.  Davis  that  he,  Mr.  Harrison,  his  staff  officers  and 
myself  wrould  probably  go  on  after  supper  and  leave  his  family,  then 
supposed  to  be  out  of  reach  of  danger,  which  caused  us  to  leave  our 
course  and  join  them.     I  state  all  this  to  show  our  feeling  of  tempo 
rary  security,  and  the  reasons  why  we  felt  and  acted  as  we  did.     The 
first  warning  wre  had  of  present  danger  was  the  firing  just  across  the 
little  creek  we  were  camped   on,  which  took   place  between   the 
Wisconsin  and  Michigan  cavalry,  between  day-dawn  and  full  light. 
Colonel  Pritchard,  as  I  afterward  learned  from  him,  had  some  time 
before  posted  one  part  of  his  command  across  the  road  in  front  of 
us,  and  the  other  part  across  the  road  in  the  rear  of  us,  and  behind 
the  little  creek  on  which  we  were  encamped.    The  firing  was  between 
these  troops  in  rear  of  us  and  the  Wisconsin  troops,  who  were  pur 
suing  us  on  the  road  we  had  traveled.     When  this  firing  occurred, 
as  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Davis  both  told  me  afterward,  Mr.  Davis  started 
out  of  his  tent,  saying  to  his  wife,  ''those  people  have  attacked  us  at 
last/'     (Meaning  the  men  whom  we  had  heard  intended  to  rob  Mr. 
Davis'  train  the  night  we  cjuit  our  course,  and  went  across  the  country 
to  the  north  of  the  Ogeechee  river.)    ''I  will  go  and  see  if  I  can  stop 
the  firing ;  surely  I  will  have  some  authority  with  Confederates  yet." 
His  staff  officers  and  myself  were  camped  about  one  hundred  yards 
in  the  direction  of  the  firing  from  him,  and  lie  supposed  we  were 
being  fired  on,  as  he  told  us  afterward.     As  he  stepped  out  of  his 
tent,  as   he  told  me  that  day,  he  saw  the  troops  which  had  been 
posted  in  front  of  us,  and  which  were  under  the  immediate  com 
mand  of  Colonel  Pritchard,  in  full  gallop  toward  him,  and  within 
some  sixty  yards  of  his  tent.     He  turned  to  his  wife  and  said:  "It 
is  the  Federal  cavalry,  and  they  are  on  us/'     As  he  turned  to  go  out 
again,  I  understood  his  wife  threw  a  waterproof  cloak  around  his 
shoulders ;  he  stepped  out,  and  was  immediately  put  under  arrest. 
Directly  afterward,  Lubbock  and  myself  went  to  him,  where  he  was 
surrounded  by  the  soldiers.    He  then  had  no  cloak  or  other  wrapping 
on  him ;   was  dressed  in  a  suit  of  Confederate  gray,  with  hat  and 
boots  on  just  as  usual.     Directly  after  this,  and  about  the  time  the 
firing  ceased  between  Colonel  Pritchard's  and  Colonel  Harnden's 
troops  across  the  creek  (I  say  Colonel  Harnden  because  General 
Wilson  says  they  were  his,  for  I  did  not  before  know  what  officer 
commanded  them),  it  was  that  the  conversation  above  alluded  to 
took  place  between  Mr.  Davis  and  Colonel  Pritchard. 


158  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

From  these  facts  the  impossibility  of  Mr.  Davis'  disguise,  as 
charged,  will  be  seen.  And  it  is  out  of  these  facts  that  the  story  of 
his  disguise  no  doubt  grew,  with  all  the  varied  forms,  more  or  less 
elaborate,  it  has  been  made  to  assume  by  sensational  and  reckless 
writers,  who  seem  to  have  been  willing  to  originate  and  circulate 
any  story  which  they  thought  would  gratify  hate  and  bring  ridicule 
on  the  leader  of  a  brave  people,  who  had  risked  all  and  lost  all  in  a 
cause  as  dear  to  them  as  life ;  and  under  wThom  vast  armies  had  been 
organized,  many  great  battles  had  been  fought,  and  a  mighty  strug 
gle  carried  on  for  four  years,  which  had  shaken  this  continent,  and 
arrested  the  attention  of  the  civilized  world ;  and  which  was  then 
being  supported  by  a  million  Federal  soldiers,  as  was  afterward 
shown  by  President  Johnson ;  the  leader  of  a  cause  sustained  by  a 
more  united  people,  with  clearer  convictions  of  what  was  involved 
in  the  struggle,  probably,  than  any  people  who  ever  engaged  in 
revolution,  if  others  may  so  call  it,  not  simply  to  preserve  slavery, 
but  to  secure  the  rights  of  local  self-government,  and  friendly  gov 
ernment,  to  a  homogeneous  and  free  people  ;  and  to  secure  protection 
against  a  government  hostile  to  their  interests  and  to  an  institution 
which  had  been  planted  in  this  country  in  early  Colonial  times  by 
the  Christian  powers  of  Europe,  in  what  they  understood  to  be  the 
humane  policy  of  civilizing  and  Christianizing  a  people  so  barbarous 
then  that  they  sacrificed,  ate,  enslaved,  and  sold  each  other ;  an  insti 
tution  which  existed  in  nearly  all  the  States  of  the  Union  when  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  was  made,  and  when  the  Federal  Con 
stitution  was  adopted;  an  institution  which  was  protected  by  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  of  all  the  States  in 
which  it  existed.  It  was  a  struggle,  whatever  it  may  be  fashionable 
to  say  about  it  now,  of  a  comparatively  weak  people,  with  limited 
resources,  against  a  people  of  more  than  twice  their  strength,  and  of 
vastly  superior  resources ;  of  an  unorganized  people,  without  an 
army  or  navy  or  treasury,  against  a  powerful  government  with  all 
these  at  command ;  a  struggle  which  cost  more  than  half  a  million 
of  lives,  and  caused  the  sacrifice  of  probably  ten  billions  of  dollars' 
worth  of  property,  to  gratify  a  fierce  and  aggressive  fanaticism 
against  the  weaker  section,  and  against  the  traditions,  the  Constitu 
tion  and  laws  of  the  country.  But  for  this,  history  will  write  it 
down  that  there  would  have  been  no  such  war,  no  such  sacrifice  of 
life,  and  no  such  sacrifice  of  property,  and  the  country  might  have 
gone  on  in  its  grand  career  the  freest,  the  most  prosperous  an<? 
happy  the  world  ever  saw. 

The  time  will  some  day  come  when  the  questions  which  led  tc 


FLIGHT  AND  CAPTURE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS.  159 

this  war,  and  which  have  grown  ont  of  it,  and  the  acts  and  motives 
of  those  who  participated  in  it,  will  be  discussed  with  candor  and 
fairness,  and  with  freedom  from  the  passions  and  prejudices  which 
still  in  some  degree  surround  them.  Then  the  real  tiuth  will  be 
known,  and  those  who  come  after  us  will,  no  doubt,  do  that  justice 
to  each  side  which  neither  can  be  expected  to  do  to  the  other  now, 
rapidly  as  AVC  have  advanced  from  the  fierce  passions  of  war  toward 
a  patriotic  and  fraternal  restoration  of  good  will. 


WAR  AS  A  POPULAR  EDUCATOR. 


BY    JOHN    A.    WEIGHT. 


WHEN  the  historian  comes  to 
write  a  truthful  narrative  of 
our  civil  war,  the  many  able 
and  varied  accounts  of  dif 
ferent  incidents  connected 
therewith,  that  have  been 
published  in  the  WEEKLY 
TIMES,  will  be  a  source  of 
profound  satisfaction.  No 
statement  that  will  shed  any 
light  upon  the  causes,  that 
will  illustrate  the  condition 
of  the  people,  or  the  progress 
of  that  dreadful  contest,  will 
be  considered  as  useless.  In 
the  hope  of  contributing 
something  toward  a  true  history,  it  is  here  proposed  to  make  a  short 
statement  of  the  general  condition  of  the  people  other  than  of 
the  Southern  States,  and  more  particularly  of  the  State  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  when  the  insurrection  in  the  South  became  an  assured  fact. 
The  mutterings  of  discontent  that  for  thirty  years  previous  to  1861 
had  been  heard  from  the  South  had  made  but  little  impression  on 
the  minds  of  the  staid  people  of  Pennsylvania.  Their  faith  in  the 
form  of  government,  and  the  successful  working  for  many  years  of 
the  institutions  engrafted  into  it,  had  given  them  a  settled  confidence 
in  its  efficiency  to  deal  justly  with  all  parts  of  the  country.  The 
people  of  Pennsylvania  could  not  entertain  the  thought  that 
the  majority  could  inflict  any  wrong  upon  the  minority  that  would 
be  irreparable,  or  that  would  warrant  any  resort  to  rebellious 
measures.  This  conviction  was  no  mere  sentiment ;  it  was  based 
on  an  educated  understanding  of  the  principles  which  underlie  the 
government  itself.  It  is  not  claiming  too  much  to  argue  that  the 
marked  agreement  in  the  opinions  of  the  people,  on  the  questions 
which  were  raised  at  that  time  affecting  the  teachings  of  the 
(160) 


WAR  AS  A  POPULAR  EDUCATOR.  161 

Constitution  of  the  United  States,  was  largely  due  to  the  education 
received  by  them  in  the  public  and  private  schools  of  the  Common 
wealth.  This  fact  should  be  carefully  noted  by  the  school  authorities, 
and  the  fullest  provision  be  made  in  the  future  for  the  study  of  the 
history  of  our  continent,  of  the  government,  and  the  principles  on 
which  the  Constitution  of  the  nation  is  founded. 

To  the  general  education  of  the  people  in   1801   is  due  the 
calmness  of  their  conduct  and  the  fixedness  of  their  purpose.     It 
was  not  the  rush  of  youthful  lire,  which  over-rode  the  wiser  and 
more  cautious  thoughts   of   middle  and    old  age,   nor  was    it    the 
yieldings  of  youth  to  the  influence  of  older  minds ;  but  the  expression 
of  public  opinion  was  a  unit,  the  result  of  education.     The  only 
question   that   was   deemed    worthy    of    discussion,    when    the    act 
of  attempted  dissolution  was  enacted,  was  not  the  right  connected 
with  it,  but  the  humanitarian  question  of  avoiding  the  horrors  of  a 
civil  war.     In  connection  with  this  educated  thought  of  the  people 
there  was  a  moral   training.     The   people    of    Pennsylvania    were 
disposed  to  leave  the  solution  of  the  slavery  question  to  the  disposition 
of  the  people  of  the  South,  and  they  fully  understood  that  it  was  a 
difficult  social  question  to  manage.     But  when,  through  the  great 
prosperity  that  the  system  of  slavery  had  brought  to  the  South,  after 
many   years   of    depression,    they    were    convinced    that    its   social 
character  was  to  be  fully  merged  into  political  efforts  to  secure  its 
enlargement  and  continuance,  then  the  moral  sentiment  was  aroused 
in  opposition  to  such  extension  of  its  borders  and  attempts  at  making 
it  a  permanent  institution  in  this  country,  which  was  in  opposition 
to  their  view  of  the  true  principles  of  the  form  of  government. 
This  condensed  statement  represents  the  condition  of  public  opinion 
on  these  questions  in  1800.     The  political  sentiments  and  partisan 
relations  of  the  people  rapidly  changed  from  the  beginning  of  18GO. 
The   exciting   general    election    of   that    year   brought    out    a   full 
discussion  of  the  prominent  political  questions,  and  as  any  party 
was  supposed  to  sympathize  with  possible  rebellion,  so  far  was  that 
party  in  the  minority.     Yet  even  then  the  probability  of  such  a 
result  as  civil  war  was  not  accepted,  nor  could  the  people  comprehend 
what  it  meant,  for,  with  the  exception  of  the  Indian  war,  and  the 
war  with  Mexico,  their  knowledge  of  war  was  as  read  of  in  books. 

The  financial  condition  of  the  country  in  the  beginning  of  1801 
was  unpromising.  The  difficulties  of  1857  had  not  been  forgotten; 
the  traces  and  effects  of  the  financial  troubles  of  that  year  were  still 
apparent.  The  country  was  but  slowly  recovering.  Labor  Avas  still 
unemployed ;  wages  were  low ;  the  prices  of  real  estate  had  receded ; 
11 


162  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

prices  of  the  products  of  the  soil  and  of  manufactures  were  not 
remunerative,  and  a  large  amount  of  money  laid  idle  for  want  of 
profitable  employment.  The  difficulty  of  making  collections  in  the 
Southern  country  increased  the  financial  dilemma,  and  as  the  fact 
grew  upon  the  people  that  war  was  inevitable,  the  certainty  of 
immense  losses  to  the  merchants  of  the  North  caused  further  depres 
sion,  and,  with  the  announcement  of  war,  there  was  an  almost  total 
collapse  of  credit  and  destruction  of  values.  For  a  time  the  people 
were  at  sea  without  a  compass  or  rudder.  National  growth  or 
development  always  moves  in  lines ;  not  like  the  tree  that  develops 
its  branches  and  twigs  equally,  and  makes,  when  grown,  one  of  the 
most  beautiful  of  God's  creations ;  but  nations  develop  as  certain 
ideas  take  possession  of  its  people,  and  such  are  run  out  until  it  is 
necessary  to  take  up  a  new  thought  to  preserve  the  results  of  the 
last.  So  there  is  always  a  want  of  completeness,  of  roundness,  in 
national  thought,  practice  and  growth.  When  lines  of  thought  in  a 
nation  become  antagonistic,  the  result  must  be  the  destruction  of 
both  or  the  supremacy  of  one.  To  solve  such  questions,  war  comes 
in  as  the  final  arbiter.  It  is  as  yet  a  necessity.  Wars  between 
civilized  people  have  been  caused,  in  the  past,  more  by  diversity  of 
opinion  than  by  desire  for  conquest,  and  will  be  for  years  to  come. 
War  tests  principles.  When  the  successful  thought  assumes  its 
position  after  war,  it  will  be  found  to  have  elevated  the  people, 
advanced  and  enlarged  their  ideas,  and  given  them  a  consciousness 
of  power  they  did  not  have  before  they  passed  through  this  trying 
ordeal. 

But  the  realities  of  war  the  people  of  Pennsylvania  did  not 
understand  nor  appreciate.  The  military  spirit  had  almost  died  out 
from  the  impulse  it  received  after  the  close  of  the  Mexican  war. 
Here  and  there,  throughout  this  broad  Commonwealth,  could  be 
occasionally  heard  the  fife  and  drum,  and  the  tramp,  tramp  of  a  few 
badly-drilled  volunteers.  Public  opinion  was  not  favorable  to  mili 
tary  organizations,  and  their  efforts  on  parade  were  a  subject  of 
sport.  It  was  much  easier  to  pay  a  militia  fine  than  to  go  through 
the  expense  and  drudgery  of  a  drill.  The  people  thought  the  small 
national  army  was  sufficient  to  man  a  few  forts,  keep  up  the  pretense 
of  a  military  organization,  and  take  care  of  the  Indians.  They  had 
no  fear  of  a  foreign  war,  and  Mexico  had  been  taught  its  lesson. 
The  military  school  at  West  Point  was  considered  by  many  people 
as  a  useless  expense.  For  what  good,  they  would  ask,  would  be 
militia  trainings  or  organized  volunteer  regiments,  of  what  service 
an  expensive  army  organization,  when  the  country  has  no  foes  ?  The 


WAR  AS  A  POPULAR  EDUCATOR.  103 

people  of  this  country  wore  in  a  position  unlike  those  of  any  other 
nation.  They  did  not  feel  directly  the  control  of  the  General 
Government.  They  paid  no  government  taxes;  such  as  were  raised 
were  indirect.  In  no  way  was  the  hand  of  the  General  Government 
openlv  laid  upon  them  or  visible.  So  far,  then,  as  their  immediate 
interests  were  concerned,  everything  tended  to  give  the  people  a 
sense  of  security,  and  the  remotest  thought  was  of  a  possible  war. 
When,  then,  war  was  actually  declared  by  the  South,  by  tiring  on 
the  Hag  of  the  country  at  Fort  Sumter,  on  the  14th  of  April,  1  ><'»!, 
the  thrill  that  went  through  every  nerve  of  the  people  of  the  North 
was  a  startling  sensation.  It  wakened  them  up  to  a  new  fact — the 
struggle  of  ideas  had  commenced;  war  was  inevitable.  Whatever 
of  secret  hostility  there  might  have  been  in  certain  quarters  to  the 
success  of  the  Xorth,  was  forbidden  expression.  The  hrst  gun  fired 
at  Sumter  cemented  the  Xorth.  The  thrill  that  awoke  the  people 
of  this  country  to  a  realization  of  the  fact  of  war,  woke  up  with  it 
their  patriotism  as  founded  upon  education,  religious  teaching,  moral 
principles,  and  the  innate  love  of  country.  The  education  of  the 
people  enabled  them  to  understand  the  issues  made,  with  the  propable 
consequences  of  any  possible  result,  and  as  they  thought,  their  minds 
grew  and  developed  until  they  felt  that  the  responsibility  of  the  future 
of  this  great  continent  was  upon  them;  that  the  great  test  of  the 
democratic  form  of  government  was  placed  in  their  hands  to  deter 
mine.  This  sense  of  responsibility  was  shared  by  all  classes,  and  the 
voice  of  the  people  of  the  Xorth  was  so  unanimous  that  to  oppose  it 
was  at  the  risk  of  personal  safety.  There  was  then  no  hesitation  as 
to  what  to  do;  but  how  to  do  it  was  the  problem. 

Here  was  war  upon  the  people  ;  war  by  land  and  by  sea.  There 
was  entire  unpreparedness  as  to  organization  in  most  of  the  loval 
States,  and  in  none  less  than  in  Pennsylvania.  There  were  a  few  of 
the  trained  officers  who  served  in  the  Mexican  war  available,  and 
some  of  the  ex-officers  of  the  regular  army,  both  those  who  had 
resigned  after  years  of  service,  and  graduates  of  West  Point  who  had 
served  in  the  army  the  legal  time.  Many  of  these  were  physically 
unfitted  for  duty.  Yet  when  the  call  was  made  for  7r>, <><><)  men- 
three  months'  men — the  eagerness  to  be  accepted  showed  the  feeling 
of  the  people,  and  their  confidence  in  their  ability  to  master  the  new 
science.  It  required  but  a  short  experience  for  the  people  to  learn 
that  a  good  and  reliable  soldier  is  composed  of  neither  hirelings  nor 
vagabonds ;  but  the  best  material  to  be  found  is  necessary  to  consti 
tute  an  army  that  will  be  obedient  to  orders,  and  submit  to  the 
severe  discipline  that  is  required.  The  old  notion  that  to  be  a  good 


16<i  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

soldier  a  man  must  lose  his  identity  and  become  a  machine,  is  an 
error.  The  experience  of  this  country,  and  of  Germany,  in  its  recent 
war  with  France,  proved  that  an  intelligent  soldiery  is  more  reliable, 
and  the  degree  of  reliability  is  in  proportion  to  the  intelligent 
appreciation  of  the  causes  that  produced  the  war,  and  what  was  to  be 
done. 

A  very  striking  evidence  of  the  want  of  preparation  for  war 
was  exemplified  in  the  absence  of  any  government  troops  in  the  city 
of  Baltimore  on  the  19th  of  April,  1861,  when  the  Massachusetts 
regiment,  a  uniformed  and  well  drilled  body  of  men,  was  attacked  on 
its  passage  through  that  city  by  a  hastily  gathered  mob,  and  a  large 
number  of  soldiers  from  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  under  Colonel 
Small,  were  driven  back  because  they  were  without  arms  and  ammu 
nition  ;  and,  further,  that  the  General  Government  were  deprived  at 
that  date  of  access  northward  by  rail  and  by  telegraph.  It  may 
surprise  many,  when  they  learn  that  for  several  days  after  the  19th 
of  April,  1861,  almost  the  entire  correspondence  between  the  Eastern, 
the  Middle,  and  the  Western  States,  and  the  government  at  Washing 
ton,  was  carried  by  private  messengers,  sent  daily  by  various  routes 
from  Ilarrisburg  to  Washington,  and  vice  versa,  under  the  instruc 
tions  of  Governor  A.  G.  Curtin.  The  necessities  of  the  situation 
after  the  government's  requisition  for  three  months'  men  was  filled, 
developed  the  importance  of  something  more  than  a  militia  organiza 
tion  for  the  protection  of  the  people  and  their  property  in  the  State 
of  Pennsylvania.  What  the  future  might  produce  the  wisest  men  at 
that  time  could  not  foresee.  What  effect  a  possible  success  on  the 
part  of  the  South  might  have  been  on  the  position  of  some  of  the 
leading  men  in  the  North,  was  unknown. 

The  Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  A.  G.  Curtin,  with  great  wisdom 
and  foresight,  recommended  to  the  Legislature  of  that  State  the 
formation  of  fifteen  full  regiments — thirteen  to  be  of  infantry,  one  of 
light  artillery,  and  one  of  cavalry — to  be  known  as  the  "Reserve 
Volunteer  Corps  of  Pennsylvania,"  to  be  used  firstly  in  the  defense 
of  the  State,  and,  secondly,  to  be  transferred  to  the  authority  of  the 
General  Government  if  not  required  by  the  State — thereby  covering 
any  probable  situation  that  the  chances  of  war  might  produce.  The 
eagerness  to  enter  the  army  in  defense  of  the  life  of  the  nation  very 
rapidly  filled  these  regiments.  They  were  organized  and  officered 
under  the  authority  of  Governor  Curtin,  as  well  as  clothed,  equipped 
and  provisioned  at  the  expense  of  the  State.  The  history  of  this 
organization,  the  only  one  of  its  kind  in  the  States,  has  been  often 
and  well  written,  and  as  long  as  the  State  of  Pennsylvania  maintains 


WAR  AS  A  POPULAR  EDUCATOR.  105 

a  separate  existence,  or  the  records  of  history  preserve  the  sad  story 
of  the  civil  war,  so  long  will  be  preserved  the  record  of  the  bravery 
and  skill  of  the  men  and  officers  of  the  Reserve  Corps  of  the  State 
of  Pennsylvania.  After  the  inglorious  defeat  at  Bull  Run — a  battle 
between  undrilled  men,  where  the  chances  of  success  or  defeat  were 
at  best  but  equal — the  terror  and  dismay  which  prevailed  over  the 
Xorth  was  rapidly  quieted  when  it  was  known  that  Governor  Curtin 
had  offered  this  Reserve  Corps  to  the  General  Government  for  three 
years'  service.  It  was  a  nucleus  around  which  a  new  army  might  be 
formed,  and  one  that  could  maintain  its  ground  in  defense  of  the 
capital  after  the  discharge  of  the  three  months'  men,  and  until  rein 
forced  bv  the  soldiers  of  other  States.  The  best  that  could  be  done, 
in  the  haste  to  join  the  regiments  for  the  three  months1  service,  was 
to  push  the  men  forward  to  the  front  as  rapidly  as  they  were  mustered 
into  service;  but  here  was  a  body  of  men,  while  their  drill  had  not 
been  completed,  and  to  soldiers  of  older  service  would  have  been  but 
raw  recruits,  yet  they  had  the  organization  and  accepted  the  idea  of 
long  and  hard  service,  and  very  rapidly  adapted  themselves  to  the 
new  situation. 

The  battle  of  Bull  Run,  the  return  of  the  three  months'  men, 
the  attack  and  defense  of  Fort  Snniter,  the  early  efforts  of  the  navy, 
very  rapidly  educated  the  people  in  what  war  was,  and  how  it  was  to 
be  met.  "With  success,  the  public  mind  exhibited  a  constant  tendency 
to  go  back  to  its  state  of  quiet.  Adversity  aroused  the  people,  and 
developed  increased  determination  and  energy.  The  change  that 
the  first  year  of  the  war  produced  in  the  condition  of  the  people  was 
marked.  The  government  becoming  the  employer,  there  was  a 
demand  for  labor,  for  all  kinds  of  manufactured  goods  and  articles, 
for  the  productions  of  the  soil,  for  the  building  and  armament  of 
ships  of  war,  and  war  material.  The  inventive  powers  of  the  people 
were  taxed  to  produce  deadlier  weapons  and  more  destructive  guns, 
to  increase  certainty  of  result  in  attack,  as  well  as  safety  in  defense. 
Very  many  of  the  inventions  thus  worked  out  have  been  adopted 
and  modified  by  the  experienced  engineers  and  artillerists  of  the  Old 
World,  and  have  given  our  makers  of  firearms  a  pre-eminence  which 
secures  them  large  orders  from  these  governments.  The  '"  Monitor,'' 
the  Gatling,  the  breech-loading  guns,  both  great  and  small,  and 
many  others  might  be  mentioned  in  this  list  of  inventions  thus  used. 
The  impetus  to  productions  of  all  kinds,  arising  from  the  demands 
for  government  supplies,  and  the  heavy  tariffs  that  was  placed  on 
imported  goods  through  the  increased  price  of  gold,  gave  the  fullest 
employment  to  the  people.  Emigration  rapidly  increased,  and  as 


1C6  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  country  was  losing  its  best  men  on  the  battle-fields  and  in  the 
hospitals,  their  places  were  rapidly  filled  by  the  hardy  emigrants. 
The  abundance  of  money  and  apparent  prosperity  gave  rise  to  an 
undue  spirit  of  speculation.  The  people  acted  as  though  the  money 
expended  by  the  government,  and  the  lives  lost,  was  so  much  added 
to  the  value  of  property  in  place  of  properly  considering  it  as  a  loss  ; 
and  it  did  seem  at  one  time  as  if  the  higher  the  prices  of  land,  of 
labor,  and  material  rose,  the  greater  was  the  demand  for  all.  These 
things  gave  the  appearance  of  the  highest  state  of  prosperity,  and  did 
much  to  make  many  people  look  upon  war  as  the  legitimate  road  to 
success.  Among  the  civilized  nations  of  the  earth  the  United  States 
has,  in  proportion  to  the  means  of  her  people,  occupied  a  high  place 
in  the  line  of  humanitarian  institutions.  War  means  the  wounding 
of  men,  the  presence  of  diseases  which  come  from  exposure,  hard 
ships,  irregularities  of  living  and  overtasking  of  powers  of  endurance. 
It  means  mental  as  well  as  physical  agony ;  it  makes  widows  and 
orphans,  leaving  them  helpless  and  poor ;  it  takes  away  from  old  age 
the  support  of  the  strong-armed  son;  the  tendency  of  war  on  the 
morals  of  men  in  the  army  is  bad,  the  excitement  of  the  passions,  the 
absence  of  home  restraints  and  home  comforts  operate  injuriously. 

The  presence  of  all  these  liabilities  and  evils  to  which  the  men 
were  exposed  who  offered  their  lives  in  defense  of  their  country 
excited  in  the  people  an  earnest  desire  and  a  feeling  of  imperative 
duty  to  provide  for  them  in  the  way  best  fitted  to  meet  the  varied 
demands.  The  medical  department  of  the  government  developed 
great  ability  in  the  professional  part  of  its  work  and  great  inventive 
power  in  planning  hospitals,  ambulances,  couches,  chairs,  etc.,  many 
of  which  should  be  added  to  the  list  of  improvements  which  foreign 
governments  have  adopted.  In  the  French  and  German  war  the 
hospital  accommodations  were  largely  copies  of  the  plans  worked  out 
by  the  officers  in  charge  of  the  medical  department  of  our  army. 
Wherever  permanent  hospitals  were  built,  every  aid  and  attention 
that  could  be  furnished  by  the  voluntary  contribution  of  the  people, 
both  male  and  female,  were  gladly  offered — whether  these  contribu 
tions  wrere  in  the  form  of  flowers  to  enliven  the  sufferer,  and  of 
enticing  cookery  to  tempt  the  appetite,  of  willingness  to  be  eyes, 
arms  or  hands  to  write  the  letters  of  love  to  those  at  home,  or  what 
ever  was  needed  that  would  comfort  the  invalid.  The  Sanitary 
Commission  and  the  Christian  Commission  were  as  ready  to  afford 
all  the  comfort  and  aid  they  could  on  the  field  of  battle  or  in  the  far 
off  temporary  hospital  as  in  the  permanent  hospital.  Aid  was 
tendered  the  widow  and  the  orphans,  and  the  aged  fathers  and 


WAR  AS  A  POPULAR  EDUCATOR.  107 

mothers  were  not  neglected.  Every  care  was  taken  that  all  moral 
influences  should  bo  placed  around  the  men.  Everything  was  done 
that  would  in  any  way  contribute  to  the  comfort  and  well-being  of 
the  men  engaged  in  the  service  of  the  country  ;  and,  while  no  amount 
of  attention  will  remove  the  sufferings  and  hardships  that  go  with 
war,  yet  it  was  found  to  be  possible  to  ameliorate  some  of  their 
sufferings  and  to  provide  for  the  living.  The  State  of  Pennsylvania 
again,  through  the  recommendation  of  Governor  A.  G.  Curtin,  who 
was  as  ready  to  recommend  the  care  of  all  sufferers  by  the  war  as  he 
was  to  urge  by  his  eloquent  voice  the  people  to  arms  in  defense  of 
the  nation,  provided  for  the  education  and  sustenance  of  the  orphan 
children  of  dead  soldiers.  This  noble  institution  has  done  a  great 
work,  and  many  will  rise  to  call  the  State  blessed. 

From  a  quiet,  peaceful  people,  but  little  interested  in  the 
world's  progress,  innocent  of  a  knowledge  of  the  arts  of  war, 
cultivating  the  soil,  digging  in  the  mines,  melting  the  ore,  handling 
goods — though  these  were  done  with  little  profit — quietly  awaiting 
better  times,  with  ill-will  to  no  nation  or  section  of  our  own  country, 
with  confidence  in  the  perpetuity  of  the  government,  and  faith  in  its 
power,  though  unseen,  to  protect  them,  if  needed,  with  their  school- 
houses  and  churches  conveniently  placed  and  well  attended  ;  from 
this  state  of  almost  pastoral  quiet  they  had  been  awakened  on  one 
Sabbath  morning  in  April,  1S(51,  and  in  a  year  they  are  a  restless, 
nervous  people,  thoroughly  absorbed  in  a  great  civil  war,  accounts 
reaching  them  daily,  and  almost  hourly,  of  a  success  here,  or  a  defeat 
there,  with  the  lives  of  their  friends,  their  relatives — brothers,  sons, 
husbands  at  peril ;  this  people  talk  and  think  of  war,  its  management, 
its  strategies,  its  losses,  and  its  honors,  as  though  they  had  been 
students  of  war  all  their  lives.  Those  at  home  are  at  work  for  those 
in  the  field  or  on  the  sea;  the  women  prepare  bandages,  and  nurse 
the  sick  and  wounded  in  place  of  the  lighter  employments  of  a  home- 
life.  The  people  have  learned  what  it  is  to  support  the  government, 
and  their  means  are  poured  out  in  its  defense;  for  if  their  govern 
ment  fails,  they  see  but  little  hope  for  the  future.  The  children  in 
the  school-houses  are  taught  about  war  ;  the  playful  drill  of  the  boys, 
the  play-gun  and  cannon,  are  instilling  into  them  what  may  be  the 
necessities  of  the  future;  the  girls  are  as  proud  of  their  boy-soldiers 
as  the  maiden  when  the  country  places  its  laurel  wreath  of  honor  on 
her  beloved.  The  churches  are  crowded  with  thoughtful  wor 
shipers,  prayers  are  earnest ;  there  is  something  to  pray  for.  It  is 
a  test  of  the  God  they  worship — the  deliverance  of  the  Israelites 
from  bondage  is  in  their  minds,  and  when  the  cloud  is  darkest  they 


168  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

see  light  through  the  darkness.  The  people  are  in  deep  earnest, 
every  power  is  strained.  What  a  change  one  year  has  produced. 
The  real  condition  of  the  people  before  the  war  will  be,  perhaps,  as 
well  understood  by  the  contrast  with  that  of  1862  and  succeeding 
years.  That  this  war  has  produced  like  effects  with  all  other  wars 
of  principle  is  unquestioned.  The  people  of  this  country  lived 
a  century  in  the  four  years  of  wrar.  The  realities  of  life  with 
its  probabilities  were  taught  them  by  a  new  teacher.  They  learned 
the  value  of  a  stable  government,  the  necessity  that  in  its  Constitu 
tion  there  must  exist  all  power  to  perpetuate  and  preserve  its  life ; 
that  this  continent  can  only  be  developed  under  a  strong  government, 
and  made  a  safe  home  for  the  millions  that  will  till  its  fields, 
cultivate  its  fruits,  clear  its  forests,  mine  its  ores,  teach  its  children, 
and  give  higher  education  to  its  people  in  all  the  arts  and  sciences 
that  will  add  to  their  happiness.  This  war  taught  the  people  their 
strength  and  their  ability  to  meet  promptly  and  adequately  every 
emergency,  and  developed  the  great  truth  that  a  republican  form  of 
government  can  withstand  and  overcome  an  internal  revolution. 
This  truth  is  the  more  strongly  marked  by  the  character,  ability  and 
perseverance  of  the  people  of  the  revolting  States.  The  war  was  a 
hard,  bloody  struggle — but  man's  salvation  is  by  the  same  emblem. 


FIRE,  SWORD,  AND  THE  HALTER. 


BY    GENERAL    J.    P.    EMBODEN. 


k 


THE  years  1802  and  ISO-t 
were  the  must  eventful  of 
the  war  in  the  Sheiiandoah 
Valley.  During1  the  spring 
of  tlie  first,  u  Stonewall" 
Jackson  made  his  famous 
twenty-eight  days'  campaign, 
with  13,ooo  men,  against 
Generals  Milroy,  I>anks,  Fre 
mont  and  Shields,  driving 
them  all  out  of  the  valley, 
with  their  aggregate  forces 
of  ahout  (U,ono  men.  In 
ISfi-i  the  Federal  operations 
were  conducted  successively 
bv  Generals  Sigel,  Hunter 
and  Sheridan,  when  that  splendid  valley  was  desolated  and  scourged 
with  tire  and  sword.  It  is  proposed  in  this  paper  merely  to  give 
some  account  of  General  David  Hunter's  performances  during  his 
hrief  command  in  June  and  July,  lsc>4,  of  the  Federal  forces  in  the 
Valley,  and  to  lay  before  the  people  of  this  country,  and  especially 
of  the  Northern  States,  some  facts  that  may  explain  why  here  and 
there  are  still  found  traces  of  bitter  feeling  in  many  a  household  in 
the  South,  not  against  the  government  of  the  United  States,  but 
against  some  of  the  agents  and  means  employed  by  them  in  the 
name  of  the  government,  to  crown  their  arms  with  success.  As 
long  as  the  present  race  inhabiting  that  famous  and  glorious  Valley, 
and  their  descendants,  retain  the  characteristics  that  inspired  them 
with  unbounded  admiration  for,  and  heroic  devotion  to,  Lee  and 
Jackson,  as  their  ideals  of  Christian  soldiers,  the  memory  of  General 
David  Hunter  will  live  and  be  handed  down  through  the  genera 
tions  to  come — it  may  be,  in  the  long  future,  oidy  by  legend  and 
tradition — in  connection  with  deeds  that  illustrate  how  far  the  pas 
sions,  fanaticism,  and  hate  engendered  by  civil  war  can  drag  a  man 
down,  from  the  boasted  civilization  of  our  age  and  country,  to  the 

(169) 


170  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

barbarism  and  implacable  personal  animosities  of  that  long  period 
of  cruel  persecution,  oppression,  and  outrage  which,  by  the  common 
consent  of  mankind,  we  denominate  "  The  Dark  Ages."  These  are 
strong  expressions,  but  if  the  facts  to  be  detailed  do  not  justify 
them,  then  the  people  of  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  from  whom  Gen 
eral  Hunter  sprung,  as  an  offshoot — transplanted  to  New  Jersey — 
of  one  of  the  most  honorable,  numerous  and  distinguished  family 
connections  in  Virginia,  have  lost  the  high  sense  of  justice  and  love 
of  right  which  even  political  opponents  and  belligerent  enemies 
have  freely  accorded  them  in  peace  and  war.  What  I  write  is 
history — every  fact  detailed  is  true,  indisputably  true,  and  sustained 
by  evidence,  both  Confederate  and  Federal,  that  no  man  living  can 
gainsay,  and  a  denial  is  boldly  challenged,  with  the  assurance  that  I 
hold  the  proofs  ready  for  production  whenever,  wherever,  and  how 
ever  required.  Perhaps  no  one  now  living  was  in  a  better  position 
to  know,  at  the  time  of  their  occurrence,  all  the  details  of  these 
transactions  than  myself. 

On  the  21st  of  July,  1863,  after  General  Lee  had  withdrawn 
his  army  from  the  battle-field  of  Gettysburg  to  Virginia,  he,  by 
special  order,  assigned  me  to  the  command  of  "The  Valley  Dis 
trict,"  in  Virginia.  The  "  district "  embraced  all  that  part  of  Vir 
ginia  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountain,  and  so  far  to  the  southwest 
as  the  James  river,  in  Bottetourt  county.  It  was  created  as  a  sepa 
rate  territorial  command  in  1861-2,  for  General  Jackson,  and  con 
tinued  as  such  after  his  death  up  to  the  close  of  the  war.  I  held  the 
command  of  the  district  up  to  December,  1861:,  except  at  short 
intervals,  when  the  exigencies  of  the  service  required  a  larger  body 
of  troops  than  I  had  to  be  sent  into  the  Valley,  under  officers  of 
higher  rank,  who,  of  course,  would  assume  command  of  me  and  the 
district  till  called  away,  when  it  would  revert  to  me  again.  The 
position  I  thus  held  in  my  native  valley  and  among  my  own  people, 
not  only  made  me  cognizant  of  all  that  transpired  when  in  command 
myself,  but  when  officers  in  higher  rank  and  their  troops  were  sent 
to  defend  the  Valley,  they  naturally  looked  to  me  for  information 
about  the  enemy  and  his  doings,  and  consulted  freely  with  me ;  so 
that  I  knew  everything  that  was  going  on  on  our  side,  and  I  had  a 
hand  in  it. 

Sigel's  defeat  at  New  Market,  on  the  15th  of  May,  1864,  by  a 
force  less  than  one-half  his  own,  proved  in  the  end  a  great  calamity 
to  the  people  of  the  Valley,  as  it  undoubtedly  led  to  a  change  of 
Federal  commanders ;  and  the  women  and  children  of  that  country 
who  experienced  the  mild  military  rule  of  the  gentlemanly  and 


FIRE,  SWORD,  AND  THE  HALTER.  171 

brave  German,  and  of  General  Hunter  successively,  had  cause  to 
regret  that  the  former  lost  his  command  by  a  disastrous  conflict 
with  their  husbands,  brothers  and  fathers  at  Xew  Market,  where 
men  fought  men  from  ''early  morn  till  dewy  eve,''  and  a  successor 
was  appointed,  who  soon  enlarged  the  Held  of  martial  enterprise  till 
it  embraced  as  tit  objects  of  his  valor  and  his  vengeance  the  helpless, 
unarmed  and  defenseless:  decrepid  age,  gentle  womanhood,  and  in 
nocent  childhood  sharing  alike  the  unpitying  hostility  of  an  army 
commander  whose  prototype  their  Scotch-Irish  ancestors  had  taught 
them  to  abhor  by  the  traditions  they  had  brought  over  of  the  career 
of  Claverhouse  on  the  Scottish  border — a  man  whose  deeds  in  the 
end  proved  no  small  impediment  to  the  union  of  England  and  Scot 
land,  because  of  the  bitter  animosities  their  cruel  nature  had  excited 
to  such  a  degree  that  even  time  had  failed  to  obliterate  them. 

About  the  1st  of  June,  Hunter,  having  been  reinforced  to  the 
full  extent  of  SigcTs  losses  in  men  and  munitions,  began  his  advance 
upon  Strasburg,  up  the  Valley  toward  Stauntoii ;  Averill  and  Crook 
moving  simultaneously  from  the  Kanawha  region,  in  "West  'Virginia, 
so  as  to  effect  the  junction  of  all  their  forces  about  the  middle  of  the 
month  at  Staunton,  and  thence  move  on  Lyiichburg.  When  Hunter 
took  up  his  line  of  march,  I  had  less  than  one  thousand  Confederate 
soldiers  in  the  Valley,  General  Breckenridge  having  not  only  with 
drawn  his  own  troops  after  the  battle  of  Xew  Market,  but  taking  also 
my  largest  regiment,  the  Sixty-second  Virginia,  to  the  aid  of  General 
Lee,  who  was  sorely  pressed  by  General  Grant  with  overwhelming 
numbers  on  that  memorable  march  from  the  Rappahannock  to  the 
James.  Having  full  information  of  the  combined  movements  of 
Hunter,  Crook,  and  Averill,  and  of  their  strength  and  purpose  to 
unite  in  the  Valley,  I  communicated  it  to  General  Lee  and  the  Con 
federate  Secretary  of  War,  announcing  my  utter  inability  to  cope 
with  them  successfully  with  only  about  one  thousand  veteran 
soldiers.  General  Lee  informed  me  that  he  could  not  then  send  me 
any  assistance  from  the  army  near  Richmond,  but  would  direct 
General  AVilliam  E.  Jones,  who  was  in  Southwestern  Virginia,  to 
come  to  my  aid  with  every  available  man  he  could  raise;  and  that  I 
might  retard  Hunter's  advance  as  much  as  possible,  he  ordered  me 
to  call  out  the  '"reserves''  of  Rockingham  and  Augusta  counties. 
These  "reserves"  were  an  improvised  militia  force  composed  of  old 
men  over  fifty  years  of  age,  and  boys  between  sixteen,  and  eighteen, 
and  were  armed  with  shot-guns,  hunting  rifles  and  such  odds  and 
ends  of  firearms  as  a  state  of  war  had  scattered,  through  the  country. 
To  this  order  about  seven  hundred  old  men  and  boys  responded, 


172  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

chiefly  mounted,  and  that  generally  on  farm  work-horses.  My  policy 
was  to  avoid  a  collision  with  any  larger  body  of  Hunter's  troops  than 
his  advance  guard,  and  to  inform  the  people  that  we  were  falling 
back  slowly  in  expectation  of  large  reinforcements  then  on  their  way 
to  my  support.  I  knew  that  any  such  statement  would  be  repeated 
to  the  enemy,  and  cause  him  to  advance  with  great  caution.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  2d  we  had  our  first  skirmish  near  Lacy  Springs,  a 
few  miles  north  of  Harrisonburg.  The  next  day,  I  w^as  pressed  so 
hard  that  I  had  to  fall  back  to  the  south  bank  of  the  North  river,  at 
Mount  Crawford,  seventeen  miles  from  Staunton,  losing  a  few  men 
killed  and  wounded  during  the  afternoon.  Hunter  camped  at 
Harrisonburg.  I  made  a  rather  ostentatious  display  of  a  purpose  to 
dispute  seriously  the  passage  of  the  river  next  day,  by  throwing  up 
some  works  on  the  hill  tops  overlooking  the  bridge  and  felling  trees 
in  the  fords  for  several  miles  above  and  below. 

During  the  night  about  two  thousand  men,  sent  forward  by 
General  Jones,  joined  me.  To  my  dismay  I  found  they  were  not 
generally  organized  in  bodies  larger  than  battalions,  and  in  companies 
and  fragments  of  companies  hastily  collected  from  Southwestern 
Virginia,  between  Lynchburg  and  Tennessee,  and  in  large  part 
indifferently  armed.  Indeed,  many  of  the  men  were  convalescents 
taken  from  the  hospitals,  and  furloughed  dismounted  cavalrymen 
who  had  gone  home  for  a  remount,  and  were  taken  possession  of  by 
General  Jones  wherever  he  could  find  them,  and  hurried  by  rail 
through  Lynchburg  and  Staunton  to  the  front.  I  spent  the  entire 
night  of  the  3d  in  obtaining  a  list  of  all  these  small  bodies  of  men, 
out  of  wThich  by  daybreak  on  the  4th  I  had  composed,  on  paper,  two 
brigades  and  assigned  officers  to  their  command.  General  Jones 
arrived  at  my  headquarters  a  little  after  sunrise,  and  on  reviewing 
my  operations  on  paper,  he  adopted  them,  and  at  an  early  hour  in 
the  morning  the  various  detachments  were  aggregated  in  their 
respective  temporary  brigades.  During  the  day  General  Vaughan, 
of  Tennessee,  with  from  six  hundred  to  eight  hundred  of  his  greatly 
reduced  brigade,  also  joined  us.  We  now  had  a  force  of  something 
over  four  thousand  men,  including  one  regular  and  excellent  six-gun 
battery,  and  one  extemporized  artillery  company  of  "  reserves,"  from 
Staunton,  with  five  guns.  Hunter,  with  eleven  thousand  superbly- 
appointed  troops  of  all  arms,  was  only  eight  miles  distant  in  our 
front,  and  Crook  and  Averill,  with  seven  thousand  more,  only  two 
days'  march  in  our  rear;  the  two  bodies  rapidly  approaching  each 
other,  and  wre  between  them  in  the  condition  I  have  just  described, 
and  with  no  hope  of  further  assistance.  Obviously  our  policy  was 


FIRE,  SWORD,  AND   THE  HALTER.  173 

to  fight  Hunter  at  the  earliest  moment,  and  possibly  defeat  him,  and 
then  turn  upon  Crook  and  Averill  and  do  the  best  we  could. 
Generals  Jones,  Yauglmn  and  myself  were  all  of  the  same  grade 
brigadiers,  Jones  being  the  senior  by  a  few  months,  and  Yaughan 
ranking  me  also  by  a  little  older  commission  than  mine.  Jones,  of 
course,  assumed  the  command.  He  was  an  old  army  officer,  brave  as 
a  lion,  and  had  seen  much  service,  and  was  known  as  a  hard  fighter. 
He  was  a  man,  however,  of  high  temper,  morose  and  fretful  to  such 
a  degree  that  he  was  known  by  the  soubriquet  of  vi  Grumble  Jones." 
He  held  the  fighting  qualities  of  the  enemy  in  great  contempt,  and 
never  would  admit  the  possibility  of  defeat  where  the  odds  against 
him  were  not  much  over  two  to  one.  So  that  when  he  took  com 
mand  of  our  little  army,  consisting  of  only  a  part  of  my  brigade,  not 
over  one  thousand  men  ;  Yaughan's  Brigade,  six  hundred  to  eight 
hundred  men ;  the  two  temporary  conglomerate  brigades  under 
Colonels  Brown  and  Jones,  of  about  one  thousand  men  each,  and 
about  seven  hundred  ''reserves,''  a  total  of  between  four  thousand 
and  four  thousand  five  hundred  men,  including  the  two  batteries,  he 
was  entirely  confident  that  lie  could  whip  Hunter.  AVe  fully 
expected  an  attack  early  on  the  morning  of  the  4-th.  The  enemy 
not  appearing,  however,  up  to  ten  o'clock,  I  sent  a  regiment  of 
cavalry— the  Eighteenth  Yirginia,  under  Colonel  George  A\r. 
Iniboden — to  Hunter's  side  of  the  river  to  find  out  what  he  was  doing. 
In  a  couple  of  hours  it  was  ascertained  that  he  had  left  the  main 
road  leading  from  AVinchester  to  Staunton,  and  was  marching  to  the 
southeastward  to  Port  Republic,  at  the  junction  of  the  Xorth  and 
South  rivers,  which  unite  there  near  the  foot  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and 
form  the  Shenandoah.  This  flank  movement  disappointed  and 
somewhat  disconcerted  General  Jones.  It  imposed  on  him  the 
necessity  of  a  night  march  over  roads  he  had  never  seen  to  get  in 
position  between  Port  Republic  and  Staunton. 

As  we  were  in  my  native  county,  Augusta,  I  knew  every  road, 
and  almost  every  farm  over  which  Hunter  would  pass.  I  did  not, 
therefore,  hesitate  to  urge  on  General  Jones  to  let  me  select  the  point 
of  conflict  with  Hunter.  lie  consented  to  this,  and  I  chose  the  crest 
of  what  is  known  as  k'Mowry's  hill,''  an  eminence  overlooking  the 
beautiful  little  vale  of  Long  Meadow  run,  about  eight  miles  northeast 
of  Staunton.  To  this  ground  Jones  decided  to  move  on  the  night 
of  the  4th,  and  in  the  morning  throw  up  some  works  to  cover  our 
most  vulnerable  points.  He  ordered  me  to  place  my  cavalry  close 
in  front  of  Hunter  during  the  night,  as  we  knew  he  would  camp  at 
Port  Republic,  and  to  avoid  any  risky  engagement  in  the  morning, 


174  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

to  obstruct  his  advance  as  much  as  I  could,  so  as  to  give  our  infantry 
time  to  strengthen  their  position  as  much  as  possible  before  the 
general  battle,  which  we  expected  to  come  off  about  noon  on  the  5th. 
I  took  position  during  the  night  about  two  miles  from  Hunter's  out 
posts.  He  began  his  march  about  daybreak,  and  by  sunrise  we  came 
in  collision  with  his  cavalry  so  unexpectedly  that  I  became  more 
seriously  engaged  than  I  intended  or  my  instructions  warranted,  and 
had  great  difficulty  in  extricating  my  command  from  what,  for  a 
little  while,  was  a  most  perilous  position.  As  it  was,  I  lost  one  of 
my  best  companies,  Captain  F.  M.  Imboden's,  of  the  Eighteenth 
Virginia  Cavalry,  which  was  cut  off  from  all  support,  overpowered 
and  captured. 

Our  next  stand  was  made  near  Piedmont,  where,  to  my  amaze 
ment  and  against  my  solemn  and  angry  protest,  General  Jones  had 
decided  to  fight,  instead  of  at  Howry's  hill,  three  miles  further  back. 
We  were  formed  in  echelon,  leaving  a  gap  of  nearly  four  hundred 
yards  between  our  right  and  left  wings.  The  two  first  assaults  made 
on  our  left  wing,  where  Jones  commanded  in  person,  were  gallantly 
repulsed,  but  General  Hunter  discovering  the  fatal  gap  in  our  line 
between  the  right  and  left  wings,  rapidly  formed  a  column  of  attack 
under  cover  of  some  woods,  and,  sweeping  rapidly  down  on  our 
exposed  centre,  pierced  the  line  at  this  point,  and  striking  the  right 
flank  of  our  left  wing,  doubled  the  line  back  on  itself,  resulting  in 
the  wildest  confusion  and  great  loss  to  us.  The  brave  and  gallant 
Jones  was  instantly  killed  when  most  heroically  endeavoring  to  change 
his  alignment  to  receive  the  blow  he  saw  descending  so  portentously 
on  his  centre.  A  braver  soldier  never  lived,  and  had  he  survived 
that  day  I  doubt  not  he  would  have  manfully  admitted  the  error  his 
over-confidence  led  him  into.  I  never  learned  the  reason  for  his 
change  of  plans,  but  infer  that  it  was  occasioned  by  a  telegram  he 
had  received  the  night  before  from  General  Lee,  and  which  the  enemy 
found  on  his  body,  to  the  effect  that  no  additional  troops  could  be 
sent  to  the  Yalley  for  several  days,  and  he  must  therefore  fight 
Hunter  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  beat  him  back  before  Crook's  and 
AverilPs  advent  on  the  scene ;  and  as  Hunter  had  the  day  before 
flanked  our  position  at  Hount  Crawford,  making  considerable  detour 
by  way  of  Port  Republic,  I  think  Jones  concluded  that  his  opponent 
sought  to  evade  a  conflict  till  the  last  possible  moment,  thus  increas 
ing  the  probabilities  of  a  junction  with  Crook  and  Averill ;  and  that 
if  such  was  his  purpose  he  would  either  not  attack  us  at  Howry's 
hill,  or  would  seek  to  flank  it  by  another  detour  either  to  the  right 
or  left.  Reasoning  thus,  and  entirely  confident  that  if  he  could 


FIRE,  SWORD,  AXD   THE  HALTER.  175 

engage  Hunter  anywhere  that  day  he  could  heat  him,  he  disregarded 
topographical  considerations  of  advantage,  and  sought  his  enemy  at 
the  nearest  point. 

Our  loss  was  over  1,500  in  killed,  wounded  and  captured,  but 
if  the  pursuit  had  been  more  vigorous  it  would  have  been  far  worse 
for  us.  The  cavalry  did  make  a  demonstration  after  the  battle,  but 
my  cavalry  brigade,  and  about  seventy-five  or  eighty  Tennessee  rifle 
men  <>n  foot,  and  McClanahan's  six-gun  battery,  arrested  their  cliarge 
and  drove  them  back,  when  we  were  permitted  to  move  olf  without 
further  molestation.  The  next  day  Hunter  proceeded  to  Stannton, 
only  eleven  miles  from  the  battle-field,  and  was  there  joined  by 

Crook  and  Averill,  increasing  his  force  to  some  18,000  men.     "We 

?"> 

camped  that  night  at  Fisherville,  seven  miles  east  of  Staunton,  on  the 
Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  next  morning  fell  back  to 
"Waynesborough,  at  the  western  base  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  where  we 
supposed  Hunter  would  attempt  to  cross  Rockiish  Gap  on  his  way 
to  Lynchburg.  Up  to  his  occupation  of  Staunton,  where  his  army 
was  so  much  strengthened  by  Crook  and  Averill  as  to  relieve  his 
mind  of  all  apprehension  of  disaster,  his  conduct  had  been  soldiery, 
striking  his  blows  only  at  armed  men.  But  at  Staunton  he  com 
menced  burning  private  property,  and,  as  will  be  seen  further  on,  the 
passion  for  house-burning  grew  upon  him,  and  a  new  system  of  war 
fare  was  inaugurated  that  a  few  weeks  afterward  culminated  in  the 
retaliatory  burning  of  Chambersburg.  At  Staunton  his  incendiary 
appetite  was  appeased  by  the  burning  of  a  large  woolen  mill  that 
gave  employment  to  many  poor  women  and  children,  and  a  large 
steam  flouring  mill,  and  the  railway  buildings.  He  made  inquiries, 
it  was  said,  for  my  own  residence  ;  but  as  I  had  sold  it,  a  few  months 
before,  to  a  man  of  i% loyal"  proclivities,  it  was  spared. 

Hunter  remained  two  or  three  days  at  Staunton,  and  on  the  9th 
of  June  moved  toward  Lexington,  on  his  route  to  Lynchburg.  On 
the  8th,  General  Breckennage  arrived  at  Rockfish  Gap  with  a  small 
force  drawn  from  General  Lee's  army,  and  assumed  command,  and 
immediately  began  preparing  for  the  defense  of  Lynchburg. 
General  John  McCausland,  with  his  cavalry  brigade,  was  ordered  to 
keep  in  front  of  Hunter,  and  delay  and  harass  him  as  much  as 
possible,  a  task  which  he  performed  with  signal  ability,  skill,  and 
bravery.  Hunter  having  sent  General  Duffle,  with  the  brigade 
under  his  command,  into  the  county  of  Kelson,  'east  of  the  Blue 
Ridge  and  south  of  Rockfish  Gap,  I  was  ordered  in  pursuit  and  to 
protect  Lynchburg,  which  was  almost  defenseless,  from  surprise  by 
thid  cavalry  detachment.  The  people  of  Kelson  and  Amherst 


176  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

counties,  never  having  had  the  enemy  before  in  their  midst,  were 
greatly  excited  and  alarmed,  and  brought  to  me  the  wildest  reports 
of  the  enemy's  doings,  and  the  most  exaggerated  accounts  of  his 
strength.  Such  information  embarrassed  me  so  much  from  its 
apparently  authentic  and  yet  often  contradictory  character  that 
I  decided  to  reach  Lynchburg  as  soon  as  possible,  and  by  a  route 
that  would  enable  me  to  save  from  destruction  the  bridges  on  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad,  one  of  the  lines  of  communication 
between  Richmond  and  Lynchburg  essential  to  the  defense  of  the 
latter.  I  accomplished  this  object,  but  failed  to  encounter  Duffie, 
who  recrossed  the  mountains  and  joined  Hunter  at  Lexington.  On 
his  march  from  Staunton  to  Lexington,  when  near  Brownsburg, 
General  Hunter  ordered  a  thing  to  be  done,  so  abhorrent  to  all  our 
ideas  of  war  between  Christian  and  civilized  powers,  that  a  simple 
recital  of  the  facts,  without  further  comment,  will  answer  all 
the  purposes  of  history. 

At  the  breaking  out  of  the  war,  David  S.  Creigh,  an  old  man  of 
the  highest  social  position,  the  father  of  eleven  sons  and  daughters, 
beloved  by  all  who  knew  them  for  their  virtues  and  intelligence, 
resided  on  his  estate,  near  Lewisburg,  in  Greenbrier  county.  His 
reputation  was  of  the  highest  order.  No  man  in  the  large  county  of 
Greenbrier  was  better  known  or  more  esteemed ;  few,  if  any,  had 
more  influence.  Beside  offices  of  high  public  trust  in  civil  life,  he 
was  an  elder  in  the  Presbyterian  church  of  Lewisburg,  one  of 
the  largest  and  most  respectable  in  the  Synod  of  Virginia.  In  the 
early  part  of  November,  1863,  there  being  a  Federal  force  near 
Lewisburg,  Mr.  Creigh,  on  entering  his  house  one  day,  found  a 
drunken  and  dissolute  soldier  there  using  the  most  insulting  language 
to  his  wife  and  daughters,  and  at  the  same  time  breaking  open 
trunks  and  drawers,  and  helping  himself  to  their  contents.  At  the 
moment  Mr.  Creigh  entered,  the  ruffian  was  attempting  to  force  the 
trunk  of  a  young  lady  teacher  in  the  family.  Mr.  Creigh  asked  him 
to  desist,  stating  that  it  was  the  property  of  a  lady  under  his 
protection.  The  villian,  rising  from  the  trunk,  immediately  drew  a 
pistol,  cocked  it,  pointed  it  at  Mr.  Creigh,  and  exclaimed :  "  Go  out 
of  this  room.  "What  are  you  doing  here  ?  Bring  me  the  keys."  Mr. 
Creigh  attempted  to  defend  himself  and  family,  but  a  pistol  he  tried 
to  use  for  the  purpose  snapped  at  the  instant  the  robber  fired 
at  him,  the  ball  'grazing  his  face  and  burying  itself  in  the  wall. 
They  then  grappled,  struggled  into  the  passage,  and  tumbled  down 
stairs,  the  robber  on  top.  They  rose,  and  Mr.  Creigh  attempted  to 
wrest  the  pistol  from  the  hands  of  his  adversary,  when  it  was 


FIRE,  SWORD,  AND  THE  HALTER.  177 

accidentally  discharged,  and  the  latter  wounded.  They  struggled 
into  the  portico,  where  the  ruffian  again  shot  at  Mr.  Creigli,  when  a 
negro  woman,  who  saw  it  all,  run  up  with  an  axe  in  her  hand,  and 
begged  her  master  to  use  it.  lie  took  it  from  her  and  dispatched 
the  robber.  After  consultation  and  advice  with  friends  it  was 
decided  to  bury  the  body,  and  say  nothing  about  it. 

The  troops  left  the  neighborhood,  and  did  not  return  till  June, 
1S64-,  when  they  were  going  through  to  join  Hunter.  A  negro 
belonging  to  a  neighbor,  having  heard  of  the  matter,  went  to  their 
camp  and  told  it.  Search  was  made,  the  remains  found,  and  Mr. 
Creigh  was  arrested.  Tie  made  a  candid  statement  of  the  whole 
matter,  and  begged  to  be  permitted  to  introduce  witnesses  to  prove 
the  facts,  which  was  refused,  and  he  was  marched  oft'  with  the 
army,  to  be  turned  over  to  General  Hunter,  at  Staunton.  On  the 
10th  of  June,  Hunter  camped  near  Brownsburg,  on  the  farm  of  the 
Hev.  James  Morrison.  About  dark,  a  rather  elderly  man  knocked  at 
the  door,  announcing  himself  as  the  TJev.  Mr.  Osborn,  of  Uniontown, 
Pennsylvania,  a  chaplain  in  the  army.  He  requested  to  see  Mr. 
Morrison,  stating  that  thev  had  with  the  army  a  citizen  of  Green- 
brier,  whose  name  was  Creigh,  who  was  about  to  be  executed;  his 
doom  had  just  been  announced  to  him.  He  stated  that  Mr.  Creigh 
claimed  to  be  well  acquainted  with  Mr.  Morrison,  and  asked  an 
interest  in  his  prayers,  as  he  was  closely  confined  in  a  negro 
cabin,  and  no  communication  would  be  permitted  with  him.  All 
efforts  to  visit  him  that  night  were  in  vain.  He  was  first  ordered  to 
be  executed  that  night,  but  was  indulged  to  live  till  morning,  that 
he  might  write  to  his  family.  The  next  morning,  a  little  after 
daylight,  he  was  brought  out,  put  into  a  wagon,  and  conveyed  up  a 
little  vale,  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  north  of  the  house,  and  in  full 
view  of  it,  and  was  there  hanged  and  left  hanging  till  after  the 
army  had  departed,  when  the  wife  of  the  venerable  minister — he 
being  too  feeble — with  such  assistance  as  she  could  get,  took  down 
the  body,  wrapped  it  in  a  blanket,  and  buried  it  in  a  grave  dug  on 
the  spot.  Mr.  Creigh  had  no  trial,  no  witnesses,  no  counsel  nor 
friends  present,  but  was  ordered  to  be  hanged  like  a  dog  for  an  act 
of  duty  to  his  helpless  wife  and  daughters. 

From  Brownsburg  General  Hunter  proceeded  to  Lexington, 
encountering  only  such  delay  as  McCausland  could  effect  with  a 
single  brigade  of  cavalry.  At  Lexington  he  enlarged  upon  the 
burning  operations  begun  at  Staunton.  On  his  way,  and  in  the 
surrounding  country,  he  burnt  mills,  furnaces,  storehouses,  grana 
ries,  and  all  farming  utensils  he  could  find,  beside  a  great  amount  of 
12 


178  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

fencing,  and  a  large  quantity  of  grain.  In  the  town  he  burnt  the 
Virginia  Military  Institute,  and  all  the  professors'  houses  except  the 
superintendent's  (General  Smith's),  where  he  had  his  headquarters, 
and  found  a  portion  of  the  family  too  sick  to  be  removed.  He  had 
the  combustibles  collected  to  burn  Washington  College,  the  recipient 
of  the  benefactions  of  the  Father  of  his  Country  by  his  will ;  but, 
yielding  to  the  appeals  of  the  trustees  and  citizens,  spared  the  build 
ing,  but  destroyed  the  philosophical  and  chemical  apparatus,  libraries 
and  furniture.  He  burned  the  mills  and  some  private  stores  in  the 
lower  part  of  the  town.  Captain  Towns,  an  officer  in  General 
Hunter's  army,  took  supper  with  the  family  of  Governor  John 
Letcher.  Mrs.  Letcher  having  heard  threats  that  her  house  would 
be  burned,  spoke  of  it  to  Captain  Towns,  who  said  it  could  not  be 
possible,  and  remarked  that  he  would  go  at  once  to  headquarters  and 
let  her  know,  He  went,  returned  in  a  half  hour,  and  told  her  that 
he  was  directed  by  General  Hunter  to  assure  her  that  the  house 
would  not  be  destroyed,  and  she  might,  therefore,  rest  easy.  After 
this,  she  dismissed  her  fears,  not  believing  it  possible  that  a  man 
occupying  Hunter's  position  wrould  be  guilty  of  wilful  and  deliberate 
falsehood  to  a  lady.  It,  however,  turned  out  otherwise,  for  the  next 
morning,  at  half -past  eight  o'clock,  his  assistant  provost  marshal, 
accompanied  by  a  portion  of  his  guard,  rode  up  to  the  door,  and 
Captain  Berry  dismounted,  rang  the  door-bell,  called  for  Mrs. 
Letcher,  and  informed  her  that  General  Hunter  had  ordered  him 
to  burn  the  house.  She  replied :  "  There  must  be  some  mistake," 
and  requested  to  see  the  order.  He  said  it  wras  verbal.  She  asked 
if  its  execution  could  not  be  delayed  till  she  could  see  Hunter  ?  He 
replied:  "The  order  is  peremptory,  and  you  have  five  minutes  to 
leave  the  house."  Mrs.  Letcher  then  asked  if  she  could  be  allowed 
to  remove  her  mother's,  her  sister's,  her  own  and  her  children's 
clothing.  This  request  being  refused,  she  left  the  house.  In  a 
very  short  time  they  poured  camphene  on  the  parlor  floor  and 
ignited  it  with  a  match.  In  the  meantime  Miss  Lizzie  Letcher  was 
trying  to  remove  some  articles  of  clothing  from  the  other  end  of  the 
house,  and  Berry,  finding  these  in  her  arms,  set  fire  to  them.  The 
wrardrobe  and  bureaus  were  then  fired,  and  soon  the  house  was 
enveloped  in  flames.  Governor  Letcher's  mother,  then  seventy- 
eight  years  old,  lived  on  the  adjoining  lot.  They  fired  her  stable, 
within  forty  feet  of  the  dwelling,  evidently  to  burn  it,  too ;  but, 
owing  to  the  active  exertions  of  Captain  Towns,  who  made  his  men 
carry  water,  the  house  was  saved.  While  Hunter  was  in  Lexington, 
Captain  Mathew  X.  White,  residing  near  the  town,  was  arrested, 


FIRE,  SWORD,  AND   THE  II ALTER.  179 

taken  about  two  miles,  and,  without  trial,  was  shot,  on  the  allegation 
that  he  was  a  bushwhacker.  During  the  first  year  of  the  war  he 
commanded  the  llockbridge  Cavalry,  and  was  a  young  gentleman 
of  generous  impulses  and  good  character.  The  total  destruction  of 
private  property  in  Ilockbridge  county,  by  Hunter,  was  estimated 
and  published  in  the  local  papers  at  the  time  as  over  $2,000,000. 
The  burning  of  the  Institute  was  a  public  calamity,  as  it  was  an 
educational  establishment  of  great  value. 

From  Lexington  he  proceeded  to  Buchanan,  in  Bottetourt 
count v,  and  camped  on  the  magnificent  estate  of  Colonel  John  T. 
Anderson,  an  elder  brother  of  General  Joseph  II.  Anderson,  of  the 
Tredeii'ar  "Works,  at  Richmond.  Colonel  Anderson's  estate,  on  the 
banks  of  the  Upper  James,  and  his  mansion,  were  baronial  in  char 
acter.  The  house  crowned  a  high,  wooded  hill,  was  very  large,  and 
furnished  in  a  style  to  dispense  that  lavish  hospitality  which  was 
the  pride  of  so  many  of  the  old-time  Virginians.  It  was  the  seat  of 
luxury  and  refinement,  and  in  all  respects  a  place  to  make  the  owner 
contented  with  his  lot  in  this  world.  Colonel  Anderson  was  old — 
his  head  as  white  as  snow — and  his  wife  but  a  few  years  his  junior. 
He  was  in  no  office,  and  too  old  to  fight — hence  was  living  on  his 
fine  estate  strictly  the  life  of  a  private  gentleman.  He  had  often, 
in  years  gone  by,  filled  prominent  representative  positions  from  his 
county.  There  was  no  military  or  public  object  on  God's  earth  to 
be  gained  by  ruining  such  a  man.  Yet  Hunter,  after  destroying  all 
that  could  be  destroyed  on  the  plantation  when  he  left  it,  ordered 
the  grand  old  mansion,  with  all  its  contents,  to  be  laid  in  ashes. 

From  Buchanan  he  proceeded  toward  Lynchburg,  by  way  of 
the  Peaks  of  Otter;  but  on  arriving  within  four  miles  of  the  city, 
where  a  sharp  skirmish  occurred  between  General  Crook's  command 
and  three  brigades  under  my  command,  at  a  place  called  the  Quaker 
Meeting-House,  he  ascertained  that  General  Early  was  in  town  with 
Stonewall  Jackson's  old  corps.  This  was  enough  for  him.  That 
night  he  began  a  rapid  retreat  toward  Salem,  leaving  his  cavalry  to 
make  demonstrations  on  Early's  lines  long  enough  to  give  him  a 
good  day's  start.  He  thus  made  his  escape  with  little  loss — the 
heaviest  of  it  consisting  of  some  ten  or  twelve  field-guns  that  fell 
into  our  hands  near  Salem.  He  escaped  through  the  mountains  into 
AVest  Virginia,  and  reached  the  Ohio  by  way  of  the  Ivanawha 
Valley.  If  he  had  been  attacked  the  evening  of  the  affair  at  the 
Quaker  Meeting-House,  or  had  been  vigorously  pursued  early  next 
morning,  I  think  the  probabilities  are  that  his  entire  army  would 
have  been  captured.  They  were  weary  from  long  inarching,  and, 


180  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

from  all  accounts,  greatly  demoralized  after  the  retreat  began. 
Indeed,  it  was  currently  reported,  and  generally  believed  on  our 
side,  that  Hunter  was,  himself,  in  so  much  alarm  for  his  personal 
safety  that  it  incapacitated  him  to  direct  the  retreat,  and  that  General 
Crook,  in  fact,  saved  their  army.  After  Hunter's  retreat,  General 
Early  moved  down  the  Yalley,  and,  in  July,  menaced  Washington, 
before  Hunter  had  time  to  get  around  to  its  defense.  But  I  do  not 
intend  to  detail  Early's  operations.  After  a  few  days  on  the  north 
side  of  the  Potomac,  he  came  back  to  the  Virginia  side,  whither 
Hunter  followed. 

I  shall  conclude  this  already  long  narrative  by  citing  a  few 
more  instances  of  Hunter's  incendiarism  in  the  Lower  Valley.  It 
seems  that,  smarting  under  the  miserable  failure  of  his  grand  raid 
on  Lynchburg,  where,  during  a  march  of  over  two  hundred  miles, 
the  largest  force  he  encountered  was  under  Jones  at  Piedmont,  and 
he  routed  that,  thus  leaving  the  way  open  to  reach  Lynchburg 
within  three  days,  destroy  the  stores  there  and  go  out  through  West 
Virginia  unmolested,  he  had  failed  to  do  anything  but  inflict  injury 
on  private  citizens,  and  he  came  back  to  the  Potomac  more  implac 
able  than  when  he  left  it  a  month  before.  His  first  victim  was  the 
Hon.  Andrew  Hunter,  of  Charlestown,  Jefferson  county,  his  own 
first  cousin,  and  named  after  the  General's  father.  Mr.  Hunter  is  a 
lawyer  of  great  eminence,  and  a  man  of  deservedly  large  influence 
in  his  county  and  the  State.  His  home,  eight  miles  from  Harper's 
Ferry,  in  the  suburbs  of  Charlestown,  was  the  most  costly  and 
elegant  in  the  place,  and  his  family  as  refined  and  cultivated  as  any 
in  the  State.  His  offense,  in  General  Hunter's  eyes,  was  that  he 
had  gone  politically  with  his  State,  and  was  in  full  sympathy  with 
the  Confederate  cause.  The  General  sent  a  squadron  of  cavalry  out 
from  Harper's  Ferry,  took  Mr.  Hunter  prisoner,  and  held  him  a 
month  in  the  common  guard-house  of  his  soldiers,  without  alleging 
any  offense  against  him  not  common  to  nearly  all  the  people  of 
Virginia,  and  finally  discharged  him  without  trial  or  explanation, 
after  heaping  these  indignities  on  him.  Mr.  Hunter  was  an  old 
man,  and  suffered  severely  from  confinement  and  exposure.  AYhile 
he  was  thus  a  prisoner,  General  Hunter  ordered  his  elegant  mansion 
to  be  burned  to  the  ground,  with  all  its  contents,  not  even  permit 
ting  Mrs.  Hunter  and  her  daughter  to  save  their  clothes  and  family 
pictures  from  the  flames ;  and,  to  add  to  the  desolation,  camped  his 
cavalry  within  the  inclosure  of  the  beautiful  grounds,  of  several 
acres,  surrounding  the  residence,  till  the  horses  had  destroyed  them. 

His  next  similar  exploit  was  at  Shepherdstown,  in  the  same 


FIRE,  SWORD,  AND   THE  HALTER,  181 

county,  where,  on  the  19th  of  July,  1804,  he  caused  to  be  burned 
the  residence  of  the  Hon.  A.  R.  Boteler,  "  Fountain  Rock."  Mrs. 
Boteler  was  also  a  cousin  of  General  Hunter.  This  homestead  was 
an  old  colonial  house,  endeared  to  the  family  by  a  thousand  tender 
memories,  and  contained  a  splendid  library,  many  pictures,  and  an 
invaluable  collection  of  rare  and  precious  manuscripts,  illustrating 
the  early  history  of  that  part  of  Virginia,  that  Colonel  Boteler  had 
collected  by  years  of  toil.  The  only  members  of  the  family  who 
were  there  at  the  time  were  Colonel  Boteler's  eldest  and  widowed 
daughter,  Mrs.  Shepherd,  who  was  an  invalid,  her  three  children, 
the  eldest  live  years  old  and  the  youngest  eighteen  months,  and 
Miss  Helen  Boteler.  Colonel  Boteler  and  his  son  were  in  the  army, 
and  Mrs.  Boteler  in  Baltimore.  The  ladies  and  children  were  at 
dinner  when  informed  by  the  servants  that  a  body  of  cavalry  had 
turned  in  at  the  gate,  from  the  turnpike,  and  were  coming  up  to  the 
house. 

It  pro  veil  to  be  a  small  detachment  of  the  First  Xew  York 
Cavalry,  commanded  by  a  Captain  William  F.  Martindale,  who,  on 
being  met  at  the  door  by  Mrs.  Shepherd,  coolly  told  her  that  he  had 
come  to  burn  the  house.  She  asked  him  by  what  authority,  lie 
told  her  by  that  of  General  Hunter,  and  showed  her  his  written 
order.  On  reading  it,  she  said  :  "The  order,  I  see,  sir,  is  for  yon  to 
burn  the  houses  of  Colonel  Alexander  It.  Boteler  and  Mr.  Edmund 
I.  Lee.  Xow  this  is  not  Colonel  Boteler's  house,  but  is  the  property 
of  my  mother,  Mrs.  Boteler,  and  therefore  must  not  be  destroyed, 
as  you  have  no  authority  to  burn  her  house.*'  "It's  Colonel  Boteler's 
1i(nit<\  and  that's  enough  for  me,"  was  Martindale's  reply.  She  then 
said:  "I  have  been  obliged  to  remove  all  my  personal  effects  here, 
and  have  several  thousand  dollars'  worth  of  property  stored  in  the 
house  and  outbuildings,  which  belongs  to  me  and  my  children.  Can 
I  not  be  permitted  to  save  it?"  But  Martindale  curtly  told  her  that 
he  intended  to  uburn  everything  under  roof  upon  the  place/'  Mean 
while,  some  of  the  soldiers  were  plundering  the  house  of  silver  spoons, 
forks,  cups,  and  whatever  they  fancied,  while  others  piled  the  parlor 
furniture  on  the  floors,  and  others  poured  kerosene  on  the  piles  and 
floors,  which  they  then  set  on  lire.  They  had  brought  the  kerosene 
with  them,  in  canteens  strapped  to  their  saddles.  Miss  Boteler,  being 
devoted  to  music,  pleaded  hard  for  her  piano,  as  it  belonged  to  her, 
having  been  a  gift  from  her  grandmother,  but  she  was  brutally  for 
bidden  to  save  it ;  whereupon,  although  the  flames  were  roaring  in 
the  adjoining  rooms,  and  the  roof  all  on  fire,  she  quietly  went  into 
the  house,  and  seating  herself  for  the  last  time  before  the  instrument, 


182  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

sang  her  favorite  hymn  :  "  Thy  will  be  done."  Then  shutting  down 
the  lid  and  locking  it,  she  calmly  went  out  upon  the  lawn,  where  her 
sick  sister  and  the  frightened  little  children  were  sitting  under  the 
trees,  the  only  shelter  then  left  for  them. 

Martindale's  written  order  from  Hunter  also  embraced  another 
Virginia  home.  He  burned  it,  too.  The  story  is  told  by  the  gifted 
mistress  of  that  household  in  the  following  letter,  which  was 
delivered  to  Hunter.  I  have  been  furnished  a  copy,  with  permission 
to  publish  it.  This  letter  will  live  in  history  for  its  eloquence  and 
sublime  invective : 

SHEPHEBDSTOWX,  VA.,  July  20th,  1864. 
General  Hunter : — 

Yesterday,  your  underling,  Captain  Martindale,  of  the  First  New  York 
Cavalry,  executed  your  infamous  order  and  burned  my  house.  You  have  the 
satisfaction  ere  this  of  receiving  from  him  the  information  that  your  orders 
were  fulfilled  to  the  letter;  the  dwelling  and  every  outbuilding,  seven  in  number, 
with  their  contents,  being  burned.  I,  therefore,  a  helpless  woman  whom  you  have 
cruelly  wronged,  address  you,  a  Major  General  of  the  United  States  Army,  and 
demand  why  this  was  done?  What  was  my  offense?  My  husband  was  absent — 
an  exile.  He  never  had  been  a  politician  or  in  any  way  engaged  in  the  struggle 
now  going  on,  his  age  preventing.  This  fact  your  chief-of-staff,  David  Strother, 
could  have  told  you.  The  house  was  built  by  my  father,  a  Revolutionary  soldier, 
who  served  the  whole  seven  years  for  your  independence.  There  was  I  born ;  there 
the  sacred  dead  repose.  It  was  my  house,  and  my  home,  and  there  has  your  niece 
(Miss  Griffith),  who  has  tarried  among  us  all  this  horrid  war  up  to  the  present 
moment,  met  with  all  kindness  and  hospitality  at  my  hands.  Was  it  for  this  that 
you  turned  me,  my  young  daughter  and  little  son  out  upon  the  world  without  a 
shelter?  Or  was  it  because  my  husband  is  the  grandson  of  the  Revolutionary 
patriot  and  "rebel,"  Richard  Henry  Lee,  and  the  near  kinsman  of  the  noblest  of 
Christian  warriors,  the  greatest  of  generals,  Robert  E.  Lee  ?  Heaven's  blessing  be 
upon  his  head  forever  !  You  and  your  government  have  failed  to  conquer,  subdue 
or  match  him ;  and,  disappointed,  rage  and  malice  find  vent  on  the  helpless  and 
inoffensive. 

Hyena-like,  you  have  torn  my  heart  to  pieces !  for  all  hallowed  memories 
clustered  around  that  homestead ;  and,  demon-like,  you  have  done  it  without  even 
the  pretext  of  revenge,  for  I  never  saw  or  harmed  you.  Your  office  is  not  to  lead, 
like  a  brave  man  and  soldier,  your  men  to  fight  in  the  ranks  of  war,  but  your  work 
has  been  to  separate  yourself  from  all  danger,  and  with  your  incendiary  band  steal 
unaware  upon  helpless  women  and  children,  to  insult  and  destroy.  Two  fair  homes 
did  you  yesterday  ruthlessly  lay  in  ashes,  giving  not  a  moment's  warning  to  the 
startled  inmates  of  your  wicked  purpose;  turning  mothers  and  children  out  of  doors, 
your  very  name  execrated  by  your  own  men  for  the  cruel  work  you  gave  them  to  do. 

In  the  case  of  Colonel  A.  R.  Boteler,  both  father  and  mother  were  far  away. 
Any  heart  but  that  of  Captain  Martindale  (and  yours)  would  have  been  touched 
by  that  little  circle,  comprising  a  widowed  daughter  just  risen  from  her  bed  of 
illness,  her  three  little  fatherless  babes — the  oldest  not  five  years  old — and  her  heroic 
sister.  I  repeat,  any  man  would  have  been  touched  at  that  sight.  But,  Captain 
Martindale !  one  might  as  well  hope  to  find  mercy  and  feeling  in  the  heart  of  a 
wolf  bent  on  his  prey  of  young  lambs,  as  to  search  for  such  qualities  in  his  bosom. 
You  have  chosen  well  your  agent  for  such  deeds,  and  doubtless  will  promote  him ! 


FIRE,  SWORD,  AND  THE  HALTER.  183 

A  colonel  of  the  Federal  army  has  stated  that  you  deprived  forty  of  your  offi 
cers  of  their  commands  because  they  refused  to  carry  out  your  malignant  mischief. 
All  honor  to  their  names  for  this,  at  least !  They  are  men — they  have  human  hearts 
and  blush  for  such  a  commander ! 

I  ask  who,  that  does  not  wish  infamy  and  disgrace  attached  to  him  forever, 
would  serve  under  you  !  Your  name  will  stand  on  history's  page  as  the  Hunter  of 
weak  women  and  innocent  children  ;  the  Hunter  to  destroy  defenseless  village's  and 
relined  and  beautiful  homes — to  torture  afresh  the  agonized  hearts  of  the  widows; 
the  Hunter  of  Africa's  poor  sons  and  daughters,  to  lure  them  on  to  ruin  and  death 
of  soul  and  body;  the  Hunter  with  the  relentless  heart  of  a,  wild  beast,  the  face  of 
a  fiend,  and  the  form  of  a  man.  Oh,  Earth,  behold  the  monster !  Can  I  say,  "  God 
forgive  you  ?  "  No  prayer  can  be  offered  for  you  !  Were  it  possible  for  human  lips 
to  raise  your  name  heavenward,  angels  would  thrust  the  foul  thing  back  again,  and 
demons  claim  their  own.  The  curses  of  thousands,  the  scorn  of  the  manly  and 
upright,  and  the  hatred  of  the  true  and  honorable,  will  follow  you  and  yours  through 
all  time,  and  brand  your  name  infamy!  infamy ! 

Again,  I  demand  why  have  you  burned  my  house  ?  Answer  as  you  must 
answer  before  the  Searcher  of  all  hearts;  why  have  you  added  this  cruel,  wicked 
deed  to  your  many  crimes  ? 

HEX  El  ETTA  E.  LEE. 

I  have  only  recited  the  more  prominent  incidents  of  Hunter's 
brief  career  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia.  The  United  States  Govern 
ment  could  not  stand  it,  his  army  could  not  stand  it,  as  many  of  his 
prominent  officers  yet  living  tell  how  keenly  they  felt  the  stigma 
such  acts — beyond  their  control — brought  on  them.  Shortly  after 
the  date  of  Mrs.  Lee's  letter  he  was  removed,  to  the  honor  of  the 
service,  and  General  Sheridan  was  his  successor — of  his  career,  per 
haps,  anon  !  If  the  people  of  Clmmbersburg  will  carefully  read  this 
record  of  wanton  destruction  of  private  property,  this  "o'er  true 
tale"  of  cruel  wrong  inflicted  on  the  helpless,  they  will  understand 
why,  when  goaded  to  madness,  remuneration  was  demanded  at  their 
hands  by  General  Early,  and  upon  its  refusal  retaliation  was  inflicted 
on  the  nearest  community  that  could  be  reached,  and  it  was  their 
misfortune  to  be  that  community.  Contrast  Lee  in  Pennsylvania,  in 
1803,  and  Hunter  in  Virginia,  in  1804,  and  judge  them  both  as 
history  will. 


UNION  VIEW  OF  THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS. 


BY    GENEKAL    KOBERT    S.   NOKTIICOTT.     , 


I  HAVE  been  a  regular  reader 
of  the  "  Unwritten  History  of 
the  Late  War,"  as  published 
in  the  WEEKLY  TIMES.  I 
read  the  history  of  the  ex 
change  of  prisoners  by  Judge 
Quid,  the  Confederate  Com 
missioner  of  Exchange,  in 
which  Secretary  Stanton  and 
other  Federal  officers  are 
charged  with  violating  the 
cartel,  while  the  Confederate 
authorities  are  represented  as 
acting  in  good  faith.  I  be 
lieve  that  I  wrill  be  able  to 
show  that  all  the  obstructions 
to  the  exchange  of  prisoners  during  the  late  war  w^ere  the  result  of 
bad  faith  in  the  President  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  On  the 
2d  of  July,  1862,  a  cartel  was  agreed  upon  by  the  belligerents,  in 
which  it  was  stipulated  that  all  prisoners  captured  by  either  party 
should  be  paroled  and  delivered  at  certain  points  specified  within 
ten  days  after  their  capture,  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable. 
This  was  to  be  done  in  all  cases  except  those  in  wThich  commanding 
generals  on  the  battle-field  paroled  their  prisoners  by  agreement. 
No  other  paroles  were  valid.  If  a  guerrilla  chief  captured  a  foraging 
party,  and  paroled  those  who  composed  it,  it  amounted  to  nothing, 
and  if  their  officers  ordered  them  into  immediate  service,  it  was  no 
violation  of  the  cartel. 

In  March,  1863,  the  gallant  General  A.  D.  Streight,  then  Colonel 
of  the  Fifty-first  Indiana  Infantry,  by  order  of  General  Rosecrans, 
made  a  raid  at  the  head  of  a  picked  brigade,  setting  out  from  Mur- 
freesboro,  Tennessee,  and  proceeding  into  the  northern  part  of 
Alabama,  and  thence  into  Northern  Georgia.  When  he  had 
advanced  as  far  as  Home,  Georgia,  he  was  intercepted  by  the  Con- 

(184) 


UNION  VIEW  OF  THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  185 

federate  General  Forrest,  with  a  largely  superior  force,  and  his 
retreat  being  cut  off,  he  was  compelled  to  make  the  "best  terms  he 
could  with  liis  enemy.  General  Forrest  gave  him  as  liberal  terms 
of  surrender  as  he  could  expect.  It  was  stipulated  that  Colonel 
Streight  and  his  officers  and  men  were  to  be  paroled  and  passed  into 
the  Federal  lines  at  as  early  a  period  as  practicable.  General  Forrest 
furnished  Colonel  Streight  with  a  copy  of  the  terms  of  surrender, 
and  him  and  each  of  his  officers  with  a  copy  of  his  parole,  and  they 
were  sent  to  Richmond  to  await  a  nag-of-truce  boat  to  convey  them 
into  the  Federal  lines.  When  they  arrived  at  Richmond,  Colonel 
Streight  and  all  his  commissioned  officers  were  confined  in  Libby 
prison,  while  the  enlisted  men  belonging  to  his  command  were 
forwarded  into  the  Federal  lines;  but  Colonel  Streight's  copy  of  the 
terms  of  surrender,  and  the  duplicate  paroles  of  himself  and  officers, 
were  taken  from  them,  and  they  were  informed  that  President  Davis 
had  decided  that  they  should  not  be  conveyed  within  the  Federal 
lines,  according  to  the  terms  of  their  surrrender,  but  that  they  would 
be  returned  to  Alabama  upon  a  requisition  from  Governor  Shorter, 
to  be  tried  by  the  courts  of  that  State  upon  a  charge  of  abducting 
slaves  (a  few  negroes  had  been  found  as  camp  followers  of  Streiglit's 
armv,  at  the  time  of  his  surrender).  Here  was  a  violation  of  the 
cartel  by  Jeff  Davis  himself.  He  ignored  the  action  of  one  of  his 
military  commanders,  who.  in  the  exercise  of  his  power,  had  com 
mitted  himself  to  a  line  of  conduct  that  Davis,  as  his  superior,  should 
have  seen  was  executed  in  good  faith. 

Colonel  Streight  and  his  officers  were,  accordingly,  retained  in 
Libby  to  await  the  pleasure  of  the  President  of  the  Southern  Con 
federacy  to  return  them  to  the  State  of  Alabama,  there  to  be  tried 
for  negro  stealing.  This  was  the  merest  child's  play;  for,  although 
negroes  were  found  with  Streiglit's  army,  President  Davis  and 
Governor  Shorter  both  knew  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  fasten 
the  crime  of  negro  stealing  upon  Colonel  Streight,  or  any  of  his 
officers.  They  knew  that  Federal  army  officers  were  not  bound  to 
return  runaway  slaves  ;  but  the  whole  matter  was  trumped  up  for  the 
purpose  of  punishing  a  gallant  commander  and  his  brave  officers  for 
having  the  courage  to  raid  two  hundred  miles  into  the  enemy's 
country.  Here  was  a  direct  violation  of  the  cartel.  But  he  was 
guilty  of  other  violations  of  it.  In  the  winter  of  1863,  he  issued 
an  order  forbidding  the  exchange  of  any  officers  belonging  to  the 
command  of  General  Milroy,  who  then  occupied  Winchester,  Vir 
ginia,  with  a  considerable  force.  This  he  did  Avithout  any  just 
cause,  for  neither  General  Milroy,  nor  any  of  his  officers,  had  violated 
the  laws  of  civilized  warfare. 


186  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

But  to  return  to  Colonel  Streight  and  liis  officers.  They  were 
retained  in  Libby,  expecting  every  day  to  be  sent  to  Alabama ;  but, 
in  the  meantime,  Colonel  Ludlow,  the  United  States  Commissioner 
of  Exchange,  arrived  upon  a  flag-of-truce  boat  at  City  Point,  near 
Eichmond,  with  one  hundred  Confederate  prisoners  to  exchange  for 
Colonel  Streight  and  his  officers.  Judge  Quid,  in  compliance  with 
instructions  received  from  his  President,  informed  Colonel  Ludlow 
that  Colonel  Streight  and  his  officers  had  been  demanded  by 
Governor  Shorter,  of  Alabama,  and  that  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  had  decided  to  comply  with  this  demand,  and,  consequently, 
could  not  send  them  ;  but  he  would  send  all  the  other  officers  except 
Streight's  command,  and  give  him  credit  for  the  one  hundred  Con 
federate  officers.  There  were  not  a  dozen  Federal  officers  in  prison 
at  that  time  beside  Streight's  command.  He  proposed  sending  the 
full  equivalent  for  the  hundred  as  soon  as  they  should  be  captured. 
Of  course,  Colonel  Ludlow  refused  to  accede  to  this  proposition,  but 
answered  Judge  Ould  that  unless  Streight  and  all  his  officers  were 
delivered  he  would  return  with  the  Confederate  prisoners.  Judge 
Ould  persistently  refusing  to  send  Streight  and  his  officers,  Colonel 
Ludlow,  accordingly,  returned  with  them. 

Another  violation  of  the  cartel  by  the  Confederate  authorities 
came  about  in  the  following  manner:  Generals  Morgan,  Imboden, 
Ferguson,  McNeil,  and  other  guerrilla  chiefs  had  captured  a  con 
siderable  number  of  Federal  soldiers,  made  up  of  small  foraging 
parties,  stragglers,  etc.,  and  paroled  them  when  and  where  captured, 
in  order  to  avoid  the  trouble  and  expense  of  conveying  them  to  any 
of  the  points  designated  in  the  cartel.  These  paroles  not  being 
valid,  the  men  accepting  them  were  ordered  to  duty  immediately ; 
but  these  paroles  were  all  charged  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States.  After  General  Grant  had  captured  Yicksburg,  and  paroled 
Pemberton's  army,  every  member  of  that  army  was  declared 
exchanged,  as  an  offset  to  the  irregularly  paroled  Federal  prisoners, 
when  the  former  amounted  to  three  times  as  many  as  the  latter.  At 
this  time  the  Federal  Government  had  a  large  excess  of  prisoners ; 
but,  as  the  Confederate  Government  had  violated  the  cartel  when 
ever  any  advantage  was  to  be  gained  by  it,  it  was  deemed  expedient 
not  to  exchange.  Shortly  after  the  Yicksburg  exchange,  Judge 
Ould  proposed  to  exchange  man  for  man,  according  to  rank,  pro 
vided  the  party  having  the  excess  would  parole  them.  This  was  an 
act  of  cool  effrontery ;  for,  had  the  Federal  Government  acceded  to 
it,  the  Confederacy  would  have  claimed  the  right  to  retain  Streight 
and  his  men,  all  officers  commanding  negro  soldiers,  all  negro 


UNION  VIEW  OF  THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS,  187 

prisoners,  and  all  others  against  whom  they  could  have  trumped  up 
charges.  They  had  then  gone  so  far  that  they  refused  to  release 
chaplains  and  surgeons.  They  would  have  obtained  20,000  men 
above  an  equivalent  for  the  Federal  prisoners  which  they  held. 
These  20,000  would  have  been  thrown  into  the  Held,  judging  from 
the  former  course  of  the  Confederate  authorities. 

The  Confederate  Government  either  did  not  understand  the 
usages  of  civilized  warfare,  or  else  violated  them  wilfully  Federal 
officers,  who  fell  into  their  hands,  were  frequently  condemned 
to  close  confinement  in  damp  cells,  upon  frivolous  charges.  In  the 
summer  of  18G3,  General  Xeal  Dow  was  captured  near  Port  Hudson, 
Louisiana,  and  first  sent  to  Richmond,  and  confined  in  Libby  prison, 
but  was  shortly  transferred  to  Pensacola,  Florida,  and  placed  in 
close  confinement  upon  some  frivolous  charge.  lie  was  kept  there 
a  few  months,  and  then  returned  to  Libby,  without  being  tried,  or 
even  knowing  what  the  charges  against  him  were.  Captains  Sawyer 
and  Flinn  were  condemned  by  lottery  to  sutler  death  by  hanging 
without  any  just  cause.  The  gallant  General  Harry  White  was 
subjected  to  much  annoyance,  and  his  exchange  refused  and  delayed, 
because  he  was  a  member  of  the  State  Senate  of  Pennsylvania,  and 
had  he  been  exchanged,  he  would  probably  have  resumed  his  place 
in  the  Senate,  which  would  have  given  his  party  one  majority  in  that 
body.  Notwithstanding  the  Federal  Government  frequently 
offered  liberal  terms  of  exchange  for  him,  the  Confederates 
persistently  refused,  and  on  the  25th  of  December,  1  $«>?>,  he  was 
sent  to  Salisbury,  Xorth  Carolina,  and  there  placed  in  close  confine 
ment.  He  was  kept  there  and  in  other  Southern  prisons  until  the 
following  September,  when  he  made  his  escape,  and  succeeded  in 
reaching  the  Federal  lines  at  Knoxville,  Tennessee.  Such  treatment 
as  General  White  received  was  violative  of  the  rules  of  civilized 
warfare. 

The  treatment  of  General  Goff,  of  West  Virginia,  by  the 
Confederates,  was  more  reprehensible,  if  possible,  than  that  of 
General  White.  General  Goff,  at  the  time  of  his  capture,  was 
Major  of  the  Fourth  West  Virginia  Cavalry.  He  was  confined  in 
Libby  prison  with  other  Federal  officers  for  a  short  time,  when  it 
was  concluded  to  place  him  in  close  confinement,  as  a  hostage  for  a 
Confederate  Major,  by  the  name  of  Armsey,  who  had  been  con 
demned  to  be  executed  by  hanging,  but  whose  sentence  had  been 
commuted  to  fifteen  years'  solitary  confinement  in  Fort  Delaware  by 
President  Lincoln.  This  Armsey,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  was 
a  citizen  of  Harrison  county,  West  Virginia.  At  the  beginning  of 


188  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  war  lie  took  part  with  the  rebellion,  and  was  commissioned 
major.  Some  time  in  the  spring  of  1863,  Armsey  returned  to  his 
home,  which  was  then  in  the  Federal  lines,  and  commenced  recruiting 
clandestinely  for  the  Confederate  service,  and  while  engaged  in  this 
work  was  captured,  and  condemned  to  death  by  hanging.  When 
the  finding  of  the  court-martial  was  presented  to  the  President  for 
approval,  he  commuted  the  sentence  to  solitary  confinement,  as 
above  stated.  Though  the  proceedings  in  Armsey's  case  were 
regular,  and  in  strict  accordance  with  the  usages  of  war,  the 
Confederate  Government  protested  against  his  punishment,  and 
when  Major  Goff  was  captured,  resolved  to  put  him  into  like 
confinement  as  Armsey,  as  a  measure  of  retaliation,  and  Major  Goff 
was  accordingly  taken  from  Libby  to  Salisbury,  and  placed  in  close 
confinement,  and  kept  there  for  several  months.  Major  Goff  had 
been  guilty  of  no  infraction  of  the  laws  of  war.  lie  was  then  very 
young,  and  belonged  to  a  wealthy  and  influential  family,  residing  in 
the  same  county  as  Armsey,  and  he  was  punished  as  a  hostage  more 
to  gratify  the  private  malice  of  some  Confederates,  who  suggested 
it,  than  for  any  principle  involved.  Officers  in  command  of  negro 
troops  were  treated  with  all  kinds  of  indignity,  when  they  were  so 
unfortunate  as  to  fall  into  rebel  hands.  On  one  occasion,  two  line 
officers,  commanding  negro  troops,  were  captured  with  two  negro 
soldiers.  Upon  their  arrival  at  Libby  prison  a  small  apartment  was 
extemporized,  and  all  four  confined  together,  and  the  officers 
compelled  to  mess  with  the  negroes  as  a  measure  of  degradation. 

In  December,  1863,  General  Benjamin  F.  Butler  was  made 
Federal  Commissioner  of  Exchange,  by  an  order  from  the  War 
Department.  The  Confederate  Government  refused  to  communi 
cate  with  him,  because  Jeff  Davis  had,  at  one  time  during  Butler's 
military  administration  at  New  Orleans,  issued  a  proclamation, 
solemnly  and  pompously  declaring  General  Butler  an  outlaw.  All 
communications  from  the  Confederate  Government,  for  a  time, 
were  addressed  to  Major  Mulford,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
flag-of-truce  steamer ;  but  the  Confederates  soon  saw  their  folly,  and 
subsequently  treated  with  General  Butler  in  relation  to  the  exchange 
of  prisoners.  But  the  refusal  to  treat  with  General  Butler  was 
another  obstruction  thrown  in  the  way  of  the  exchange  of  prisoners 
used  by  the  Confederate  Government. 

A  cartel  binds  both  belligerent  parties,  and  when  one  party 
violates  it  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  some  advantage,  the  other 
party  is  not  bound  to  abide  by  the  obligations  of  the  contract.  That 
the  Confederate  Government  first  violated  the  cartel,  there  can  be 


UNION  VIEW  OF  THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PRISONERS.  189 

no  doubt.  The  forbidding  of  the  exchange  of  General  Milroy's 
officers,  was  a  violation  of  it ;  the  holding  of,  and  refusing  to  ex 
change,  Streight  and  his  officers,  was  a  violation ;  the  sentence  of 
Sawyer  and  Flinn  to  be  hung,  was  a  violation  ;  the  declaring  of  the 
Vicksburg  prisoners  exchanged,  was  a  violation  ;  the  refusal  to  ex 
change  officers  commanding  negroes,  was  a  violation;  the  treatment 
of  General  White,  and  the  treatment  of  General  Goff,  were  direct 
infractions,  as  was  the  holding  of  surgeons  and  chaplains  as  prisoners 
of  war. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  President  Davis  issued  his  orders 
declaring  General  Butler  an  outlaw,  and  had  refused  to  exchange 
General  Streight  and  his  officers,  before  the  United  States  Govern 
ment  refused  to  return  Confederate  prisoners ;  and  even  after  the 
first  infraction  of  the  cartel,  the  government  at  Washington  con 
tinued  to  send  Confederate  prisoners  to  Richmond,  until  the  refusal 
to  exchange  Streight  and  his  officers.  The  truth  is,  the  Federal 
Government  found  it  impossible  to  continue  the  general  exchange 
of  prisoners  without  giving  the  Confederate  Government  the  power 
to  deal  unjustly  with  many  of  the  Federal  officers  who  fell  into 
their  hands.  Had  Jefferson  Davis  and  his  confederates  been  per 
mitted  to  keep  Streight  and  his  officers,  and  turned  them  over  to 
the  Governor  of  Alabama,  to  have  a  mock  trial  in  his  State  courts, 
on  the  false  charge  of  negro  stealing,  and  condemned  to  imprison 
ment  at  hard  labor  in  the  Alabama  penitentiary;  had  they  been 
permitted  to  hang  Sawyer  and  Flinn,  and  commit  indignities  upon 
other  Federal  officers  whom  they  desired  to  maltreat,  they  would,  of 
course,  have  been  glad  to  continue  the  exchange.  But  the  demand 
of  the  Confederates  just  amounted  to  this  :  They  must  hang  or  keep 
in  close  confinement  every  Federal  officer  against  whom  they  chose 
to  prefer  charges  of  a  violation  of  the  laws  of  war,  and  all  officers 
commanding  negro  troops,  while  they  required  the  Federal  Govern 
ment  to  return  to  them  all  prisoners  captured.  They  acted  all  the 
time  as  if  the  Federal  Government  were  bound  to  a  strict  obedience 
to  the  laws  of  war,  while  they  were  exempt  from  that  obedience, 
because  they  were  rebels.  They  hung  spies,  and  denied  the  Federal 
Government  that  right.  They  assumed  the  right  to  declare  t hat- 
officers  commanding  negro  troops,  and  negro  troops  themselves, 
were  not  entitled  to  the  humanities  of  war.  They  assumed  that  the 
United  States  should  not  be  governed  by  the  accepted  code  of  war 
fare,  but  by  one  specially  manufactured  for  them  by  the  Confederate 
Government.  By  this  code,  if  a  commander  of  the  Union  army 
hung  a  spy,  the  Confederate  Government  would  hang  a  Federal 


190  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

soldier  or  officer  of  equal  rank,  who  was  no  spy,  by  way  of  retalia 
tion.  By  this  code,  the  United  States  Government  were  required  to 
deliver  all  the  Confederate  prisoners  captured,  while  the  Confederate 
Government  should  be  permitted  to  retain  any  prisoners  they  chose, 
and  condemn  them  to  execution,  or  otherwise  maltreat  them. 

So  far  as  the  treatment  of  prisoners  while  confined  in  the  Con 
federate  military  prisons  is  concerned,  I  have  carefully  refrained 
from  saying  anything,  and  I  have  written  this  chapter  only  to  vindi 
cate  the  truth  of  history. 


THE  MORALE  OF  GENERAL  LEE'S  ARMY. 


BY    REV.    ,T.    WILLIAM    JONES,     D.  D. 


Tx  his  testimony  before  the 
"Committee  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  AVaiv  Major  General 
Joseph  Hooker  says:  "Our 
artillery  had  always  been 
superior  to  that  of  the  rebels, 
as  was  also  our  infantry. 
e,wj>t  in  discipline]  and 
t/taf,  for  reasons  not  necessary 
to  mention,  never  did  equal 
Lee's  army.  With  a  rank 
and  file  vcistly  inferior  t<> 
our  ou*n,  intellectually  a/id 
pliysiccdly,  that  army  had,  by 
discipline  olonc^  acquired  a 
character  for  steadiness  and 
efficiency  unsurpassed,  in  my  judgment,  in  ancient  or  modern  times. 
AVe  have  not  been  able  to  rival  it,  nor  has  there  been  any  near 
approximation  to  it  in  the  other  rebel  armies."  [  Italics  mine.] 

I  do  not  propose  to  enter  upon  any  "odious"  comparison 
between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of  Xortliern 
Virginia,  as  to  the  character  of  the  men  who  composed  them;  yet.  I 
think  I  shall  be  able  to  show  that  General  Hooker  is  entirely  mis 
taken  in  attributing  the  confessed  superiority  of  the  Army  of 
Xortliern  Virginia  to  "discipline  cdon<\"  and  that  this  army  was 
composed  of  a  body  of  men  who,  in  all  the  qualities  which  go  to 
make  up  what  we  call  morale,  were  rarely,  if  ever,  equaled,  and  never 
surpassed  by  any  army  that  ever  marched  or  fought  '*  in  all  the  tide 
of  time." 

1  he  very  circumstances  which  produced  the  organization  of 
that  army  called  into  it  the  flower  of  the  South.  On  the  memorable 
17th  day  of  April,  ISfil,  the  day  on  which  the  Virginia  Convention 
passed  its  Ordinance  of  Secession,  I  witnessed  at  the  little  village  of 
Louisa  Court-House,  Virginia,  a  scene  similar  to  those  enacted  all 

(101) 


192  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

over  the  South,  which  none  who  saw  it  can  ever  forget.  The 
"Louisa  Blues,"  a  volunteer  company,  composed  of  the  very  best 
young  men  of  the  county,  were  drilling  at  noon  on  the  Court  green, 
when  a  telegram  from  Richmond  ordered  them  to  be  ready  to  take 
a  train  of  cars  at  sundown  that  evening.  Immediately  all  was  bustle 
and  activity;  couriers  were  sent  in  every  direction  to  notify 
absentees,  and  in  every  household  busy  lingers  and  anxious  hearts 
were  engaged  in  preparing  these  brave  volunteers  to  meet  promptly 
the  call  of  their  native  Virginia.  There  was  scarcely  a  laggard  or  a 
skulker  in  the  whole  company.  Delicate  boys,  of  scarcely  sixteen, 
vied  with  gray-haired  fathers  in  eagerness  to  march  to  the  post  of 
duty,  and  an  hour  before  the  appointed  time  that  splendid  company 
(numbering  considerably  more  than  its  original  roll  strength) 
gathered  at  the  depot,  where  an  immense  crowd  had  assembled  to 
see  them  off.  An  aged  minister  of  the  Gospel  spoke  words  of  earnest 
counsel,  and  led  the  multitude  in  fervent  prayer  that  the  God  of 
Jacob  might  go  forth  with  these  patriot  soldiers,  keep  them  in  the 
way  whither  they  went,  and  bring  them  back  to  their  homes  in  safety 
and  peace ;  but,  above  all,  that  he  would  shield  them  from  the  vices 
of  the  camp,  and  lead  them  into  paths  of  righteousness. 

The  man  of  God  is  interrupted  by  the  shrill  whistle  of  the  iron 
horse — the  train  dashes  up  to  the  depot,  all  are  soon  aboard,  and, 
amid  the  waving  of  handkerchiefs,  the  cheers  of  the  multitude,  and 
the  suppressed  sobs  of  anxious  mothers,  waives,  sisters,  and  daughters, 
those  noble  men  go  forth  at  the  bidding  of  the  sovereign  power  of 
their  loved  and  honored  State.  At  Gordonsville  they  are  joined  by 
companies  from  Staunton,  Charlottesville,  and  the  University  of 
Virginia;  and  Orange,  Culpepper,  and  other  counties  along  the 
route  swell  their  numbers  as  they  hasten  to  the  capture  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  the  defense  of  the  border.  The  call  of  Virginia  now 
echoes  through  the  land,  and  from  seaboard  to  mountain  valley  the 
tramp  of  her  sons  is  heard.  Maryland,  the  Carolinas,  Georgia, 
Florida,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Arkansas, 
Louisiana,  Missouri,  and  distant  Texas,  catch  the  sound — her  sons  in 
every  clime  heed  the  call  of  their  mother  State ;  and  these  rush  to 
our  Northern  border — the  very  flower  of  the  intelligence,  the  wealth, 
the  education,  the  social  position,  the  culture,  the  refinement,  the 
patriotism,  and  the  religion  of  the  South — to  form  the  armies  of  the 
Shenandoah,  and  Manassas,  and  Norfolk,  which  those  masters  of  the 
art  of  war,  J.  E.  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  moulded  into  what  was 
afterward  the  famous  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  with  which  our 
peerless  Lee  won  his  series  of  splendid  victories. 


THE  MORALE  OF  GEXEEAL   LEE\S  AR1IY.  193 

It  was  common  for  the  Xorthern  press  to  represent  that 
"secession  leaders'1'  betrayed  the  people  of  the  South,  and  led  them 
unawares  and  unwilling  into  "the  rebellion,"  and  many  of  the  so- 
called  "histories"  still  insist  that  the  "Union"  men  of  the  South 
were  forced  against  their  will  into  "the  revolt/'  Xever  were  a 
people  more  misrepresented.  The  simple  truth  is,  that  after  Mr. 
Lincoln  issued  his  proclamation,  calling  for  troops  to  coerce  sovereign 
States,  there  ceased  to  he  any  "  Union  "  party  in  the  South,  and  the 
people  of  every  class  and  every  section  prepared  for  resistance  to  the 
hitter  end,  &&&  forced  thi-ir  leaders  to  join  the  secession  movement. 
A  public  sentiment  was  at  once  formed,  which  not  only  impelled 
our  best  men  to  enter  the  army,  but  branded,  as  a  "skulker,"  the 
able-bodied  young  man  who  failed  to  do  so.  This  spirit  affected  the 
character  of  all  of  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy,  and  none  more 
than  the  Army  of  Xorthern  Virginia. 

The  colleges  of  the  South  were  deserted,  and  professors  and 
students  alike  enlisted.  The  "learned  professions"  were  suspended, 
and  the  office  abandoned  for  the  camp.  The  hum  of  the  workshop 
ceased,  the  plough  was  left  in  the  furrow,  the  ledger  was  left 
unposted,  in  many  instances  the  pastor  enlisted  with  the  men  of  his 
flock,  and  the  delicate  sons  of  luxury  vied  with  the  hardy  sons  of 
toil  in  meeting  patiently  the  hardships,  privations,  and  sufferings  of 
the  camp,  the  march,  the  bivouac,  or  the  battle-field.  1  remember 
that  the  first  time  I  ever  saw  the  "  Tiockbridge  Artillery" —that 
famous  battery  which  was  attached  to  the  "Stonewall  Brigade"  at 
the  first  battle  of  Manassas,  with  "Rev.  Dr.  (afterward  General; 
Pendleton  as  its  captain — it  had  as  private  soldiers  in  its  ranks  no 
less  than  seven  Masters  of  Arts  of  the  University  of  Virginia  (the 
highest  evidence  of  real  scholarship  of  any  degree  conferred  by  any 
institution  in  this  country),  a  large  number  of  graduates  of  other 
colleges,  and  a  number  of  others  of  the  verv  pick  of  the  young  men 
of  the  State,  among  them  a  son  of  General  R.  E.  Lee,  and  a  score  or 
more  of  theological  students.  Two  companies  of  students  of 
the  University  of  Virginia  were  mustered  into  service,  and  fully 
nine-tenths  of  the  five  hundred  and  fifty  students,  who  were  at  the 
University  that  session,  promptly  entered  the  Confederate  service — 
most  of  them  the  Army  of  Xorthern  Virginia — as  private  soldiers. 

When  Ivev.  Dr.  Junkin,  of  Pennsylvania,  who  was  then  presi 
dent  of  Washington  College,  Lexington,  Virginia,  called  a  meeting 
of  his  faculty  to  devise  means  of  punishing  the  students  for  raising 
a  secession  flag  on  the  dome  of  the  college,  the  day  after  Virginia 
seceded,  he  found  the  faculty  in  hearty  sympathy  with  the  students ; 
13 


194  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  while  the  doctor  resigned  his  position,  and  went  North,  the 
students  formed  a  volunteer  company,  and  marched  to  the  front 
under  Professor  White  as  their  captain.  Even  Dr.  Junkin's  own 
sons  threw  themselves  heartily  into  the  Confederate  struggle,  while 
his  son-in-law  left  his  quiet  professor's  chair  at  Lexington  to  become 
the  world-famous  "  Stonewall  Jackson."  The  president  of  llampden- 
Sidney  College,  Virginia  (Rev.  Dr.  Atkinson),  entered  the  service  at 
the  head  of  a  company  of  his  students.  Major  T.  J.  Jackson  marched 
the  corps  of  cadets  of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute  from  the  parade- 
ground  at  Lexington  at  precisely  twelve  o'clock  on  the  day  he  received 
orders  from  the  Governor  of  the  Commonwealth,  and  all  these  young 
men  entered  active  service.  Indeed,  every  college  in  Virginia,  and 
throughout  the  South,  suspended  its  regular  exercises,  and  the  "mid 
night  lamp  "  of  the  student  was  exchanged  for  the  "  camp-fires  of  the 
boys  in  gray." 

There  might  have  been  seen  in  the  ranks  of  one  of  the  companies 
a  vonng  man  who  met  every  duty  as  a  private  soldier  with  enthusi 
asm,  but  who  carried  in  his  haversack  copies  of  the  Greek  classics, 
which  he  read  on  the  march  or  around  the  camp-fires,  who  has, 
since  the  war,  borne  off,  at  a  German  university,  the  highest  honor 
ever  won  there  by  an  American ;  who  now  fills  the  chair  of  Greek 
in  one  of  the  most  important  universities  at  the  South,  and  who  has 
already  won  a  place  in  the  very  front  rank  of  American  scholars.  I 
remember  another  (a  Master  of  Arts  of  the  University  of  Virginia), 
whom  I  found  lying  on  an  oilcloth  during  an  interval  in  the  battle 
of  Cold  Harbor,  in  1804,  oblivious  of  everything  around  him,  and 
deeply  absorbed  in  the  study  of  Arabic,  in  which,  as  in  other 
Oriental  languages,  he  has  perfected  himself,  since  the  war,  at  the 
LTniversity  of  Berlin,  and  by  his  own  studies  in  connection  with  the 
professorship  he  fills,  until  he  has  now  no  superior,  and  scarcely  an 
equal,  in  that  department  in  this  country.  In  winter  quarters,  it 
was  very  common  to  organize  schools,  in  which  accomplished 
teachers  would  guide  enthusiastic  students  into  the  mysteries  of 
Latin,  Greek,  modern  languages,  and  the  higher  mathematics. 

One  single  shot  of  the  enemy,  at  first  Fredericksburg,  mor 
tally  wounded  Colonel  Lewis  Minor  Coleman  (professor  of  Latin  at 
the  University  of  Virginia),  who  was  widely  known  and  loved  as 
the  accomplished  scholar,  the  splendid  soldier,  the  high-toned  gen 
tleman,  and  the  humble  Christian ;  Randolph  Fairfax,  one  of  the 
most  accomplished  young  men  and  brightest  Christians  in  the  State ; 
and  Arthur  Robinson,  a  grandson  of  William  Wirt,  and  a  worthy 
son  of  an  illustrious  sire. 


THE  MORALE  OF  GENERAL  LEE'S  ARMY.         105 

I  count  it  my  proud  privilege  to  have  entered  the  service  as 
io'li  private  in  the  rear  rank"  of  the  famous  old  Thirteenth 
Virginia  Infantry,  and  I  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm  that  (while  that 
regiment  was  not  superior  to  others  of  our  army  in  moral]  it  would 
be  impossible  to  pick  out  of  any  community  in  the  land  a  nobler 
body  of  men  than  they  were.  Our  colonel  was  A.  P.  Hill,  who,  by 
gallantry  and  skill,  and  solid  merit,  rose  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant 
general  ;  achieved  a  reputation  for  the  highest  qualities  of  the  soldier, 
and  on  that  last  sad  day  at  Petersburg,  with  a  sick  furlough  in  his 
pocket,  yielded  up  his  noble  life  in  an  attempt  to  restore  his  broken 
lines.  Our  lieutenant  colonel  was  James  A.  AValker,  who  won  his 
wreath  and  stars  by  cool  courage  and  notable  skill;  who  was  the  last 
commander  of  the  old  "Stonewall  Brigade;"  who  led  Early  "s  old 
division  to  Appomattox  Court-House,  and  who  has  since  occupied  a 
prominent  portion  ;  is  now  Lieutenant  Governor,  and  exerts  a  potent 
influence  in  the  affairs  of  the  Commonwealth.  Our  major  was  J.  E. 
I).  Terrill,  one  of  the  very  best  drill-masters  in  the  service,  whose 
gallantry  was  conspicuous  on  every  occasion,  and  whose  well-merited 
appointment  as  brigadier  general  the  Confederate  Senate  confirmed 
at  the  very  hour  at  which  he  fell  at  Bethesda  Church,  in  June,  1SC>4, 
while  leading  the  old  Fourth  Virginia  Brigade  in  a  heroic  charge. 
Our  company  officers  were,  many  of  them,  men  fitted  for  the  highest 
command,  and  among  the  rank  and  file  were  those  competent,  in 
every  respect,  to  command  a  brigade,  or  even  a  division.  There 
were  not  a  few  private  soldiers  in  that  army  who  were  wealthy 
planters,  merchant  princes,  leading  citizens,  men  of  rank  and  influ 
ence,  at  home. 

It  has  been  a  subject  of  general  remark  that  since  the  war  our 
Governors,  legislators,  Congressmen,  Senators,  Judges,  city  and  county 
officers,  our  leading  business  and  professional  men,  the  engineers  on 
our  railroads,  the  professors  in  our  colleges,  and  even  our  preachers, 
have  been,  as  a  ride,  selected  from  among  those  who  ''wore  the  gray/' 
The  Radical  press- has  sneered  at  this,  and  held  it  up  as  a  proof  of  the 
existence  of  a  "rebellious  spirit''  still  in  the  South.  It  is  true  that 
there  is  a  feeling  among  our  people  that  they  owe  something  to  the 
men  who  risked  their  lives  for  what  they  believed  to  be  the  cause  of 
justice  and  right;  but  the  real  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  when  we 
look  for  one  of  our  1><  xt  men  to  fill  any  position  of  honor,  emolument 
or  trust,  we  naturally  turn  to  a  Confederate  soldier — for  the  native 
talent,  education,  and  moral  worth  of  the  South  were  in  our  army. 

But  the  rdif/ioiis  element  which  entered  that  army,  or  was 
developed  in  it,  has  absolutely  no  parallel  in  all  history.  Our 


196  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

noble  old  chief  (General  Lee)  was  a  Christian,  not  merely  in  pro 
fession,  but  in  reality,  and  did  everything  in  his  power  to  promote 
the  moral  and  spiritual  welfare  of  his  army.  The  piety  of 
"Stonewall"  Jackson  is  as  historic  as  his  splendid  military  achieve 
ments,  and  the  influence  which  he  exerted  for  the  religious  good  of 
his  officers  and  men  can  never  be  fully  known  in  this  world.  These 
noble  leaders  had  at  the  first  the  co-operation  of  such  Christian 
soldiers  as  Generals  D.  H.  Hill,  T.  E.  Cobb,  A.  II.  Colquitt,  J.  E.  B. 
Stuart,  W.  N.  Pendleton,  John  B.  Gordon,  C.  A.  Evans,  John 
Pegram,  and  a  large  number  of  other  general,  field,  staff,  and  subor 
dinate  officers;  and,  during  the  wrar,  Generals  Ewell,  Longstreet, 
Hood,  Fender,  R.  II.  Anderson,  Rodes,  Paxton,  Baylor,  and  a 
number  of  others  made  professions  of  religion.  Of  the  first  four 
companies  from  Georgia,  which  arrived  in  Virginia,  three  of  the 
captains  were  earnest  Christians,  and  fifty  of  one  of  the  companies 
belonged  to  one  church.  I  remember  one  single  regiment  which 
reported  over  four  hundred  church  members,  when  it  first  came  into 
service,  and  another  regiment  which  contained  five  ministers  of  the 
Gospel — a  chaplain,  one  captain,  and  three  privates. 

I  have  not  space  to  give  the  details,  but  I  have  in  my  possession 
the  minutes  of  our  Chaplains'  Association,  rny  diary  carefully  kept  at 
the  time,  files  of  our  religious  newspapers,  a  large  number  of  letters 
and  memoranda  from  chaplains  and  army  missionaries,  and  other  data, 
going  to  show  that  the  world  has  rarely  witnessed  such  revivals  as  we 
had  in  Lee's  army  from  the  autumn  of  1862  to  the  close  of  the  war.  I 
never  expect  to  address  such  congregations,  or  to  witness  such  results, 
as  we  daily  had  in  that  army.  I  frequently  preached  to  several 
thousand  eager  listeners,  and  I  have  seen  over  five  hundred  inquirers 
after  the  way  of  life  present  themselves  at  one  time,  and  have 
witnessed  hundreds  of  professions  of  conversion  at  one  service.  I 
preached  one  day  in  Davis'  Mississippi  Brigade  to  a  large  congrega 
tion  who  assembled  in  the  open  air,  and  sat  through  the  service  with 
apparently  the  deepest  interest,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  a 
drenching  rain  was  falling  at  the  time.  Upon  several  occasions  I 
saw  barefooted  men  stand  in  the  snow  at  our  service,  and  one  of  the 
chaplains  reported  that  in  February,  1864,  he  preached  in  the  open 
air  to  a  very  large  congregation,  who  stood  in  snow  several  inches 
deep  during  the  entire  service,  and  that  he  counted  in  the  number 
fourteen  barefooted  men.  And  this  eagerness  to  hear  the  Gospel 
was  even  more  manifest  during  the  most  active  campaigns.  On 
those  famous  marches  of  the  Valley  campaign  of  1862,  which  won 
for  our  brave  fellows  the  soubriquet  of  "  Jackson's  Foot  Cavalry,"  I 


THE  MORALE  OF  GENERAL  LEE'S  ARMY.  1<>7 

never  found  the  men  too  weary  to  assemble  in  large  numbers  at  the 
evening1  prayer-meeting,  and  enter  with  hearty  zest  into  the  simple 
service.  At  half-past  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  day  of  the 
battle  of  Cross  Keys,  a  large  part  of  Elzey's  Brigade  promptly 
assembled  on  an  intimation  that  there  would  be  preaching;  the 
chaplain  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Virginia  Regiment  (Rev.  Dr.  George 
13.  Taylor,  now  a  missionary  to  Italy)  was  interrupted  at  "thirdly/' 
in  his  able  and  eloquent  sermon,  by  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  and 
soon  the  shock  of  battle  succeeded  the  invitations  of  the  Gospel. 

The  morning  Early's  Brigade  was  relieved  from  its  perilous 
position    at    AVarrenton    AVhite    Sulphur    Springs,    on    the    second 
Manassas  campaign,  and  recrossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock,  one  of  the  largest  congregations  I  ever  saw,  assembled  for 
preaching.     A  lierce  artillery  duel  was  going  on  at  the  time,  across 
the  river,  and  a  shell  would    occasionally    burst    nearer    than  was 
entirely  comfortable;  but  the  service  went  on,  despite  this  strange 
church  music,  and  the  woods  rang  with  hundreds  of  strong  voices, 
swelling  the  strains  of  an  old  hymn,  which  recalled  precious  memo 
ries  of  home,  and  the  dear  old  church  of  other  davs,  as,  at  the  same 
time,  it  lifted  tender  hearts  up  to  the  God  whom  they  worshiped. 
Just  as  the  last  stanza  of  the  last  hymn,  before  the  sermon,  had  been 
finished,  and  the  preacher  arose  to  announce  his  text,  an  immense 
rifle-shell  fell  in  the  very  centre  of  the    congregation,  and  buried 
itself  in  the  ground,   just  between  the  gallant   colonel  of  the  Thir 
teenth  Virginia  and  one  of  his  captains.      Fortunately,  it  failed   to 
explode,  and  only  threw  dirt  over  all  around.     There  was,  of  course, 
some  commotion  in  that  part  of  the  congregation;   but  quiet  was 
soon  restored,  and  the  chaplain  announced   his  text,  and  was  pro 
ceeding  with  his  sermon,  when  Colonel  AValker  informed  him  that, 
if  he  would  suspend  the  service,  he  would  move  the  brigade  back 
under  shelter  of  the  hill.     Accordingly,  the  command  was  moved 
back  (a  member  of  an  artillery  company  was  wounded   just  as  our 
rear  left  the  ground),  and  I  preached  to  one  of  the  most  solemnly 
attentive    congregations    it  was    ever    my  fortune  to    address.     At 
"early  dawn''  of  the  next  day,  we  moved  on  that  splendid  march 
which  threw   "the    foot   cavalry'"    on   Pope's    flank   and    rear,   and 
compelled  him  (despite  his  general  orders)  to  look  to  his  "lines  of 
retreat/'  and  to  realize  the    now  prophetic  words  of    that   famous 
order:    "Disaster  and   shame  lurk  in   the   rear.''     Alas!    many   of 
those  gallant  fellows  heard  that  day,   on  the  Rappahannock,  their 
last  message  of  salvation. 

The  night  before  the  last  day  at  the  second  ^lanassas.  Colonel 


198  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

W.  II.  S.  Baylor  was  in  command  of  the  old  Stonewall  Brigade,  of 
which  lie  was  made  brigadier  general  the  very  day  he  was  killed. 
Sending  for  his  friend,  Captain  Hugh  White,  he  said  to  him :  "  I 
know  the  men  are  very  much  wearied  out  by  the  battle  of  to-day, 
and  that  they  need  all  of  the  rest  they  can  get  to  fit  them  for  the 
impending  struggle  of  to-morrow ;  but  I  cannot  consent  that  we 
shall  seek  our  repose  until  we  have  had  a  brief  season  of  worship,  to 
thank  God  for  the  victory  of  to-day,  and  to  beseech  His  continued 
protection  and  blessing  during  this  terrible  conflict."  The  men 
were  quietly  notified  that  there  would  be  a  short  prayer-meeting, 
and  nearly  the  whole  of  the  brigade,  and  a  number  from  other  com 
mands,  assembled  at  the  appointed  place.  The  service  was  led  by 
Rev.  A.  C.  Hopkins,  of  the  Second  Virginia  Infantry — one  of  those 
faithful  chaplains  who  was  always  at  the  post  of  duty,  even  though 
it  should  be  the  post  of  danger.  Captain  Hugh  White  entered  into 
the  meeting  with  the  intelligent  zeal  of  the  experienced  Christian. 
Colonel  Baylor  joined  in  with  the  fervor  of  one  who  had  but 
recently  felt  the  preciousness  of  a  new-born  faith  in  Christ,  and  it 
was  a  solemn  and  impressive  scene  to  all.  In  the  great  battle  which 
followed,  the  next  day,  Colonel  Baylor,  with  the  flag  of  the  "  Stone 
wall"  Brigade  in  his  hands,  and  the  shout  of  victory  on  his  lips,  fell, 
leading  a  splendid  charge,  and  gave  his  noble  life  to  the  cause  he 
loved  so  well.  Hard  by,  and  about  the  same  moment,  Captain 
White  was  shot  down,  while  behaving  with  most  conspicuous  gal 
lantry  ;  and  these  two  young  men  had  exchanged  the  service  of  earth 
for  golden  harps,  and  fadeless  crowns  of  victory. 

I  remember  that  on  the  comparatively  quiet  Sabbath  with  which 
we  were  blessed  at  Cold  Harbor,  in  June,  1864,  I  preached  four 
times  to  large  and  deeply  solemn  congregations.  The  service  at 
sundown  was  especially  impressive.  Fully  three  thousand  men 
gathered  on  the  very  ground  over  which  had  been  made  the  grand 
Confederate  charge  which  swept  the  fleld  at  Cold  Harbor  and  Games' 
Mill,  on  the  memorable  27th  of  June,  1862.  It  was  a  beautiful 
Sabbath  eve,  and  all  nature  seemed  to  invite  to  peace  and  repose ; 
b  it  the  long  lines  of  stacked  muskets  gleaming  in  the  rays  of  the 
setting  sun,  the  tattered  battle-flags  rippling  in  the  evening  breeze, 
the  scattering  fire  of  the  picket  line  in  front,  the  occasional  belching 
of  the  artillery  on  the  flanks,  and  the  very  countenances  of  those 
powder-begrimed  veterans  of  an  hundred  fights,  all  spoke  of  victories 
in  the  past,  and  terrible  conflicts  yet  to  come.  The  whole  scene  was 
inspiring,  and  as  I  gazed  into  those  eager,  upturned  faces,  and  saw 
that 


THE  MORALE  OF  GENERAL  LEE'S  ARMY.  109 

"  Something  on  the  soldier's  check 
AY  ashed  oil'  the  stain  of  powder," 

f  tried,  with  an  earnestness  I  have  rarely,  if  ever,  commanded,  to  tell 
them  the  story  of  the  Cross — to  hold  up  Christ  as  "the  way,  the 
truth,  and  the  life  v  ;  and  I  remember  that  there  were  quite  a  number 
who,  at  the  close  of  the  service,  signified  their  personal  acceptance 
of  the  way  of  salvation. 

All  during  that  memorable  campaign,  as  well  as  in  the  trenches 
lit  Petersburg,  the  revival  spirit  was  unabated,  and  incidents  of 
thrilling  interest  occurred.  I  have  in  my  possession  carefully  col 
lated  statistics,  to  show  that,  during  the  four  years  of  its  existence,  at 
least  fp'r'h-<  fi  tltniixitml  soldiers  of  the  .Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
professed  faith  in  Christ,  and  that  these  professions  were  as  genuine 
and  as  lasting  as  those;  of  any  of  the  churches  at  home. 

These  statistics  are  not  given  at  random,  but  are  very  carefully 
compiled  from  the  minutes  of  our  Chaplains'  Association,  the  reports 
of  chaplains  and  an.iy  missionaries  made  at  the  time,  and  other 
sources  of  information,  which  fully  satisfied  me  \\\&ijif teen  thousand- 
is  a  really  low  estimate  of  the  number  of  converts.  And  as  to  the 
genuineness  of  these  professions,  I  am  prepared  to  prove  that  in  their 
after  lives  in  the  army — their  triumphant  deaths — or  the  conduct  of 
the  survivors  since  the  war,  these  army  converts  </\  //  /'"/<-  (of  course 
there  were  some  cases  of  sad  backsliding,  as  there  have  been  in  every 
revival  since  the  days  of  Judas  Iscariot  and  Simon  Magus)  gave  as 
conclusive  evidence  of  the  genuineness  of  their  conversion,  as  is  ever 
found  in  revivals  at  home.  Among  our  chaplains  there  were  some 
of  the  ablest  and  most  devoted  men  in  all  of  the  evangelical  denom 
inations.  AY~e  had  some  inefficient  men.  of  course,  and  the  hard  jokes 
which  irreligious  officers  sometimes  perpetrated  at  the  expense  of 
their  chaplains  (such  as  telling  one  making  for  the  real1,  when  the 
battle  was  growing  hot,  k*  You  have  been  preaching  about  what  a 
sweet  place  heaven  is,  and,  now  that  you  have  a  chance  to  go  there 
in  a  few  minutes,  you  are  running  away  from  it"),  were,  doubtless, 
well  deserved.  And  yet  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  chaplains 
of  the  Army  of  Xorthern  Virginia,  enables  me  to  say  as  I  do,  with 
out  reserve,  that  they  were,  as  a  class,  as  self-sacrificing,  devoted  a 
band  of  Christian  workers  as  the  world  has  seen  since  apostolic  times. 
The  public  sentiment,  among  both  officers  and  men,  in  that  armv, 
would  speedily  drive  away  a  chaplain  who  was  unfaithful  to  his  trust. 

Heligion  became  among  tis  such  a  real,  living,  vital  j.x>n*<  r  that 
even  irreligious  officers  came  to  recognize  and  encourage  it — many 
of  them  having  preaching  regularly  at  their  headquarters,  and 


200  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

treating  the  chaplains  and  missionaries  with  the  greatest  courtesy 
and  respect.  I  can  testify  that,  in  constant  intercourse  with  our 
officers,  from  Generals  Lee,  Jackson,  Ewell,  Stuart,  A.  P.  Hill,  Early, 
J.  B.  Gordon,  J.  A.  Walker,  and  others  of  highest  rank  down  to  the 
lowest  rank,  I  was  never  treated  otherwise  than  with  marked 
courtesy,  kindness,  and  respect,  and  I  usually  found  them  ready  to 
give  me  their  cordial  co-operation  in  my  work. 

I  have  dwelt  at  such  length  on  the  morale  of  Lee's  army, 
because  this  was  the  key  to  its  discipline.  In  the  sense  in  which 
the  term  is  understood  in  the  regular  armies  of  Europe,  or  of  the 
United  States,  we  really  had  no  discipline.  The  degraded  punish 
ments  resorted  to  in  those  armies ;  the  isolation  of  the  officers  from 
the  privates ;  the  mere  machine  performance  of  duty,  and  the 
carrying  out  of  any  routine,  simply  because  discipline  required  it, 
were  almost  unknown  in  our  army.  The  private  mingled  in  freest 
social  intercourse  with  his  officers,  and  learned  to  obey  them,  because 
he  loved  them,  and  loved  the  common  cause  for  which  they  fought. 
Right  or  wrong  (and  I  do  not  propose  to  discuss  that  question  here), 
the  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  enlisted  from  a 
thorough  conviction  that  they  were  defending  the  principles  of 
constitutional  freedom — the  humblest  private  in  the  ranks  could 
"  give  a  reason  for  the  faith  that  was  in  him  " — indeed,  could  make 
an  argument  in  favor  of  the  justice  of  his  cause,  which  it  would 
puzzle  the  ablest  lawyer  on  the  other  side  to  answer.  And  thus 
they  marched  forth  gayly  to  battle,  and  needed  not  the  spur  of 
discipline  to  drive  them  on. 

Personal  devotion  to  their  leaders  was  also  an  important  element 
in  their  discipline  and  morale.  They  ceased  their  loud  murmurs 
against  retreating  from  Darks ville  without  fighting  Patterson, 
because  their  honored  chief  ("  old  Joe  Johnston  ")  said  it  was  best 
not  to  do  so,  and  they  started  with  the  utmost  enthusiasm  from 
Winchester  to  Manassas,  because  he  told  them,  in  general  orders, 
that  it  was  aa  forced  march  to  save  the  country."  They  would 
march,  many  of  them  barefooted,  thirty  or  forty  miles  a  day,  because 
"Old  Stonewall"  said  they  must  "press  forward"  to  accomplish 
important  results,  and  because  he  would  frequently  gallop  along  the 
column  and  give  them  a  chance  to  cheer  him.  And  they  would 
make  the  welkin  ring  with  "  General  Lee  to  the  rear,"  while  they 
counted  it  all  joy  to  fight  five  times  their  numbers  when  the  eyes  of 
their  idolized  chief  were  upon  them.  General  Hooker  was  certainly 
right  in  testifying  that  Lee's  army  had  "acquired  a  character 
for  steadiness  and  efficiency  unsurpassed  in  ancient  or  modern 


THE  MORALE  OF  GENERAL  LEE'S  ARMY.         201 

times ;"  but  it  was  not  from  "  discipline  alone,''  but  because  each 
individual  was  a  hero,  and  the  morale  of  the  whole  army  such  as  the 
world  has  never  seen. 

I  could  Ull  a  volume  with  incidents  of  individual  heroism  on 
the  part  of  private  soldiers  in  that  army.  I  have  space  for  only  a 
few.  At  first  Fredericksburg,  just  after  Lawton's  Georgia  Brigade 
(under  the  command  of  Colonel  Atkinson)  had  driven  the  enemy 
out  of  the  woods  on  Early's  front,  and  made  their  gallant  dash  across 
the  plain  (the  men  growling  loudly  at  being  ordered  back,  saying, 
k'If  it  had  been  those  Virginia  fellows  that  made  the  charge,  "Old 
Jubal'  would  have  let  them  drive  the  Yankees  into  the  river"), 
a  Georgia  boy,  who  seemed  to  be  not  over  sixteen,  rushed  up  to  me 
with  his  two  middle  fingers  shattered,  and  exclaimed  (mistaking  me 
for  a  surgeon),  "Doctor,  I  want  you,  please,  to  cut  off  these  lingers 
and  tie  them  up  as  soon  as  you  can.  The  boys  are  going  into  another 
charge  directly,  and  I  want  to  be  with  them."  I  procured  him  a 
surgeon,  the  wound  was  dressed,  and  the  brave  boy  hurried  to  the 
front  again.  At  Cedar  Creek,  on  the  l!>th  of  October,  lsi'4,  Ser 
geant  Trainum,  the  color-bearer  of  the  Thirteenth  Virginia  Infantry, 
was  surrounded  bv  a  number  of  Sheridan's  troopers,  but — exclaim 
ing,  u  You  may  kill  me,  but  I  will  never  give  up  my  colors"- — he 
fought  until  he  fell  insensible,  and  the  nag  was  stripped  from  his 
body,  around  which  he  had  wrapped  it. 

Looking  through  a  port -hole  in  the  trenches,  below  Petersburg, 
one  day,  a  sudden  gust  of  wind  lifted  mv  hat  off,  and  landed  it 
between  the  two  lines.  Private  George  llaner,  of  Company  1), 
Thirteenth  Virginia  Regiment,  at  once  stepped  up,  and  oll'ered  to 
get  my  hat  for  me.  I  peremptorily  forbade  his  doing  so,  as  I  knew 
the  great  risk  he  would  run  ;  but  the  fearless  fellow  soon  disappeared, 
and  before  long  returned  with  the  hat.  '"How  did  you  manage  to 
get  it  F'  I  asked.  "Oh!  I  crawled  down  the  trench  leading  to  our 
picket  line,  and  fished  it  in  with  a  pole.*'  ''Did  not  the  Yankees 
see  you  F'  "Oh,  yes!  they  shot  at  me  eight  or  ten  times;  but  that 
made  no  difference,  so  they  did  not  hit  me."  Poor  fellow,  he  Avas 
afterward  killed,  bravely  doing  his  duty.  I  frequently  saw  men  in 
the  trenches  at  Petersburg  watching  the  shell  from  the  enemy's 
mortars,  as  they  came  over,  claiming  some  particular  one  as  ''my 
shell,''  and  scarcely  waiting  for  the  smoke  from  the  explosion  to 
clear  away,  before  eagerly  rushing  forward  to  gather  up  the  scattered 
pieces,  which  were  sold  to  the  ordnance  officer  for  a  few  cents  (Con 
federate  money)  per  pound.  They  called  shells  which  went  far  +o 
the  rear,  "  quartermaster  hunters ;''  and  one  day  a  gallant  fellow 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

(utterly  reckless  of  personal  danger  in  liis  eagerness  for  a  joke) 
mounted  the  parapet,  the  target  of  many  sharpshooters,  and  point 
ing  to  a  shell  that  was  flying  over,  exclaimed :  "A  little  further  to 
the  right.  Captain  B—  -  (the  name  of  a  worthy  quartermaster)  is 
down  yonder  under  the  hill." 

Upon  another  occasion,  I  saw  a  good-natured  fellow  frying  some 
meat  on  the  side  of  the  trench,  while  the  Minnie  balls  of  the  sharp 
shooters  whistled  all  around  him.  At  last,  one  struck  in  his  fire, 
and  threw  ashes  in  his  frying-pan,  when  he  quietly  moved  to  the 
other  side  of  the  fire,  as  if  to  avoid  smoke,  and  went  on  with  his 
culinary  operations,  coolly  remarking :  "  Plague  on  those  fellows ; 
I  expect  they  will  spoil  all  my  grease  yet,-  before  they  quit  their 
foolishness." 

I  have  frequently  seen  men  of  that  army  display  a  fortitude 
under  severe  suffering,  a  calm  resignation  or  ecstatic  triumph  in  the 
hour  of  death,  such  as  history  rarely  records.  A  noble  fellow,  who 
fell  at  Games'  Mill,  on  the  27th  of  June,  1862,  said  to  comrades 
who  offered  to  bear  him  from  the  field:  "No!  1  die.  Tell  my 
parents  I  die  happy.  On !  on  to  victory !  Jesus  is  with  me,  and  can 
render  all  the  help  I  need."  Another,  who  fell  mortally  wounded 
at  second  Manassas,  said  to  me,  in  reply  to  my  question  as  to  what 
message  I  should  send  home  for  him  :  "  Tell  father  that  it  would 
be  very  hard  to  die  here  on  the  roadside  without  seeing  him,  or  any 
of  the  loved  ones  at  home ;  but  I  have  fallen  at  the  post  of  duty, 
and,  as  I  have  with  me  the  'friend  that  sticketh  closer  than  a 
brother,'  He  maketh  it  all  peace  and  joy."  A  Georgia  soldier, 
who  was  shot  through  the  mouth,  during  the  battle  of  the  Wilder 
ness,  and  unable  to  speak,  wrote  in  my  note-book  this  sentence :  u  I 
am  suffering  very  much;  but  I  trust  in  Christ,  and  am  perfectly 
resigned  to  His  will.  I  am  ready  still  to  serve  Him  on  earth,  or  to 
go  up  higher,  just  as  He  may  see  fit  to  direct."  Another,  who  was 
mortally  wounded  in  the  "bloody  angle"  at  Spottsylvania  Court- 
House,  said  to  me,  with  a  radiant  smile  :  "  Well,  my  hours  on  earth 
are  numbered.  But  what  care  I  for  that  ?  Jesus  says,  '  Him  that 
cometh  unto  me,  I  will  in  no  wise  cast  out.'  Now  I  have  gone  to 
Him,  and  I  am  happy  in  the  assurance  that  He  will  not  falsify  His 
word,  but  will  be  true  to  His  promise." 

As  the  great  cavalry  chief,  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  was  quietly 
and  calmly  breathing  out  his  noble  life,  he  said  to  President  Davis, 
who  stood  at  his  bedside :  "  I  am  ready  and  willing  to  die,  if  God 
and  my  country  think  that  I  have  fulfilled  my  destiny  and  discharged 
my  duty."  Colonel  Lewis  Minor  Coleman,  of  the  University  of 


THE  MORALE  OF  GENERAL  LEE'S  ARMY.         203 

Virginia,  who  fell  mortally  wounded  at  first  Fredericksburg,  and 
lingered  for  some  weeks  in  great  agony,  uttered  many  sentiments 
which  would  adorn  the  brightest  pages  of  Christian  experience,  and, 
among  other  things,  sent  this  message  to  his  loved  and  honored 
chieftains  :  "Tell  Generals  Lee  and  Jackson  that  they  know  how  a 
Christian  soldier  should  1'icc  •  I  only  wish  they  were  here  to  see  a 
Christian  soldier  <//<•„'/"  2s  ot  many  months  afterward  Jackson  was 
called  to  ''cross  over  the  river,  and  rest  under  the  shade  of  the 
trees,1'  and  left  another  bright  illustration  of  how  Christian  soldiers 
of  that  army  were  wont  to  <l't<\  Colonel  AVillie  Pegram,  "the  boy 
artillerist,"1  as  he  was  familiarly  called,  left  the  University  of 
Virginia,  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  war,  as  a  private  soldier,  rose  to 
the  rank  of  colonel  of  artillery  (he  refused  a  tender  of  promotion  to 
the  command  of  an  infantry  brigade),  upon  more  than  one  occasion 
elicited  high  praise  from  A.  P.  Hill,  Jackson,  and  Lee,  and,  at  the 
early  age  of  twenty-two,  fell  on  the  ill-fated  field  of  Five  Forks, 
gallantly  resisting  the  overwhelming  odds  against  him.  His  last 
words  were:  "./  have  done  nnj  dniij,  and  now  1  tufu  to  ?//// 
Stivtor" 

And  thus  I  might  fill  pages  with  the  dying  words  of  these 
noble  men,  which  are,  indeed,  ''apples  of  gold  in  pictures  of  silver," 
and  show  that  they  were  taught  by  God's  spirit  how  to  Jive,  and 
how  to  die.  Put  I  have  already  exceeded  my  allotted  space,  and 
must  hasten  to  close.  2si»!  it  was  not  ^//.vr//V/'//r  alone  which  made 
the  Army  of  Xorthern  Virginia  what  it  was — which  gave  to  it  that 
heroic  courage,  that  patience  under  hardships,  that  indomitable 
nerve  under  disaster,  and  that  full  confidence  in  its  grand  old  chief, 
and  in  itself,  that  won,  against  fearful  odds,  a  long  series  of  splendid 
victories,  and  which,  even  in  its  defeat,  wrung  from  Horace  Greeley 
the  tribute,  "The  rebellion  had  failed,  and  gone  down,  but  the  rebel 
army  of  Virginia  and  its  commander  had  not  failed;"'  and  from 
Swinton,  in  his  ''Army  of  the  Potomac/'  the  following  graceful 
eulogy:  u  2s or  can  there  fail  to  arise  the  image  of  that  other  army, 
that  was  the  adversary  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  which  who 
can  ever  forget  that  once  looked  upon  it  ( — that  array  of  tattered 
uniforms  and  bright  muskets — that  body  of  incomparable  infantry,  the 
Army  of  Xorthern  Virginia,  which,  for  four  years,  carried  the  revolt 
on  its  bayonets,  opposing  a  constant  front  to  the  mighty  concentration 
of  power  brought  against  it  ;  which,  receiving  terrible  blows,  did  not 
fail  to  give  the  like;  and  which;  vital  in  all  its  parts,  died  only  with 
its  annihilation/' 

It  was  a  noble  band  of  intelligent,  educated,  patriotic  soldiers, 


20tt  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

with  a  'morale  such  as  the  world  has  rarely,  if  ever,  witnessed — men 
who  were  devoted  to  their  leaders,  and  to  the  cause  for  which  they 
fought,  who  were  very  heroes  in  the  fight,  but  who  submitted  with 
no  bitter,  or  unmanly  murmurings,  when  their  idolized  chieftain 
told  them  that  he  was  u  compelled  to  yield  to  overwhelming  numbers 
and  resources;"  who  have  preserved  unsullied  their  honor  as  they 
have  observed  to  the  letter  the  terms  of  their  parole,  and  who  will 
transmit  to  posterity,  as  a  proud  legacy,  the  story  of  their  deeds  as 
they  marched,  and  fought,  and  suffered,  and  counted  it  all  joy  to  le 
members  of  u  Lee's  annv." 


GENERAL  MEADE  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


BY    COLONEL    JAMES    C.    BTDDLE. 


Ix  order  to  understand  fully 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  and 
to  appreciate  General  Meade' s 
services  on  that  occasion,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  refer 
brietly  to  some  of  the  pro 
ceeding  events.  Two  great 
battles  had  been  recently 
fought  between  the  contend- 


Virginia — at 


ing  forces  in 
Fredericksburg  and  at  Chan- 
cellorsville — both  resulting  in 
the  defeat  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  At  Freder 
icksburg,  that  army,  under 
the  command  of  General 
Burnside,  assaulted  the  enemy  in  a  position  naturally  strong  and 
thoroughly  fortified,  and  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  General 
Meade,  in  this  action,  won  great  distinction.  Holding  the  left  of  our 
line  with  his  noble  division,  the  Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps,  he 
made  an  impetuous  assault  on  the  enemy's  right,  broke  into  his  lines, 
and  drove  him  from  his  works  for  over  a  half  mile,  capturing  over 
two  hundred  prisoners,  and  several  standards.  In  this  advanced 
position,  in  which  General  Meade  was  left  without  support,  he 
encountered  heavy  reinforcements  of  the  enemy,  who  poured  into 
his  lines  a  destructive  fire  of  infantry  and  artillery,  not  only  in  front 
but  also  on  both  flanks.  Meade,  unwilling  to  abandon  the  advantage 
he  had  gained,  called  repeatedly  and  earnestly  for  reinforcements, 
but  in  vain,  and  after  a  loss  of  nearly  forty  per  cent,  of  his  command, 
he  was  compelled  to  fall  back,  which  he  did  without  confusion. 
The  history  of  the  war  does  not  contain  the  record  of  a  more  gallant 
assault,  and  by  his  brilliant  conduct  on  this  occasion,  General  Meade 
added  to  his  already  high  reputation  in  the  army.  Soon  after,  in  the 
latter  part  of  December,  1SG2,  he  was  promoted  to  the  command  of 
the  Fifth  Army  Corps. 

(20.5) 


206  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

In  the  following  May  was  fought  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville, 
the  result  of  which  caused  the  most  universal  gloom  and  depression. 
We  cannot  here  enter,  at  any  length,  into  the  history  of  that  battle. 
It  will  be  sufficient  to  call  to  mind  how  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
reorganized  and  reinforced,  in  the  best  of  spirits,  and  confident  of 
victory,  led  by  General  Hooker,  who  enjoyed  its  confidence  to  a  very 
high  degree,  went  forth  to  meet  its  old  antagonist,  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia.  It  was  again  doomed  to  disappointment,  and 
after  a  short  and  unsuccessful  campaign,  it  recrossed  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  disheartened — not  demoralized — for  it  is  the  crowning  glory  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  that  it  never  faltered  under  misfortunes 
which  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  efficiency  of  most  armies.  It  has 
been  well  said:  "Not  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  beaten  at 
Chancellorsville,  but  its  commander ; "  for  the  truth  is,  that  the  army, 
as  a  whole,  did  not  fight  in  that  battle,  but  the  different  corps  were 
attacked  by  Lee  and  beaten  in  detail.  The  Eleventh  Corps,  badly 
posted,  was  surprised  by  superior  numbers,  and  routed.  The  Third 
Corps,  which  had  been  sent  out  to  follow  the  enemy,  who  was  sup 
posed  to  be  in  retreat,  was  cut  off  from  the  rest  of  the  army  by  the 
rout  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  and  was  compelled  to  sustain  alone,  and 
for  several  hours,  the  attack  of  Lee's  whole  force,  until  it  fell  back, 
gallantly  fighting,  upon  the  rest  of  the  army — the  First,  Second, 
Fifth,  and  Twelfth  Corps,  only  parts  of  some  of  these  corps  being 
engaged.  Lee  then  turned  upon  Sedgwick,  who  was  advancing  from 
Fredericksburg,  and  drove  him  across  the  Rappahannock.  This  was 
on  the  5th  of  May,  and  the  same  night  the  whole  army  recrossed 
the  river,  the  Fifth  Corps,  under  General  Meade,  covering  the 
retreat.  In  this  battle  Lee  had  sixty  thousand  men,  Longstreet's 
Corps  having  been  sent  to  operate  south  of  the  James  river ;  Hooker 
had  not  less  than  ninety  thousand  men. 

Lee's  successes  at  Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville,  neces 
sarily  dispiriting  to  our  troops,  had  a  contrary  effect  upon  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  whose  morale  was  thereby  raised  to  the 
highest  pitch,  and  who  became  inspired  with  the  belief  that  it  could 
defeat  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  any  circumstances.  Colonel 
Freemantle,  of  the  British  service,  who  was  with  General  Lee  at 
Gettysburg,  in  writing  of  that  battle,  says :  "  The  staff  officers  spoke 
of  the  coming  battle  as  a  certainty,  and  the  universal  feeling  was  one 
of  profound  contempt  for  an  enemy  whom  they  have  beaten  so  con 
stantly,  and  under  so  many  disadvantages."  Lee  himself  was  em 
boldened  by  these  victories ;  and  induced,  as  he  says,  by  "  important 
considerations,"  doubtless  under  the  conviction,  too,  that  the  Army 


GENERAL  MEADE  AT  GETTYSBURG.  207 

of  the  Potomac  would  be  handled  in  Pennsylvania  as  at  Chaneellors- 
ville,  he  determined  upon  an  offensive  campaign,  the  object  of  which 
was  the  capture  of  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  and  Washington.  The 
end  he  hoped  to  attain  was  the  long  coveted  recognition  by  foreign 
powers  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  its  consequent  successful  estab 
lishment,  and  the  complete  humiliation  of  the  Union  canse.  Accord 
ingly,  on  the  22(1  of  June,  after  a  series  of  bold  movements  in 
Virginia,  he  ordered  the  advance  of  his  army,  under  Fwell,  into 
Maryland ;  and  on  the  24th  and  ^.w»th,  his  two  remaining  corps, 
under  Longstreet  and  Hill,  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport 
and  Shepherdstown,  and  followed  Fwcll,  who  had  already  advanced 
into  Pennsylvania  as  far  as  Chambersbnrg.  The  Army  of  the 
Potomac  crossed  on  the  L^th  and  ijo'th,  at  Edwards'  Ferry,  and  was 
concentrated  in  the  neighborhood  of  Frederick,  Maryland. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  that,  at  two  A.  M.  of  June  L^sth, 
General  Meade,  still  in  command  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  received  from 
General  Ilardie,  of  the  War  Department,  the  order  of  the  President 
placing  him  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  This  order 
was  a  complete  surprise  to  General  Meade,  and  it  is  not  too  much  to 
sav  that  by  it  he  was  suddenly  called  to  a  position  in  which,  for  a 
time,  the  fate  of  the  country  was  in  his  hands.  One  false  step  now, 
and  the  Inion  cause  was  lost  ;  for  if  Lee  had  succeeded  in  his  plans 
for  this  campaign,  the  capture  of  Yicksburg,  and  other  victories  in 
the  West,  would  have  been  of  little  avail.  General  Meade  was  as 
modest  as  he  was  brave,  and  while  he  never  sought  promotion,  he 
never  shrank  from  the  responsibility  which  it  brought.  We  shall 
see  that  he  bore  himself  so  well  in  this  grave-  crisis,  that  within  six 
days  after  he  assumed  command,  by  his  rare  energy  and  skill,  he 
accomplished  a  difficult  march,  and  fought  successfully,  with  an 
army  inferior  in  numbers  to  that  of  his  adversary,  the  greatest  battle 

.  i    "  O 

of  the  war. 

Immediately  after  receiving  the  order  placing  him  in  command. 
General  Meade  sought  an  interview  with  General  Hooker,  and  used 
every  effort  to  obtain  information  concerning  the  strength  and  posi 
tion  of  the  different  corps  of  our  army,  and  the  movements  of  the 
enemy.  General  Meade,  in  his  evidence  before  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  says:  uMv  predecessor,  General  Hooker, 
left  the  camp  in  a  very  few  hours  after  I  relieved  him.  I  received 
from  him  no  intimation  of  any  plan,  or  any  views  that  he  may  have 
had  up  to  that  moment,  and  I  am  not  aware  that  he  had  any,  but 
was  waiting  for  the  exigencies  of  the  occasion  to  govern  him,  just  as 
I  had  to  do  subsequently." 


208  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

On  assuming  command,  General  Meade  addressed  his  army  in 
the  following  characteristic  order : 

By  direction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  I  hereby  assume  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  As  a  soldier,  in  obeying  this  order — an  order  totally 
unexpected  and  unsolicited — I  have  no  promises  or  pledges  to  make.  The  country 
looks  to  this  army  to  relieve  it  from  the  devastation  and  disgrace  of  a  hostile  inva 
sion.  Whatever  fatigues  and  sacrifices  we  may  be  called  upon  to  undergo,  let  us 
have  in  view  constantly  the  magnitude  of  the  interests  involved,  and  let  each  man 
determine  to  do  his  duty,  leaving  to  an  all-controlling  Providence  the  decision  of 
the  contest.  It  is  with  just  diffidence  that  I  relieve  in  the  command  of  this  army 
an  eminent  and  accomplished  soldier,  whose  name  must  ever  appear  conspicuous  in 
the  history  of  its  achievements ;  but  I  rely  upon  the  hearty  support  of  my  com 
panions  in  arms  to  assist  me  in  the  discharge  of  the  important  trust  which  has  been 
confided  to  me. 

Our  army  at  this  time  consisted  of  the  First  Corps,  General 
Reynolds ;  Second,  General  Hancock ;  Third,  General  Sickles ; 
Fifth,  General  Sykes  (who  succeeded  General  Meade) ;  Sixth,  Gen 
eral  Sedgwick ;  Eleventh,  General  Howard,  and  Twelfth,  General 
Slocum;  the  cavalry  under  General  Pleasonton,  and  the  artillery 
under  General  Hunt,  the  Chief  of  Artillery.  Nothing  was  kn  own 
of  General  Lee  excepting  that  he  was  north  of  us  threatening 
Harrisburg.  It  should  be  mentioned  here  that  we  had  been  reduced 
in  material  strength  by  the  expiration  of  the  term  of  service  of  many 
of  the  two  years'  and  nine  months'  regiments,  while  the  enemy  had 
been  reinforced  by  the  return  of  Longstreet's  Corps.  Two  corps  of 
our  army  wrere  on  the  north  side  of  the  Sharp  Mountain,  separated 
from  the  main  column  by  the  ridge.  General  Meade  ordered  these 
corps  to  recross  the  ridge,  and  on  the  morning  of  June  29th,  put  his 
whole  force  in  motion,  his  right  flank  covering  Baltimore,  and  his  left 
opposing  Lee's  right.  General  Meade  says  of  his  own  intentions  in 
this  movement :  "  My  object  being,  at  all  hazards,  to  compel  the 
enemy  to  loose  his  hold  on  the  Susquehanna,  and  meet  me  in  battle 
at  some  point.  It  was  my  firm  determination,  never  for  an  instant 
deviated  from,  to  give  battle  wherever  and  as  soon  as  I  could  possibly 
find  the  enemy."  On  the  night  of  June  29th,  Lee  learned  that  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  he  thought  was  still  in  Virginia,  was 
advancing  northward,  threatening  his  communications.  He  there 
fore  suspended  the  movement  on  Harrisburg,  which  he  had  ordered, 
and  directed  Longstreet,  Hill,  and  Ewell  to  concentrate  at  Gettysburg. 
On  the  night  of  the  30th,  after  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  made 
two  days'  marches,  General  Meade  heard  that  Lee  was  concentrating 
his  army  to  meet  him,  and  being  entirely  ignorant  of  the  nature  of 
the  country  in  front  of  him,  he  at  once  instructed  his  engineers  to 


GENERAL  MEADE  AT  GETTYSBURG.  209 

select  some  ground  having  a  general  reference  to  the  existing  position 
of  the  army,  which  he  might  occupy  by  rapid  movement  of  concen 
tration,  and  thus  give  battle  on  his  own  terms,  in  case  the  enemy 
should  advance  across  the  South  Mountain.  The  general  line  of  Pipe 
Clay  creek  was  selected,  and  a  preliminary  order  of  instructions 
issued  to  the  corps  commanders,  informing  them  of  this  fact,  and 
explaining  how  they  might  move  their  corps  and  concentrate  in  a 
good  position  along  this  line.  This  measure  was  made  the  ground  of 
an  accusation  that  General  Meade  had  ordered  a  retreat.  The  mere 
statement  of  the  nature  of  the  order  is  of  itself  a  sufficient  refutation 
of  the  charge.  General  Humphreys,  one  of  the  ablest  officers  in  our 
army,  in  speaking  on  this  subject,  says  :  "  These  instructions  stated, 
'Developments  may  cause  the  commanding  general  to  assume  the 
offensive  from  his  present  positions.'  Xot  many  hours  after,  new 
developments  did  cause  him  to  change  his  plans,  but  these  instruc 
tions  evince  that  foresight  which  proves  his  (Meade\s)  ability  to 
command  an  army.  In  similar  circumstances,  the  agreement  between 
Wellington  and  Blucher  to  concentrate  their  two  armies — nearly 
double  the  number  of  Napoleon — far  to  the  rear,  in  the  vicinity  of 
Waterloo,  has  been  esteemed  a  proof  of  their  great  ability/' 

On  June  30th,  General  Meade  had  sent  General  Reynolds,  who 
commanded  the  left  wing  of  our  army,  to  Gettysburg,  with  orders 
to  report  to  him  concerning  the  character  of  the  ground  there,  at  the 
same  time  ordering  General  Humphreys  to  examine  the  ground  in 
the  vicinity  of  Emmetsburg.  But  while  thus  active  in  his  endeavors 
to  ascertain  the  nature  of  the  several  positions  where  he  could  light 
Lee,  he,  at  the  same  time,  continued  to  press  forward  his  army,  and 
concentrate  it  so  that  he  could  with  ease  move  it  toward  any  point. 
On  the  morning  of  July  1st,  our  advance,  consisting  of  the  First  and 
Eleventh  Corps,  under  General  Reynolds,  arrived  at  Gettysburg, 
and  there  found  Buford's  Division  of  cavalry  already  engaged  with 
the  enemy.  Reynolds,  with  that  quickness  of  perception,  which  was 
one  of  his  most  marked  characteristics,  saw  at  a  glance  that  here  was 
the  ground  on  which  the  great  contest  must  be  fought  out.  In  the 
language  of  General  Meade  :  "  He  immediately  moved  around  the 
town  of  Gettysburg,  and  advanced  on  the  Cashtown  road,  and, 
without  a  moment's  hesitation,  deployed  his  advanced  division,  and 
attacked  the  enemy,  at  the  same  time  sending  orders  for  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  General  Howard,  to  advance  as  promptly  as 
possible.''  Then  it  was  that  Reynolds  fell,  the  greatest  soldier  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  ever  lost  in  battle.  AVe  have  seen,  with 
regret,  a  statement  recently  made  that  General  Meade  had  failed  to 
14 


210  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

do  justice  to  his  services  and  to  liis  memory.  This  statement  does 
injustice  to  General  Meade,  between  whom  and  General  Reynolds 
existed  a  strong  personal  friendship,  and  we  feel  sure  that  both 
these  gallant  soldiers,  now  in  their  graves,  would  disapprove  of  the 
publication  of  anything  calculated  to  convey  so  wrong  an  impression. 
The  above  quotation  from  Meade's  official  report  is  proof  that 
he  appreciated  General  Reynolds'  action  on  the  first  day  at  Gettys 
burg,  and,  subsequently,  on  the  occasion  of  the  presentation  to  him  of 
a  sword  by  the  Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps,  he  thus  spoke,  in  words 
that  express  most  eloquently  the  regret  and  admiration  with  which 
he  cherished  the  memory  of  his  fallen  comrade  and  friend  :  "  This 
reunion  awakens  in  my  heart  a  new  sorrow  for  an  officer  whom  it 
vividly  recalls  to  my  mind,  for  he  commanded  the  division  when  I 
commanded  one  of  the  brigades.  He  was  the  noblest  as  well  as  the 
bravest  gentleman  in  the  army.  I  refer  to  John  F.  Reynolds.  I 
cannot  receive  this  sword  without  thinking  of  that  officer.  When 
he  fell  at  Gettysburg,  leading  the  advance,  I  lost  not  only  a  lieutenant 
of  the  utmost  importance  to  me,  but,  I  may  say,  that  I  lost  a  friend, 
aye,  even  a  brother." 

While  the  contest  was  going  on  between  the  enemy  and  our 
advance,  General  Meade  wras  at  Taneytown,  about  thirteen  miles 
distant,  in  the  centre  of  his  army.  Owing  to  the  direction  of  the 
wind,  the  sound  of  Reynolds'  guns  did  not  reach  his  headquarters, 
and  he  did  not  hear  until  one  P.  M.  of  the  same  day  that  a  portion  of 
our  troops  had  met  the  enemy,  and  that  Reynolds  had  fallen. 
General  Meade  at  once  sent  General  Hancock  to  Gettysburg,  with 
orders  to  assume  command  of  all  the  troops,  and  to  report  to  him 
concerning  the  practicability  of  fighting  a  battle  there.  General 
Meade  has  been  criticised  for  sending  General  Hancock  to  command 
officers  who  were  his  superiors  in  rank,  but  that  he  was  justified  in 
doing  so  is  made  apparent  by  the  following  extract  from  a  dispatch 
from  General  Buford,  an  able  and  distinguished  officer,  received  by 
General  Meade  after  Hancock  had  gone  to  the  front : 

HEADQUARTERS  FIRST  CAVALRY  DIVISION, 

July  1st,  1863—3.20  P.  M. 

*    General  Reynolds  was  killed  early  this  morning.     In  my  opinion 
there  seems  to  be  no  directing  person.  JOHN  BUFORD. 

Being  satisfied,  from  the  reports  of  officers  returning  from  the 
field,  that  General  Lee  was  about  to  concentrate  his  whole  army 
there,  General  Meade,  without  waiting  to  hear  from  Hancock,  issued 
orders  to  the  Fifth  and  Twelfth  Corps  to  proceed  to  the  scene  of 
action.  At  6.30  P.  M.  he  received  the  first  report  from  Genera] 


GENERAL  MEADE  AT  GETTYSBURG.  211 

Hancock,  in  which  that  officer  said:  "AVe  can  fight  here,  as  the 
ground  appears  not  unfavorable,  with  good  troops."  General  Meade 
at  once  issued  orders  to  all  his  corps  commanders  to  move  to  Gettys 
burg,  broke  up  his  headquarters  at  Taneytown,  and  proceeded  him 
self  to  the  field,  arriving  there  at  one  A.  M.  of  the  2cl.  He  was 
occupied  during  the  night  in  directing  the  movements  of  the  troops, 
and  as  soon  as  it  was  daylight,  he  proceeded  to  inspect  the  position 
occupied,  and  to  make  arrangements  for  posting  the  several  corps  as 
they  should  arrive.  By  seven  A.  M.  the  Second  and  Fifth  Corps,  with 
the  rest  of  the  Third,  had  reached  the  ground,  and  soon  after  the 
whole  army  was  in  position,  with  the  exception  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
which  arrived  at  two  P.M.  after  a  long  and  fatiguing  march.  General 
Sedgwick  says,  in  relation  to  this  march:  "I  arrived  at  Gettysburg 
at  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  July  2d,  having  marched 
thirty-five  miles  from  seven  o'clock  the  evening  previous.  I  received, 
on  the  way,  frequent  messages  from  General  Meade  to  push  forward 
iny  corps  as  rapidly  as  possible.  I  received  no  less  than  three  mes 
sages,  by  his  aides,  urging  me  on." 

As  soon  as  the  Sixth  Corps  had  arrived,  General  Meade  left  his 
headquarters,  and  proceeded  to  the  extreme  left,  to  attend  to  the 
posting  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  which  he  had  ordered  over  from  the 
right,  and  also  to  inspect  the  position  of  the  Third  Corps,  about 
which  he  was  in  doubt.  When  he  arrived  on  the  ground,  at  about 
four  P.  M.,  he  found  that  General  Sickles,  instead  of  connecting  his 
right  with  the  left  of  General  Hancock,  as  he  had  been  ordered  to 
do,  had  thrown  forward  his  line  three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  front  of 
the  Second  Corps,  leaving  Little  Round  Top  unprotected,  and  was, 
technically  speaking,  "in  air" — without  support  on  either  flank. 
General  Meade  at  once  saw  this  mistake,  and  General  Sickles 
promptly  offered  to  withdraw  to  the  line  he  had  been  intended  to 
occupy,  but  General  Meade  replied :  a  You  cannot  do  it.  The 
enemy  will  not  let  you  get  away  without  a  fight."  Before  he  had 
finished  the  sentence,  his  prediction  was  fulfilled.  The  enemy 
opened  with  artillery  from  the  woods  on  our  left,  and  the  action 
was  begun.  Soon  large  masses  of  infantry  from  Longstreet's  Corps 
were  thrown  upon  Sickles,  the  enemy  at  the  same  time  sending  a 
heavy  force  toward  Little  Round  Top,  the  key  to  the  whole  position. 
General  Warren,  Meade's  chief  engineer,  was  holding  this  important 
point,  with  a  few  men  whom  he  had  collected  together.  General 
Meade  sent  several  staff  officers  to  urge  forward  the  column  under 
General  Sykes,  which  was  coming  up  with  all  possible  speed,  and 
which  fortunately  soon  arrived.  General  Sykes  at  once  threw  a 


212  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

strong  force  upon  Round  Top,  and  succeeded  in  holding  it  against 
the  enemy's  assaults,  after  a  fearful  struggle. 

In  the  meantime,  the  attack  upon  General  Sickles  was  continued 
with  great  fury,  and  after  a  stubborn  and  gallant  resistance,  during 
which  General  Sickles  was  wounded,  the  Third  Corps  was  compelled 
to  fall  back,  shattered  and  broken,  and  to  re-form  behind  the  line 
originally  intended  to  be  held.  Caldwell's  Division  of  the  Second 
Corps  was  sent  by  General  Hancock  to  assist  in  checking  the  advance 
of  the  enemy,  but  after  a  severe  struggle,  in  which  Caldwell  lost  one- 
half  of  his  command,  the  enemy  enveloped  his  right  and  forced  him 
back.  The  division  of  General  Ayres  was  then  struck  on  the  right 
and  rear,  but  with  great  courage  it  fought  its  way  back  through  the 
enemy  to  its  original  line.  General  Humphreys,  with  his  division, 
held  the  right  of  the  line  of  the  Third  Corps.  Although  severely 
pressed  by  the  enemy,  he  did  not  retire  until  ordered  to  do  so,  and 
then,  judging  that  a  rapid  backward  movement  would  demoralize 
his  men,  and  make  it  difficult  to  rally  them  on  the  crest,  he  deter 
mined  to  withdraw  slowly.  He  succeeded  in  this  difficult  movement, 
but  with  the  loss  of  nearly  one-half  of  his  division.  At  length,  when 
the  enemy  made  a  last  furious  charge  on  the  crest,  they  were  met  by 
fresh  troops,  which  had  been  sent  by  General  Meade  from  other 
portions  of  the  line,  and  were  repulsed.  General  Meade,  during  this 
encounter,  brought  forward  in  person  a  brigade  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  and  in  the  early  part  of  the  action  his  horse  was  shot  under 
him.  Finally,  about  sunset,  a  counter  charge  was  made  by  our 
troops,  in  which  the  remnants  of  Humphrey's  Division  joined,  and 
had  the  satisfaction  of  bringing  back  the  guns  they  had  previously 
lost.  The  division  of  Regulars,  under  General  Ayres,  led  the  assault 
on  the  right  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  pressed  the  enemy  on  the  centre, 
but  on  the  left  they  were  outflanked  and  driven  back.  General 
Sykes  at  once  ordered  forward  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  who,  led 
by  General  Crawford,  made  a  gallant  charge,  and,  after  a  sharp  con 
test,  the  enemy  retired.  This  ended  the  action  on  our  left,  but  at 
eight  P.  M.  it  was  suddenly  renewed  on  our  right  by  General  Ewell, 
who  made  a  powerful  attack  on  our  lines  with  the  divisions  of 
General  Early  and  General  Johnson,  the  former  at  Cemetery  Hill 
and  the  latter  at  Gulp's  Hill.  General  Howard,  w^ho  held  the 
ground  at  Cemetery  Hill,  succeeded  in  repulsing  the  enemy,  with  the 
assistance  of  Carroll's  Brigade  of  the  Second  Corps,  which  had  been 
sent  to  his  support  by  General  Hancock.  At  Gulp's  Hill,  the 
extreme  right  was  held  by  only  one  brigade  of  the  Twelfth  Corps, 
the  remainder  of  that  corps  not  having  yet  returned  from  the  left. 


GENEEAL  MEADE  AT  GETTYSBURG.  213 

This  brigade,  commanded  by  General  Greene,  resisted  the  assault 
with  great  firmness,  and,  aided  by  Wadsworth's  Division  of  the  First 
Corps,  finally  succeeded  in  repulsing  the  enemy,  who,  however, 
advanced  and  occupied  the  breastworks  on  our  furthest  right, 
vacated  by  Geary's  Division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  which  position 
they  held  during  the  night. 

Thus  ended,  at  ten  P.  M.,  the  second  day  of  the  battle.  Both 
armies  had  fought  with  a  desperation  which  proved  that  they  realized 
the  tremendous  issues  which  hung  upon  the  conflict,  but  the  result 
was  indecisive.  Lee  had  gained  what  he  calls  ''partial  successes," 
Longstreet  having  taken  possession  of  our  advanced  position  on  the 
left,  and  Ewell  had  a  foothold  within  our  lines  on  the  right.  But 
our  main  line  remained  intact,  and  the  army,  although  wearied  by 
long  marches  and  hard  lighting,  was  ready  and  anxious  to  renew  the 
contest.  Both  officers  and  men  had  acquired  from  this  day's 
experience  a  firm  confidence  in  their  new  commander.  General 
Meade's  prompt  and  rapid  movement  of  troops  from  one  part  of  the 
line  to  another,  wherever  the  enemy  pressed  most  heavily,  had  made 
them  feel  that  they  were  under  the  lead  of  a  general  who  had  the 
ability  to  handle  the  army  effectively.  Fredericksburg  and  Chan- 
cellorsville  had  shown  how  little  the  valor  of  the  troops  could 
accomplish  when  incompetently  led  ;  at  Gettysburg,  under  a  skilful 
and  able  leader,  their  bravery  and  heroic  endurance  were  rewarded 
with  victory.  A  Latin  proverb  says:  " Formiddbilior  cervoritni 
exercitus  dttre  leone,  quarn  leonum,  c^rro." 

The  battle  was  renewed  at  daylight  on  the  3d,  on  our  right. 
During  the  night,  General  Meade  had  returned  the  portion  of  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  that  had  been  sent  over  to  the  left,  to  its  former 
position,  and  a  terrible  struggle  took  place  for  the  possession  of  the 
ground  which  had  been  occupied  by  General  Ewell  the  night  before. 
General  Lee  had  hoped,  by  holding  this  ground,  to  turn  our  position, 
but  General  Geary,  with  his  division,  assisted  by  troops  from  the 
Sixth  Corps,  attacked  the  enemy,  and,  after  a  severe  engagement, 
which  lasted  five  hours,  he  drove  them  from  our  lines  with  heavy 
loss.  This  action  terminated  at  ten  A.  ]\L,  and  was  followed  by 
several  hours  of  perfect  quiet,  when,  suddenly,  the  enemy  opened 
upon  us  a  terrific  artillery  fire,  with  not  less  than  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  guns.  Our  batteries,  which  had  been  posted  by  General 
Hunt,  the  efficient  Chief  of  Artillery,  replied  with  about  seventy 
guns — the  nature  of  the  ground  not  admitting  of  the  use  of  more. 
This  artillery  duel,  which  lasted  an  hour  and  a  half,  was  the  most 
severe  experienced  anywhere  during  the  war.  The  air  was  filled 


214  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

with  bursting  shells  and  solid  shot,  and  the  very  earth  shook  with 
the  resounding  cannon.  General  Meade  well  understood  that  the 
object  of  the  enemy  in  this  fire  was  to  demoralize  our  men,  prepara 
tory  to  making  a  grand  assault.  He,  therefore,  directed  our  artillery 
to  slacken  their  fire,  and,  finally,  to  cease  altogether,  with  the  view 
of  making  the  enemy  believe  that  they  had  silenced  our  guns,  and 
thus  bring  on  their  assault  the  sooner.  It  resulted  as  he  desired. 
Soon  Lee's  attacking  column,  composed  of  Pickett's  Division, 
supported  by  Wilcox  and  Pettigrew,  made  a  most  gallant  and  well- 
sustained  assault  on  our  lines,  advancing  steadily,  under  a  heavy 
artillery  fire  from  the  guns  Lee  thought  he  had  silenced,  to  within 
musket  range  of  our  infantry.  Here  they  were  met  by  a  terrible 
volley  from  Hays'  and  Gibbon's  divisions,  of  the  Second  Corps. 
Pettigrew's  command,  composed  of  raw  troops,  gave  way,  and  many 
of  them  were  made  prisoners ;  but  Pickett's  men,  still  undaunted, 
pressed  on,  and  captured  some  of  the  intrenchments  on  our  centre, 
crowding  back  the  advanced  portion  of  Webb's  Brigade,  which  was 
soon  rallied  by  the  personal  efforts  of  its  commander.  General 
Meade  had  ordered  up  Doubleday's  Division  and  Stannard's  Brigade 
of  the  First  Corps,  and,  at  this  critical  moment,  General  Hancock 
advanced,  and  Pickett's  brave  men  were  driven  back  with  terrible 
loss.  All  their  brigade  commanders  had  fallen — one  of  them, 
General  Armistead,  being  wounded  and  captured  inside  of  our  bat 
teries.  No  one  could  have  witnessed  the  conduct  of  the  Southern 
troops,  on  this  occasion,  without  a  feeling  of  admiration,  mingled 
with  regret  that  such  heroic  courage  and  brave  determination  had 
not  been  displayed  in  a  better  cause.  On  our  side  the  loss  was  very 
heavy,  General  Hancock  and  General  Gibbon  being  among  the 
wounded.  When  General  Meade  heard  that  Hancock,  who  had 
rendered  conspicuous  service  throughout  the  battle,  was  wounded, 
he  said  to  General  Mitchell,  of  Hancock's  staff,  who  had  brought 
him  the  news :  "  Say  to  General  Hancock  that  I  thank  him  in  my 
own  name,  and  I  thank  him  in  the  name  of  the  country,  for  all  he 
has  done." 

As  soon  as  the  assault  was  repulsed,  General  Meade  went  to  the 
left  of  our  lines  and  ordered  Crawford's  Division,  the  Pennsylvania 
Reserves,  to  advance.  This  division  met  a  portion  of  Hood's  com 
mand  and  attacked  them,  capturing  many  prisoners  and  seven 
thousand  stand  of  arms.  By  this  action  Crawford  regained  posses 
sion  of  nearly  all  the  ground  lost  by  Sickles  the  day  before,  and 
rescued  our  wounded,  who  had  lain  for  twenty-four  hours  entirely 
uncared  for.  While  our  artillery  and  infantry  were  thus  engaged, 


GENERAL  MEADE  AT  GETTYSBURG.  215 

onr  cavalry  was  doing  good  service  on  both  flanks.  General  Farns- 
worth,  on  onr  left,  with  one  brigade,  made  a  gallant  charge  against 
the  enemy's  infantry ;  and,  on  onr  right,  General  Gregg  successfully 
resisted  an  attempt  of  General  Stuart  to  pass  to  our  rear  while 
Picket!  attacked  us  in  front. 

Thus  ended,  in  victory  for  the  Union  army,  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  one  of  the  greatest  battles  on  record — great  in  its 
results,  as  well  as  in  the  skill  and  valor  with  which  it  was  fought. 
Of  the  private  soldiers  of  the  army,  who  names  are  unknown 
to  fame,  it  must  be  said,  that  men  did  never  show  more  courage, 
more  patience,  and  tirm  endurance,  than  did  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
grand  old  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  this  battle,  and  during  the 
trying  marches  which  preceded  it.  In  this  imperfect  account  it  has 
been  impossible  to  do  justice  to,  or  even  to  mention,  many  who  most 
distinguished  themselves  in  the  great  contest.  All  did  their  duty 
zealously,  some  with  more,  some  with  less  ability.  But  among  the 
men  who  will  ever  be  remembered  in  connection  with  that  proud 
day  in  our  history,  General  Meade  will  stand  foremost  as  the 
"facillimeprinceps"  the  leader  under  whose  command  the  glorious 
result  was  achieved. 

The  loss  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  this  battle  was 
twenty-three  thousand — that  of  the  enemy  could  not  have  been  less 
than  thirty  thousand.  At  the  close  of  the  action,  General  Meade. 
issued  the  following  address  to  his  troops : 

The  Commanding  General,  in  behalf  of  the  country,  thanks  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  for  the  glorious  result  of  the  recent  operations. 

Our  enemy,  superior  in  numbers,  and  flushed  with  the  pride  of  a  successful 
invasion,  attempted  to  overcome,  or  destroy  this  army.  Utterly  baffled  and 
defeated,  he  has  now  withdrawn  from  the  contest. 

The  privations  and  fatigue  the  army  has  endured,  and  the  heroic  courage  and 
gallantry  it  has  displayed,  will  be  matters  of  history  to  lie  ever  remembered.  Our 
task  is  not  yet  accomplished,  and  the  Commanding  General  looks  to  the  army  for 
greater  efforts  to  drive  from  our  soil  every  vestige  of  the  presence  of  the  invader. 

It  is  right  and  proper  that  we  should,  on  suitable  occasions,  return  our  grateful 
thanks  to  the  Almighty  Disposer  of  events,  that,  in  the  goodness  of  his  Providence, 
He  has  thought  fit  to  give  voice  to  the  cause  of  the  just. 

It  had  been  General  Meade's  intention  to  order  a  general 
advance  from  our  left,  after  the  close  of  the  action ;  but,  owing  to 
the  lateness  of  the  hour,  and  the  wearied  condition  of  the  armv,  with 
a  "wisdom  that  did  guide  his  valor  to  act  in  safety,"  he  abandoned 
the  movement  he  had  contemplated.  For  this  he  has  been  severely 
censured.  General  Howard,  in  an  article  in  the  Atlantic  Monti Jij, 
of  July  last,  says:  "I  have  thought  that  the  fearful  exposure 


216  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  General  JVIeade's  headquarters,  where  so  much  havoc  was 
occasioned  by  the  enemy's  artillery,  had  so  impressed  him  that 
he  did  not  at  first  realize  the  victory  he  had  won."  The  reverse  of 
this  is  true.  General  Meade  was  not  in  the  least  "  demoralized  "  by 
the  enemy's  fire,  but  realized  fully  the  exact  condition  of  affairs. 
Lee  had  been  repulsed,  not  routed,  and,  if  Meade  had  yielded  to  his 
own  inclination  to  attack,  he  would  have  been  repulsed  himself,  and 
would  thus  have  thrown  away  the  fruits  of  his  great  victory.  That 
this  view  is  correct,  is  proved  beyond  all  doubt  by  the  following 
passage,  from  Mr.  William  S  wanton's  "  History  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac."  Mr.  Swinton  says  : 

I  have  become  convinced,  from  the  testimony  of  General  Longstreet  himself, 
that  attack  would  have  resulted  disastrously.  "  I  had,"  said  that  officer  to  the 
writer,  "  Hood  and  McLaws,  who  had  not  been  engaged ;  I  had  a  heavy  force  of 
artillery ;  I  should  have  liked  nothing  better  than  to  have  been  attacked,  and  have 
no  doubt  that  I  should  have  given  those  who  tried  as  bad  a  reception  as  Pickett 
received." 

On  July  4th,  Lee,  during  a  heavy  storm,  withdrew  from  our 
front,  and  on  the  llth  took  up  a  position  at  Williamsport,  on  the 
Potomac.  He  was  closely  followed  by  Meade,  who  came  up  with 
him  on  the  12th,  and  who  found  him  in  a  position  naturally  almost 
impregnable,  and  strongly  fortified.  Meade's  impulse  was  to  attack 
at  once,  but,  after  consultation  with  his  corps  commanders,  he 
abstained  from  ordering  an  assault  until  he  could  more  fully  recon 
noitre  the  enemy's  position.  On  the  morning  of  the  14th,  a  recon- 
noissance  in  force,  supported  by  the  whole  army,  was  made  at  daylight ; 
but,  on  the  night  of  the  13th,  Lee  had  recrossed  the  Potomac. 
There  was  a  great  deal  of  clamor  at  the  time,  because  Meade  did  not 
destroy  or  capture  Lee's  army  at  Williamsport ;  but  Meade,  conscious 
that  he  had  acted  wisely,  always  felt  that  history  would  do  him 
justice.  Had  he  assaulted,  he  would  certainly  have  been  defeated, 
and  the  result  would  have  been  disastrous  not  only  to  the  army,  but 
to  the  country,  for  a  defeat  to  our  army  there  would  have  opened 
the  road  to  AYashington  and  the  North,  and  all  the  fruits  of  Gettys 
burg  would  have  been  dissipated.  A  brief  reference  to  the  subsequent 
experience  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  will  confirm  the  truth  of 
this  assertion.  In  May,  1864,  we  began  the  campaign  with  one 
hundred  and  fifteen  thousand  men,  and  after  Spottsylvania  Court- 
House  were  constantly  receiving  heavy  reinforcements.  General 
Lee  had  about  sixty  thousand  men.  And  yet,  with  this  great  prepon 
derance  of  strength,  we  assaulted  the  enemy  again  and  again,  in 
positions  not  so  strong  as  the  one  held  at  "Williamsport,  always  with- 


GENERAL  MEADE  AT  GETTYSBURG.  217 

out  success  and  with  terrible  loss.  From  the  crossing  of  the  Hapidan, 
011  May  5th,  to  the  unsuccessful  assault  on  the  enemy's  works  at 
Petersburg,  June  18th,  a  period  of  about  six  weeks,  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  lost  not  less  than  seventy  thousand  men.  In  the  battles 
between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  in  no  case  was  a  direct  assault  upon  an  intrenched  position 
successful. 

There  is  evidence  that  the  enemy  were  anxious  to  be  attacked  at 
Williamsport.  In  the  "  History  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps," 
by  Mr.  J.  II.  Sypher,  a  letter  is  quoted  from  the  Rev.  Dr.  Falk,  who 
was  in  the  enemy's  lines  at  that  place.  Dr.  Falk  says : 

I  was  at  the  College  of  St.  James,  to  which,  on  account  of  its  commanding 
position,  very  many  officers  of  the  highest  rank  came  to  reconnoitre  M cade's  lines. 
From  the  conversation  of  these  officers  among  themselves,  and  with  us,  it  was  evident 
that  they  most  ardently  desired  to  be  attacked.  "  Now  we  have  Meade  where  we 
want  him."  "  If  he  attacks  us  here,  we  will  pay  him  back  for  Gettysburg."  "  But 
the  old  fox  is  too  cunning."  These  and  similar  expressions  showed  clearly  that  they 
believed  their  position  strong  enough  to  hold  it  against  any  attacking  force. 

The  country  has  never  realized  how  much  it  owes  to  General 
Meade's  moral  firmness  in  resisting  his  strong  desire  to  attack  the 
enemy  here  and  at  Gettysburg,  and  in  view  of  the  vital  issues 
depending  upon  his  action  on  these  occasions,  it  may  be  said  of  him, 
as  truly  as  it  was  said  of  Fabius : 

Unus  homo  nobis  cunctando  restituit  rem ; 
Xon  ponebat  cnim  rumores  ante  salutem. 

(One  man  by  delay  restored  to  us  the  State,  for  he  preferred  the  public  safety 
to  his  own  fame.) 

Although.  General  Meade  needs  no  eulogy,  his  great  deeds 
speaking  for  him  more  eloquently  than  any  words,  it  may  not  be  out 
of  place  to  say  something  concerning  his  character  as  a  soldier  and  as 
a  man.  As  a  soldier  he  was  singularly  modest  and  unassuming.  He 
did  his  duty  always  in  a  quiet  and  undemonstrative  way,  and  was 
entirely  free  from  what  may  be  called  the  tricks  of  popularity.  He 
never  claimed  credit  for  services  rendered  by  others,  nor  did  he 
exaggerate  those  rendered  by  himself.  On  the  night  of  July  3d,  at 
Gettysburg,  after  the  final  repulse  of  the  enemy,  when  every  man  in 
the  army  felt  elated  with  the  great  victory,  he  prepared  a  dispatch 
to  the  General-in-chief  so  moderate  in  tone  that  one  of  his  staff  offi 
cers  said  to  him :  "  You  ought  to  boast  a  little  more,  General,  for  the 
country  will  not  appreciate  what  you  have  done,  unless  you  do  so.'' 
General  Meade  replied  :  "  I  would  rather  understate  our  success 
than  claim  greater  results  than  I  have  accomplished,"  and  the  dispatch 


218  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

was  sent  as  he  had  written  it.  General  Meade  gave  to  the  country 
his  best  energies  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  war,  and  from 
July,  1863,  until  the  final  mustering  out  of  our  armies,  as  commander 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he  held  a  position  not  second  in  import 
ance  to  that  occupied  by  any  other  officer.  !N"ot  only  is  there  an 
entire  absence  of  undue  boasting  in  his  dispatches  and  orders  during 
all  this  period,  but  he  was  ready  at  all  times  to  speak  in  words  of 
praise  of  other  generals,  some  of  whom  had  received  honors  which 
his  friends  believed  rightfully  to  belong  to  him. 

As  the  commander  of  an  army,  General  Meade  was  prompt  to 
plan,  and  quick  to  execute ;  always  ready  for  every  possible  move 
ment  of  the  enemy ;  fertile  in  expedients  to  meet  unlooked-for 
emergencies ;  full  of  vigor,  but  not  rash ;  firm,  patient,  and  self- 
reliant.  He  showed  these  great  qualities,  not  only  in  the  campaign 
through  which  we  have  followed  him,  but  in  many  others ;  and  we 
may  say  here  that,  if  the  true  history  of  the  campaigns  in  Virginia, 
from  the  Wilderness  to  Appomattox  Court-House,  shall  ever  be 
written,  the  country  will  be  surprised  to  hear  how  much  was  done 
by  one  whose  name  is  hardly  connected  in  the  public  mind  with 
these  achievements.  The  more  General  Meade's  career  is  studied, 
the  greater  does  his  ability  as  a  soldier  appear ;  and  lest  we  should 
seem  to  over-estimate  him,  we  give  the  opinion  of  General  Lee,  the 
man  of  all  others  best  qualified  to  judge  of  the  skill  of  our  generals. 
In  an  article  written  by  Colonel  J.  Esten  Cooke,  who  served  in  the 
Southern  army,  on  the  staff  of  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  that  officer 
says : 

General  Lee  esteemed  the  late  General  Meade  very  highly  as  a  soldier,  declar 
ing  that  he  was  the  best  officer  in  the  Federal  army,  and  had  "  given  him  more  trouble 
than  any  of  them." 

General  Grant,  too,  has  put  on  record  his  estimate  of  Meade's 
ability.  Writing  not  long  before  the  closing  campaign  of  the  war, 
he  said: 

General  Meade  is  one  of  our  truest  men,  and  ablest  officers.  He  has  been 
constantly  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  confronting  the  strongest,  best  appointed, 
and  most  confident  army  of  the  South.  He  therefore  has  not  had  the  opportunity 
of  winning  laurels  so  distinctly  marked  as  have  fallen  to  the  lot  of  other  generals. 
But  I  defy  any  man  to  name  a  commander  who  would  dp  more  than  Meade  has 
done,  with  the  same  chances.  General  Meade  wras  appointed  [Major  General  in 
the  Regular  army]  at  my  solicitation,  after  a  campaign  of  most  protracted,  and 
covering  more  severely-contested  battles  than  any  of  which  we  have  any  account 
in  history.  I  have  been  with  General  Meade  through  the  whole  campaign,  and  I 
not  only  made  the  recommendation  upon  a  conviction  that  this  recognition  of  his 


GENERAL  MEADE  AT  GETTYSBURG.  219 

services  was  fully  won,  but  that  he  was  eminently  qualified  for  the  command  such 
rank  would  entitle  him  to.* 

General  Meade  was  emphatically  a  Christian  soldier,  and  never 
forgot  his  responsibility  to  a  higher  power.  Caring  more  for  the 
approval  of  his  conscience  than  for  the  applause  of  his  countrymen, 
no  consideration  could  ever  swerve  him  from  the  course  he  knew  to 
be  right ;  and  on  more  than  one  occasion  he  deliberately  chose  to 
endanger  his  own  reputation,  rather  than  risk  unnecessarily  the  lives 
of  his  men.  For  he  was  a  man  who  "gained  strength  by  prayer, 
and  knew  no  guide  but  duty."  In  speaking  of  him  in  this  respect, 
we  cannot  better  conclude  than  by  quoting  the  following  extract 
from  the  address  delivered  at  his  funeral,  by  Bishop  Whipple,  of 
Minnesota : 

If  I  asked  any  of  you  to  describe  our  brother's  character,  you  would  tell  me 
that  he  had  a  woman's  gentleness,  with  the  strength  of  a  great-hearted  man.  1 
believe  it  was  the  lessons  of  Christian  faith,  inwrought  into  a  soldier's  lite,  which 
made  him  know  no  guide  but  duty,  which  made  him  so  kind  to  the  helpless,  which 
placed  him  foremost  in  all  public  works,  and  made  his  name  a  household  word  in 
all  your  homes.  During  the  dark  days  of  our  civil  war,  I  happened  to  be  in  Wash 
ington,  lie  telegraphed  me  to  come  and  celebrate  Easter  in  his  camp,  with  the 
Holy  Communion.  It  was  a  strange  place  for  Easter  flowers  and  Easter  songs,  and 
the  story  of  the  Insurrection,  but  I  do  not  recall  a  sweeter  service,  nor  one  more 
redolent  of  the  peace  of  heaven.  Of  the  bronzed  veterans  who  knelt  beside  the 
Lord's  table,  some,  like  Williams  and  Meade,  are  sleeping  with  the  dead  ;  others 
are  scattered  far,  and  busy  in  life's  work.  That  day  I  knew  that  we  had  in  our 
camp  centurions  who  feared  God  and  prayed  always.  The  world  loves  to  tell  other 
stories  of  public  men;  and,  perhaps,  no  eye  but  God's  sees  the  record  of  the  conflict 
of  human  souls  in  the  battle  of  life.  Death  came  suddenly,  without  the  sound  of  a 
footfall ;  there  were  a  few  days  when  friends  waited  on  medical  skill,  but  his  heart 
was  in  the  country  whither  he  was  going.  He  looked  to  the  Savior,  the  only  one 
in  heaven  or  earth  who  could  help  him.  He  asked  for  the  Holy  Communion,  and 
by  the  Lord's  table  gathered  manna  for  the  journey ;  the  words  of  penitence,  and 
the  look  of  faith,  were  blended  with  his  dying  prayers,  and  he  fell  asleep. 

Our  country  had  no  greater  soldier,  no  truer  man,  than  George 
G.  Meade,  the  skilful  general,  the  incorruptible  patriot,  the  pure, 
honorable,  chivalrous,  Christian  gentleman.  AVe  need  such  men  in 
the  army  and  in  the  State,  always  and  everywhere.  Long  may  we 
cherish  his  memory,  and  honor  his  virtues. 


*  General  Grant  subsequently,  when  he  became  President  of  the  United 
States,  overslaughed  General  Meade  by  appointing  to  the  vacant  Lieutenant  Gen 
eralship  General  Sheridan,  Meade's  junior  in  rank.  This  was  unjust,  not  only  to 
General  Meade,  but  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  had  displayed  such  won 
derful  fortitude  and  courage  during  the  protracted  and  bloody  campaign  of  which 
General  Grant  speaks,  and  which  deserved  that,  by  the  promotion  of  its  commander 
to  this  high  rank,  the  government  should  recognize  the  paramount  importance  of 
its  services  in  bringing  the  war  to  a  successful  end.  It  is  far  from  our  intention  to 
say  anything  in  disparagement  of  General  Sheridan,  who  was  a  brave  and  able 
officer,  but  as  General  Grant  ''  defies  any  man  "  to  name  an  abler  commander  than 
Meade.  and  as  Meade  ranked  Sheridan,  the  injustice  is  apparent. 


ME.  LINCOLN  AND  THE  FORCE  BILL. 


BY    HON.    A.    R.    BOTELEK. 


A  FEW  days  before  the  close 
of  the  Thirty-sixth  Congress, 
which  will  be  remembered  as 
the  eventful  Congress  that 
immediately  preceded  the 
war,  I  received  a  number  of 
letters  from  conservative 
sources,  similar  in  their  im 
port  to  the  following  from  a 
well-known  Union  man,  who 
was  at  that  time  a  member  of 
the  Virginia  Legislature : 

RICHMOND,  VA., 
February  25th,  1861. 
My   Dear  Sir :     Let  me   say   to 
you,  in  all    earnestness,  that    the 

passage,  at  this  time,  of  Mr.  Stanton's  Force  bill  will  do  us,  in  Virginia,  infinite 
harm.  The  disunionists,  one  and  all,  will  clap  their  hands  in  very  ecstacy,  if  the 
measure  prevails.  Already,  some  of  the  conservative  friends  in  the  convention 
have  given  way.  Many,  I  fear,  will  follow.  The  States'  rights  sensibilities  of  our 
people  are  already  wounded.  If  the  bill  passes,  I  verily  believe  that  an  ordinance 
of  Secession  will  be  passed  in  two  days  thereafter.  For  God's  sake,  for  the 
country's  sake,  do  not  let  it  pass !  Yours,  truly, 

JOS.  SEGAR. 
HON.  A.  R.  BOTELER,  House  of  Representatives,  Washington,  D.  C. 

The  bill  referred  to  in  the  foregoing  letter  had  been  reported  to 
the  House,  on  the  18th  of  February,  from  the  Committee  on 
Military  Affairs,  by  its  chairman,  the  Hon.  Benjamin  Stanton,  of 
Ohio.  It  extended  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1795,  "  for  calling 
forth  the  militia,"  and  those  of  the  Act  of  1807,  "for  the  employ 
ment  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States,"  so  as  not 
only  to  place  the  latter — the  regular  army  and  navy — at  the  disposal 
of  the  incoming  President,  but  also  to  confer  on  him  the  plenary 
power  to  call  out  and  control  the  militia,  and  to  authorize  him, 
beside,  to  accept  the  services  of  an  unlimited  number  of  volunteers, 
(220) 


ME.  LINCOLN  AND   THE  FORCE  BILL.  221 

who  should  be  on  the  same  footing  as  the  regular  forces  of  the 
United  States,  and  whose  officers  should  all  be  commissioned  by 
himself. 

On  the  day  after  the  introduction  of  the  bill,  and  before  an 
opportunity  was  had  to  examine  its  provisions,  an  attempt  was 
made  to  pass  it  without  debate,  under  the  operation  of  the  previous 
question.  This  effort,  however,  was  successfully  resisted,  and  a 
limited  discussion  of  it  was  allowed,  which  lasted,  at  intervals,  until 
the  1st  of  March — the  Friday  before  Mr.  Lincoln's  inauguration— 
when  it  was  understood  that  the  measure  would  then  be  put  upon 
its  passage,  so  that  the  Senate  might  have  an  opportunity  to  act 
upon  it  before  the  end  of  the  session.  Observing  Mr.  Stanton's 
anxiety  that  day  to  get  the  floor  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  having 
the  bill  disposed  of  without  further  delay,  and,  knowing  that  if  he 
should  call  it  up,  it  would  be  carried  by  a  large  majority,  inasmuch 
as  the  secession  of  the  cotton  States,  and  the  consequent  withdrawal 
of  their  members  of  Congress,  had  left  the  conservatives  of  both 
Houses  completely  in  the  power  of  the  extremists  of  the  dominant 
party,  I  resolved  10  make  a  personal  appeal  to  him,  in  the  forlorn 
hope  that,  possibly,  he  might  be  persuaded  to  refrain  from  pressing 
his  measure  to  a  vote.  Accordingly,  I  went  over  to  his  desk,  and 
used  every  argument  I  could  think  of  to  induce  him  to  forego  his 
determination.  But  all  in  vain,  lie  was  utterly  obdurate ;  and  I 
finally  said  to  him  : 

"  Mr.  Stanton,  your  bill  is  thwarting  the  efforts  of  the  conserva 
tive  men  of  Virginia,  who  are  striving  to  prevent  her  secession,  and 
to  avert  the  calamity  of  civil  war.  If  you  persist  in  its  passage,  the 
effect  will  be  to  convince  our  people  that  the  policy  of  coercion  is  a 
foregone  conclusion.  The  secessionists  of  our  State  convention  at 
Richmond,  though  now  in  a  minority,  will  be  enabled  thereby  to 
carry  their  point,  and  Virginia  will  be  forced  out  of  the  Union 
against  her  will." 

tkAVell!"  said  he,  folding  his  arms,  and  leaning  back  in  his 
chair,  uAVell,  what  if  she  does  go?  If  that  is  to  be  her  course,  so 
be  it.  I  have  contemplated  the  possibility  of  such  a  contingency  for 
some  time  past.  Governor  AYinslow,  over  there,  can  tell  you  of  a 
talk  I  had  with  him  on  the  subject  two  years  ago.  I  said  then,  as  I 
say  now,  that  in  the  event  of  a  separation  of  the  North  and  South 
on  the  basis  of  our  respective  systems  of  labor — slave  and  free — I 
suppose  we'll  have  to  submit  to  it ;  and  I  have  made  up  my  mind  to 
do  so,  provided  we  can  keep  up  our  social  and  commercial  intercourse 
unrestricted  between  the  sections." 


222  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

"  Though  I  have  never  allowed  myself,"  said  I,  "  to  look  forward 
to  such  a  contingency,  and  don't  believe  that  there  will  be  a  perma 
nent  separation  of  the  two  sections  on  the  basis  of  their  labor 
systems,  notwithstanding  the  untoward  action  and  attitude  of  the 
cotton  States,  yet  I  consider  it  to  be  the  bounden  duty  of  us  all  in  this 
crisis  to  do  everything  in  our  power  to  prevent  the  possibility  of 
such  a  calamity.  And  as  an  ounce  of  prevention  is  worth  a  pound 
of  cure,  I,  therefore,  beg  and  entreat  you  not  to  press  this  bill  of 
yours." 

"'Tis  useless,"  he  replied,  "to  say  anything  further.  I'm  sorry 
that  I  cannot  comply  with  your  request ;  for  the  bill  must  pass,  and 
pass  the  House  this  evening." 

"Am  I  then  to  understand,"  I  asked,  "that  this  is  a  party 
measure,  and  one  that  Mr.  Lincoln  approves  of  ? " 

To  which  he  replied  by  telling  me  that  he  himself  had  originated 
it ;  that  no  one  else  was  responsible  for  its  provisions,  and  that  he 
had  never  spoken  to  Mr.  Lincoln  on  the  subject. 

Whereupon  I  remarked,  "I  am  very  glad  to  hear  that,  and  will 
myself  speak  to  him  about  it  without  delay  I  don't  know  him 
personally,  but  this  is  no  time  to  stand  on  ceremony ;  so  I  shall  go 
to  him  at  once  and  ascertain,  if  possible,  his  opinion  of  the  policy  of 
such  a  movement  as  yours  at  this  particular  juncture;  and,  perhaps," 
I  added,  as  I  turned  to  leave  him,  "Mr.  Lincoln  may  not  be  so 
inflexible  as  you  are  in  this  matter,  and  can  be  induced  to  exert  his 
influence  to  stop  it  in  the  Senate  if  too  late  to  do  so  in  the  House." 

"  Yes,  that's  likely ! "  was  his  laconic  rejoinder,  qualified  by  an 
incredulous  laugh. 

On  my  way  to  the  cloak-room,  I  stopped  to  speak  to  two  of  my 
colleagues,  Messrs.  Thomas  S.  Bocock  and  Muscoe  R.  II.  Garnett, 
who  were  standing  together  in  the  area  outside  the  bar  of  the  House. 
Mentioning  my  purpose  to  see  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  the  object  of  the 
visit,  I  requested  them,  if  Stanton  should  call  up  the  bill  in  my 
absence,  to  do  me  the  favor  to  filibuster  on  it  until  I  could  get  back 
to  record  my  vote  against  it,  which  they  promised  to  do ;  I,  on  my 
part,  promising  to  report  to  them  the  particulars  of  my  proposed 
interview.  It  was  about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  when  I  left 
the  Capitol,  and  driving  rapidly  to  Willard's,  where  the  President 
elect  had  a  suite  of  rooms  fronting  the  avenue,  the  first  person  I  met 
on  reaching  the  hotel  was  an  old  acquaintance  from  the  county  of 
Berkeley,  Virginia,  Colonel  Ward  II.  Lamon,  Mr.  Lincoln's  law 
partner  and  compagnon  de  voyage  from  Springfield  to  Washington, 
who,  on  learning  my  wishes,  kindly  undertook  to  ascertain  if  Mr. 


MR.  LINCOLN  AND   THE  FORCE  BILL.  223 

Lincoln,  whom  he  had  just  left  alone,  would  see  me.  lie  soon  came 
down  with  an  invitation  to  walk  up  stairs,  and  as  I  did  so,  accompa 
nied  by  the  Colonel,  I  noticed  that  the  corridors  were  strictly  guarded 
by  policemen — an  unnecessary  but  natural  precaution  under  the 
circumstances  of  apprehension  and  excitement  that  then  prevailed  in 
Washington. 

On  being  introduced,  Mr.  Lincoln  greeted  me  with  great  kind 
ness  and  cordiality.  "  I'm  glad  to  see  you,"  said  he ;  "  always  glad 
to  see  an  Old  Line  Whig.  Sit  down.''' 

Apologizing  for  disturbing  him,  I  said :  "  I've  no  doubt  that 
the  unusual  demands  now  made  on  your  time  and  energies  require 
you  to  have  more  rest  than  is  likely  to  be  allowed  you  here  by  the 
public;  but  my  visit  is  not  one  of  conventional  formality  or  idle 
curiosity,  as  I  come  upon  an  important  matter  now  pending  in  the 
House,  and,  therefore,  trust  that  I  am  not  trespassing  too  far  on  your 
courtesy  in  calling  this  evening/' 

"Xot  a  bit  of  it,"  he  replied;  "not  a  bit.  I'm  really  glad  you 
have  come,  and  wish  that  more  of  you  Southern  gentlemen  would 
call  and  see  me,  as  these  are  times  when  there  should  be  a  full,  fair, 
and  frank  interchange  of  sentiment  and  suggestion  among  all  who 
have  the  good  of  the  country  at  heart.  So  draw  up  your  chair,  and 
tell  me  what's  going  on  in  the  House  to-day." 

Thus  encouraged,  showing  him  a  copy  of  Stanton's  Force  bill, 
I  called  his  attention  to  some  of  its  extraordinary  features,  and  to 
the  fact  that  it  was  ''bristling  all  over  with  war."  I  spoke  of  the 
angry  feeling  it  had  excited  in  Congress,  and  of  the  painful  anxieties 
it  had  caused  throughout  Virginia ;  how  it  had  demoralized  the 
members  of  her  State  convention,  and  was  frustrating  the  patriotic 
efforts  of  her  conservative  citizens  to  keep  her  from  seceding.  I 
told  him,  also,  how  determined  the  friends  of  the  measure  were  to 
force  it  through  the  House  that  evening,  and  how  much  reason 
there  was  to  fear  that  its  passage  would  do  irreparable  injury  to  the 
cause  of  the  L^nion.  "Consequently,  Mr.  Lincoln,"  said  I,  "I  have 
ventured  to  come  to  you  to  tell  you  frankly  what  I  think  of  the 
policy  of  this  bill — to  ask  your  opinion  of  it,  and  to  invoke  your 
influence  in  having  it  defeated." 

While  I  was  making  these  remarks,  Mr.  Lincoln  listened  to  me 

o 

with  patient  politeness,  and  when  I  paused  for  a  reply,  he  said: 
ik  You  must  allow  me  the  Yankee  privilege  of  answering  your  ques 
tions  by  first  asking  a  few  myself.  During  the  late  Presidential 
canvass,  were  you  not  chairman  of  the  Xational  Executive  Com 
mittee  of  the  party  that  supported  Bell  and  Everett  ? " 


224:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

"  Yes,"  said  I,  "  of  the  Constitutional  Union  party." 

"The  campaign  motto  or  platform  of  which,"  he  continued, 
"  was  ''The  Union,  the  Constitution,  and  enforcement  of  tJie  laws'?" 

"It  was,"  I  replied;  "and  I  think  that  it  was  not  only  the 
briefest,  but  about  the  best  and  most  comprehensive  platform  that 
could  have  been  adopted  for  that  canvass." 

"And  you  still  stand  by  it,  of  course  ? "  said  he. 

"  I  certainly  do,"  was  my  reply. 

"  Then,"  he  remarked,  "  there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not 
be  of  the  same  mind  in  this  emergency,  if  I  understand  the  meaning 
of  your  platform.  How  do  you,  yourself,  interpret  it  ? " 

"  It's  meaning,"  I  answered,  "  is  obvious.  It  has  nothing  hidden 
in  it — nothing  more  than  meets  the  eye.  We  go  for  '  the  Union '  as 
our  fathers  made  it — to  be  a  shield  of  protection  over  our  heads,  and 
not  a  sword  of  subjugation  at  our  hearts ;  for  i  the  Constitution '  as 
they  designed  it,  to  be  equally  binding  on  both  sections,  North  as 
well  as  South,  in  all  its  compromises,  and  in  all  its  requirements ; 
and  for  'the  enforcement  of  the  laws7  by  peaceable  and  constitu 
tional  means,  not  by  bayonets — Federal  bayonets,  especially,  Mr. 
Lincoln." 

"  Then  your  idea  is,"  said  he,  "  that  Federal  bayonets  should 
not  be  used  for  the  enforcement  of  laws  within  the  limits  of  a 
State?" 

"As  a  general  rule,  unquestionably  not,"  I  answered ;  "  but,  of 
course,  there  are  exceptional  cases,  such  as  have  already  occurred — 
cases  of  invasion,  insurrection,  etc. — when  the  civil  authorities  of  a 
State,  finding  themselves  inadequate  to  the  duty  of  protecting  their 
people,  or  unable  to  enforce  the  laws  within  the  limits  of  their 
jurisdiction,  may  rightfully  require  the  Federal  forces  to  assist  them  ; 
in  which  event,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  General  Government,  on 
application  of  the  Legislature  of  the  State,  or  of  its  Executive,  when 
the  Legislature  cannot  be  convened,  to  furnish  the  required  aid." 

"And,  now,"  said  he,  "to  apply  your  platform  to  the  present 
condition  of  affairs  in  those  Southern  States  of  the  Union  which  are 
assuming  to  be  no  longer  part  of  it.  How  about  enforcing  the  laws 
in  them,  just  now — the  laws  of  the  United  States  ? " 

"  Inasmuch,"  I  replied,  "  as  the  difficulties  of  doing  so  peaceably, 
under  existing  circumstances,  are  exceeded  only  by  the  dangers  of 
attempting  it  forcibly,  the  practical  question  to  be  determined  before 
hand  is  whether  the  experiment  is  worth  a  civil  war.  Which 
consideration,"  I  added,  "brings  us  back  to  the  object  of  my  visit, 
and  I  therefore  again  take  the  liberty  of  asking  if  you  approve  of 


ME.  LINCOLN  AND  THE  FORCE  BILL.  225 

Congress  passing  such  a  Force  bill  now  as  this  of  Stanton's,  and 
whether  YOU  will  not  aid  us  in  defeating  it  ? " 

"  Of  course,"  said  he,  "  I  am  extremely  anxious  to  see  these 
sectional  troubles  settled  peaceably  and  satisfactorily  to  all  concerned. 
To  accomplish  that,  I  am  willing  to  make  almost  any  sacrifice,  and  to 
do  anything  in  reason  consistent  with  my  sense  of  duty.  There 
is  one  point,  however,  I  can  never  surrender — that  which  was  the 
main  issue  of  the  Presidential  canvass  and  decided  at  the  late  election 
concerning  the  extension  of  slavery  in  the  Territories." 

"As  to  that  matter,"  I  replied,  "however  important  it  may  have 
heretofore  seemed  to  some  persons,  we  can  well  afford  to  remit  it  to  the 
remote  future,  when  there  may  be  a  practical  necessity  for  its  consid 
eration,  inasmuch  as  it  has  dwindled  into  utter  insignificance  before 
that  portentous  issue  now  so  unexpectedly  before  us." 

u  Unexpectedly,  indeed,  and  portentous  enough  in  all  conscience  !  " 
said  he  ;  "but  I  trust  that  matters  are  not  as  bad  as  they  appear." 

"  P>ad  as  they  certainly  are,"  I  replied,   "they  will  be  infinitely 
worse  before  long  if  the  utmost  care  be  not  taken  to  allay  the  present 
excitement,  and  to  preserve  the  existing  status  between  the  sections 
until  some  such  plan  as  that  of  Mr.  Crittenden's,  for  a  general  con 
vention,  can  be  carried  into  effect,  which,  as  the   Peace  Conference 
here  has  failed  to  secure  a  compromise,  is  the  ultimate  reliance  left 
us  for  that  object."     I  then  went  onto  say:  "Mr.  Lincoln,  it  may 
seem  presumptuous  in  me  to  express  my  opinion  to  you  on  these 
subjects    so  decidedly.     But  I  speak  frankly,  because  I  feel  deeply 
their  vital  importance  to  the  whole  country,  and  especially  to  the 
people  of  the  district  which  I  represent,  which  is  a  border  district, 
stretching  along  the  Potomac  from  the  Alleghenies  to  tidewater,  and 
which,  in  the  event  of  a  sectional  civil  war,  will  not  only  be  the  first 
to  suffer  from  its  effects,  but  will  feel  them  first,  last,  and  all  the 
time,  and  in  all  their  intensity.     I   speak  to  you  as  a  Union  man, 
from  a  Union  county,  of  a  Union  district,  of  a  Union  State — a  State 
which  lias  done  more  to  make  and  to  maintain  the  Union  than  any 
of  her  sister  States  have  had  it  in  their  power  to  do,  and  which  now, 
from  her  known  conservatism,  her  acknowledged  prestige  in  national 
politics,  and  her  geographical  position,  midway  between  the  angry 
sections,  can  do  more  than  any  other  State  to  preserve  the  peace  and 
to  bring  about,  by  her  mediatorial  influence,  a  satisfactory  adjustment 
of  these  fearful  complications  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  those  twin 
foes  of  the  Union — the  fanatical  faction  of  Abolitionists  in  the  Xorth, 
and  that  of  the  no  less  fanatical  secessionists  per  se  in  the  South — 
provided  only  that  a  little  more  time  be  allowed  her  to  continue  her 
15 


226  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

patriotic  efforts  to  these  ends.  You  will,  therefore,  I  trust,  not  impute 
my  earnestness  to  presumption  when  I  say  to  you,  in  all  sincerity, 
that  the  passage  of  this  Force  bill  will  paralyze  the  Unionists  of 
Virginia,  and  be  the  means  of  precipitating  her  into  secession — a 
calamity  which,  at  this  juncture,  will  unquestionably  involve  the 
whole  country  in  a  civil  war." 

After  a  silence  of  some  seconds,  during  which  Mr.  Lincoln 
seemed  to  be  absorbed  in  thought,  he  presently  looked  up  with  a 
smile,  and  said :  "  Well,  I'll  see  what  can  be  done  about  the  bill  you 
speak  of.  I  think  it  can  be  stopped,  and  that  I  may  promise  you  it 
will  be." 

Thanking  him  most  cordially  and  sincerely  for  his  kindness  in 
acceding  to  my  request,  I  then  inquired  if  I  might  announce  from 
my  place  in  the  House  that  he  did  not  approve  of  the  measure. 

"  By  no  means,"  said  he,  "  for  that  would  make  trouble.  The 
question  would  at  once  be  asked,  what  right  I  had  to  interfere  with 
the  legislation  of  this  Congress.  Whatever  is  to  be  done  in  the 
matter,  must  be  done  quietly." 

"But,  as  I  have  promised  two  of  my  colleagues,"  said  I,  "to  let 
them  know  the  result  of  this  interview,  I  hope  you  will  at  least  allow 
me  to  acquaint  them,  confidentially,  with  the  substance  of  your  con 
versation  ? "  To  this  he  assented,  arid  warmly  thanking  him  again, 
I  got  up  to  take  leave ;  but,  on  his  insisting  that  I  should  resume  my 
seat,  I  remained  in  conversation  with  him  some  fifteen  minutes  longer. 
As  what  subsequently  passed  between  us  had  no  special  bearing  on 
the  object  of  my  visit,  it  is  needless  now  to  make  any  further  refer 
ence  to  it,  except  to  say,  that  it  served  to  deepen  the  impression 
already  made  upon  me  by  the  interview,  that  Mr.  Lincoln  was  a 
kind-hearted  man ;  that  he  was,  at  that  time,  willing  to  allow  the 
moderate  men  of  the  South  a  fair  opportunity  to  make  further 
efforts  for  a  settlement  of  our  intestine  and  internecine  difficulties, 
and  that  he  was  by  no  means  disposed  to  interfere,  directly  or  indi 
rectly,  with  the  institutions  of  slavery  in  any  of  the  States,  or  to 
yield  to  the  clamorous  demand  of  those  bloody-minded  extremists, 
who  were  then  so  very  keen  to  cry  "  havoc ! "  and  "  let  slip  the  dogs  of 
war ; "  and  afterward  so  exceedingly  careful,  with  the  characteristic 
caution  of  their  kind,  to  keep  out  of  harm's  way  during  the  continu 
ance  of  hostilities.  Having  concluded  my  visit,  I  was  about  to  return 
to  the  Capitol,  when,  perceiving  that  the  House  flag  was  down  (a 
recess  having  been  ordered  from  five  until  seven  o'clock  the  same 
evening),  I  went  at  once  to  my  room  (at  Willard's,  where  I  boarded 
that  winter),  and  employed  myself  until  dinner  in  making  full  notes 
of  the  foregoing  conversation,  while  it  was  fresh  in  my  memory. 


J/ff.  LINCOLN  AND   THE  FORCE  BILL.  227 

OH  flic  re-assembling  of  the  House  that  evening,  naturally 
anxious  to  know  what  would  be  the  fate  of  the  Force  bill,  I  closely 
watched  the  proceedings;  some  of  which,  upon  a  proposition  to  sus 
pend  the  rules,  to  receive  the  report  of  the  Peace  Congress,  were  of 
an  exciting  character,  and  afforded  a  significant  illustration  of  the 
truth  of  the  proverb  that  "  extremes  meet ;"  for  when  the  ayes  and 
nays  were  called,  Abolitionists  and  Secessionists  ]><>/'  w  were  found 
voting  together  against  the  suspension.  It  was  nearly  ten  o'clock 
before  Mr.  Stanton  succeeded  in  getting  the  bill  up  for  considera 
tion,  and  immediately  thereupon,  a  leading  Republican  member  from 
Mr.  Lincoln's  own  State  (Mr.  AVashburne,  our  distinguished  Miiyster 
to  France),  moved  an  adjournment;  but  a  question  of  order  having 
arisen,  Mr.  AVashb time's  motion  was  not  entertained.  Shortly  after 
ward,  Mr.  Stanton  moved  the  previous  question  on  the  engrossment 
of  the  bill,  which  was  followed  by  another  motion  to  adjourn,  made 
by  a  prominent  Republican  from  Pennsylvania  (Mr.  Iliekman),  which 
was  not  put  to  vote,  because  the  floor  had  not  been  yielded  to  Mr. 
Ilickman  bv  Mr.  John  Cochrane,  of  Xew  York,  who  was  entitled  to 
it,  but  who  himself,  before  taking  his  seat,  renewed  the  motion  for  an 
adjournment;  and  although  it  was  well  understood  on  both  sides  of 
the  House  that  Coclirane's  motion  involved  the  fate  of  the  bill,  it 
was  finally  agreed  to  by  a,  vote  of  seventy-seven  to  sixty.  So  the 
House  adjourned  that  evening,  and  the  Thirty-sixth  Congress  expired 
on  the  following  Monday,  without  having  given  to  Mr.  Lincoln  the 
power  asked  for — to  call  out  the  militia,  and  to  accept  the  services 
of  volunteers.  Yet.  alas!  in  little  more  than  a  month  thereafter,  he 
allowed  himself  to  be  persuaded  to  issue  his  proclamation  for  that 
purpose,  the  sad  results  of  which  are  recorded  on  the  bloodiest  pages 
of  our  country's  history. 


THE  FIRST  ATTACK  ON  FORT  FISHER. 


BY   BENSON    J.    LOSSING,    LL.D. 


THERE  exists,  I  think,  much 
misapprehension  in  the  public 
mind  concerning  the  first  at 
tack  on  Fort  Fisher,  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Cape  Fear 
river,  by  National  land  and 
naval  forces,  late  in  December, 
1864.  I  was  an  eye  and  ear 
witness  of  that  event,  and 
several  months  afterward  I 
visited  the  ruined  fort  with  a 
citizen  of  Wilmington,  who 
was  familiar  with  the  facts  on 
the  Confederate  side.  Wil 
mington,  on  the  Cape  Fear 
river,  almost  thirty  miles 
from  the  sea,  was,  for  a  long  time,  the  chief  goal  of  the  British 
blockade-runners,  which  brought  supplies  for  the  Confederates. 
These  were  swift-moving  steam-vessels,  of  medium  size,  with  raking 
smoke-stacks,  and  painted  a  pale  gray,  or  fog-color.  They  were 
almost  invisible,  even  in  a  slight  mist  on  the  ocean,  and  they 
continually  eluded  the  vigilance  and  the  power  of  the  active  and 
watchful  blockading  squadron  on  the  coast  of  North  Carolina.  To 
protect  these  supply-ships,  and  to  prevent  National  vessels  from 
entering  the  Cape  Fear  river,  forts  and  batteries  had  been  constructed 
by  the  Confederates  on  the  borders  of  the  sea,  at  the  mouth  of  that 
stream.  The  chief  of  these  defenses  was  Fort  Fisher,  a  formidable 
earthwork  of  an  irregular  quadrilateral  trace,  writh  exterior  sides,  of 
an  average  of  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  yards.  Its  northeastern 
angle,  which  was  nearest  the  sea,  approached  high-water  mark 
within  one  hundred  yards.  From  that  salient  to  the  water  was 
a  strong  stockade,  or  wooden  palisade.  The  land-face  of  the  fort 
occupied  the  whole  width  of  the  cape,  known  as  Federal  Point.  It 
mounted  twenty-six  guns,  nineteen  of  which  were  in  a  position 
(228) 


THE  FIRST  ATTACK  ON  FORT  FISHER.  999 

to  sweep  the  narrow,  sandy  cape,  on  which  it  stood.  These  being 
exposed  to  an  enfilading  lire  from  ships  on  the  sea,  were  heavily 
traversed  with  sand ;  the  tops  of  the  traverses  rising  full  six  feet 
above  the  general  line  of  the  interior  crests,  and  affording  bomb 
proof  shelters  for  the  garrison.  At  a  distance,  these  traverses  had 
the  appearance  of  a  series  of  mounds.  The  slopes  of  the  parapet 
were  well  secured  by  blocks  of  thick  marsh-sods.  The  quarters 
of  the  men  Avere  wooden  shanties,  just  outside  the  works,  and  to  the 
north  of  it.  All  along  the  land-front  of  the  fort,  and  across  the  cape 
from  the  ocean  to  the  river,  was  a  stockade,  and  on  the  beach,  alonir 

O 

the  sea-front,  were  the  wrecks  of  several,  blockade-runners.  Many 
torpedoes  were  planted  near  each  front  of  the  fort.  ^Sear  the  end  of 
Federal  Point  was  an  artificial  hill  of  sand,  about  lift v  feet  in  height, 
called  Mound  .Battery.  On  this  two  heavy  columbiads  were 
mounted.  Between  Fort  Fisher  and  this  lofty  battery  was  a  line  of 
intrenchments,  on  which  were  mounted  sixteen  heavy  guns.  These 
intrenclmients  ran  parallel  with  the  beach.  Bark  of  these,  and 
extending  across  to  the  ('ape;  Fear  river,  was  a  line  of  rifle-pits 5 
and  on  the  shore  of  the  stream,  across  from  Mound  Battery,  was 
another  artificial  sand-hill,  thirtv  feet  in  height,  with  four  cannon 
upon  it,  and  named  Battery  Buchanan.  These  constituted  the 
defenses  on  Federal  Point,  and  commanded  the  entrance  to  the 
Cape  Fear  river  by  Xew  Inlet.  About  seven  miles  southwest  from 
Fort  Fisher,  at  Smith ville.  on  the  ri^ht  of  the  old  entrance  to 
the  Cape  Fear,  was  Fort  Johnson;  and  about  a  mile  south  of  that 
was  Fort  Caswell.  The  latter  and  Fort  Fisher  were  the  principal 
guardians  of  the  port  of  Wilmington.  At  Baldhead  Point,  on 
Smith's  Island,  was  .Battery  Holmes. 

These  were  the  works  which  the  government  proposed  to  turn 
or  assail  after  Farragut  had  effectually  closed  the  port  of  Mobile,  in 
August,  ls<U.  Wilmington  was  then  the  only  refuge  for  blockade- 
runners  on  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts.  The  Xational  Government 
considered  several  plans  for  capturing  and  holding  the  city  of 
Wilmington.  ( )ne,  submitted  by  Frederic  Kidder,  of  Boston,  seemed 
most  promising  of  success.  Mr.  Kidder  proposed  to  have  a  fleet  of 
fiat-bottomed  steamers  rendezvous  at  Beaufort,  fifty  or  sixty  miles 
up  the  coast,  on  which  should  be  placed  about  twelve  thousand 
soldiers  under  a  competent  commander.  These  were  to  be  suddenly 
landed  on  the  main  at  Masonboro'  Inlet  and  marched  directly  upon 
Wilmington.  At  the  same  time  a  strong  cavalry  force  should  move 
rapidly  from  Xewbern,  tear  up  the  railway  between  Wilmington 
and  Goldsboro',  and,  if  possible,  destroy  the  bridge  over  the  Cape 


230  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Fear  river,  ten  miles  above  the  first-named  town.  It  was  known 
tliat  no  formidable  defenses  near  Wilmington  would  oppose  a  force 
coming  over  from  the  sea.  This  plan  was  submitted  by  Mr.  Kidder, 
early  in  1864,  to  General  Burnside,  who  was  then  recruiting  men  in 
New  York  and  New  England  to  fill  up  his  corps — the  Ninth.  That 
energetic  officer  wTas  so  pleased  and  interested  in  the  plan  that  he 
submitted  it  to  the  government,  and  received  from  the  War  Depart 
ment  full  permission  to  carry  it  out.  For  that  purpose  he  collected 
a  large  force  at  Annapolis,  and  was  almost  ready  to  go  forward  in 
the  execution  of  the  plan,  when  the  campaigns  in  Virginia  and 
Georgia  wrere  arranged  by  General  Grant,  and  Burnside  and  the 
Ninth  Corps  were  called  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  expe 
dition  against  Wilmington  was  abandoned,  and  its  capture  was 
postponed  for  nearly  a  year. 

In  the  summer  of  1864,  General  Charles  IL  Graham  submitted 
a  plan  for  the  seizure  of  Wilmington.  It  was  suggested  by  Kidder' s 
plan.  It  proposed  to  have  a  force  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  a  thousand 
strong,  collectively,  and  a  section  of  artillery,  go  out  from  Newbern 
(then  held  by  the  National  forces)  and  strike  the  railway  between 
Wilmington  and  Goldsboro'  with  destructive  energy,  while  two 
picked  squadrons  of  cavalry  and  two  thousand  infantry,  with  a  good 
battery,  should  land  at  Snead's  ferry,  at  the  mouth  of  New  river, 
forty-one  miles  from  Wilmington.  This  force  should  then  march 
on  that  city,  while  another,  composed  of  twenty-five  hundred 
infantry,  with  ten  pieces  of  artillery,  should  land  at  Masonboro'  Inlet 
and  push  on  toward  Wilmington.  It  was  believed  that  the  menaces 
of  these  several  bodies  of  troops  would  so  distract  and  divide  the 
Confederates  that  the  capture  of  Wilmington  would  be  an  easy  task. 
Circumstances  prevented  an  attempt  to  execute  General  Graham's 
plan. 

Meanwhile,  arrangements  had  been  made  by  the  government  for 
an  attack,  by  land  and  water,  on  the  forts  at  the  entrance  to  Mobile 
Bay,  which  were  crowned  with  success.  Similar  arrangements  were 
made  to  assail  the  forts  at  the  entrance  to  the  Cape  Fear  river.  So 
early  as  August,  1864,  armored  and  unarmored  gunboats  began  to 
gather  in  Hampton  Roads.  Full  fifty  of  these  were  there  in  October, 
under  the  command  of  Admiral  David  D.  Porter,  who  had 
performed  signal  services  on  the  Mississippi  and  other  inland  waters 
in  the  Southwest.  Among  them  were  several  vessels  of  the 
"Monitor"  class  and  the  "New  Ironsides,"  a  powerful  vessel,  built 
at  Philadelphia,  having  a  wooden  hull  covered  with  iron  plates  four 
inches  in  thickness,  and  at  her  bow  an  immense  wrought- iron  beak, 


THE  FIRST  ATTACK  OX  FORT  FISHER.  231 

constituting   her   the    most    formidable  "ram"  in    existence.     She 

D 

carried  sixteen  eleven-inch  Dahlgren  gnus,  two  two  hundred-pound 
Parrott  guns,  and  four  twenty-four-pound  howitzers,  making  her 
aggregate  weight  of  metal  two  hundred  and  eighty-four  thousand 
eight  hundred  pounds.  She  Avas  propelled  by  a  screw  moved  by  two 
horizontal  engines,  and  was  furnished  with  sails  and  completely  bark- 
rigii'ed.  Tliis  was  the  most  formidable  vessel  in  Porter's  lleet,  and 
fought  Fort  Fisher  gallantly  without  receiving  a  wound.  After  that 
she  returned  to  the  place  of  her  nativity,  where  she  was  dismantled 
and  allowed  to  repose  at  League  Island,  just  below  Philadelphia, 
until  accidentally  destroyed  by  lire  on  Sunday,  about  the  middle  of 
December,  1S»><;. 

While  this  naval  armament  was  gathering  in  Hampton  Roads, 
Governor  Andrews,  of  Massachusetts,  had  laid  Mr.  Kidder's  plan 
before1  the  government,  and  it  was  au'ain  approved.  The  proponent 
•was  sent  for,  and  he  accompanied  Admiral  Porter  from  the  .National 
Capital  to  Hampton  Roads.  At  Fortress  "Monroe,  they  had  an 
interview  with  Lieutenant  General  Grant,  who  also  approved  the 
plan,  and  agreed  to  send  the  bulk  of  Sheridan's  army,  then  in  the 
Shenandoah  A  allev,  to  execute  it.  Airain  the  supreme  necessities  of 
the  service  interfered.  The  movements  of  the  Confederates  in  the 
"Valley  detained  Sheridan  there  ;  and,  as  no  competent  force  of  cavalry 
could  be  had  to  make  the  co-operating  movement  from  Newbern 
with  forces  at  Masonboro'  Inlet,  the  plan  was  again  abandoned. 
Then  measures  for  making  a  direct  attack  upon  the  Cape  Fear 
defenses  were  pressed  with  energy. 

In  September,  Generals  Godfrey  "\Veitzel  and  Charles  1C.  Gra 
ham  had  made  a  reconnoissance  of  Fort  Fisher  by  means  of  the 
blockading  squadron.  "Rumors  of  this  movement  had  reached  the 
Confederates.  On  the  fall  of  the  Mobile  forts,  they  perceived  that 
their  only  hopes  of  receiving  supplies  from  the  sea  rested  :m  their 
ability  to  keep  open  the  port  of  Wilmington  to  blockade-runners. 
The  reconnoissance  implied  a  meditated  attempt  to  close  it.  Their 
suspicions  were  confirmed  bv  the  gathering  of  the  formidable  naval 
force  in  Hampton  Koads.  Then  they  hastened  to  strengthen  Fort 
Fisher  and  its  dependencies,  bv  erecting  new  military  works  and 
increasing  its  garrison.  The  skilful  engineer  and  judicious  com 
mander,  General  "\V.  H.  C.  "Whiting,  was  in  charge  of  the  Confederate 
forces  in  that  region,  in  the  absence  of  General  Braxton  Bragg,  who 
had  gone  to  Georgia  with  a  greater  portion  of  the  Confederate  troops 
at  and  around  Wilmington,  to  oppose  General  Sherman's  march  from 
Atlanta  to  the  sea.  The  fact  that  General  Bra^o-  had  o-one  to  Georgia, 


232  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

with  most  of  the  troops  in  Eastern  North  Carolina,  was  communicated 
to  General  Grant  at  the  close  of  November,  and  he  considered  it 
important  to  strike  the  blow  at  Fort  Fisher  in  the  absence  of  that 
general.  Grant  had  held  a  consultation  with  Admiral  Porter  in 
Hampton  Roads,  and  it  was  agreed  that  the  lieutenant  general  should 
provide  6,500  troops  from  the  Army  of  the  James,  then  under  the 
command  of  General  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  to  co-operate  with  the 
fleet.  The  immediate  command  of  the  troops  was  given  to  General 
"VVeitzel.  Orders  were  issued  for  the  soldiers  and  transports  to  be 
put  in  readiness  at  Bermuda  Hundred  (at  the  junction  of  the  Appo- 
mattox  and  James  rivers),  to  move  as  speedily  as  possible ;  and  in 
the  instructions  given  to  General  Butler  (who  accompanied  the 
expedition),  on  the  Gtli  of  December,  it  was  stated  that  the  first 
object  of  the  effort  was  to  close  the  port  of  Wilmington,  and  the 
second  was  the  capture  of  that  city.  He  was  instructed  to  debark 
the  troops  between  the  Cape  Fear  river  and  the  sea,  north  of  the 
north  entrance  (or  New  Inlet)  to  the  river.  Should  the  landing  be 
effected  while  the  Confederates  still  held  Fort  Fisher  and  the 
batteries  guarding  the  entrance  to  the  river,  the  troops  were  to 
intrench  themselves,  and,  by  co-operating  with  the  navy,  effect  the 
reduction  and  capture  of  these  places,  when  the  navy  could  enter  the 
river,  and  the  port  of  Wilmington  would  be  sealed.  General  Butler 
was  further  instructed  that, "  Should  the  troops  under  General  Weitzel 
fail  to  effect  a  landing  at  or  near  Fort  Fisher,  they  will  be  returned 
to  the  armies  operating  against  Richmond,  without  delay." 

A  part  of  the  plan  of  the  operations  against  Fort  Fisher  was  the 
explosion  of  a  floating  mine,  containing  between  two  and  three 
hundred  tons  of  gunpowder,  so  near  the  works  that  they  might  be 
destroyed,  or  the  garrison  be  so  paralyzed  by  the  shock  as  to  make 
the  conquest  an  easy  task.  General  Butler  had  proposed  this  expe 
dient,  having  read  of  the  destructive  effects,  at  a  considerable  distance, 
of  the  explosion  of  a  large  quantity  of  gunpowder  in  England.  He 
made  the  suggestion  to  the  government,  just  as  he  was  about  to 
depart  for  the  city  of  New  York  to  preserve  order  during  the 
Presidential  election.  It  was  submitted  to  experts.  Among  these 
was  the  late  Richard  Delafield,  then  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Army, 
who  made  an  elaborate  report,  in  which  he  showed  that  experience 
had  taught  the  impossibility  of  very  serious  injury  being  done,  in  a 
lateral  direction,  by  the  explosion  of  unconflned  gunpowder.  He 
fortified  his  opinion  by  diagrams,  showing  the  form  of  Fort  Fisher 
and  the  other  defenses,  and  concluded  that  the  experiment  would 
certainly  result  in  failure.  Captain  Henry  A.  Wise,  Chief  of  the 


THE  FIRST  ATTACK  ON  FORT  FISHER.  233 

Ordnance  Bureau,  gave  it  as  liis  opinion  that  no  serious  damage 
would  be  done  beyond  five  hundred  yards  from  the  point  of  explo 
sion.  At  a  consultation  of  experts,  at  the  house  of  Captain  Wise, 
who  had  been  summoned  by  Mr.  Fox,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  the  subject  was  fully  discussed,  and  it  was  concluded  that 
it  would  be  worth  while  to  try  the  experiment,  with  a  hope  that  the 
explosion  might  be  effectual.  When  General  Butler  returned  from 
New  York,  he  found  that  the  powder  experiment  was  to  be  tried, 
and  that  preparations  for  it  were  being  made.  This  matter  caused 
some  delay  in  the  movements  of  the  navy,  and  the  expedition  was 
not  ready  to  sail  before  the  13th  of  December. 

At  this  juncture  I  arrived  at  Hampton,  accompanied  by  two 
Philadelphia  friends  (Ferdinand  J.  Ureer  and  Edward  Greble),  on 
my  way  to  the  headquarters  of  the  army  at  City  Point.  While 
breakfasting  at  a  restaurant  I  heard  a  person  say,  "  The  general  is 
here."  "  What  generaH  "  I  inquired.  "General  Butler,''  he 
answered.  "  lie  is  at  Fort  Monroe."  I  had  a  private  letter  of  intro 
duction  to  General  Butler,  and  letters  from  the  Secretaries  of  War 
and  Navy,  and  from  President  Lincoln,  requesting  officers  of  the 
United  States  service,  who  should  read  them,  to  give  me  every  facility 
consistent  with  the  rules  of  the  service  for  obtaining  historical 
materials.  We  went  to  the  fort  ;  I  sent  in  my  credentials  to  General 
Butler,  and  we  were  invited  to  his  quarters,  where  we  were  introduced 
to  his  wife  and  daughter.  Turning  to  me  the  General  asked,  "Did  you 
ever  see  a  naval  light  { "  I  replied  in  the  negative.  "  If  you  will  go 
with  me,"  he  said,  k*  I  will  show  you  one  of  the  greatest  naval  con 
tests  on  record/'  "Of  course,  I  cannot  ask  -trJu't'e  it  will  occur,"  I 
answered;  u  but  I  will  inquire  about  how  long  we  shall  be  gone  ?  " 
"A  week  or  ten  days,"  the  General  replied.  I  guessed  the  destination 
to  be  Fort  Fisher.  "I  will  go,"  I  said;  but,  recalling  the  words, 
remarked,  "I  cannot  leave  these  gentlemen,  who  are  traveling  with 
me."  "Invite  them  to  go  along,"  said  the  General.  We  consulted 
a  few  moments,  and  agreed  to  go.  In  the  afternoon  we  accompanied 
General  Butler  on  a  visit  to  Admiral  Porter,  in  his  flag-ship,  the 
"  Malvern,"  lying  in  the  Roads.  On  our  return  we  were  directed  to 
be  on  board  the  Ben  Deford,  Butler's  headquarters'  ship,  at  eight 
o'clock  the  next  morning.  The  vessel  did  not  sail  that  day,  and  we 
visited  the  battle-field  at  Bethel,  a  few  miles  up  the  Virginia  Penin 
sula,  where  the  gallant  son  of  Mr.  Greble  was  slain  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war. 

The  troops  that  composed  the  expedition  against  Fort  Fisher 
were  the  divisions  of  Generals  Ames  and  Paine,  of  the  Army  of  the 


231  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

James.  Those  of  the  latter  were  colored  troops.  They  arrived  at 
Hampton  Roads  in  transports  from  Bermuda  Hundred,  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  9th  of  December,  when  General  Butler  notified  the 
Admiral  that  his  troops  were  in  readiness,  and  his  transports  were 
coaled  and  watered  for  only  ten  days.  The  Admiral  said  he  would 
not  leave  before  the  13th,  and  must  go  into  Beaufort  harbor,  on  the 
North  Carolina  coast,  to  obtain  ammunition  for  his  "  monitors." 
The  13th  being  the  day  fixed  for  the  departure  of  the  fleet,  at  three 
o'clock  in  the  morning  of  that  day  General  Butler  sent  all  the 
transports  but  his  own  ship  up  the  Potomac  some  distance,  where 
they  remained  all  day.  This  was  to  mislead  the  Confederates,  and 
divert  their  attention  from  his  real  designs.  At  night  they  returned 
and  anchored  under  the  lee  of  Cape  Charles.  On  the  following 
morning  the  Ben  Deford  left  her  moorings  at  Hampton,  joined 
the  fleet  of  transports,  and  all  went  out  to  sea.  As  we  moved  from 
the  wharf  a  solitary  cannon  at  Fortress  Monroe  fired  a  parting  salute, 
and  ladies  on  the  ramparts,  standing  near  the  great  Rodman  gun 
that  dwarfed  them  into  dolls,  waved  an  adieu  with  fluttering  white 
handkerchiefs.  The  Ben  Deford  bore  Generals  Butler,  Weitzel 
and  Graham,  and  their  respective  staff  officers,  and  Colonel  Comstock 
of  General  Grant's  staff,  as  his  representative.  The  atmosphere  was 
cloudless  and  serene ;  and  all  the  afternoon  the  white  beach  and  a 
continuous  fringe  of  an  almost  unbroken  pine  forest  along  the  North 
Carolina  coast  was  visible.  The  transports  dotted  the  sea  at  wide 
intervals ;  and  when,  at  past  midnight,  we  passed  "  Stormy  Cape 
Hatteras,"  in  the  light  of  the  waning  moon,  the  heaving  bosom  of 
the  ocean  was  as  unruffled  as  a  lake  on  a  calm  summer's  day.  On 
the  evening  of  the  15th,  we  reached  the  appointed  rendezvous, 
twenty-five  miles  at  sea  east  of  Fort  Fisher,  and  out  of  reach  of  dis 
covery  by  the  Confederates  on  the  shore.  The  rest  of  the  transports 
soon  gathered  around  us,  and  constituted  a  social  community  in  the 
watery  waste.  There  we  waited  three  days  for  the  arrival  of  the 
vessels  of  war,  which  had  gone  to  sea  the  day  before  the  departure 
of  the  transport-ships.  The  weather  was  delightful.  There  was  a 
dreamy  repose  in  the  air  like  that  of  the  delicious  Indian  summer, 
and  the  mercury  rose  to  seventy-five  degrees  in  the  shade  on  the 
deck  of  the  Ben  Deford.  This  continued  until  the  18th.  Mean 
while,  all  eyes  had  been  turned  anxiously  northward  to  catch  a 
glimpse  of  the  expected  war  fleet,  but  disappointment  came  with 
each  morning  and  evening. 

Never  was  the  sea  more  favorable  for  landing  troops  on  the 
beach,  and  executing  the  details  of  the  expedition,  than  during  those 


THE  FIRST  ATTACK  ON  FORT  FISHER.  235 

tliree  calm  days.  Delay  caused  the  golden  opportunity  to  be  lost. 
On  Sunday  afternoon,  the  18th,  a  chilling  breeze  came  from  the 
southeast,  bringing  with  it  a  slight  mist,  the  harbinger  of  an 
approaching  storm.  White-caps  soon  garnished  the  bosom  of  the 
ocean,  and  the  wind  constantly  freshened.  Toward  sunset,  the 
shadowy  forms  of  vessels  appeared  on  the  hazy  northern  horizon. 
They  were  the  heralds  of  Porter's  magnificent  licet  of  warriors — the 
most  formidable  naval  armament  ever  put  afloat  on  the  sea. 
There  were  fifty-eight  strongly-armed  vessels,  fullv  manned,  and 
four  of  them  were  ''monitors."  They  gathered  around  us  at 
twilight;  and  when  the  night  set  in,  dark  and  lowering,  their 
numerous  lights  on  deck,  and  in  the  rigging,  some  white,  and  some 
colored,  gave  the  pleasing  impression  of  a  floating  city  on  the  bosom 
of  the  great  deep;  and  so  it  was.  Very  soon  there  was  brisk 
signaling,  with  blazing  torches,  between  the  Pen  Peford  and  the 
'•  ^lalvern  :''  and,  at  eight  o'clock,  General  Butler  departed  for  the 
latter  in  his  gig  to  confer  with  Admiral  Porter.  On  his  return,  he 
announced  that  it  was  intended  to  explode  the  floating  mine,  near 
Port  Fisher,  at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  to  land  the  troops 
for  attack,  if  possible,  soon  after  the  dawn  of  day. 

The  floating  mine,  or  powder-ship,  was  a  propeller  of  two 
hundred  and  ninety-five  tons  burden,  named  "  Louisiana."  She  was 
disguised  as  a  blockade-runner,  in  form  and  color,  with  two  raking 
smoke-stacks — one  real,  the  other  a  sham.  A  light  deck  above  the 
water-line  contained  two  hundred  and  fifteen  tons  (four  hundred  and 
thirty  thousand  pounds)  of  gunpowder,  placed  first  in  a  row  of 
barrels  standing  on  their  ends,  the  upper  ones  open,  and  the 
remainder  in  bags,  each  containing  sixty  pounds.  The  latter  were 
stowed  in  tiers  above  the  barrels.  To  communicate  fire  to  the 
whole  mass  simultaneously,  four  separate  threads  of  the  Gomez  fuse 
were  woven  through  it,  passing  through  each  separate  barrel  and 
bag.  At  the  stern,  and  under  the  powder-charged  deck,  was  placed 
a  heap  of  pine  wood  and  other  combustible  materials,  which  were  to 
be  fired  by  the  crew,  when  they  were  to  escape  in  a  swift  little 
steamer  employed  for  the  purpose.  Clock-work,  by  which  a 
percussion-cap  might  be  exploded,  and  ignite  the  fuse;  short 
spermaceti  candles,  which  would  burn  down,  and  fire  the  fuse,  and 
a  slow  match,  that  would  work  in  time  with  the  candles,  were  all 
employed.  The  plan  was  to  choose  a  favorable  state  of  the  weather 
for  landing  troops  in  launches  on  the  beach,  explode  the  powder-ship 
after  midnight,  and  debark  the  troops  at  dawn,  to  take  advantage  of 
the  effects  of  the  explosion  on  the  fort  and  garrison. 


236  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Warned  that  the  explosion  would  take  place  in  the  "small 
hours  "  of  the  morning,  we  watched  on  deck  until  far  past  midnight, 
and  were  disappointed.  The  vessels  had  moved,  in  the  darkness,  to 
a  point  about  twelve  miles  from  Fort  Fisher.  Ignorant  of  what 
might  be  the  effect  of  the  explosion  in  the  air  at  that  distance, 
the  engineers  of  the  vessels  caused  the  steam  to  be  much  lowered,  to 
avoid  a  possible  explosion  of  the  boilers,  in  case  of  a  sudden  relief 
from  atmospheric  pressure.  But  the  grand  spectacle  was  not 
exhibited.  It  was  evident  that  the  water  wras  too  rough  for  troops 
to  land,  and  the  attack  was  postponed.  The  wind  increased  in 
violence  the  next  day,  and  toward  evening  assumed  the  aspects  of  a 
gale.  The  low-decked  "  monitors "  w^ere  frequently  submerged, 
only  their  revolving  turrets  being  visible.  The  transports  had  been 
coaled  and  watered,  as  we  have  observed,  for  only  ten  days,  and  that 
time  had  now  been  consumed  in  waiting  for  warriors  and  voyaging ; 
and,  by  the  advice  of  Admiral  Porter,  the  unarmed  fleet  went 
to  Beaufort,  seventy  miles  up  the  coast,  for  a  new  supply.  We 
were  before  the  furious  gale  all  night,  and,  with,  difficulty,  threaded 
the  sinuous  channel  into  Beaufort  harbor  the  next  morning,  just  in 
time  to  escape  the  severest  portion  of  the  tempest,  the  heaviest,  our 
pilot  told  us,  that  had  been  experienced  on  that  coast  in  thirty 
years.  There  we  remained  until  Saturday,  the  24th.  On  Friday, 
when  the  ships  wTere  replenished,  and  the  storm  had  passed  by, 
General  Butler  sent  one  of  his  aides  (Captain  Clark),  in  an  armed 
tug,  to  inform  Porter  that  the  transports,  with  the  troops,  would  be 
at  the  rendezvous,  off  Fort  Fisher,  at  six  o'clock  in  the  evening  the 
next  day.  Clark  returned  at  sunrise  on  Saturday,  and  reported  that 
Porter  had  determined  to  explode  the  powder-ship  at  one  o'clock 
that  morning,  and  begin  the  attack  without  waiting  for  the  troops. 
Butler  could  not  believe  the  report  to  be  correct,  because  the 
presence  of  the  troops  to  co-operate  in  the  attack  would  be  essential 
to  the  success  of  the  costly  experiment  of  the  powder-ship. 

We  departed  for  the  rendezvous  on  Saturday  morning.  Between 
three  and  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  we  were  off  Masonboro' 
Inlet,  and  while  standing  on  the  bow  of  the  Ben  Deford  with 
General  Weitzel,  I  called  his  attention  to  small  white  flacculent  clouds 
that  appeared  and  disappeared  at  irregular  intervals  near  the  southern 
horizon.  "  Porter  is  at  work,"  he  said.  "  The  '  clouds '  are  the  smoke 
of  exploding  bombshells."  Yery  soon  we  met  an  ammunition-box  ; 
then  a  dozen,  and  then  an  acre  of  them,  floating  in  the  sea.  The 
testimony  of  these  mute  witnesses  of  a  combat  was  soon  confirmed 
by  the  sullen  roar  of  artillery  that  fell  upon  the  ear.  We  arrived 


THE  FIRST  ATTACK  ON  FORT  FISHER.  237 

at  the  scene  of  conflict  just  as  it  had  ceased.  A  heavy  pall  of  sul 
phurous  smoke,  made  blood-red  by  the  setting  sun  behind  it,  hung 
in  the  still  air  over  Fort  Fisher.  Porter  had,  indeed,  caused  the 
"  Louisiana,"  under  the  command  of  the  intrepid  Captain  Rhind,  to 
follow  iii  the  wake  of  a  blockade-runner,  at  midnight,  to  within 
three  hundred  yards  of  the  northeast  salient  of  Fort  Fisher.  There 
she  was  anchored,  and  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  powder 
Avas  exploded  without  any  sensible  effect  upon  the  fort  or  the  garri 
son.  The  shock  was  felt  like  a  slight  earthquake  at  Xewbern  and 
Beaufort,  but  the  garrison  of  Fort  Fisher  thought  it  was  the  effect 
of  the  bursting  of  the  boiler  of  a  blockade-runner.  Probably  not 
one-tenth  of  the  powder  was  ignited.  The  fort  seemed  untouched 
by  the  explosion,  for  the  edges  of  the  parapet  remained  as  sharply 
denned  as  ever. 

Ten  hours  later  Admiral  Porter  opened  his  heavy  artillery  on 
Fort  Fisher  and  Mound  Battery,  and  in  the  course  of  a  few  hours 
he  hurled  eight  thousand  shells  upon  them.  The  brief  and  feeble 
responses  made  by  the  guns  of  these  defenses  deceived  the  Admiral, 
and  he  believed  he  had  disabled  them  all.  At  the  middle  of  the 
afternoon  he  sent  a  dispatch  to  the  Secretary  of  the  ^Navy,  in  which 
he  said  that  in  half  an  hour  after  getting  the  ship*  in  position  he 
silenced  Fort  Fisher,  but  there  u:<  re  no  ti'oops  to  take  possess  ion ,  and 
he  was  "  merely  tiring  at  it  to  keep  up  practice/1  "The  torts,''  he 
said,  "are  nearly  demolished,  and  as  soon  as  troops  come  we  can  take 
possession."  He  added:  "All  that  is  wanted  now  is  troops  to  land 
to  go  into  them."  How  utterly  deceived  and  mistaken  the  Admiral 
was  appears  from  a  statement  of  General  Whiting,  who  said  that  no 
damage  was  done  to  Fort  Fisher;  that  only  one  man  was  killed,  and 
three  were  severely  and  nineteen  were  slightly  wounded,  and  that 
only  five  gun-carriages  were  disabled  and  not  a  gun  was  bruised. 
The  complaint  of  the  absence  of  troops,  by  Admiral  Porter,  seems 
disingenious  and  ungracious  under  the  circumstances,  and  was  unjust 
to  the  army,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  had  waited  for  the  motions  of 
the  fleet  already  six  days.  And  had  the  Admiral  waited  a  few  hours 
for  the  troops,  which,  he  had  been  informed,  would  be  there  that 
day,  he  would  have  had  them  in  full  co-operation  with  him.  As  it 
was,  he  had  defeated  the  intentions-  of  both  branches  of  the  service 
concerning  the  powder-vessel,  by  causing  it  to  be  exploded  when  the 
army,  in  consequence  of  waiting  for  the  navy,  was,  by  the  advice  of 
the  Admiral,  seventy  miles  from  the  scene  of  action.  Butler  and 
Porter  made  arrangements  to  renew  the  attack  the  next  morning 
at  eight  o'clock.  Orders  were  given  for  us  all  to  breakfast  at  six. 


238  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Preparations  for  the  next  day's  serious  work  were  completed  at  an 
early  hour,  and  the  young  staff  officers,  who  generally  kept  the  deck 
merry  with  songs  and  jokes  and  conundrums  until  midnight,  retired 
soberly  at  nine  o'clock  on  that,  to  them,  momentous  Christmas  eve. 

The  morning  dawned  brightly.  It  was  the  Christian  Sabbath 
and  the  recurring  birthday  of  the  Prince  of  Peace.  The  fleet  was 
not  ready  before  ten  o'clock,  when  the  conflict  was  begun  by  light- 
draft  gunboats  shelling  batteries  on  the  shore,  to  clear  the  way  for 
landing  troops  on  the  beach.  Yery  soon  the  larger  vessels  began  to 
hurl  heavy  missiles  upon  the  main  works.  For  several  hours  the 
bombardment  continued  without  intermission.  At  a  little  past  noon 
the  transports  were  moved  within  eight  hundred  yards  of  the  beach. 
A  few  shells  sent  from  the  land  batteries  exploded  near  us,  and  one 
passed  directly  through  one  of  the  smaller  gunboats.  Finally,  these 
batteries  were  silenced  by  broadsides  from  the  "Brooklyn,"  whose 
one  hundred-pound  guns  were  effective.  Soon  afterward  the 
launches  were  prepared  and  filled  with  a  part  of  Ames'  Division 
(about  one-third  of  all  the  troops  present)  and  moved  for  the  shore. 
General  Curtis  was  the  first  to  make  the  beach.  We  saw  his  tall, 
commanding  figure  bear  forward  the  Stars  and  Stripes  and  plant 
them  on  a  deserted  battery.  The  act  was  greeted  by  loud  cheers 
from  the  transports,  and  the  bands  struck  up  "Yankee  Doodle."  It 
was  then  about  three  o'clock.  The  "Malvern"  passed  near  the 
Ben  Deford,  and  Admiral  Porter,  standing  on  the  wheel-house, 
called  out  to  General  Butler,  saying :  "  There  is  not  a  rebel  within 
five  miles  of  the  fort.  You  have  nothing  to  do  but  march  in  and 
take  it."  This  was  another  grave  mistake,  and  led  the  Admiral  to 
make  most  unkind  reflections  upon  the  military  commander  in  his 
report  two  days  afterward.  At  that  moment,  according  to  the 
testimony  of  General  "Whiting,  there  were  two  hundred  and  fifty 
more  men  in  Fort  Fisher  than  on  the  previous  day,  and  behind  its 
uninjured  sand  walls  were  nine  hundred  effective  men,  in  good  spirits, 
who,  secure  in  their  bomb-proofs,  kept  up  a  lazy  response  to  the 
bombardment  from  the  sea-front  all  day.  The  guns  on  the  land- 
front  were  drawn  back  behind  the  traverses,  and  so  excessively 
enfilading  was  the  fire  of  the  fleet,  that  not  one  of  the  nineteen  can 
nons  was  seriously  injured. 

General  Weitzel,  the  immediate  commander  of  the  National 
troops,  accompanied  by  General  Graham  and  Colonel  Comstock, 
pushed  a  reconnoitering  party  to  within  five  hundred  yards  of  Fort 
Fisher,  accepting  the  surrender,  on  the  way,  of  the  garrison  of  Flag 
Pond  Hill  Battery,  consisting  of  sixty-two  men,  who  were  sent  to 


THE  FIRST  ATTACK  ON  FORT  FISHER.  239 

the  fleet.  The  skirmishers  went  within  seventy-five  yards  of  the 
fort,  where  nearly  a  dozen  were  wounded  by  the  bursting  of  shells 
from  the  fleet.  One  soldier  ran  forward  to  the  ditch  and  captured 
a  flag,  which  the  shells  had  cut  from  the  parapet ;  and  Lieutenant 
Walling,  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-second  New  York  Regiment, 
seeing  a  courier  leave  the  sally-port,  near  the  Cape  Fear,  rushed 
forward,  shot  the  messenger,  took  his  pistols  from  the  holsters  and  a 
paper  from  his  pocket,  and,  mounting  the  dead  man's  mule,  rode 
back  to  the  lines.  The  paper  contained  an  order  from  Colonel 
Lamb,  the  immediate  commander  of  the  fort,  for  some  powder  to  be 
sent  in. 

(icneral  Butler  did  not  go  on  shore,  but  in  the  tug  Chamber 
lain  he  moved  to  F<»rt  Fisher,  abreast  the  troops,  and  kept  up 
communication  with  Weitzel  by  signals.  Meanwhile,  the  remainder 
of  Ames'  Division  had  captured  over  two  hundred  North  Caro 
linians,  witli  ten  commissioned  officers,  from  whom  Butler  learned 
that  I  Joke's  Division  had  been  detached  from  the  Confederate  army 
at  Petersburg  for  the  defense  of  Wilmington;  that  two  brigades 
were  then  within  two  miles  of  Fort  Fisher,  and  that  others  were 
pressing  on.  The  weather  was  now  murky,  and  a  heavy  surf  was 
beginning  to  roll  in,  making  it  impossible  to  land  any  more  troops. 
Weit/el,  who  had  thoroughly  reconnoitred  the  fort,  reported  to  Butler 
that  in  his  judgment,  and  that  of  the  officers  with  him,  a  successful 
assault  upon  it,  with  the  troops  at  hand,  would  be  impossible,  for 
the  moment  the  fleet  should  cease  tiring,  the  parapets  would  be  fully 
manned  and  its  nineteen  heavy  guns  would  sweep  the  land.  It  was 
also  evident  that  the  Confederate  force  outside  of  Fort  Fisher,  and 
near  it,  was  much  larger  than  that  of  the  Nationals.  Considering  all 
of  these  things,  Butler  ordered  the  troops  to  withdraw  and 
re-embark.  While  doing  so,  at  twilight,  the  guns  of  the  navy  ceased 
work,  when  those  of  Fort  Fisher  sent  a  storm  of  grape  and  canister- 
shot  after  the  retiring  troops.  It  was  impossible  to  get  them  on 
board  that  night,  and  it  was  thirty-six  hours  before  they  were  rescued 
from  their  perilous  position.  On  the  following  day  the  transports 
departed  for  Hampton  Roads,  leaving  the  fleet  lying  off  Fort  Fisher, 
with  its  ammunition  nearly  exhausted.  The  National  loss,  in  this 
attack,  was  about  fifty  men  killed  and  wounded,  nearly  all  by  the 
bursting  of  six  heavy  Parrott  guns  of  the  fleet.  The  Confederate 
loss  was  three  killed,  fifty-five  wounded,  and  three  hundred  made 
prisoners. 

The  failure  to  capture  Fort  Fisher  produced  keen  disappoint 
ment,  and  Admiral  Porters  misleading  report  caused  widespread 


2-iO  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

indignation.  Experts  say,  in  the  light  of  facts  revealed,  that  the 
army  officers  acted  wisely  in  not  attacking.  It  seems  to  me  that  the 
chief  cause  of  our  failure  may  be  found  in  the  lack  of  co-operation 
with  the  land  forces  at  the  beginning.  During  the  delay  caused  by 
the  first  day's  waiting  for  the  fleet  at  the  rendezvous,  and  the  suc 
ceeding  gale,  the  Confederates  were  apprised  of  the  expedition,  and 
took  sufficient  measures  to  meet  and  frustrate  it.  Wilmington  was 
denuded  of  troops,  and  the  army  was  waiting  for  the  fleet  off  Fort 
Fisher  on  the  middle  of  December.  At  that  time  the  garrison  of 
the  fort  consisted  of  only  six  hundred  and  sixty-seven  men.  "When 
Weitzel  stood  before  it  on  Christmas  day,  it  was  nine  hundred  strong, 
and  at  least  seven  thousand  men  were  within  forty-eight  hours' 
march  of  it. 


MORGANS  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  RAID. 


BY    GENERAL    BASIL    AV.    DUKE. 


THE  expedition  undertaken 
by  General  John  II.  Morgan, 
in  the  summer  of  1803,  and 
known  as  the  "Indiana  and 
Ohio  Raid,"  serves  more  than 
any  other  effort  of  his  active 
and  adventurous  career  to  il 
lustrate  his  audacious  strategy, 
and  an  account  of  it  may  be 
read  "\vith  some  interest  as  a 
contribution  to  the  history  of 
the  late  civil  war.  I  shall 
endeavor,  therefore,  as  re 
quested,  to  narrate  its  prin 
cipal  incidents;  and,  in  order 
that  a  proper  understanding 
of  its  purpose  and  importance  as  a  military  movement  may  be  had,  I 
must  be  allowed  a  brief  description  of  the  relative  conditions  and 
attitude  of  the  two  contending  armies  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky 
at  that  date.  Indeed,  if  I  hope  to  vindicate  General  Morgan's 
reputation  from  the  charge  of  senseless  audacity  to  which  this  raid 
gave  rise,  I  should  premise  by  saying  that  in  this,  as  in  all  similar 
enterprises,  he  planned  and  conducted  his  operations  with  reference 
to  those  of  the  army  to  which  he  was  attached,  and  with  strict 
regard  to  the  exigencies  of  the  general  campaign.  While  chiefly 
employed  in  what  the  French  term  la  petite  (jncrre,  he  directed  his 
movements  in  accordance  with  the  programme  of  the  "great  war.'1 
The  military  situation  in  General  Bragg's  department  was 
ominous  of  ill-fortune  to  the  Confederates.  Bragg' s  army,  always 
inferior  to  the  one  opposing  it,  in  numerical  strength,  had  recently 
been  greatly  reduced  by  large  detachments  summoned  by  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston,  to  aid  in  his  projected  movement  to  relieve 
Vickslmrg.  It  was  confronted  at  Tullahoma  by  the  vastly  superior 
forces  of  Hosecrans.  General  ISimoii  Buckner 

16  (241) 


was   holding  East 


242  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Tennessee  with  a  force  entirely  inadequate  to  the  defense  of  that 
important  region.  General  Burnside  was  concentrating  in  Ken 
tucky,  for  the  invasion  of  East  Tennessee,  a  force  variously  estimated 
at  from  twenty  to  more  than  thirty  thousand  men.  It  was  estimated 
that  on  the  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  border  there  were,  at  least,  ten 
or  twelve  thousand  Federal  troops,  under  the  command  of  a  General 
Judah,  five  thousand  of  which  were  excellent  cavalry.  This  body 
was  in  a  position  to  threaten  the  right  flank  of  the  Confederate 
army  at  Tullahoma  if  it  should  remain  there,  or  greatly  embarrass 
its  movements  if  it  retreated.  General  Bragg  did  not  doubt  that 
there  would  be  an  early  advance  of  this  formidable  line — that 
Rosecrans  would  press  on  him,  and  Burnside  simultaneously  fall 
upon  Buckner — and  he  knew  that  the  Confederate  positions  could 
not  be  held.  So  soon  as  he  fully  realized  the  danger,  he  determined, 
as  the  only  means  of  saving  his  attenuated  army  from  utter  annihila 
tion  by  the  enemy's  masses,  to  promptly  retreat  to  the  south  of  the 
Tennessee  river.  But  retreat  to  the  army  in  front  of  Rosecrans  was 
in  no  wise  easy  or  free  from  hazard.  To  cross  the  Tennessee,  with 
the  Federal  columns  pushing  close  on  its  rear  and  flanks,  threatened 
danger  to  that  army  almost  as  serious  as  a  battle.  Nor  could  battle 
be  avoided,  or  long  delayed,  even  if  this  retreat  was  successfully 
accomplished.  The  Confederate  General  knew  that  somewhere  in 
the  vicinity  of  Chattanooga  he  would  have  to  turn  upon  his  foes  and 
fight.  It  was  no  longer  possible  to  defend  Middle  Tennessee.  A 
greater  sacrifice,  the  evacuation  of  East  Tennessee — the  citadel  of 
the  Confederacy — was,  perhaps,  necessary.  But  retreat,  continued 
too  far,  would  degenerate  into  flight,  and  bring  speedy  ruin. 

After  the  safe  withdrawal  of  his  army  from  Tullahoma  to  the 
new  line  south  of  the  Tennessee,  Bragg's  chief  object  would  be  to 
delay  Judah  and  Burnside — the  latter  especially — and  to  retard  their 
advance  and  junction  with  Kosecrans  until  after  reinforcements  he 
was  expecting  from  Virginia  should  arrive.  He  even  hoped  that 
circumstances  might  be  so  ordered  as  to  prohibit  a  part  of  these  forces, 
at  least,  from  appearing  in  season  for  the  decisive  battle  he  intended 
to  deliver.  In  this  strategic  emergency  he  saw  no  means  of  diverting 
the  attention  of  the  enemy,  and  of  securing  the  much-needed  time 
for  the  consummation  of  his  plans,  save  by  an  energetic  use  of  his 
cavalry.  While  vigorously  pushing  Rosecraiis'  outposts  with  the 
divisions  of  Martin  and  Wharton,  in  accordance  with  this  policy,  he 
designed  for  Morgan,  in  pursuance  of  the  same  plan,  a  far  more 
important  service.  The  latter  was  instructed  to  move  rapidly  with 
two  thousand  men  of  his  division  in  the  direction  of  Louisville,  cap- 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND   OHIO  RAID.  »±3 

turc  that  city,  if  possible,  and  proceed  thence  into  Middle  and 
Eastern  Kentucky,  inviting  pursuit  by  all  the  Federal  forces  who 
could  thus  be  lured  away  from  the  vicinity  of  the  anticipated  conflict. 
By  such  a  raid  General  Bragg  believed  that  Judah  could  be  so 
thoroughly  employed  as  to  leave  him  no  leisure  time  to  harass  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Confederates  from  Tullahoma ;  and  he  Avas  confi- 
dent  that,  if  it  should  be  more  than  usually  active  and  prolonged,  it 
might  even  engage  the  attention  and  arrest  the  march  of  Burnside. 

Morgan  had  foreseen  the  necessity  of  such  a  diversion,  and  had 
long  eagerly  looked  forward  to  a  campaign  in  the  ^Northern  border 
States.  Months  before,  he  received  intimation  that  he  would  be  dis 
patched  on  this  service,  and  believing  the  period  to  consummate  his 
favorite  hope  was  approaching,  he  had  sent  men  to  examine  the  fords 
of  the  upper  Ohio.  Ardently  agreeing  with  General  Bragg  that  a 
cavalry  raid,  judiciously  managed,  would  do  much  to  assist  in  extri 
cating  the  army  from  its  difficult  and  perilous  situation,  he  vet 
differed  with  his  superior  in  regard  to  one  important  feature  of  the 
proposed  expedition.  lie  argued  that  it  should  not  be  confined  to 
Kentucky,  and  urged  that  he  should  be  allowed  to  cross  the  Ohio. 
The  people  of  Kentucky,  he  said,  were  grown  accustomed  to  raids, 
and  no  longer  prone  to  magnify  the  numbers  of  those  who  made 
them.  The  Federal  Government,  too,  cared  little  to  guard  Kentucky 
against  such  incursions,  and  certainly  would  sacrifice  no  military 
advantage  to  do  so.  A  dash  into  Kentucky  would  be  decided  too 
soon  to  effect  any  positive  good,  but  a  raid  into  Indiana  and  Ohio, 
he  contended,  would  bring  all  the  troops  under  Judah  and  Burnside 
in  hot  haste  after  him;  would  keep  them  engaged  for  weeks,  and 
prevent  their  participation  in  Bragg's  battle  with  Rosecrans — the 
object  of  greatest  moment.  Notwithstanding  the  sound  military 
reasons  why  Itosecrans'  plans  should  not  be  interrupted  by  the  with 
drawal  of  troops  upon  which  he  relied  for  their  execution,  the  alarm 
and  the  clamor  in  those  States  would  be  so  great  that  the  adminis 
tration  would  be  forced  to  heed  their  outcry,  and  furnish  soldiery  for 
their  protection. 

His  earnest  representations,  however,  wrought  no  change  in  the 
views  of  his  chief,  and  he  was  ordered  to  conduct  the  expedition  in 
the  manner  which  General  Bragg,  who  was  unwilling  to  risk  the  loss 
of  so  large  a  body  of  his  cavalry,  had  first  directed.  But  so  positive 
were  Morgan's  convictions  that,  in  order  to  be  of  any  benefit  in  so 
grave  a  crisis,  his  raid  should  be  extended  to  northern  territory,  he 
deliberately  resolved  to  disobey  the  order  restricting  his  operations 
to  Kentucky  ;  and,  although  he  well  knew  that  the  chances  of  disaster 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

were  multiplied  ten-fold  by  such  a  step,  he  made  up  his  mind  to  take 
it.  "When  he  declared  this  determination,  those  with  whom  he 
advised  made  no  effort  to  dissuade  him  from  it,  perfectly  obvious  as 
were  the  hazards  to  be  encountered,  and  the  serious  breach  of  disci 
pline  involved  in  the  infraction  of  the  instructions  given  him.  There 
was  much  in  the  idea  of  an  enterprise  so  bold  and  exciting  that  found 
favor  in  the  eyes  of  men  trained  to  war  under  Morgan.  In  their 
judgment,  informed  by  a  long  experience  in  just  such  service,  his 
view  of  the  situation  was  the  correct  one.  And,  at  any  rate,  his 
resolve  was  fixed,  and  opposition  would  have  been  useless.  It  would 
have  been  easier  to  halt  the  stag-hound  in  full  stretch  after  his  quarry, 
than  to  have  induced  him  to  abandon  this  purpose.  I  do  not  remem 
ber  to  have  ever  seen  General  Morgan's  remarkable  military  genius 
so  vividly  indicated  as  when  he  sketched  his  plan  of  that  raid,  and 
predicted  its  general  events.  Concealing  from  himself  in  no  wise  the 
dangers  before  him,  and  fairly  calculating  all  the  adverse  chances,  he 
explained,  as  he  traced  his  proposed  course  upon  the  map,  the  expe 
dient  by  which  he  expected  to  avoid  every  difficulty  as  it  should 
arise.  In  these  conferences  he  exhibited  in  a  marked  degree  his 
extraordinary  power  of  anticipating  the  effect  of  his  own  action  upon 
his  opponents,  and  of  calculating  what  they  would  do ;  and  more 
than  once  afterward,  wThen  Indiana  and  Ohio  guides  proved  stubborn 
or  recusant,  and  our  devious  march  seemed  about  to  end  in  abrupt 
disaster,  I  had  occasion  to  recall  his  previous  delineation  of  it,  and 
wonder  at  his  singular  faculty  of  arriving  at  a  correct  idea  of  the 
nature  and  features  of  a  country  of  which  he  was  informed  only  by 
maps,  and  the  most  general  description.  While  conceding  that,  from 
first  to  last,,  his  progress  would  be  attended  with  unusual  difficulty 
and  peril,  he  anticipated  very  serious  danger  at  four  points  only,  viz., 
at  the  crossing  of  the  Cumberland  river,  the  crossing  of  the  Ohio, 
the  march  past  Cincinnati,  and,  if  compelled  to  attempt  it,  the 
recrossing  of  the  Ohio.  He  hoped,  however,  to  be  relieved  from  the 
necessity  of  this  latter  risk  by  joining  General  Lee's  army,  if  it  should 
still  be  in  Pennsylvania. 

On  the  2d  of  July,  1863,  with  two  brigades  of  cavalry,  aggre 
gating  an  effective  strength  of  twenty-four  hundred  and  sixty  men, 
and  a  battery  of  four  field-pieces,  he  commenced  the  passage  of  the 
Cumberland,  at  Burksville.  The  heavy  rains,  of  eight  or  ten  days' 
duration,  just  previously,  had  immensely  swollen  the  river.  Its 
banks  no  longer  confined  the  volume  of  its  waters ;  its  width  was 
far  greater  than  usual,  and  its  current  very  strong  and  rapid.  No 
large  boats  could  be  procured,  and  the  only  means  of  transportation 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND   OHIO  RAID. 

for  the  men  and  artillery  were  small  rafts,  constructed  Ivy  lashing 
canoes  together,  and  making  a  flooring  upon  them  of  fence-rails. 
The  horses  were  forced  to  swim,  and,  after  laboring  through  the 
fierce  stream  and  painfully  climbing  the  crumbling,  treacherous 
bank,  they  stood  panting  and  trembling,  in  little  groups,  until 
comforted  by  the  arrival  of  their  masters.  "With  such  inadequate 
facilities,  the  passage  of  the  river  was  necessarily  tedious;  but  some 
thing  worse  than  hard  work,  and  loss  of  time,  was  to  be  appre 
hended.  As  has  already  been  intimated,  this,  the  initiatory  step  of 
the  expedition,  was  one  of  the  most  perilous.  Judali's  cavalry  was 
stationed  only  twelve  miles  distant  from  Burksville,  where  it  had 
been  concentrated  immediately  when  Morgan  appeared  upon  the 
border.  It  was  more  than  double  our  entire  strength,  and  if  its 
commander  had  closely  watched  the  river,  and  had  attacked  vigor 
ously  when  our  passage  was  partially  effected,  not  only  would  the 
raid  have  been  crushed  in  its  inception,  but  we  would  have  been  cut 
to  pieces.  It  is  possible  that  his  vigilance  had  been  deceived  by  the 
apparent  withdrawal  of  our  regiments,  after  thev  had  remained 
inactive  for  nearly  a  week  upon  the  banks  of  the  river;  and  he  may 
have  believed  that,  having  recruited  men  and  horses  in  the  fertile 
and  grassy  valleys  where  they  had  been  encamped,  Morgan  intended 
to  seek  safer  proximity  to  Bragg.  But,  even  if  the  Federal  com 
mander  was  beguiled  into  such  a  delusion  by  demonstrations  made 
with  no  other  view  than  to  mislead  him,  his  negligent  watch  was 
inexcusable.  So  far  from  himself  trusting  to  chance,  Morgan,  -find 
ing  the  river  unguarded,  and  not  even  observed  by  videttes,  chose 
the  very  time  that  the  difficulty  of  getting  over  was  the  greatest, 
for  the  reason  that  the  attempt  would  then  be  least  expected. 

The  result  verified  the  accuracy  of  his  calculations.  Informa 
tion  of  our  movements  was  not  transmitted  to  the  enemy  until  late 
in  the  day,  and  it  was  not  until  nearly  three  in  the  afternoon  that 
a  column  of  about  one  thousand  strong  approached  Burksville, 
so  closely  as  to  threaten  the  First  Brigade,  of  which  some  eight 
hundred  men  were,  by  that  hour,  across.  This  force  Avas  promptly 
disposed  to  receive  the  advancing  cavalry,  and  the  ground  about  a 
mile  back  of  the  village  being  favorable,  the  greater  part  of  it  was 
placed  in  ambuscade.  The  Federals,  unsuspectingly,  trotted  into 
the  trap,  and,  recoiling  before  one  stinging  volley,  delivered  at  short 
range,  rushed  back  in  confusion.  General  Morgan,  at  the  head  of  a 
reserve  of  two  hundred  men,  whom  he  had  kept  mounted,  pressed 
the  retreat  so  energetically  that  he  dashed  into  JudalTs  c;nnp  along 
with  the  fleeing  squadrons.  For  a  few  minutes  there  ensued  a  scene 


246  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  indescribable  turmoil,  which  promised  to  become  a  panic  of  the 
entire  Federal  command.  Tents  were  overthrown,  men  were 
trampled  down  by  their  comrades  rushing  blindly  about,  riderless 
horses  plunged  in  every  direction,  and  the  startled  soldiers  thronged 
and  huddled  together  in  fear  and  amazement,  which  paralyzed  them 
while  it  lasted.  But  even  while  the  Confederates  were  firing  into 
their  faces,  and  the  confusion  seemed  irremediable,  the  discipline  of 
these  veterans  reasserted  itself,  and  their  coolness  began  to  return. 
Rallying  in  squads,  without  alignment  or  formation,  for  which  there 
was  no  time,  they  poured  a  quick  and  continuous  fire  upon  their 
assailants.  Two  or  three  pieces  of  artillery,  wheeled  rapidly  into 
position,  opened  like  a  succession  of  thunder-claps,  and  raked  the 
road  along  which  the  Confederate  column  was  charging.  To  have 
continued  the  attack  would  have  been  madness,  and  Morgan,  drawing 
off  his  riders  as  suddenly  as  he  had  brought  them  on,  retired,  leaving 
his  adversaries  so  stupefied  by  the  unexpected  blow  he  had  dealt 
them  that  they  remained  quietly  in  camp  until  next  morning.  But 
before  that  morning's  sun  had  risen,  Morgan  had  gotten  everything 
across  the  angry  flood,  and  was  miles  away  upon  the  road  to 
Northern  Kentucky.  Thus  actually  had  he,  from  the  nettle 
"  danger,"  plucked  the  flower  "  safety." 

It  would  be  impossible,  even  were  it  desirable,  to  give,  in  the 
limits  of  an  article  like  this,  a  detailed  account  of  all  the  minor  inci 
dents  which  make  up  the  history  of  an  expedition  of  this  character ; 
and,  of  course,  the  numerous  personal  adventures  of  constant  occur 
rence,  when  such  a  body  of  daring,  reckless  cavalrymen  were  thread 
ing  or  forcing  their  dubious  way  through  the  multitude  of  foes 
encompassing  them,  cannot  well  be  told.  The  acts  of  individual 
prowess,  the  "hairbreadth  escapes"  which  add  such  zest  to  the 
campaign,  and  afford  the  veteran  "  fighting  his  battles  o'er  again  " 
exhaustless  themes  of  interest  or  amusement,  will  scarcely  be  worth 
recital,  unless  the  raconteur,  forsaking  all  graver  topics,  devotes 
exclusive  attention  to  them.  The  usual  concomitants  of  a  cavalry 
raid,  the  petty,  but  often  sharp  and  desperately  contested  combats 
between  small  scouting  parties,  the  fatal  duels  between  videttes  and 
pickets,  which,  trifling  as  they  seem,  yet  fearfully  swell  the  tale  of 
blood  and  death,  were  uncommonly  frequent  in  the  six  days  during 
which  we  were  traversing  the  breadth  of  Kentucky.  Our  line  of 
inn  i-cli  brought  us  in  contact  with  the  enemy  far  oftener  than  General 
Morgan  wished,  for  he  was  anxious  to  economize  his  strength  for  the 
long,  tough  strain  that  he  was  yet  to  encounter.  Nevertheless,  as  we 
had  no  choice  but  to  pass  through  points  strongly  garrisoned,  or  avoid 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA   AND   OHIO  EAID.  9-iT 

them  by  deflections  from  tlic  direct  route  which  would  have  greatly 
lengthened  the  march,  and,  perhaps,  enabled  the  cavalry  force  we 
had  eluded  at  the  Cumberland,  and  now  following,  to  overtake  and 
attack  us,  we  were  forced  to  fight  more  than  once  when  little  inclined 
to  do  so.  On  the  evening  of  the  3d,  our  advance  guard  and  the  Second 
Kentucky  found  a  sharp  skirmish  with  Woodford's  regiment  neces 
sary  to  win  the  right  of  way  through  Columbia.  On  the  4th,  one  of 
the  hottest  collisions  I  ever  witnessed  occurred  between  five  or  six 
hundred  men  of  the  Third,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  Kentucky  Regiments  of 
ours,  and  a  Michigan  regiment  four  or  five  hundred  strong,  at  the 
crossing  of  Green  river.  The  officer  commanding  this  1'ederal  detach 
ment  had  selected  an  exceedingly  strong  position,  and  had  fortified 
it  hastily,  but  skilfully.  Summoned  to  surrender,  he  answered  that 
the  4th  of  July  was  not  "  a  good  day  for  surrender.'-  The  assault 
was  spirited  and  resolute,  but  was  repulsed,  and,  after  severe  loss,  we 
marched  around  the  position  without  taking  it.  On  the  r>th,  we 
attacked  and  captured  Lebanon,  occupied  by  a  Kentuckv  infantry 
regiment.  Two  Michigan  cavalry  regiments  advanced  to  relieve  the 
garrison,  but  we're  driven  oil'.  The  fighting  lasted  several  hours,  and 
the  town  was  badly  battered  by  our  artillery.  ( )n  the  <>th,  the  column 
passed  through  Bardstown  without  meeting  with  resistance,  although 
it  was  a  point  where  we  had  anticipated  serious  opposition.  On  the 
same  evening  we  crossed  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad,  at 
the  Lebanon  Junction,  thirty  miles  from  Louisville,  and  ascertained 
that  a  large  and  satisfactory  panic  was  prevailing  in  that  city. 

We  had  now  run  the  gauntlet  of  garrisoned  towns,  and  passed 
the  cordon  of  cavalry  detachments  stretched  through  Middle  and 
Southern  Kentucky.  Judalfs  cavalry,  under  General  Kobson,  was 
following  us,  but  was  far  in  the  rear.  We  had  reason  to  believe  the 
distance  between  us  was  hourly  increasing.  Our  column  marched 
the  more  rapidly  and  constantly,  and  uncertainty  about  our  course 
would  delay  Ilobson.  Finding  that  we  had  not  attacked  Louisville, 
and  had  turned  to  the  left,  he  would  naturally  suppose  that  we  were 
seeking  to  escape  through  Western  Kentucky.  It  was  improbable 
that  he  would  divine  Morgan's  intention  to  cross  the  Ohio. 

On  the  8th,  before  mid-clay,  we  reached  Brandenburg,  and  the 
Ohio  river  rolled  before  our  eyes.  Kever  before  had  it  looked  so 
mighty  and  majestic — and  so  hard  to  cross.  A  small  detachment, 
under  picked  officers,  had  been  sent  in  advance  to  capture  steam 
boats,  and  had  successfully  accomplished  its  mission.  We  found 
two  large  boats  awaiting  us,  and  preparations  to  cross  were  instantly 
commenced.  At  this  point  the  Ohio  is  about  one  thousand  yards 


248  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

wide,  and  the  Indiana  shore,  just  opposite,  favorable  for  the  landing 
of  the  boats  and  disembarkation  of  men  and  horses.  A  dense  mist 
which  had  overspread  the  surface  of  the  river  during  the  morning, 
suddenly  lifted  just  before  noon  as  one  of  the  steamboats  was  about 
to  push  off  with  the  Second  Kentucky  and  Ninth  Tennessee,  which 
two  regiments  (leaving  their  horses  for  the  nonce)  wrere  detailed 
as  the  first  to  cross.  Almost  simultaneously  with  the  disappearance 
of  the  foggy  curtain  which  had  obstructed  our  view  of  the  farther 
bank,  and  before  the  quickened  eye  well  had  time  to  take  in  the 
situation,  our  glances  were  attracted  by  the  spouting  flashes  from, 
perhaps,  a  hundred  rifles,  aimed  from  the  very  spot  where  the  boat 
must  land,  and  quickly  followed  by  the  long,  leaping  flame  and 
sullen  roar  of  a  field-piece.  The  range  was  too  great  for  the  small- 
arms  to  do  danger,  but  several  shell  from  the  piece  smashed  into  the 
groups  scattered  about  the  wharf,  before  it  was  silenced,  and  two  or 
three  men  were  wounded.  General  Morgan  at  once  ordered  the 
section  of  three-inch  Parrotts,  which  made  part  of  the  battery,  to  be 
brought  up.  A  few  well-directed  shots  from  these  dispersed  this 
party  of  hospitable  Indianians,  whose  eager  haste  to  welcome  us 
anticipated  our  actual  arrival  in  their  State,  and  although  they  tried 
hard  to  save  their  artillery  they  were  forced  to  abandon  it.  The 
boat  immediately  shoved  across,  and  the  two  regiments  which  she 
carried  sprang  ashore,  formed,  and  pressed  forward,  under  fire  from 
the  party  just  before  driven  back  by  the  steel  guns,  but  which  had 
retreated  no  further  than  a  wooded  ridge  some  five  hundred  yards 
from  the  river,  where  they  either  rejoined  or  were  reinforced  by 
another  body  of  about  the  same  strength. 

Before  more  troops  could  be  put  over  an  interruption  occurred, 
which  threatened  to  stop  all  further  proceedings.  A  river  gunboat, 
small  but  vicious,  put  in  an  appearance,  and  opened  fire  alternately 
upon  the  men  on  the  Indiana  shore,  the  boats,  and  the  troops  in 
town.  She  carried  three  guns,  and  it  was  evident  that,  if  well  and 
boldly  handled,  it  was  possible  for  her  to  become  mistress  of  the 
situation.  So  long  as  she  remained  within  range,  it  would  have  been 
suicidal  to  have  attempted  to  pass  the  river.  A  single  well-aimed 
shot  would  have  sent  either  boat  to  the  bottom,  and  caused  the  loss 
of  every  man  on  board.  But  delay  would  be  equally  fatal.  If  the 
gunboat  should  do  no  more  than  stand  guard  over  the  ferry,  and 
hold  us  inactive,  we  were  ruined.  Two  of  our  strongest  and  best 
regiments  were  already  dangerously  compromised.  Separated  from 
the  main  body  by  the  broad  torrent,  and,  in  that  most  awkward  of 
all  predicaments  for  cavalry,  cut  off  from  their  horses,  they  might 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND   OHIO  If  AID.  24:9 

be  attacked  at  any  moment  by  overwhelming  odds,  while  debarred 
retreat  or  assistance. 

We  were  only  thirty  or  forty  miles  from  Louisville.  So  soon 
as  a  true  comprehension  of  the  situation  was  obtained  there,  a 
sufficient  force  might  be  sent  thence  to  capture  our  comrades  on  the 
Indiana  side,  and  successfully  resist  our  passage,  even  if  the  gunboat 
should  then  release  us  from  durance.  'Moreover,  although  llobson 
might  be  mystified  for  a  short  period  in  regard  to  our  movements, 
his  doubt  could  not  last  long,  and  nothing  could  be  more  certain 
than,  if  we  were  detained  twenty-four  hours,  he  would  be  upon  us, 
reinforced,  perhaps,  by  every  Federal  cavalry  detachment  in  Central 
Kentucky.  We  were  not  strong  enough  to  cope  with  the  half 
of  such  a  force,  for  our  original  total  of  twenty-four  hundred 
and  sixty  was  now  diminished  by  one  hundred  and  fifty  or  sixty 
men,  killed  and  wounded  in  the  engagements  sustained  on  the 
march,  and  some  two  hundred  detached  for  necessary  diversions.  It 
was  a  sheer,  absolute  necessity  that  the  gunboat  should  be  sunk,  or 
driven  oil',  and  the  Parrotts  were  posted  on  a  small  hill,  immediately 
overlooking  the  river,  and  set  to  work  at  her  in  dead  earnest. 
.Nothing  loth,  she  instantly  accepted  the  challenge,  and,  turning  her 
broadside  to  the  battery,  gave  back  shot  for  shot. 

Crowding  upon  the  bluffs,  the  men  watched  this  duel  with 
intense  interest.  The  hardiest  veterans  of  the  command,  inured  to 
a  service  in  which  every  day  brought  its  peculiar  peril,  every  hour 
had  its  hazard,  paled,  and  breathed  thick  and  hard  with  keen 
excitement.  For  once.  General.  Morgan's  coolness  and  self-command 
forsook  him,  and  he  could  not  disguise  the  emotion  he  felt.  Tso  one 
realized  so  thoroughly  as  he  the  magnitude  and  imminence  of  the 
danger  to  which  delay  exposed  him.  Ko  one  knew  so  well  the 
importance  of  promptly  accomplishing  this  invasion,  now  that  he 
had  notitied  the  people  of  Indiana  that  he  was  about  to  enter  their 
territory.  The  news  was  speeding  over  the  State.  Everywhere 
resistance  was  being:  organized.  He  felt  that  he  must  cross  that 

O  C5 

river  at  once;  to  be  free  to  fight  or  flee,  to  elude  the  danger  by 
celerity  of  movement,  or  quell  it  by  audacious  aggression.  J>ut  the 
feeling  with  which  every  man  in  our  ranks  regarded  that  scene  was 
quite  different  from  that  which  conflict,  grown  familiar  with  custom, 
usually  evoked.  That  wide,  strong  current,  pouring  steadily  along, 
as  if  in  contemptuous  indifference  of  our  struggles,  divided  us  from 
a  momentous  future.  Thrice  our  number  of  eager  enemies  were 
upon  our  track.  The  broad  States  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee 
separated  us  from  the  retreating  Confederate  armies.  When  we 


250  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

passed  the  great  river,  we  would  be  confronted  by  the  angry 
and  hostile  North — a  vast  and  infuriated  population,  and  a  soldiery 
outnumbering  us  twenty  to  one.  We  were  throwing  down  the  gaunt 
let  to  the  "nation."  We  could  expect  no  such  sympathy  as  in 
Kentucky  often  guided  our  movements,  and  rendered  us  valuable 
aid.  But  we  knew  that  the  whole  people  would  rise  in  arms,  and 
rush  from  all  quarters  against  us.  Our  march  would  be  incessantly 
harassed.  The  omnipresent  telegraph  would  constantly  tell  of  our 
course.  Railroads  would  bring  fresh  assailants  from  every  point  of 
the  compass,  and  we  w^ould  have  to  undergo  this  ordeal — night 
and  day,  with  no  intermission,  not  an  hour  of  safety — for  nearly 
seven  hundred  miles. 

After  a  contest  of  perhaps  an  hour,  but  which,  to  the  impatient 
spectator^  seemed  interminable,  the  gunboat  backed  out  and  steamed 
up  the  river.  Whether  she  had  sustained  injury  from  our  guns  or 
had  exhausted  her  ammunition,  we  never  knew.  Without  specu 
lating  about  the  cause  of  her  withdrawal,  we  witnessed  it  with  an 
exquisite  sense  of  relief.  Both  boats  were  immediately  crowded 
with  men  and  horses  to  their  fullest  capacity,  and  the  crossing  was 
resumed  and  hastened  with  all  possible  dispatch.  About  five  P.  M. 
the  gunboat  returned,  accompanied  by  a  consort,  causing  us  lively 
apprehension.  They  hovered  in  sight  until  dark,  and  once  came  so 
near  as  to  elicit  a  few  shots  from  the  Parrotts,  by  way  of  protest,  but 
made  no  further  effort  to  interrupt  the  ferriage.  Both  brigades  and 
the  artillery  were  gotten  over  by  midnight  and  encamped  not  far 
from  the  river.  The  panic  of  the  people  was  excessive.  Leaving 
their  houses  with  doors  unlocked  and  ajar,  they  fled  into  the  woods, 
and  concealed  themselves  so  effectually  that,  thickly  settled  as  was 
that  portion  of  the  State,  we  did  not  see  the  face  of  one  citizen,  man, 
woman,  or  child,  until  after  noon  of  the  next  day.  At  Corydon, 
the  first  town  through  which  our  march  conducted  us,  we  encoun 
tered  a  spirited  resistance  from  a  considerable  body  of  militia,  who, 
selecting  a  position  where  the  road  ran  between  two  rather  abrupt 
hills,  had  erected  a  long  barricade  of  timber,  from  which  they  opened 
a  brisk  fire  upon  the  head  of  the  column.  The  advance  guard 
charged  this  work  on  horseback,  and  as  it  was  too  high  for  the  horses 
to  leap,  and  too  strong  to  be  broken  down  by  their  rush,  some  sixteen 
or  eighteen  men  were  unnecessarily  lost.  A  demonstration  upon 
the  flank,  however,  quickly  dislodged  the  party,  and  we  entered  the 
town  without  further  molestation. 

On  the  following  day,  before  we  reached  Salem,  we  found  parties 
of  militia  thick  along  the  road,  and  at  that  place  several  hundred 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND   OHIO  HA  ID.  251 

were  collected,  while  squads  were  rapidly  coining  in  from  all 
directions.  To  attack  instantly  was  the  only  policy  proper  with 
these  fellows,  for  although  they  were  raw  and  imperfectly  armed, 
they  would  fight,  and  if  we  had  hesitated  in  the  least,  might  have 
become  dangerous.  The  Second  Regiment,  dashing  at  full  speed 
into  the  town,  dispersed  this  body  with  trifling  loss  on  either  side. 

I  have  seen  the  number  of  militia  called  out  in  the  two  States 
to  resist  this  raid  estimated  at  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand.  I 
know  not  how  correct  this  may  be,  but  I  am  confident  that  I  quite 
often  saw  as  many  as  ten  thousand  per  diem,  and  it  wasn't  always  a 
"good  day"  for  militia.  To  men,  accustomed  as  we  were  to  the 
sparsely  populated  Southern  States,  drained  by  the  demands  of  the 
war,  the  dense,  able-bodied  male  population  of  Indiana  and  Ohio 
was  as  astonishing  as  it  was  disagreeable,  and  we  never  collided  with 
an  exceptionally  stubborn  gang  without  cursing  the  lack  of  patriotism 
which  kept  them  at  home  and  out  of  the  army.  Sending  out  detach 
ments  in  every  direction,  General  Morgan  was  enabled  to  pi-event,  in 
some  measure,  a  concentration  of  the  large  bodies  of  militia.  This 
method  also  caused  his  actual  strength  to  be  greatly  magnified,  and 
occasioned  perplexity  and  doubt  in  regard  to  the  course  of  his  inarch, 
and  the  points  at  which  he  was  really  striking.  Very  nice  calcula 
tion  and  careful  management,  however,  was  necessary  to  guard 
against  their  permanent  separation  from  the  main  bodv. 

At  Vienna,  where  we  tapped  the  telegraph  lines,  General 
Morgan  obtained  the  first  reliable  information  he  had  gotten,  since 
crossing  the  river,  of  the  movements  of  the  regular  troops  under 
Buiiiside  and  Judah.  I  use  the  term  '•'regular''  in  contradistinction 
to  u  militia."  Tie  learned  that  an  immense  force  of  infantry  was 
being  disposed  to  intercept  him,  and  that  points  on  the  river  were 
already  being  occupied  by  the  soldiery.  Threatening  Madison,  the 
most  dangerous  of  these  points,  with  one  regiment,  he  turned  due 
northward,  toward  Vernon,  where  heavy  bodies  of  militia  were  con 
centrating.  Amusing  the  officer  in  command  here  with  a  demand 
for  his  surrender,  and  apparent  preparations  for  battle,  he  flanked 
'the  town  without  fighting,  and  urged  his  march  rapidly  in  the 
direction  of  Cincinnati.  lie  had  learned  the  fact  that  Burnside  was 
in  that  city,  and  inferred  therefrom  that  a  strenuous  effort  would  be 
made  to  capture  or  rout  him  in  that  neighborhood.  He  expected  to 
find  the  enemy  in  strong  force  along  the  line  of  the  Hamilton  and 
Dayton  Railroad,  and  between  Hamilton  and  Cincinnati.  He 
believed  that  if  he  could  elude  this  danger  his  ultimate  success  would 
be  assured,  unless  the  Ohio  should  be  so  high  that  boats  could  convey 


252  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

troops  to  the  upper  fords.  It  was  important,  therefore,  to  deceive 
General  Burnsidc  in  regard  to  the  point  where  he  would  cross  this 
railroad.  Accordingly,  so  soon  as  lie  reached  Harrison,  on  the 
Indiana  and  Ohio  line,  and  twenty-five  miles  from  Cincinnati,  he 
dispatched  a  strong  detachment  in  the  direction  of  Hamilton,  and 
bivouacked  the  entire  command  on  the  road  leading  to  that  place,  as 
if  he  meant  to  pursue  it.  But,  that  afternoon,  when  he  thought 
time  enough  had  elapsed  for  the  newTs  of  this  demonstration  to  have 
reached  Burnside,  he  pressed  directly  for  Cincinnati.  In  a  few 
hours  the  detachment  which  had  maneuvred  toward  Hamilton 
rejoined  him  by  a  flank  march  across  the  country.  As  he  had 
expected,  General  Burnside,  believing  Hamilton  to  be  his  objective 
point,  sent  there  the  greater  part  of  the  troops  posted  at  Cincinnati 
and  in  the  vicinity.  Hoping,  although,  of  course,  not  knowing,  that 
this  could  be  done,  and  that  Cincinnati  would  be  left  with  a  garrison 
no  stronger  than  the  absolute  defense  of  the  place  might  require, 
Morgan  marched  with  unusual  celerity,  and  penetrated  into  the 
suburbs  of  the  city.  This  threat  had  the  anticipated  effect.  The 
troops  remaining  there,  about  twenty-five  hundred  or  three  thousand 
in  number,  were  withdrawn  from  the  outskirts  to  the  interior  of  the 
city,  under  the  impression  that  it  was  about  to  be  attacked,  but 
uncertain  wrhere  the  blow  would  be  delivered.  Our  advance  videttes 
were  instructed  to  cut  the  telegraph  wires,  so  that  no  troops  could 
be  recalled,  and  also  to  chase  in  the  pickets  on  every  road ;  and  thus 
feigning  assault,  while  really  bent  on  escape,  the  column  cautiously 
wound  its  way  through  the  populous  environs  of  the  big  town. 

So  long  as  I  live  I  shall  never  forget  that  night  march  around 
Cincinnati.  We  had  now  been  almost  constantly  in  motion  for 
eleven  days  and  nights,  and  gone  nearly  four  hundred  miles.  It 
had  been  a  period  of  almost  total  deprivation  of  rest  and  sleep ;  for, 
when  not  marching,  we  had  been  fighting,  or  hard  at  work.  The 
column  was  incumbered  with  the  men  wounded  in  Indiana;  and 
those  still  in  the  saddle,  reduced  in  number  to  less  than  two  thou 
sand,  were  worn  with  the  enormous  fatigue  consequent  upon  such 
exertions,  of  which  no  one,  who  has  not  had  a  similar  experience, 
can  form  the  slightest  conception.  The  Second  Brigade  had  com 
paratively  little  trouble,  for  it  was  in  front,  and  General  Morgan 
rode  at  its  head  with  the  guides.  But  the  First  Brigade  was  embar 
rassed  beyond  measure.  If  the  regiment  in  the  rear  of  the  advance 
brigade  had  been  kept  "closed  up,"  and  held  compactly  together, 
the  entire  column  would  have  been  directed  by  the  guides.  But, 
although  composed  of  the  very  best  fighting  material,  this  regiment 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA   AND   OHIO   SAID.  253 

had  always  been  under  lax  discipline,  and  the  effect  was  now 
observable.  Its  rear  companies  would  straggle,  halt,  and  delay  all 
behind  them.  When  forced  to  proceed,  they  would  move  at  a 
gallop.  A  great  gap  would  thus  be  opened  between  the  two  bri 
gades,  and  we,  who  were  in  the  rear,  were  obliged  to  grope  our  way 
without  assistance.  At  the  frequent  junctions  of  roads,  which  occur 
in  the  suburbs  of  so  large  a  city,  we  were  compelled  to  consult  all 
sorts  of  indications  to  ascertain  the  right  path.  The  night  Avas 
intensely  dark,  and  it  was  necessary  to  light  torches  at  all  such 
points.  The  horses'  tracks,  on  paved  and  dusty  streets,  so  constantly 
traveled,  afforded  no  clue  to  the  route  our  comrades  had  taken ;  but 
we  could  trace  it  by  noticing  the  manner  in  which  the  dust  kk  settled" 
or  floated.  On  a  calm  night,  the  dust  occasioned  by  the  passage  of 
a  large  body  of  cavalry  will  remain  in  the  air  for  minutes,  and  moves 
slowly  in  the  direction  followed  by  those  wTho  have  disturbed  it.  We 
were,  also,  aided  by  remarking  the  slaver  which  had  been  dropped 
from  the  mouths  of  the  horses. 

At  every  halt  men  would  fall  asleep,  and  even  drop  from  their 
saddles,  and  the  officers  were  compelled  to  exercise  constant  vigilance 
to  keep  them  in  ranks.  Daylight  returned  just  as  we  reached  the 
Little  Miami  Railroad,  the  last  point  at  which  we  anticipated  imme 
diate  danger,  and,  after  the  trials  of  the  night,  its  appearance  was 
gratefully  hailed.  Our  progress  was  continued,  however,  save  an 
hour's  halt,  in  sight  of  Camp  Dennison,  to  feed  the  horses,  until  we 
reached  Williamsburg,  where  we  rested,  after  a  march  of  ninety- 
seven  miles,  and,  for  the  first  time  during  the  raid,  slept  the  sleep  of 
the  righteous  who  know  not  fear. 

Our  experience  in  Ohio  was  very  similar  to  that  in  Indiana. 
Small  lights  with  the  militia  were  of  hourly  occurrence.  They  hung 
about  the  column,  incessantly  assaulting  it;  keeping  up  a  continuous 
fusilade,  the  crack  of  their  rifles  sounded  in  our  ears  without  inter 
mission,  and  the  list  of  killed  and  wounded  was  constantly  swelling. 
We  captured  hundreds  daily,  but  could  only  break  their  guns  and 
turn  them  loose  again.  They  finally  resorted  to  one  capital  means 
of  annoyance,  by  felling  trees  and  barricading  the  roads.  The 
advance  guard  was  forced  to  carry  axes  to  cut  away  these  blockades. 

While  thus  pleasantly  occupied,  we  learned  that  Vicksburg 
had  fallen,  and  General  Lee,  after  Gettysburg,  had  retreated  from 
Pennsylvania.  The  information  did  not  conduce  to  improve  our 
nioi'<ile.  General  Morgan  had  managed,  in  both  Indiana  and  Ohio, 
to  successfully  avoid  any  serious  engagement,  and  as  his  progress 
through  the  latter  (State  drew  near  its  conclusion,  he  was  more  than 


254  ANNALS  OF  THE   WAR. 

ever  anxious  to  shun  battle.  At  Pomeroy,  where  we  approached 
the  river  again,  a  large  force  of  regular  troops  appeared;  but, 
although  our  passage  by  the  place  was  one  sharp,  continuous  skir 
mish,  we  prevented  them  from  gaining  a  position  that  would  have 
forced  us  into  a  decisive  combat. 

On  the  night  of  the  18th,  we  encamped  again  on  the  banks  of 
the  Ohio,  at  the  little  village  of  Portland,  not  far  from  Buffington 
Island.  This  was  the  point  where  Morgan  had  planned  to  recross 
the  river  (when  he  first  contemplated  the  raid),  in  the  event  he 
could  not  join  General  Lee  in  Pennsylvania ;  and  here  was  the  scene 
of  the  disaster  which  closed  the  expedition,  and  virtually  terminated 
his  own  career  of  almost  unparalleled  success.  An  important  ele 
ment  in  his  calculations,  when  he  was  planning  this  enterprise,  was 
the  fact  that,  after  what  is  known  as  the  "  June  rise "  in  the  Ohio, 
the  river  generally  runs  down,  and  becomes  fordable,  at  certain 
points,  in  the  latter  part  of  July.  But  this  "  rise,"  produced  by  the 
melting  of  the  snow  in  the  mountains,  came,  this  year,  not  in  June, 
but  in  July,  so  that  the  ford  at  Buffington,  usually  quite  shallow 
and  practicable  in  the  latter  month,  was,  in  1863,  deep  and  difficult. 
We  were  unfortunate,  also,  in  arriving  at  Portland  after  nightfall, 
and  feared  to  attempt,  in  the  solid  gloom,  and  without  guides,  the 
passage  of  the  stream.  Men  and  horses  were  alike  exhausted; 
a  train  of  vehicles  of  every  description,  filled  with  wounded  men, 
and  the  artillery,  had  to  be  crossed.  If  we  missed  the  ford,  as  we 
might  easily  do  in  the  darkness,  many  lives  would  be  lost. 

General  Morgan  knew  that  he  would  probably  be  attacked  on 
the  following  day.  He  at  once,  and  correctly,  conjectured  that  the 
troops  we  had  seen  at  Pomeroy  were  a  portion  of  the  infantry  which 
had  been  sent  from  Kentucky  to  intercept  us,  and  that  they  had 
been  brought  by  the  river  from  Cincinnati  to  Pomeroy.  He  knew 
that  if  the  boats  could  pass  that  place,  they  could  run  up  as  far  as 
Buffington's  Island.  The  transports  would  certainly  be  accompanied 
by  small  gunboats.  Against  these,  small-arms  would  be  useless,  and 
our  artillery  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted.  Moreover,  an  attack 
from  the  forces  under  Hobson  was  to  be  apprehended,  for  our  recent 
delays  had  enabled  him  to  gain  rapidly  upon  us. 

It  is  needless  to  dwell  upon  the  anxiety  of  the  commander  in 
such  a  situation,  and  impossible  to  describe  the  despondency  which 
now  assailed  the  subaltern  officers  and  the  men.  The  latter,  demor 
alized  by  tremendous  and  constant  toil,  and  forced  and  long-continued 
abstinence  from  sleep,  for  the  first  time  doubting  a  successful  issue 
of  their  efforts,  lay  down  along  the  river  shore  in  dogged  despair. 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  RAID.  255 

They  forgot  their  long  experience  of  victory ;  they  seemed,  tempora 
rily,  to  discard  the  confidence  which  they  had  hitherto  unreservedly 
given  their  general;  they  could  think  only  of  the  safety  and  repose 
which  were  just  beyond  the  river,  but  separated  from  them  by  diffi 
culties  they  saw  no  means  of  overcoming.  At  the  first  streak  of 
dawn,  five  hundred  men,  detailed  for  that  service,  advanced  to  carry 
an  earthwork  thrown  up  at  the  entrance  to  the  ford,  and  which  on 
the  previous  night  had  been  occupied  by  three  hundred  Federal 
infantry,  and  had  mounted  two  heavy  guns.  They  found  the  work 
abandoned,  and  the  guns  rolled  over  the  bluff.  ]>ut  as  this  detach 
ment  moved  on  down  the  Pomeroy  road,  which  it  was  instructed  to 
guard  while  the  main  body  was  fording,  a  sharp  rattle  of  musketry 
suddenly  announced  that  it  had  encountered  an  enemy.  This  turned 
out  to  be  JudalTs  advance  guard,  and  sustained  a  smart  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded,  beside  a  piece  of  artillery  and  some  fifty  men  captured. 
One  of  Judah's  staff  was  wounded,  and  his  adjutant  general  made 
prisoner. 

Our  triumph,  however,  was  short-lived.  The  Federal  infantry, 
eight  or  ten  thousand  strong,  instantly  deployed  and  advanced, 
flanked  by  three  regiments  of  cavalry.  Two  pieces  of  our  battery 
were  taken  at  the  first  onset.  They  were  no  great  loss,  inasmuch  as 
but  three  cartridges  remained  to  the  guns,  and  the  bores  were  so 
clogged  with  dust  and  dirt  that  they  could  scarcely  be  loaded.  Our 
effective  strength  was  now  little  more  than  eighteen  hundred.  The 
men  were  almost  without  ammunition;  it  had  either  been  shot 
away  in  the  frequent  skirmishes,  or  worn  out  in  the  cartridge- 
boxes.  Nevertheless,  they  formed  with  alacrity,  and  prepared  for  a 
resistance  which  should  secure  a  safe  retreat.  And  it  would  have 
been  successfully  done  had  not  Ilobson  arrived  just  at  this  crisis  with 
three  thousand  men  and  attacked  our  right  flank. 

If  the  reader  will  picture  in  his  mind  a  long  valley,  which  may 
be  roughly  described  as  in  the  shape  of  an  enormous  Y,  one  side  of 
which  is  a  wooded,  ridgy  hill,  and  the  other  the  river;  if  he  will 
imagine  this  angle  crowded  with  Confederates,  while  Judah  pressed 
into  the  opening,  Ilobson  aligned  his  command  upon  the  ridge,  and 
three  gunboats  steamed  up  the  river  and  took  position  at  short 
range  on  the  left,  he  will  have  formed  a  tolerably  accurate  idea  of 
the  situation.  The  only  means  of  egress  from  the  valley  left  open 
to  us  was  at  the  apex  or  northern  end — the  river  runs  here  nearly 
due  north  and  south.  Upon  the  level  and  unsheltered  surface  of 
this  river  bottom  we  were  exposed  to  a  tremendous  direct  and  cross 
fire  from  twelve  or  thirteen  thousand  small-arms,  and  fifteen  pieces 


250  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  artillery.  The  screams  of  the  shells  drowned  the  hiss  of  the  bullets ; 
coming  from  three  different  directions,  and  bursting  between  the  two 
lines  formed  at  right  angles — a  disposition  we  were  compelled  to 
adopt  in  order  to  confront  both  assailants — the  air  seemed  filled  with 
metal,  and  the  ground  was  torn  and  ploughed  into  furrows.  Only 
some  twenty-five  men  were  killed,  and  about  eighty  wounded.  The 
open,  skirmish  line  formation,  which  our  system  of  tactics  prescribed, 
saved  us  from  heavier  loss. 

The  odds  were  too  overwhelming  and  too  apparent  for  the  con 
test  to  have  lasted  long,  even  had  the  men  been  in  better  fighting 
condition.  After  sustaining  the  attack  for  little  more  than  half  an 
hour,  we  began  to  retreat,  at  first  in  good  order.  The  upper  end  of 
the  valley  was  filled  with  wagons  and  ambulances,  whose  wounded 
and  terror-stricken  occupants  urged  the  scared  horses  to  headlong 
night.  Often  they  became  locked  together,  and  were  hurled  over  as 
if  by  an  earthquake.  Occasionally  a  solid  shot,  or  uiiexploded  shell 
would  strike  one,  and  dash  it  into  splinters.  As  the  retreating 
battalions  neared  the  point  of  exit,  and  discovered  that  only  two 
narrow  roads  afforded  avenues  of  escape,  they  broke  ranks  and  rushed 
for  them.  Both  were  instantly  blocked.  The  remaining  section  of 
artillery  was  tumbled  into  a  ravine,  during  this  mad  swirl,  as  if  the 
guns  had  been  as  light  as  feathers.  The  gunboats  raked  the  roads 
with  grape,  and  the  Seventh  and  Eighth  Michigan  Cavalry  dashed 
into  the  mass  of  fugitives.  In  a  moment  the  panic  was  complete, 
and  the  disaster  irretrievable. 

Between  seven  and  eight  hundred  of  the  command  were  cap 
tured  on  this  field.  Some  three  hundred  swam  the  river  at  a  point 
twenty  miles  above.  Several  were  drowned  in  the  attempt  to  do  so. 
-General  Morgan  succeded  in  withdrawing  about  a  thousand  men 
from  the  fight,  and  effected  their  reorganization,  although  closely 
pursued  and  continually  attacked  by  cavalry.  This  was  a  last  effort, 
gallant  but  unavailing.  Fresh  thousands  met  him  everywhere,  lie 
was  baffled  at  every  point,  and,  finally,  about  a  week  later,  surrounded 
and  obliged  to  surrender. 

Thus  ended  a  raid  which,  in  boldness  of  conception  and  purpose, 
vigor  and  skill  of  execution,  and  importance  of  object,  has  no  equal 
in  the  history  of  such  enterprises.  The  soldier  who  carefully  studies 
it  will  pronounce  that  its  failure  was  not  disgraceful,  and  that  even 
success  could  have  furnished  no  stronger  proof,  than  did  its  conduct, 
of  the  genius  and  nerve  of  its  author. 


ON  THE  FIELD  OF  EREDERICKSBrRG. 


BY    HON.    I).    WATSON    KOWE. 


EVERY  one  remembers  the 
slaughter  and  the  failure  at 
Fredericksburg ;  the  grief  of 
it,  the  momentary  pang  of 
despair.  Burnside  was  the 
man  of  the  13th  of  Decem 
ber;  than  he,  no  more  gallant 
soldier  in  all  the  army,  no 
more  patriotic  citizen  in  all 
the  republic.  But  lie  at 
tempted  there  the  impossible, 
and,  as  repulse  grew  toward 
disaster,  lost  that  equal  mind, 
which  is  necessary  in  arduous 
affairs.  Let  us  remember, 
however,  and  at  once,  that  it 
is  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  felt, 
at  the  end  of  that  calamitous  day,  that  hope  itself  was  killed — hope, 
whose  presence  was  never  before  wanting  to  that  array  of  the 
unconquerable  will,  and  steadfast  purpose,  and  courage  to  persevere  ; 
the  secret  of  its  linal  triumph.  I  have  undertaken  to  describe 
certain  night-scenes  on  that  field  famous  for  bloodshed.  The  battle 
is  terrible  ;  but  the  sequel  of  it  is  horrible.  The  battle,  the  charging 
column,  is  grand,  sublime.  The  field  after  the  action  and  the 
reaction  is  the  spectacle  which  harrows  up  the  soul. 

Marye's  Hill  was  the  focus  of  the  strife.  It  rises  in  the  rear  of 
Fredericksburg,  a  stone's  throw  beyond  the  canal,  which  runs  along 
the  western  border  of  the  city.  The  ascent  is  not  very  abrupt.  A 
brick  house  stands  on  the  hillside,  whence  you  may  overlook 
Fredericksburg,  and  all  the  circumjacent  country.  The  Orange 
plank  road  ascends  the  hill  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  house,  the 
telegraph  road  on  the  left.  A  sharp  rise  of  ground,  at  the  foot  of 
the  heights,  afforded  a  cover  for  the  formation  of  troops.  Above 
Marye's  Hill  is  an  elevated  plateau,  which  commands  it.  The  hill  is 

17  (257) 


258  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

part  of  a  long,  bold  ridge,  on  which  the  declivity  leans,  stretching 
from  Falmouth  to  Massoponax  creek,  six  miles.  Its  summit  was 
shaggy  and  rough  with  the  earthworks  of  the  Confederates,  and  was 
crowned  with  their  artillery.  The  stone  wall  on  Marye's  Height 
was  their  "  coigne  of  vantage,"  held  by  the  brigades  of  Cobb  and 
Kershaw,  of  McLaws'  Division.  On  the  semi-circular  crest  above, 
and  stretching  far  on  either  hand,  was  Longstreet's  Corps,  forming 
the  left  of  the  Confederate  line.  His  advance  position  was  the  stone 
wall  and  rifle-trenches  along  the  telegraph  road,  above  the  house. 
The  guns  of  the  enemy  commanded  and  swept  the  streets  which  led 
out  to  the  heights.  Sometimes  you  might  see  a  regiment  marching 
down  those  streets  in  single  file,  keeping  close  to  the  houses,  one  file 
on  the  right-hand  side,  another  on  the  left.  Between  the  canal  and 
the  foot  of  the  ridge  was  a  level  plat  of  flat,  even  ground,  a  few 
hundred  yards  in  width.  This  restricted  space  afforded  what 
opportunity  there  was  to  form  in  order  of  battle.  A  division 
massed  on  this  narrow  plain  was  a  target  for  Lee's  artillery,  which 
cut  fearful  swaths  in  the  dense  and  compact  ranks.  Below,  and  to 
the  right  of  the  house,  were  fences,  which  impeded  the  advance  of 
the  charging  lines.  Whatever  division  was  assigned  the  task  of 
carrying  Marye's  Hill,  debouched  from  the  town,  crossed  the  canal, 
traversed  the  narrow  level,  and  formed  under  cover  of  the  rise 
of  ground  below  the  house.  At  the  word,  suddenly  ascending  this 
bank,  they  pressed  forward  up  the  hill  for  the  stone  wall  and  the 
crest  beyond. 

From  noon  to  dark  Burnside  continued  to  hurl  one  division 
after  another  against  that  volcano-like  eminence,  belching  forth 
fire,  and  smoke,  and  iron  hail.  French's  Division  was  the  first  to 
rush  to  the  assault.  "When  it  emerged  from  cover,  and  burst  out  on 
the  open,  in  full  view  of  the  enemy,  it  was  greeted  with  a  frightful, 
fiery  reception  from  all  his  batteries  on  the  circling  summit,  The 
ridge  concentrated  upon  it  the  convergent  fire  of  all  its  enginery  of 
war.  You  might  see  at  a  mile  the  lanes  made  by  the  cannon  balls 
in  the  ranks.  You  might  see  a  bursting  shell  throw  up  into  the  air 
a  cloud  of  earth  and  dust,  mingled  with  the  limbs  of  men.  The 
batteries  in  front  of  the  devoted  division  thundered  against  it.  To 
the  right,  to  the  left,  cannon  were  answering  to  each  other  in  a 
tremendous  deafening  battle-chorus,  the  burden  of  which  was — 

Welcome  to  these  madmen  about  to  die. 

The  advancing  column  was  the  focus,  the  point  of  concentration, 
of  an  arc — almost  a  semi-circle — of  destruction.  It  was  a  centre 


OX  THE  FIELD   OF  FREDERICKSBURG.  259 

of  attraction  of  all  deadly  missiles.  At  that  moment  that  single 
division  was  going  np  alone  in  battle  against  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy,  and  was  being  pounded  to  pieces.  It  continued  to  go  up, 
nevertheless,  toward  the  stone  wall,  toward  the  crest  above.  With 
lips  more  firmly  pressed  together,  the  men  closed  up  their  ranks  and 
pushed  forward.  The  storm  of  battle  increased  its  fury  upon  them; 
the  crash  of  musketry  mingled  with  the  roar  of  ordnance  from  the 
peaks.  The  stone  wall  and  the  rifle-pits  added  their  terrible  treble 
to  the  deep  bass  of  the  bellowing  ridge.  The  rapid  discharge  of 
small-arms  poured  a  continuous  rain  of  bullets  in  their  faces ;  they 
fell  down  by  tens,  by  scores,  by  hundreds.  AVhen  they  had  gained 
a  large  part  of  the  distance,  the  storm  developed  into  a  hurricane  of 
ruin.  The  division  was  blown  back,  as  if  by  the  breath  of  hell's 
door  suddenly  opened,  shattered,  disordered,  pell-mell,  down  the 
declivity,  amid  the  shouts  and  yells  of  the  enemy,  which  made  the 
horrid  din  demoniac.  Until  then  the  division  seemed  to  be  contend 
ing  with  the  wrath  of  brute  and  material  force  bent  on  its  annihila 
tion.  This  shout  recalled  the  human  agency  in  all  the  turbulence 
and  fury  of  the  scene.  The  division  of  French  fell  back — that  is  to 
say,  one-half  of  it.  It  suffered  a  loss  of  near  half  its  numbers. 

Hancock  immediately  charged  with  h've  thousand  men,  veteran 
regiments,  led  by  tried  commanders.  They  saw  what  had  happened  ; 
thev  knew  what  would  befall  them.  They  advanced  up  the  hill ; 
the  bravest  were  found  dead  within  twenty-five  paces  of  the  stone 
wall  ;  it  was  slaughter,  havoc,  carnage.  In  fifteen  minutes  they 
were  thrown  back  with  a  loss  of  two  thousand — unprecedented 
severity  of  loss.  Hancock  and  French,  repulsed  from  the  stone 
wall,  would  not  quit  the  hill  altogether.  Their  divisions,  lying 
down  on  the  earth,  literally  clung  to  the  ground  they  had  won. 
These  valiant  men,  who  could  not  go  forward,  would  not  go  back. 
All  the  while  the  batteries  on  the  heights  raged  and  stormed  at 
them.  Howard's  Division  came  to  their  aid.  Two  divisions  of  the 
Xinth  Corps,  on  their  left,  attacked  repeatedly  in  their  support. 

It  was  then  that  Burnside  rode  down  from  the  Phillips  House, 
on  the  northern  side  of  the  Ilappahannock,  and  standing  on  the  bluff 
at  the  river,  staring  at  those  formidable  heights,  exclaimed,  "  That 
crest  must  be  carried  to-night/'  Hooker  remonstrated,  begged, 
obeyed.  In  the  army  to  hear  is  to  obey.  He  prepared  to  charge 
with  Humphrey's  Division ;  he  brought  up  every  available  battery 
in  the  city.  "I  proceeded,"  he  said,  "against  their  barriers  as  I 
would  against  a  fortification,  and  endeavored  to  breach  a  hole  suffi 
ciently  large  for  a  forlorn  hope  to  enter."  He  continued  the  camion- 


260  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ading  on  the  selected  spot  until  sunset.  He  made  no  impression 
upon  their  works,  "  no  more  than  you  could  make  upon  the  side  of 
a  mountain  of  rock."  Humphrey's  Division  formed  under  shelter 
of  the  rise,  in  column,  for  assault.  They  were  directed  to  make  the 
attack  with  empty  muskets ;  there  was  no  time  there  to  load  and 
fire.  The  officers  were  put  in  front,  to  lead.  At  the  command  they 
moved  forward  with  great  impetuosity ;  they  charged  at  a  run,  hur 
rahing.  The  foremost  of  them  advanced  to  within  fifteen  or  twenty 
yards  of  the  stone  wall.  Hooker  afterward  said :  "  No  campaign 
in  the  world  ever  saw  a  more  gallant  advance  than  Humphrey's  men 
made  there.  But  they  were  put  to  do  a  work  that  no  men  could 
do."  In  a  moment  they  wrere  hurled  back  with  enormous  loss.  It 
was  now  just  dark ;  the  attack  was  suspended.  Three  times  from 
noon  to  dark  the  cannon  on  the  crest,  the  musketry  at  the  stone 
wall,  had  prostrated  division  after  division  on  Marye's  Hill. 

And  now  the  sun  had  set ;  twilight  had  stolen  out  of  the  west 
and  spread  her  veil  of  dusk  ;  the  town,  the  flat,  the  hill,  the  ridge,  lay 
under  the  "  circling  canopy  of  night's  extended  shade."  Darkness 
and  gloom  had  settled  down  upon  the  Phillips  House,  over  on  the 
Stafford  Heights,  where  Burnside  would  after  awhile  hold  his  council 
of  war. 

The  shattered  regiments  of  Tyler's  Brigade  of  Humphrey's 
Division  were  assembled  under  cover  of  the  bank  where  they  had 
formed  for  the  charge.  A  colonel  rode  about  through  the  crowd 
with  the  colors  of  his  regiment  in  his  hand,  waving  them,  inciting 
the  soldiers  by  his  words  to  re-form  for  repelling  a  sortie.  But  there 
was  really  little  need  for  that.  Longstreet  was  content  to  lie  behind 
his  earthworks  and  stone  walls,  and  with  a  few  men,  and  the  con 
verging  fire  of  numerous  guns,  was  able  to  fling  back  with  derision 
and  scorn  all  the  columns  of  assault  that  madness  might  throw 
against  his  impregnable  position.  The  brick  house  on  the  hill  was 
full  of  wounded  men.  In  front  of  it  lay  the  commander  of  a  regi 
ment,  with  shattered  leg,  white,  still,  with  closed  eyes.  His  riderless 
horse  had  already  been  mounted  by  the  general  of  the  division ;  about 
him,  in  rows,  the  wounded,  the  dying,  a  few  of  the  dead,  of  his  own 
and  other  commands.  The  fatal  stone  wall  was  in  easy  musket 
range ;  in  a  moment,  with  one  rush,  the  enemy  might  surround  the 
building.  Beyond  the  house,  and  around  it,  and  on  all  the  slope  below 
it,  the  ground  was  covered  with  corpses.  A  little  distance  below 
the  house,  a  general  officer  sat  on  his  horse — the  horse  of  the  wounded 
colonel  lying  above.  It  was  the  third  steed  he  had  mounted  that 
evening.  The  other  two  lay  dead.  lie  wras  all  alone ;  no  staff,  not 


OAT  THE  FIELD  OF  FREDERICESBVRG.  261 

even  an  orderly.  His  face  was  toward  the  house  and  the  ridge.  lie 
pointed  to  the  stone  wall.  "  One  minute  more,"  he  said,  "  and  we 
should  have  been  over  it/'  He  did  not  reflect  that  that  would  have 
been  but  the  beginning  of  the  work  given  him  to  do.  lie  praised 
and  blamed,  besought  and  even  swore;  to  be  so  near  the  goal,  and 
not  to  reach  it.  "When  he  saw  a  party  of  three  or  four  descending 
the  hill,  he  ordered  them  to  stop,  in  order  to  renew  the  attack. 
After  little  they  did  what  was  right,  quietly  proceeded  to  the  foot 
of  the  hill  and  joined  their  regiments.  All  the  while  stretcher- 
bearers  were  passing  up  and  down.  Descending,  they  bore  pitiable 
burdens.  A  wounded  man,  upheld  by  one  or  two  comrades,  haltingly 
made  his  slow  way  to  the  hospital,  followed  by  another  and  another. 
The  colonel  was  conveyed  by  four  men  to  the  town,  in  agony,  on  a 
portion  of  a  panel  of  fence  torn  down  in  the  progress  of  the  charge. 
The  stretcher-bearers,  not  distinguishing  between  persons,  had  taken 
whatsoever  one  they  first  saw  that  needed  their  assistance  ;  moreover, 
there  was  no  time  for  selection.  The  next  minute  all  the  wounded 
en  the  hillside  might  be  in  the  hands  of  the  Confederates. 

There  was  the  darkness  which  belongs  to  night.  The  regiments 
had  re-formed  around  their  respective  standards.  They  presented  a 
short  front  compared  with  the  long  lines  that  had  gone  up  the  steep, 
hurrahing.  The  Southerners  were  quiet  and  close  behind  their 
works.  It  seemed  that  they  would  not  sally  forth.  Then  from  each 
regiment  a  lieutenant,  with  a  small  party,  went  up  the  ascent,  and 
sought  in  the  darkness  what  fate  had  befallen  the  missing,  and 
brought  succor  to  the  wounded.  They  went  from  man  to  man,  as 
they  lay  on  the  ground.  In  the  obscurity  it  was  hard  to  distinguish 
the  features  of  the  slain.  They  felt  for  the  letters  and  numbers  on 
the  caps.  The  letters  indicated  the  company,  the  numbers  denoted 
the  regiment.  Whatsoever  man  of  their  regiment  they  discovered, 
him  they  bore  off,  if  wounded  ;  if  dead,  they  took  the  valuables  and 
mementos  found  on  his  person,  for  his  friends,  and  left  him  to  lie 
on  the  earth  where  he  had  fallen,  composing  his  limbs,  turning  his 
face  to  the  sky.  They  found  such  all  the  way  up;  some  not  far 
from  the  stone  wall,  a  greater  number  near  the  corners  of  the  house, 
where  the  rain  of  bullets  had  been  thickest. 

At  nine  o'clock  at  night,  the  command  was  withdrawn  from  the 
front,  and  rested  on  their  arms  in  the  streets  of  the  town.  Some 
sat  on  the  curbstones,  meditating,  looking  gloomily  at  the  ground; 
others  lay  on  the  pavement,  trying  to  forget  the  events  of  the  day 
in  sleep.  There  was  little  said  ;  deep  dejection  burdened  the  spirits 
of  all.  The  incidents  of  the  battle  were  not  rehearsed,  except  now 


262  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  then.  Always,  when  any  one  spoke,  it  was  of  a  slain  comrade — 
of  his  virtues,  or  of  the  manner  of  his  death ;  or  of  one  missing, 
with  many  conjectures  respecting  him.  Some  of  them,  it  was  said, 
had  premonitions,  and  went  into  the  battle  not  expecting  to  survive 
the  day.  Thus  they  lay  or  sat.  The  conversation  was  with  bowed 
head,  and  in  a  low  murmur,  ending  in  a  sigh.  The  thoughts  of  all 
were  in  the  homes  of  the  killed,  seeing  there  the  scenes  and  sorrow 
which  a  day  or  two  afterward  occurred.  Then  they  reverted  to  the 
comrade  of  the  morning,  the  tent-sharer,  lying  stark  and  dead  up  on 
Marye's  Hill,  or  at  its  base.  A  brave  lieutenant  lay  on  the  plank 
road,  just  where  the  brigade  crossed  for  the  purpose  of  forming  for 
the  charge.  A  sharpshooter  of  the  enemy  had  made  that  spot  his 
last  bed.  It  was  December,  and  cold.  There  was  no  camp-fire,  and 
there  was  neither  blanket  nor  overcoat.  They  had  been  stored  in  a 
warehouse  preparatory  to  moving  out  to  the  attack.  But  no  one 
mentioned  the  cold ;  it  was  not  noticed.  Steadily  the  wounded  were 
carried  by  to  the  hospitals  near  the  river.  Some  one,  now  and  then, 
brought  word  of  the  condition  of  a  friend.  The  hospitals  were  a 
harrowing  sight ;  full,  crowded,  nevertheless  patients  were  brought 
in  constantly.  Down  stairs,  up  stairs,  every  room  full.  Surgeons, 
with  their  coats  off  and  sleeves  rolled  up  above  the  elbows,  sawed 
off  limbs,  administered  anaesthetics.  They  took  off  a  leg  or  an  arm 
in  a  twinkling,  after  a  brief  consultation.  It  seemed  to  be,  in  case 
of  doubt — off  with  his  limb.  A  colonel  lay  in  the  middle  of  the 
main  room  on  the  first  floor,  white,  unconscious.  When  the  surgeon 
was  asked  what  hope,  he  turned  his  hand  down,  then  up,  as  much  as 
to  say  it  may  chance  to  fall  either  way.  But  the  sights  in  a  field 
hospital,  after  a  battle,  are  not  to  be  minutely  described.  Nine 
thousand  was  the  tale  of  the  wounded — nine  thousand,  and  not  all 
told. 

After  midnight — perhaps  it  was  two  o'clock  in  the  morning — • 
the  brigade  was  again  marched  out  of  the  town,  and,  filing  in  from 
the  road,  took  up  a  position  a  short  distance  below  the  brick  house. 
It  was  on  the  ground  over  which  the  successive  charges  had  been 
made.  The  fog,  however,  obscured  everything ;  not  a  star  twinkled 
above  them;  nothing  could  be  discerned  a  few  feet  away.  The 
brick  house  could  not  be  seen,  though  they  were  close  to  it.  Looking 
back  toward  the  town,  lying  on  the  river  bank,  over  the  narrow  plain 
which  lay  below,  one  could  not  persuade  one's  self  it  was  not  a  sheet 
of  water  unruffled  in  the  dim  landscape.  Few  lights,  doubtless,  were 
burning  at  that  hour  in  the  town.  None  could  be  seen.  You  would 
not  have  supposed  that  there  was  a  town  there.  A  profound  stillness 


O.Y  THE  FIELD  OF  FREDERICKSBURG.  263 

prevailed,  broken  by  no  other  sound  than  the  cries  of  the  wounded. 
On  all  the  eminence  above,  where  Longstreet's  forces  lav,  there  was 
the  silence  of  death.  With  the  night,  which  had  brought  conviction 
of  failure,  the  brazen  throats  of  Burnside's  guns  had  ceased  to  roar. 
It  was  as  if  furious  lions  had  gone,  with  the  darkness,  to  their  lairs. 
Now  and  then  an  ambulance  crept  along  below,  without  seeming  to 
make  any  noise.  The  stretcher-bearers  walked  silently  toward  what 
ever  spot  a  cry  or  a  groan  of  pain  indicated  an  object  of  their  search. 
It  may  not  have  been  so  quiet  as  it  seemed.  Perhaps  it  was  contrast 
with  the  thunder  of  cannon,  and  shriek  of  shell,  and  rattle  of  mus 
ketry,  and  all  the  thousand  voices  of  battle. 

When,  on  the  return  to  Marye's  Heights,  the  command  first  filed 
in  from  the  road,  there  appeared  to  be  a  thin  line  of  soldiers  sleeping 
on  the  ground  to  be  occupied.  They  seemed  to  make  a  sort  of  row 
or  rank.  It  was  as  if  aline  of  skirmishers  had  halted  and  lain  down  ; 
they  were  perfectly  motionless;  their  sleep  was  profound.  Not  one 
of  them  awoke  and  got  up.  They  were  not  relieved,  either,  when 
the  others  came.  They  seemed  to  have  no  commander— at  least 
none  awake.  Had  the  fatigues  of  the  day  completely  overpowered 
all  of  them,  officers  and  privates  alike?  They  were  nearest  the 
enemy,  within  call  of  him.  They  were  the  advance  line  of  the 
Union  army.  Was  it  thus  that  they  kept  their  watch,  on  which  the 
safety  of  the  whole  army  depended,  pent  up  between  the  ridge  and 
the  river  \  The  enemy  might  come  within  ten  steps  of  them  without 
bein<r  seen.  The  foff  was  a  veil.  No  one  knew  what  lav,  or  moved, 

O  O  v    ' 

or  crept  a  little  distance  off.  The  regiments  were  allowed  to  lie 
down.  In  doing  so,  the  men  made  a  denser  rank  with  those  there 
before  them.  Still  those  others  did  not  waken.  If  you  looked 
closely  at  the  face  of  one  of  them,  in  the  mist  and  dimness,  it  was 
pallid,  the  eyes  closed,  the  mouth  open,  the  hair  was  disheveled ; 
besides,  the  attitude  was  often  painful.  There  were  blood-marks, 
also.  These  men  were  all  dead.  Nevertheless,  the  new  comers  lay 
down  among  them,  and  rested.  The  pall  of  night  concealed  the 
foe  now.  The  sombre  uncertainty  of  fate  enveloped  the  morrow. 
One  was  saved  from  the  peril  of  the  charge,  but  he  found  himself 
again  on  Marye's  Hill,  near  the  enemy,  face  to  face  with  the  dead, 
sharing  their  couch,  almost  in  their  embrace,  in  the  mist  and  the 
December  night.  Why  not  accept  them  as  bed-fellows  ?  The 
bullet  that  laid  low  this  one,  if  it  had  started  diverging  by  ever  so 
small  an  angle,  would  have  found  the  heart's  blood  of  that  other 
who  gazed  upon  him.  It  was  chance  or  Providence,  which  to-morrow 
might  be  less  kind.  So  they  lay  down  with  the  dead,  all  in  line,  and 


264:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

were  lulled  asleep  by  the  monotony  of  the  cries  of  tlie  wounded 
scattered  everywhere. 

At  this  time  three  officers  rode  out  from  the  ranks,  down  the 
hill,  toward  the  town.  They  sought  to  acquire  a  better  knowledge 
of  the  locality.  They  were  feeling  about  in  the  fog  for  the  foot  of 
the  hill,  and  the  roads.  After  they  had  gone  a  little  distance,  one  of 
them  was  stationed  as  a  guide-mark,  wrhile  the  two  others  went 
further,  reconnoitering  or  exploring.  He  who  was  thus  left  alone 
found  himself  amid  strange  and  melancholy  surroundings.  Medita 
tion  sat  upon  his  brow,  but  to  fall  into  complete  revery  was  impossi 
ble.  The  hour  and  the  scene  would  intrude  themselves  upon  his 
thoughts  of  what  had  befallen.  The  dead  would  not  remain  unno- 

o 

ticed.  The  dying  cried  out  into  the  darkness,  and  demanded  succor 
of  the  world.  Was  there  nothing  in  the  universe  to  save  ?  Tens  of 
thousands  within  ear-shot,  and  no  footstep  of  friend  or  foe  drew  near 
during  all  the  hours.  Sometimes  they  drew  near  and  passed  by, 
which  was  an  aggravation  of  the  agony.  The  subdued  sound  of 
wheels  rolling  slowly  along,  and  ever  and  anon  stopping,  the  murmur 
of  voices  and  a  cry  of  pain,  told  of  the  ambulance  on  its  mission.  It 
went  off  in  another  direction.  The  cries  were  borne  through  the 
haze  to  the  officer  as  he  sat  solitary,  waiting.  Now  a  single  lament, 
again  voices  intermingled  and  as  if  in  chorus ;  from  every  direction, 
in  front,  behind,  to  right,  to  left,  some  near,  some  distant  and  faint. 
Some,  doubtless,  were  faint  that  were  not  distant,  the  departing 
breath  of  one  about  to  expire.  They  expressed  every  degree  and 
shade  of  suffering,  of  pain,  of  agony;  a  sigh,  a  groan,  a  piteous 
appeal,  a  shriek,  a  succession  of  shrieks,  a  call  of  despair,  a  prayer  to 
God,  a  demand  for  water,  for  the  ambulance,  a  death-rattle,  a  horrid 
scream,  a  voice,  as  of  the  body  when  the  soul  tore  itself  away,  and 
abandoned  it  to  the  enemy,  to  the  night,  and  to  dissolution.  The 
voices  were  various.  This,  the  tongue  of  a  German ;  that  wail  in 
the  Celtic  brogue  of  a  poor  Irishman.  The  accent  of  New  England 
was  distinguishable  in  the  thin  cry  of  that  boy.  From  a  different 
quarter  came  utterances  in  the  dialect  of  a  far  off  Western  State. 
The  appeals  of  the  Irish  were  the  most  pathetic.  They  put  them 
into  every  form — denunciation,  remonstrance,  a  pitiful  prayer,  a 
peremptory  demand.  The  German  was  more  patient,  less  demon 
strative,  withdrawing  into  himself.  One  man  raised  his  body  on  his 
left  arm,  and  extending  his  right  hand  upward,  cried  out  to  the 
heavens,  and  fell  back.  Most  of  them  lay  moaning,  with  the  fitful 
movement  of  unrest  and  pain. 

At  this  hour  of  the  night,  over  at  the  Phillips'  House,  Burnside, 


OX  THE  FIELD  OF  FREDEEICKSBUEG.  9(35 

overruling  his  council  of  war,  had  decided,  in  desperation,  to  hurl 
the  Ninth  Corps  next  day,  himself  at  its  head,  against  that  self -same 
eminence.  The  officer  sat  on  his  horse,  looking  out  into  the  spectre- 
making  mist  and  darkness.  Nothing  stirred ;  not  the  sound  of  a 
gun  was  heard ;  a  dread  silence,  which  one  momentarily  expected  to 
be  broken  by  the  rattle  of  tire-anus.  All  at  once  he  looked  down. 
lie  saw  something  white,  not  far  off,  that  moved  and  seemed  to  be 
a  man.  It  was,  in  fact,  a  thing  in  human  form.  In  the  obscurity 
one  could  not  discern  what  the  man  was  doing.  The  officer  observed 
him  attentively.  lie  stooped  and  rose  again;  then  stooped  and 
handled  an  object  on  the  ground.  lie  moved  away,  and  again  bent 
down.  Presently  he  returned,  and  began  once  more  his  manipula 
tions  of  the  former  object.  The  chills  crept  over  one.  The  darkness 
and  the  gloom,  and  the  contrasted  stillness  from  the  loud  and  fright 
ful  uproar  of  the  day,  except  for  the  intermittent  cries  of  the 
wounded  and  dying,  groans  intermingled  with  fearful  shrieks,  and 
cries  for  water,  and  this  thing,  man  or  tiend,  Hitting  about  on  the 
tield,  now  up,  now  down,  intent  on  his  purpose,  seeing  nothing  else, 
hearing  nothing,  seemingly  fearing  nothing,  loving  nothing;  the 
hill  all  overstrewn  with  dead  and  the  debris  of  artillery,  and  mutila 
ted  horses — it  was  a  ghostly,  weird,  wicked  scene,  sending  a  shudder 
through  the  frame. 

uAVho  goes  there  T'  at  the  length  the  officer  said,  and  rode 
forward. 

k'  A  private,'1  the  man  replied,  and  gave  his  regiment  and 
company. 

"What  are  you  doing  here  at  this  hour?''  and  so  questioning  lie 
saw  that  the  man  was  engaged  in  putting  on  the  clothes  of  a  dead 
soldier  at  his  feet. 

ki  I  need  clothes  and  shoes,"  he  said,  "  and  am  taking  them  from 
this  dead  man ;  lie  won't  need  them  any  more." 

''You,  there!  you  are  rifling  the  dead;  robbing  them  of  their 
watches  and  money.  Begone  ! ''  And  the  man  disappeared  into  the 
nii^ht  like  an  evil  bird  that  had  flown  awav. 

o  *. 

"\Vhere  he  had  stood  lay  the  dead  man,  who  had  fallen  in  the 
charge,  stripped  of  his  upper  clothing;  robbed  of  his  life  by  the 
enemy,  robbed  of  his  garments  by  a  comrade,  alone  on  the  hillside, 
in  the  darkness,  waited  for  in  some  far  off  Northern  home. 

The  three  officers  returned  to  their  posts.  Toward  morning  the 
general  commanding  the  brigade  came  out,  and,  withdrawing  his 
troops  a  little  distance  to  the  rear,  took  up  a  new  position,  less 
exposed  than  the  former  line.  The  captains  were  cautioned  to  leave 


266  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

none  of  their  men  unwarned  of  the  movement.  Nevertheless,  a  few 
of  them  were  not  distinguished  from  the  dead,  and  were  left  where 
they  lav.  An  orderly  sergeant,  waking  from  sound  sleep,  induced 
by  the  fatigues  of  the  day,  opened  his  eyes,  and  looked  about  him 
on  all  sides  with  surprise  and  wonder.  Ills  company  and  regiment 
were  gone.  The  advance  line,  of  which  they  had  formed  a  part,  had 
disappeared.  lie  saw  no  living  or  moving  thing.  lie  started  up 
and  stood  at  gaze.  What  to  do  now?  Which  way  to  go?  He 
concluded  that  the  regiment  had  moved  farther  forward,  and,  going 
first  to  the  left,  and  then  up  along  a  piece  of  fence,  he  saw  the 
hostile  line  a  short  distance  before  him.  Falling  down,  he  crept  on 
hands  and  knees,  descending  the  hill  again  until  he  reached  the 
road.  An  officer,  anxious  wThen  the  withdrawal  was  ordered  that  no 
one  should  remain  behind  for  want  of  notice,  waited  until  the 
regiments  had  moved  away,  then  passed  along  the  line  just  aban 
doned.  He  saw  a  man  lying  on  his  side,  reposing  on  his  elbow,  his 
head  supported  on  his  hand,  his  left  leg  drawn  up.  You  would  have 
been  certain  he  dozed,  or  meditated,  so  natural  and  restful  his  posture. 
Him  he  somewhat  rudely  touched,  and  thus  accosted :  "  Get  up  and 
join  your  company.  We  have  moved  to  the  rear."  The  reclining 
figure  moved  not,  made  no  response.  The  officer  bent  over  him, 
and  looked  closely — he  was  a  corpse. 

At  length  the  'dawn  appeared — the  mist  was  dispelled.     With 
the  coming  of  morning,  the  command  wTas  again  taken  into  the  town. 


A  CAMPAIGN  WITH  SHARPSHOOTERS. 


BY    CAPTAIN    JOHN    D.    YOUNG. 


LONG  before  the  close  of  the 
campaign  of  1803,  in  the  late 
war  between  the  States,  the 
Army  of  Xorthern  Virginia, 
as  well  as  its  historic  antag 
onist,  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  had  completely  inaugu 
rated  the  system  of  fighting 
from  behind  earthworks.  So 
universal  had  become  this 
method  of  defense  that  in 
trenching  tools  formed  part 
of  the  soldier's  regular  equip 
ment  as  mud i  as  lie  did  his 
arms  of  offense,  and  the  spade 
and  mattock  were  ranked 
almost  equal  in  importance  with  the  sabre  and  rifle.  The  use  of 
trenches  by  the  Confederate  army  was  dictated  by  a  consideration 
higher  than  the  mere  effort  of  the  individual  to  protect  his  own  life. 
It  was,  on  public  grounds,  a  matter  of  dire  necessity;  its  numbers, 
reduced  by  disease  and  death  in  hospital  and  field,  were  far  from 
being  recuperated  by  the  conscription,  sweeping  as  it  was,  of  1804. 
It  was  apparent  to  all  that  every  life  must  be  husbanded,  and  that 
every  advantage  of  position  must  be  taken,  both  as  to  nature  and  the 
addition  of  art,  to  render  the  weaker  side  able  to  cope  with  its  adver 
saries.  Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  whenever  a  line  was  formed  or  a 
position  occupied  where  there  was  any  likelihood  of  attack,  trenches 
were  dug  at  once  and  earthworks  thrown  up,  which  were  elaborated 
and  extended  as  the  approach  of  the  enemy  increased  the  chances  of 
an  action.  These  preparations  extended  even  to  the  picket-line. 
The  remains  of  this  vast  system  of  defense  are  to  be  seen  at  this 
day,  and  will  long  be  regarded  as  notable  monuments  of  that  long 
and  desperate  strife,  whose  other  sequels,  we  hope  and  believe,  are 
now  being  gradually  effaced  by  the  pitying  touch  of  time  and  the 

(267) 


268  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

wise  counsels  of  later  statesmanship.  The  chain  of  earthworks 
around  Petersburg  was  fifty  miles  in  extent ;  being  an  effort,  which 
proved  futile  in  its  ultimate  issue,  to  make  the  inanimate  soil,  how 
ever  "  sacred,"  supply  the  absence  of  flesh  and  blood.  In  the  cam 
paign  of  1804  the  necessity  of  still  further  utilizing  the  limited  forces 
of  the  army  loomed  up  as  of  prime  consideration.  It  was  also  noticed 
that  a  great  part  of  the  fighting  fell  on  the  pickets  ;  that  these  troops 
were  time  and  again  pushed  in  on  the  main  body,  and  that,  as  a 
general  thing,  being  unable  to  resist  the  slightest  exhibition  of  force 
in  their  front,  they  roused  the  line  when  driven  in,  and  caused  the 
greatest  trouble  and  annoyance. 

Up  to  this  time  picket  and  outpost  duty  of  all  kinds  was  per 
formed  by  details  drawn  haphazard  from  the  various  companies  of 
the  regiments  constituting  a  brigade;  a  single  regiment  or  even 
company  being  rarely  sent  as  a  body  on  this  kind  of  service.  These 
promiscuous  details  were  usually  placed  under  officers  with  whom 
they  were  as  utterly  unacquainted  as  each  man  was  with  his  right 
and  left  file.  As  a  natural  consequence,  the  details  failed  to  act  in 
the  presence  of  the  enemy  as  a  compact,  confident  body  ;  for  if  there 
is  any  one  thing  more  than  any  other  that  is  well  calculated  to  de 
stroy  the  efficiency  of  a  soldier,  it  is  the  suspicion  that  his  comrades 
are  going  to  give  way.  It  is  equally  a  confessed  fact  that,  when 
satisfied  of  the  courage  and  fidelity  of  one  another,  men  who  will 
fight  at  all  will  fight  till  overcome  by  hostile  numbers.  This  was 
the  state  of  things  that  presented  itself  to  the  leaders  of  the  army  in 
1864.  In  the  sharp  economy  of  war,  the  use  of  works  was  a  fixed 
fact  and  acknowledged  advantage.  Some  improvement  must  now 
be  made  in  the  character  of  the  troops  wTho  did  the  outpost  duty. 
To  remedy  the  inefficiency  of  the  "  details,"  and  form  a  picket  line 
that  on  sudden  occasions  might  do  the  work  of  a  line  of  battle ; 
in  short,  by  discipline  and  association,  to  render  a  small  body  of 
troops  equal  in  strength  and  effectiveness  to  twice  or  even  thrice 
their  number — this  was  the  problem,  the  solution  of  which  was  of 
no  small  labor  to  General  Lee. 

To  accomplish  such  results  no  plan  of  organization  presented 
itself  in  the  formation  of  either  army.  The  only  thing  known 
among  military  men  that  would  in  any  degree  approach  the  forma 
tion  indicated,  was  the  embodiment  of  a  regiment  for  each  division, 
after  the  manner  of  the  Zouave  regiments  of  the  French  service. 
There,  as  is  known,  to  each  division  of  the  army  is  attached  a  corps, 
who  act,  as  Kinglake  aptly  puts  it,  as  "the  spike-head  of  the 
division,"  being  used  either  to  push  in,  or  else  to  ward  off  attack. 


A   CAMPAIGN  WITH  SHARPSHOOTERS.  269 

There  was,  however,  a  serious  difficulty  in  the  way  of  constantly 
employing  a  regiment  on  this  kind  of  duty  ;  for,  while  one  regiment, 
taken  as  a  whole,  were  always  safe  to  be  relied  on  for  line  righting, 
it  was  well-nigh  impossible  to  find  such  an  organization  in  any 
division  as  combined  all  the  qualities  found  necessary  for  single  and 
determined  picket  fighting.  Besides,  at  this  time,  it  was  considered 
a  duty,  11  <>t  only  extra  dangerous,  but  otherwise  specially  onerous 
and  distasteful ;  and  regimental  commanders  were  inclined  to  stand 
on  their  rights  of  only  acting  in  their  regular  routine  on  the  brigade 
roster.  Therefore,  it  was  decided,  after  long  deliberation,  to  adhere 
to  the  old  plan  of  details,  but  to  introduce  such  improvements 
as  would  remedy  the  most  obvious  defects,  especially  that  of  having 
raw  men  and  officers  on  every  occasion  that  presented  itself.  To 
accomplish  these  ends  an  order  was  issued  from  division  head 
quarters  for  the  formation  of  battalions,  or  corps  of  sharpshooters 
for  each  brigade.  This  order  organized  a  body  of  troops  that 
gained  no  little  renown  in  the  service.  How  often  they  stood  before 
the  tierce  advance  of  the  enemy,  the  unwritten  history  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  will  attest ;  while  their  unmarked  graves  that 
fringe  the  lines  from  the  Wilderness  to  Petersburg,  and  the  thinned 
ranks  they  paraded  on  the  last  muster  at  Appomattox  Court-House, 
will  prove  that  in  heroic  devotion  to  duty  they  were  second  to  none 
in  an  army  that  challenged  the  admiration  of  the  world. 

The  organization  and  operation  of  the  corps  of  sharpshooters  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  will  possess,  if  nut  for  the  general 
public,  at  least  for  the  intelligent  military  student,  the  interest  that 
naturally  attaches  to  every  movement  new  in  the  details  of  the 
service — a  service  the  necessities  of  which  developed  many  expedients 
before  unknown  in  the  annals  and  science  of  war.  There  were 
incidents  connected  with  its  manner  of  independent  and  advanced 
operations  which  cannot  fail,  from  their  unique  and  striking 
character,  to  possess  a  common  interest  for  all.  It  was  the  fortune 
of  the  sharpshooters  to  experience  all  the  romance  and  glamour  of 
war ;  and  to  these  was  added  enough  of  danger  to  make  the  service 
exciting  and  exhilarating.  Placed  between  the  lines  of  two  great 
armies,  they  saw  at  least  the  beginnings  of  all  movements,  and  had 
the  first  intimations  of  that  pleasurable  feeling — the  cjdudia 
certaminis — which  battle  ever  brings  to  the  heart  of  the  true 
soldier.  Their  time  was  not  spent  in  weary  waiting  for  the  order  to 
advance ;  nor  were  they,  except  in  rare  instances,  subjected  to  the 
trying  ordeal  of  remaining  quiet  under  fire,  with  no  power  to  return 
the  compliment.  From  the  earliest  opening  of  battle  to  its  tragic 


270  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

close,  the  ears  of  the  sharpshooters  were  made  familiar  with  the 
peculiar  music  of  the  rifle,  and  their  whole  mind  was  exercised  in 
the  problem  of  affording  as  much  annoyance  as  possible  to  the 
enemy.  A  battalion  was  composed  of  one  commandant,  eight 
commissioned  officers,  ten  non-commissioned  officers,  one  hundred 
and  sixty  privates,  four  scouts,  and  two  buglers,  specially  selected, 
and  drafted  from  each  brigade.  These  were  divided  into  four 
companies,  equally  officered.  As  it  was  a  matter  of  the  utmost 
importance  that  men  should  be  chosen  of  tried  courage  and  steadi 
ness,  who  were  good  marksmen,  and  possessed  of  the  requisite 
self-confidence,  great  care  and  caution  were  exercised  in  the  drafts. 
Company  commanders  were  ordered  to  present  none  for  duty  with 
the  sharpshooters  who  did  not  come  up  to  the  standard ;  while  the 
commandant  of  each  battalion,  assisted  by  his  lieutenants,  personally 
superintended  the  examination  of  all  recruits  offered  for  this  branch 
of  the  service.  The  company  officers  in  the  corps  were  equally  set 
apart  for  their  military  reputations  with  respect  to  zeal,  intelligence, 
and  personal  gallantry.  As  soon  as  the  requisite  number  of  men 
was  obtained,  a  separate  camp  was  established,  and  in  every  respect 
the  command  was  placed  on  an  independent  footing — reporting,  as 
in  case  of  a  regiment,  directly  to  brigade  headquarters.  Thus 
closely  associated  together,  rank  and  file  soon  learned  to  know  and 
to  rely  upon  each  other.  Still  further  to  increase  this  confidence, 
the  companies  were  subdivided  into  groups  of  fours,  something  like 
the  comrades  de  battaille  of  the  French  army.  These  groups 
messed  and  slept  together,  and  were  never  separated  in  action,  save 
by  its  casualties  of  disability  and  death.  The  further  strengthening 
of  this  body  of  troops  was  hoped  to  be  accomplished  by  thorough 
drill. 

In  order  to  assimilate  the  men  and  make  them  fully  acquainted 
with  the  special  character  and  details  of  the  duties  to  which  they 
were  assigned,  and  above  all  to  impart  that  sense  of  self-reliance  so 
necessary  for  outpost  fighting,  a  new  system  of  drill  and  exercise 
was  adopted.  This  scheme  was  presented  in  the  form  of  a  ~broch  ure, 
translated  from  the  French  by  General  C.  M.  AVilcox,  and  comprised 
the  skirmish  drill,  the  bayonet  exercise,  and  practical  instruction  in 
estimating  distances.  In  a  short  time  men,  eager  to  learn  and  easily 
handled,  not  only  became  proficient  in  their  drill  and  excellent  shots, 
but  from  frequent  practice  could  correctly  measure  with  a  glance  the 
distance  intervening  between  themselves  and  the  objects  at  which 
they  aimed.  The  drill  was  conducted  by  signals  on  the  bugle,  as  the 
line  when  deployed  was  too  extended  to  be  reached  by  the  voice,  or, 


A   CAMPAIGN   WITH  SHARPSHOOTERS.  271 

when  silence  was  requisite,  by  the  wave  of  the  sword  of  the  officer  in 
command.  The  sharpshooters  were  armed  with  the  improved  Entield 
rifle ;  the  scouts  with  rifles  of  Whitworth  make,  with  telescopic  sights. 
In  order  to  preserve  the  elan  of  the  corps,  and  to  make  the  service 
sought  after,  it  was  ordered  that  this  body  should  be  exempt  from  all 
regimental  or  camp  duty,  and  from  all  picket  duty  except  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy.  They  were  also  assigned  to  the  right  of  the  column— 
the  front  in  advance,  the  rear  in  retreat.  This  freedom  from  the 
irksome  and  distasteful  duties  of  the  camp,  which  were  always 
especially  detested  by  the  average  Confederate  soldier — unaccustomed 
as  he  was  to  do  any  menial  service  for  himself — made  a  place  in  the 
ranks  of  the  sharpshooters  an  honor  much  to  be  desired.  There 
was,  in  the  very  joyous  nature  of  the  service,  something  that  had  a 
great  charm  for  the  soldier,  to  which,  to  descend  from  sentiment  to 
business,  may  be  added  the  very  general  ambition  at  that  time  pre 
valent,  and  by  no  means  conflned  to  the  line,  to  be  among  the  first 
to  handle  the  plunder  of  the  enemy's  camps.  It  was  in  this  manner, 
as  briefly  above  related,  that  the  opening  campaign  of  1S(U  found 
every  brigade  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  provided  with  a 
body  of  picked  troops  to  guard  its  front  or  clear  the  way  for  its 
advance.  It  was  truly  a  "spike-head"  of  Toledo  steel,  which  was 
not  suffered  to  rust  from  disuse  in  the  days  that  so  quickly  followed. 
It  was  kept  bright  and  sharp  by  constant  employment  in  the  series 
of  actions  that  lasted  throughout  that  eventful  year,  beginning  with 

i/  O 

the  great  battle  of  the  Wilderness. 

O 

Though  the  sharpshooters  were  not  employed  in  this  engage 
ment  with  any  exclusive  or  even  special  reference  to  the  method  and 
distinctive  purposes  of  their  formation,  it  was  the  first  action  in 
which  they  fought  as  a  separate  organization,  and  as  such  deserves 
our  notice  ;  especially  as  some  of  its  incidents,  well  worthy  of  record 
and  remembrance,  have  never  been  honored  by  historic  notice. 
Almost  as  soon  as  the  leading  divisions  had  engaged  the  enemy,  the 
sharpshooters  were  detached  and  scut  to  the  left  of  the  plunk  road, 
to  protect  the  flank  of  the  troops  ordered  to  Ileth's  support,  and  to 
fill  a  gap  between  Ewell  and  the  troops  on  the  right  of  the  road. 
Moving  forward,  they  passed  long  lines  of  artillery  going  into  bivouac, 
well-knowing  from  the  nature  of  the  country  that  their  services 
would  not  be  needed ;  while  riding  about  in  a  restless  and  eager 
manner.  Colonel  William  Johnson  Pegram  was  to  be  seen,  asking 
through  many  a  courier,  dispatched  one  after  another,  if  lie  could 
not  get  in  a  battery,  or  at  least  a  section,  and  highly  disquieted  that 
his  pieces  should  be  silent  at  such  a  time.  lie  forcibly  recalled,  in 


272  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

some  respects,  the  figure  of  Lord  Cardigan,  at  Balaklava,  chewing  his 
moustache,  and  cursing  the  luck  of  "  Scarlett  and  the  heavies." 
Colonel  Pegram  was  invited  to  go  in  with  us,  and  would  probably 
have  accepted — for  battle  had  a  powerful  fascination  for  the  calm, 
spectacled,  studious,  devout  boy-colonel — but  that  he  had  been  per 
emptorily  ordered  to  remain  with  his  guns  and  await  developments. 
The  sharpshooters  moving  in,  found  that  the  left  of  the  road  was 
clear ;  and  Ewell,  swinging  laterally,  soon  filled  up  the  gap  which 
they  had  held,  leaving  them  free  to  rejoin  their  command,  which,  was 
actively  engaged  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  road.  The  battalion 
moved  less  by  sight  than  by  faith  in  obeying  this  order ;  following 
the  supposed  line  of  the  brigade's  advance,  and  principally  guided 
by  the  fire  from  the  front,  which  grew  in  intensity  and  effect.  Too 
much  has  been  written  in  regard  to  the  scenes  of  war,  and  too  many 
living  men  actually  witnessed  these  horrors  and  were  part  of  the 
same,  to  render  necessary  any  description  of  the  advance  through 
wounded  men  falling  to  the  rear,  through  mounted  men  moving  in 
haste  and  excitement,  and  through  straggling  parties  who  never 
failed  to  have  urgent  business  somewhere  in  the  rear,  as  soon  as  the 
business  of  these  bloody  days  became  critical.  One  little  thing  may 
be  noted ;  the  road  was  literally  strewed  with  packs  of  playing-cards, 
thrown  away  by  superstitious  soldiers  as  they  went  into  the  fiery 
focus.  It  was  a  noticeable  fact  among  the  Confederate  soldiers,  that 
many  who  were  regular  gamblers,  who  would  play  "poker"  or  any 
thing  else  all  night  if  permitted,  and  who  would  carefully  deposit 
the  cards  in  their  haversacks  when  the  game  was  over,  were  very 
careful  to  throw  them  away  as  soon  as  firing  began ;  after  which 
they  would  load  their  guns  and  be  ready  to  go  in  coolly.  One  figure 
that  the  command  passed  on  its  way  forward  will  receive  in  time  a 
more  prominent  and  picturesque  position  than  has  yet  been  given  it 
in  the  constellation  of  Confederate  commanders — the  calm,  courteous, 
unselfish,  gallant,  patriotic  A.  P.  Hill.  Surrounded  by  his  staff,  this 
beloved  general,  whose  custom  it  ever  was  to  feel  in  person  the  pulse 
of  battle,  and  who  always  stationed  himself  just  behind  his  men  in 
action,  sat,  a  stately  presence,  anxiously  awaiting  the  issue  of  events 
and  sending  up  troops  to  support  General  Ileth,  who  was  sorely 
pressed. 

"  Face  the  fire  and  go  in  where  it  is  hottest !  "  were  the  brief 
words  in  which  the  lieutenant  general  assigned  the  sharpshooters  to 
their  place  in  the  battle.  They  were  obeyed  wdth  a  will ;  and  the 
battalion  soon  found  itself  on  the  left  of  Lane's  Brigade,  where  it 
fought  on  its  own  account  till  night  put  an  end  to  the  bloody  contest. 


A  CAMPAIGN  WITH  SHARPSHOOTERS.  273 

Not  till  tlicn  did  the  battalion  find  its  proper  brigade,  and  resume  its 
specific  duties  on  the  outpost  petween  the  armies.  A  picket  line  in 
front  was  at  once  established,  and  the  long  watches  of  the  night 
were  spent  in  anxious  conjecture  of  the  issue  of  the  enemy's  fight, 
and  the  chances  of  its  renewal  on  the  morrow.  No  fires  nor  lights 
of  any  kind  were  allowed ;  and  only  the  watery  and  feeble  glimpses 
of  the  moon,  then  past  her  quarter,  exposed  the  grim  aspects  of  the 
bloody  field,  defining  the  outlines  of  silent  and  lifeless  bodies,  mark 
ing  also  the  broken  Jcl/'ls  of  battle  and  the  patches  of  blood-soaked 
ground.  Here  the  sharpshooters  passed  the  first  of  many  like  nights 
— on  the  fringe  of  two  mighty  hosts,  the  deep  stillness,  unbroken 
except  by  the  stray  shots  of  pickets  and  the  tramp  of  troops  moving 
in  their  front.  Several  prisoners  were  picked  up  by  the  scouts,  from 
whom  the  information  was  extracted  that  the  enemy  was  in  front,  in 
strong  force,  and  would  advance  at  daylight.  This  intelligence  was 
communicated  to  headquarters,  while  the  sharpshooters,  throwing  up 
a  temporary  work  of  logs,  camly  awaited  the  appearance  of  morning, 
and  with  it,  that  of  the  enemy. 

Xor  were  they  disappointed  ;  for  at  the  first  gray  light  there 
were  movements  in  front  which  showed  very  clearly  that  something 
serious  was  on  foot.  In  the  direction  of  Ewell,  to  the  right,  the 
scattering  fire  of  the  night  previous  could  be  heard  rapidly  assuming 
the  volume  of  a  regular  fusilade,  which  gathered  force  as  it  worked 
up  to  the  left,  increasing  the  activity  of  the  enemy  in  the  immediate 
front.  Just  as  day  fairly  opened  the  memorable  combat  of  May 
5th  began.  Coming  forward  in  loose  order,  the  line  of  the  enemy 
moved  down  upon  us  without  the  skirmishers  either  firing  or  cheer 
ing.  The  courage  and  discipline  of  the  sharpshooters  were  never 
more  severely  tried  than  on  this  occasion  ;  nor  did  they  omit  to 
respond  to  the  high  expectations  of  their  superiors,  receiving  the 
enemy's  charge  with  great  steadiness,  and  continuing  the  unequal 
combat  till  both  flanks  were  turned.  The  command,  still  unbroken, 
retired  to  the  main  line  before  the  desperate  odds  it  had  engaged, 
having  held  the  enemy  in  check  over  ten  minutes,  which  proved  a 
delay  of  most  timely  and  providential  interposition,  as  the  following 
facts,  which  has  never  before  transpired  in  connection  with  the  battle, 
will  attest;  for  the  confident  expectation  with  which  the  sharp 
shooters  withdrew — of  re-forming  on  the  main  line  and  putting  a 
stop  there  at  once  to  the  enemy's  forward  movement — was  doomed 
to  be  a  terrible  disappointment,  and  a  state  of  things  was  developed 
which  might  easily  have  led  to  the  utmost  disaster.  By  some  unac 
countable  neglect  the  divisions  of  Generals  Ileth  and  Wilcox,  which 
18 


274  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

had  engaged  the  enemy  on  the  evening  before,  still  remained  on  the 
front  line ;  some  brigades  having  bivouacked  where  they  found  them 
selves  when  the  fight  was  over,  while  others  had  gone  into  camp 
parked  by  regiments,  and  not  even  the  pretense  of  a  line  of  battle 
had  been  formed.  One  brigade  rested  with  its  naked  flank  perpen 
dicular  to  the  enemy's  line.  All  this  was  done,  or  neglected,  within 
a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  foe.  No  works  had  been  thrown  up, 
and  when  the  Federal  force  broke  the  lines,  there  was  no  expectation 
of  battle  or  danger.  The  men  hastily  aroused,  thought  of  nothing 
but  safety  in  flight,  and  " sauve  quipeut"  was  the  order  of  the  day. 
The  conditions  were  reversed,  but  the  stampede  exactly  recalled  the 
day  when  Jackson  turned  Hooker's  right  at  ChanceUorsville,  and 
sent  his  Eleventh  Corps  with  great  speed  to  the  rear.  This  time, 
however,  we  were  not  the  pursuers,  but  the  pursued.  The  enemy 
made  good  use  of  his  opportunity,  and  as  the  panic-stricken  Con 
federates  fled  in  great  confusion  before  his  advance,  it  was  apparent 
that  all  organized  fighing  by  Heth  and  Wilcox  was  at  an  end  for  that 
time. 

The  day  seemed  irretrievably  lost,  and  so  it  would  have  been 
except  for  the  arrival  of  other  troops.  Moving  rapidly  through  the 
entwining  trees  and  matted  undergrowth,  in  all  haste  to  find  the 
rear,  we  caught  the  gleam  of  bayonets  in  front  of  our  disordered 
and  plunging  mass,  and  soon  saw  the  dauntless  mien  and  heard  the 
steady  tread  of  Longstreet's  Corps,  marching  up  to  the  relief,  under 
the  composed  direction  of  "Old  Pete"  himself.  Like  Dessaix  at 
Marengo,  he  arrived  just  in  time  "  to  wTin  a  victory."  While  some 
of  the  broken  troops  of  Heth  and  Wilcox  joined  in  the  advance  with 
Longstreet's  column,  others  straggled  back  to  the  point  at  which  they 
were  first  engaged  the  night  before.  The  sharpshooters  moved  across 
the  road,  near  by  certain  batteries  of  Poague's  artillery,  which  had 
been  planted  on  a  slight  plateau  on  the  left  of  the  road,  and  was  at 
this  time  crowded  with  troops.  General  Hill  and  General  Lee  both 
occupied  this  position;  the  latter  appearing  intensely  disgusted  at 
the  turn  which  affairs  had  taken.  The  ridiculous  procedure  of  the 
ambulance  corps,  the  teamsters,  and  the  camp-followers  generally, 
was  singularly  well  calculated  to  aggravate  this  irritated  feeling ;  for 
these  people,  supposing  the  day  to  have  been  lost,  sought  the  rear 
with  keen  ardor,  leaving  the  road  so  blockaded  with  sporadic  plunder, 
and  wagons  turned  upside-down,  as  to  render  difficult  the  movement 
of  the  supports.  The  "  old  man  "  was  in  no  good  humor,  and  had  a 
business  look  about  the  eyes  as  he  ordered  the  guns  to  be  loaded  with 
canister,  and  trained  down  the  road.  For  five  hundred  yards  in  front 


A   CAMPAIGN   WITH  SHAEPSHOOTERS.  275 

of  the  plateau,  the  road  ran  perfectly  smooth  and  straight,  and  was 
now  tilled  with  Federal  troops,  moving  in  column,  but  in  no  regular 
order;  for  all  conformity  had  been  sacrificed  in  the  charge,  and, 
beside,  a  great  number  of  soldiers  had  converged  into  and  advanced 
up  the  road,  to  escape  the  tangled  undergrowth  of  the  Wilderness. 
On  the  line  came,  firing  and  shouting,  so  closely  following  our  own 
fugitives  as  to  be  mingled  with  them,  and  thus  cause  the  cruel  neces 
sity  of  firing  through  the  last  of  our  own  people  to  check  the  pursuit ! 
A  few  rounds  of  canister  did  the  work  ;  and  by  this  time  fresh  troops 
had  come.  Thus  not  only  was  a  defeat,  that  seemed  to  be  impending, 
averted,  but  a  substantial  victory  was  gained,  though  at  a  great 
sacrifice.  Fur  Longstreet,  in  himself  a  tower  of  strength,  upon 
whose  sturdy  valor  and  fidelity  General  Lee  leaned  not  less  confi 
dently,  and  not  less  worthily,  than  on  Stonewall  Jackson's,  was 
taken  from  the  field  grievously  wounded ;  while  Jenkins,  of  South 
Carolina,  and  many  other  brave  officers,  had  sealed  in  blood  their 
devotion  to  the  cause  which  their  swords  and  their  souls  upheld. 
The  Wilderness  was  a  field  well  adapted,  by  the  very  nature  of  the 
country,  to  the  operations  of  the  sharpshooters;  but  so  fierce  had 
been  the  engagement  that  no  opportunity  was  afforded  them  for  the 
display  either  of  maneuvres  or  marksmanship.  The  Wilderness 
battle  has  fitly  been  compared  to  the  struggles  of  two  giants,  not 
unequally  matched,  who  fruitlessly,  yet  frightfully,  writhe  and  twist 
in  each  other's  embrace  until  they  are  forcibly  wrenched  asunder. 

The  movement  from  the  Wilderness  to  Spottsylvania  Court- 
House  was  exceedingly  arduous  to  the  sharpshooters,  who  were 
compelled  to  march  to  the  left  flank  of  the  column,  deployed  as  if 
in  regular  line.  At  last  the  Court-House  was  reached;  but  it  failed 
to  afford  the  expected  rest.  Almost  immediately  the  command  was 
thrown  forward,  and  began  what  appeared  to  be  an  endless  picket 
fight.  One  day  was  the  reflection  of  another,  though  the  elements 
of  exposure  and  excitement  prevented  their  succession  from  becoming 
monotonous.  At  three  o'clock,  before  light,  the  command  would  be 
moved  out  of  the  camp  inside  the  main  lines,  and  sent  forward  to 
relieve  the  regimental  details  who  did  guard  duty  at  night.  Arrived 
on  the  picket  line,  while  darkness  yet  reigned,  the  men  were  placed 
in  the  rifle-pits,  and,  arranging  themselves  as  comfortably  as  circum 
stances  permitted,  proceeded  to  make  what  their  rations  afforded 
in  the  way  of  breakfast.  This  was  generally  light,  except  when 
contributions  had  been  levied  from  some  contraband  source,  or  the 
camp  of  the  enemy  had  been  put  into  requisition.  Even  during 
this  daylight  repast,  the  more  adventurous  would  stop,  at  times,  to 


276  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

take  a  shot  at  the  gentlemen  in  front,  while  all  had  occasion  to  look 
about  very  sharply  to  keep  their  own  brains  from  being  knocked 
out.  The  rage  after  plunder  was  often  fatal  to  some  of  our  very 
best  men.  Some  incidents  of  this  passion  are  worth  relating.  A 
sergeant,  named  Warren,  during  the  day  killed  a  man  a  short 
distance  in  front  of  his  pit,  and  at  night,  just  before  the  command 
was  relieved,  moved  quickly  forward  and  possessed  himself  of  the 
dead  man's  effects.  It  proved  to  be  a  rich  haul,  and  next  morning 
the  men  were  wild  for  an  attack,  beholding  in  each  hostile  form  the 
bearer  of  property,  of  which  they  burned  to  possess  themselves. 
All  day  long  they  were  taking  what  I  may  call  pot-shots  at  the 
enemy's  videttes,  and  in  keeping  away  their  friends,  who  might 
have  otherwise  removed  the  spoils.  The  impatience  of  the  sports 
men  was  too  great  that  night  to  wait  till  it  was  fully  dark;  they 
stole  off  in  the  gray  dusk  of  the  evening,  and  some  of  them — among 
whom  was  Sergeant  Warren — returned  no  more.  We  passed,  next 
morning,  their  bloated  corpses,  on  the  very  spot  where  their  opera 
tions  had  been  so  rashly  begun.  After  this  occurrence,  stringent 
orders  were  issued  against  the  practice  of  going  outside  of  and 
beyond  the  lines.  In  this  manner  the  command  spent  its  days ; 
sometimes  on  the  outposts,  sometimes  in  the  rear;  but  always 
prepared  to  move  at  an  instant's  warning.  It  so  happened  that  we 
were  not  on  picket  service  on  the  12th  of  May,  a  day  long  to  be 
remembered  as  the  bloodiest  of  all  the  horrible  fights  that  raged 
along  the  lines,  and  only  equaled  in  mortality,  in  proportion  to  the 
numbers  engaged,  by  Cold  Harbor,  of  -the  same  year.  The  sharp 
shooters,  however,  saw  and  acted  an  important  part  of  this  stubborn 
engagement.  Our  position  having  been  changed  the  night  of  the 
llth  to  a  road  in  rear  of  the  works,  we  were  startled  the  morning  of 
the  battle  by  the  sudden  apparition  of  a  mounted  officer,  who  dashed 
forward  and  shouted — without  speaking  to  the  general  in  command — 
"  Right  shoulder  shift,  arms  !  File  left !  Double  quick,  march  ! " 
"  This  way ! "  and  away  the  sharpshooters  went  after  him,  not 
stopping  to  ask  for  his  authority,  or  otherwise  to  "  reason  why."  As 
the  command  hurried  through  the  woods,  the  ears  of  the  men  were 
saluted  with  the  familiar  roll  of  musketry,  and  the  occasional 
thunder  of  a  big  gun.  As  we  debouched  from  the  woods  into  the 
open,  we  came  upon  that  fatal  angle — the  error,  it  is  said,  of  General 
M.  L.  Smith,  engineer-in-chief  of  the  army — which  gave  so  much 
trouble,  and  lost  so  many  men,  and  which  has  passed  into  history  as 
Johnson's  salient.  This  angle  had  been  early  recognized  as  the  weak 
point  of  our  line,  and  was  so  much  feared  that  the  artillery  which 


A   CAMPAIGN  WITH  SHARPSHOOTERS.  277 

guarded  it  was  withdrawn  every  night,  and  sent  in  early  each 
morning  before  light. 

The  enemy  in  front  of  this  salient  was  commanded  by  General 
Hancock,  to  whose  skill  and  gallantry  was  intrusted  an  assault  on 
our  lines  at  that  point.  In  the  dusky  light  he  came  up  with  a 
rush ;  and  just  as  our  artillery,  which  was  moving  in  battery  at  the 
same  moment,  galloped  up,  and  unlimbered  for  action,  it  was 
captured.  Only  one  piece  or  two  was  fired.  The  infantry  of 
Johnson's  Division  were  overpowered  almost  as  speedily ;  but  the 
supports  came  up  promptly,  and  a  hand-to-hand  conflict  ensued, 
during  which  the  two  forces  were  rarely  as  far  apart  as  a  dozen 
yards.  At  times,  as  if  by  mutual  consent,  there  would  be  a  cessation 
of  the  fire  ;•  but  it  would  soon  break  out  at  some  other  point  of  the 
line,  and,  sweeping  down,  include  the  wasted  antagonists  in  its  folds. 
In  the  rear  of  each  line  were  the  supports,  who  were  either  to 
relieve  the  first  line,  or  send  in  plenty  of  ammunition.  There  was 
no  lack  of  ammunition  that  day. 

The  training  of  the  sharpshooters  in  actual  Avar  was  completed 
by  these  actions,  and  the  efforts  of  their  officers  were  conceded  to  bo 
successful  beyond  the  most  sanguine  expectations.  These  battalions 
had  already  established  the  best  reputation  among  friend  and  foe  for 
endurance  and  stubborn  fighting.  The  knowledge  that  the  sharp 
shooters  held  the  picket  lines  enabled  many  a  head  to  repose  in 
peace  of  nights,  undisturbed  by  visions  of  sudden  attack,  and  the 
midnight  call  to  arms.  The  battalion  was  now  the  very  lightest  of 
light  troops  in  every  particular  of  'in)p<<r<m<rit<t.  They  carried 
absolutely  nothing,  save  their  arms  and  haversacks.  The  last  were 
of  but  little  use.  The  sharpshooters  found  it  much  less  burdensome 
to  make  a  raid  for  supplies  on  the  line  of  the  enemy  than  to  carry 
knapsacks.  AVhen  rations  were  ordered  to  be  prepared  for  three 
days,  they  were  generally  cooked  and  eaten  at  the  same  time ;  not  a 
difficult  thing  to  do  in  the  Confederate  service,  where  the  ration  was 
scientifically  calculated  to  the  least  that  a  man  could  live  on. 
Sometimes  blankets  and  fly-tents  were  carried,  but  only  when  there 
was  to  be  a  long  march,  and  no  immediate  prospect  of  a  fight.  In 
the  face  of  the  enemy  these  daring  corps  usually  threw  away  every 
thing  but  their  arms,  and  relied  for  provision  on  the  chance  of  war. 
Their  losses  were  heavy,  but  were  easily  filled  by  details  of  the  best 
material  of  the  line.  The  prestige  of  the  sharpshooters  were  well 
kept  up,  and  was  the  just  subject  of  pride  alike  to  their  officers  and 
at  army  headquarters.  And  so,  when  Grant  changed  his  base, 
moving  south,  while  Lee  followed,  describing  the  interior  line,  the 


278  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

sharpshooters  brought  up  the  rear  of  the  latter,  engaging  in  quite  a 
number  of  unrecorded  actions,  gaining  high  credit  for  lighting,  and 
occasionally  rewarded  by  a  good  bit  of  plunder. 

After  General  Grant's  failure  to  break  our  front  at  Cold 
Harbor,  he  suddenly  decamped,  bag  and  baggage,  for  the  south  side 
of  James  river,  masking  his  movement  by  covering  his  front  with 
strong  bodies  of  cavalry,  supported  by  detached  infantry.  These 
covering  troops  were  encountered  at  Riddle's  shop,  half  way  between 
Cold  Harbor  and  the  river,  in  such  heavy  force  as  to  induce  General 
Lee  to  suspend  the  movement  then  in  progress  of  transferring  Hill's 
Corps  across  the  James.  In  leaving  Cold  Harbor,  the  sharpshooters 
were  left  on  the  picket  line,  and  were  not  ordered  to  follow  until  ten 
A.  M.  Another  delay  resulted  from  the  rifling  of  a  bee-tree ;  and, 
before  reaching  Riddle's  shop,  the  dropping  fire  notified  the  rear 
guard  that  the  armies  were  at  it  again.  At  this  point  General  Lee 
and  his  staff  rode  by  rapidly  to  the  front,  hurrying  as  they  did  so  the 
forward  movement  of  the  battalion.  When  we  arrived  on  the 
ground  we  found  that  details  from  the  brigade  were  already  engaged 
writh  dismounted  cavalry  in  front,  with  but  poor  success ;  while  the 
advance  of  the  whole  corps  was  suspended  till  the  force  in  front 
could  be  developed. 

"We  were  at  once  put  in,  and  the  three  battalions  detailed  from 
Wilcox's  Division  were  ordered  to  support  us.  As  we  had  to  move 
across  an  open  field,  the  officer  commanding  the  details  flatly  refused 
to  go ;  and  the  commandant  in  charge,  rightly  judging  that  it  was 
better  to  proceed  alone  than  to  depend  on  troops  who  would  hang 
back,  promptly  decided  to  do  without  these  supports,  and  ordered 
them  back  to  the  line,  where  they  went  with  great  cheerfulness. 
The  word  was  then  passed  that  both  General  Lee  and  General  Hill 
would  view  the  advance,  and  at  the  command  "  Forward ! "  a  charge 
was  made  that  swept  the  enemy  from  the  field,  disclosed  his  designs, 
and  resulted  in  hurrying  Hill's  Corps  forward  to  Petersburg,  where 
its  presence  was  greatly  needed.  When  Petersburg  wras  reached,  the 
command  was  placed  well  on  the  right  of  the  line,  and  the  duties 
that  developed  upon  the  sharpshooters  were,  in  consequence,  very 
light.  The  men  became  fat  and  lazy  on  the  accumulated  captures  of 
previous  campaigns,  and  nothing  more  serious  was  attempted  while 
the  days  dreamily  glided  by  than  an  occasional  "  blockade  "  escapade 
into  the  city.  This  halcyon  period  was  rudely  disturbed  by  the 
combat  of  the  22d  of  June,  on  the  line  of  the  Petersburg  and 
Weldon  Railroad.  This  affair,  brilliant  in  all  respects  to  the 
Confederate  cause,  has  been  noticed  so  slightly  heretofore  that  the 


A   CAMPAIGN  WITH  SHAEFSHOOTEES.  279 

details  of  the  movement  may  well  be  given  here,  as  its  results 
in  prisoners  and  guns,  and,  above  all,  in  the  fresh  life  imparted  to 
the  drooping  spirits  uf  the  men,  were  of  a  magnitude  not  easy  to  be 
overstated.  For  a  proper  appreciation  of  the  character  of  this 
action,  some  description  is  necessary  of  Major  General  William 
Mahone,  the  leader  and  moving  spirit  of  the  occasion.  Mahone  was 
a  singular  illustration  of  the  fact  that  the  Confederate  service,  while 
well  calculated  to  develop  the  natural  native  aptitudes  of  its 
generals,  did  not  afford  all  of  them  full  scope  for  the  exercise  of  the 
genius  thus  ecjuced,  but  kept  within  narrow  limits  many  high 
spirits  which  felt  themselves  capable  of  larger  responsibilities,  or 
wider  fields  than  the  cramped  resources  of  the  South  admitted 
of  their  undertaking.  He  was  a  man  of  high  personal  courage  and 
magnetic  presence.  A  stern  disciplinarian,  he  was  greatly  respected 
by  his  men,  who,  in  the  hour  of  battle,  never  fought  so  well  as  when 
under  his  immediate  command.  His  frequent  selection  for  the 
conduct  of  most  delicate  and  difficult  movements  proved  the  high 
esteem  in  which  he  was  held  by  General  Lee.  lie  was  an  officer  in 
whom,  it  may  be  said,  were  blended  the  strategic  qualities  of  Soult, 
and  the  ardent  gallantly  of  Vandamme.  Closely  watching  his  front 
at  all  times,  he  never  failed  to  strike  the  enemy  whenever  an 
opportunity  offered,  and  his  blows  were  always  felt. 

When  General  Grant,  with  the  intention  of  more  closely  envelop 
ing  Petersburg,  applied  his  old  maneuvre  of  extending  his  left,  he 
moved  forward  the  Second  and  Sixth  Army  Corps  for  the  purpose 
of  seizing  the  Weldon  Railroad.  The  movement  was  begun  by  the 
Second  Corps,  which  marched  to  the  Federal  left  and  took  position 
west  of  the  Jerusalem  plank  road,  their  right  connecting  with  the 
Fifth  Corps.  This  movement  at  once  drew  out  a  strong  force  of 
Confederates  to  confront  it,  and  a  slight  skirmish,  was  the  result. 
This  happened  on  the  21st  of  June.  That  same  night  the  Sixth 
(Federal)  Corps  moved  up  in  rear  of  the  Second  Corps,  and  on  a  line 
parallel  with  it.  It  thus  happened  that  when  General  Birney,  com 
manding  the  Second  Corps,  swung  forward  his  left  more  closely  to 
envelop  the  Confederate  works,  a  gap  was  created  between  the 
Second  and  Sixth,  which  widened  as  the  turning  movement  progressed. 
General  Mahone  promptly  noticed  the  bad  formation  of  this  part  of 
the  line,  and  himself  suggested  to  General  Lee  the  feasibility  of 
attacking  the  left  flank  of  Birney,  then  thrown  well  forward  in  the 
air.  The  march  of  Mahone's  Division  to  the  front  was  concealed 
from  the  enemy  by  the  nature  of  the  ground  over  which  it  passed  to 
get  into  position.  Xor,  indeed,  was  his  departure  from  the  works 


280  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

observed ;  for,  with  great  circumspection,  even  in  details,  he  ordered 
the  men  to  leave  them  one  by  one,  dropping  to  the  rear  as  if  for  any 
other  purpose  than  that  of  going  out  to  fight.  The  places  of  the 
absentees  were  gradually  filled  by  an  extension  of  the  lines.  In  order 
to  follow  up  the  movement,  the  division  of  General  Wilcox  was 
dispatched  to  the  right  of  Mahone,  and  was  expected  to  render  him 
support  by  moving  to  the  front  and  connecting  with  his  (Mahone' s) 
right,  and  by  afterward  conforming  with  the  latter's  movements. 
The  plan  was  a  good  one,  and  its  results  might  have  been  very 
momentous.  Mahone,  moving  cautiously  to  the  front,  holding  his 
troops  well  in  hand,  furiously  assaulted  the  left  of  Birney  in  flank 
and  rear,  carrying  the  line  and  capturing  whole  regiments  and  bat 
teries.  Penetrating  further  in  the  gap  with  one  of  his  brigades,  he 
struck  the  right  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  here  rested,  after  vainly 
waiting  for  the  expected  support,  which  never  came.  After  securing 
his  guns  and  prisoners,  Mahone  returned  to  his  works. 

We  will  now  follow  the  division  of  General  Wilcox.  These 
troops,  moving  well  to  the  right,  took  position  at  some  distance  from 
the  Weldon  road.  When  the  sharpshooters  were  sent  forward  they 
soon  developed  a  strong  skirmish  line  of  the  enemy,  which  was 
speedily  broken ;  and  an  advance  still  further  disclosed  an  open 
field  with  no  enemy  in  front  except  a  skirmish  line  and  the  ordinary 
reserve.  Evidently  the  left  of  the  Sixth  Corps  was  near  at  hand. 
Two  brigades  of  the  division  were  moved  into  position,  and  the 
inevitable  intrenchments  soon  began  to  appear ;  but  beyond  a  sharp 
picket  fire  in  front  there  was  no  fighting.  All  the  evening  we  heard 
the  firing  to  our  left,  and  as  it  increased  in  volume  an  officer  of  the 
division  staff  was  sent  out  to  the  picket  line  and  informed  the  officer 
in  charge  that  the  division  would  withdraw  at  once  from  its  position ; 
that  it  must  do  its  best  to  hold  the  line  with  both  its  flanks  unprotected, 
and,  if  forced  back,  was  to  make  a  run  for  it.  The  sharpshooters 
kept  up  a  steady  fight,  and  were  glad  to  perceive  that  there  was  no 
disposition  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  advance ;  on  the  contrary, 
they  seemed  rather  nervous  lest  we  should  do  so.  At  nightfall,  how 
ever,  unwonted  signs  of  activity  among  them  were  to  be  observed. 
Fresh  troops  were  moved  into  line  ;  the  rattle  of  accoutrements  and 
canteens  could  be  heard,  and  the  officers'  words  of  command  all 
indicated  preparations  for  an  early  advance.  The  word  was  passed 
down  our  line  to  give  them  one  volley  and  then  retire.  When  it 
was  well  dark,  on  the  Federals  came  at  a  charge.  Greatly  to  our 
relief  we  could  hear  the  officers  shouting  out,  "  Hold  your  fire  for 
the  line  of  battle ! "  This  was  just  the  thing  we  wanted.  We  gave 
them  one  volley  and  broke  for  the  rear  like  quarter-horses. 


A   CAMPAIGN  WITH  SHARPSHOOTERS.  281 

There  was  a  line  of  cavalry  pickets  in  our  rear ;  but  these  were 
alarmed  at  the  shouting  of  the  enemy  and  at  once  decamped,  nor  did 
they  draw  rein  until  they  reached  their  camp.  The  fact  that  the 
sharpshooters  got  away  without  losing  a  man  in  the  race,  proved  that 
they,  on  occasion,  could  show  a  clean  pair  of  heels.  Late  that  night 
it  was  learned  that  Wilcox  arrived  on  the  ground  in  rear  of  Mahone 
too  Lite  to  be  of  any  service.  The  ground  had  been  reached  by  a  ret 
rograde  movement.  This  ended  this  brilliant  affair,  which,  successful 
as  it  was,  was  greatly  marred  in  execution  by  the  manner  in  which 
General  Mahone  was  supported.  If  the  division  of  AVilcox  had  been 
moved  to  the  front,  the  Confederates  would  have  completely  turned 
and  enveloped  the  left  flank  of  the  Sixth  Corps ;  and  these  troops 
caught  between  two  tires  must  have  suffered  great  losses.  It  is  a  sig 
nificant  fact,  with  regard  to  the  various  movements  conducted  by 
General  Mahone,  which  reflected  such  lustre  on  himself  and  on  the 
Confederate  arms,  that  at  no  time  was  lie  placed  under  the  command 
of  any  division  commander.  So  great  was  the  confidence  reposed  by 
General  Lee  in  his  skill  and  energy,  that  in  all  cases  he  reported  to 
the  corps  commander  or  directly  to  the  general-iii-chief. 

Almost  immediately  following  the  movement  on  Reams'  Station, 
in  which  the  sharpshooters  bore  their  full  part,  and  bore  it  well,  was 
the  battle  of  the  Crater,  an  action  fought  entirely  by  Mahone,  from 
which  he  gained  enduring  fame.  Here,  also,  the  sharpshooters 
covered  themselves  with  glory,  being  always  in  the  van  and  doing 
full  service  there.  Their  commandant,  Captain  ISroadbent,  a  man 
of  gigantic  strength  and  stature,  especially  distinguished  himself  by 
his  reckless  daring.  Like  the  brave  Major  Ridge,  who  led  the 
stormers  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  Broadbent  was  the  first  in  the  works 
and  fell  at  the  foot  of  the  Crater  wall,  pierced,  it  was  said,  with  no 
less  than  eleven  bayonet  wounds.  After  Mahone  drove  the  enemy 
from  the  captured  mine  and  retook  the  pieces,  when  the  line  was 
re-established,  a  Napoleon  gun  belonging  to  IVgram's  .Battery  (which 
being  just  over  the  mine  was  blown  up  by  its  explosion),  was  found 
to  be  outside  of  the  line,  at  some  distance  in  front  of  them.  It  was 
then  almost  death  to  show  a  head  along  the  line,  and  the  great  ques 
tion  was  how  to  get  that  gun  in.  Finally  some  adventurous  spirits, 
being  inspired  by  the  promise  of  a  furlough,  crept  at  night  to  the 
front,  fixed  a  strong  rope  around  the  muzzle,  and  so  dragged  it  in  in 
triumph.  In  this  action  the  artillery  was  specially  well  served, 
officers  encouraging  the  men,  both  by  their  presence  and  example. 
One  battery  to  the  south  of  the  mine  was  handled  with  a  degree  of 
gallantry  which  challenged  all  honor.  It  was  here  that  Lieutenant 

•J  O 


282  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Colonel  Frank  linger,  of  South  Carolina,  a  yonng  officer  of  great 
promise  and  of  high  personal  courage,  with  his  own  hands  worked 
one  of  the  guns  throughout  the  fight.  The  sharpshooters  in  this 
battle  sustained  heavy  losses,  having  not  only  skirmished  with  the 
enemy  during  the  entire  evening,  but  also  participating  in  the  attack 
with  the  main  line.  The  extent  of  the  enemy's  losses  is  known ; 
and  the  battle  itself  lives,  alone  of  Confederate  victories,  on  the 
canvas  of  John  E.  Elder,  of  Richmond,  whose  picture  is  notable  for 
the  absence  from  it  of  every  recognizable  figure  of  those  who  bore 
part  in  the  heroic  labors  and  perils  of  the  bloody  day.  After  this 
battle  the  army  had  a  long  rest,  unbroken  except  by  an  occasional 
fusilade  over  some  wretched  deserter. 

At  this  time  desertions  from  the  Confederate  army  had  become 
matters  of  such  common  occurrence  that  it  was  determined  to  put  a 
stop  to  the  evil  by  a  summary  execution  of  the  law.  When  men 
had  been  taken  for  this  offense,  there  was  held  what  was  called  a 
corps  court-martial ;  when  they  were  found  guilty  they  were  re 
manded  to  their  respective  commands,  that  the  sentence  might  be 
carried  out.  The  sentence  was  executed  with  all  the  formalities 
suitable  to  such  occasions,  and  the  scene  was  well  calculated  to 
strike  terror  to  the  hearts  of  those  who  contemplated  the  commis 
sion  of  this  gravest  of  all  military  offenses.  The  brigade  charged 
with  the  duty  of  executing  the  sentence  was  drawn  up  without  arms, 
forming  three  sides  of  a  hollow  square.  The  condemned  man,  with 
the  firing  party,  was  marched  around  the  inside  of  the  square,  the 
band  in  front  playing  a  dirge — usually  the  "  Dead  March  in  Saul." 
These  parades  were  the  most  disgusting  and  disagreeable  duty  en 
countered  during  the  whole  war.  One  can  never  forget  the  looks 
of  the  poor  fellows  moving  slowly  around  to  their  death.  Some 
were  erect  and  composed ;  others  so  nearly  dead  from  terrror  at  the 
approach  of  death  as  to  be  reduced  almost  to  a  state  of  coma.  After 
moving  around  the  circle  of  the  troops,  the  condemned  man  was 
fastened  to  a  stake  and  shot,  and  the  brigades,  filing  slowly  by  the 
corpse,  were  dismissed  to  their  quarters.  There  were,  I  am  glad  to 
say,  no  deserters  from  the  sharpshooters,  as  was  natural ;  for  they 
were  the  elite  of  the  army. 

When  the  heavy  winter  days  were  ended  and  spring  found  us 
prepared  to  continue  the  unequal  contest,  General  Lee,  weary  of 
waiting,  his  depleted  command  being  somewhat  strengthened  by  its 
long  rest,  determined  to  assume  the  initiative.  Accordingly,  on  the 
25th  of  March,  a  movement  was  made  on  our  left  (Fort  Stedman), 
which  proved  a  failure.  That  very  evening  Grant  delivered  his 


A   CAMPAIGN  WITH  SHARPSHOOTERS.  2S3 

riposte  in  the  shape  of  a  sharp  thrust  on  our  right  at  u  Battery  45." 
Our  pickets — only  details  were  on  duty — were  driven  in,  and  forced 
back  almost  under  the  works.  The  next  day  General  Lee  made  a 
personal  inspection  of  this  portion  of  the  lines,  in  company  with 
Lieutenant  General  Hill  and  his  division  commanders.  The  picket 
line,  as  it  remained,  was  undoubtedly  faulty  in  the  last  degree,  and 
General  Lee,  vexed  with  the  burden  of  so  many  and  such  heavy 
responsibilities,  seemed  by  no  means  disposed  to  tax  his  mind 
further  with  the  assumption  of  details  of  this  description.  Turning 
sharply  to  General  Hill,  he  exclaimed:  ''Here  are  your  troops  and 
yonder  is  the  enemy.  If  you  can't  establish  your  picket  line,  I  can't 
do  it  for  you.''  And  with  these  words  he  rode  away.  General  Hill 
that  night  ordered  the  sharpshooters  of  "Wilcox  to  carry  the  crest  in 
their  front,  and  the  next  day  found  us  strongly  intrenched  on  a  line 
commanding  all  the  country  before  it.  In  moving  to  our  right  to 
meet  the  continued  advances  of  the  enemy  in  that  direction,  each 
day  saw  our  works  stripped  of  men,  and  each  day  found  us  fighting. 
The  sharpshooters  were  in  greater  demand  than  ever  before.  It  was 
a  common  thing  for  a  general  officer  to  request  their  assistance  in  the 
establishment  of  his  picket  lines.  One  instance  of  the  kind  is  worthy 
of  record.  Three  days  before  the  enemy  broke  through  the  lines 
around  Petersburg,  they  pushed  up  their  skirmish  line  almost  to  our 
works,  in  front  of  General  Cook,  near  Hatcher's  run,  with  the  view 
of  masking  their  larger  movements.  Friday  evening,  a  battalion  of 
sharpshooters  of  Wilcox's  Division  received  orders  to  report  to 
General  Took  for  duty.  On  reaching  the  quarters  of  that  officer, 
they  were  informed  that  the  command  was  told  off  for  "nervous 
duty"  in  front  of  his  line.  We  were  placed  in  position  with  them 
by  Captain  Stephen  "W.  Jones,  a  famous  officer  of  sharpshooters  in 
command  of  Cook's  Corps.  That  night  the  battalion  moved  on  the 
enemy,  and  with  but  slight  loss  captured  their  rifle-pits  and  re 
established  the  picket  line.  The  next  day  occurred  the  great  break 
up  and  the  death  of  A.  P.  Hill. 

It  was  under  most  singular  circumstances  that  Lieutenant 
General  A.  P.  Hill,  an  officer  whose  name  will  ever  be  inseparably 
connected  with  the  glory  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  met 
his  death.  When  the  Federal  commander  for  the  last  time  applied 
his  favorite  tactics,  and  extended  his  left  flank  to  envelop  our  right, 
General  Hill's  Corps  was  massed  at  and  beyond  Hatchers  run, 
though  a  portion  of  his  command  held  the  works  from  "  Battery 
4:5  "  to  the  extreme  right.  His  headquarters  were  still  established 
near  Petersburg.  On  Saturday  evening  he  left  the  front  at 
Hatcher's  run,  there  being  no  indication  at  that  point  of  a  forward 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

hostile  movement.  This  the  writer  knows,  as  having  obtained 
permission  from  General  Hill  himself  to  return  to  Petersburg,  and 
having  ridden  up  the  lines  in  company  with  him  and  his  staff. 
Next  morning  before  dawn  the  enemy  carried  several  points  of  his 
line  by  reason  of  its  extension,  and  the  attenuation  of  its  defense. 
Moving  across  the  country,  the  victorious  Federals  re-established 
their  pickets  in  the  direction  of  the  river.  General  Hill,  apprised  of 
this  state  of  things  at  his  headquarters,  at  once  dispatched  such  of 
his  staff  as  were  with  him  to  report  the  facts  to  General  Lee,  and  to  see 
what  could  be  done  toward  repairing  the  disaster.  Accompanied  by 
a  few  couriers,  he  rode  immediately  afterward  toward  Hatcher's  run, 
with  the  view  of  rejoining  the  main  body  of  his  command.  He 
was  repeatedly  urged  not  to  attempt  the  undertaking ;  but  his  sole 
and  laconic  reply  was,  "  I  must  get  to  my  corps." 

As  the  General  and  his  party  proceeded  upon  their  way  they 
found  the  country  filled  with  detached  bodies  of  Federal  infantry, 
straggling  and  plundering.  The  first  lot  of  these  stragglers  which 
was  come  across,  uncertain  of  their  strength,  and  perhaps  awed  by 
the  appearance  of  a  general  officer — a  sentiment  natural  to  disciplined 
soldiery — quietly  surrendered,  and  were  sent  to  Petersburg  in  charge 
of  three  couriers.  Accompanied  only  by  Sergeant  Tucker,  General 
Hill  continued  on  his  way  till,  on  reaching  a  point  some  four  miles 
from  Petersburg,  on  the  plank  road,  they  saw  before  them  two 
Federal  infantrymen.  These  men,  seeing  the  mounted  Confederates, 
took  cover  behind  a  tree.  Hill,  without  hesitation,  called  to  Tucker 
to  ride  them  down ;  and,  pushing  forward  in  advance,  received  their 
fire  with  fatal  effect.  Thus  perished,  in  the  prime  of  life,  a  gallant 
officer,  who  had  engaged  in  more  pitched  battles  than  he  numbered 
years ;  who  organized  and  fought  with  eminent  success  and  daring 
the  famous  Light  Division,  and  who  handled  the  Third  Corps  of  the 
army  with  the  same  vigilance,  efficiency,  and  fidelity  which  distin 
guished  him  in  lower  commands,  and  which  so  singularly  recalled 
his  image  to  the  dying  eyes  both  of  Lee  and  Jackson.  In  tone,  in 
character,  and  in  military  force,  he  was  strikingly  like  Bessieres ;  and 
his  death  may  also  be  compared  with  that  of  the  commander  of  the 
Old  Guard,  who  lost  his  life  in  an  insignificant  skirmish  on  the  eve 
of  the  great  battle  of  Lutzen.  His  death  was  peculiarly  unfortunate 
ut  this  time ;  but  even  his  magnetic  presence — and  no  man's  was 
more  so — could  hardly  have  redeemed  the  fortunes  of  the  day.  In 
fact,  the  army  was  so  broken  as  almost  to  have  lost  its  military 
attitude. 

With  the  beginning  of  the  retreat  began  also  the  most  arduous 
labors  of  the  sharpshooters.  To  this  body  was  assigned  the  duty  of 


A   CAMPAIGN  WITH  SHARPSHOOTERS.  285 

protecting  the  rear  of  the  wearied  and  worn  battalions  of  Lee  that 
now  moved  slowly  up  the  line  of  the  Southside  Railroad,  contesting 
the  way  inch  by  inch  with  the  determined  pursuer.  At  Farmville  a 
decided  stand  was  made,  and  here  the  rear  guard  was  joined  by  Fitz 
Lee  and  his  cavalry.  The  lighting  on  the  retreat,  except  in  rare 
instances,  did  not  reach  the  dignity  of  pitched  battles ;  but  one 
action  that  took  place  near  Farmville  deserves  the  record  it  has  so 
far  received  from  no  pen  or  tongue.  When  the  army  reached  this 
point,  the  conduct  of  operations  in  the  rear  was  intrusted  to  Major 
General  Fitz  Lee,  of  cavalry  fame ;  an  officer  who,  after  the  death 
of  Stuart,  ranked  iirst  in  the  army  for  energy,  chin,  and  all  other 
qualities  that  make  the  ideal  beau-  sabruer.  "With  a  small  column  of 
infantry,  and  such  of  his  own  command  as  he  was  yet  able  to  hold 
together,  Fitz  Lee  stoutly  guarded  the  rear  of  the  retreating  army. 
As  the  main  column  passed  the  bridge  in  rear  of  Farmville,  Fitz  Lee 
in  pereon  held  the  town,  gradually  diminishing  his  front,  which  was 
closely  pressed  by  the  enemy,  till  there  remained  with  him  but 
a  handful  of  brave  men.  Seated  on  horseback,  near  the  bridge,  he 
calmly  watched  the  preparations  for  firing  it,  and  directed  the 
movements  of  the  last  groups  that  filed  across.  There  he  sat,  a 
grand  figure,  in  his  own  person  the  last  remnant  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia;  and,  like  Marshal  Xey  at  the  bridge  Kowno,  he 
fired  the  last  shot,  and  was  the  last  to  cross.  As  the  final  man  was 
seen  to  be  over,  and  when  the  bridge  itself  was  in  flames,  the  soldiers 
supposing  him  to  be  a  vidette,  shouted  to  him  to  ride  across.  Lee 
turned  slowly  toward  them,  ordering  them  to  hurry  across,  and, 
adding,  %*  I  am  Fitz  Lee/'  plunged  into  the  river  below  the  bridge. 
lie  gained  the  opposite  bank  in  safety,  but  not  without  difficulty 
and  danger,  and  the  quick  fire  of  the  horse  artillery  from  the  other 
side  soon  gave  assurance  of  his  presence  among  the  guns. 

Hemmed  in  on  all  sides  at  Appomattox,  General  Robert  E. 
Lee's  only  hope  was  to  cut  his  way  through,  and,  by  the  abandon 
ment  of  his  guns  and  baggage,  to  force  his  path  to  the  mountains. 
Having  formed  this  resolution,  Gordon  was  promptly  dispatched 
forward,  while  the  left  flank  was  protected  by  moving  in  the  four 
battalions  of  Wilcox's  sharpshooters.  Two  of  these  were  engaged, 
and  two  more  were  moving  into  action.  But  a  period  to  the 
fighting  of  the  sharpshooters  and  of  all  the  rest  of  that  "incom 
parable  infantry"  was  now  close  at  hand.  AVhen  Ouster  rode 
through  the  Confederate  lines,  an  officer  of  General  Lee's  staff 
was  at  once  sent  to  recall  the  sharpshooters,  and  the  sound  of  their 
bugles  to  "  Cease  firing  ! "  in  a  few  minutes  silenced  forever  the  guns 
of  the  Army  of  Xorthern  Virginia. 


THE  DRAFT  RIOTS  IN  NEW  YORK. 


BY  MAJOR   T.    P.    M  ELBATH. 


THE  story  of  the  New  York 
draft  riots  of  1863  has  been 
related  with  more  or  less  com 
pleteness  by  every  historian 
of  the  civil  war.  No  thor 
oughly  accurate  account,  how 
ever,  has  yet  been  published. 
The  chroniclers  appear  to 
have  confined  their  researches 
to  surface  events,  and  have 
been  either  ignorant  of  the 
true  circumstances  attending 
the  suppression  of  the  riots, 
or  desirous  of  keeping  those 
circumstances  concealed.  At 
that  particular  juncture  a  large 
portion  of  the  city's  militia  force  was  absent  at  the  seat  of  war,  a 
fact  which  gave  rise  to  the  opinion  that  the  riots  had  been  previously 
planned  instead  of  being,  as  it  really  was,  a  sudden  and  spontaneous 
insurrection.  Through  the  same  cause,  also,  the  civil  authorities 
were  crippled,  and  the  task  of  restoring  order  was  thrown  into  the 
hands  of  the  few  Federal  troops  then  stationed  in  the  vicinity  of 
New  York.  It  is  probable  that  the  city  was  a  gainer  in  the  end  by 
this  state  of  tilings,  which  in  the  outset  appeared  so  unfortunate. 
The  interference  which  the  regular  troops  encountered  at  the  hands 
of  the  State  officers — growing  out  of  the  jealousy  of  the  local  militia 
commander — doubled  the  period  of  the  rioters'  triumph,  and  coupled 
with  his  inefficiency  throughout,  suggests  forcibly  what  might  have 
been  the  consequence,  had  he  been  in  absolute  command. 

Early  in  the  summer  it  had  been  announced  from  Washington 
that  a  compulsory  addition  was  to  be  made  to  the  armies  in  the  field 
by  means  of  a  general  conscription.  The  quota  of  the  city  of  New 
York  was  fixed  at  12,500,  and  that  of  Brooklyn  at  5,000.  Colonel 
Robert  Nugent,  of  the  Sixty-ninth  New  York  Volunteers — a  captain 

(286) 


THE  DRAFT  RIOTS  IN  NEW  YORK.  287 

« 

in  tlic  Thirteenth.  United  States  Infantry — was  detailed  as  assistant 
provost  marshal  general,  and  established  his  headquarters  in  Leonard 
street.  The  business  of  his  department  was  conducted  with  <miet 
discretion,  and  the  bugbear  of  a  draft,  which  at  first  had  created 
great  consternation,  in  the  course  of  time  lost  its  terrors,  as  people 
became  accustomed  to  its  contemplation.  Still  there  was  a  deep- 
seated  hostility  to  the  proposed  conscription,  which  the  political 
opponents  of  the  war  fostered  as  sedulously  as  they  dared,  with  the 
hospitalities  of  Fort  Lafayette  and  its  sturdy  commandant,  Martin 
Burke,  staring  them  in  the  face. 

On  Monday,  June  29th,  Governor  Seymour,  in  Albany,  received 
private  information  that  a  deep  laid  conspiracy  was  on  foot  in  Xew 
York  to  resist  the  draft.  Hastening  to  the  city  the  details  of  the 
plot  were  communicated  to  him  from  the  same  source,  to  the  ell'ect 
that  a  large  body  of  deserters,  1,800  strong,  acting  in  concert  with 
another  large  body  of  "Copperheads"  were  banded  together  to 
oppose  the  draft.  Arms  were  to  be  obtained  for  the  revolutionists 
by  a  simultaneous  attack  on  the  State  arsenal  in  Seventh  avenue,  and 
on  the  Seventh  Regiment  armory,  to  be  made  during  the  night  of 
July  fkl,  when  it  was  believed  that  the  noise  and  confusion  attendant 
upon  ushering  in  the  national  holiday  would  render  the  movements 
of  the  leaders  in  the  daring  project  less  liable  to  be  observed. 
Governor  Seymour  held  a  council  with  Mayor  Opdyke  and  General 
Sanford.  Strong  guards  were  posted  at  the  places  threatened  with 
attack.  The  police  authorities  were  privately  notified,  and  Superin 
tendent  Kennedy  detailed  trusty  officers  to  watch  the  armories,  and 
to  report  the  slightest  circumstance  of  an  unusual  character  that 
might  occur  in  their  neighborhood.  Having  made  preparations  for 
the  assault  General  Sanford  left  the  city  on  Friday  morning,  con 
fiding  the  management  of  affairs  to  General  Spicer.  The  night 
passed  quietly,  however.  No  attack  was  made,  no  conspirators 
exposed  themselves  to  arrest,  and  the  Governor  and  the  small  circle 
whom  lie  had  admitted  to  his  confidence  satisfied  themselves  that  the 
whole  affair  was  a  hoax,  gotten  up  with  the  mischievous  intent  of 
creating  an  alarm.  The  incident,  however,  revealed  the  existence  of 
a  dangerous  under-current  of  sentiment  in  New  York,  at  that  time, 
hostile  to  the  war  policy  of  the  government,  and  competent  to  impress 
itself  with  fatal  distinctness  upon  the  minds  of  the  ignorant  masses 
who  make  up  so  large  a  portion  of  that  city's  foreign  population. 
The  "Peace  party,"  as  the  opposition  styled  itself,  was  carrying 
things  with  a  high  hand.  At  a  meeting  in  the  Twenty-second  ward, 
held  shortly  after  the  -ith  of  July,  the  approaching  conscription  was 


288  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

denounced  in  bitter  terms,  and  the  President  and  his  Cabinet  were 
stigmatized  as  "murderers"  and  "despots."  The  train  was,  beyond 
a  doubt,  being  carefully  laid,  when  an  unexpected  spark  brought 
about  a  premature  explosion. 

The  llth  of  July  was  the  date  appointed  for  the  draft  to  begin. 
As  that  day  fell  on  Saturday  its  selection  was  particularly  ill-advised, 
the  Sabbath  holiday  which  followed  affording  the  ignorant  masses, 
as  well  as  the  disaffected  element  of  the  population,  an  opportunity 
for  studying  into  the  situation  through  the  morning  papers,  and  of 
discussing  the  prospect  over  their  liquor — the  probable  result  of 
which  might  have  been  easily  foreseen.  Some  slight  impediments 
had  been  placed  in  the  way  of  the  enrolling  officers,  but  nothing 
had  occurred  to  excite  apprehensions  of  any  outbreak,  and  the  first 
day's  work  of  conscription  passed  off  in  a  quiet  and  orderly  manner. 
The  drafting  took  place  in  the  deputy  provost  marshal's  office,  at  the 
corner  of  Forty-sixth  street  and  Third  avenue,  and  1,236  names  were 
peacefully  drawn  that  day  out  of  the  1,500  called  for  from  the 
Twenty-second  ward.  It  was  believed  that  the  popular  enthusiasm 
created  by  the  routing  of  Lee's  army  had  effectually  silenced  the  anti 
war  party.  Some  hopeful  ones  expressed  the  belief  that  the  contest 
was  so  near  its  close  that  even  if  the  draft  went  on  the  conscripts 
would  never  be  called  for  in  the  field.  Then  that  fatal  Sunday  inter 
vened.  On  the  following  morning  the  papers  stated  that  the  Irish 
laboring  classes  in  the  Twentieth  ward,  where  the  draft  was  to  be 
held  that  day  were  in  a  state  of  intense  excitement,  and  threatened 
to  resist  it  to  the  utmost. 

The  threat  was  speedily  put  into  execution.  The  Sunday  deliber 
ations  had  evidently  led  to  a  determination  to  break  up  the  drafting 
depot  in  Third  avenue.  About  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  fifty 
rough  and  rowdyish-looking  fellows  were  observed,  by  persons  doing 
business  on  the  East  river,  in  the  region  of  Grand  street,  prowling 
along  the  wharves  and  picking  up  recruits.  Gaining  insolence  by 
increase  of  numbers,  they  entered  the  foundries  and  warehouses,  and 
by  persuasion  and  threats  induced  the  workmen  to  join  them.  Simul 
taneously  with  this  movement  a  similar  one  was  progressing  on  the 
west  side.  About  ten  o'clock  a  large  body  of  laboring  men  and  ill- 
favored  ruffians,  armed  mostly  with  clubs  and  bludgeons,  after  hold 
ing  a  brief  parley  in  a  vacant  lot  near  Central  Park,  marched  down 
Forty-seventh  street  to  Third  avenue.  The  deputy  marshal's  office 
was  immediately  entered,  Captain  Jenkins  and  his  assistants  retreat 
ing  precipitately  through  a  rear  door.  The  wheel  containing  the 
names  was  carried  away  safely,  but  all  the  books  and  papers  that 


THE  DRAFT  RIOTS  IN  NEW  YORK.  289 

could  lie  found  were  destroyed,  and  the  building  itself  was  set  on 
lire.  Police  Superintendent  Kennedy,  who  was  driving  across  the 
town  on  a  tour  of  inspection,  observed  the  names,  and  leaving  his 
wagon  at  the  corner  of  Forty-sixth  and  Lexington  avenue,  proceeded 
unsuspiciously  and  unarmed  on  foot  to  the  scene  of  the  disturbance. 
Although  not  in  uniform  he  was  recognized.  In  an  instant  he  was 

o  ^ 

set  upon  and  beaten  so  brutally  that  when,  after  a  race  for  life  of 
several  blocks,  he  was  happily  rescued  from  his  pursuers  and  carried 
in  a  market  wagon  to  the  police  headquarters  in  Mulberry  street,  his 
colleagues  failed  to  recognize  him.  lie  was  the  first  person  assaulted 
in  the  riot.  Police  Commissioner  Acton  immediately  realized  the 
situation.  ITe  assumed  command,  and  dispatching  what  police  were 
available  (forty-four  in  number)  to  the  scene  of  the  riot,  telegraphed 
to  each  of  the  thirty-two  precincts  covered  by  the  Metropolitan  police 
for  the  whole  reserve  force  to  be  concentrated  at  the  headquarters. 
This  wise  step  was  taken  just  in  time,  for  soon  afterward  the  rioters 
had  cut  down  the  telegraph  poles  and  destroyed  all  communication 
between  the  headquarters  and  the  upper  precincts  of  the  city. 

A  futile  effort  had  meanwhile  been  made  to  subdue  the  rioters 
in  Third  avenue  by  a  force  of  between  forty  and  fifty  invalid 
soldiers,  who  were  ordered  to  the  aid  of  the  deputy  provost  marshal 
from  the  Park  barracks.  These  soldiers  he-Id  the  key  of  the 
situation  in  their  hands.  The  mob  up  to  this  period  was  entirely 
without  definite  organization,  and  destitute  of  leaders,  and  was 
wholly  incapable  of  maintaining  its  ground  against  a  resolute  attack 
of  disciplined  troops.  But  either  through  a  mistaken  sense  of  their 
own  superiority,  or  a  misguided  disposition  to  leniency,  the  soldiers 
contented  themselves  with  firing  a  harmless  volley  over  the  heads  of 
the  rioters.  The  latter,  who  a  moment  before  were  wavering,  saw 
their  opportunity  immediately.  They  rushed  upon  the  soldiers, 
wrested  from  them  their  yet  unloaded  weapons,  and  drove  them  in 
wild  confusion  down  the  avenue.  Two  of  the  soldiers  were  beaten 
down,  and  left  for  dead  on  the  pavement.  Others  would  doubtless 
have  suffered  a  similar  fate,  had  they  not  fortunately  encountered  in 
their  night  the  police  force  sent  bv  Commissioner  Acton.  The 
mob,  having  tasted  blood  after  receiving  its  baptism  of  fire,  was  by 
this  time  worked  up  into  a  state  of  uncontrollable  frenzy.  Brand 
ishing  clubs  and  muskets  above  their  heads,  and  yelling,  and 
shouting,  they  rushed  down  the  avenue  like  a  torrent.  Sergeant 
McCredie,  who  commanded  the  police,  expecting  speedy  reinforce 
ments,  deployed  his  men  in  line  across  the  street,  and,  as  the  head 
of  the  disorderly  column  approached,  he  ordered  a  charge.  Despite 
19 


290  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

their  overwhelming  numbers,  the  mob  could  not  withstand  this 
onset  of  a  disciplined  force.  Step  by  step,  they  were  driven  back 
three  blocks.  By  the  time  Forty-sixth  street  was  reached,  however, 
Sergeant  McCredie's  little  band  was  thoroughly  exhausted.  The 
expected  reinforcements  did  not  arrive.  A  large  body  of  rioters, 
who  had  slipped  out  of  the  way  into  Forty-fifth  street,  seeing  the 
paltry  number  of  police  before  whom  they  were  retreating,  emerged 
again  into  the  avenue,  in  rear  of  the  latter,  thus  hemming  them  in 
on  every  side.  Fighting  was  no  longer  in  the  question.  The  brave 
little  force  broke  and  fled,  every  man  seeking  his  own  safety,  and  all 
eventually  escaped,  though  nearly  every  one  of  the  party  was 
severely  beaten  and  wounded.  This  first  triumph  of  the  mob 
was  achieved  about  noon.  The  excitement  had  spread  rapidly 
through  the  city,  and  at  that  hour  Third  avenue,  from  the  Cooper 
Institute  to  Forty-sixth  street,  was  black  with  human  beings — the 
sidewalks,  housetops  and  windows  being  all  crowded  with  rioters,  or 
spectators.  It  was  estimated  that  fifty  thousand  persons  were  thus 
congregated  within  the  stretch  of  thirty  blocks  along  the  avenue. 

The  attention  of  the  mob  having  been  drawn  away  in  the 
manner  related  from  the  building  they  had  set  on  fire,  the  firemen 
succeeded  in  subduing  the  flames,  after  four  houses  had  been  burned 
to  the  ground.  It  is  deserving  of  notice  that,  while  these  terrible 
scenes  were  being  enacted  in  the  Ninth  district,  the  draft  in  the 
Eighth  district,  at  1190  Broadway,  under  Captain  Manierre,  was 
going  on  without  molestation.  It  was  adjourned  at  noon,  and  the 
policemen  in  attendance  hastened  to  the  aid  of  their  comrades  on  the 
east  side.  In  the  meantime  the  work  of  destruction  progressed,  but 
in  an  irregular  and  desultory  manner,  clearly  indicating  the  absence 
of  previous  arrangement.  The  news  of  the  uprising,  as  it  spread 
through  those  portions  of  the  city  where  the  low  Irish  dwelt,  stirred 
up  the  dregs  of  the  population,  and  they  came  thronging  forth  in 
great  numbers,  so  that  at  almost  every  turn  a  mob  was  discernible. 
Splitting  up  into  several  sections,  as  different  objects  attracted 
them,  they  would  rejoin  and  separate  without  apparently  any 
concert  of  action.  A  shout  and  a  cry  in  one  direction  would  call  oil 
a  throng,  while  a  similar  shout  in  another  direction  would  attract  a 
portion  thither.  The  armory,  at  the  corner  of  Second  avenue  and 
Twenty-first  street,  was  captured  from  the  police  detailed  to  hold  it, 
and  the  rioters,  after  arming  themselves,  destroyed  all  the  material 
they  could  not  carry  away.  Several  of  the  attacking  party  were 
killed  in  this  encounter.  One  detachment  started  for  Captain 
Manierre's  drafting  office,  at  the  corner  of  Broadway  and  Twenty- 


THE  DRAFT  RIOTS  IN  NEW  YORK.  201 

ninth  street,  which  they  burned  down.  The  rich  goods  in  the 
stores  on  the  block  of  Broadway,  between  Twenty-eighth  and 
Twenty-ninth  streets,  turned  the  attention  of  the  mob  to  plunder. 
It  was  estimated  that  the  active  rioters  in  this  crowd  were  not  over 
one  hundred  in  number,  but  they  were  attended  by  an  enormous 
horde,  including  women  and  children,  who  displayed  a  skilled 
expertness  in  appropriating  property.  AVatches,  bracelets,  jewelry, 
and  valuable  goods  of  all  kinds  disappeared  from  the  stores,  as  if  by 
magic,  and  in  an  hour's  time  the  whole  block  had  been  devastated 
and  set  on  lire.  It  was  completely  destroyed.  Simultaneously  with 
these  two  outrages,  a  third  and  larger  s<piad  of  rioters  broke  away  in 
the  direction  of  the  Colored  Orphan  Asylum,  on  Fifth  avenue  and 
Forty-third  and  Forty-fourth  streets. 

The  old  antipathy  of  the  Irish  to  the  negroes  had  already  been 
given  full  vent,  and  since  noon  had  manifested  itself  in  various  parts 
of  the  city — even  those  remote  from  the  scenes  of  worst  outrage — 
bv  a  sort  of  desultory  persecution  of  black  people  wherever  they 
we're  met.  The  station-houses  were  tilled  with  the  hounded  creatures 
seeking  protection;  and  about  the  time  of  the'  attack  on  the  orphan 
asylum,  a  colored  cartman  had  been  murdered,  mutilated,  hanged, 
and  burned,  in  Clarkson  street,  under  circumstances  of  atrocity 
unparalleled  in  civilized  communities.  ( )n  their  way,  the  mob 
stopped  to  sack  and  burn  two  valuable  dwellings,  on  Lexington 
avenue,  after  which  the  orphan  asvlum  was  subjected  to  a  pillage, 
which  lasted  nearly  two  hours;  and  the  editice  was  then,  despite  the 
earnest  efforts  of  the  firemen,  burned  to  the  ground.  The  inmates 
had  been  removed  before  the  mob's  arrival.  Soon  after  this,  the 
crowd,  flushed  with  success  and  maddened  with  liquor,  made  a 
demonstration  on  the  police  headquarters.  They  were  met,  in 
Broadway,  near  Amity  street,  bv  Inspector  Daniel  Carpenter,  who, 
after  a  brief  struggle,  drove  them  back  with  terrible  punir>hment. 
Xo  more  spirited  light  took  place  during  the  entire  riots  than  this 
one,  in  which  a  desperate  mob,  armed  with  every  description  of 
weapon,  and  numbering  several  thousand,  was  totally  routed  by  two 
hundred  policemen,  armed  solely  with  their  clubs.  A  similar  scene 
was  enacted  at  about  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  when  an  attack 
was  made  on  the  Tribune  building.  Here,  again,  the  crowd 
was  enormously  in  excess  of  the  police;  and  here,  again,  the  latter 
swept  the  ruffianly  assailants  before  them  like  chaff  before  an 
autumn  breeze.  This  ended  the  heavy  lighting  of  the  day,  though 
minor  disturbances  occurred  at  various  points  during  the  evening, 
including  the  burning  of  Postmaster  AVakemans  house,  in  Eighty- 


292  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

sixtli  street.  The  custom-house  and  sub-treasury,  in  Wall  street, 
were  under  guard;  and  General  Sanford,  commanding  the  city 
military,  had  collected  some  men  for  the  protection  of  the  State 
arsenal,  in  Seventh  avenue.  But,  throughout  the  deadly  occurrences 
of  the  day,  he  had  not  dispatched  a  single  body  of  soldiers  to  assist 
the  police  in  quelling  the  mob. 

At  the  beginning  of  July,  the  military  post  of  the  city  and 
harbor  of  New  York  was  commanded  by  Brevet  Brigadier  General 
Harvey  Brown,  Colonel  of  the  Fifth  United  States  Artillery.  The 
headquarters  of  the  Department  of  the  East,  under  General  Wool, 
were  in  New  York  city.  The  "post"  headquarters  were  at  Fort 
Hamilton,  where,  as  Adjutant  of  the  Fifth  Artillery,  I  performed 
the  additional  duty  of  Acting  Assistant  Adjutant  General.  The 
"post"  comprised  all  the  forts  and  military  commands,  excepting 
Governor's  Island,  in  the  vicinity  of  New  York,  together  with  the 
hospital  and  convalescent  depots  at  Hart's  and  Riker's  Islands  and 
Willett's  Point.  The  garrison  of  this  rather  comprehensive  post, 
exclusive  of  the  volunteers  wrho  passed  through  it  in  a  continuous 
stream,  on  their  way  from  Northern  hospitals,  to  rejoin  their  com 
mands  in  the  field,  was  constituted  as  follows :  At  Fort  Hamilton, 
the  headquarters,  and  two  mounted  batteries  (Dupont's  and  Piper's) 
of  the  Fifth  Artillery ;  headquarters  Second  Battalion  Twelfth 
United  States  Infantry,  Major  Bruen,  commanding,  and  the  Elev 
enth  Regiment  New  York  Volunteer  Heavy  Artillery,  Colonel  W. 
B.  Barnes.  Fort  Ethan  Allen  (Sandy  Hook),  Company  F,  Twelfth 
Infantry,  Captain  II.  R.  Putnam,  commanding.  Fort  Richmond, 
Company  II,  Twelfth  Infantry,  Captain  Walter  S.  Franklin,  com 
manding.  Fort  Lafayette,  one  company  of  the  Ninth  United  States 
Infantry,  under  Lieutenant  Wood ;  Lieutenant  Colonel  Mai-tin  Burke, 
Third  United  States  Artillery,  commanding.  Fort  Schuyler,  Twen 
tieth  and  Twenty-eighth  New  York  Batteries,  First  Lieutenant  B. 
F.  Ryer,  Twentieth  Battery,  New  York  Volunteer  Artillery,  com 
manding.  New  York  city,  a  volunteer  guard  at  the  Park  barracks, 
designated  the  Invalid  Corps. 

Beside  the  above-named  commands,  there  was  a  company  of 
infantry  at  Fort  Hamilton  known  as  the  "  Permanent  Guard,"  which 
had  been  organized  by  myself  a  few  weeks  previous  in  compliance 
with  instructions  from  department  headquarters.  The  garrison  of 
that  post — being  composed  of  light  artillery — had  special  duties  to 
perform  incident  to  the  mounted  service  which,  in  addition  to  their 
not  being  armed  with  muskets,  precluded  their  being  detailed  for 
the  general  garrison  guard  and  fatigue  duty.  The  "  Permanent 


THE  DRAFT  RIOTS  IN  NEW  YORK. 

Guard"'  was  in  its  way  a  "  crack"  organization.  My  orders  author 
ized  me  to  take  from  all  the  volunteer  troops,  convalescents  and  fur 
lough  men  in  the  harbor,  whatever  private  soldiers  I  might  select, 
not  to  exceed  one  hundred  and  eighty  in  number,  and  by  dint  of 
careful  selection  and  occasional  changes — substituting  good  material 
for  poor — the  company  became  eventually  a  type  of  the  cream  of  the 
volunteer  army.  Xo  two  men  in  it  belonged  necessarily  to  the  same 
regiment ;  all  had  seen  hard  service  in  the  field,  and  all  were  willing 
to  pass  a  portion  of  their  terms  of  enlistment  in  protecting  Fort 
Hamilton  from  invasion.  The  severest  punishment  I  could  inflict, 
was  to  ship  an  undesirable  soldier  to  his  regiment.  The  name  I 
adopted  in  mild  imitation  of  the  celebrated  "Permanent  Party"  of 
Governor's  Island.  Their  association  with  the  regulars  excited  in 
them  a  wholesome  spirit  of  emulation.  I  succeeded  in  having  them 
equipped  in  every  respect  the  same  as  the  Twelfth  Infantry;  had 
their  clothing  made  over  by  a  company  tailor  to  tit  them;  fed  them 
well  with  the  accumulations  of  the  company  fund  ;  held  them  down 
to  strict  discipline,  and  in  a  short  time  I  found  mvself  in  charge  of 
as  orderly,  self-possessed,  and  %i  natty"1  a  company  as  any  otlicer  need 
desire  to  command.  The  gallant  service  thev  performed  in  the  July 
riots,  and  the  eagerness  displayed  by  the  regular  infantry  officers  in 
[New  York  during  that  period  to  lead  them,  showed  the  sterling 
metal  of  which  they  were  composed,  and  justify  me  in  claiming  for 
the  "Permanent  Guard  of  Fort  Hamilton"  the  place  it  is  entitled 
to  in  the  history  of  that  deadly  outbreak.  On  Julv  4th  telegraphic 
orders  were  received  from  Washington  to  dispatch  the  two  batteries 
from  Fort  Hamilton  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Chambersburg, 
and  the  "Permanent  Guard "  thus  became  the  only  effective  garrison 
of  the  post.  The  aggregate  strength  c,f  General  .Brown's  command 
at  that  time  was  less  than  500. 

About  two  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  [Monday,  July  loth, 
having  occasion  to  visit  the  telegraph  office  just  outside  the  military 
inclosure  of  Fort  Hamilton,  I  was  informed  by  the  operator  that 
communication  with  the  city  had  been  in  some  way  cut  off.  [No 
word  of  any  disturbance  had  reached  us  at  the  Narrows.  Shortly 
afterward  a  mounted  orderlv  from  General  Wool's  headquarters 
made  his  appearance,  bearing  an  order  to  send  immediately  to  [New 
York  a  portion  of  the  troops  from  Fort  Lafayette,  and  half  the  com 
pany  then  ffarrisoninsr  Fort  [Richmond.  While  T  was  proceeding;  to 

L        *;  tr  o  <T} 

carry  this  order  into  execution  General  Brown  arrived  from  the  city 
and  expressed  great  surprise  at  the  small  number  of  men — about 
eighty — specified  in  General  Wool's  order.  As  the  tug  was  then  in 


294  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

sight  which  was  to  carry  the  detachment  to  New  York,  General 
Brown  ordered  me,  without  delay,  to  get  all  the  troops  at  Forts 
Hamilton,  Lafayette,  Richmond,  and  at  Sandy  Hook,  in  readiness  to 
move  at  a  moment's  notice,  while  he  proceeded  to  the  city  to  provide 
transportation  for  them.  This  first  detail  of  troops  sent  to  New  York 
consisted  of  one  platoon  of  Company  II,  Twelfth  United  States  In 
fantry,  from  Fort  Richmond,  and  Lieutenant  Wood,  Ninth  United 
States  Infantry,  with  his  company  (fifty-four  strong),  from  Fort 
Lafayette — the  whole  under  the  command  of  Captain  "W alter  S. 
Franklin.  These  troops  were  ordered  by  General  Brown,  upon 
landing,  to  report  to  Colonel  Nugent  at  the  corner  of  Broadway  and 
Leonard  street ;  and  as  that  officer  was  found  to  be  at  the  Seventh 
avenue  arsenal,  they  were  dispatched  without  delay  to  that  point. 
Captain  Franklin,  on  arriving  at  the  arsenal,  found  everything 
already  in  the  state  of  confusion  that  prevailed  there  during  the 
whole  period  of  the  disturbances.  Nobody  seemed  to  know  who 
was  in  command — militia  staff  officers  were  displaying  great  activity 
in  a  purposeless  way;  and  excepting  a  single  sentry  at  the  front 
entrance,  there  was  literally  no  guard  established  over  the  building. 
A  detachment  of  marines  arriving  from  the  Brooklyn  Navy  Yard, 
Captain  Franklin  used  them  to  clear  away  the  noisy  crowd  that  had 
congregated  in  the  avenue  and  established  a  line  of  sentries  along  the 
four  streets  by  which  that  post  was  approached. 

In  the  meanwhile,  after  ordering  the  remainder  of  the  regular 
troops  in"  the  harbor  to  be  in  readiness,  and  making  provision  to 
replace  them  with  volunteers,  I  occupied  myself  at  Fort  Hamilton 
in  an  effort  to  improvise  for  the  occasion  a  section  of  light  artillery, 
which  I  knew  would  be  valuable  in  street  fighting.  The  two  batter 
ies,  on  their  departure  a  few  days  previous,  had  carried  with  them 
every  trained  horse  and  driver,  and  all  the  equipments  at  the  post. 
There  remained,  however,  two  guns,  brass  six-pounders,  wThich  had 
belonged  to  Bragg's  celebrated  battery  in  the  Mexican  war,  and 
which,  having  been  condemned,  had  for  several  years  past  performed 
ornamental  service  on  Governor's  Island,  and,  more  lately,  had  been 
utilized  for  drill  instruction  by  the  batteries  of  the  Fifth  Artillery. 
A  couple  of  hours'  effort  enabled  me  to  rig  together  a  harness  for 
the  post  quartermaster's  horses,  a  wheel  and  a  lead  team  to  each  piece. 
The  quartermaster's  teamsters  supplied  the  drivers,  and  a  sufficient 
number  of  volunteers  were  detailed  to  serve  as  cannoneers.  This 
motley  battery  was  completed  by  my  assigning  the  drum  major  of 
the  Fifth  Artillery  as  chief  of  one  of  the  pieces,  and  the  commissary 
sergeant  as  the  chief  of  the  other,  and  placing  a  volunteer  officer  of 


THE  DRAFT  RIOTS  IN  NEW  YORK.  295 

heavy  artillery  in  command  of  the  whole,  with  orders  to  make  every 
effort  to  report  to  General  Drown,  at  the  St.  Nicholas  Hotel.  As 
the  horses  were  unused  to  that  kind  of  pulling,  I  was  in  great  doubt 
about  the  guns  ever  reaching  Xew  York ;  but  my  concern  on  that 
score  was  greatly  modified  by  the  reflection  that  none  of  the  men 
accompanying  them  knew  anything  respecting  their  use.  My  doubts 
as  to  the  horses  turned  out  to  be  groundless,  though  those  respecting 
the  men  were  fully  realized. 

About  eight  in  the  evening  two  steamboats  reported  to  me  at 
Fort  Hamilton.  On  one  of  these  I  placed  a  company  of  volunteer 
artillery  to  replace-  at  Sandy  Hook  Captain  Putnam's  company  of  the 
Twelfth  Infantry,  which  latter  I  ordered  to  return  on  the  same  boat 
to  Xew  York.  On  the  other  boat  I  proceeded  myself  with  the 
"  Permanent  Guard,"  and  the  remainder  of  the  troops  already  referred 
to  from  F<»rts  Lafayette  and  Richmond,  numbering  in  all  about  one 
hundred  and  forty  soldiers.  Landing  at  the  foot  of  Spring  street  I 
marched,  in  a  heavy  shower,  up  to  the  St.  Nicholas  Hotel,  where  I 
was  ushered  into  General  Wool's  olHce,  in  one  of  the  parlors.  The 
apartment  was  crowded  with  officers  and  civilians.  Amon^  the 
latter  I  recognized  several  of  the  most  prominent  merchants  of  New 
York  engaged  in  earnest  discussion  with  General  l>ro\vn.  Approach 
ing  Major  ( 'hristensen.  General  Wool's  adjutant  general,  I  inquired 
what  had  been  going  on  in  the  city  that  day,  for  as  yet  I  was  ignorant 
of  the  details.  Major  ( 'hristensen'' s  reply  was  characteristic.  u  Good 
God!  McFlrath,  this  is  the  one  spot  in  New  York  where  the  least 
is  known  of  \\hat  is  taking  place!"  The  course  of  events  showed 
that  the  refreshing  ignorance  admitted  by  Major  Christensen  pre 
vailed  at  General  Wool's  headquarters  without  interruption  through 
the  riots,  despite  the  intelligent  stalf  with  which  he  was  surrounded. 
Ilcportiiiir  mv  arrival  to  General  P>rown,  I  was  informed  that  having 

1  r^          *  o 

declined  to  serve  under  General  Sanford  when  ordered  to  do  so  by 
General  Wool,  he  had,  at  his  own  request,  been  relieved  from  duty. 
I  replied  that  I  should  like  then  to  be  relieved  also,  but  he  requested 
me  to  report  to  General  Wool,  which  I  did.  A  more  arbitrary  piece 
of  absurdity  has  seldom  been  recorded  in  military  annals  than  this 
attempt  to  place,  at  a  critical  juncture,  a  veteran  of  nearly  fifty  years' 
service  in  the  regular  army  in  a  position  subordinate  to  an  un prac 
ticed  militia  otlicer,  simply  because  the  latter  held  higher  rank  by 
State  commission.  General  Wool,  however,  was  firm  in  spite  of  the 
earnest  remonstrances  of  the  gentlemen  present,  and  General  Brown 
was  equally  determined.  Happily  for  the  welfare  of  Xew  York  city, 
the  matter  was  compromised  during  the  night  by  the  interposition 


29G  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  Mayor  Opdyke  and  others,  and  General  Brown  the  next  morning 
assumed  command  of  all  the  government  troops  in  the  city,  and  took 
up  his  quarters  at  the  police  headquarters  in  Mulberry  street,  where 
he  and  Commissioner  Acton  concerted  measures  which  speedily  re 
duced  the  rioters  to  submission.  No  effective  steps  were  taken  to 
accomplish  this  purpose  until  these  two  gentlemen  formed  their 
alliance,  and  no  steps  other  than  those  which  they  carried  out  tended 
in  any  degree  whatever  to  that  end. 

In  the  meanwhile,  I  had  reported  to  General  Wool,  wTho  ner 
vously  ordered  me  to  take  my  command  to  the  arsenal,  and  to 
carefully  avoid  any  encounter  with  a  mob  on  my  way  thither,  as  it 
was  imperative  to  reinforce  General  Sanford  promptly.  No  obstacle 
was  offered,  however,  to  our  progress,  and  we  reached  the  arsenal 
about  eleven  o'clock.  General  Sanford  was  there  in  command,  but 
did  not  wear  any  vestige  of  uniform,  either  then,  or  at  any  time 
during  the  riots.  About  midnight,  word  was  received  that  a  mob 
was  preparing  to  assault  the  arsenal.  A  few  minutes  later  General 
Sanford  put  on  his  hat,  and,  bidding  us  good-night,  with  the 
assurance  that  he  should  look  in  again  in  the  morning,  he  departed 
for  his  private  residence.  This  resembled  his  behavior  on  the  3d 
of  the  month,  as  above  related.  Two  staff  officers  remained  and 
entertained  us  for  the  rest  of  the  night  with  a  dispute  as  to  which 
was  in  command.  About  two  A.  M.,  Lieutenant  Wood  arrived  at 
the  arsenal  with  the  section  of  artillery  from  Fort  Hamilton,  whicli 
had  succeeded  in  reaching  the  St.  Nicholas  Hotel,  and  lie  and  I 
made  a  transfer  of  commands,  he  taking  my  infantry  and  I  assuming 
charge  of  the  artillery.  The  staff  officers  desired  me  to  bring  the 
guns  inside  the  building,  but  as  that  was  preposterous,  I  persuaded 
them  to  allow  me  to  put  them  in  battery  at  the  corners  of  Thirty- 
fifth  and  Thirty-sixth  streets,  pointing  up  and  down  Seventh  avenue. 
Rumors  reached  us,  from  time  to  time,  of  disorderly  gatherings 
moving  about  the  city ;  but,  as  I  have  already  stated,  no  further 
violence  was  attempted  by  the  mob  until  Tuesday  morning. 

The  14th  of  July  dawned  clear  and  lovely.  In  the  lower  part 
of  the  city  some  attempt  was  made  in  the  morning  to  resume 
business,  but  in  the  upper  districts  stores  and  residences  remained 
closed.  Second  and  Third  avenues  were  the  rallying  points,  but 
the  rioters,  being  without  leaders,  hesitated  as  to  their  course  of 
action.  Early  in  the  morning  Inspector  Carpenter,  with  two  hun 
dred  and  fifty  police,  started  on  a  reconnoissance  from  the  Mulberry 
street  headquarters.  About  the  same  time  one  of  the  staff  officers 
at  the  arsenal  ordered  the  officer  whom  I  had  placed  in  command  of 


THE  DRAFT  EIOTS  IN  NEW  YOEK.  997 

the  section,  while  I  went  to  breakfast  at  a  restaurant,  in  the  next 
block,  to  accompany  a  detachment  under  Colonel  O'Brien,  Eleventh 
Xew  York  Volunteers,  to  Yorkville,  where  lighting  was  reported 
to  be  in  progress.  The  lieutenant  was  refused  permission  to  notify 
me,  and  when  I  returned  to  the  arsenal  I  was  thunder-struck  to  tind 
that  my  guns,  and  men,  and  horses  had  disappeared,  nobody  seemed 
to  know  whither!  Seeking  out  the  staff  officer  who  had  performed 
the  brilliant  coup,  I  gave  him  my  opinion  of  his  conduct  in  the 
language  it  merited,  and  had  the  satisfaction  of  being  informed,  in 
return,  that  ''the  regular  army  officers  were  always  trying  to  ride 
over  the  militia!"  My  occupation  in  that  quarter  being  gone,  1 
returned  to  General  Brown,  for  assignment  to  whatever  other  duty 
might  offer  itself. 

It  was  no  easy  matter  to  accomplish  this.  Xo  street  cars  were 
running,  and  it  would  have  been  sheer  fool-hardiness  to  undertake 
to  make  the  trip  on  foot,  alone.  Two  livery  stables  were  near  by, 
but  in  neither  could  I  induce  a  driver  to  undertake  the  risky  job. 
Filially,  the  proprietor  of  one  of  the  stables  declared  that  he  would 
drive  me  down  himself.  A  coach  was  driven  out,  and  cautioning 
me  to  keep  the  curtains  down  and  to  have  my  revolver  ready  for 
use,  he  started  briskly  across  the  town.  It  seemed  like  passing 
through  a  deserted  city!  Fp  Thirty-sixth  street  to  Fifth  avenue, 
and  down  that  thoroughfare  to  Fourteenth  street,  every  house  we 
passed  was  closed,  with  curtains  down  and  blinds  tight  shut.  Xeither 
cars  nor  stages  were  running,  and,  excepting  occasional  glimpses  of 
people  grouped  together  at  distant  points  down  the  side  streets,  we 
did  not  see  a  living  creature  until,  after  turning  into  Broadway,  we 
approached  Amity  street.  From  that  point  Broadway  was  crowded 
as  far,  almost,  as  the  eye  could  reach,  with  citizens  eager  to  hear 
what  was  occurring  in  the  disaffected  districts.  I  found  General 
Brown  at  the  St.  Nicholas  Hotel,  and  was  instructed  to  serve  on  his 
personal  staff,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Frothingham,  aide-de-camp,  having 
been  detailed  as  his  adjutant  general.  In  the  meanwhile,  the 
section  with  Colonel  O'Brien's  command  had  encountered  a  mob  at 
Second  avenue  and  Thirty-fourth  street.  Carpenter's  policemen  had 
just  before  inflicted  a  severe  punishment  upon  this  gang,  and  threat 
ening  demonstrations  were  made  toward  O'Brien,  who  attempted  to 
awe  the  crowd  by  a  discharge  of  blank  cartridges.  This  cleared  the 
streets  and  Colonel  O'Brien,  who  appears  to  have  been  operating 
thus  far  on  his  own  responsibility,  marched  down  town  and  reported 
to  General  Brown  for  orders.  As  he  was  in  too  excited  a  condition 
to  be  tit  to  intrust  with  a  command,  his  scry  ices  were  declined,  and 


208  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

his  company  melted  away  as  mysteriously  as  it  had  sprung  into 
existence.  The  unfortunate  colonel  undertook  to  return  to  his 
residence.  As  he  was  passing  through  Thirty-second  street,  he  was 
attacked  by  the  very  ruffians  whose  lives  he  had  so  unwisely  spared, 
and  after  being  subjected  to  horrible  brutalities,  was  dragged  almost 
naked  into  his  own  back  yard,  where  he  died  in  agony,  surrounded 
by  a  howling  crowd  of  ferocious  men  and  women. 

This  tragedy  was  a  type  of  the  acts  that  were  being  perpetrated 
in  twenty  different  parts  of  the  city.  The  mob  had  asserted  itself, 
and  the  spirit  of  pandemonium  was  set  loose.  It  is  impracticable  to 
give  a  detailed  account  of  all  the  riotous  and  murderous  transactions. 
Detachments  of  police  and  military  were  incessantly  setting  out  from 
the  Mulberry  street  headquarters,  returning  for  a  brief  rest,  and  then 
sallying  forth  again.  Wherever  a  mob  was  encountered,  it  was 
charged  upon  relentlessly,  with  utter  disregard  to  the  relative 
strength  of  the  two  forces ;  and  in  every  case  the  rioters  were 
repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  Finally,  they  ceased  showing  fight  on 
the  open  streets,  and,  at  the  first  appearance  of  their  determined 
pursuers,  broke  and  fled,  to  assemble  again  at  some  distant  point, 
and  resume  their  work  of  havoc.  In  all  the  proceedings,  from 
Tuesday  morning  on,  no  co-operation  was  received  from  General 
Sanford  by  General  Brown  or  Commissioner  Acton.  Members  of 
volunteer  regiments,  wrho  chanced  to  be  in  the  city,  tendered  their 
services ;  and  nearly  four  hundred  citizens  were  sworn  in  at  police 
headquarters,  as  specials,  receiving  clubs  and  badges.  Business  was 
closed  dowTn  town,  and  the  merchants  and  bankers  resolved  to 
volunteer,  in  companies  of  one  hundred  each,  to  serve  under  the 
military.  William  E.  Dodge  was  made  captain  of  one  of  these 
companies.  The  armory,  at  White  and  Elm  streets,  was  guarded 
by  a  mixed  command  of  the  Eighty-fourth  New  York  Militia  and 
some  Zouaves.  The  sub-treasury  and  custom-house  were  similarly 
defended.  In  front  of  the  government  stores,  in  Worth  and  White 
streets,  the  Invalid  Corps  and  a  squad  of  marines  patrolled,  while 
howitzers,  loaded  with  grape  and  canister,  stood  ready  for  action. 
All  this  time  the  fight  was  going  on  in  every  direction,  while  the 
constant  ringing  of  fire-bells  contributed  to  increase  the  constantly- 
spreading  terror  of  the  citizens.  The  negro  population  were  hunted 
down  mercilessly,  and  the  ferryboats  were  crowded  through  the  day 
by  the  poor  wretches,  fleeing  for  their  lives. 

Scenes  of  violence  and  carnage,  such  as  I  have  described, 
prevailed  in  the  streets  of  New  York  from  Monday  noon  until 
Thursday  night.  The  political  sentiment,  which  displayed  itself  in 


THE  DRAFT  RIOTS  IN  NEW  YORK.  200 

the  original  assault  on  the  draft  office,  in  Third  avenue,  disappeared 
after  that  demonstration,  and  thenceforward  the  mob  was  actuated 
solely  by  an  instinct  of  rapine  and  plunder.  The  limits  of  this 
sketch  will  not  admit  a  recital  of  every  encounter  between  the 
rioters  and  the  city's  defenders.  Outbreaks  would  occur  simulta 
neously  in  widely-separated  sections  of  the  city,  compelling  the 
police  and  military  to  split  up  into  small  detachments.  These  latter 
would  combine,  as  they  happened  to  meet  in  the  streets,  so  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  give  a  connected  narrative  of  the  services  of 
any  individual  portion  of  the  command.  I  will,  accordingly,  briefly 
summarize  the  principal  occurrences  of  the  riots  not  yet  described  : 

TnriisDAY,  July  .14-. — Lieutenant  AVood,  ^sinth  Infantry,  com 
manding  the  mixed  detachment  from  the  Narrows,  being  assaulted, 
about  ten  A.  M.,  in  Pitt  street,  tired  on  the  mob,  killing  fourteen 
and  wounding  seventeen.  lie  dispersed,  at  the  point  of  the  bavonet, 
another  mob  in  Division  street.  The  "Permanent  Guard"  received 
special  mention  for  its  gallantry  in  both  the  above  actions.  Captain 
Dilks,  with  two  hundred  policemen,  had  a  desperate  li^ht,  on  Second 
avenue,  near  Thirtieth  street,  with  over  one  thousand  rioters,  whom 
he  routed  with  severe  loss.  Later  in  the  day,  the  mob  returned,  in 
increased  numbers,  and  overpowered  the  police,  but  were-  again 
repulsed,  by  Captain  Franklin  (Twelfth  Infantry),  after  a  spirited 
tight,  in  which  a  number  of  rioters  were  killed.  Mayor  Opdyke's 
house  was  partially  sacked  by  a  mob  of  boys.  An  attack  was  made 
on  some  houses  at  Forty-sixth  street  and  Fifth  avenue,  which  was 
suppressed  by  Captain  Putnam  (Twelfth  Infantry),  with  a  loss  to 
the  rioters  of  forty  men.  The  residence  of  James  Gibbon,  a  relative 
of  Horace  Greeley,  in  Twenty-ninth  street,  between  Seventh  and 
Eighth  avenues,  was  emptied  of  its  contents.  Brooks  Brothers' 
clothing  store,  in  Catharine  street,  was  ransacked,  until  Captain 
Franklin  came  to  the  rescue.  Four  barricades  were  erected  in 
Xinth  avenue,  near  Thirty-iifth  street,  which  Captain  AYilkins,  with 
the  Governor's  L-land  troops,  captured  and  destroyed  after  a  lively 
fight.  My  section,  of  which  I  had  resumed  command  after  it  was 
rescued  from  Colonel  O'Brien,  was  attacked  at  Thirty-sixth  street 
and  Seventh  avenue.  I  went  into  battery,  but  my  raw  gun  detach 
ments  worked  clumsily,  and  the  mob  vanished  like  smoke  into  the 
side  streets.  As  the  excitement  was  intense  in  that  neighborhood, 
and  General  Sanford  was  apprehensive  for  the  safety  of  the  arsenal, 
[  bivouacked  where  I  was,  having  the  "Permanent  Guard,"  under 
Lieutenant  Porter,  First  United  States  Artillery,  as  my  support. 

WEDNESDAY,   Julv    15. — Several   thousand    rioters,    who    were 


300  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

sacking  houses  and  hanging  negroes  to  lamp-posts  at  Thirty-second 
street  and  Eighth  avenue,  were  driven  off  by  Colonel  Mott,  with  a 
squadron  of  cavalry,  and  a  battery  of  the  Eighth  New  York 
Volunteer  Artillery.  All  through  that  day,  from  points  in  the  city 
five  miles  apart,  came  the  news  of  riots  and  calls  for  help.  One  of 
the  latter  was  from  General  Sanford,  asking  to  be  relieved  of  some 
of  the  negroes  who  had  taken  refuge  in  the  arsenal,  so  that  he  could 
make  room  for  more  soldiers.  Several  colored  men  were  hung  to 
lamp-posts  near  Twenty-seventh  street  and  Seventh  avenue,  and  a 
force  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  infantry  was  sent  in  the  afternoon  by 
General  Sanford  to  disperse  the  mob.  The  soldiers  returned,  how 
ever,  without  attempting  to  clear  the  streets,  and  almost  while  they 
were  still  in  sight  the  rioters  had  recommenced  their  occupation  of 
plunder  and  murder.  Late  in  the  day,  a  fight  took  place  in  First 
avenue,  between  Eighteenth  and  Nineteenth  streets,  between  a 
desperate  mob  and  a  force  of  militia  and  enrolled  citizens.  Colonel 
Jardine,  of  the  Ninth  New  York  Volunteers,  was  shot,  and  crippled 
for  life,  and  the  troops  wTere  repulsed  until  Captain  Putnam,  with 
his  company,  and  the  u  Permanent  Guard,"  under  Captain  Shelley, 
acting  aide-de-camp,  were  sent  by  General  Brown  to  the  rescue. 

THURSDAY,  July  10. — At  an  early  hour  in  the  morning  the 
Seventh  Regiment  New  York  Militia,  which  had  been  summoned 
home  by  telegraph,  arrived,  and  the  other  militia  regiments  followed 
during  the  day.  By  this  time  the  riot  was  regarded  as  practically 
over.  Mayor  Opdyke  had  the  day  previous  issued  a  proclamation, 
calling  on  the  citizens  to  resume  their  avocations.  It  was  also 
announced  from  Washington  that  the  draft  had  been  suspended,  and 
the  Common  Council  appropriated  $2,500,000  toward  paying  $300 
exemption  money  per  man  to  the  poor  who  might  be  drafted. 
General  Brown,  however,  and  Commissioner  Acton  remained 
steadily  at  their  posts.  The  riotous  spirit,  which  for  three  days  and 
nights  had  held  the  metropolis  by  the  throat,  though  crushed,  was 
not  yet  wholly  extinguished.  The  "Permanent  Guard"  had 
encounters  during  the  day  with  rioters  on  Fourth  avenue,  near 
Grammercy  Park,  and  in  Fifty-second  street,  near  Eleventh  avenue. 
A  heavy  fight  took  place  about  one  P.  M.  at  Jackson's  foundry,  at 
First  avenue  and  Twenty-eighth  street.  The  inob,  driven  to  final 
desperation,  rallied  repeatedly  after  being  dispersed  by  the  soldiers, 
and  renewed  their  attack.  The  troops  were  so  divided,  engaged  in 
patroling  the  city,  that  it  was  night  before  a  sufficient  force  could  be 
concentrated  by  General  Brown  to  finish  the  work  of  subjugation. 
Captain  Putnam,  with  several  companies  under  his  command,  earned 


THE  DRAFT  RIOTS  AV  .YE  IF  YORK.  301 

this  crowning    lionor,  and,  about   ten  P.  M.,  in  a  heavy  thunder 
storm,  finished  successfully  the  last  fight  of  the  ^New  York  riots. 

While  these  military  operations  were  in  progress,  other  influ 
ences  were  being  exerted  for  the  restoration  of  peace  and  order, 
none  of  which,  however,  had  any  perceptible  effect.  Governor 
Seymour  arrived  in  .New  York  on  Tuesday,  and  issued  a  proclama 
tion,  notifying  the  insurgents  that  the  only  opposition  to  the 
conscription  that  could  be  allowed  was  an  appeal  to  the  courts,  the 
right  of  every  citizen  to  make  which  would  be  maintained,  and 
urging  all  To  stand  firmly  by  the  authorities  in  sustaining  law  and 
order  in  the  city.  It  was  soon  urged  upon  the  Governor,  however, 
that  more  rigorous  measures  were  demanded,  and,  becoming 
convinced  that  such  was  the  case,  he  issued  a  second  proclamation, 
declaring  the  city  in  a  state  of  insurrection.  It  was  too  late, 
however.  Opposition  to  the  conscription  had,  hours  before,  faded 
from  the  minds  of  the  frenzied  rioters,  and  the  glare  of  the  incen 
diaries'  torch  blinded  them  to  the  inevitable  consequences  of  their 
misdoing.  Later  on  that  same  dav.  Governor  Sevmoiir  was  induced 
to  speak  from  the  steps  of  the  City  Hall  to  an  immense  gathering  of 
the  people,  among  whom,  it  is  probable,  there  were  manv  who  had 
participated  in  the  outrages  which  had  been  committed.  The 
Governor  made  a  few  remarks,  intended  to  allav  the  popular 
excitement,  and  earnestly  counseled  obedience  to  the  laws  and  the 
constituted  authorities.  He  also  read  a  letter,  containing  a  statement 
that  the  conscription  had  been  postponed  bv  the.1  authorities  in 
"Washington.  This  speech  of  Governor  Seymour,  owing  to  his 
well-known  affiliation  with  the  opposition,  was  severelv  criticised  by 
his  political  opponents,  chiefly  on  account  of  his  opening  it  with  the 
words,  "My  friends."  While  he  was  speaking,  however,  his  previous 
proclamation  showed  that  he  was  exerting  his  influence  for  sup 
pressing  the  insurrection,  and  he  could  hardly  be  expected  to  address 
a  peaceable  audience  with  the  invective  applicable  to  red-handed 
rioters  and  incendiaries.  In  his  remarks  he  expressed  his  belief  that 
the  conscription  act  was  illegal,  and  announced  his  determination  to 
have  it  tested  in  the  courts.  In  dwelling  upon  these  points  he  may 
have  violated  good  taste,  but  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  his 
purpose  was  to  soothe  an  unusual  popular  excitement,  and  that  he 
was  justified  in  using  whatever  reasonable  argument.1,  were  available 
for  that  purpose.  In  his  official  acts  and  proclamations  during  the 
riots,  Governor  Seymour  expressed  himself  in  very  different 
phrases.  There  was  better  ground  for  censure  in  the  attitude 
assumed  bv  Archbishop  Hughes  toward  the  rioters.  Although  that 

«•  JL  O  O 


302  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

prelate  had  yielded  on  Wednesday,  July  loth,  to  the  pressure 
exerted  upon  him  by  issuing  a  brief  address  to  the  Irish,  urging 
them  to  abstain  from  violence,  he  caused  to  be  published  at  the 
same  time  a  long  letter  to  Horace  Greeley,  expressing  his  sympathy 
with  the  opponents  of  the  war,  and  his  belief  that  the  Irish  were 
the  victims  of  oppression.  On  Thursday  Archbishop  Hughes  issued 
a  call  for  a  meeting  at  his  residence,  at  Madison  avenue  and  Thirty- 
sixth  street,  on  the  following  day,  of  "  the  men  of  New  York  who 
are  now  called  in  many  of  the  papers  rioters."  At  the  time 
appointed  between  three  thousand  and  five  thousand  persons  assem 
bled  there,  and  listened  to  a  sensible  exhortation  to  good  conduct,  at 
the  conclusion  of  which  they  returned  to  their  homes  as  peaceably 
as  they  had  come  together.  Such  an  effort,  if  made  four  days 
earlier,  would  have  prevented  incalculable  suffering  and  loss. 

The  riots  were  brought  to  an  end  on  the  evening  of  Thursday, 
July  16th,  and  the  city  immediately  resumed  its  customary  aspect, 
while  the  authorities  proceeded  to  calculate  the  amount  of  damage 
that  had  been  sustained.  The  exact  number  of  rioters  killed  was 
never  ascertained.  It  was  reported,  how  truly  I  cannot  say,  that  the 
remains  of  many  of  them  were  secretly  carried  into  the  country  for 
burial.  Governor  Seymour,  in  his  next  annual  message,  stated  that 
"the  number  of  killed  and  wounded  is  estimated  by  the  police  to  be 
at  least  one  thousand."  The  mortality  statistics  for  the  riot  week  at 
the  City  Inspector's  office  showed  an  increase  of  four  hundred  and 
fifty  over  the  average  weekly  mortality,  including  ninety  deaths  from 
gun-shot  wounds.  The  increase  for  the  month  was  twelve  hundred. 
A  large  number  of  wounded  persons  probably  died  during  the  fol 
lowing  week.  Only  three  policemen  were  killed.  The  damage  to 
property  was  more  precisely  estimated.  A  committee  was  appointed 
by  the  county  supervisors  to  audit  claims  for  damages,  for  all  of 
which  the  county  was  responsible  under  law.  Claims  were  presented 
to  the  amount  of  $2,500,000,  of  which  $1,500,000  were  allowed,  and 
were  paid  as  expeditiously  as  possible. 

On  July  17th,  an  unexpected  order  was  received  from  the  "War 
Deparment  relieving  General  Brown  from  the  command  of  the  city 
and  harbor  of  New  York,  General  Canby  being  sent  from  Washing 
ton  to  assume  the  position.  On  the  following  day,  General  Wool 
was  superseded  by  Major  General  John  A.  Dix.  Old  age  and  con 
sequent  infirmity  rendered  the  removal  of  General  Wool  from  so 
responsible  a  command  a  matter  of  perfect  propriety,  but  the  citizens 
of  New  York,  conscious  of  the  debt  of  gratitude  they  owed  to  Gen 
eral  Brown,  were  very  reluctant  to  see  him  so  peremptorily  supplanted 


THE  DP,  A  FT  RIOTS  IX  NEW  YORK.  303 

at  the  very  moment  of  his  and  their  triumph.  The  orders  in  both 
cases  were  dated  the  l.*>th,  and,  doubtless,  had  their  origin  in  a  sup 
position  at  the  AVar  Office  that  so  extensive  an  outbreak  must,  in 
some  degree,  be  attributed  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  commanding 
officers.  To  a  certain  extent  such  an  impression  was  correct.  The 
strong  contrast  presented  throughout  the  riots  by  the  conduct  of  the 
three  generals  between  whom  the  command  was  nominally  divided 
enabled  observers,  even  during  the  height  of  the  excitement,  to 
recognize  the  difference  between  capacity  and  titled  incompetencv. 
General  "Wool,  in  his  temporary  office  at  the  St.  Nicholas  Hotel, 
unconscious  of  the  real  condition  of  things,  and  issuing  orders  con- 
trarv  to  reason  and  to  military  precedent,  and  General  Sanford,  in 
citizens'  dress,  jealously  locking  himself  up  for  three  davs  in  the 
arsenal,  collecting  about  him  eagerly  every  soldier  he  could  lay  his 
hands  upon,  and  in  no  single  instance  initiating  a  movement  against 
the  rioters  of  sufficient  consequence  to  receive  mention  in  the  daily 
journals,  were  types  of  prejudiced  inefficiency;  while  General 
Brown,  on  dutv  without  intermission  through  four  davs  and  nights, 
covering  the  entire  city  of  New  York  with  a  military  force  whose 
aggregate  number  was  far  smaller  than  the  bodies  of  rioters  with 
which  any  one  of  its  detachments  came  into  collision,  co-operating 

t  ^ 

generously  with  the  sturdy  Police  Commissioners,  and  bending  his 
whole  energies  to  the  single  task  of  carrying  out  their  plans  for 
saving  the  city,  was  emphatically  the  man  for  the  occasion.  I  have 
before  me,  as  I  write,  General  Brown's  order-book,  in  which  are 
transcribed  the  orders  he  issued  during  these  four  eventful  July 
days.  They  coyer  nearly  all  the  movements  I  have  referred  to  above, 
beside  many  that  T  have  not  alluded  to — such  as  sending  troops  to 
protect  the  down  town  wharves,  to  the  aid  of  Brooklyn,  of  Harlem, 
and  of  Jersey  City,  to  guard  private  residences,  providing  ordnance 
material  and  subsistence  supplies,  and  the  innumerable  incidents  of 
a  campaign.  Yet  General  AYool,  in  a  letter  written  July  20th  to 
Governor  Seymour,  asserted  to  himself  the  credit  of  all  these  pre 
cautions,  and  made  a  special  boast  of  having,  at  the  first  outbreak, 
ordered  to  Xew  York  all  the  troops  in  the  harbor,  ''leaving  only 
small  guards  to  protect  the  forts/'  I  have  already  shown  how  Gen 
eral  Brown  was  compelled  to  exert  himself  in  order  to  accomplish 
this  very  thing  which  General  Wool's  order  practically  forbade. 

A  similar  spirit  was  displayed  by  General  Sanford  in  his  report 
of  July  25th  to  the  Governor,  in  which  he  claims  to  have  sent 
detachments  "  to  all  parts  of  the  city,  and  the  rioters  were  every 
where  beaten  and  dispersed  on  Monday  afternoon,  Monday  night. 


304  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  Tuesday  morning,  and  the  peace  of  the  city  would  have  been 
entirely  restored  in  a  few  hours  but  for  the  interference  of  Brevet 
Brigadier  General  Brown,  who,  in  disobedience  of  the  orders  of 
General  Wool,  withdrew  the  detachments  belonging  to  the  General 
Government."  Both  of  the  letters  referred  to  abound  in  mis-state 
ments  ;  but  a  further  analysis  of  their  prejudiced  features  is  unneces 
sary  in  this  place.  The  Police  Commissioners  of  New  York,  and  the 
merchants  whose  interests  being  at  stake  rendered  them  keen 
observers,  were  unanimous  in  attributing  to  General  Brown  the 
saving  of  the  city  from  further  inestimable  damage.  A  number  of 
representative  citizens  united  on  July  25th  in  presenting  him  with 
an  elegant  service  of  silver  as  a  testimonial  of  their  gratitude  and 
esteem.  The  letter  accompanying  the  present  concluded  with  these 
words  of  sympathy :  "  Your  memory  will  always  remain  with  us 
safe  from  all  detraction,  and  beyond  all  forgetfulness."  General 
Brown's  command  was  now  limited  to  the  affairs  of  his  regiment, 
the  Fifth  Artillery.  I  reported  to  him  each  morning  at  his  residence 
for  the  day's  instructions.  Early  in  August,  a  few  weeks  after  the 
riots,  I  presented  myself,  as  usual,  and  was  surprised  and  grieved  to 
hear  him  remark  :  "I  shall  never  give  you  orders  again ! "  In  re 
sponse  to  my  look  of  surprise,  General  Brown  silently  pointed  to  a 
paragraph  among  the  telegraphic  dispatches  in  that  morning's  issue 
of  the  New  York  Times,  which  he  was  reading  on  my  arrival.  It 
announced  that  Colonel  and  Brevet  Brigadier  General  Harvey  Brown 
had  been  retired  from  active  service,  to  date  from  August  1st,  by  order 
of  the  President !  This  was  the  first  notification  he  had  received  of 
his  impending  fate.  In  this  abrupt  manner  was  a  faithful  army 
service  of  forty-five  years  brought  harshly  to  an  end.  Such  is  the 
reward  which  our  republic  sometimes  bestows  upon  her  honest 
servants  who  have  patiently  passed  their  lives  in  upholding  her 
honor. 

The  foregoing  condensed  narrative  is  written  from  a  purely 
military  standpoint,  with  a  view  to  placing  in  their  true  light  the 
services  performed  in  the  New  York  riots  by  the  United  States 
troops  under  General  Brown.  All  that  I  have  written  is  substan 
tiated  by  official  documents  on  file  at  the  department  headquarters, 
copies  of  which  are  in  my  hands.  My  purpose  being  so  restricted, 
much  of  equal  interest  to  many  minds  has  been  necessarily  omitted. 
That  portion  of  the  subject,  however,  I  leave  the  politicians  to  relate, 
being  satisfied  to  contribute,  as  my  meed  to  history,  this  true  chapter 
concerning  the  New  York  draft  riots  of  1863. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PENNSYL  VANIA. 


BY    COLOXKL    AV.    n.    TAYLOR. 


FROM  the  very  necessity  of  the 
case,  the  general  theory  upon 
which  the  Avar  was  conducted, 
on  the  part  of  the  South,  was 
one  of  defense.  The  great 
superiority  of  the  North  in 
men  and  material  made  it 
indispensable  for  the  South 
to  husband  its  resources  as 
much  as  possible,  inasmuch 
as  the.  hope  of  ultimate  suc 
cess  which  the  latter  enter 
tained,  rested  rather  upon  the 
dissatisfaction  and  pecuniary 
distress  which  a  prolonged 
war  would  entail  upon  the 
former — making  the  people  weary  of  the  struggle — than  upon  any 
expectation  of  conquering  a  peace  by  actually  subduing  so  powerful 
an  adversary.  ^Nevertheless,  in  the  judgment  of  General  Lee,  it 
was  a  part  of  a  true  defensive  policy  to  take  the  aggressive  when 
good  opportunity  offered;  and  by  delivering  an  effective  blow  to  the 
enemy,  not  only  to  inflict  upon  him  serious  loss,  but,  at  the  same 
time,  to  thwart  his  designs  of  invasion,  derange  the  plan  of  campaign 
contemplated  by  him,  and  thus  prolong  the  conflict.  The  Federal 
army,  under  General  Hooker,  had  re-occupied  the  heights  opposite 
Fredericksburg,  where  it  could  not  be  attacked  except  at  a  disadvan 
tage.  Instead  of  (piietly  awaiting  the  pleasure  of  the  Federal  com 
mander,  in  designing  and  putting  into  execution  some  new  plan  of 
campaign,  General  Lee  determined  to  maneuvre  to  draw  him  from 
his  impregnable  position,  and,  if  possible,  to  remove  the  scene  of 
hostilities  beyond  the  Potomac.  His  design  was  to  free  the  State 
of  Virginia,  for  a  time,  at  least,  from  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  to 
transfer  the  theatre  of  Avar  to  Xorthern  soil,  and,  by  selecting  a 
favorable  time  and  place  in  which  to  receiATe  the  attack  which  his 
20  (305) 


306  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

adversary  would  be  compelled  to  make  on  him,  to  take  the  reason 
able  chances  of  defeating  him  in  a  pitched  battle ;  knowing  full  well 
that  to  obtain  such  an  advantage  there,  would  place  him  in  position 
to  attain  far  more  decisive  results  than  could  be  hoped  for  from  a 
like  advantage  gained  in  Virginia.  But  even  if  unable  to  attain  the 
valuable  results  which  might  be  expected  to  follow  a  decided  advan 
tage  gained  over  the  enemy  in  Maryland  or  Pennsylvania,  it  was 
thought  that  the  movement  would  at  least  so  far  disturb  the  Federal 
plan  for  the  summer  campaign  as  to  prevent  its  execution  during 
the  season  for  active  operations. 

In  pursuance  of  this  design,  early  in  the  month  of  June,  Gen. 
eral  Lee  moved  his  army  northward  by  way  of  Culpepper,  and 
thence  to  and  down  the  Valley  of  Virginia  to  Winchester.  The 
army  had  been  reorganized  into  three  army  corps,  designated  the 
First,  Second,  and  Third  Corps,  and  commanded  respectively  by 
Lieutenant  Generals  Longstreet,  Ewell,  and  A.  P.  Hill.  The  Second 
Corps  was  in  advance,  and  crossed  the  branches  of  the  Shenandoah, 
near  Front  Royal,  on  the  12th  of  June.  Brushing  aside  the  force 
of  the  enemy  under  General  Milroy,  that  occupied  the  lower  valley- 
most  of  which  was  captured,  and  the  remnant  of  which  sought 
refuge  in  the  fortifications  at  Harper's  Ferry — General  Ewell  crossed 
the  Potomac  river  with  his  three  divisions  in  the  latter  part  of  June ; 
and,  in  pursuance  of  the  orders  of  General  Lee,  traversed  Maryland 
and  advanced  into  Pennsylvania.  General  A.  P.  Hill,  whose  corps 
was  the  last  to  leave  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock,  followed,  with 
his  three  divisions,  in  Ewell's  rear.  General  Longstreet  covered 
these  movements  with  his  corps;  then  moved  by  Ashby's  and 
Snicker's  Gaps  into  the  Valley,  and  likewise  crossed  the  Potomac 
river,  leaving  to  General  Stuart  the  task  of  holding  the  gaps  of  the 
Blue  Ridge  Mountains  with  his  corps  of  cavalry.  The  Federal 
commander  had  meanwhile  moved  his  army  so  as  to  cover  Washing 
ton  City ;  and,  as  soon  as  he  was  thoroughly  informed,  by  Ewell's 
rapid  advance,  of  the  real  intention  of  his  adversary,  he,  too,  crossed 
into  Maryland.  On  the  27th  of  June,  General  Lee  was  near  Cham- 
bersburg  with  the  First  and  Third  Corps,  the  Second  being  still  in 
advance,  but  within  supporting  distance.  With  the  exception  of 
the  cavalry,  the  army  was  well  in  hand.  The  absence  of  that  indis 
pensable  arm  of  the  service  was  most  seriously  felt  by  General  Lee. 
lie  had  directed  General  Stuart  to  use  his  discretion  as  to  where  and 
when  to  cross  the  river — that  is,  he  was  to  cross  east  of  the  moun 
tains,  or  retire  through  the  mountain  passes  into  the  Valley  and  cross 
in  the  immediate  rear  of  the  infantry,  as  the  movements  of  the 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PENNSYLVANIA,  307 

enemy  and  his  own  judgment  should  determine ;  hut  he  was  ex 
pected  to  maintain  communication  with  the  main  column,  and 
especially  directed  to  keep  the  commanding  general  informed  of  the 
movements  of  the  Federal  army. 

The  army  continued  to  advance.  On  the  1st  of  July,  General 
Lee  reached  Cashtown,  and  stopped  to  confer  with  General  A.  L*. 
Hill,  whose  corps  was  concentrating  at  that  point,  and  who  reported 
that  the  advance  of  IletlTs  Division  had  encountered  the  cavalry  of 
the  enemy  near  Gettysburg.  Instructions  had  been  sent  to  General 
Ileth  to  ascertain  what  force  was  at  Gettysburg,  and,  if  he  found 
infantry  opposed  to  him,  to  report  the  fact  immediately,  without 
forcing  an  engagement.  No  tidings  whatever  had  been  received 
from,  or  of  our  cavalry  under  General  Stuart,  since  crossing  the 
river;  and  General  Lee  was  consequently  without  accurate  informa 
tion  of  the  movements,  or  position  of  the  main  Federal  army.  An 
army  without  cavalry  in  a  strange  and  hostile  country  is  as  a  man 
deprived  of  his  eyesight  and  beset  by  enemies;  he  may  be  ever  so 
brave  and  strong,  but  he  cannot  intelligently  administer  a  single 
effective  blow.  The  sound  of  artillery  was  soon  heard  in  the 
direction  of  Gettysburg.  General  Hill  hastened  to  the  front. 
General  Lee  followed.  On  arriving  at  the  scene  of  battle,  General 
Lee  ascertained  that  the  enemy's  infantry  and  artillery  were  present 
in  considerable  force,  lletlfs  Division  was  already  hotly  engaged, 
and  it  was  soon  evident  that  a  serious  engagement  could  not  be 
avoided.  Orders  had  previously  been  sent  to  General  Ewell  to 
recall  his  advanced  divisions,  and  to  concentrate  about  Cashtown. 
While  c/i  route  for  that  point,  on  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  July, 
General  Ewell  learned  that  .Hill's  Corps  was  moving  toward  Gettys 
burg,  and,  on  arriving  at  Middletown,  he  turned  the  head  of  his 
column  in  that  direction.  When  within  a  few  miles  of  the  town, 
General  Ilodes,  whose  division  was  in  advance,  was  made  aware,  by 
the  sharp  cannonading,  of  the  presence  of  the  enemy  in  force 
at  Gettysburg,  and  caused  immediate  preparations  for  battle  to  be 
made. 

On  reaching  the  scene  of  conflict,  General  Tfcodes  made  his 
disposition  to  assail  the  force  with  which  Hill's  troops  were  engaged, 
but  no  sooner  were  his  lines  formed  than  he  perceived  fresh  troops 
of  the  enemy  extending  their  right  flank,  and  deploying  in  his 
immediate  front.  With  this  force  he  was  soon  actively  engaged. 
The  contest  now  became  sharp  and  earnest.  Neither  side  sought  or 
expected  a  general  engagement ;  and  yet,  brought  thus  unexpectedly 
in  the  presence  of  each  other,  found  a  conflict  unavoidable.  The 


308  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAE. 

battle  continued,  with  varying  success,  until  perhaps  three  P.  M., 
when  General  Early,  of  E well's  Corps,  reached  the  field  with  his 
division,  moved  in  on  Rodes'  left,  and  attacked  the  enemy  with  his 
accustomed  vigor  and  impetuosity.  This  decided  the  contest.  The 
enemy's  right  gave  way  under  Early's  assault.  Pender's  Division, 
of  Hill's  Corps,  had  meanwhile  been  advanced  to  relieve  that  of 
lleth ;  and  Rodes,  observing  the  effect  of  Early's  attack,  ordered  his 
line  forward.  There  resulted  a  general  and  irresistible  advance 
of  our  entire  line;  the  enemy  gave  way  at  all  points,  and  wrere 
driven  in  disorder  through  and  beyond  the  town  of  Gettysburg, 
leaving  over  five  thousand  prisoners  in  our  hands.  In  this  action 
the  force  engaged  on  the  Confederate  side,  as  already  stated,  consisted 
of  the  divisions  of  lleth  and  Pender,  of  Hill's  Corps,  and  those  of 
Early  and  Rodes,  of  Ewell's  Corps.  On  the  side  of  the  Federals 
there  was  the  First  Corps,  embracing  the  divisions  of  Wadsworth, 
Doubleday,  and  Robinson;  the  Eleventh  Corps,  embracing  the 
divisions  of  Sclmrz,  Barlowr,  and  Steinwrehr,  and  the  cavalry  force 
under  General  Buford.  The  infantry  force  on  each  side  was  about 
the  same,  and  the  preponderance  in  numbers  was  with  the  Federals — 
to  the  extent  of  General  Buford's  cavalry  command. 

General  Lee  witnessed  the  flight  of  the  Federals  through 
Gettysburg,  and  up  the  hills  beyond.  He  then  directed  me  to  go 
to  General  Ewell,  and  to  say  to  him  that,  from  the  position  which 
he  occupied,  he  could  see  the  enemy  retreating  over  those  hills, 
without  organization,  and  in  great  confusion ;  that  it  was  only 
necessary  to  press  "  those  people "  in  order  to  secure  possession  of 
the  heights ;  and  that,  if  possible,  he  wished  him  to  do  this.  In 
obedience  to  these  instructions,  I  proceeded  immediately  to  General 
Ewell,  and  delivered  the  order  of  General  Lee ;  and,  after  receiving 
from  him  some  message  for  the  commanding  general  in  regard  to 
the  prisoners  captured,  returned  to  the  latter,  and  reported  that  his 
order  had  been  delivered.  General  Ewell  did  not  express  any 
objection,  or  indicate  the  existence  of  any  impediment,  to  the 
execution  oi  the  order  conveyed  to  him,  but  left  the  impression  on 
my  mind  that  it  would  be  executed.  In  the  exercise  of  that 
discretion,  however,  which  General  Lee  was  accustomed  to  accord  to 
his  lieutenants,  and  probably  because  of  an  undue  regard  for  his 
admonition,  given  early  in  the  day,  not  to  precipitate  a  general 
engagement,  General  Ewell  deemed  it  unwise  to  make  the  pursuit. 
The  troops  were  not  moved  forward,  and  the  enemy  proceeded  to 
occupy  and  fortify  the  position  which  it  was  designed  that  General 
Ewell  should  seize.  Major  General  Edward  Johnson,  whose  division 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PENNSYLVANIA,  309 

readied  the  field  after  the  engagement,  and  formed  on  the  left  of 
Early,  in  a  conversation  had  with  me,  since  the  war,  about  this 
circumstance,  in  which  I  sought  an  explanation  of  our  inaction  at 

that  time,  assured  me  that  there  was  no  hindrance  to  his  moving 

o 

forward;  but  that,  after  getting  his  command  in  line  of  battle,  and 
before  it  became  seriously  engaged,  or  had  advanced  any  great 
distance,  for  some  unexplained  reason,  he  had  received  orders  to 
halt.  This  was  after  General  Lee's  message  was  delivered  to 
General  Ewell. 

Such  Avas  the  condition  of  affairs  when  darkness  veiled  the 
scene  on  the  evening  of  the  first  day.  The  prevailing  idea  with 
General  Lee  was,  to  press  forward  without  delay;  to  follow  up 
promptly  and  vigorously  the  advantage  already  gained.  Having 

1       i/  O  t/  o  «/      o  O 

failed  to  reap  the  full  fruit  of  the  victory  before  night,  his  mind 
was  evidently  occupied  with  the  idea  of  renewing  the  assault  upon 
the  enemy's  right  with  the  dawn  of  day  on  the  second.  The  divis 
ions  of  Major  Generals  Early  and  Uodes,  of  Ewell's  Corps,  had 
been  actively  engaged,  and  had  sustained  some  loss,  but  were  still 
in  excellent  condition,  and  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  the  prestige  of 
success  and  a  consequent  elation  of  spirit,  in  having  so  gallantly 
swept  the  enemy  from  their  front,  through  the  town  of  Gettysburg, 
and  compelled  him  to  seek  refuge  behind  the  heights  beyond.  The 
division  of  Major  General  Edward  Johnson,  of  the  same  corps,  was 
perfectly  fresh,  not  having  been  engaged.  Anderson's  .Division,  of 
Hill's  Corps,  was  also  now  up.  "With  this  force  General  Lee  thought 
that  the  enemy's  position  could  be  assailed  with  every  prospect  of 
success;  but,  after  a  conference  with  the  corps  and  division  com 
manders  on  our  left,  who  represented  that,  in  their  judgment,  it 
would  !>e  hazardous  to  attempt  to  storm  the  strong  position  occupied 
by  the  enemy,  with  troops  somewhat  fagged  by  the  marching  and 
fighting  of  the  first  day ;  that  the  ground  in  their  immediate  front 
furnished  greater  obstacles  to  a  successful  assault  than  existed  at 
other  points  of  the  line,  and  that  it  could  be  reasonably  concluded, 
since  they  had  so  severely  handled  the  enemy  in  their  front,  that  he 
would  concentrate  and  fortify  with  special  reference  to  resisting  a 
further  advance  just  there,  he  determined  to  make  the  main  attack 
well  on  the  enemy's  left,  indulging  the  hope  that  Long-street's  Corps 
would  be  up  in  time  to  begin  the  movement  at  an  early  hour  on  the 
second.  He  instructed  General  Ewell  to  be  prepared  to  co-operate  by 
a  simultaneous  advance  by  his  corps.  General  Longstreet  was  unex 
pectedly  detained,  however,  as  will  best  appear  from  the  following 
extract  from  his  report-  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign.  In  speaking 
of  his  movements  on  the  first  day  of  July,  he  says : 


310  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAS. 

Our  march  on  this  day  was  greatly  delayed  by  Johnson's  Division,  of  the 
Second  Corps,  which  came  into  the  road  from-Shippensburg,  and  the  long  wagon- 
trains  that  followed  him.  McLaws'  Division,  however,  reached  Marsh  creek,  four 
miles  from  Gettysburg,  a  little  after  dark,  and  Hood's  Division  got  within  nearly 
the  same  distance  of  the  town  about  twelve  o'clock  at  night.  Law's  Brigade  was 
ordered  forward  to  its  division  during  the  day,  and  joined  about  noon  on  the  2d. 
Previous  to  his  joining  I  received  instructions  from  the  commanding  general  to 
move,  with  the  portion  of  my  command  that  was  up,  around  to  gain  the  Eminetts- 
burg  road  on  the  enemy's  left.  The  enemy,  having  been  driven  back  by  the  corps 
of  Lieutenant  Generals  Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill,  the  day  previous,  had  taken  a  strong 
position  extending  from  the  hill  at  the  cemetery  along  the  Emmettsburg  road. 
Fearing  that  my  force  was  too  weak  to  venture  to  make  an  attack,  I  delayed  until 
General  La\v's  Brigade  joined  its  division.  As  soon  after  his  arrival  as  we  could 
make  our  preparations,  the  movement  was  begun.  Engineers,  sent  out  by  the  com 
manding  general  and  myself,  guided  us  by  a  road  which  would  have  completely  dis 
closed  the  move.  Some  delay  ensued  in  seeking  a  more  concealed  route.  McLaws' 
Division  got  into  position,  opposite  the  enemy's  left,  about  4  P.  M.  Hood's  Division 
was  moved  on  farther  to  our  right,  and  got  into  position,  partially  enveloping  the 
enemy's  left. 

General  Longstreet  here  explains  the  canse  of  the  delay  in 
bringing  up  his  troops  on  the  first  day  ;  but,  notwithstanding  this, 
the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws  (with  the  exception  of  Law's 
Brigade)  encamped  within  four  miles  of  Gettysburg  at  midnight  of 
the  1st  of  July.  He  then  received  instructions  to  move  with  the 
portion  of  his  command  that  was  then  up,  to  gain  the  Emmettsburg 
road  on  the  enemy's  left ;  but  fearing  that  his  force  was  too  weak  to 
venture  to  make  an  attack,  he  delayed  until  Law's  Brigade  joined 
its  division,  about  noon  on  the  2d.  In.  this,  General  Longstreet 
clearly  admits  that  he  assumed  the  responsibility  of  postponing  the 
execution  of  the  orders  of  the  commanding  general.  Owing  to  the 
causes  assigned,  the  troops  were  not  in  position  to  attack  until  4  P.  M. 
One  can  imagine  what  was  going  on  in  the  Federal  lines  meanwhile. 
Round  Top,  the  key  to  their  position,  which  was  not  occupied  in  the 
morning,  they  now  held  in  force,  and  another  corps  (Sedgwick's)  had 
reached  the  field.  Late  as  it  was,  the  original  plan  was  adhered  to. 
The  two  divisions  of  Longstreet's  Corps  gallantly  advanced,  forced 
the  enemy  back  a  considerable  distance,  and  captured  some  trophies 
and  prisoners.  E  well's  Divisons  were  ordered  forward,  and  likewise 
gained  additional  ground  and  trophies.  On  Cemetery  Hill  the  attack 
by  Early's  leading  brigades  was  made  with  vigor.  They  drove  the 
enemy  back  into  the  works  on  the  crest,  into  which  they  forced  their 
way,  and  seized  several  pieces  of  artillery ;  but  they  were  compelled 
to  relinquish  what  they  had  gained,  from  want  of  expected  support 
on  their  right,  and  retired  to  their  original  position,  bringing  with 
them  some  prisoners  and  four  stands  of  colors.  In  explanation  of 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  311 

this  lack  of  expected  support,  General  Rodes,  who  was  on  General 
Early "s  right,  states  in  his  report,  that  after  he  had  conferred  with 
General  Early  on  his  left,  and  General  Lane  on  his  right,  and 
arranged  to  attack  in  concert,  he  proceeded  at  once  to  make  the 
necessary  preparations ;  but  as  he  had  to  draw  his  troops  out  of  the 
town  by  the  Hunk,  change  the  direction  of  the  line  of  battle,  and 
then  traverse  a  distance  of  twelve  or  fourteen  hundred  yards,  while 
General  Early  had  to  move  only  half  that  distance,  without  change 
of  front,  it  resulted  that,  before  he  drove  in  the  enemy's  skirmishers, 
General  Early  had  attacked,  and  been  compelled  to  withdraw. 

The  whole  affair  was  disjointed.  There  was  an  utter  absence 
of  accord  in  the  movements  of  the  several  commands,  and  no 
decisive  results  attended  the  operations  of  the  second  day.  It  is 
generally  conceded  that  General  Longstreet,  on  this  occasion,  was 
fairly  chargeable  with  tardiness,  and  I  have  always  thought  that  his 
conduct,  in  this  particular,  was  due  to  a  lack  of  appreciation,  on  his 
part,  of  the  circumstances  which  created  an  urgent  and  peculiar  need 
for  the  presence  of  his  troops  at  the  front.  As  soon  as  the  necessity 
for  the  concentration  of  the  army  was  precipitated  by  the  unexpected 
encounter,  on  the  1st  of  Julv,  with  a  large  force  of  the  enemy,  near 
Gettysburg,  General  Longstreet  was  urged  to  hasten  his  march  ;  and 
this,  perhaps,  should  have  suth'ced  to  cause  him  to  push  his  divisions 
on  toward  Gettysburg,  from  which  point  he  was  distant  but  four 
miles,  early  on  the  2d.  P>ut  I  cannot  say  that  lie  was  notified,  on 
the  night  of  the  1st,  of  the  attack  proposed  to  be  made  on  the 
morning  of  the  2d,  and  the  part  his  corps  was  to  take  therein. 
Neither  do  I  think  it  just  to  charge  that  he  was  alone  responsible 
for  the  delay  in  attacking  that  ensued  after  his  arrival  on  the  Held. 
I  well  remember  how  General  Lee  was  chafed  by  the  non-appearance 
of  the  troops,  until  he  finally  became  restless,  and  rode  back  to  meet 
General  Longstreet,  and  urge  him  forward;  but,  then,  there  was 
considerable  delay  in  putting  the  troops  to  work  after  they  reached 
the  Held;  and  much  time  was  spent  in  discussing  what  was  to  be 
done,  which,  perhaps,  could  not  be  avoided.  At  any  rate,  it  would 
be  unreasonable  to  hold  General  Longstreet  alone  accountable  for 
this.  Indeed,  great  injustice  has  been  done  him  in  the  charge  that 
he  had  orders  from  the  commanding  general  to  attack  the  enemy  at 
sunrise  on  the  2d  of  July,  and  that  he  disobeyed  these  orders.  This 
would  imply  that  he  was  in  position  to  attack,  whereas  General  Lee 
but  anticipated  his  early  arrival  on  the  2cl,  and  based  his  calculations 
upon  it.  I  have  shown  how  he  was  disappointed,  and  I  need  hardly 
add  that  the  delay  was  fatal. 


312  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAS. 

General  Lee  determined  to  renew  the  attack  upon  the  enemy's 
position  on  the  3d  of  July.  In  his  report  of  the  campaign,  in  speaking 
of  the  operations  of  the  second  day,  he  says : 

The  result  of  this  day's  operations  induced  the  belielf  that,  with  proper 
concert  of  action,  and  with  the  increased  support  that  the  positions  gained  on  the 
right  would  enable  the  artillery  to  render  the  assaulting  columns,  we  should  ulti 
mately  succeed ;  and  it  was  accordingly  determined  to  continue  the  attack.  The 
general  plan  was  unchanged.  Longstreet,  reinforced  by  Pickett's  three  brigades, 
which  arrived  near  the  battle-field  during  the  afternoon  of  the  2d,  was  ordered  to 
attack  the  next  morning ;  and  General  Ewell  was  directed  to  assail  the  enemy's 
right  at  the  same  time. 

General  Longstreet's  dispositions  were  not  completed  as  early 
as  was  expected.  It  appears  that  he  was  delayed  by  apprehensions 
that  his  troops  would  be  taken  in  reverse  as  they  advanced.  General 
Ewell,  who  had  orders  to  co-operate  with  General  Longstreet,  and 
who  was,  of  course,  not  aware  of  any  impediment  to  the  main  attack 
arranged  to  be  made  on  the  enemy's  left,  having  reinforced  General 
Johnson,  whose  division  was  upon  our  extreme  left,  during  the 
night  of  the  2d,  ordered  him  forward  early  the  next  morning.  In 
obedience  to  these  instructions,  General  Johnson  became  hotly 
engaged  before  General  Ewell  could  be  informed  of  the  halt  which 
had  been  called  on  our  right.  After  a  gallant  and  prolonged 
struggle,  in  which  the  enemy  was  forced  to  abandon  part  of  his 
intrenchments,  General  Johnson  found  himself  unable  to  carry  the 
strongly-fortified  crest  of  the  hill.  The  projected  attack  on  the 
enemy's  left  not  having  been  made,  he  was  enabled  to  hold  his  right 
with  a  force  largely  superior  to  that  of  General  Johnson,  and,  finally, 
to  threaten  his  flank  and  rear,  rendering  it  necessary  for  him  to  retire 
to  his  original  position  about  one  P.  M.  General  Lee  then  had  a 
conference  with  General  Longstreet,  and  the  mode  of  attack,  and 
the  troops  to  make  it,  were  thoroughly  debated.  I  was  present,  and 
understood  the  arrangement  to  be  that  General  Longstreet  should 
endeavor  to  force  the  enemy's  lines  in  his  front.  That  front  was 
held  by  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws.  To  strengthen  him  for 
the  undertaking,  it  was  decided  to  reinforce  him  by  such  troops  as 
could  be  drawn  from  the  centre. 

Pickett's  Division,  of  Longstreet's  Corps,  was  then  up,  fresh 
and  available.  Heth's  Division,  of  Hill's  Corps,  was  also  mentioned 
as  available,  having  been,  in  great  measure,  recuperated  since  its 
active  engagement  of  the  first  day;  so,  also,  were  the  brigades  of 
Lane  and  Scales,  of  Pender's  Division,  Hill's  Corps ;  and  as  our 
extreme  right  was  comparatively  safe,  being  well  posted,  arid  not  at 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  313 

all  threatened,  one  of  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  MeLaws,  and  the 
greater  portion  of  the  other,  could  be  removed  out  of  the  lines  and 
he  made  to  take  part  in  the  attack.  Indeed,  it  was  designed, 
originally,  that  the  two  divisions  last  named,  reinforced  by  Pickett. 
should  make  the  attack ;  and  it  was  only  because  of  the  apprehen 
sions  of  General  Longstreet  that  his  corps  was  not  strong  enough 
for  the  movement,  that  General  Hill  was  called  on  to  reinforce  him. 
Orders  were  sent  to  General  Hill  to  place  Hetlrs  Division  and  two 
brigades  of  Fender's  at  General  Longstreet' s  disposal,  and  to  be 
prepared  to  give  him  further  assistance  if  requested.  The  assault 
was  to  have  been  made  with  a  column  of  not  less  than  two  divisions, 
and  the  remaining  divisions  were  to  have  been  moved  forward  in 
support  of  those  in  advance.  This  was  the  result  of  the  conference 
alluded  to,  as  understood  by  me.  Lieutenant  General  A.  P.  Hill 
appears  to  have  had  the  same  impression,  for  he  says,  in  his  report 
of  the  operations  of  his  corps  at  this  time: 

I  was  directed  to  hold  my  line  with  Anderson's  Division  and  the  half  of 
Fender's,  now  commanded  by  General  Lane,  and  to  order  Heth's  Division,  com 
manded  l>y  Pettigrew,  and  Lane's  and  Scales'  Brigades,  of  Pender's  Division,  to 
report  to  Lieutenant  General  Longstreet,  as  a  (support  to  hix  corpx,  in  the  assault  on 
the  enemy's  lines. 

General  Longstreet  proceeded  at  once  to  make  the  dispositions 
for  attack,  and  General  Lee  rode  along  the  portion  of  the  line  held 
by  A.  P.  Hill's  ( 1orps,  and  finally  took  position  about  the  Confederate 
centre,  on  an  elevated  point,  from  which  he  could  survey  the  field 
and  watch  the  result  of  the  movement.  After  a  heavy  artillery  tire1 
along  the  entire  line,  and  at  a  given  signal,  the  movement  began, 
but  the  plan  agreed  on  was  not  carried  out.  The  only  troops  that 
participated  in  the  attack  were  the  divisions  of  Pickett  (First  Corps) 
and  Heth  (Third  Corps') — the  latter,  since  the  wounding  of  General 
Ileth,  commanded  by  General  Pettigrew — and  the  brigades  of  Lane, 
Scales,  and  Wilcox.  The  two  divisions  were  formed  in  advance,  the 
three  brigades  as  their  support.  The  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws 
(First  Corps)  were  passive  spectators  of  the  movement.  To  one  who 
observed  the  charge,  it  appeared  that  Pettigrew's  line  was  not  a  con 
tinuation  of  that  of  Pickett,  but  that  it  advanced  in  ^-In-hm.  It 
would  seem  that  there  was  some  confusion  in  forming  the  troops,  for 
Captain  Louis  G.  Young,  of  General  Pettigrew's  staff,  says: 

On  The  morning  of  the  3d  of  July,  General  Pettigrew,  commanding  Heth's 
Division,  was  instructed  to  report  to  General  Longstreet,  who  directed  him  to  form 
in  the  rear  of  Pickett's  Division,  and  support  his  advance  upon  Cemetery  Hill,  which 
would  he  commenced  as  soon  as  the  fire  from  our  artillery  should  have  driven  the 


314  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

enemy  from  his  guns,  and  prepared  the  way  for  the  attack.  And  I  presume  that  it 
was  in  consequence  of  this  having  been  the  first  plan  settled  on,  that  the  erroneous 
report  was  circulated  that  Heth's  Division  was  assigned  the  duty  of  supporting  that 
of  Pickett.  But  the  order  referred  to  was  countermanded  almost  as  soon  as  given, 
and  General  Pettigrew  was  instructed  to  advance  upon  the  same  line  with  Pickett,  a 
portion  of  Pender's  Division  acting  as  supports. 

"Wilcox's  Brigade  was  ordered  to  support  Pickett' s  right  flank, 
and  tlie  brigades  of  Lane  and  Scales  acted  as  supports  to  Ileth's 
Division.  General  Lane,  in  his  report,  says : 

General  Longstreet  ordered  me  to  form  in  rear  of  the  right  of  Heth's  Division, 
commanded  by  General  Pettigrew.  Soon  after  I  had  executed  this  order,  putting 
Lowrance  on  the  right,  I  was  relieved  of  the  command  of  the  division  by  Major 
General  Trimble,  who  acted  under  the  same  orders  that  I  had  received.  Heth's 
Division  was  much  longer  than  Lowrance's  Brigade  and  my  own,  which  constituted 
its  only  support,  and  there  was,  consequently,  no  second  line  in  the  rear  of  its  left. 

The  assaulting  column  really  consisted  of  Pickett's  Division — 
two  brigades  in  front,  and  one  in  the  second  line  as  a  support — with 
the  brigade  of  Wilcox  in  the  rear  of  the  right,  to  protect  that  flank ; 
while  Heth's  Division  moved  forward  on  Pickett's  left  in  echelon,  or 
with  the  alignment  so  imperfect  and  so  drooping  on  the  left  as  to 
appear  in  echelon,  with  Lane's  and  Scales'  Brigades  in  rear  of  its  right, 
and  its  left  without  reserve  or  support,  and  entirely  exposed.  Thus 
the  column  moved  forward.  It  is  needless  to  say  a  word  here  of  the 
heroic  conduct  of  Pickett's  Division  ;  that  charge  has  already  passed 
into  history  as  "  one  of  the  world's  great  deeds  of  arms."  While, 
doubtless,  many  brave  men  of  other  commands  reached  the  crest  of 
the  height,  this  was  the  only  organized  body  that  entered  the  works 
of  the  enemy.  Much  can  be  said  in  excuse  for  the  failure  of  the 
other  commands  to  fulfil  the  task  assigned  them.  As  a  general  rule, 
the  peculiarly  rough  and  wooded  character  of  the  country  in  which 
our  army  was  accustomed  to  operate,  and  which,  in  some  respects, 
was  unfavorable  for  the  maneuvres  of  large  armies,  was  of  decided 
advantage  to  us ;  for,  in  moving  upon  the  enemy,  through  bodies  of 
woods,  or  in  a  broken,  rolling  country,  not  only  was  the  enemy  at  a 
loss  how  to  estimate  our  strength,  but  our  own  men  were  not  im 
pressed  with  that  sense  of  insecurity,  which  must  have  resulted  from 
a  thorough  knowledge  of  their  own  weakness.* 


"  The  enemy's  batteries  soon  opened  upon  our  lines  with  canister,  and  the  left 
seemed  to  stagger  under  to,  but  the  advance  was  resumed,  and  with  some  degree  of 
steadiness.  Pickett's  troops  did  not  appear  to  be  checked  by  the  batteries,  and  only 
halted  to  deliver  a  fire  when  close  under  musket  range.  Major  General  Anderson's 
Division  was  ordered  forward  to  support  and  assist  the  wavering  columns  of  Petti 
grew  and  Trimble.  Pickett's  troops,  after  delivering  fire,  advanced  to  the  charge, 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  315 

It  was  different  here.  The  charge  was  made  down  a  gentle 
slope,  and  then  up  to  the  enemy's  lines,  a  distance  of  over  half  a 
mile,  denuded  of  forests,  and  in  full  sight  of  the  enemy,  and  perfect 
range  of  their  artillery.  These  combined  causes  produced  their 
natural  effect  upon  Pettigrew's  Division,  and  the  brigade  supporting 
it,  caused  them  to  falter,  and  finally  retire.  Then  Pickett's  Division, 
continuing  the  charge  without  supports,  and  in  the  sight  of  the 
enemy,  was  not  half  so  formidable  or  effective  as  it  would  have  been 
had  trees  or  hills  pi-evented  the  enemy  from  so  correctly  estimating 
the  strength  of  the  attacking  column,  and  our  own  troops  from  expe 
riencing  that  sense  of  weakness  which  the  known  absence  of  support 
necessarily  produced.  In  spite  of  all  this,  it  steadily  and  gallantly 
advanced  to  its  allotted  task.  As  the  three  brigades  under  Garnett, 
Armistead,  and  Kemper,  approach  the  enemy's  lines,  a  most  terrific 
fire  of  artillery  and  small-arms  is  concentrated  upon  them;  but  they 
swerve  not — there  is  no  faltering;  steadily  moving  forward,  they 
rapidly  reduce  the  intervening  space,  and  close  with  their  adversa 
ries ;  leaping  the  breastworks,  they  drive  back  the  enemy,  and  plant 
their  standard  on  the  captured  guns,  amid  shouts  of  victory — dearly 
won  and  short-lived  victory. 

Tso  more  could  be  exacted,  or  expected,  of  those  men  of  brave 
hearts  and  nerves  of  steel  ;  but  where  are  the  supports  to  reap  the 
benefit  of  their  heroic  efforts,  and  gather  the  fruits  of  a  victory  so 
nobly  won  {  AVas  that  but  a  forlorn  hope,  on  whose;  success,  not 
only  in  penetrating  the  enemy's  lines,  but  in  maintaining  its  hold 
against  their  combined  and  united  efforts  to  dislodge  it,  an  entire 
army  was  to  wait  in  quiet  observation?  AVas  it  designed  to  throw 
these  few  brigades — originally,  at  the  most,  but  two  divisions — upon 
the  fortified  stronghold  of  the  enemy,  while,  full  half  a  mile  away, 
seven-ninths  of  the  army,  in  breathless  suspense,  in  ardent  admira 
tion  and  fearful  anxiety,  watched,  but  moved  not?  I  maintain  that 
such  was  not  the  design  of  the  commanding  general.  I  Fad  the 
veteran  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws  been  moved  forward,  as  was 


and  entered  the  enemy's  lines,  capturing  some  of  his  batteries,  and  gained  his  works. 
Al>out  the  same  moment  the  troops  that  had  before  hesitated  broke  their  ranks  and 
fell  back  in  great  disorder,  many  more  falling  under  the  enemy's  lire  in  retreating 
than  Avhile  they  were  attacking.  This  gave  the  enemy  time  to  throw  his  entire 
force  upon  Pickett,  with  a  strong  prospect  of  being  able  to  break  np  his  lines,  or 
destroy  him  before  Anderson's  Division  could  reach  him,  which  would,  in  its  turn, 
have  greatly  exposed  Anderson.  He  was,  therefore,  ordered  to  halt.  In  a  few 
moments  the  enemy,  marching  against  both  flanks,  and  the  front  of  Pickett's  Di 
vision,  overpowered  it  and  drove  it  back,  capturing  about  half  of  those  of  it  who  were 
not  killed  or  wounded." — Extract  from  the  Official  Report  of  General  Lony street. 


316  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

planned,  in  support  of  those  of  Pickett  and  Pettigrew,  not  only 
would  the  latter  division,  in  all  probability,  have  gained  the  enemy's 
works,  as  did  that  of  Pickett,  but  these  two  would  have  been  enabled, 
with  the  aid  of  Hood  and  McLaws,  to  resist  all  efforts  of  the  enemy 
to  dislodge  them.  The  enemy  closing  in  on  Pickett's  Brigades,  con 
centrating  upon  that  small  band  of  heroes  the  fire  of  every  gun  that 
could  be  brought  to  bear  upon  them,  soon  disintegrated  and  over 
powered  them.  Such  as  were  not  killed,  disabled,  and  made  captive, 
fell  back  to  our  lines. 

It  appears  that  General  Longstreet  deemed  it  necessary  to 
defend  his  right  flank  and  rear  with  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and 
Hood.  These  divisions,  as  before  stated,  constituted  all  of  the  Con 
federate  line  held  by  Longstreet's  troops,  and  it  is  not  apparent  how 
they  were  necessary  to  defend  his  flank  and  rear.  The  nearest  in 
fantry  force  of  the  enemy,  to  our  right,  occupied  the  hills — Round 
Top  and  Little  Hound  Top — and  the  only  force  that  could  be  said 
to  have  threatened  our  flank  and  rear  consisted  of  a  few  brigades  of 
cavalry,  so  posted  as  to  protect  the  enemy's  left.  It  is  not  my  pur 
pose  here  to  undertake  to  establish  the  wisdom  of  an  attack  on  the 
enemy's  position  on  the  third  day,  which  General  Longstreet  con 
tends  was  opposed  by  his  judgment,  and  of  w^hich  he  says  he  would 
have  stayed  the  execution,  had  he  felt  that  he  had  the  privilege  so 
to  do ;  nor  do  I  propose  to  discuss  the  necessities  of  his  position, 
which  he  represents  to  have  been  such  as  to  forbid  the  employment 
of  McLaws'  and  Hood's  Divisions  in  the  attack ;  neither  do  I  seek 
any  other  than  a  just  explanation  of  the  causes  of  our  failure  at  that 
time ;  but  well  recalling  my  surprise  and  disappointment  wrhen  it 
was  ascertained  that  only  Pickett's  Division,  and  the  troops  from 
Hill's  Corps  had  taken  part  in  the  movement,  and  with  positively 
distinct  impressions  as  to  the  occurrences  just  related,  I  deem  it 
proper  to  record  them  for  confirmation  or  refutation  as  the  undis 
puted  facts  of  the  case,  and  the  testimony  of  others,  may  determine. 

After  the  assault  on  the  enemy's  works,  on  the  3d  of  July,  there 
was  no  serious  fighting  at  Gettysburg.  The  4th  passed  in  compara 
tive  quiet.  Neither  army  evinced  any  disposition  to  assail  the 
other.  Notwithstanding  the  brilliant  achievements  of  Ewell  and 
Hill  on  the  first  day,  and  the  decided  advantage  gained  by  Long- 
street  on  the  second,  the  failure  of  the  operations  of  the  third  day, 
involving,  as  they  did,  but  two  divisions  of  the  army,  deprived  us  of 
the  prestige  of  our  previous  successes,  and  gave  a  shadow  of  right  to 
our  adversary's  claim  of  having  gained  a  victory.  Their  exultation, 
however,  should  be  tempered  with  moderation,  when  we  consider 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  317 

that,  after  one  day  of  absolute  quiet,  the  Confederates  withdrew 
from  their  front  without  serious  molestation,  and  with  bridges 
swept  away,  and  an  impassable  river  in  rear,  stood  in  an  attitude  of 
defiance  until  their  line  of  retreat  could  be  rendered  practicable, 
after  which  they  safely  recrossed  into  Virginia.  Then,  again,  so 
serious  was  the  loss  visited  upon  the  Federals  in  the  engagements  of 
the  first  and  second  days,  and  so  near  success  was  the  effort  to  storm 
their  position  on  the  third  day,  that  they  were  themselves  undecided 
as  to  whether  they  should  stand  or  retreat.  In  discussing  several 
councils,  or  conferences,  held  by  General  Meade  with  his  corps 
commanders,  General  Sickles  testified,  before  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  that  the  reason  the  Confederates  were  not 
followed  up  was  on  account  of  differences  of  opinion  whether  or 
not  the  Federals  should  themselves  retreat,  as  "it  was  bv  no  means 
clear,  in  the  judgment  of  the  corps  commanders,  or  of  the  general  in 
command,  whether  they  had  won  or  not.'' 

It  appears,  from  the  official  returns  on  tile  in  the  War  .1  )epartment, 
that  on  the  31st  of  May,  1803,  the  Army  of  Xorthern  Virginia  num 
bered:  infantry,  fifty-nine  thousand  four  hundred  and  fifty-seven; 
cavalry,  ten  thousand  two  hundred  and  ninety-two;  and  artillery, 
four  thousand  seven  hundred  and  two;  of  all  arms,  seventy-four 
thousand  four  hundred  and  fifty-one  effectives.  This  was  immediately 
before  the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  and  may  be  regarded  as  repre 
senting  the  maximum  of  General  Lee's  army  in  the  Gettysburg 
campaign.  On  the  2oth  <->!'  July,  18(53,  after  the  return  of  General 
Lee  to  Virginia,  his  army  numbered  forty-one  thousand  three 
hundred  and  eighty-eight  effectives,  exclusive  of  the  cavalry  corps, 
of  which  no  report  is  made  in  the  return  of  the  date  last  mentioned  ; 
allowing  "eight  thousand  one  hundred  and  twelve,"  a  fair  estimate 
for  the  cavalry,  the  effective  total  of  the  army  on  the  2<>th  of  July 
was  forty-nine  thousand  five  hundred.  It  appears,  therefore,  that 
General  Lee's  loss  in  the  Pennsylvania  campaign  was  nearly  twenty- 
live  thousand. 

Concerning  the  strength  of  the  Federal  army,  General  Meade 
testified  as  follows,  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War  (second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  337):  "Including  all  arms  of  the  ser 
vice,  my  strength  was  a  little  under  one  hundred  thousand  men— 
about  ninety-five  thousand.  I  think  General  Lee  had  about  ninety 
thousand  infantry,  four  thousand  to  five  thousand  artillery,  and  about 
ten  thousand  cavalry."  Again,  he  testifies :  "  I  think  the  returns 
showed  me,  when  I  took  command  of  the  army,  amounted  to  about 
one  hundred  and  five  thousand  men ;  included  in  those  were  the 
eleven  thousand  of  General  French."  In  this  latter  matter  tJiee  vi- 


318  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

dence  is  against  General  Meade.  General  Hooker,  on  the  27th  of 
June,  1863,  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck,  from  Poolesville :  "  My 
whole  force  of  enlisted  men  for  duty  will  not  exceed  one  hundred 
and  five  thousand  (105,000)."  This  would  make  his  total  effective 
force  (officers  and  men)  full  one  hundred  and  twelve  thousand. 
This  dispatch  was  received  by  General  Halleck  at  nine  A.  M.  On 
reaching  Sandy  Hook,  subsequently,  on  the  same  day,  General 
Hooker  telegraphed  as  follows,  concerning  the  garrison  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  under  General  French  :  "  I  find  ten  thousand  men  here  in 
condition  to  take  the  field.  Here  they  are  of  no  earthly  account. 
They  cannot  defend  a  ford  of  the  river;  and,  as  far  as  Harper's 
Ferry  is  concerned,  there  is  nothing  of  it.  As  for  the  fortifications, 
the  work  of  the  troops,  they  remain  when  the  troops  are  withdrawn. 
No  enemy  will  ever  take  possession  of  them  for  them.  This  is  my 
opinion.  All  the  public  property  could  have  been  secured  to-night, 
and  the  troops  marched  to  where  they  could  have  been  of  sqme  ser 
vice."  This  dispatch  was  received  by  General  Halleck  at  2.55  P.  M. 
It  is  evident  that  the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry  was  not  embraced 
in  the  returns  alluded  to  by  General  Hooker  in  his  first  dispatch. 
Although  General  Halleck  refused  these  troops  to  General  Hooker, 
they  were  immediately  awarded  to  General  Meade,  on  his  assuming 
command  when  General  Hooker  was  relieved. 

With,  t  more  accurate  returns  of  the  two  armies  at  Gettysburg, 
we  are  left  to  form  our  conclusions  as  to  their  strength  from  the 
data  given  above.  I  put  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  one  hundred 
and  five  thousand,  and  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at  sixty-seven 
thousand  of  all  arms — fifty-three  thousand  five  hundred  infantry, 
nine  thousand  cavalry,  and  four  thousand  five  hundred  artillery— 
and  believe  these  figures  very  nearly  correct.  In  this  estimate,  I 
adopt  the  strength  of  the  Federal  army  as  given  by  its  commander 
on  the  27th  of  June,  but  four  days  before  the  first  encounter  at 
Gettysburg,  excluding  all  consideration  of  the  troops  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  although  General  Meade,  on  assuming  command,  at  once 
ordered  General  French  to  move  to  Frederick  with  seven  thousand 
men,  to  protect  his  communications,  and  thus  made  available  a  like 
number  of  men  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  who  would  otherwise 
have  been  detached  for  this  service. 

On  the  side  of  the  Confederates,  the  entire  cavalry  corps  is 
included.  That  portion  wrhich  General  Stuart  accompanied  made  a 
complete  circuit  of  the  Federal  army,  and  only  joined  General  Lee 
on  the  evening  of  the  second  day ;  and  the  brigades  under  Generals 
Jones  and  Robertson,  which  had  been  left  to  guard  the  passes  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  did  not  rejoin  the  army  until  the  3d  of  July. 


THE  FIRST  SHOT  AGAINST  THE  FLAG. 


BY    MAJOR    GENERAL    S.    WYLIE    CRAWFORD. 


TIIE  passage  of  the  Ordinance 
of  Secession  of  the  State  of 
South  Carolina  found  the 
General  Government  in  pos 
session  of  certain  piece's  of 
property  ceded  to  the  United 
States,  in  accordance  with 
law,  and  mainly  used  for  mili 
tary  purposes.  An  arsenal 
had  been  built  within  the 
corporate  limits  of  the  city 
of  Charleston;  it  was  a  depot 
of  supplies,  and  contained 
valuable  stores.  Within  the 
same  city  were  the  custom 
house  and  post-office.  Of  the 

three  forts  in  the  harbor,  Fort  Moultrie  alone  was  garrisoned,  and 
this  by  two  companies  of  artillery,  numbering  about  eighty  men. 
Castle  Pinckney,  an  old  and  crumbling  work,  close  to  the  city,  was 
the  station  of  an  ordnance  sergeant  only,  whose  principal  duty 
consisted  in  the  care  of  an  harbor  light  that  shone  nightly  from  its 
parapet.  Four  miles  down  the  bay,  and  commanding  the  channel 
entrance,  stood  Fort  Sumter,  in  process  of  construction,  and  wholly 
defenseless.  A  large  number  of  workmen,  principally  inhabitants 
of  Charleston,  were  employed  on  its  completion,  which  was  con 
ducted  by  the  Engineer  Department,  under  authority  of  an  act  of 
Congress.  The  importance  of  its  position  was  early  recognized  by 
all,  and  the  determination  to  possess  it  was,  beyond  all  other 
considerations,  the  direct  cause  of  hostilities.  It  was  claimed  that 
the  State  could  not  be  said  to  have  resumed  her  sovereignty  until 
she  exercised  undisputed  control  over  all  the  dependencies  of  her 
territory. 

This  question  entered  into  every  speech  that  was  made,  to  keep 
up  the  spirit  that  w-as   carrying  the    State   onward,  and   in  every 

(319) 


320  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

document  drawn  up  denning  her  position  and  marking  her  course. 
It  was  presented  in  official  argument  in  every  demand  for  the 
surrender  of  Fort  Sumter,  and  in  its  solution  the  State  was  brought 
face  to  face  with  the  General  Government,  and  at  a  point  from 
which  neither  felt  that  it  could  retire.  In  order  to  open  negotia 
tions,  it  was  desired  by  the  authorities  of  South  Carolina  that  the 
existing  status  in  the  harbor  should  not  be  disturbed,  and,  early  in 
November,  the  Congressional  delegation  of  South  Carolina  waited 
upon  the  President  to  secure  his  consent  to  such  an  arrangement. 
It  was  asserted  by  them  that  such  consent  was  obtained,  and, 
although  the  existence  of  any  obligation  limiting  his  freedom  of 
action  was  distinctly  denied  by  Mr.  Buchanan,  in  his  letter  to  the 
commissioners,  it  was,  nevertheless,  relied  upon  by  the  authorities 
of  South  Carolina  as  affording  time  and  opportunity  for  the  discus 
sion,  and,  perhaps,  peaceable  solution  of  the  difficulties.  Far  ahead 
of  the  people,  the  leaders  of  the  movement  saw  the  necessity  for 
vigorous  action.  They  knew  that,  to  maintain  the  Union,  there 
would  be  war;  but  they,  nevertheless,  held  out  to  the  people  that 
there  would  be  no  collision  ;  and,  in  this,  they  were  partially  justified 
by  the  reiterated  assertions  of  the  partisan  press  in  the  North,  and 
the  opinions  of  men  high  in  public  position.  Immediately  upon  the 
passage  of  the  Ordinance  of  Secession  by  the  State  of  South  Carolina, 
a  commission,  consisting  of  three  gentlemen  of  character,  standing, 
and  well-known  public  service — Messrs.  Adams,  Barnwell,  and  Orr — 
were  sent  to  Washington  to  open  communications  with  the  govern 
ment  for  a  settlement  of  the  important  questions  which  immediately 
arose  upon  the  assumption,  by  the  State,  of  her  new  position.  They 
were  in  actual  communication  with  the  President,  when  an  event 
occurred  which,  while  it  awoke  the  country  to  a  realization  of  the 
actual  condition  of  things  in  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  served 
equally  to  remove  every  scruple  in  the  minds  of  doubting  men,  and 
to  bind  the  whole  State  together  firmly  in  a  determined  purpose  of 
resistance. 

Major  Anderson,  the  commandant  of  the  garrison  of  Fort  Moul- 
trie,  fearing  that  he  would  be  attacked,  on  the  night  of  the  26th  of 
December,  after  partially  dismantling  the  fort,  moved  his  entire 
command  to  Fort  Sumter.  Without  awaiting  explanation  or  the 
action  of  their  commissioners  in  Washington,  the  authorities  of  the 
State  proceeded  to  seize  and  occupy  the  forts  in  the  harbor  and  the 
government  property  in  the  State.  Fort  Moultrie  was  garrisoned 
and  the  flag  of  South  Carolina  raised  over  it.  The  seizure  of  Castle 
Pinckney  followed ;  the  arsenal  was  seized  and  its  contents  appro- 


THE  FIRST  SHOT  AGAINST  THE  FLAG.  321 

priatcd.  The  engineers'  office  in  Charleston  was  occupied  and  its 
valuable  maps  and  records  appropriated,  and  among  them  the  entire 
details  of  the  construction  of  Fort  Sumter.  The  chief  clerk  was 
made  an  officer  in  the  service  of  the  State,  and  a  messenger  was  sent 
to  Major  Anderson,  by  the  Governor  of  the  State,  requiring  him  to 
return  to  Fort  Moultrie.  It  was  declined,  and  both  sides  commenced 
preparations  for  hostilities,  that  seemed  now  to  be  unavoidable. 
Whatever  hopes  might  have  been  entertained  by  the  authorities  of 
a  peaceful  solution  of  the  difficulties,  were  rudely  shaken,  if  not 
abandoned,  when  it  was  known  that  the  General  Government  acqui 
esced  in  the  movement  of  Major  Anderson,  and  refused  to  remand 
him  to  Fort  Moultrie.  At  first  the  President  was  inclined  to  order 
Anderson  to  return  to  Fort  Moultrie,  and  he  authorized  the  trans 
mission  of  a  telegram  to  South  Carolina  that  Anderson's  movement 
was  not  only  without,  but  against  his  orders;  but  lie  would  go  no 
further.  The  action  of  South  Carolina  in  seizing  the  government 
property,  and  that  specific  instructions  had  been  given  by  his  Secre 
tary  of  War  authorizing  just  such  a  movement,  restrained  the  Presi 
dent  and  rendered  the  restoration  of  the  former  status  impossible. 
In  vain  was  a  ''breach  of  faith"  alleged,  and  the  "personal  honor" 
of  the  President  said  to  be  involved.  In  vain  the  commission  in 
Washington  urged  their  understanding  of  the  pledge  made  to  them. 
The  President  stood  firm.  ''Should  I  return  Major  Anderson  to 
Fort  Moultrie,"  said  he,  ik  I  might  go  back  to  Wheatland  by  the 
light  of  my  burning  effigies." 

It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  paper  to  inquire  how  far  the  Presi 
dent  had  pledged  himself  to  maintain  the  status  in  Charleston  harbor. 
His  great  desire,  as  well  as  his  intention,  was,  no  doubt,  to  preserve 
that  status  until  the  close  of  his  administration.  This  had  become 
impossible.  The  South  Carolina  commissioners  could  accept  nothing 
less,  and  they  left  Washington,  after  having  transmitted  to  the  Presi 
dent  a  communication,  so  offensive  in  its  tone,  and  so  personal  in  its 
character,  that  he  declined  to  receive  it.  This  decision  was  reached 
in  a  Cabinet  council.  When  it  was  announced,  the  President  turned 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  said :  "  Reinforcements  must  now  be 
sent."  The  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Floyd,  whose  resignation  had 
been  invited  by  the  President,  was  virtually  out  of  the  government. 
Although  he  had  given  the  very  instructions  which  justified  the 
movement  of  Major  Anderson,  he  made  the  refusal  of  the  President 
to  restore  the  status  in  Charleston  harbor  the  pretext  for  his  action, 
and  vacated  his  office.  The  movement  of  Major  Anderson,  however 
justified  in  a  military  point  of  view,  led  directly  to  such  measures  on 
21 


322  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  part  of  the  State  authorities  and  of  its  people  as  to  greatly  increase 
the  probabilities  of  a  collision.  But  while  the  friends  of  peace  did 
not  cease  their  exertions,  work  on  the  batteries  went  steadily  on  in 
the  harbor  of  Charleston.  The  policy  of  the  President  had  changed. 
Major  Anderson  was  not  only  to  be  maintained  in  his  position  ;  he 
was  to  be  supplied,  and  reinforced,  if  possible.  A  large  transport, 
the  Star  of  the  West,  left  Kew  York  on  the  5th  of  January,  and 
arrived  off  Charleston  on  the  9th.  She  was  unarmed  and  without 
convoy,  and  as  she  attempted  to  enter  the  harbor  she  was  fired  upon 
from  a  hastily  constructed  battery  near  the  entrance.  She  had  passed 
this  fire  when  Fort  Moultrie  opened  upon  her  at  long  range,  when, 
lowering  her  flag,  she  proceeded  northward.  From  the  fact  that 
there  were  no  guns  of  sufficient  calibre  in  position  at  that  time,  as 
well  as  the  absence  of  any  instructions  to  meet  such  a  contingency, 
Fort  Sumter  was  silent.  The  gauntlet  was  thus  distinctly  thrown 
down ;  South  Carolina  boldly  avowed  the  hostile  step  she  had  taken 
and  asserted  her  determination  to  defend  it.  And  yet  the  efforts  of 
those  who  earnestly  desired  peace  did  not  slacken. 

Agents  from  the  fort,  and  from  the  State,  were  sent  to  Wash 
ington  to  represent  to  the  government  the  exact  condition  of  things, 
and  to  ask  its  interference.  Increased  activity  was  immediately 
visible  in  the  harbor  of  Charleston ;  skilful  engineers  selected  the 
most  eligible  points  for  batteries,  and  field-works  were  rapidly 
erected.  Emboldened  by  the  result  of  the  firing  on  the  Star  of 
the  West,  a  formal  demand  for  the  immediate  surrender  of  Fort 
Sumter  was  made  by  the  Governor  of  South  Carolina.  On  the  20th 
of  January,  a  boat,  bearing  a  white  flag — the  only  means  of  com 
munication  between  the  fort  and  the  State — appeared  off  Sumter. 
She  brought  two  officials,  "  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Secretary 
of  War  of  South  Carolina,"  with  a  message  from  the  Governor  con 
taining  a  demand  for  the  immediate  delivery  of  the  work  to  the 
authorities  of  the  State.  The  interview  was  characterized  by  every 
courtesy,  and  the  demand  sustained  by  earnest  verbal  representa 
tions.  It  was  as  firmly  declined,  and  the  matter  referred  to  Washing 
ton.  Long  and  elaborate  discussions  between  the  Secretary  of  War, 
Mr.  Holt,  and  the  envoy  of  the  Governor,  Colonel  Ilayne,  followed. 
Lieutenant  Hall,  on  behalf  of  Major  Anderson,  represented  him  as 
secure  in  his  position.  The  envoy  bore  a  demand  for  the  surrender 
of  the  fort.  Before  this  could  be  presented,  nine  of  the  Senators 
from  the  cotton  States  induced  Colonel  Ilayne  to  postpone  the 
delivery  of  the  communication  until  they  could  ascertain  whether 
the  President  would  refrain  from  reinforcing  the  fort,  provided  the 


THE  FIEST  SHOT  AGAINST  THE  FLAG.  303 

Governor  of  South  Carolina  would  also  refrain  from  an  attack  upon 
it ;  but  upon  this  being  transmitted  to  the  President,  he  at  once 
authorized  his  secretary  to  state  that  Major  Anderson  had  made  no 
request  for  reinforcements,  but  should  his  safety  require  them,  every 
effort  would  be  made  to  supply  them.  On  the  30th,  Colonel  Ilayne 
presented  his  demand ;  but,  as  in  the  case  of  the  commissioners 
originally  sent  by  the  State,  the  negotiations  were  not  satisfactory, 
and  an  able  and  conclusive  reply  from  the  Secretary  of  "War,  Mr. 
Holt,  was  transmitted  to  the  envoy  of  the  Governor,  which  placed 
the  whole  subject  beyond  discussion. 

It  was  now  clear  that  the  government  at  Washington  intended 
to  relieve  Fort  Sumter  at  its  option.  For  the  State,  but  one  course, 
consistent  with  the  attitude  assumed  by  her,  was  to  be  pursued,  and 
that  was  to  close  the  harbor  to  all  relief  to  the  fort.  Increased 
activity  prevailed  everywhere,  and  the  scene  that  was  daily  presented 
from  the  parapet  of  Fort  Sumter  was  well  calculated  to  discourage 
all  hope  of  peace.  Troops  and  munitions  of  war  moved  to  various 
points,  and  the  garrison  earnestly  watched  the  daily  progress  of 
works  intended  for  their  destruction.  The  buoys  had  been  taken 
up  ;  the  lights  were  extinguished,  and  pilots  forbidden  to  bring  ships 
bearing  the  United  States  flag  into  the  harbor.  "Within  Fort  Sum 
ter,  as  far  as  their  limited  means  would  allow,  a  similar  activity  was 
manifested  by  the  garrison.  Guns  of  heavy  calibre  were  raised  to 
the  parapet,  and  placed  in  position  ;  others  were  mounted  in  the 
casements  below,  and  every  resource  was  made  use  of  to  strengthen 
and  arm  the  work,  and  to  make  effective  the  scanty  material  in  their 
possession.  Meantime,  a  provisional  government  had  been  organ 
ized  by  the  States  which  had  passed  the  Ordinances  of  Secession. 
Jurisdiction  over  the  public  property  in  the  harbor  of  Charleston 
was  assumed  by  it,  and  Brigadier  General  P.  G.  T.  Beauregard,  an 
officer  of  engineers,  who  had  resigned  his  commission  in  the  Army 
of  the  United  States,  was  commissioned  by  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment,  and  sent  to  Charleston  to  take  command  of  the  military 
operations.  Daily  reports  were  sent  to  Washington,  by  Major  An 
derson,  of  the  condition  of  Fort  Sumter  and  its  garrison,  and  the 
government  was  fully  informed  of  their  pressing  wants.  On  the 
1st  of  February,  1861,  in  anticipation  of  the  future,  the  women  and 
children  belonging  to  the  garrison  were  sent  northward.  And  thus, 
openly,  without  disguise  of  any  sort,  warlike  preparations  went  on, 
from  day  to  day,  until  the  fort  was  surrounded  by  batteries,  all  bear 
ing  upon  it  and  upon  the  channel  by  which  any  relief  could  reach 
it,  and  ready  to  open  at  any  moment. 


324  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

The  month  of  March  had  come,  and  with  it  the  close  of  the 
administration  of  President  Buchanan.  Congress  had  adjourned 
without  an  effort  to  avert  the  dangers  threatening  the  nation. 
Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  vacillating  policy  of  President 
Buchanan,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  he  never  at  any  time  contem 
plated  the  surrender  of  the  forts  in  Charleston  harbor,  however 
anxious  he  was  to  avoid  a  collision  that  would  alarm  the  Border 
States,  and  precipitate  war.  His  administration  closed  with  the 
issues  still  unsettled,  and  the  country  steadily  drifting  to  war.  Up 
to  the  last  moment  the  Confederate  authorities  had  hoped  that 
Sumter  would  be  voluntarily  evacuated,  and  they  had  at  one  time 
reason  for  the  belief.  An  accredited  agent  from  President  Lincoln 
had  visited  the  fort  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  for  the  removal  of  the 
garrison.  An  intermediary  between  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the 
Confederate  authorities,  Associate  Justice  John  A.  Campbell,  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  had  telegraphed  on  the  15th 
of  March  that  he  felt  perfect  confidence  in  the  belief  that  Fort 
Sumter  would  be  evacuated  in  five  days ;  that  no  measure  changing 
the  existing  status  was  contemplated;  that  the  demand  for  the 
surrender  should  not  be  pressed ;  and  again  on  the  21st  and  22d  of 
March  he  telegraphed  that  his  "  confidence "  in  the  decision  was 
unabated.  In  the  meantime,  however,  other  agencies  were  at  work, 
of  which  he  was  probably  ignorant,  and  which  largely  contributed 
to  an  immediate  precipitation  of  hostilities.  Soon  after  the  occu 
pancy  of  Fort  Sumter,  and  up  to  the  earlier  days  of  President 
Lincoln's  administration,  Major  Anderson  had  reported  to  his  gov 
ernment  that  he  was  not  in  need  of  reinforcements,  that  he  was 
secure  in  his  position,  that  he  could  not  be  relieved  without  a 
struggle,  and,  in  a  later  report,  that  in  his  opinion  twenty  thousand 
men  would  be  necessary  to  take  the  batteries,  and  relieve  him  But 
as  time  passed,  while  reporting  daily  to  his  government,  he  brought 
finally  the  facts  of  his  position  so  plainly  to  their  notice,  in  a  com 
munication  of  the  1st  of  April,  that  action  upon  their  part  was 
imperative.  He  reported  that  his  provisions  were  nearly  exhausted, 
that  his  command  would  be  without  food  in  a  few  days,  and  that  his 
condition  was  such  that  some  measures  for  his  relief  must  be  taken. 
His  communication  engaged  the  immediate  attention  of  the  President 
and  his->  Cabinet. 

Yielding  to  the  argument  of  a  "  military  necessity,"  the  written 
opinions  of  every  member  of  the  Cabinet,  except  the  Postmaster 
General,  Mr.  Montgomery  Blair,  was  in  favor  of  the  withdrawal  of 
the  garrison  from  the  harbor  of  Charleston,  when,  suddenly,  the 


THE  FIRST  SHOT  AGA1XST  THE  FLAG.  325 

whole  purpose  was  changed,  and  an  expedition  to  reinforce  the 
fort  was  ordered.  A  dispatch  of  the  following  purport  was  for 
warded  to  Major  Anderson :  lie  was  told  that  his  report  had 
caused  great  anxiety  to  the  President.  It  was  hoped  from  his 
previous  communication,  and  the  report  of  the  special  messenger, 
Captain  Fox,  that  he  could  hold  out  until  the  15th  of  April,  when 
an  expedition  was  to  have  gone  to  his  relief.  lie  was  directed,  if 
possible,  to  hold  out  until  the  12th  of  April,  when  the  expedition 
would  go  forward,  and,  rinding  his  '"flag  still  living,"  an  effort 
would  he  made  to  provision  him,  and  to  reinforce  him  if  resisted. 
As  soon  as  this  dispatch  was  sent  to  Major  Anderson,  it  was  followed 
by  a  messenger,  Mr.  Chew,  the  chief  clerk  of  the  State  Department, 
to  the  authorities  of  South  Carolina,  informing  them  that  an  attempt 
to  provision  and  relieve  the  fort  would  now  be  made.  The  mes 
senger  accomplished  his  mission,  and  barely  escaped  from  the  city  of 
Charleston  without  molestation.  Upon  receipt  of  the  message  from 
the  State  Department,  not  a  moment  was  lost  by  the  officer  in 
command  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  harbor  of  Charleston.  A 
telegram  was  at  once  sent  to  the  Confederate  Government,  at  Mont 
gomery,  with  the  information  brought  by  the  messenger,  and 
instructions  asked  for.  The  reply  betrayed  no  appreciation  of  the 
long  and  terrible  war  it  inaugurated:  ''If  you  have  no  doubt  of 
the  authorized  character  of  the  agent,"  was  the  reply,  uyoii  will  at 
once  demand  the  evacuation  of  the  fort,  and,  if  this  is  refused, 
proceed  in  such  manner  as  you  may  determine  to  reduce  it." 

On  the  morning  of  the  11  th  of  April,  the  dawn  of  day  disclosed 
an  activity  at  once  unusual  and  significant  over  the  entire  harbor. 
The  waters  were  covered  with  vessels  hastily  putting  to  sea.  An 
iron-clad  floating-battery  of  four  guns,  the  construction  of  which  in 
Charleston  had  been  watched  by  the  garrison  for  months,  was  towed 
down  the  bay  to  a  point  at  the  western  end  of  Sullivan's  Island, 
where  its  guns  bore  directly  upon  Fort  Snmter.  A  wooden  dwelling 
on  the  beach,  near  the  end  of  the  island,  was  pulled  down  and 
unmasked  a  land  work,  mounting  four  guns,  hitherto  unknown  to 
the  garrison.  Its  fire  would  enfilade  the  most  important  battery  of 
Fort  Sumter,  which  was  upon  the  parapet  of  the  right  flank  of  the 
work,  and  whose  guns  were  mainly  relied  upon  to  control  the  fire 
from  the  heavy  guns  on  dimming' s  Point,  that  would  take  the  fort 
in  reverse.  Bodies  of  troops  were  landed,  and  the  batteries  on  shore 
fully  manned,  and  every  preparation  completed,  when,  at  four  o'clock 
P.  M.,  a  boat  under  a  white  flag  approached  the  fort.  Two  officials, 
aides-de-camp  of  the  general  commanding  the  Confederate  forces  in 


326  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  harbor,  Colonel  Chesnut  and  Captain  S.  D.  Lee,  were  admitted 
to  the  guard-room  just  inside  the  main  entrance  to  the  work.  They 
bore  a  communication  from  the  military  commandant  at  Charleston, 
and  to  the  following  effect :  It  stated  that  the  Government  of  the 
Confederate  States  had  hitherto  forborne  from  any  hostile  demon 
stration  against  Fort  Sumter,  in  the  hope  that  the  General  Govern 
ment  would  voluntarily  evacuate  it  in  order  to  avert  war,  and  that 
there  was  reason  to  believe  that  such  would  have  been  the  course 
pursued,  but  that  the  Confederate  Government  could  no  longer 
delay  "assuming  actual  possession"  of  a  fortification  so  important  to 
it.  The  evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter  was  demanded  in  the  name  of 
the  Government  of  the  Confederate  States.  All  proper  f acilites  were 
tendered  to  Major  Anderson  for  the  removal  of  himself  and  his 
command.  He  was  to  take  with  him  his  company  and  private  prop 
erty,  and  to  salute  his  flag  upon  taking  it  down. 

Calling  the  officers  of  the  garrison  into  his  private  room,  he  laid 
the  communication  before  them,  and  then,  for  the  first  time,  made 
known  to  them  the  confidential  dispatch  from  the  government, 
received  a  few  days  previously,  in  which  their  determination  to 
relieve  the  fort  was  expressed,  and  instructions  in  regard  to  it  con 
veyed.  In  this  communication  authority  was  given  him  to  capitulate 
when  the  necessity  of  the  case  required  it.  The  conference  of  the 
officers  was  long  and  earnest.  There  was  no  thought  for  a  moment 
of  acceding  to  the  demand  for  the  evacuation  of  the  fort,  and  the 
following  reply  was  returned  by  Major  Anderson :  "  That  the  demand 
for  the  evacuation  of  the  fort  was  one  with  which  he  regretted  that 
his  sense  of  honor  and  his  obligations  to  his  government  prevented 
his  compliance."  On  receiving  this  communication  the  Confederate 
officers  left  the  fort.  The  entire  interview  was  characterized  by 
every  courtesy,  though  more  distant  and  formal  than  in  previous 
conferences.  They  were  followed  to  the  main  gate  of  the  work  by 
Major  Anderson,  and  the  writer  of  this  article.  As  they  were  about 
to  embark,  Major  Anderson  remarked  in  their  hearing  that  he  would 
be  starved  out  any  way  in  a  few  days,  if  their  guns  did  not  batter 
him  to  pieces,  and  this  was  repeated  more  specifically  to  the  Confed 
erate  officers  in  reply  to  their  inquiries  on  the  subject.  As  the  boat 
returned,  the  batteries  around  were  covered  with  spectators  all 
anxiously  watching  the  result  of  the  mission. 

Renewed  activity  prevailed.  Inside  the  fort  powder  was  taken 
from  the  magazines,  which  were  now  closed,  ammunition  was  served 
to  the  batteries  and  the  details  of  the  men  made  to  serve  them. 
Careful  instructions  were  given  to  use  the  utmost  economy  in  regard 


THE  FIRST  SHOT  AGAINST  THE  FLAG.  327 

to  what  food  was  left,  and  the  officers  in  command  of  the  batteries 
were  directed  not  to  "unnecessarily  expose  their  men.  Outside  the 
fort,  steamers,  large  and  small,  were  plying  in  every  direction.  The 
buoy  which  marked  the  turn  in  the  harbor  from  the  main  channel, 
and,  which  alone  had  been  suffered  to  remain,  was  taken  up  at  about 
live  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Its  place  was  supplied  by  three  hulks 
loaded  with  combustible  material,  the  evident  object  of  which  was 
to  light  the  channel  should  the  licet,  whose  arrival  was  now  hourly 
anticipated,  attempt  to  enter  by  night.  They  were  anchored  directly 
under  the  guns  of  Fort  Moultrie.  In  this  state  of  preparation  the 
night  of  the  llth  of  April  closed  upon  the  harbor.  Toward  mid 
night  the  officers  of  the  garrison  were  aroused  by  the  report  of  the 
officer  of  the  day,  that  a  boat  under  a  white  flag  had  arrived,  and 
that  two  messengers  from  the  Confederate  authorities  had  again 
come  to  the  work.  It  was  now  one  and  a  half  o'clock  in  the  morn 
ing,  when  the  aides  of  the  military  commandant  of  the  Confederate 
forces,  accompanied  by  Colonel  Chisholm  and  Mr.  Koger  A.  Pry  or, 
of  Virginia,  entered  the  work.  They  bore  a  letter  from  Brigadier 
General  Beaureguard,  commanding  Provisional  Army  Confederate 
States  of  America,  to  Major  Anderson,  to  the  effect,  that  in  conse 
quence  of  the  verbal  obser  /ation  made  to  his  aides  in  relation  to  the 
condition  of  his  supplies,  and  that  he  would  soon  be  starved  out,  he 
had  communicated  the  same  to  his  government.  The  proposition 
was  then  made  to  him,  that  if  he  would  state  the  time  at  which  he 
would  evacuate  the  fort,  and  that  meanwhile  he  would  agree  not  to 
use  his  guns  against  the  Confederate  forces  unless  theirs  should  be 
employed  against  Fort  Suinter,  General  Beaureguard  would  abstain 
from  opening  fire  upon  him,  and  that  his  aides  were  authorized  to 
enter  into  such  an  arrangement. 

Again  the  officers  of  the  garrison  were  assembled  in  consultation, 
and  a  long  deliberation  followed.  The  question  which  engaged  the 
most  serious  consideration  was  in  regard  to  the  provisions  in  the  fort, 
and  how  far  the  men,  who  were  now  without  sufficient  or  proper 
food,  could  be  lelied  upon  for  resistance.  The  bread  supplies  of  the 
garrison  were  exhausted;  nothing  remained  but  short  rations  of  pork 
and  coffee.  Still  it  was  earnestly  desired  that  the  utmost  expecta 
tions  of  the  government  should  be  realized,  and  it  was  determined 
to  hold  out  to  the  period  desired  by  them,  the  15th  instant.  It  was 
agreed  that  the  terms  proposed,  which  would  tie  the  hands  of  the 
garrison  and  neutralize  its  fire,  could  not  be  acceded  to,  and  a  reply 
to  the  following  effect  was  made  by  Major  Anderson  :  "  That  if  pro 
vided  with  proper  means  he  would  evacuate  the  fort  at  noon  on  the 


328  ANXALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

15th  instant,  provided  he  should  not  receive  controlling  instructions 
or  additional  supplies  from  his  government ;  that  he  would  not  open 
the  iire  of  his  batteries  unless  compelled  to  do  so  by  some  hostile  act 
or  demonstration  by  the  Confederate  forces  against  his  fort  or  the 
nag  it  bore."  Xo  sooner  had  Colonel  Chesnut,  the  officer  to  whom 
it  was  handed,  read  the  reply  of  Major  Anderson  than  he  pronounced 
it  unsatisfactory,  and  made  the  following  reply  in  writing  : 

FORT  SUMTER,  S.  C.,  April  12, 1861—3.20  A.  M. 

SIR :  By  authority  of  Brigadier  General  Beauregard,  commanding  the  Pro 
visional  forces  of  the  Confederate  States,  we  have  the  honor  to  notify  you  that  he 
will  open  the  fire  of  his  batteries  upon  Fort  Sumter  in  one  hour  from  this  time. 

We  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servants, 

JAMES  CHESNUT,  JR., 

Aide-de-camp. 

STEPHEN  D.  LEE, 

Captain  C.  S.  and  A.  D.  C. 

To  MAJOR  ROBERT  ANDERSON,  U.  S.  A.,  commanding  Fort  Sumter. 

Positive  instructions  from  the  Confederate  Government  had 
been  sent  to  their  agent  in  Charleston  harbor  that  if  this  last  propo 
sition  to  Major  Anderson  was  refused  by  him,  he  should  reduce  the 
fort  as  his  judgment  decided  to  be  most  practicable.  But  little 
conversation  followed  the  delivery,  to  the  aides,  of  the  reply  of 
Major  Anderson.  An  inquiry  as  to  the  exact  time  in  the  morning 
was  made,  which  was  found  to  be  3.30  A.  M. 

The  Confederate  officers  left  the  fort  without  any  formal  leave- 
taking,  and  their  boat  soon  disappeared  in  the  darkness.  Upon  their 
arrival  in  Charleston,  and  the  delivery  of  Major  Anderson's  response, 
a  telegram  was  sent  to  Montgomery,  informing  the  authorities  that 
Major  Anderson  "would  not  consent."  Inside  the  work,  the  men 
were  informed  of  what  had  happened,  and  directed  to  await  the 
summons  to  the  guns.  No  fire  was  to  be  returned  until  daylight. 
The  night  was  cairn  and  clear,  and  the  sea  was  still.  Fires  were 
lighted  in  all  the  Confederate  works,  when,  at  4.30  A.  M.,  the 
silence  was  broken  by  the  discharge  of  a  mortar  from  a  battery  near 
Fort  Johnson,  within  easy  range  of  the  work ;  a  shell  rose  high  in 
the  air,  and  burst  directly  over  Fort  Sumter;  its  echo  died  away, 
and  all  was  still  again ;  when,  suddenly,  fire  was  opened  from  every 
battery  of  the  enemy.  At  daylight,  all  the  guns  of  Fort  Sumter 
opened,  and  the  fire  steadily  continued  all  day.  During  the  night 
of  the  12th,  the  accurate  range  of  the  mortars  lodged  a  shell  in  the 
parade,  or  about  the  work,  at  intervals  of  fifteen  minutes.  It  was 
estimated  that  over  twenty-five  hundred  shot  and  shell  struck  the 


THE  FIRST  SHOT  AGAINST  THE  FLAG.  329 

fort  during  tlie  first  twenty-four  hours.  By  morning,  the  fleet  sent 
to  our  assistance  appeared  off  the  bar,  but  did  not  enter.  At  8.30 
on  the  13th,  the  quarters  took  fire,  from  the  effect  of  hot  shot,  and 
could  not  be  extinguished,  and  soon  the  entire  barracks  were  in  a 
blaze.  The  barrels  containing  powder  were  thrown  into  the  sea. 
At  1.20  on  the  loth,  the  flagstaff,  having  been  struck  four  times, 
was  shot  away,  and  the  flag  replaced  upon  the  parapet.  The  firing 
upon  the  work  was  severe  and  continued;  the  return  from  the  fort 
slow  and  feeble,  sounding  like  signals  of  distress  to  the  nation,  and, 
finally,  ceased  altogether.  Seeing  the  condition  of  things,  a  Colonel 
Wigfall  pushed  out  in  an  open  boat  from  Gumming' s  Point — unau 
thorized  it  is  true — and,  learning  from  Major  Anderson  that  he 
would  evacuate  the  fort  upon  the  terms  originally  proposed  to  him, 
returned  and  communicated  with  General  Beauregard,  who  imme 
diately  sent  a  commission  authorized  to  arrange  terms  for  the 
evacuation,  which  were  soon  agreed  upon.  The  garrison  was  trans 
ferred  to  the  large  transport  lying  off  the  bar,  and  was  soon  on  its 
way  to  the  Xorth.  Many  an  eye  turned  toward  the  disappearing 
fort,  and  as  it  sunk  at  last  upon  the  horizon  the  smoke-cloud  still 
hung  heavily  over  its  parapet. 


THE  DALTON-ATLANTA  OPERATIONS. 


BY    GENERAL    JOSEPH    E.    JOHNSTON. 


IT  is  stated  on  page  24  of  Gen 
eral  Sherman's  "  Memoirs  " 
volume  ii,  that  on  the  1st  of 
May,  1864,  the  strength  of  the 
three  armies — of  the  Cum 
berland,  of  the  Tennessee, 
and  of  the  Ohio — with  which 
General  Sherman  was  about 
to  invade  Georgia,  was  ninety- 
eight  thousand,  seven  hundred 
and  ninety-seven  men  of  all 
arms  present  for  duty,  with 
two  hundred  and  fifty-four 
field-pieces.  As  the  forces  of 
the  three  departments  fur 
nishing  these  troops  amounted 
at  the  time  to  two  hundred  and  twenty-nine  thousand,  five  hundred 
and  twenty-four  men  present  for  duty  (see  Secretary  of  War's  report, 
1865,  page  5),  the  strength  of  the  invading  army  could  have  been 
doubled  without  leaving  its  communications  insufficiently  guarded. 
Therefore,  General  Sherman  must  have  regarded  the  forces  he 
assembled  as  ample  for  his  object.  That  object  was  (see  General 
Grant's  letter,  on  page  26)  "to  move  against  Johnston's  army,  to 
break  it  up,  and  to  get  into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country  as 
far  as  he  could,  inflicting  all  the  damage  he  could  against  their  war 
resources."  That  army  was  in  front  of  Dalton,  of  forty-two  thou 
sand,  eight  hundred  men,  of  all  arms,  present  for  duty,  with  one 
hundred  and  fifty  field-guns.  Its  position  had  not  been  selected,  but 
was  occupied  by  accident.  General  Bragg  took  it  for  the  encamp 
ment  of  a  night  in  his  retreat  from  Missionary  Ridge ;  but  the 
troops  remained  there  because  it  was  ascertained  that  the  pursuit  had 
ceased.  During  the  previous  winter  General  Gilmer,  Chief  Engi 
neer  of  the  Confederacy,  had  wisely  provided  a  strong  base  for  this 
army,  by  the  intrenchment  of  Atlanta,  and  the  engineers  of  the 

(330) 


THE  DALTON-ATLANTA   OPERATIONS.  331 

army  constructed  some  field-works  at  Resaca  for  the  protection  of 
the  bridges  there,  and  three  very  rough  country  roads  from  Dalton 
to  Resaca  were  converted  into  good  ones.  In  the  spring  the  works 
there  were  considerably  enlarged. 

On  the  5th  of  May,  the  Federal  army  was  in  order  of  battle 
three  or  four  miles  in  front  of  Tunnel  Hill.  On  the  6th,  it  ap 
proached  Tunnel  Hill ;  on  the  7th,  drove  our  advanced  guard  from 
that  place,  and  placed  itself,  in  the  afternoon,  near  and  parallel  to 
Rocky  Face,  its  right  some  distance  below  Mill  Creek  gap.  On 
pages  32,  33,  3-i,  and  35,  General  Sherman  describes  the  operations 
of  the  8th,  9th,  and  10th,  except  the  very  sharp  fighting.  In  his 
report,  that  of  the  9th  is  characterized  as  almost  a  battle  (see  page 
14rj.  In  these  engagements  the  Confederates,  who  were  completely 
sheltered  by  intrenchmeiits,  had  almost  no  loss;  but  the  Federal 
troops,  standing  on  open  ground  and  in  great  numbers,  suffered  very 
severely.  On  page  3J-,  General  Sherman  claims  to  have  surprised 
Johnston,  by  McPherson's  arrival  before  Resaca  on  the  9th  ;  forget 
ting,  apparently,  that  his  approach  was  discovered  on  the  Sth  (see  his 
report,  page  Itt),  and  that  the  place  was  found  well  prepared  for 
defense,  being  held  not  by  "one  small  brigade,1"  as  he  supposed,  but 
by  a  division — so  intrenched  as  to  be  able  to  maintain  itself  a  full 
day,  at  least.  So  if  McPherson  had  attacked  on  the  9th,  according 
to  General  Sherman's  plan,  "Resaca  could  easily  have  been  held 
against  him  until  next  morning,  when  the  army,  having  left  Dalton 
the  night  before,  without  the  enemy's  knowledge,  would  be  ready 
to  fall  upon  him  from  the  rear,  while  holding  his  line  of  retreat. 
"NVith  twice  his  number  on  one  side,  and  Resaca  on  the  other,  he 
could  not  have  escaped.  If  the  other  course,  suggested  for  McPher 
son  by  General  Sherman,  had  been  taken — that  of  "placing  his 
whole  force  astride  the  railroad  above  Resaca ''—-Johnston  must  have 
marched  against  and  assailed  him  in  the  same  manner,  with  the  same 
advantages.  Either  course  suggested,  taken  by  McPherson,  would 
have  compelled  Johnston  to  attack  him,  and  with  such  advantages 
of  numbers  and  position  as  to  secure  his  destruction.  We  never 
found  it  difficult  to  leave  the  presence  of  the  Federal  army  at  night 
without  its  knowledge.  The  retreat  to  the  east,  which  General 
Sherman  supposed  that  the  Confederates  would  have  attempted,  was 
impossible.  But  even  if  it  had  been  easy,  they  could  not  have  hes 
itated  to  attack  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  in  either  of  the  cases 
supposed — opportunities  for  armies  to  fight  detachments  of  half 
their  strength  are  rarely  offered  in  war. 

General  Sherman  is  mistaken  in  the  opinion,  appearing  both  in 


332  ANXALS  OF  THE  WAS. 

his  report  and  memoirs,  that  the  Confederate  army  at  Dalton  was 
brought  to  the  verge  of  ruin  by  his  movement  through  Snake  Creek 
gap.  This  operation  had  been  provided  against  by  making  Resaca 
strong  enough  to  hold  out  at  least  a  day  against  twenty  thousand  or 
thirty  thousand  men,  and  by  the  making  of  roads  by  which  the 
Southern  troops  at  Dalton  could  reach  Resaca  before  their  antag 
onists.  Resaca  was  held,  instead  of  Snake  Creek  gap,  because  it  was 
nearer  than  the  latter  to  the  main  Confederate  position,  and  much 
farther  from  the  Federal  main  body,  and  could  be  held  by  a  smaller 
body  of  troops.  This  operation  could  have  produced  no  better 
result  than  that  gained — the  abandonment  of  Dalton  by  the  Southern 
army.  Rocky  Face,  instead  of  covering  Dalton,  completely  covered 
the  Federal  flank  march  to  Snake  Creek  gap,  and,  therefore,  was 
advantageous  to  him  (General  Sherman),  and  not  to  his  adversary. 

On  page  32,  General  Sherman  gives  the  impression  that  the 
position  in  front  of  Dalton  was  very  strong,  and  he  says  in  his 
report  (page  73) :  "  To  strike  Dalton  in  front  was  impracticable,  as 
it  was  covered  by  an  inaccessible  ridge."  This  ridge  covered  the 
left  flank,  not  the  front,  arid  terminated  but  two  miles  north  of  the 
position,  which  was  east  of  the  mountain,  in  ground  as  fit  for  the 
maneuvres  of  a  large  army  as  a  tactician  can  expect  to  find  in  the 
interior  of  the  Southern  country.  On  page  35,  the  General  writes 
that  the  bulk  of  the  Southern  army  was  "  found  (on  the  13th)  inside 
of  Resaca.  *  *  A  complete  line  of  intrenchments  was  found 

covering  the  place."  The  two  armies  were  formed  in  front  of 
Resaca  nearly  at  the  same  time ;  so  that  the  Federal  army  could  give 
battle  on  equal  terms,  except  as  to  numbers,  by  attacking  promptly — 
the  difference  being  about  ten  to  four.  The  two  armies  intrenched 
that  day.  There  was  very  brisk  fighting  all  day  of  the  14th — 
greatly  to  our  advantage,  for  we  were  assailed  in  our  intrenchments. 
General  Sherman  was  misinformed  as  to  the  taking  of  an  important 
ridge  by  the  advance  of  McPherson's  whole  line,  and  bloody  repulses 
of  Confederate  attempts  to  retake  it — this  on  the  15th ;  there  were 
no  such  occurrences.  But  on  the  14th,  about  dusk,  the  left  of  our 
line  of  skirmishers — forty  or  fifty  men — was  driven  from  a  slight 
elevation  in  front  of  our  left ;  but  no  attempt  was  made  to  retake  it. 

The  first  paragraph  on  page  36  is  inaccurate.  The  fighting  on 
the  15th  was  to  our  advantage  (none  of  it  at  night),  for  we  were  on 
the  defensive — behind  breastworks.  As  to  capturing  a  four-gun 
intrenched  battery  with  its  men  and  guns :  On  the  morning  of  the 
15th,  General  Hood  advanced  one,  eighty  or  one  hundred  yards. 
Soon  after  its  fire  opened  the  men  and  horses  were  driven  off  by  an 


THE  DALTON-ATLANTA  OPERATIONS.  333 

infantry  fire  from  a  ravine  near.  The  Federal  soldiers,  who 
attempted  to  carry  them  off,  were  in  like  manner  driven  back  by 
our  musketry.  So  the  unintrenched  guns,  without  men,  were  left 
between  the  two  lines  until  the  Southern  troops  abandoned  the 
position.  Wliat  is  said  on  page  30  might  create  the  impression  that 
the  Southern  army  crossed  the  Oostenaula  in  consequence  of  the 
fighting  described.  It  was  because  two  bridges  and  a  large  body  of 
Federal  troops  were  discovered  the  afternoon  of  the  14th  at  Lay's 
ferry,  some  miles  below,  strongly  threatening  our  communications 
by  the  indication  of  another  flanking  operation — covered  by  the 
river  as  the  first  had  been  by  the  ridge.  To  avoid  this  danger  the 
Southern  army  crossed  the  Oostenaula  about  midnight,  and  moved 
alonr  the  railroad  about  seven  miles.  The  17th,  it  marched  eight 
miles  to  Adairsville  by  eight  o'clock  A.  M. ;  remained  there  till  next 
morning  (Isth),  and  marched  nine  miles  to  Cassville  before  eleven 
o'clock;  passed  that  day  and  the  lUth  there,  and  at  one  or  two 
o'clock  A.  M.  of  the  20th  marched  to  the  Etowah,  and  crossed 
it  early  in  the  afternoon  near  the  railroad. 

On  page  3<>  the  difficulties  overcome  by  the  Federal  army  seem 
somewhat  magnified,  and  its  advantage  of  greatly  superior  numbers 
depreciated.  The  operations  in  question  can  scarcely  be  termed 
"rapid  successes."  Indeed,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  the  progress  made 
in  '•  breaking  up  Johnston's  army"  by  the  advance  of  the  Federal 
army  sixteen  miles,  at  the  expense  of  live  days  of  sharp  fighting,  all 
to  the  advantage  of  its  enemy. 

The  circumstances  referred  to  on  pages  40  and  41  are  these 
(related  in  "Johnston's  Narrative,"  pages  3i!l  to  324):  In  the  morn 
ing  of  May  19th,  the  Federal  army  was  approaching  Cassville,  in  two 
bodies,  one  following  the  railroad,  the  other  the  direct  wagon  road. 
Ilardee's  Corps  was  near  the  former,  Folk's  and  Hood's  at  Cassville. 
Johnston  determined  to  attack  the  column  on  the  direct  road  with 
Folk's  and  Hood's  Corps  when  the  other  was  at  Kingston,  three 
hours'  march  to  the  west.  Folk  was  to  meet  and  attack  the  head  of 
the  column ;  Hood,  marching  a  little  in  advance  of  him  on  a  road  on 
his  right,  was  to  join  in  the  action  as  the  enemy  deployed.  AVhen 
the  latter  had  marched  some  miles  in  the  proper  direction,  he  turned 
his  corps  and  marched  back  and  formed  it  facing  to  the  east,  about  a 
mile  east  of  Cassville,  upon  a  wild  report  brought  him,  he  said,  by 
one  of  liis  aide-de-camps.  Neither  this  information  nor  his  action 
uj x  »:i  it  was  reported.  As  the  plan  depended  on  the  distance  between 
the  two  Federal  columns  for  success,  it  was  defeated  by  the  loss  of 
time  produced  by  this  erratic  movement.  The  army  was  then  drawn 


334  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

up  in  the  best  position  it  ever  occupied,  in  which  it  skirmished  during 
the  afternoon.  But  at  night  General  Hood's  persistent  declaration 
that  he  and  General  Polk  would  not  be  able  to  hold  their  ground  an 
hour,  caused  the  withdrawal  of  the  army. 

Page  43  :  The  broken  ground  south  of  the  Etowah  can  nowhere 
be  called  a  "  ridge  of  mountains."  The  route  through  it  chosen  by 
General  Sherman  was  the  least  unfavorable.  Page  44 :  The  action  at 
New  Hope  Church  was  the  attack  on  Stewart's  Division  by  Hooker's 
Corps.  It  began  an  hour  and  a  half  before  sunset,  and  continued 
until  dark,  Stewart  holding  his  ground.  As  the  corps  had  a  front 
equal  only  to  that  of  the  division,  and  was  exposed  to  the  musketry 
of  five  thousand  infantry,  and  the  canister  of  sixteen  guns  at  short 
range,  great  execution  must  have  been  done  in  its  ranks.  Pag~  45 : 
The  "  bloody  battle  "  mentioned  was  an  absurd  attack  on  the  Federal 
right,  made  without  orders,  by  two  Confederate  brigades.  It  was 
quickly  ended  by  the  division  commander,  who  drew  back  the  troops 
as  soon  as  he  heard  the  firing,  after  they  had  lost  three  hundred  men. 
But  a  real  battle,  which  occurred  the  day  before,  is  unnoticed — a  care 
fully  prepared  attack  upon  our  right  by  the  Fourth  Corps,  supported 
by  a  division  of  the  Fourteenth.  The  battle  began  about  five  o'clock 
P.  M .,  and  continued  two  hours.  After  the  repulse  of  the  assailants  we 
counted  about  seven  hundred  dead  within  thirty  yards  of  our  line.  The 
description  of  daily  fighting  on  the  same  page  is  correct  as  to  spirit  and 
frequency ;  but  as  the  Confederates  were  not  permitted  to  leave  their 
breastworks,  the  sallies  and  repulses  were  all  Federal.  Page  46 : 
The  Confederate  army  abandoned  the  line  of  New  Hope  Church  on 
the  4th  of  June,  because  it  wras  discovered  that  day  that  the  Federal 
troops  were  moving  by  their  left  rear  toward  Allatoona,  under  cover 
of  their  line  of  intrenchments.  On  the  same  page,  General  Sherman 
claims  that  substantially  during  May  he  had  fought  over  one  hundred 
miles  of  most  difficult  country — from  Chattanooga  to  Big  Shanty. 
The  fighting  commenced  at  Tunnel  Hill,  thirty  miles  from  Chatta 
nooga,  and  lie  reached  Big  Shanty  only  on  the  10th  of  June. 

Page  49 :  "I  always  estimated  my  force  at  about  double  his ; 
*  *  *  but  I  also  reckoned  that  in  the  natural  strength  of  the 
country,  in  the  abundance  of  mountains,  streams  and  forests,  he  had 
a  fair  offset  to  our  numerical  superiority."  Such  being  General 
Sherman's  opinion,  it  is  not  easy  to  understand  why  he  did  not  make 
his  army  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  or  two  hundred  thousand 
men.  He  knew  the  strength  of  the  country,  and  it  has  been  seen 
that,  on  the  5th  of  May,  he  had  one  hundred  and  thirty  thousand 
men  under  his  control,  beside  those  assembled  around  him.  Page 


THE  WALTON-ATLANTA   OPERATIONS.  335 

51 :  It  is  stated  that  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  lately  arrived,  with  new 
regiments,,  and  returned  furloughed  men,  "equaled  the  Federal 
losses  by  battle,  sickness,  and  by  detachments,"  so  that  the  three 
armies  still  aggregated  about  one  hundred  thousand  effective  men. 
According  to  the  table  on  page  130,  they  aggregated  one  hundred 
and  twelve  thousand  eight  hundred  men.  On  the  same  page,  below, 
it  is  said  that  the  Confederates  had  signal  stations  and  fresh  lines  of 
parapets  on  Kenesaw,  Lost  Mountain  and  Pine  Mount.  Kenesaw 
was  not  occupied  by  our  (Southern)  troops  until  the  19th,  and  Lost 
Mountain  was  abandoned  on  the  8th.  Our  only  signal  stations  were 
on  Kenesaw,  as  an  observatory,  and  at  headquarters.  Page  53  :  The 
circumstances  of  General  Polk's  death  were  these  :  He  had  accom 
panied  General  Hardee  and  me  to  Pine  Mount  to  reconnoitre.  ~\Ve 
placed  ourselves  in  a  battery  near  the  summit,  on  the  enemy's  side. 
After  seeing  everything  that  interested  us,  we  turned  to  leave  the 
place.  As  we  did  so  a  cannon  shot  from  a  battery  opposite,  probably 
tired  at  a  crowd  of  soldiers  on  the  summit  behind  us,  passed  over  us. 
A  second  came  after  about  a  minute,  and  a  minute  later,  while  we 
were  walking  slowly  toward  our  horses,  General  Polk  being  on  the 
very  top  of  the  hill,  a  third  shot  passed  through  the  middle  of  his 
chest,  from  left  to  right.  lie  was  lifeless  when  I  reached  him  in  a 
few  seconds,  for  we  were  but  twenty  or  thirty  feet  apart.  A  brisk 
lire  of  artillery  (shell)  commenced  soon  after ;  there  had  been  no 
volleys,  and  there  was  no  signal  station  there. 

Page  5-t :  uAVe  captured  a  good  many  prisoners,  among  them  a 
whole  infantry  regiment,  the  Fourteenth  Alabama,  three  hundred 
and  twenty  strong."  The  occurrences  of  the  day  made  this  highly 
improbable,  if  not  impossible — it  was  the  15th.  On  the  16tL,  a  com 
pany  of  skirmishers  was  forgotten  in  a  change  of  position,  and 
captured.  Page  55 :  "  The  Confederate  intrenchment  was  much 
smaller  than  that  described — a  ditch  about  two  feet  deep,  the  earth 
thrown  up  on  the  outside,  making  a  parapet  two  feet  and  a  half  high, 
surmounted  with  a  head  log."  We  had  no  intrenching  tools,  a  dis 
advantage  for  which  all  the  mountain  streams  and  forests  of  Georgia 
would  not  have  compensated.  Page  56  :  "  These  successive  contrac 
tions  of  the  enemy's  line  encouraged  us  and  discouraged  him,  but 
were  doubtless  justified  by  strong  reasons.  On  the  20th,  Johnston's 
position  was  unusually  strong  •,"  by  which  his  troops  were  greatly 
encouraged — indeed,  made  confident.  Pages  59  and  60  :  The  reports 
upon  which  General  Sherman's  telegram  of  the  23d  was  based,  were 
extremely  inaccurate.  Johnston  had  not  half  so  many  miles  of  con 
nected  or  other  trenches  as  he.  The  Federal  army  had  gained  no 


33G  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ground  by  fighting,  unless  the  driving  in  of  a  few  skirmishers  can 
be  called  so.  The  Southern  army  was  never,  during  this  part  of  the 
campaign,  driven  from  a  position  by  fighting,  or  the  fear  of  it ;  only 
by  danger  to  its  communications,  by  the  extension  of  the  strongly 
intrenched  lines,  which  the  enemy's  greatly  superior  numbers  enabled 
him  to  make  and  man.  The  positions  gained  on  the  21st,  near  the 
south  end  of  Kenesaw,  and  on  a  hill  near,  were  outside  of  our  position 
—not  occupied  by  our  line,  and  if  at  all,  only  by  pickets,  and  General 
Sherman  was  deceived  by  reports  of  efforts  to  retake  them  and  night 
attacks,  which  were  never  made  by  our  troops.  If  the  Confederate 
troops  were  so  incessantly  beaten,  it  is  unaccountable  that  they  were 
permitted  to  remain  before  Marietta  four  weeks,  and  then  shifted 
their  ground  only  to  avoid  losing  their  communications.  The  attack 
on  Hooker  and  Schofield  on  the  22d,  was  made  against  orders  by 
General  Hood  with  Stevenson's  Division,  supported  by  Hindman's. 
It  was  defeated  by  intrenched  artillery.  But  the  troops  held  the 
ground  they  gained  long  enough  to  remove  their  dead  and  wounded. 
On  the  25th,  an.  attack  like  this  was  made  on  Stevenson's  Division 
by  the  troops  that  had  repulsed  it  on  the  22d,  and  they  were  repelled 
with  as  heavy  a  loss  as  they  had  inflicted  then.  But  this  affair 
escapes  General  Sherman's  notice. 

Pages  60  and  61 :  The  description  of  the  attack  on  the  Con 
federate  army  on  the  27th  of  June,  prepared  from  the  24th,  and  the 
statement  of  the  Federal  loss,  contrast  strangely  :  "  About  9  A.  M.  of 
the  day  appointed  the  troops  moved  to  the  assault,  and  all  along  our 
lines  for  ten  miles  a  furious  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry  was  kept 
up.  At  all  points  the  enemy  met  us  with  determined  courage,  and 
in  great  force.  *  *  *  By  half -past  eleven  the  assault  was  over, 
and  had  failed."  The  statement  of  loss  was  twenty-five  hundred 
killed  and  wounded.  According  to  this,  an  army  of  Americans, 
inured  to  war,  was  defeated  by  a  loss  of  but  two  and  a  half  per  cent, 
It  is  incredible.  General  Sherman's  subordinates  must  have  imposed 
upon  him.  It  is  equally  incredible  that  another  army  of  American 
veterans,  as  completely  protected  as  men  using  arms  can  be,  could 
strike  but  two  and  a  half  per  cent,  of  men  exposed  to  their  muskets 
and  cannon,  in  seven  lines  at  least,  in  two  hours  and  a  half.  The 
writer  has  seen  American  soldiers,  not  inured  to  war,  win  a  field  witli 
a  loss  ten  times  greater  proportionally. 

Page  TO :  The  Confederates  are  accused  of  burning  their  pon 
toon  bridges  after  crossing  the  Chattahoochec.  They  did  not 
commit  that  folly. 

On  the  17th,  it  was  reported  that  the  Federal  army  was  on  the 


THE  DALTON-ATLANTA   OPERATIONS.  337 

southeast  bank  of  the  Cliattalioocliee,  from  Iloswell  to  Powers'  ferry. 
That  night  General  Hood  was  placed  in  command  of  the  Southern 
army  by  telegraph.  On  the  ISth,  at  his  urgent  request,  Johnston 
forced  the  troops  on  the  high  ground,  overlooking  the  valley  of 
Peachtree  creek  from  the  south,  to  meet  the  advance  of  the  Federal 
forces  reported  that  morning  by  General  Wheeler. 

General  Sherman's  returns,  on  pages  24  and  130,  shows  ninety- 
eight  thousand  seven  hundred  and  ninety-seven  men  present  for  duty 
May  1st;  one  hundred  and  twelve  thousand  eight  hundred  and  nine 
teen  June  1st,  and  one  hundred  and  six  thousand  and  seventy  July  1st. 
Those  of  the  Southern  army  show  forty-two  thousand  eiirht  hundred 

i/  «/  O 

present  for  duty  May  1st ;  fifty-eight  thousand  live  hundred  and  sixty- 
two  June  6th,  and  fifty-three  thousand  two  hundred  and  seventy  live 
July  1st.  Fourteen  thousandt  wo  hundred  infantry  and  artillery  and 
seven  thousand  cavalry  were  received  in  six  detachments,  coming  at 
different  times — all  in  May.  General  Sherman  points  out  these  addi 
tions  to  our  forces,  but  says  nothing  of  the  reinforcements  lie  received 
— except  the  arrival  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  (nine  thousand  men) 
June  8th.  His  reported  losses  in  May,  corrected  by  General  Thomas 
(on  page  5,  report  of  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War,  supple 
mentary  part  5),  and  the  difference  between  the  May  and  June 
returns  above,  show  that  lie  received  above  twenty-five  thousand 
men  in  May  alone.  According  to  the  table  on  page  133,  before 
July  18th  the  Federal  army  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  about  twenty- 
one  thousand  men,  of  whom  about  twenty-five  hundred  were  killed. 
The  Southern  army  lost  in  the  same  time  nine  thousand  nine  hundred 
and  seventy-two  killed  and  wounded,  of  whom  one  thousand  two 
hundred  and  eighty-eight  were  killed.  The  Southern  officers  believed 
that  the  Federal  losses  compared  with  theirs  about  as  five  to  one.  And 
circumstances  justify  that  belief. 

Except  011  three  occasions,  the  Southern  troops  fought  in  their 
intrenchments,  exposing  scarcely  a  thirtieth  of  their  persons,  while 
their  adversaries  were  fully  exposed  on  open  ground.  Therefore, 
with  equal  marksmanship,  they  would  have  given  thirty  hits  for  one 
received.  According  to  the  reports  of  General  Sherman's  subordi 
nates,  they  gave  but  two ;  or,  on  equal  ground,  would  have  made 
one  effective  shot  to  the  enemy's  fifteen — which  is  incredible.  The 
more  so,  because  a  fire  so  utterly  ineffective  could  not  have  repulsed 
or  checked,  in  seventy  days  of  such  close  and  continued  fighting  as 
General  Sherman  describes,  veteran  American  soldiers  such  as  his. 
We  had,  too,  direct  proofs  of  the  inaccuracy  of  these  reports.  After 
the  action  of  June  27th  (pages  60,  61),  we  counted  one  thousand 


338  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

dead  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  lying  before  two  of  Ilardee's 
divisions,  very  near,  some  against,  our  breastworks.  The  calculated 
proportion  of  wounded  to  killed  is  five  to  one ;  this  would  indicate 
a  loss  of  six  thousand  there.  But  the  officers  of  that  army  reported 
fifteen  hundred  and  eighty  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  (see  page 
223,  above  report) — less  than  two  per  cent,  of  the  sixty  thousand 
men  of  that  army.  The  dead  belonged  to  the  first  and  second  lines ; 
and  we  could  see  seven  exposed  to  our  muskets  and  cannon,  so  that 
many  others  must  have  been  killed.  In  like  manner,  on  the  27th 
of  May,  we  repelled  an  assault  by  four  divisions,  and  counted  seven 
hundred  dead  within  thirty  paces  of  our  line.  As  five  or  six  lines 
immediately  behind  these  dead  were  exposed  to  our  shot,  there  must 
have  been  considerable  additional  loss.  Yet  Federal  officers  reported 
but  fourteen  hundred  as  the  entire  loss,  when  it  could  not  have 
been  so  little  as  four  thousand.  General  Sherman  does  not  allude 
to  this  action.  In  the  engagement  two  days  before  (referred  to  on 
page  44),  we  had  a  much  greater  force  engaged  longer,  and,  there 
fore,  must  have  inflicted  a  much  greater  loss.  In  the  three  actions, 
at  least  twenty-five  hundred  Federal  soldiers  must  have  been  killed — 
as  many  as,  according  to  Federal  officers,  were  killed  in  all  the  fighting 
in  ten  weeks  described  by  General  Sherman,  of  which  that  in  these 
three  actions  was  not  a  fourth  part. 

The  reports  made  to  General  Sherman  charge  his  troops,  indi 
rectly,  with  being  checked,  repulsed,  intimidated,  by  such  losses  as 
ordinary  troops  would  have  disregarded.  This  is  incredible  to  those 
who,  like  the  writer,  have  often  witnessed  the  vigorous  and  persistent 
courage  of  American  soldiers,  the  best  of  whom  were  not  superior 
to  General  Sherman's.  But  the  testimony  of  the  ten  thousand  and 
thirty-six  graves  in  the  Union  Cemetery  at  Marietta,  of  soldiers 
killed  south  of  the  Etowah,  is  conclusive.  Less  than  two  thousand 
of  them  fell  in  the  actions  about  Atlanta.  But  at  least  three  thou 
sand  were  killed  north  of  the  Etowah,  and  buried  at  Chattanooga. 
As  the  towns  and  villages  in  the  route  of  the  Federal  army  were 
burned,  there  could  have  been  no  hospitals,  and,  therefore,  few 
deaths  by  sickness  south  of  Dalton.  These  proofs  show  that  the 
estimate  on  page  357,  "  Johnston's  Narrative,"  which  General  Sher 
man  pronounces  erroneous,  is  not  much  so,  to  say  the  least.  On 
page  48,  General  Sherman  claims  to  have  taken  three  thousand  two 
hundred  and  forty-five  prisoners  in  May,  because  he  had  captured 
twelve  thousand  nine  hundred  and  eighty-three  in  the  four  and  a 
half  months  ending  September  15th.  We  had  no  loss  by  capture  in 
May,  and  only  a  little  more  than  two  hundred  up  to  July  18th.  The 


THE  D ALTON- ATLANTA    OPERATIONS.  339 

marches  and  the  results  of  the  fighting  in  that  time  did  not  enable 
the  enemy  to  make  prisoners.  His  successes  and  prisoners  were 
subsequent.  On  page  49,  General  Sherman  claims  that  the  strength 
of  the  country,  by  mountains,  streams,  and  forests,  gave  his  enemy 
a  fair  offset  to  his  numerical  superiority.  Between  Dalton  and 
Atlanta,  one  sees  but  two  semblances  of  mountains — Rocky  Face, 
which  covered  the  march  by  which  he  "flanked"  Dalton  and 
Kenesaw,  less  than  two  miles  long.  The  country  was  no  more 
unfavorable  for  the  offensive  than  the  Wilderness,  or  that  on  which 
Lee  and  McClellan  fought  near  Richmond,  or  that  between  Amelia 
and  Appomattox  Court-Houses. 

General  Sherman  certainly  executed  his  plan  of  operations  with 
great  perseverance,  skill,  and  resolution.  But  it  is  a  question  if  that 
plan  was  the  best.  The  results  obtained,  compared  with  those 
attainable,  indicate  that  it  was  not.  At  Dalton,  only  the  southern 
left  Hank  was  covered  by  Rocky  Face,  not  its  front;  and  an  attack 
in  front  would  have  been  on  ground  as  favorable  to  the  Federal 
army  as  its  general  could  have  hoped  to  find.  With  odds  of  near 
ten  to  four,  he  might  well  have  thought  the  "breaking  up  of  John 
ston's  army"1  attainable  there.  If  defeated,  Atlanta,  its  place  of 
refuge,  was  one  hundred  miles  oil',  with  three  rivers  intervening; 
while  the  Federal  army,  if  unsuccessful,  had  a  secure  refuge  in 
Chattanooga,  which  was  easily  reached.  At  Resaca,  the  Federal 
general  had  a  still  better  opportunity,  for  the  two  armies  met  there 
without  intrenchments  between  them — the  Federals  having  a  line 
of  retreat  from  their  centre  directly  to  the  rear;  while  the  Southern 
troops,  formed  near  and  parallel  to  the  road  to  Atlanta,  would  have 
been  driven  from  that  road  by  defeat,  and,  consequently,  destroyed. 
Battle  at  either  place,  whatever  the  result,  Avould  not  have  cost  a 
fourth  of  the  number  of  men  actually  lost.  And  success  would  have 
ended  the  campaign,  and  decided  the  war. 

On  page  39,  General  Sherman  says:  "Of  course  it  was  to  my 
interest  to  bring  him  to  battle  as  soon  as  possible/'  His  overwhelm 
ing  numbers  ought  to  have  made  it  possible  at  any  time.  The  flank 
ing  operations  forced  the  Southern  army  back  to  Atlanta,  but  could 
do  no  more.  There  it  was  safe  in  intrenchments  much  stronger 
than  any  it  had  previously  occupied,  and  too  extensive  to  be  invested. 
And  three  railroads  met  there,  either  one  capable  of  supplying  the 
army.  So  it  could  have  maintained  itself  there  indefinitely,  and  so 
won  the  campaign  with  little  more  loss.  This  is  no  afterthought, 
but  was  expressed  to  General  Hood  when  he  took  command.  The 
Federal  march  to  Jonesboro'  caused,  but  did  not  compel,  the  abandon- 


34:0  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

merit  of  Atlanta.  For  if  the  Southern  troops  had  remained  in  the 
place,  the  enemy  would,  in  a  few  days,  have  been  forced  to  return 
to  his  railroad.  And,  besides,  Atlanta  could  have  been  sufficiently 
supplied  from  Macon,  through  Augusta;  but  at  Jonesboro'  the 
Federal  troops  could  not  be  fed.  This  mode  of  gaining  Atlanta 
made  the  acquisition  of  no  great  value.  For  the  campaign  continued, 
and  General  Sherman  was  occupied  by  General  Hood  until  late  in 
October,  when  he  commenced  the  disastrous  expedition  into  Ten 
nessee,  which  left  the  former  without  an  antagonist. 

Bentonville — pages  303-4—5-6 :  Johnston  attempted  to  unite 
the  three  little  bodies  of  his  troops  near  Bentonville,  on  the  18th  of 
March,  to  attack  the  head  of  General  Sherman's  left  column  next 
morning,  on  the  Goldsboro'  road.  Less  than  two-thirds  had  arrived 
at  eight  A.  M.  of  the  19th,  when  the  Federal  column  appeared  and 
deployed,  intrenching  lightly  at  the  same  time.  The  lighting  that 
day  was  a  vigorous  attack  on  our  left,  defeated  in  half  an  hour ;  then 
a  similar  one  on  our  right,  repulsed  in  like  manner.  About  three 
o'clock,  all  the  troops  being  in  line,  the  Federal  army  was  attacked, 
driven  from  its  position,  and  pursued  a  mile  and  a  half,  into  an  ex 
tensive  thicket,  wrhich  compelled  the  Southern  troops  to  halt  when 
otherwise  they  were  not  opposed.  Two  hours  after  we  were  slightly 
attacked — by  a  reconnoitering  party,  probably ;  it  \vas  so  easily  re 
pelled.  We  made  no  other  attack,  but  held  our  ground  till  after 
nightfall,  to  carry  off  our  wounded.  Our  army  remained  in  line 
nearly  parallel  to  the  Goldsboro'  road,  to  remove  the  wounded  to 
Smithfield.  Its  flanks  were  somewhat  thrown  back — the  left  only 
of  cavalry  skirmishers.  Butler's  cavalry  was  observing  the  right 
Federal  column;  Wheeler's  arrived  from  Averysboro'  the  evening 
of  the  19th.  Mower's  movement  (see  page  304:)  was  made  after 
three  o'clock;  for  he  had  proceeded  but  a  mile  and  a  half  when 
attacked  and  driven  back,  about  half-past  four  o'clock,  being  then 
in  rear  of  our  centre  where  orders  could  not  reach  him.  So  the 
skirmishing  mentioned  on  page  304:  must  have  been  very  brief. 
Our  men,  being  intrenched,  easily  drove  off  the  enemy.  In  refer 
ence  to  "  wide  discrepancies,"  General  O.  O.  Howard's  (right)  wing 
fought  only  in  this  skirmish.  Yet  it  is  claimed  (page  305)  that  its 
loss  was  but  four  hundred  and  eight,  while  it  inflicted  one  of  near 
two  thousand,  including  wounded,  on  the  Confederates — four  times 
as  great  as  that  they  suffered  June  27th,  by  the  assault  of  the  whole 
Federal  army  (see  page  61).  It  is  claimed,  also,  on  page  305,  that 
the  Southern  army,  which  was  successful  in  all  the  fighting  and 
intrenched  in  most  of  it,  lost  fifty  per  cent,  more  than  the  Federals. 
These  "  discrepancies  "  cannot  be  charged  to  the  Southern  officers. 


THE  D ALTON- ATLANTA   OPERATIONS.  3-il 

Meetings  of  Sherman  and  Johnston,  April  17th  and  18th:  By 
a  not  unusual  error  of  memory,  General  Sherman  probably  attri 
butes  to  Johnston  language  that  he  heard  in  Kaleigh  the  following 
evening  (see  pages  3-At)  and  851).  It  could  not  have  entered  the 
mind  of  the  latter  that  any  of  the  class  to  which  General  Sherman 
belongs  could  entertain  a  suspicion  that  Mr.  Davis  was  accessory  to 
assassination.  The  object  of  our  meeting,  expressed  in  a  letter  in 
his  report,  page  137,  was  to  make  a  general  armistice — ''to  enable 
the  civil  authorities  to  enter  into  the  needful  arrangements  to  ter 
minate  the  existing  war/'  lie  said  that  this  was  impracticable,  and 
ottered  such  terms  of  surrender  as  were  granted  to  the  army  of 
Northern  Virginia.  Johnston  declined  to  capitulate,  because  the 
military  condition  in  Xorth  Carolina  was  unlike  that  in  Virginia, 
and  proposed  that  they  should  agree  upon  preliminaries  of  peace, 
citing  authorities.  General  Sherman  assented,  and  in  less  than  two 
hours  the  terms,  drawn  up  and  adopted  next  day,  were  agreed  upon, 
except  that  General  Sherman  refused  to  include  Mr.  Davis  and  his 
Cabinet  in  the  article  (sixth)  granting  amnesty.  This  question  was 
discussed  till  sunset,  when  they  agreed  to  resume  the  subject  next 
morning.  General  Breckenridge  accompanied  Johnston  to  the 
meeting,  and  Mr.  Reagan  put  on  paper  the  terms  discussed  the  day 
before,  which  Johnston  had  given,  and  sent  the  paper  after  him. 
As  soon  as  received,  without  any  discussion  aside,  these  terms  were 
proposed  to  General  Sherman,  with  the  reminder  that  they  had  been 
almost  accepted  the  day  before.  With  this  paper  before  him,  Gen 
eral  Sherman  wrote  rapidly  that  which  was  adopted  and  signed, 
which  expressed  in  his  language  the  terms  discussed  the  day  before. 
The  terms  of  this  convention  show  that  there  was  no  question  of 
surrender,  but  of  peace ;  nor  of  Johnston's  power  over  other  Con 
federate  armies,  for  in  the  last  paragraph  both  acknowledge  that  they 
had  not  the  power,  but  pledge  themselves  to  obtain  it. 


SOME  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GRANT. 


BY    S.    IT.    M.    BYERS. 


LOOKING  over  my  diary  to-day, 
kept  when  a  corporal  in  Com 
pany  B,  I  find  this  half-faded 
entry :  "  This  day  our  corps, 
the  Seventeenth,  McPherson 
commanding,  marched  from 
the  Mississippi  river  up  to 
Fort  Gibson."  "While  I  was 
standing  by  the  pontoon 
bridge  watching  the  boys 
cross  the  bayou,  I  heard  some 
body  cheering,  and,  looking 
round,  saw  an  officer  on  horse 
back  in  a  major  general's 
uniform.  He  dismounted  and 
came  over  to  the  very  spot 
where  I  was  standing.  I  did  not  know  his  face,  but  something  told 
me  it  was  Grant — Ulysses  Grant,  at  that  moment  the  hero  of  the 
Western  army.  Solid  he  stood — erect ;  about  five  feet  eight,  with 
square  features,  thin  closed  lips,  brown  hair,  brown  beard,  both  cut 
short  and  neat.  "  He  must  weigh  one  hundred  and  fifty  pounds ; 
looks  just  like  the  soldier  he  is.  I  think  he  is  larger  than  Napoleon, 
but  not  much — he  is  not  so  dumpy ;  looks  like  a  man  in  good  earnest, 
and  the  rebels  think  he  is."  And  this  was  the  first  time  I  saw  Grant. 
I  think  I  still  possess  some  of  the  feeling  that  overcame  me  at  that 
moment  as  I  stood  so  near  to  one  who  held  our  lives  and,  possibly, 
our  country's  in  his  hands.  I  heard  him  speak :  "  Men,  push  right 
along ;  close  up  fast,  and  hurry  over."  Two  or  three  men  mounted 
on  mules  attempted  to  wedge  past  the  soldiers  on  the  bridge.  Grant 
noticed  it,  and  quietly  said,  "  Lieutenant,  send  those  men  to  the  rear." 
Every  soldier  passing  turned  to  gaze  on  him,  but  there  was  no  further 
recognition.  There  was  no  McClellan,  begging  the  boys  to  allow 
him  to  light  his  cigar  by  theirs,  or  inquiring  to  what  regiment  that 
exceedingly  fine-marching  company  belonged  to.  There  was  no 
(342) 


SOME  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GRANT.  34;} 

Pope,  bullying  the  men  for  not  marching  faster,  or  officers  for  some 
trivial  detail  remembered  only  by  martinets.  There  was  no  Bona 
parte,  posturing  for  effect;  no  pointing  to  the  Pyramids,  no  calling 
the  centuries  to  witness.  There  was  no  nonsense,  no  sentiment ; 
only  a  plain  business  man  of  the  republic,  there  for  the  one  single 
purpose  of  getting  that  command  across  the  river  in  the  shortest 
time  possible.  On  a  horse  near  by,  and  among  the  still  mounted 
staff,  sat  the  general's  son,  a  bright-looking  lad  of  about  eleven  years. 
Fastened  to  his  little  waist,  by  the  broad  yellow  belt,  was  his  father's 
sword — -that  sword  on  whose  clear  steel  was  soon  to  be  engraved 
Vicksburg,  Spottsylvania,  the  Wilderness,  and  Richmond.  The  boy 
talked  and  jested  with  the  bronzed  soldiers  near  him,  who  laughingly 
inquired  where  we  should  camp;  to  which  the  young  tie  Id  marshal 
replied:  " Over  the  river !"  Over  the  river !  Ah!  that  night  we 
slept  with  our  guns  in  our  liands  ;  and  another  night,  and  another, 
saw  more  than  one  of  our  division  camped  beyond  and  over  the 
river — in  that  last  tenting-ground  where  the  reveille  was  heard  no 
more  forever. 

I  next  saw  Grant  on  May  ISth,  1803,  and  this  time  at  the  battle 
of  "Champion  Hills,"  in  rear  of  Yicksburg.  We  had  crossed  the 
Mississippi  river  at  Grand  Gulf,  and  swung  off  east  and  north  ;  had 
fought  the  battles  of  Port  Gibson,  Raymond,  and  Jackson,  and  were 
overtaking  Pemberton's  army  hastening  to  the  walls  of  \  ickslmrg. 
It  was  a  very  hot  day,  and  we  had  marched  hard,  slept  little,  and 
rested  none.  Among  the  magnolias  on  Champion  hills,  the  enemy, 
forty  to  fifty  thousand  strong,  turned  on  us.  Sherman's  Corps  was 
already  engaged  far  on  the  right  as  we  approached  the  field  in  that 
overpowering  Mississippi  sun.  Our  brigade  was  soon  in  line,  on  the 
edge  of  a  meadow,  or  open  field  sloping  toward  the  woods,  where 
the  enemy  were  concealed,  and  steadily  tiring  upon  us.  We  were  in 
that  most  trying  position  of  soldiers,  for  regulars  even — being  fired 
on  without  permission  to  return  the  shots.  We  were  standing  two 
files  deep,  bearing  as  patiently  as  we  could  not  a  heavy,  but  a  steady 
tire  from  infantry,  while  an  occasional  cannon-ball  tore  up  the  turf 
in  front  or  behind  us.  A  good  many  men  were  falling,  and  the 
wounded  were  being  borne  to  the  rear  of  the  brigade,  close  to  an 
old  well,  whose  wooden  curb  seemed  to  offer  the  only  protection 
from  bullets  on  the  exposed  line.  "  Colonel,  move  your  men  a  little 
by  the  left  flank,''  said  a  quiet,  though  commanding  voice.  On 
looking  round,  I  sawr  immediately  behind  us  Grant,  the  commander- 
in-chief,  mounted  on  a  beautiful  bay  mare,  and  followed  by  perhaps 
half  a  dozen  of  his  staff.  For  some  reason  he  dismounted,  and 


344  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

most  of  Ins  officers  were  sent  off,  bearing  orders,  probably,  to  other 
quarters  of  the  field.  It  was  Grant  under  fire.  The  rattling 
musketry  increased  on  our  front,  and  grew  louder,  too,  on  the  left 
flank.  Grant  had  led  his  horse  to  the  left,  and  thus  kept  near  the 
company  to  which  I  belonged.  He  now  stood  leaning  complacently 
against  his  favorite  steed,  smoking — as  seemed  habitual  with  him— 
the  stump  of  a  cigar.  His  was  the  only  horse  near  the  line,  and 
must,  naturally,  have  attracted  some  of  the  enemy's  fire.  What  if 
he  should  be  killed,  I  thought  to  myself,  and  the  army  be  left 
without  its  commander  ?  In  front  of  us  was  an  enemy  ;  behind  us, 
and  about  us,  and  liable  to  overcome  and  crush  us,  were  his  rein 
forcements.  For  days  we  had  been  away  from  our  base  of  supplies, 
and  marching  inside  the  enemy's  lines.  What  if  Grant  should  be 
killed,  and  we  be  defeated  here — in  such  a  place,  and  at  such  a 
time  ?  I  am  sure  every  one  who  recognized  him  wished  him  away ; 
but  there  he  stood — clear,  calm,  and  immovable.  I  was  close  enough 
to  see  his  features.  Earnest  they  were ;  but  sign  of  inward  movement, 
there  wras  none.  It  was  the  same  cool,  calculating  face  I  had  seen 
before  at  the  bridge ;  the  same  careful,  half -cynical  face  I  afterward 
saw  busied  with  affairs  of  State. 

Whatever  there  may  have  been  in  his  feelings  there  was  no 
effort  to  conceal ;  there  was  no  pretence,  no  trick ;  whatever  that 
face  was,  it  was  natural.  A  man  close  by  me  had  the  bones  of  his 
leg  shattered  by  a  ball,  and  was  being  helped  to  the  rear.  His  cries 
of  pain  attracted  the  attention  of  Grant,  and  I  noticed  the  half- 
curious,  though  sympathizing  shades,  that  crossed  his  quiet  face  as 
the  bleeding  soldier  seemed  to  look  toward  him  for  help.  Men  have 
often  asked  if  Grant  were  personally  brave  in  battle.  Bravery,  like 
many  other  human  qualities,  is  comparative.  That  Grant  was 
fearless  in  battle  would  be  hard  to  say.  If  he  possessed  true  bravery, 
he  also  possessed  fear.  Brave  men  are  not  fearless  men.  The  fools, 
the  excited,  and  the  drunken,  are  they  who,  fearless  and  unasked, 
run  on  to  death.  Where  duty  was,  imposed  or  assumed,  Grant 
feared  not  to  stand,  and  his  sang  froid  was  as  marked,  and  not 
more  necessary,  in  the  presence  of  bullets,  as  it  afterward  was  in  the 
presence  of  popular  clamor  and  senseless  political  reproach.  He  was 
eminently  and  above  all  things  a  cool  man,  and  that,  I  take  it,  was, 
in  the  exciting  times  in  which  he  lived,  the  first  great  key  to  his 
success.  He  was  not  made  hilarious  by  victory,  nor  was  he  depressed 
by  defeat.  His  services  had  not  been  forced  upon  the  country,  nor 
was  he  oblivious  to  his  country's  claims.  He  recognized  simple 
duty,  and  his  worst  enemies  envied  the  ardor  with  which  that  duty 


SOME  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GRANT.  345 

was  performed.  He  was  called  a  born  soldier,  but  was,  in  fact, 
nothing  of  the  kind,  lie  was  simply  a  man  of  correct  methods  and 
a  fixed  will.  The  same  methods  and  the  same  will  would  have  led 
men  to  call  him  a  burn  railway  director,  or  a  born  anything  to 
which  he  had  once  in  good  earnest  turned  his  hand.  As  a  young 
soldier  he  had  lacked  opportunity.  lie  lived  in  a  land  where  neither 
soldiers  nor  poets  were  wanted.  There  were  no  wars,  no  romances, 
and  little  history.  If  he  had  tried  business  a  little  as  a  farmer, 
a  tanner,  a  surveyor,  or  what  not,  it  was  not  in  good  earnest.  It  was 
a  makeshift  for  the  occasion.  The  war  was  Grunt's  opportunity,  and 
he  was  at  the  age  and  had  the  disposition  to  seize  it.  But  his 
military  renown  was  not  of  luck  alone.  It  was  earned  blow  by  blow. 
A\re  had  not  waited  many  minutes  at  the  meadow  when  an 
orderly  dashed  up  to  Grant,  and  handed  him  a  communication. 
Then  followed  an  order  to  move  rapidly  to  the  left,  and  into  the 
road.  The  lire  grew  heavier,  and  the  air  seemed  too  hot  to  be  borne. 
''  Forward  !  "  came  a  second  order,  all  along  the  line — "  Forward  ! 
double  quick  !  "  Everybody  shouted  "  double  quick,"  as  the  noise 
was  becoming  terrific.  AVe  had  forgotten  to  fix  bayonets  !  what  for- 
getfulness !  and  again  the  screaming  was,  ''Fix  bayonets!  fix 
bayonets!"  Iliad  been  selected  by  the  colonel,  just  as  we  entered 
the  road,  to  act  as  sergeant  major,  and  I  now  ran  behind  and  along 
the  line,  shouting  at  the  top  of  my  voice,  u  Fix  bayonets ! "  The 
orders  were  not  heard,  and  we  were  charging  the  enemy's  position 
with  bare  muskets.  A  moment  more  and  we  were  at  the  top  of  the 
ascent,  and  among  thinner  wood  and  larger  trees.  The  enemy  had 
fallen  back  a  few  rods,  forming  a  solid  line  parallel  with  our  own  ; 
and  now  commenced,  in  good  earnest,  the  fighting  of  the  day.  For 
half  an  hour  we  poured  the  hot  lead  into  each  others'  faces.  AVe 
had  forty  rounds  each  in  our  cartridge-boxes,  and,  probably,  nine- 
tenths  of  them  were  tired  in  that  half  hour.  For  me  it  was  the  first 
real  u stand  up  and  fight,"  as  the  boys  called  it,  of  my  life.  Of 
skirmishes,  I  had  seen  many,  and  had  been  under  fire ;  but  this  was 
a  real  battle,  and  what  Grant  himself  might  have  called  "business." 
I  tried  to  keep  cool,  and  determined  to  fire  no  shot  without  taking 
aim ;  but  a  slight  wound  in  the  hand  ended  my  coolness,  and  the 
smoke  of  the  battle  soon  made  aim-taking  mere  guessing.  One  rebel 
officer  I  noticed,  through  the  smoke,  directly  in  front  of  me  on  horse 
back.  That  was  my  mark,  and  I  must  have  fired  twenty  times  at 
him  before  his  form  disappeared.  I  remember  how,  in  the  midst  of 
it  all,  a  young  lad — he  could  not  have  been  more  than  sixteen — came 
running  up  to  me,  and  weeping,  cried  :  '*  My  regiment— my  regiment 


346  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

is  gone — has  run !  What  shall  I  do  ? "  "  Here's  the  place,"  I  said, 
"  pitch  in  !  "  and  pitch  in  he  did.  He  was  of  metal,  that  boy,  and 
kept  his  place  with  the  bravest  veteran  in  the  line.  Hotter  and  hot 
ter  grew  the  fight,  and  soon  this  same  boy  cried :  "  Look — look 
behind  us,"  and,  sure  enough,  the  regiment  to  our  left  had  disap 
peared,  and  we  were  flanked. 

"  Stop  !  halt !  surrender ! "  cried  a  hundred  rebels,  whose  voices 
seem  to  ring  in  my  ears  to  this  very  day.  But  there  was  no  stopping, 
and  no  surrender.  We  ran,  and  ran  manfully.  It  was  terribly  hot, 
a  hot  afternoon  under  a  Mississippi  sun,  and  an  enemy  on  flank  and 
rear,  shouting  and  firing.  The  grass,  the  stones,  the  bushes,  seemed 
melting  under  the  shower  of  bullets  that  was  following  us  to  the  rear. 
We  tried  to  halt,  and  tried  to  form.  It  was  no  use.  Again  we  ran, 
and  harder,  and  farther,  and  faster.  We  passed  over  the  very  spot 
where,  half  an  hour  before,  we  left  Grant  leaning  on  his  bay  mare 
and  smoking  his  cigar.  Thank  God !  he  was  gone.  The  dead  were 
still  there,  and  the  wounded  called  pitiably  to  us  to  halt  and  help 
them  as  we  ran  headlong  to  the  rear.  Like  ten  thousand  starving 
and  howling  wolves  the  enemy  pursued,  closer  and  closer,  and  we 
scarcely  dared  look  back  to  face  the  fate  that  seemed  certain.  Grant 
had  seen  it  all,  and  in  less  time  than  I  can  tell  it  a  line  of  cannon  had 
been  thrown  across  our  path,  which,  as  soon  as  we  had  passed,  belched 
grape-shot  and  canister  into  the  faces  of  our  pursuers.  They  stopped, 
they  turned,  and  they,  too,  ran,  and  left  their  dead  side  by  side  with 
our  own.  Our  lines,  protected  by  the  batteries,  rallied  and  followed, 
and  Champion  hills  was  won,  and  with  it  was  won  the  door  to  Yicks- 
burg.  Three  army  corps  had  taken  part  in  the  fight — Sherman's, 
McClernand's,  and  McPherson's.  One  division  of  the  enemy  passed 
us  and  got  to  our  rear,  thus  escaping  being  captured  with  the  thirty 
thousand  who  surrendered  on  that  birthday  of  the  nation  in  1863. 

Grant  passed  along  the  lines,  after  the  fight,  as  we  stood  in  the 
narrow  roads,  waiting  to  pursue  the  enemy  to  their  works  at  Vicks- 
burg.  Every  hat  was  in  the  air,  and  the  men  cheered  till  they  were 
hoarse ;  but,  speechless,  and  almost  without  a  bow,  he  pushed  on 
past,  like  an  embarrassed  man  hurrying  to  get  away  from  some 
defeat.  Once  he  stopped,  near  the  colors,  and,  without  addressing 
himself  to  any  one  in  particular,  said :  "  Well  done ! "  It  was  mid 
night  before  we  halted  for  the  night ;  and  then,  before  lying  down5 
we  called  the  roll,  and  found  how  many  comrades  were  left  coldly 
sleeping  under  the  magnolias  of  Champion  hills.  My  best  friend 
was  killed,  and  our  mess  had  three  that  night  instead  of  the  six  who 
had  shared  our  rations  in  the  morning  at  reveille.  In  a  few  weeks 


SOME  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GRANT.  34:7 

Yicksburg  was  added  to  the  victor's  crown.  The  siege,  though  not 
especially  long,  had  been  severe.  On  the  22d  of  May,  Grant,  under 
the  impression  that  the  enemy  had  been  demoralized  by  their  defeat 
at  Champion  hills,  gave  ear  to  the  general  cry  of  soldiers  and  officers 
to  "  storm  the  works."  On  the  19th,  we  had  assaulted  and  failed. 
For  days  the  batteries  had  been  receiving  enormous  additions  of 
ammunition,  and,  all  the  morning  of  the  day  designated  for  the 
attack,  Yicksburg  trembled  under  the  most  terrific  cannonade  from 
every  gun  on  the  line.  Men  were  detailed  to  spring  before  the 
advancing  line,  with  ladders  and  planks  to  aid  us  in  getting  over 
ditches.  It  was  a  forlorn  hope — this  little  party  of  brave  men, 
advancing  with  their  ladders  to  certain  death.  At  the  given  signal, 
the  storming  lines  uncovered,  and,  advancing,  were  met  by  the  most 
terrible  crashing  of  musketry.  The  ditches  were  deep  and  wide, 
and  the  earthworks,  bristling  with  red-mouthed  cannon,  were  very 
high.  At  places,  too,  the  enemy  were  outside  of  the  breastworks, 
hidden  behind  bags  of  sand,  from  which  they,  with  safety  to  them 
selves,  delivered  a  galling  fire.  Others,  again,  during  the  night,  had 
dug  holes  more  than  breast-deep,  in  which  they  stood,  as  the  line 
advanced,  and  picked  off,  at  ease,  our  men  with  ladders. 

Still,  in  face  of  all  this,  and  in  the  heat  of  a  broiling  sun,  our 
troops  advanced  to  the  very  ditches,  only  to  be  driven  back  by  a  tire 
that  no  body  of  soldiers  could  withstand.  It  was  of  no  use  ;  we  were 
attempting  the  impossible.  Many  lives  were  being  sacrificed,  and 
nothing  gained.  Some  of  the  breastworks  we  could  not  have  entered 
from  the  front,  even  had  there  not  been  an  enemy  within.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  same  day,  we  attempted  the  charge  again,  with  the 
same  result.  Afterward,  when  Yicksburg  was  ours,  I  walked,  time 
and  again,  over  the  very  ground  where  we  had  so  desperately  fought, 
and  looked  at  the  forts  which  we  had  sought  to  storm,  reflecting  on 
the  extreme  madness  of  the  undertaking.  The  result  of  the  attack, 
however  mortifying  it  must  have  been  to  Grant  himself,  did  not 
lessen  his  cool  and  fixed  determination  to  possess  Yicksburg  before 
a  step  in  any  other  direction  should  be  taken.  Silently,  this  one 
feeling  was  communicated  to  every  soldier  of  his  army.  There 
were  no  loud  proclamations,  orders,  or  manifestos  as  to  what  would 
next  come.  There  were  no  promises  of  victory  to  the  North,  no 
threats  of  humiliation  to  the  South ;  but  every  soldier  knew  that,  as 
we  had  intrenched  before  Yicksburg,  we  would  stay  there  until  the 
city  had  surrendered.  There  was  no  doubt,  no  fears.  We  knew 
that  our  commander  was  a  man  of  business,  with  certain  regular, 
fixed  methods  and  determinations,  and  that,  just  then,  it  was  his 


34:8  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

particular  business  to  take  that  particular  town.  So,  we  said,  as  we 
lay  in  the  rifle-pits  :  "  Let  us  make  ourselves  comfortable ;  for  here 
we  stay  till  the  last  enemy  in  our  front  has  become  our  prisoner." 

But  Grant  was  not  the  only  commander  at  Yicksburg  with  cool 
pluck,  brave  heart,  and  fixed  determination.  Logan,  the  fearless; 
the  accomplished  McPherson,  the  Bayard  of  the  West,  were  there ; 
and  Sherman,  the  brilliancy  of  whose  deeds  were  soon  to  eclipse 
even  those  of  his  great  commander.  What  restless  energy  was 
there — what  pluck  among  both  officers  and  men.  How  many  the 
incidents  of  daring — of  risk,  sacrifice,  and  of  camp  humor,  even  on 
the  "ragged  edge"  of  danger.  Sometimes  a  flag-of-truce  came 
out — often  on  business  intent,  to  collect  the  wounded,  or  bury  the 
dead ;  but  an  occasional  one  as  a  "  feeler,"  to  learn  incidentally,  or 
perhaps  directly,  if  there  was  still  hope.  It  was  told  of  Sherman 
how  one  of  these  flag-of-truce  officers  one  day  asked  the  grim 
general,  in  a  haughty  tone,  "  How  long  he  calculated  it  would  take 
the  Yankees  to  reduce  the  heroic  city  ? "  The  prompt  reply  was : 
"  You  don't  know  me,  perhaps.  My  name  is  Sherman.  My  ene 
mies  in  the  North  sometimes  call  me  '  Crazy  Sherman ;'  but,  in  my 
sane  moments,  I  have  said  this  war  may  last  seventeen  years  yet; 
and  I  know  of  no  place  where  I  should  so  soon  spend  seven  of  them 
as  right  here,  before  Yicksburg."  The  rebel  said  "  Good  day,"  and 
returned  to  the  forts,  where  it  was  soon  whispered  round  that,  with 
such  a  man  besieging  them,  the  city  was  doomed. 

Our  army  occupied  the  anomalous  position  of  being  besiegers 
and  besieged  at  the  same  time.  Peniberton's  army  was  in  front  of 
us  in  the  works,  while  the  army  of  his  confederate,  Johnston,  almost 
surrounded  us  from  behind,  and  was  vigilant  in  seeking  either  an 
opportunity  to  break  through  and  join  the  forces  in  Yicksburg  or 
lend  them  a  helping  hand  in  getting  out.  Many  were  the  adven 
tures,  grim  sports  and  escapes  we  had  as  we  lay  for  weeks  between 
these  two  lines  of  the  enemy.  The  noise  of  the  bombardment  was 
constant,  the  click  of  the  rifles  on  the  line  of  pickets  never  ceased 
day  or  night,  and  many  were  the  deceptions  practiced  by  the  pickets 
of  both  armies  as  they  stood  within  speaking  distance  of  each  other 
to  induce  a  show  of  "  heads  "  above  the  long  lines  of  rude  rifle-pits. 
I  remember  how,  one  day,  I  and  two  of  my  companions  fired  for  an 
hour  at  a  rebel  who  kept  for  ever  hopping  up  and  down  behind  the 
sand  bags  and  calling  constantly,  "  Try  again,  will  you,  Mr.  Yankee  ? " 
Finally  the  figure  mounted  up  in  full  view,  when  we  discovered  we 
were  cheaply  sold,  as  the  daring  rebel  was  a  stuffed  suit  of  old  clothes 
on  a  pole,  while  the  mockery  came  from  the  real  rebel,  safe  behind 


SOME  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GRANT. 

the  sand  bags.  Another  one,  more  reckless,  however,  placed  himself 
in  the  open  embrasure  of  a  low  earthwork  for  a  moment,  and  shouted 
"  Fire  !  "  In  an  instant  lie  lay  stretched  dead  in  the  embrasure.  An 
effort  was  made  bj  his  comrades  to  pull  away  his  body,  but  shots 
were  constantly  fired  into  the  opening  at  every  one  daring  to  show 
himself  for  an  instant.  They  tried  to  pull  the  body  away  with  poles, 
but  in  vain  ;  the  firing  increased  almost  to  the  dignity  of  an  action, 
and  finally  a  battery  joined  in  the  conflict  over  the  poor  corpse 
which,  darkness  hiding  the  combatants,  they  were  at  last  able  to 
secure.  I  have  thought  since  then,  owing  to  the  risks  run  on  his 
behalf,  that  the  poor  man  was  possibly  not  dead  after  all,  but  sadly 
wounded,  and  lying  there  under  the  hot  sun  dying — with  help  so 
near  and  yet  so  powerless  to  save. 

But  incidents  though  as  dangerous,  touching  the  ludicrous,  also 
occurred.     I  recall  how  a  young  Federal  sergeant  foolishly  insisted 
on  exposing  himself  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy  by  creeping  over  the 
earthwork  and  surveying  the  lines  with  an   opera-glass,  borrowed 
during  his  raids  from  some  planter's  house.     The  captain  had  re 
peatedly  and   vainly  warned   him   against  his   recklessness,   till   one 
sunny  morning,  while  engaged  in  his  usual  observations  with  glass 
to  eye,  a  bullet  fired  from  an  unlooked-for  quarter  smashed  the  glass 
in  his  hand.     Our  boys,  seeing  he  was  not  killed,  but  rejoicing  at 
the  warning,  gave  cheers  for  the  rebel  who  tired  the  shot.     It  was  a 
close  shave,  but  our  sergeant  was  cured  of  reckless  curiosity.    Another 
incident,  not  less  ludicrous,  occurred  the  morning  on  which  we  assaulted 
the  works  of  Vicksburg.     I  had  been  detailed  to  bring  cartridges  to 
my  regiment,  which  had  advanced  out  of  the  hollow  in  which  it  lay 
and  over  the  brow  of  the  hill  under  a  heavy  fire.     The  firing  was 
still  going  on,  but  the  regiment  lay  down  unharmed,  when  cartridges 
were  called  for.     I  went  back,  but  found  the  boxes  of  a  1,000  "  58s" 
too  heavy  to  carry,  and  so  strapped  two  of  them  over  the  back  of  a 
strong  mule,  and  started  to  the  front.     I  walked  and  led  the  mule, 
while    a    companion    followed,   administering   a   wagon-whip  from 
behind.     On  emerging  from   the  breastworks  it  was  necessary  to 
hurry  over  a  little  rise  in  full  view  of  the  enemy.     It  was  but  a 
dozen  rods  to  a  spot  of  safety  in  the  hollow.     We  took  a  good  start 
at  a  run,  and  emerged  into  full  view  of  the  forts,  not  a  hundred  rods 
away,  when  the  beast,  true  to  his  instincts,  took  it  into  his  head  at 
this  particular  crisis  to  stop  stock-still.     Persuasion,  pulling,  whoop 
ing,  separate  or  combined,  helped  nothing.     There  he  stood,  fixed 
as  the  general  of  the  army  himself,  and  apparently  ten  times  as  cool. 
What  could  be  done  ?     Bullets  were  whizzing  about  our  heads  and 


350  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ears,  two  had  skinned  up  the  boxes  on  the  mule's  back,  and  the  next 
moment  some  sharpshooter  might,  and  certainly  would,  pick  us  off 
forever.  We  couldn't  run ;  the  ammunition  was  pressingly  needed. 
It  was  too  hot  to  remain  there,  and  go  we  could  not.  Again  my 
comrade  whipped,  both  shouted,  and  I  pulled  and  tugged  till, 
suddenly,  halter  and  bridle  both  slipped  over  the  mule's  head. 
Free  from  restraint,  he  was  disposed  to  run,  and  run  he  did — but 
fortunately  in  the  right  direction.  We,  too,  ran  faster,  possibly, 
than  did  the  mule.  He  was  caught  in  the  right  place,  unloaded  and 
tied  to  a  bush,  where,  in  a  few  hours,  when  the  line  fell  back,  he 
was  left  standing  as  an  outpost,  being  probably  seized  upon  and 
eaten  by  the  hungry  soldiers  of  Pemberton's  army.  I  have  often 
wondered  since  then  how  that  mule  was  accounted  for  at  Washing 
ton.  Was  he  reported  stolen,  captured,  or  simply 

"  Died  on  the  field  of  honor?" 

During  the  long  weeks  of  the  siege,  the  common  soldiers  saw 
Grant  daily ;  not  exhibiting  himself  for  the  sake  of  being  cheered 
and  cheaply  glorified,  but  patiently  examining  the  little  details 
necessary  to  the  safety  and  comfort  of  the  army.  Near  my  regi 
ment  was  an  Ohio  battery  of  brass  six-pounders,  and  it  wras  not 
uncommon  to  see  the  commander  walk  over  and  aim  the  guns  him 
self  or  watch  with  intense  interest  the  effect  of  some  particular  shot. 
His  own  tents,  though  not  as  exposed,  were  as  close  to  the  lines  of 
the  enemy  as  were  the  huts  of  the  soldiers  on  duty.  He  was  com 
manding  his  troops  from  the  front,  not  from  the  rear.  He  lived  in 
his  army,  and  was  himself  not  only  its  director,  but  a  part  of  it.  He 
was  a  private  soldier  in  command,  a  corporal  in  the  uniform  of  a 
general.  Enormous  quantities  of  ammunition  had  been  furnished 
the  batteries,  and  Grant  proposed  celebrating  the  anniversary  of  the 
nation  by  pouring  hot  lead  into  Yicksburg.  Pemberton  certainly 
expected  as  much,  and  offered  to  surrender  in  time.  What  days 
those  were  to  us,  the  common  soldiers  of  the  army,  as  we  lay  in  the 
trenches  of  Yicksburg!  It  was  here  that  I  got  my  first  commission, 
and,  in  a  very  few  days,  the  first  order  I  had  the  honor  of  reading 
to  a  regiment  of  bronzed  soldiers  in  line  contained  the  words : 

Vicksburg  has  capitulated.  At  ten  to-morrow  morning,  July  4th,  1863,  the 
garrison,  thirty  thousand  in  number,  will  march  outside  the  works  and  surrender 
their  arms. 

U.  S.  GRANT. 

There  was  a  shout,  a  throwing  up  of  hats ;  then  came  a  silence. 
"Not  true,  not  true;  too  good,  too  good!"  cried  many.  But  the 


SOME  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GRANT.  351 

colonel  said,  "Praised  be  God!  it  is  true;  Grant  never  jests;"  and 
again  the  woods  rang  with  grateful  shouts.  Some  danced  wildly 
about,  all  shouting  and  shaking  hands,  and  a  few  even  rolled  on  the 
grass  in  deliriums  of  joy,  that  our  nation's  birthday  should  be  wel 
comed  in  a  way  like  that.  As  for  me,  I  saw  again  the  boys  in  blue 
marching  down  the  court-house  steps  of  my  native  village,  off  over 
the  lawn,  and  away  to  death  and  glory.  Some  of  them  were  then 
beside  me,  and  joining  in  the  maddening  shouts  of  victory.  I  could 
not  shout ;  my  heart  was  too  full,  my  joy  too  great.  That  night  I 
wrote  in  my  diary :  "  This  day  has  rewarded  me  a  thousand  times 
for  all  the  sacrifices,  hardships,  dangers,  and  vicissitudes  of  two 
years  as  a  private  soldier."  I  went  to  my  little  tent,  made  of  bushes, 
and  writing  my  mother  a  letter,  told  how  gloriously  Yicksburg  was 
won,  and  how  her  boy  had  helped  to  take  it.  I  inclosed  to  her,  too, 
a  copy  of  my  commission  in  one  of  the  fighting  regiments,  and 
closed  by  asking  if  she  were  not  glad  her  boy  was  not  too  young  to 
be  a  soldier?  Her  answer  brought  me  her  blessing  and  her  prayer, 
and  I  was  doubly  rewarded. 

We  at  once  turned  and  pursued  the  enemy  in  our  rear,  under 
Johnston.  The  Vicksburg  prisoners  were  to  go  back  to  a  camp  of 
parole,  and  for  days  we  marched  along  the  country  road  side  by  side — 
lines  of  the  u  blue  "  and  lines  of  the  "  gray."  It  was  a  strange  sight— 
those  two  armies  that  only  a  few  hours  before  had  been  hurling 
destruction  and  death  at  each  other,  now  walking  in  silence,  side  by 
side;  they  to  prison,  we  in  pursuit  of  their  retreating  comrades;  we 
glowing  in  victory,  they  saddened  in  defeat.  There  were  no  jeers 
as  we  marched  along;  no  reproaching,  no  boasting,  and  no  insults. 
On  the  contrary,  we  recognized  an  honorable  foe,  crippled  but  not 
dead ;  and  many  were  the  little  kindnesses  received  on  that  strange 
and  silent  march,  by  Pemberton's  men,  from  the  boys  of  Grant's 
army.  Many  a  ration  was  divided,  many  a  canteen  tilled,  and  many 
were  the  mutual,  sympathizing  wishes  that  the  cruel  war  might  soon 
be  over.  I  recall  how  a  soldier,  observing  one  of  the  prisoners  foot 
sore,  weary  with  the  march,  and  almost  fainting,  relieved  him  by 
taking  from  him  his  heavy  burden,  and  fastening  it  on  top  of  his 
own,  carrying  it  for  miles.  The  prisoners,  seeing  the  incident, 
cheered,  and  I  think  more  than  one  honest,  kindly  man  of  that 
stranger  train  was  touched  to  tears.  Pemberton  rode  at  the  head  of 
his  prisoner  column,  silent  and  sad.  lie  as  well  as  all  the  officers  of 
of  his  army,  were  in  the  full  gray  uniform  of  the  South,  and  though 
prisoners,  their  swords  still  hung  in  the  scabbards  at  their  sides. 
Many  of  them  were  mounted  on  the  thin  steeds  that  had  survived 


352  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  hunger  of  the  siege.  When  Grant  passed  us,  and  the  boys 
cheered,  the  curiosity  of  the  rebels  was  extreme ;  and  I  was  told 
that  at  one  point  they  even  joined  in  the  shouts  that  welcomed  him. 

In  September,  I  was  allowed  a  short  leave  of  absence  to  visit  my 
home  in  the  far  West.  As  I  went  down  to  the  docks,  the  boat  on 
which  I  was  to  have  had  passage  blew  up,  killing  many  soldiers  and 
negroes.  Later,  I  got  on  another  steamer,  which  on  our  way  up  the 
river  stuck  on  a  sand-bar  for  days.  My  leave  was  for  but  a  month, 
and  in  this  vexing  wray  was  the  time  so  precious  to  me  being  lost. 
At  last  I  got  home,  saw  my  friends,  and  after  eight  days  there,  the 
only  time  spent  at  home  during  the  whole  four  years'  war,  I 
hurried  back  to  join  my  corps,  which  was  then  on  its  march  to 
Chattanooga.  There  I  saw  Grant,  the  last  time  for  many  months, 
preparing  for  the  great  battles  of  Missionary  Ridge  and  Lookout 
Mountain.  I  was  under  Sherman  now,  and  joining  in  the  charge 
made  by  a  part  of  Smith's  Division,  on  the  right  wing  of  Bragg's 
army,  was  surrounded  and  captured.  It  was  the  last  battle  of  my 
life.  I  saw  my  sword,  and  pistols,  and  purse  divided  among  a 
corporal  and  two  privates,  who  came  near  shooting  each  other 
on  account  of  the  trophies  captured  from  the  young  Yankee.  I 
also  saw,  however,  from  the  top  of  Mission  Ridge,  the  flying  enemy, 
and  the  grand  advance  of  Thomas'  and  Sherman's  armies.  I  was  a 
prisoner ! 

What  I  experienced  during  more  than  fifteen  months  in  the 
prisons  of  Libby,  Columbia,  Charleston,  and  elsewhere,  will  not  be 
related  here.  In  September,  186-i,  the  Libby  prisoners,  seven 
hundred  in  number,  and  all  officers,  were  transferred  from  Charleston 
to  a  camp  in  the  woods,  on  the  Congaree  river,  near  Columbia, 
South  Carolina.  There  seemed  but  one  outlook  ahead  for  us,  and 
that  was  a  lingering  death,  unless  hastened  by  some  attempt  to 
escape.  I  had  got  away  twice,  for  a  few  days  at  a  time,  but  was 
recaptured,  and  my  position  made  even  worse  than  before.  In 
December,  Sherman  had  made  that  brilliant  inarch  to  the  sea,  and 
in  February  was  engaged  in  that  still  more  arduous  campaign 
through  the  Carolinas  to  Richmond.  I  learned  that  his  army  was 
approaching  Columbia,  and  for  the  third  time  attempted  to  get 
away.  I  escaped  the  guards,  and,  aided  by  an  old  slave,  secreted 
myself  in  Columbia,  and  witnessed  the  evacuation  by  the  rebels,  and 
the  grand  entry  of  Sherman's  army.  Sherman,  with  his  character 
istic  kindness,  sought  out  myself  and  others  wrho  had  been  prisoners, 
and  who  had  escaped,  and  cared  for  the  wants  of  all.  I  was  given, 
for  the  time,  a  place  on  his  staff.  What  a  change  it  was,  from  the 


SOME  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GRANT.  353 

degradation,  the  starving,  the  suffering  of  a  mistrusted  prisoner  to 
the  headquarters  of  the  most  brilliant  general  of  modern  times. 
Sherman  was  marching  northward  with  an  army  of  ninety  thousand 
men  in  four  columns,  on  as  many  different  roads,  all  bearing  on 
some  designated  point.  One  day  he  would  ride  with  this  column, 
the  next  day  with  that ;  but  whenever  he  appeared  among  the 
soldiers  it  was  one  loud  and  continued  cheer  for  "  Billy  Sherman." 
Here  was  the  general  whom  everybody  knew,  and  whom  everybody 
loved.  If  Grant  had  been  the  creator  of  the  A\Testern  army,  Sherman 
was  its  idol.  He  was,  indeed,  looked  upon  as  a  sort  of  common 
property,  in  which  every  man  in  the  army  had  a  special  and 
particular  interest.  I  speak  knowingly,  as  one  who  was  a  private 
soldier,  and  who  associated  with  private  soldiers  under  him.  In  the 
tent,  in  the  bivouac,  in  the  rifle-pits,  the  men's  faith  in  his  consum 
mate  generalship  never  faltered.  On  the  march  his  name  was  more 
than  respected — it  was  loved  ;  and  whenever  he  appeared,  the  knap 
sacks  of  the  boys  grew  lighter,  the  step  brisk,  and  the  face  bright. 
It  was  in  this  march  through  the  Carolinas  I  again  saw  so  much  of 
the  influence  of  that  presence  on  the  soldiery.  It  rained  nearly  all 
the  time;  the  roads  were  horrid,  and  had  to  be  corduroyed  with 
poles  and  rails  half  the  way  ;  the  wagons  and  the  artillery  stuck  in 
the  mire  hourly,  and  the  soldiers  had  to  drag  them  out  with  their 
own  hands.  Every  stream  had  to  be  bridged,  every  quagmire  tilled, 
and  every  mile  skirmished  with  the  enemy. 

There  was  not  a  tent  in  the  army.  Even  the  general  slept  in  the 
woods,  under  "plys,"  in  deserted  houses,  or  lone  churches  along  the 
way.  On  right  and  left,  before  and  behind,  was  an  enemy  ;  quag 
mires  were  under  foot,  and  continued  rain  overhead ;  yet  through 
all  this  the  boys  tugged  and  fought,  and  amidst  their  tugging  sang 
and  cheered.  It  was  the  magnetism  of  one  really  great  man.  It 
was  "  Billy  Sherman."  His  approach  to  the  line  of  march  was  the 
signal  for  shoutings  that  I  have  heard  taken  up  and  repeated  for 
miles  ahead.  Riding  alongside  the  regiments  struggling  through  the 
mud  or  the  underbrush  at  the  roadside,  he  would  often  speak  to  the 
nearest  soldiers  with  some  kind  and  encouraging  word.  Kor  was  it 
unusual  to  hear  private  soldiers  call  out  to  him,  knowing  his  kind 
heart  would  give  them  no  rebuff.  At  headquarters  there  was  little 
pretense,  and  no  show.  When  evening  came  a  convenient  spot  in 
the  woods  was  usually  sought  out,  a  few  tent  plys  were  stretched, 
and  a  rail  fire  built  in  front.  The  mess-chest  was  opened,  and  a 
hasty  but  substantial  meal  was  enjoyed,  amid  conversation  on  almost 
every  topic  but  the  war.  On  this  he  was  oftenest  silent,  preferring 
23 


354  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

to  keep  his  own  judgment,  hopes  and  fears  to  himself.  He  wrote 
most,  probably  all,  of  his  own  dispatches,  leaving  his  staff  little  or 
nothing  to  do.  After  supper  he  studied  his  maps  in  the  fire-light, 
or  heard  the  reports  from  the  other  columns  for  the  day.  He  was 
last  in  bed  at  night,  and  first  in  the  saddle  in  the  morning.  Dinner 
consisted  of  a  light  lunch  at  twelve ;  all  dismounted  at  the  roadside, 
and  an  hour's  rest  brought  us  again  to  the  saddle.  So  the  days 
passed,  and  the  enemy  was  continually  pushed  or  beaten  back  from 
each  and  every  chosen  position. 

At  Fayetteville  a  tugboat  met  us  in  answer  to  a  message  sent  by 
one  of  Sherman's  scouts  to  Wilmington.  The  general  seized  the 
opportunity  to  report  his  progress  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  at 
Washington,  and  to  General  Grant,  then  with  his  army  before  Rich 
mond.  At  the  breakfast-table  that  Sunday  morning  he  announced 
his  intentions,  and  I  was  to  be  the  lucky  one  to  go.  That  night  a 
i'ew  of  us  ran  down  the  Cape  Fear  river  to  the  sea,  and  a  ship  bore 
me  around  Cape  Hatteras,  across  to  Fortress  Monroe,  and  up  the 
James  to  Grant.  I  found  him  in  a  little  board  cabin  of  two  rooms. 
He  stood  talking  with  a  delegation  of  Northern  citizens,  who  had 
come  down  ostensibly  to  encourage  the  army,  but  in  reality  to  inter 
fere  with  the  plans  of  its  commander  by  insisting  on  giving  some 
pet  advice.  In  those  days  everybody  thought  himself  fit  to  command 
an  army,  and  the  newspapers  seemed  to  be  all  edited  by  major  gen 
erals,  so  full  were  they  of  warning  instructions,  "We  told  you  so's," 
etc.  I  was  announced  to  Grant  as  a  bearer  of  dispatches  from 
Sherman,  whose  army  I  soon  learned  had  not  been  heard  from  since 
cutting  loose  from  its  base  at  Savannah,  the  greatest  anxiety  being 
felt  for  its  safety  the  country  over.  Grant  took  my  hand  and  con 
ducted  me  into  the  little  back  room,  closing  the  door  behind  us. 
The  dispatches,  which  I  had  sewed  up  in  my  clothes,  were  turned 
over  and  carefully  read,  and  I  saw  with  what  a  glow  his  face  lighted  up 
as  he  read  of  the  continued  successes  of  his  friend  and  co-commander. 
He  hurried  them  through  again,  rose  to  his  feet,  and  for  a  moment 
paced  the  little  room;  then  suddenly  opening  the  door  he  called 
General  Ord,  who  was  in  the  adjoining  room,  to  come  in  and  hear 
the  good  news  from  Sherman.  Bad  news  of  some  misfortune  to 
Sherman's  army  had  been  telegraphed  to  Richmond  by  Wade  Hamp 
ton,  of  the  enemy's  army,  the  day  before.  The  reports  had  come 
through  the  lines  to  Grant  in  most  exaggerated  form.  "  Glorious  ! " 

cried  Ord,  "  glorious !     I  was  beginning  to  have  my  fears,  but 

"  Not  a  bit !  not  a  bit !  "  replied  Grant.  "  I  knew  him.  I  knew  my 
man.  I  expected  him  to  do  just  this,  and  he  has  done  it."  I  was 


SOME  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GRANT.  355 

then  questioned  as  to  many  a  detail  of  Sherman's  last  movements. 
k'We  have  been  in  perfect  ignorance,"  said  Grant,  "of  all  these 
things  ;  von  have  brought  me  the  iirst  authentic  news.  How  about 
Kilpatrick?"  And  I  told  him  how,  a  few  nights  before,  this  officer 
had  been  surprised  in  bed,  and  his  staff  all  captured ;  how  he  fled  to 
the  swamp,  rallied  his  men,  and,  returning,  chased  Wade  Hampton 
completely  from  the  road.  Grant  and  Orel  both  laughed  heartily. 
"And.  this,  then,  was  the  disaster  to  Sherman's  army,  of  which  the 
rebels  had  been  boasting  so  loudly.  I  expected  just  exactly  as  much," 
said  Grant, 

Kilpatrick  had,  in  fact,  a  most  laughable  adventure  with  a 
narrow  escape,  however,  for  life.  He  was  at  Sherman's  headquar 
ters  the  day  after  the  surprise,  and  I  heard  him  telling  how  he  was 
chased,  and  his  staff  captured  and  put  up  stairs  in  a  house,  where 
they  remained  while  he  rallied  his  men  in  the  swamp,  and  surprised 
Hampton  in  return,  and  to  more  purpose,  too,  than  he  himself  had 
been  surprised,  lie  lost  a  couple  of  hundred  of  prisoners,  however, 
and  some  horses.  But  Kilpatrick  kept  his  ground  and  lived  to  lead 
his  dashing  cavalry  on  many  another  Held.  kk  How  do  the  men  seem 
off  for  shoes  and  for  coats?"  asked  Grant.  I  replied,  if  suffering, 
there  was  no  complaint.  At  that  moment  a  fierce  and  sudden  can 
nonade  commenced  at  some  point  on  the  enemy's  line.  An  officer 
was  called  and  ordered  off  to  see  what  it  meant.  "It  is  one  of  the 
usual  make-believes  that  we  are  having  daily,"  said  Grant.  I  asked 
if  an  engagement  was  expected.  He  replied  it  was  quite  possible  at 
any  hour;  but  his  own  opinion  was  that  Lee  at  that  very  moment 
might  be  getting  ready  to  try  and  escape  from  Richmond,  and  that 
this  thundering  cannonade  was  one  of  his  preparatory  ruses  to  attract 
attention.  The  correctness  of  his  opinion  was  proven  in  a  few  days, 
when  Lee  and  his  whole  army  fell  back  from  Richmond,  only  to  be 
captured  at  Appomattox  Court -House.  Grant  mentioned  that  the 
Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Stanton,  was  there  from  Washington,  and 
would  visit  him  that  evening,  and  suggested  that  he  should  take 
charge  of  my  other  papers  and  turn  them  over  to  him.  He  was  then 
kind  enough  to  ask  about  rny  own  personal  experiences,  especially  my 
life  in  prison,  and  if  I,  too,  confirmed  the  horrible  tales  of  suffering 
that  had  met  his  ears  daily.  I  gave  him  a  list  of  what  we  had  to 
eat  for  months,  told  him  that  the  prisoners  were  in  rags,  that  not  a 
single  garment  had  ever  been  given  to  them  since  their  capture,  and 
some  of  them  had  been  in  the  enemy's  hands  for  eighteen  months. 
He  expressed  his  sorrow;  surprise  he  had  none  ;  and  added  that  their 
sufferings  would  soon  be  over,  as  he  believed  the  war  would  very 


356  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

soon  terminate.  "You  would  like  to  go  home  at  once,  wouldn't 
you  ? "  lie  said,  again  going  to  the  door  and  asking  llawlins,  his  chief  - 
of -staff,  to  have  leave  of  absence  and  pass  made  out  for  me.  lie 
signed  the  papers,  and  thanked  me  for  my  promptness. 

It  was  the  last  time  I  ever  saw  Grant  in  uniform.  I  went  to 
my  home  in  the  far  West.  I  was,  as  a  soldier,  almost  alone ;  yet  in 
a  few  days  I  saw  the  little  fragment  of  the  company,  of  which  I  had 
been  a  member,  returning  from  the  war.  They  were  veterans  then. 
I,  too,  was  a  veteran.  I  heard  the  drums  beating,  and  again  I  went 
down  to  the  village,  and  there  saw  the  "  boys  "  paraded  for  the  last 
time  on  the  green  grass  of  the  court-house  yard ;  on  the  very  spot, 
indeed,  where,  four  years  before,  we  had  been  mustered  in.  There 
was  not  so  much  room  required  now,  as  then.  Twenty-seven  bronzed 
faces  were  all  that  were  left  of  a  hundred  stout  youths  who  had 
stood  on  that  same  spot  but  four  short  years  before.  There  was  no 
cheering  now,  as  then ;  the  silence  was  painful,  almost.  Many  of 
the  wives,  and  mothers,  and  sisters  who  were  there  before,  were  not 
there  again — they  could  not  be.  In  their  desolate  homes  they  sat,  and, 
like  Rachel,  wept  and  would  not  be  comforted.  Their  soldiers  had 
been  left  behind;  had  been  mustered  out  on  the  red  battle-field 
many  a  day  before.  I  have  left  my  native  village  since  then — I 
could  not  stay  there.  The  recollections  that  always  crowded  upon 
my  mind  when  passing  the  green  court  yard  made  it  impossible. 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE 


BY    II.    V.    KEDFIELD. 


j  FOR  the  first  three  years  of 
the  war  my  home  in  Tennes 
see  was  surrounded  l>y  the 
armed  hosts  of  one  army,  and 
then  the  other  (and  sometimes 
both  at  once,  or  so  near  it  as 
to  l)e  uncomfortable),  and  my 
pportunities  for  observation 
were  good.  "When  the  war 
broke  out,  the  people  of  our 
portion  of  lower  East  Tennes 
see  calculated  upon  exemption 
from  its  ravages.  I  remember 
vividly  how  the  old  citizens, 
in  whom  I  had  implicit  confi 
dence,  shook  their  heads  with 

prophetic  earnestness,  saying  that  we  would  see  no  soldiers  of  either 
army,  ''as  they  couldn't  get  their  cannons  over  these  mountains." 
The  leading  merchant,  the  leading  minister,  and  the  leading  physi 
cian  were  of  this  opinion,  and  the  solemn  judgment  of  three  such 
distinguished  men  was,  in  my  mind,  all  but  conclusive,  "i  et,  alas! 
the  village  knowledge  of  war  proved  as  illusive  as  that  of  Betsey 
"Ward,  when  her  old  man,  the  immortal  A.  Ward,  was  prancing  up 
and  down  the  room,  musket  in  hand,  "drilling."  The  cellar-door 
being  open,  a  sudden  right-about  wheel  threw  him  in,  nearly  breaking 
his  neck.  "Are  you  hurt,  deary?"  exclaimed  Mrs.  A.  AV.,  running 
to  the  hole,  and  putting  her  question  in  the  direction  of  the  groans 
below.  "  Go  away!"  shouted  "Ward;  "what  do  you  know  about 
war?"  Well,  when  the  war  was  over  our  little  circle  of  prophets, 
or  those  of  them  who  lived  through  it,  knew  more  about  it  than  they 
did  when  it  commenced.  They  found  that  mountains  were  no 
barrier  to  camion,  and  that  "terrible  armies  with  banners"  swept 
past  them  Lack  and  forth  with  the  apparent  ease  that  a  pendulum 
swings  in  its  course. 

(357) 


358  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

From  near  the  beginning  the  Southern  soldiers  were  with  us — 
squads,  companies,  and  regiments.  They  were  almost  always  well 
behaved.  Of  course  they  "  scouted,"  and  arrested  ultra  Union  men, 
and  carried  them  away  from  their  families,  and  did  many  hard  and 
cruel  things  ;  but  they  did  not  pillage,  or  wantonly  destroy  property, 
and  they  paid  for  forage  and  animals  in  Confederate  currency, 
which  was  at  first  very  good  money.  Looking  back  at  it  impartially — 
and  I  pledge  myself  to  try  and  write  the  truth — I  am  constrained  to 
say  that  the  Southern  soldiers,  as  a  mass,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
were  gentlemen.  Even  our  chickens  roosted  securely  near  their 
camps.  Indeed,  for  the  first  year  of  the  war,  I  do  not  recall  an 
instance  of  theft  in  our  neighborhood  by  the  Southern  soldiers.  At 
first  the  greater  portion  of  them  seemed  to  have  little  conception  of 
the  magnitude  of  the  job  they  had  undertaken.  They  thought  the 
war  would  soon  be  over;  that  the  Yankees  would  not  fight  very 
much,  and  all  hands  could  go  home  before  the  end  of  the  year. 
They  conceived  it  to  be  more  of  a  frolic  than  a  real  war.  Indeed, 
the  Southern  troops  were  ultra  sanguine  at  the  beginning,  counting 
upon  a  united  South  and  a  divided  North,  and  a  timid  enemy 
without  taste  for  war  and  gunpowder.  Occasionally,  one  wiser  than 
the  rest  would  shake  his  head  ominously,  and  say  that  Southern 
independence  could  only  be  established  after  a  most  desperate  and 
bloody  contest ;  but  such  were  regarded  as  men  made  melancholy 
by  a  cross  in  love,  or  an  absent  sweetheart,  far,  far  away,  or  the 
dyspepsia,  or  constitutional  melancholy.  In  fine,  such  gloomy 
persons  were  laughed  at. 

AJ1  the  talk  about  the  ability  of  one  Southern  man  to  make 
away  with  five  of  the  enemy,  and  all  the  prophecies  about  the  war 
as  "  only  a  frolic,"  was  ended,  in  the  part  of  the  country  where  I 
was,  by  the  crushing  Confederate  defeat  at  Mill  Spring,  Kentucky, 
January  19th,  1862.  Here  the  idol  of  the  Tennesseeans,  General 
Felix  IL  Zollicoffer,  was  killed,  and  his  command  put  to  utter  rout. 
I  was  living  fully  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  south  of  this  battle 
field;  yet  it  is  a  fact  that  some  of  the  panic-stricken  soldiers 
stampeded  that  distance  before  they  got  over  their  fright !  I  saw 
some  of  them  on  horses  without  saddles,  both  men  and  animals 
having  a  wild  look  in  the  eyes,  as  if  awakened  from  a  terrible  dream. 
At  Knoxville,  the  fugitives  had  to  be  "herded"  and  guarded. 
Some  went  to  that  city,  some  to  Chattanooga,  and,  indeed,  they 
spread  out  over  the  face  of  the  country  like  frightened  cattle. 
Perl  laps  this  panic  was  not  equaled  in  the  whole  course  of  the  war. 
It  certainly  served  the  purpose  of  awakening  the  Southern  soldiers, 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  ARMIES.  359 

in  this  part  of  the  country,  from  the  dream  that  "the  Yankees" 
would  be  easily  discouraged  and  overcome.  The  whole  affair  was 
extremely  humiliating  to  the  Confederates.  Not  only  was  their 
army  defeated,  but  utterly  routed  and  broken  up,  and  its  com 
mander  killed.  Zollicoffer's  death  was  tragic.  At  first,  the  action 
seemed  favorable  to  the  Southern  troops,  and  Zollicoffer  advanced 
at  the  head  of  his  men.  lie  was  in  advance,  and  came  upon  a 
Kentucky  (Federal)  regiment  in  a  piece  of  woods.  The  commander 
of  this  regiment,  Colonel  Fry,  shut  Zollicoffer  dead,  and  his  body 
fell  into  their  hands.  This  victory  was  the  first  considerable  Union 
victory  of  the  war.  After  that,  the  magnitude  of  the  conflict  dawned 
upon  the  people  of  the  western  portion  of  the  Confederacy.  It  was 
"  an  eye-opener,"  and  dispelled  the  delusions  they  had  been  cherishing. 

A  month  after,  Fort  Donelson  and  Nashville  fell,  and  the  Con 
federate  plans  of  campaign  in  the  AVest  were  all  broken  up.  General 
John  1).  Floyd  (Secretary  of  War  under  Buchanan),  who  had  escaped 
from  Donelson,  came  through  our  neighborhood  in  retreat.  The 
soldiers  were  much  dispirited,  and  Floyd  himself  was  rather  melan 
choly,  lie  camped  near  us  two  or  three  days,  resting  his  men  on 
their  long  retreat.  Hearing  that  there  were  many  Union  men  in 
the  neighborhood,  lie  sent  word  for  them  to  come  in;  that  his 
soldiers  should  not  molest  them.  Nor  did  they.  The  General  made 
a  speech  to  the  citizens,  explaining  how  it  was  that  he  escaped  from 
Donelson.  "I  shall  never  be  captured  in  this  war,"  said  he,  "for  I 
have  a  long  account  to  settle  with  the  Yankees,  and  they  can  settle 
it  in  hell!"  The  General  did  not  lose  heart  in  the  success  of  the 
Confederacy;  but  it  was  plain,  from  his  remarks,  which  I  heard, 
that  the  magnitude  of  the  conflict  had  dawned  upon  him  at  Donelson 
as  it  never  had  before.  Some  of  the  Union  men  would  not  hear  his 
speech  out,  but  left  the  room.  Floyd  was  very  unpopular  among 
this  class  of  citizens,  owing  to  the  wide  belief  that  he  had  been 
active  in  precipitating  the  Southern  States  into  secession. 

It  was  about  the  1st  of  March  that  Floyd  came  through  on  his 
way  to  Chattanooga.  In  two  months — May  1st,  18(52 — the  first 
u  Yankees"  appeared  in  our  neighborhood.  It  was  a  company  of 
the  Tenth  Ohio  Infantry.  A  few  of  them  had  impressed  horses, 
and  came  into  town  as  though  shot  out  of  a  gun.  The  others  fol 
lowed  on  foot,  in  close  order.  The  more  ultra  of  the  Southern 
people  ran  away.  The  Union  people  were  delighted.  But  their 
delight  was  brief,  for  the  soldiers  set  about  indiscriminate  robbery. 
One  Union  citizen  was  knocked  down  in  his  own  house,  in  the 
presence  of  his  family,  and  robbed  of  four  thousand  dollars.  By 


360  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  aid  of  General  O.  M.  Mitchell,  he  subsequently  recovered  the 
most  of  this  money ;  but  the  conduct  of  the  soldiers,  on  this  occasion, 
was  a  stunning  blow  to  the  Union  people.  It  happened  that  the 
company  were  foreigners,  and,  however  valuable  they  might  be  as 
fighters,  they  had  an  eye  to  pillage.  They  stole  more  in  a  few  hours 
than  the  Southern  soldiers,  in  the  same  immediate  neighborhood,  had 
stolen  in  the  whole  course  of  the  war  up  to  that  time.  This  company 
returned  in  the  direction  of  Iluntsville,  Alabama,  the  same  day,  and 
we  saw  no  more  Federals  for  about  five  weeks.  Meantime,  the 
Southern  soldiers  came  in,  and  from  that  time  until  the  close  of  the 
war  the  citizens  were  first  treated  to  one  side  and  then  the  other. 
Near  the  close  of  1863,  I  left  that  part  of  the  country,  and  went 
North ;  but,  having  been  within  both  lines  and  both  camps,  my 
opportunities  for  observing  the  characteristics  of  the  two  armies 
were  excellent.  Beside,  I  had  kinsmen  and  friends  in  each  army 
operating  in  that  region,  and  through  them  I  had  many  inside  views 
of  camp  life,  and  opportunities  to  contrast  the  traits  of  each  army. 

The  Union  army  was  altogether  the  best  £ed.     Early  in  1862 
the  Confederates  ceased  to  have  coffee.     Indeed,  they  had  not  from 
the  first  anything  like  a  regular  supply.     Soon  after  meat  and  flour 
began  to   grow  scarce.     But   the  abundance  of   coffee  which   the 
Federals  had  was  worth  several  regiments  of  men  to  that  side.     I 
personally  knew  of  an   amusing  instance  of  coffee  alone  drawing 
three  soldiers  into  the  Federal  army.     Not  far  from  us  lived   a 
family  whom  I  will  call  Blank — father  and  two  sons.     The  father 
was  among  the  first  to  volunteer  in  the  Southern  army  and  fight 
for  his  "  rights,"  although  he  was  utterly  impecunious,  having  no 
negroes'  or  much  of  anything  else.     lie  was  captured,  paroled  and 
came  home  until  exchanged.     The  Federal  army  came  near,  and  his 
two  sons,  then  at  man's  estate,  went  down  to  the  Union  "  camp  "  to 
see  how  tilings  looked.     They  met  friends  there  and  were  bounti 
fully  fed  upon  crackers  and  coffee.     This  last  was  a  luxury  which 
they  had  long  been  deprived.     They  actually  enlisted  to  get  plenty 
of  coffee  and  "  grub."    When  the  old  man  heard  of  this  performance 
he  started  for  the  camp  to  get  his  sons  out  of  the  "  scrape."     He  got 
in,  got  some  of  that  good  coffee,  and  enlisted  for  the  war  and  fought 
it  through  with  his  two  sons !     Thus  coffee  captured  recruits.     The 
reader  may  doubt  this  story,  but  I  can  vouch  for  its  truth.     The 
parties  are  all  yet  living,  and  not  long  ago  I  saw  the  old  man,  and, 
indeed,  have  known  him  for  many  years.     Through  the  whole  war 
the  superior  food  of  the  Union  army  was  a  powerful  lever  upon  that 
side.     After  the  first  year  the  Confederates  had  little  coffee,  and 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  ARMIES.  361 

their  food  became  very  indifferent.  In  the  spring  of  1803,  I  spent 
two  days  in  the  camp  of  a  Confederate  cavalry  brigade,  and  their 
food  was  simply  Hour  and  beef,  nothing  else.  They  had  not  an 
ounce  of  salt,  and  it  was  not  to  be  got  for  love  or  money.  They 
mixed  the  flour  with  water,  baked  it,  and  roasted  the  beef  on  the  end 
of  a  stick.  I  could  but  contrast  their  style  of  living  with  that  of  the 
well  fed  and  splendidly  equipped  Federal  army,  with  their  full  rations 
of  coffee  pork,  beef,  salt,  bread,  and  beans,  and  convenient  cooking 
vessels. 

In  clothing,  there  was  no  comparison.     The  Southern  uniform 
was  supposed  to  be  gray,  but  the  soldiers  wore  homespun  of  all 
colors.     Of  overcoats  they  had  no  regular  supply      Blankets  were 
very  scarce.     Ditto  woolen  shirts  and  socks.     The  splendid  double- 
thick  overcoat  which  every  Federal  soldier  had  was  usually  warmer 
than  every  article  of  clothing  that  the  Southern  soldier  had  com 
bined.     I  do  not  think  that  the  Confederate  Government  attempted 
t<»  is.- ue  overcoats  to  their  men.     At  least  I  never  saw  anv  among 
them  that  bore  resemblance  to  uniformity.     But  it  was  in  cavalry 
equipment  that  the  Federal  soldier  stood  out  pre-eminently  superior. 
And  over  all,  he  had  an  oil-cloth  blanket  which  fitted  around  the 
neck,  keeping  the  whole  person  dry,  as  well  as  protecting  arms  and 
ammunition.      Much    of    the    Southern    cavalry    was    ridiculously 
equipped.     In  one  regiment  I  have  seen  four  or  five  different  kinds 
of  riiles  and  shot-guns,  all  sorts  of  saddles,  some  with  rope  stirrups, 
many  of   the  saddles  without  blankets;  all   sorts  of  bridles,  and  in 
fact    a    conglomerate    get-up    fairly    laughable.       The    horses    were 
usually  fed  on  raw  corn  on  the  cob.     Baled  hay,  sacked  corn,  and 
oats,  such  as  the  Union  army  had,  was  rather  a  rarity  on  the  other 
side.     I   speak  of  what  fell  under  mv  own  observation.     The  stock 
of  the  Southern  army,  horses  and  mules,  never  looked  as  well  as  that 
of  the  Union  army.     The  animals  of  the  two  armies  could  be  distin 
guished  even  if  no  men  were  about.     Animals  in  the  Union  army 
were  not  only  better  fed,  but   better  attended,  better  groomed,  and 
cared  for.     Another  point  of  difference  was  the  superior  brightness 
and  cleanliness  of  the  Xorthern  arms.     The  muskets  and  bayonets, 
and  brass  ornaments  upon  the  ammunition  boxes  always  looked  bright 
and  cleanly.     In  the  Southern  army  there  was  never  this  care  to  keep 
the  guns  bright  and  free  from  dirt  and  rust. 

The  first  time  I  visited  a  large  camp  of  the  Union  army,  I  was 
struck  with  the  convenience  of  everything  as  compared  with 
Southern  camps.  This  was  afterward  repeatedly  verified.  The 
^Northern  soldiers,  although  they  might  be  in  camp  but  a  few  days, 


362  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

would  busy  themselves  constructing  beds  up  off  the  ground,  usually 
by  driving  forked  sticks,  and  laying  rails  and  bits  of  plank  across. 
If  in  the  woods,  they  utilized  small  boughs  and  leaves  in  preparing 
beds,  and  the  larger  limbs  in  building  shelters  from  the  sun  and  rain 
to  cook  in,  etc.  Indeed,  whenever  they  went  into  camp  they  were 
as  busy  as  bees  arranging  for  health  and  comfort.  On  the  other  side, 
the  Southerners  rarely  troubled  themselves  to  provide  these  little 
comforts.  In  camp  they  were  usually  idle.  The  scenes  of  busy 
industry,  which  we  always  saw  in  the  Northern  camp,  were  never 
duplicated  in  the  other.  And  as  to  filth,  the  Union  camps  were 
almost  incomparably  cleaner.  The  difference  was  amazing,  and  one 
could  but  wonder  why  there  should  be  this  great  contrast.  In  the 
Southern  camp  you  could  hardly  go  twenty  steps  without  getting 
into  filth  of  some  sort,  while  in  the  camp  of  the  other  side  all 
deposits  of  filth  were  carefully  removed  out  of  the  way.  Much 
of  the  sickness  which  scourged  the  Southern  army,  particularly  in 
the  early  stages  of  the  war,  is  attributable,  no  doubt,  to  the  filthy 
condition  of  their  camps. 

The  little  comforts  and  conveniences,  which  the  Northern 
soldiers  arranged  for  themselves  in  their  temporary  habitations,  was 
perhaps  but  a  reflex  of  their  home  life.  One  soldier  knew  how  to 
make  himself  comfortable  in  his  temporary  quarters,  and  preferred 
this  duty  to  idleness,  while  the  other  preferred  to  take  it  easy. 
There  was  always  a  scene  of  bustling  activity  about  the  Federal 
encampments,  very  noticeable  when  compared  to  the  laxity  and 
idleness  of  the  other  side. 

In  the  wagon  trains  of  the  respective  armies  there  was  a  great 
difference.  Right  here  it  is  proper  to  say  that  I  speak  exclusively 
of  the  Western  armies,  knowing  nothing  whatever  from  observation 
of  the  Eastern  armies.  The  wagons  of  the  Federals  were  uniform 
in  size  and  make,  and  much  stronger  and  heavier  than  the  wagons 
of  the  Confederates;  beside,  there  were  more  of  them.  That  is, 
ordinarily,  a  brigade  of  Union  troops  on  the  march  would  have 
about  twice  as  many  wragons  as  a  detachment  of  Confederates  of 
equal  size.  Confederate  army  wagons  were  not  uniform  in  size  and 
build.  They  usually  had  the  appearance  of  having  been  picked  up 
about  the  country,  as  well  as  made  to  order  after  several  different 
patterns.  The  Federal  wagons  when  on  the  move  were  covered 
with  canvas,  and  this  was  generally  kept  white  and  clean,  and  upon 
it,  in  plain  black  lettering,  was  the  brigade,  division,  and  corps 
to  which  the  wagon  belonged.  In  a  camp  of  a  hundred  wagons,  a 
man  could  pick  out  the  one  he  wanted,  without  asking  a  question,  as 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  ARMIES.  303 

each  was  distinctly  marked  upon  both  sides  of  the  canvas.  Not  so 
with  the  Confederate  wagons.  There  was  among  them  a  lack 
of  uniformity  in  build,  style,  and  size,  and  no  general  attempt  was 
made  to  designate  them  by  lettering.  Also,  Federal  harness  and 
"gearing,"  in  strength,  uniformity,  and  adaptability  was  greatly 
superior  to  the  hastily  improvised,  and  often  weak  and  faulty 
harness  and  "  gearing,"  employed  with  the  Confederate  teams. 
Indeed,  through  the  whole  transportation  department  of  the  Union 
service  there  was  much  more  system,  order,  and  business  stability 
than  in  the  same  department  of  the  Confederates.  From  the  very 
shoes  upon  the  mules'  feet  to  the  hat  on  the  driver's  head,  the  wagon 
transportation  system  of  the  Federals  was  superior.  There  was  a 
strength,  uniformity,  system,  and  durability  about  it  that  was 
conspicuous  when  compared  with  the  rather  slip-shod  wagon 
transportation  of  the  Confederates. 

One  of  the  most  marked  differences  in  the  personnel  of  the  two 
armies  was  the  far  greater  propensity  of  the  Federals  to  pillage. 
When  the  Union  troops  were  around  we  all  had  to  look  out  for  our 
money,  jewels,  watches,  vegetables,  pigs,  cows,  and  chickens.  All 
the  men,  of  course,  would  not  pillage,  hut  there  were  always  some 
in  each  regiment  who  laid  hold  of  everything  they  could  steal, 
whether  of  much  use  to  them  or  not.  And  much  of  that  which  was 
of  no  earthly  use  they  sometimes  wantonly  destroyed.  I  had  in  my 
charge  a  small  building  tilled  with  articles  usually  kept  in  a  country 
store.  This  they  repeatedly  broke  into,  carrying  oH'  what  they  chose  and 
destroying  what  they  did  not  want.  They  kindled  a  tire  in  the  fireplace, 
and  burned  up  several  pairs  of  hames  worth  two  dollars  and  a  half  a  pair 
— using  them  for  firewood.  A  hundred  or  two  bibles,  belonging  to  the 
American  Bible  Society,  they  tore  up  and  scattered  about  the  floor, 
or  made  fires  of  them.  Such  utter  and  wicked  waste  I  had  not 
thought  human  beings  could  be  guilty  of.  No  unoccupied  building 
was  exempt  from  their  ravages,  and  few  that  were  occupied.  No 
amount  of  fastenings  could  protect  a  building  from  the  insatiate 
ravages  of  the  pillagers.  Nothing  was  too  sacred  to  be  stolen  or 
destroyed,  and  it  was  almost  impossible  to  secrete  anything  from 
their  search.  Money  buried  was  dug  up  and  appropriated;  valuables 
hidden  in  the  most  unheard-of  places  were  searched  out.  A  neighbor 
put  a  ham  of  meat  in  a  writing-desk,  but  it  was  found.  Another 
secreted  a  sum  of  gold  under  his  house,  but  the  "fresh  dirt"  betrayed 
it,  and  they  took  it.  We  had  some  money  and  jewelry  which  we 
thought  would  be  safest  in  a  cupboard  in  the  sitting-room.  It  hap 
pened  that  all  the  family  went  into  another  room  for  about  three 


£6i  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

minutes,  and  hearing  footsteps  came  hastily  back,  but  the  cupboard 
was  broken  open  and  the  valuables  gone.  Some  of  General  Turehin's 
men  committed  this  robbery,  and  I  made  every  effort  to  recover ; 
but  it  was  no  use.  Seldom  was  a  valuable  recovered  when  once  the 
pillagers  got  hold  of  it.  Not  all  the  soldiers  would  do  this;  perhaps 
not  one  in  fifty  were  robbers,  but  there  were  robbers  in  every  regi 
ment.  When  the  Federal  army  first  came  among  us  we  had  about 
sixty  chickens,  and  every  night  we  would  hear  the  "  squak  !  squak !  " 
of  the  fowls  as  they  were  hurried  away  to  the  soldiers'  mess-kettles. 
An  old  rooster  that  had  been  with  us  for  four  years  we  imagined 
would  be  rather  tough  eating,  and  I  remember  that  I  rather  enjoyed 
hearing  his  "  squak !  squak !  "  which  grew  fainter  and  fainter,  as  the 
soldiers  ran  away  with  him.  I  knew  that  they  had  a  tough  dose, 
and  that  unless  the  rebellion  held  out  pretty  well  it  would  be  over 
before  they  could  get  him  cooked  to  a  point  that  his  tough  ligaments 
and  muscles  could  be  masticated.  At  last  all  of  our  chickens  were 
gone  but  one.  An  old  hen,  solitary  and  alone,  occupied  the  roost. 
We  thought  we  would  save  her  for  a  "  nest  egg,"  as  it  were,  until 
the  cruel  war  was  over.  We  put  her  in  the  cellar.  A  kitchen  stood 
over  this  cellar.  That  night  was  dark  and  stormy.  Two  soldiers 
came,  saying  that  they  were  separated  from  their  regiment,  could 
not  find  it  in  the  darkness,  and  begged  that  they  might  sleep  on  the 
floor  in  the  kitchen,  anywhere,  to  be  out  of  the  storm.  We  gave 
them  permission.  Early  in  the  morning  they  were  gone,  taking  with 
them  our  last  old  hen. 

The  remarkable  difference  in  the  pillaging  propensities  of  the 
two  armies  may  be  accounted  for  on  the  ground,  first,  that  the  Fed 
eral  army  was  in  an  enemy's  country,  and  all  things  were  considered 
legitimate  game,  and  little  inquiry  made  whether  or  not  the  owners 
were  Union  people.  Second,  the  foreign  element  in  the  Federal 
army  was  very  large,  and  with  them  was  the  riff-raff  from  the  large 
cities,  who  entered  the  army  more  from  motives  of  pillage  than 
patriotism.  Regiments  raised  in  cities  were  always  more  troublesome 
as  pillagers  than  those  from  the  rural  districts.  In  the  Southern  army 
these  conditions  did  not  exist.  There  were  no  enlistments  in  that 
army  prompted  by  motives  of  invasion  and  pillage.  And  there  were 
few  large  cities  to  send  out  "  wharf  rats,"  roughs,  and  pickpockets 
into  the  army.  Beside,  the  foreign  element  in  the  Southern  army 
was  very  small.  And  for  this  reason,  I  doubt  if  the  whole  Southern 
army  had  been  poured  into  the  North,  that  the  robbery  and  pillage 
would  have  been  as  great  as  that  which  marked  the  course  of  the 
Federal  army  in  the  South.  The  personnel  of  the  two  armies  differed 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  ARMIES.  365 

widely  in  the  points  above-mentioned.  The  pillagers  and  robbers 
in  the  Federal  army  did  not  spare  the  Union  people.  The  first  who 
came  to  our  neighborhood  committed  several  outrageous  robberies, 
and  it  happened  that  the  victims  in  every  instance  were  Union  men. 
Tiiis  had  an  unhappy  effect,  one  of  the  victims,  at  least,  thereafter 
transferring  his  sympathies  from  the  Union  side  to  the  Confederate, 
on  account  of  his  ill-treatment.  The  outrages,  robberies,  and  pillaging 
which  took  place  wherever  the  Union  army  moved,  is  traceable  to  a 
small  minority  of  the  soldiers,  and  almost  invariably  to  the  foreign 
element  among  them,  enlisted  in  the  large  cities.  The  officers  used 
to  say  in  explanation  that  every  Hock  had  black  sheep,  and  that  a 
thousand  men,  picked  up  promiscuously,  would  always  contain  a  few 
desperate  characters,  who  went  from  motives  of  plunder.  This  is  no 
doubt  true,  but  the  bummer  element  in  the  Union  army  was  certainly 
larger  than  in  the  other.  I  have  known  regiments  of  Southern 
troops  to  encamp  around  premises  for  weeks,  and  not  even  rob  a  hen 
roost  ;  but  when  the  other  side  came,  then  chickens  and  all  other 
movable  property,  animate  and  inanimate,  had  to  be  under  the  eye 
of  its  owner,  and  often  this  did  not  protect  it. 

The  Confederates  usually  paid  for  what  they  took  for  the  use 
of  the  army  in  Confederate  money.  Indeed,  payment  was  the  rule 
seldom  violated.  The  Federals,  when  upon  organized  foraging  ex 
peditions,  usually  gave  receipts  for  what  they  took,  which  were 
pavable  upon  proof  of  loyalty,  on  the  part  of  the  claimant.  But  it 
was  from  the  foraging  of  irresponsible  soldiers,  without  an  officer, 
that  the  people  mostly  suffered.  Often  in  our  neighborhood  would 
they  kill  a  line  cow,  for  instance,  take  a  quarter,  or  what  they  could 
conveniently  carry,  and  leave  the  rest  to  waste.  In  fact,  every  living 
animal  tit  for  food  was  in  constant  danger  from  irresponsible  Federal 
foragers  and  stragglers.  When  men  are  hungry,  they  must  eat,  and 
eat  they  would,  when  they  could  get  anything,  whether  Union  or 
Secession  ;  but  the  Union  soldiers  were  by  far  the  most  inveterate, 
wasteful  and  reckless  foragers.  The  farmers  and  country  people, 
who  traded  in  the  camps  of  both  armies,  had  to  skin  their  eyes  when 
in  the  camp  of  the  "Yankees,"  as  they  called  them.  A  farmer  of 
my  acquaintance  took  a  barrel  of  cider  into  a  Union  camp  near  by. 
The  barrel  held  forty  gallons.  lie  had  sold  about  twenty  quarts,  at 
twenty  cents  a  quart,  when,  to  his  intense  amazement,  the  barrel  was 
empty !  Come  to  investigate,  he  found  that  the  soldiers  had  bored 
up  through  the  wagon-bed,  and  into  the  barrel,  and  slyly  but  rapidly 
drawn  the  contents  into  their  canteens  !  Another  farmer  had  a  very 
large  sack  of  peaches  upon  a  mule,  which  he  led.  By  a  sly,  quick 


366  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

motion  a  soldier  cut  the  string,  and  away  went  the  peaches  over  the 
ground  and  the  soldiers  after  them.  The  farmer  came  home  with 
out  a  cent,  saying  that  "  them  Yankees "  were  the  d — dest  sharpest 
folks  in  a  trade  he  ever  heard  of !  Another  farmer  lost  nearly  all  of 
a  wagon-load  of  apples  by  a  very  simple  process.  Two  soldiers 
engaged  him  in  violent  "argument"  upon  theology,  while  a  whole 
regiment  swarmed  around  the  rear  of  the  wagon,  and  stole  the  most 
of  the  apples  before  the  hard-shell  Baptist,  who  was  attempting  to 
peddle  them,  knew  what  wras  going  on — or  rather  off.  He  came  home 
offering  to  bet  that  the  Yankees  could  steal  the  shortening  out  of  a 
gingercake  without  breaking  the  crust.  Another  dealer  had  a  barrel 
of  brandy,  which  he  put  into  the  depot  over  night,  with  other  mili 
tary  stores  which  were  guarded.  Surely,  he  thought,  that  brandy  is 
safe.  In  the  morning  he  found  the  barrel  just  where  he  had  left  it, 
but  it  was  wonderfully  light !  In  the  night,  the  soldiers  had  crawled 
under  the  floor,  bored  up  through  and  into  the  barrel,  and  drained 
the  last  drop  into  their  canteens.  The  owner  joined  the  apple  pecl- 
ler  in  the  opinion  that  the  irrepressible  Yankees  could  take  the 
shortening  out  of  a  gingercake  without  breaking  the  crust. 

Both  armies  had  a  weakness  for  vegetables.  The  regulation 
diet  not  embracing  them  to  any  great  extent,  this  mania  for  vege 
tables,  and  particularly  for  potatoes,  is  accounted  for.  But  the 
Southern  soldiers  very  rarely  entered  gardens,  and  took  without  per 
mission.  The  others  did,  or  many  did.  And  in  this  I  noticed  that 
the  pillagers  in  the  Union  army  were  the  few,  and  not  the  many. 
We  had  quite  a  lot  of  Irish  potatoes  in  the  garden,  and  where  one 
Federal  soldier  slipped  over  the  fence  and  stole  them,  ten  would 
come  to  the  front  door  and  ask  for  them,  or  offer  to  buy.  Yet  the 
one  in  ten,  or  even  one  in  twenty,  gave  the  whole  army  a  bad  name. 
The  Union  soldiers  did  a  thriving  business  with  the  country  people, 
swapping  off  coffee  and  salt  for  potatoes  and  vegetables.  They  had 
an  abundance  of  coffee,  while  within  the  Confederate  lines  there 
was  scarcely  any.  Even  the  pickets  of  the  two  armies  used  to  ex 
change  papers  and  coffee  for  tobacco.  The  Confederates  had  an 
abundance  of  tobacco,  but  no  coffee,  while  the  Union  troops  had 
coffee,  but  tobacco  was  scarce.  For  some  time  the  Tennessee  river, 
near  us,  was  the  line.  It  was  nothing  unusual  for  the  soldiers  to 
swim  across  to  each  other  and  make  exchanges  of  coffee,  tobacco, 
and  papers.  And  in  all  these  transactions  I  never  knew  an  instance 
of  bad  faith  on  either  side. 

The  discipline  in  the  Union  army,  in  many  respects,  appeared  to 
be  best.  That  is,  there  was  less  insubordination  and  more  respect 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  ARMIES.  307 

for  officers.  There  was  stronger  individuality  about  the  Southern 
soldier,  and  he  was  far  more  apt  to  "  talk  Lack1'  to  his  superior  than 
were  the  Federals.  Frequently  have  I  seen  Southern  soldiers  split 
ting  the  mud  with  their  feet  and  the  air  with  oaths,  as  they  pranced 
up  and  down  the  streets,  promising  to  "get  even"  with  such  and 
such  an  officer  when  the  war  was  over  and  all  were  on  an  equality 
again.  "  Just  wait  until  this  thing  is  over,  and  I  can  give  him  a  fail- 
fight,"  was  about  the  way  the  case  was  put.  But  I  have  not  heard 
of  the  settlement  of  any  of  these  momentous  difficulties  since  the 
surrender.  Among  Southern  officers  of  lower  rank  there  always 
seemed  to  me  to  be  more  ill-feeling  for  certain  of  their  superiors, 
and  lack  of  confidence,  than  I  ever  had  an  opportunity  of  noticing 
on  the  other  side.  But  jealousies  and  bickerings  are  common  to  all 
humanity,  only  it  did  seem  to  me  there  were  more  of  it  in  the 
Southern  army  than  the  other;  and,  too,  more  disposition  to  saddle 
the  responsibility  of  disaster  upon  the  shoulders  of  their  commanders. 
I  may  have  mentioned  that  it  used  to  seem  to  me  that  the  Southern 
troops  were  more  liable  to  ''panics"  and  stampedes  than  the  others. 
This  may  be  because  I  happened  to  have  personal  knowledge  of 
three  "panics"  among  Southern  soldiers,  and  never  chanced  to 
witness  anything  of  the  sort  on  the  other  side.  The  Federals  always 
appeared  to  me  to  be  more  self-possessed  and  cooler  in  the  hour 
of  danger,  and  I  have  seen  them  in  some  trying  situations.  The 
"panics"  among  the  Southern  troops  that  I  happened  to  know  of, 
from  seeing  some  of  the  fugitives,  was  the  famous  Fishing  creek 
panic,  the  Battle  creek  panic,  and  the  Bridgeport  panic.  The  Battle 
creek  affair  was  very  ridiculous.  Two  cavalry  regiments  were  camped 
near  us.  Hearing  there  were  some  "  Yankees  "  near  the  head  of 
Battle  creek  they  sallied  forth  in  the  early  morning  to  scoop  them 
up.  They  went  out  in  tine  style,  and  in  the  best  of  spirits.  The 
commander,  I  believe,  was  Colonel  Adams.  Late  in  the  afternoon 
a  few  cavalry  came  dashing  through  the  town,  bareheaded  and 
covered  with  mud  "  Get  out  of  the  way  ! "  they  cried ;  "  the 
Yankees  are  right  behind  us  !  AVe  are  all  cut  to  pieces  ! "  And  on 
they  went.  Soon  more  came,  and  then  the  whole  command,  riding 
rapidly,  some  bareheaded,  and  all  in  a  hurry,  and  apparently  badly 
scared.  Before  dark  they  were  all  through,  and  left  us  in  momen 
tary  expectation  of  seeing  the  victorious  Federals.  They  did  not 
get  along,  however,  until  noon  next  day.  Come  to  get  at  the  truth 
of  the  matter,  the  advance  of  the  cavalry  had  been  fired  into  and 
"seen"  more  Yankees  than  they  expected,  whereupon  a  "panic" 
seized  the  whole  command  and  they  fled  most  ingloriously  and 


368  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ridiculously.  Yet  they  were  good  soldiers.  They  simply  "  took  a 
panic."  Only  one  man  was  killed,  and  he  from  the  fall  of  his  horse. 
The  Bridgeport  panic  was  equally  ridiculous,  some  of  Ledbetter's 
men  on  that  occasion  actually  crowding  one  another  off  the  bridge 
into  the  river  in  their  fright.  Had  the  Federal  commander  ran  his 
cannon  around  to  the  hill  on  the  upper  side  of  the  bridge,  and  which 
fully  commanded  it,  he  could  have  bagged  the  whole  lot.  The 
nearest  approach  to  a  panic  I  ever  saw  among  the  Union  troops  was 
in  October,  1863,  when  Wheeler's  cavalry  got  in  behind  the  lines 
and  burned  a  train  of  five  hundred  loaded  wagons  at  Anderson's,  in 
Seynatchie  valley.  Yet  the  panic  was  among  the  teamsters,  and  this 
was  perhaps  justifiable.  The  squads  of  Federal  cavalry  from  all 
directions  started  right  out  after  the  enemy  instead  of  away  from 
them. 

The  Federal  cavalry  made  the  best  appearance,  owing  to  their 
uniform,  better  equipment,  and  better  fed  horses ;  but  at  first,  certainly 
the  Southerners  were  altogether  the  best  riders.  I  have  seen  some 
of  the  Texas  cavalry  perform  feats  almost  incredible,  such  as  riding 
at  full  gallop,  leaning  over  toward  the  ground,  picking  up  a  stone 
and  throwing  it,  and  dropping  hats  on  the  ground  and  coming  back 
at  full  gallop  and  picking  them  up  without  the  least  abatement  in 
speed.  Inspired  by  such  as  this,  and  the  consciousness  of  perfect 
horsemanship,  the  Southerners  at  first  underrated  the  Northern 
cavalry,  but  soon  after  learned  to  respect  this  branch  of  the  service. 
I  remember  reading  in  a  Southern  paper  a  ridiculous  account  of 
what  was  to  be  expected  from  "  Yankee  tailors  and  shoemakers  on 
horse."  The  sequel  was  not  quite  so  cheerful."  At  the  beginning 
the  Southern  cavalry  was  no  doubt  superior ;  but  toward  the  close  it  is 
a  question  if  the  superiority  did  not  shift  to  the  other  side,  mainly 
owing  to  the  excellent  equipments  of  this  branch  of  the  Union 
service.  The  superiority  of  Federal  cavalry  equipment  has  been 
more  fully  mentioned  in  another  place.  Gradually  their  skill  in 
horsemanship  equaled  their  equipment,  and  then  the  Union  cavalry 
became  of  extraordinary  efficiency. 

For  about  a  year  and  a  half,  one  end  of  the  Nashville  and 
Chattanooga  road  was  in  possession  of  one  army,  and  the  other  end 
held  by  the  other.  They  "  see-sawed  "  up  and  down  its  line,  raided 
upon  it,  and  fought  over  every  inch  of  it.  So  far  as  each  side  could 
hold  possession,  they  erected  "  stockades  "  at  the  important  stations 
and  bridges  to  protect  them  from  raids.  These  stockades  were 
usually  made  of  oak  logs,  set  endwise  in  the  ground,  covered  with 
like  heavy  timber,  and  with  loop-holes  for  defense.  Without 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  ARMIES.  369 

artillery,  they  could  hardly  be  reduced.  The  superiority  of  the 
stockades  built  by  the  Union  troops,  over  those  built  by  the  Con 
federates  on  the  same  line  of  road,  was  striking.  The  Union  troops 
bestowed  an  immense  amount  of  labor  on  theirs,  making  them  of 
square  timber,  massive,  and  enduring,  and  perfect  in  every  par 
ticular,  while  those  put  up  by  the  Confederates  were  feeble  and 
ridiculous  imitations,  showing  not  one-tenth  of  the  labor  and  skill 
that  the  Federals  bestowed  upon  theirs.  These  little  stockades 
were,  to  my  mind,  significant  illustrations  of  the  characteristics  of 
the  two  armies.  "What  the  Northern  troops  built  was  of  an  enduring 
and  substantial  character,  and  constructed  with  the  highest  skill, 
while  Southern  works  of  the  same  character  were  loosely  thrown 
together,  with  little  skill  and  less  labor,  negroes  usually  being  put 
to  such  service.  In  the  construction  of  hospitals  and  warehouses 
the  same  difference  was  noticeable.  Confederate  buildings,  no 
matter  for  what  purpose  to  be  employed,  were  slovenly  built, 
showing  little  skill  and  great  economy  of  labor,  and  little  display 
of  the  ''knack"  of  making  them  convenient.  The  "public  works" 
of  the  Confederates  were  about  as  short-lived  as  the  Confederacy 
itself. 

War  horrors  predominated  in  our  neighborhood ;  but  the 
humorous  side  was  not  altogether  lacking.  A  brigade,  one  day, 
camped  around  the  premises  of  a  neighbor  of  ours.  He  was  sitting 
on  the  fence  (for  the  purpose,  as  he  said,  of  saving  one  rail  at  least), 
contemplating  the  destruction  going  on  all  around.  One  soldier  was 
killing  a  calf,  another  was  after  the  pigs,  another  was  milking  the 
cows,  hundreds  were  burning  rails,  others  were  taking  off  the  well 
bucket  and  rope,  some  were  digging  for  "hidden  treasures,"  and, 
altogether,  the  scene  was  rather  lively.  Our  neighbor  looked  for 
some  time,  saying  nothing,  doubtless  from  inability  to  do  the  subject 
justice,  when  he  broke  out :  "  Gentlemen,  if  I  live  through  this  war, 
I  shall  never  fear  hell ! "  When  Bragg  retreated  from  Tullahoma, 
a  large  part  of  his  army  passed  through  our  neighborhood.  The 
soldiers  were  much  discouraged.  Within  a  few  months,  they  had 
retreated  all  the  way  from  before  Nashville — about  one  hundred  and 
thirty  miles — and,  in  all  that  time,  they  declared  they  had  not  been 
whipped.  "  It's  bad  enough  to  run  when  we  are  whipped,"  said  one 
of  the  soldiers ;  "  d — n  this  way  of  beating  the  Yankees  and  then 
running  away  from  them ! "  I  asked  one  of  the  officers,  an  acquaint 
ance,  to  what  point  they  were  retreating.  "  To  Cuba,"  he  replied, 
sharply,  "  if  old  Bragg  can  get  a  bridge  built  across  from  Florida ! " 
On  the  same  retreat,  a  couple  of  soldiers  stopped  at  a  house  near  us, 
24 


370  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  proposed  to  swap  horses,  as  theirs  were  worn  out.  Our  neighbor 
trotted  out  two,  and  offered  them  a  bargain.  One  of  his  horses, 
however,  had  a  very  white  head  and  face.  "  That  one  won't  do," 
said  one  of  the  soldiers ;  "  the  enemy  could  see  that  face  a  mile." 
"  No,"  said  the  other  soldier,  quickly,  "  that's  no  objection ;  for  the 
other  end  of  Bragg's  cavalry  is  always  toward  the  Yankees ! "  So 
they  took  the  white-faced  horse  and  went  on,  satisfied  that  the  rear 
only  would  point  toward  the  enemy  during  the  remainder  of  the 
war.  This  happened  just  as  I  have  related  it,  and  shows  something 
of  the  spirit  of  Bragg's  army  on  the  famous  retreat  from  Tullahoma. 
"When  General  John  B.  Floyd  retreated  from  Fort  Donelson  to 
Chattanooga,  he  passed  near  us,  and  made  a  speech  to  the  people  of 
the  neighborhood,  as  I  have  before  related,  in  which  he  said  that  he 
would  "  never  be  taken  alive  by  the  Yankees,  that  he  had  a  long 

settlement  to  make  with,  them,  which  they  might  settle  in  h 1."     I 

was  telling  a  Federal  soldier  of  this,  an  Irishman,  when  he  broke 
out :  "  That's  all  right — we'll  be  ripresented  thar,  too  ! "  A  lady 
living  near  us,  hearing  that  the  Federal  army  was  coming,  took 
some  corn  to  the  side  of  the  mountain,  buried  it,  and  covered  the 
spot  with  leaves.  A  few  days  after  a  blue  coat  appeared  at  the 
door.  "  Madam,"  said  he,  "  I  found  some  corn  on  the  side  of  the 
mountain,  which  I  am  told  is  yours.  I  came  to  tell  you  that  you 
should  hide  it  better,  as  our  boys  will  get  it ! "  Another  neighbor, 
having  lost  all  his  bacon  but  one  large  "  middling,"  hid  that  in  his 
writing-desk.  A  squad  of  cavalry  officers  swooped  down  upon  him, 
searched  his  house,  and  found  the  bacon.  Said  one  soldier  to 
another :  "  Ain't  it  a  pity  we're  in  such  a  hurry,  we  can't  stop  to 
cook  and  eat  this  bacon?"  They  thought  it  very  sad,  indeed,  that 
they  should  find  such  a  treasure,  and  not  be  able  to  make  immediate 
use  of  it.  Another  neighbor  had  two  wagon  loads  of  bacon  when 
the  Federal  advance  was  near.  He  hustled  one  load  across  the 
Tennessee  river  in  a  hurry,  and  came  back  for  the  other.  When  he 
returned  to  the  south  side  of  the  river  again,  he  found  that  the 
Southern  troops  had  eaten  the  last  morsel  of  his  first  load,  and  were 
lying  in  wait  for  the  second.  He  broke  down  completely.  "  It's 
just  no  use,"  he  said,  "  to  try  to  save  anything  in  this  war."  One 
day  a  squad  of  Federal  cavalry  were  searching  the  house  of  a 
neighbor  for  plunder.  They  threw  the  beds  on  the  floor,  emptied 
the  contents  of  the  trunks  out,  climbed  up  into  the  garret,  and  upset 
things  generally  in  their  mad  chase  for  hidden  treasures.  "While  one 
of  the  soldiers  was  up  to  his  elbows  in  the  sacred  contents  of  a  trunk, 
he  said  to  the  owner,  who  stood  near,  pale  and  trembling,  "What 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  ARMIES.  371 

sort  of  a  man  is  Dr.  B.  ? "  referring  to  a  physician  of  the  neighbor 
hood.  "Why,  sir,  he  is  a  gentleman,"  was  the  reply.  "Oh,  that 
don't  signify  anything,"  said  the  pillager.  "/'•??*  a  gentleman  ;  I 
meant  what  is  his  politics?"  Our  neighbor,  although  badly  fright 
ened,  could  not  help  laughing  at  the  pillager's  opinion  of  what 
constituted  a  gentleman. 

The  Confederates  were  fierce  in  their  pursuit  of  conscripts. 
All  able-bodied  men,  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-five, 
were  held  to  military  service,  and  those  who  did  not  enter  volun 
tarily  were  caught,  if  possible,  and  put  in.  To  prevent  this  the 
Union  men,  who  had  not  left  the  country,  used  to  hide  out  in  the 
woods  and  mountains.  A  gentleman  of  my  acquaintance,  hearing 
that  the  conscript  officers  were  to  make  a  raid  in  his  neighborhood 
on  a  certain  night,  went  into  the  woods.  It  was  pitch  dark,  and  he 
wandered  about  until  he  came  to  a  tree  top.  lie  crawled  into  that, 
and  went  to  sleep.  In  the  morning  he  found  that  the  tree  top  was 
in  the  centre  of  the  road  by  which  the  conscript  officers  would 
approach!  The  position  was  about  the  most  dangerous  lie  could 
have  selected  in  the  whole  neighborhood.  Two  other  men  went  far 
up  the  side  of  the  mountain,  built  a  fire,  and  went  to  sleep.  The 
fire  could  be  plainly  seen  from  town,  and  the  conscript  officers  went  to 
it  and  bagged  their  men.  Two  others  hid  in  a  cave,  and  built  a  fire, 
feeling  great  security.  The  heat  from  the  fire  loosened  the  rocks 
above,  which  fell  down,  breaking  a  leg  for  each  of  the  men.  They 
crawled  out,  and  gave  themselves  up,  saying  that  they  might  as  well 
go  to  war  at  once  as  to  have  their  legs  snapped  off  in  that  style. 

I  could  write  much  of  the  humors  of  the  war,  but  these  few 
anecdotes  will  show  to  the  reader  that,  horrible  as  war  is,  it  has  its 
comical  and  ridiculous  features. 


THE  UNION  CAVALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


BY  MAJOR  GENERAL  D.  MM.  GREGG. 


IN  considering  the  importance 
of  the  part  taken  by  the  cav 
alry  of  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac,  in  the  Gettysburg 
campaign,  it  will  not  be  amiss 
to  refer  briefly  to  the  circum 
stances  under  which  the  vol 
unteer  cavalry  was  organized, 
and  the  difficulties  and  hin 
drances  which  were  met,  and 
had  to  be  overcome,  in  bring 
ing  it  to  the  high  state  of 
efficiency  that  characterized 
it  at  the  opening  of  that  cam 
paign.  During  the  fall  of 
1861,  and  the  winter  follow 
ing,  there  had  been  established  in  camps  about  Washington,  regi 
ments  of  men  with  horses,  intended  for  the  volunteer  cavalry  service. 
These  regiments  had  been  formed  hastily  by  uniting  companies  of 
men  from  different  parts  of  the  same  State,  and  after  this  the  organ 
ization  was  completed  by  the  appointment  of  the  field  officers  by  the 
Governor  of  the  State.  Naturally  enough,  very  many  improper 
appointments  were  made,  and  the  result  was  the  failure  of  many  of 
the  regiments  to  make  any  progress  in  preparing  themselves  for  the 
duties  of  cavalry  in  the  field.  The  absence  or  laxity  of  discipline, 
inattention  to  police  and  sanitary  regulations,  ignorance  of  their 
duties  on  the  part  of  officers,  and  dissensions  producing  discontent 
and  insubordination  (growing  out  of  the  claims  of  rival  candidates 
for  appointments),  unfortunately  obstructed  too  many  of  the  regi 
ments.  In  some  instances,  the  colonels  were  aged  men  of  local 
influence,  whose  patriotic  zeal,  associated  with  an  imagined  dash  of 
character,  led  them  to  enter  an  arm  of  service,  the  fatigues  and  hard 
ships  of  which  compelled  an  early  return  to  their  homes ;  in  others, 
they  were  men  who  had  been  selected  for  any  other  reason  than 

(372) 


THE  UNION  CAVALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  373 

even  their-  supposed  fitness  to  command,  and  these,  by  their  incapa 
city  or  unwillingness  to  learn  their  duties,  fell  under  the  contempt 
of  their  commanders.  The  enlisted  men  were  the  very  best  mate 
rial,  and  these  furnished  non-commissioned  officers  of  intelligence 
and  peculiar  fitness  for  their  offices.  Of  the  company  officers, 
many  had  been  wisely  chosen,  and  were  willing  to  both  learn  and 
practice  their  duties. 

The  condition  of  the  horses  in  many  of  the  camps  was  as  bad 
as  possible.  Of  these,  many  when  received  were  totally  unfit  for 
cavalry  service,  having  been  taken  without  inspection  by  competent 
examiners,  from  dishonest  contractors,  or  from  government  corrals, 
superintended  by  dishonest  examiners.  With  some  exceptions,  what 
ever  care  was  given  the  horses,  was  at  such  times  as  best  suited  the 
convenience  of  the  individual  trooper,  and  as  the  horses  generally 
stood  in  mud  to  their  knees,  unless  their  masters  were  prompted  by 
exceptionally  humane  feelings,  the  intervals  between  feedings  and 
waterings  were  distressingly  long.  In  many  of  the  regiments,  when 
their  condition  was  the  worst  possible,  the  well-intentioned  subordi 
nate  officers  and  enlisted  men  asked  the  War  Department  or  their 
State  authorities  to  detail  young,  but  experienced,  officers  of  the  reg 
ular  cavalry,  or  the  appointment  of  civilians  who  had  served  in 
European  armies,  to  command  their  regiments.  This  was  done ;  and 
the  officers  so  selected,  on  taking  command,  were  from  the  first 
encouraged  by  the  hearty  spirit  in  which  officers  and  enlisted  men 
entered  into  the  work  of  reform  and  improvement.  Schools  for 
instruction  in  tactics  and  in  the  rules  and  articles  of  war  were  estab 
lished  ;  officers,  as  well  as  enlisted  men,  were  drilled  in  the  school  of 
the  squad  and  upward,  the  camps  were  changed,  better  police  and 
sanitary  regulations  enforced,  strict  discipline  maintained,  inefficient 
officers  were  discharged  by  the  examining  board,  and  their  vacancies 
given  deserving  non-commissioned  officers. 

When  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  moved,  in  the  spring  of  1862, 
to  the  Peninsula,  it  was  accompanied  by  a  cavalry  force,  the  volun 
teer  regiments  of  which  were  in  a  surprising  state  of  serviceability, 
considering  the  short  time  and  the  unfavorable  circumstances  under 
which  their  real  organization  had  been  effected.  The  regular  regi 
ments  were  in  their  habitual  state  of  efficiency.  During  this  cam 
paign  the  cavalry  won  for  itself  no  particular  distinction.  The 
volunteer  regiments  were  distributed  among  the  different  corps  of  the 
army  ;  the  country  was  very  generally  heavily  wooded,  or  covered  the 
with  dense  undergrowth ;  the  armies  were  in  close  proximity,  and 
ordinarily  intrenched;  the  space  between  the  lines  obstructed  by 


374  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

felled  timber,  and  the  roads  barricaded,  and,  for  the  greater  part  of 
the  time,  impassable,  because  of  the  almost  unfathomable  mud. 
There  was  no  proper  field  for  cavalry  operations,  and  if  there  had 
been,  nothing  could  have  been  done ;  for,  while  it  was  the  fashion  to 
sneer  at  the  cavalry,  there  was  a  remarkable  fondness  displayed  at 
corps,  division,  and  brigade  headquarters  of  infantry  for  the  presence 
of  numerous  and  well-mounted  orderlies ;  details  for  this  ornamental 
and  often  menial  duty,  and  those  for  the  most  grossly  absurd  picket 
and  escort,  duty,  absorbed  pretty  much  the  entire  cavalry. 

Returning  from  the  Peninsula,  the  cavalry  disembarked  at 
Alexandria,  in  condition  very  unfitted  for  the  hard  service  that  was 
expected  of  it  in  the  Maryland  campaign  of  the  fall  of  1862.  But 
little  improvement  was  made,  and,  with  some  noted  exceptions, 
nothing  strikingly  brilliant  was  accomplished  by  it  until  General 
Hooker  took  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Then  it  was 
at  last  thought  that  the  cavalry,  properly  organized  and  taken  care 
of,  and  employed  in  legitimate  duty,  might  become  an  important 
element  of  that  grand  army.  The  rebel  cavalry  under  Stuart,  and 
his  lieutenants,  the  younger  Lees,  had  from  the  onset  been  very 
efficient.  It  was  composed  of  the  best  blood  of  the  South — officers 
and  enlisted  men  had  been  accustomed  all  their  lives  to  the  use  of 
fire-arms,  and  were  well  practiced  in  horsemanship.  Its  strength  had 
not  been  frittered  away  in  petty  details,  but  preserved  for  the  heavy 
blows  which  it,  from  time  to  time,  inflicted  on  our  lines  of  communi 
cation,  and  means  of  transportation. 

General  Hooker  organized  his  cavalry  into  a  corps,  commanded 
by  General  Stoneman,  the  division  commanders  being  Generals 
Pleasonton,  Buford,  Averill,  and  D.  McM.  Gregg.  Soon  after  this 
organization  was  made,  the  cavalry,  save  a  part  detained  to  take  part 
in  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  (where  it  did  distinguished  service), 
left  the  lines  of  the  army  on  what  is  known  as  the  Stoneman  raid. 
Without  considering  at  all  the  material  results  of  that  raid,  which,  if 
not  so  great  as  expected,  were  lessened  by  the  adverse  issue  of  the 
battle  in  which  our  army  engaged  at  Chancellorsville,  its  moral  result 
was  to  convince  the  cavalry  engaged  in  it  of  its  ability  to  do  what 
ever  might  thereafter  be  required  when  employed  in  its  proper 
sphere.  General  Pleasonton  now  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the 
corps,  and  the  work  of  preparation  for  future  campaigns  went  for 
ward  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm  and  zeal.  To  this  time,  for  the 
reasons  heretofore  given,  the  prestige  of  success  had  steadily  remained 
with  the  rebel  cavalry  in  its  greater  and  more  important  undertakings, 
but  the  time  was  now  at  hand  for  its  transfer  to  our  side,  there  to 


THE   UNION  CAVALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  375 

remain  to  the  close  of  the  war,  not,  however,  without  our  enemy 
making,  at  all  times  and  places,  the  most  desperate  and  gallant  efforts 
to  win  it  back. 

In  the  early  part  of  June,  1803,  the  rebel  cavalry  corps  was 
assembled  about  Brandy  Station,  and  in  front  of  that  point  on  the 
Rappahannock  river.  There  had  been  reviews  and  inspections  pre 
paratory  to  making  some  great  movement ;  this  was  suspected  to  be 
northward,  and  not  directly  against  the  forces  confronting  on  the 
river.  The  strength  of  Stuart's  command  at  this  time  was  subse 
quently  ascertained  to  have  been  about  twelve  thousand  horsemen, 
divided  into  live  brigades,  with  sixteen  pieces  of  light  artillery.  Had 
this  force  gotten  off  undiscovered,  and  readied  Pennsylvania  without 
having  fought  the  battle  of  Brandy  Station,  and  subsequently  been 
defeated  at  Aldie,  Middleburg,  and  Upperville,  the  fertile  valleys, 
busy  towns,  and  wealthy  cities  of  our  beloved  State  would  have  been 
devastated  to  an  extent  beyond  ordinary  estimate.  But  this  was  not 
to  be.  On  Saturday  and  Sunday,  June  6th  and  7th,  General 
Pleasonton  assembled  his  corps  about  Warrentoii  Junction  and  Cat- 
lett's  Station,  rations,  forage,  and  ammunition  were  issued,  and 
every  trooper  was  put  in  the  best  possible  condition  for  a  ceremoni 
ous  visit  to  our  neighbors  opposite.  On  Monday  evening,  General 
John  Buford,  with  his  two  brigades  and  light  batteries,  and  a  small 
supporting  column  of  infantry,  moved  to  the  vicinity  of  Beverly 
Ford,  and  General  Gregg,  with  his  own  and  Colonel  Duffle's  divis 
ions,  and  light  batteries,  moved  to  Kelly's  Ford,  six  miles  below, 
and  here  was  found  another  small  column  of  infantry.  The  strength 
of  these  two  commands  was  about  nine  thousand  cavalry. 

At  daylight,  on  Tuesday,  June  9th,  General  Buford,  with  his 
regular  and  volunteer  brigades  crossed  the  Rappahannock  at  Beverly 
Ford  and  surprised  the  enemy's  pickets,  driving  them  back  upon 
their  camps  and  intrenchments,  and  maintained  for  hours  a  most 
obstinate  light  with  a  force  largely  superior  to  his  own.  His  advance 
was  through  a  rough,  wooded  country,  which  afforded  the  enemy 
every  defensive  advantage,  but  his  regiments,  led  by  such  soldiers  as 
Colonel  Davis,  of  the  Eighth  Xew  York  (killed  in  the  action),  Major 
Morris,  of  the  Sixth  Pennsylvania,  and  Captain  Merritt,  of  the  Second 
Regulars,  and  others  of  like  character,  were  not  to  be  stopped  by 
ordinary  resistance ;  and  by  their  repeated  mounted  charges,  and 
advances  as  dismounted  skirmishers,  the  enemy  was  driven  back  to 
a  line  strongly  held  by  a  large  number  of  field-pieces  supported  by 
troops. 

General  Gregg,  with  his  own  and  Colonel  Dufie's  command, 


376  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

crossed  at  the  same  time  at  Kelly's  Ford.  Agreeably  to  orders  from 
the  corps  commander,  Colonel  Dufie  proceeded  at  once  to  Stevens- 
burg  to  take  position,  while  Gregg  marched  directly  upon  Brandy 
Station,  which,  owing  to  the  number  of  miles  to  be  marched  and 
obstructions  met  in  the  roads,  he  did  not  reach  until  some  hours 
after  Buford's  attack  had  been  made.  Upon  an  open  plain,  his 
brigades,  led  by  Colonels  Kilpatrick  and  Wyndham,  fell  upon  the 
enemy  so  furiously  that  General  Stuart's  headquarters  were  captured. 
There  were  no  reserves,  but  at  once  the  entire  command  charged  the 
enemy,  and  here,  at  last,  were  two  forces  of  cavalry,  on  favorable 
ground,  all  mounted,  struggling  for  victory  with  sabre  and  pistol. 
Brigade  met  brigade,  and  the  blue  and  the  gray  met  in  hand-to-hand 
strife,  and  many  gallant  horsemen  went  down  that  day  on  a  field 
whose  glories  have  not  often  been  surpassed.  Moving  on  a  short 
interior  line,  the  mass  of  the  rebel  mounted  force  was  speedily  con 
centrated  at  the  point  of  danger,  so  as  to  give  it  largely  the  pre 
ponderance  in  numbers.  Dufie's  command,  at  Stevensburg,  having 
encountered  there  some  of  the  enemy,  could  not  be  gotten  on  the 
field  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  engagement ;  still  the  contest  was 
maintained  until  the  arrival  of  rebel  infantry  from  Culpepper ;  after 
this  a  junction  was  made  by  the  two  divisions,  and  toward  evening, 
leisurely  and  unmolested,  all  recrossed  the  Rappahannock. 

The  object  of  the  reconnoissance  had  been  fully  accomplished 
— the  numbers,  position,  and  intentions  of  the  enemy  fully  dis 
covered.  On  the  morrow  this  cavalry  giant  was  to  have  marched 
for  Pennsylvania.  No  further  objection  was  offered  to  his  departure, 
as  we  felt  sure  his  stature  was  somewhat  shortened,  and  his  gait  would 
show  a  limp.  Our  total  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  a  small  number 
of  prisoners,  was  about  five  hundred;  the  enemy's,  from  reports 
published  in  the  Richmond  papers,  greater.  The  result  of  this 
engagement  created  the  greatest  enthusiasm  in  our  regiments ;  the 
virtues  of  those  who  fell  were  fondly  told  by  their  surviving  com 
rades,  and  acts  of  conspicuous  gallantry  and  daring  were  applauded  and 
remembered  for  imitation  on  other  fields.  Even  now,  when  there 
is  a  meeting  of  any  of  those  who  fought  at  Brandy  Station,  and  the 
talk  falls  upon  the  fight,  the  pulse  quickens  and  the  eye  brightens  as 
the  story  is  repeated. 

Our  cavalry  was  again  reorganized  in  two  divisions,  commanded 
respectively  by  Generals  John  Buford  and  D.  McM.  Gregg,  and  to 
each  division  were  attached  two  light  batteries.  Everything  neces 
sary  was  done  in  preparation  for  an  active  campaign.  The  division 
formerly  commanded  by  General  Averill  (who  had  been  transferred 


THE  UNION  CAVALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  377 

to  another  field)  was  consolidated  with  Gregg's,  and  the  new  division 
was  named  the  second ;  an  additional  brigade  was  formed  in  it,  com 
manded  by  Colonel  I.  Irvin  Gregg,  the  other  two  being  commanded 
respectively  by  General  Kilpatrick  and  Colonel  Mclntosh.  The  two 
divisions  were  soon  put  in  motion  toward  the  Potomac,  but  did  not 
take  exactly  the  same  route,  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  followed 
their  lead.  The  major  part  of  the  rebel  army,  having  moved  in 
advance,  entered  the  Shenandoah  Valley  by  the  passes  of  the  Blue 
Itidge,  either  for  the  purpose  of  masking  the  movements  of  the 
rebel  infantry,  or  else  to  discover  the  whereabouts  of  and  to  impede 
the  march  of  our  army.  The  advance  of  Stuart's  command  had 
reached  Aldie,  and  here,  on  June  17th,  began  a  series  of  skirmishes, 
or  engagements,  between  the  two  cavalry  forces,  all  of  which  were 
decided  successes  for  us,  and  terminated  in  driving  Stuart's  cavalry 
through  the  gap  at  Paris. 

On  June  17th,  Kilpatrick- s  Brigade,  moving  in  the  advance  of 
the  Second  Division,  fell  upon  the  enemy  at  Aldie,  and  there  en 
sued  an  engagement  of  the  most  obstinate  character,  in  which  seve 
ral  brilliant  mounted  charges  were  made,  terminating  in  the  retreat 
of  the  enemy.  On  June  19th,  the  division  advanced  to  Middleburg, 
where  a  part  of  Stuart's  force  was  posted,  and  was  attacked  by 
Colonel  Irvin  Gregg's  Brigade.  Here,  as  at  Aldie,  the  light  was 
very  obstinate.  The  enemy  had  carefully  selected  a  most  defensible 
position,  from  which  he  had  to  be  driven  step  by  step,  and  this  work 
had  to  be  done  by  dismounted  skirmishers,  owing  to  the  unfavorable 
character  of  the  country  for  mounted  service.  On  the  19th,  Gregg's 
Division  moved  on  the  turnpike  from  Middleburg  in  the  direction 
of  Upperville,  and  soon  encountered  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  great 
force.  The  attack  was  promptly  made,  the  enemy  offering  the  most 
stubborn  resistance.  The  long  lines  of  stone  fences  which  are  so 
common  in  that  region,  were  so  many  lines  of  defense  to  a  force  in 
retreat ;  these  could  be  held  until  our  advancing  skirmishers  were 
almost  upon  them,  but  then  there  would  be  no  escape  for  those 
behind — it  was  either  to  surrender  as  prisoners  or  to  attempt  to 
escape  across  the  open  fields  beyond,  to  fall  before  the  deadly  fire  of 
the  carbines  of  the  pursuers.  Later  in  the  day,  General  Buford's 
Division  came  in  on  the  right  and  took  the  enemy  in  flank ;  then  our 
entire  force,  under  General  Pleasonton,  and  supported  by  a  column 
of  infantry,  moved  forward  and  dealt  the  finishing  blow.  Through 
Upperville  the  pursuit  was  continued  at  a  run,  the  enemy  flying  in 
the  greatest  confusion ;  nor  were  they  permitted  to  re-form,  until 
night  put  a  stop'  to  further  pursuit  at  the  mouth  of  the  gap. 


378  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Our  losses  in  the  fighting  of  these  three  days  amounted  to  five 
hundred  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing;  of  the  latter,  there  were 
but  few.  The  enemy's  loss  was  much  greater,  particularly  in  prison 
ers.  Our  captures  also  included  light  guns,  flags,  and  small-arms. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  moving  in  pursuit  of  Lee,  was 
required  to  protect  itself  on  one  side  from  any  possible  attack  of  the 
enemy,  and  to  extend  its  protection,  on  the  other  side,  to  Washing 
ton.  These  successful  engagements  of  our  cavalry  left  our  infantry 
free  to  march,  without  the  loss  of  an  hour,  to  the  field  of  Gettys 
burg,  where  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  destined  to  deliver  the 
blow  which,  more  than  any  other,  was  to  determine  the  issue  of  the 
rebellion. 

The  limits  of  this  article  will  forbid  following  our  divisions  of 
cavalry  on  their  marches  to  Gettysburg.  It  must  be  mentioned  that 
at  Frederick,  Maryland,  the  addition  of  the  cavalry  formerly  com 
manded  by  General  Stahl,  made  it  necessary  to  organize  a  third 
division,  the  command  of  which  was  given  to  General  Kilpatrick. 
General  Buford,  with  his  division,  in  advance  of  our  army,  on  July 
1st,  first  encountered  the  enemy  in  the  vicinity  of  Gettysburg.  How 
well  his  brigades  of  regulars  and  volunteers  resisted  the  advance  of 
that  invading  host,  yielding  only  foot  by  foot,  and  so  slowly  as  to 
give  ample  time  for  our  infantry  to  go  to  his  support,  is  well  known 
to  every  one  familiar  with  the  history  of  the  great  battle.  General 
Kilpatrick's  division  marched  from  Frederick  well  to  the  right,  at 
Hanover  engaged  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  a  sharp  skirmish,  and 
reached  Gettysburg  on  the  1st,  and  on  the  left  of  our  line,  on  the 
3d,  one  of  his  brigades,  led  by  General  Farnsworth,  gallantly  charged 
the  enemy's  infantry,  even  to  his  line  of  defenses,  and  protected 
that  flank  from  any  attack,  with  the  assistance  of  General  Merritt's 
regular  brigade.  General  Gregg's  Division,  having  crossed  the  Poto 
mac  at  Edwards'  Ferry,  in  rear  of  our  army,  passed  through  Fred 
erick,  and,  on  the  afternoon  of  July  1st,  was  at  Hanover  Junction, 
and  reached  Gettysburg  on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  taking  position 
on  the  right  of  our  line.  On  the  3d,  during  that  terrific  fire  of 
artillery,  which  preceded  the  gallant  but  unsuccessful  assault  of 
Pickett's  Division  on  our  line,  it  was  discovered  that  Stuart's  cav 
alry  was  moving  to  our  right,  with  the  evident  intention  of  passing 
to  the  rear,  to  make  a  simultaneous  attack  there.  What  the  conse 
quence  of  the  success  of  this  movement  would  have  been,  the  merest 
tyro  in  the  art  of  war  will  understand.  When  opposite  our  right, 
Stuart  was  met  by  General  Gregg,  with  two  of  his  brigades  (Colo 
nels  Mclntosh  and  Irvin  Gregg),  and  Ouster's  Brigade  of  the  Third 


THE  UNION  CAVALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  379 

Division,  and,  on  a  fair  field,  there  was  another  trial  between  two 
cavalry  forces,  in  which  most  of  the  fighting  was  done  in  the  saddle, 
and  with  the  trooper's  favorite  weapon — the  sabre.  Without  enter 
ing  into  the  details  of  the  fight,  it  need  only  be  added,  that  Stuart 
advanced  not  a  pace  beyond  whore  he  was  met ;  but  after  a  severe 
struggle,  which  was  only  terminated  by  the  darkness  of  night,  he 
withdrew,  and  on  the  morrow,  with  the  defeated  army  of  Lee,  was 
in  retreat  to  the  Potomac. 

Tims  has  been  outlined  the  services  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  during  the  Gettysburg  campaign.  Xo  period  of 
its  history  is  more  glorious,  nor  more  fondly  dwelt  upon  by  those 
who  were  for  a  long  time  identified  with  the  cavalry  arm.  AV hat- 
ever  credit  its  services  deserve,  must  be  fully  shared  by  the  light 
batteries  of  the  regular  service,  and  Martin's  Xew  York  Volunteer 
Battery,  which  were  attached  to  the  divisions,  and  rendered  such 
service  as  could  only  result  from  perfect  discipline  and  the  highest 
professional  skill  and  training. 


A  It  USE  OF  WAIL 


BY    CAPTAIN    JOHN    SCOTT. 


WHEN  General  Butler  landed 
at  City  Point  and  Bermuda 
Hundreds,  in  the  spring  of 
1864,  with  an  army  of  thirty 
thousand  men,  and  accom 
panied  and  guarded  by  gnn- 
boats  and  iron-clads,  why  he 
did  not  at  once  occupy  Peters 
burg,  to  obtain  which  after 
ward  cost  so  much  blood  to 
the  Federal  army,  is  a  ques 
tion,  the  answer  to  which  is 
not  very  obvious.  Peters 
burg,  on  the  line  of  the 
railway  leading  south  from 
Richmond,  the  heart  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy  was  distant  twenty  miles  from  City  Point, 
with  which  it  was  connected  by  a  railway,  a  navigable  river,  and  a 
broad  highway  in  good  condition,  and  passing  through  a  level 
country  not  occupied  by  the  military  forces  of  the  enemy.  I  propose 
to  furnish  what  I  thought  then,  and  think  now,  to  be  an  answer  to 
this  question.  It  will  be  a  modicum  of  information,  -which  may 
prove  useful  to  the  historian,  when  he  comes  to  gather  up  all  the 
facts  for  an  impartial  history  of  the  four  years'  war,  wrhich  has  left 
scars  even  on  the  Constitution.  It  will,  moreover,  be  doing  justice 
to  the  memory  of  Major  General  George  E.  Pickett,  a  distinguished 
officer  of  the  Southern  army,  wrhose  reputation  is  dear  to  us  all  of 
the  South. 

To  render  my  brief  narrative  intelligible  to  the  reader  not 
particularly  informed  of  the  military  facts  to  which  it  has  reference, 
k  will  be  necessary  first  to  state  the  situation  in  the  Department  of 
North  Carolina  with  which  Petersburg  was  embraced,  or  so  much  of 
it  as  ailccted  that  point.  General  Pickett  was  still  in  command  at 
Petersburg,  though  he  had  been  relieved,  when  General  Butler,  with 
(380) 


A  £USE  OF  WAR.  381 

his  large  army,  suddenly  occupied  City  Point.  His  troops  were 
engaged  in  an  expedition  to  North  Carolina,  with  the  exception  of  a 
single  regiment  of  infantry  belonging  to  Clingman's  Brigade,  not 
more  than  five  or  six  hundred  strong ;  nor  had  the  troops  of  General 
Beauregard,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  department, 
yet  arrived.  The  strong  defenses  of  the  town  were  unoccupied. 
It  was  only  necessary  for  the  Federal  commander  to  send  up  a 
detachment  of  his  army  to  occupy  them,  and  cut  the  communications 
of  Richmond  with  the  South,  the  seat  of  its  principal  resources. 
Why  so  vital  a  point  as  Petersburg  at  that  time  was,  should  have 
been  left  unguarded,  and  its  defenses  sent  off  in  search  of  objects  of 
secondary  importance,  I  do  not  know.  The  biographer  of  General 
Pickett,  Colonel  Walter  Harrison,  states,  in  his  interesting  volume, 
that  General  Pickett,  as  early  as  the  preceding  November,  had 
penetrated  the  enemy's  design  to  make  an  expedition  up  James 
river  against  Petersburg,  and,  in  a  personal  interview  with  the 
Confederate  authorities,  had  represented  this  contingency  and  the 
unprotected  state  of  that  town.  He  had  even  carried  his  represen 
tations  to  General  Lee,  who  had  referred  him  to  General  Beauregard, 
with  whom,  in  consequence,  he  had  had  an  interview  at  Weldon. 
u  But,"  says  Colonel  Harrison,  "  the  expedition  to  Plymouth  was  at 
this  time  put  on  foot ;  much  valuable  time  was  wasted,  and  the 
troops  which  should  have  been  ordered  at  once  to  Petersburg  were 
kept  in  North  Carolina  doing  little  or  nothing,  while  Pickett  was 
left  in  Petersburg  with  merely  a  handful  of  men."  Colonel  Harrison 
continues :  "  General  Beauregard  was  in  no  way  responsible  for  this. 
He  had  no  control  over  these  troops,  and  I  have  understood  strongly 
urged  their  being  hastened  to  Petersburg  to  support  Pickett."  But 
the  danger  to  Petersburg,  from  the  direction  of  the  lower  James, 
was  apparent  to  others  beside  General  Pickett.  A  gentleman  of 
Petersburg  had,  but  a  short  time  before  the  arrival  of  General 
Butler,  pointed  out  to  me  on  one  of  the  military  maps  of  the  day 
that  Bermuda  Hundreds  would  probably  be  the  point  which  the 
enemy  would  next  strike.  The  eyes,  which  should  have  seen  every 
thing,  appear  to  have  been  alone  blinded  to  this  vulnerable  point. 

Not  long  before  the  occurrences  of  these  events  I  had  been 
ordered  to  report  for  duty  to  General  Pickett,  whom  I  found  in 
Petersburg.  As  the  town  was  vacant  of  soldiers,  I  employed  the 
leisure  in  examining  its  fortifications,  and  in  other  ways  that  pleased 
me.  I  was  in  my  quarters  early  in  the  day,  when  I  was  suddenly 
summoned  to  report  to  General  Pickett.  I  found  everything  astir, 
and  he  informed  me  of  the  occupation  of  City  Point  by  the  forces  com- 


382  ANNALS  .OF  THE  WAR. 

manded  by  General  Butler.  lie  told  me  I  was  the  only  cavalry 
officer  on  the  ground,  and  that  he  wished  me  to  take  a  party  of 
cavalry  to  reconnoitre  Butler's  position,  to  remain  in  the  vicinity  of 
his  outposts,  and,  if  possible,  induce  the  belief  that  I  commanded  but 
an  advance  body  of  troops,  and  that  he  might  soon  expect  an  attack. 
But  that,  in  truth,  he  had  no  troops  with  which  to  defend  Petersburg, 
and  that  the  place  would  be  captured  unless  General  Butler  could  be 
amused  with  this  false  opinion,  until  Beauregard  could  arrive  from 
the  South.  I  inquired  where  I  should  find  my  cavalry  command. 
He  told  me  that  he  had  none,  but  that  he  would  exert  himself  to  get 
together  a  body  of  mounted  citizens,  and  that  with  these  I  must  per 
form  that  duty.  With  characteristic  energy  he  set  about  to  impro 
vise  such  a  command  as  he  had  described,  and  in  that  chivalrous 
community  it  was  not  long  before  I  found  myself  at  the  head  of  a 
body  of  thirty  mounted  citizens,  armed  with  such  weapons  as  each 
man  could  obtain.  My  most  serious  difficulty  was  in  procuring  a 
horse  for  my  own  use.  But  I  succeeded  in  buying  a  very  fine  one, 
for  which  I  had  to  pay  a  price  large  even  in  the  depreciated  currency 
of  the  war.  One  cavalryman  who  had  been  at  home  on  a  furlough, 
was  the  only  enlisted  soldier  who  joined  me,  and  the  only  one  who 
was  killed  on  this  tour  of  duty.  As  we  passed  beyond  the  limits  of 
Petersburg,  on  the  City  Point  road,  we  saw  encamped  on  our  right 
the  regiment  of  North  Carolina  infantry,  as  if  thrown  forward  to 
engage  General  Butler,  and  what  guns  we  had  were  mounted  on 
the  fortifications  on  that  side.  It  was  evident  that  our  brave  com 
mander  was  not  dismayed,  and  that  he  was  ready  to  use  every  avail 
able  force  at  his  disposal. 

Toward  the  close  of  the  day  we  came  in  view  of  the  enemy's 
outposts,  and  at  once  began  the  work  of  observation,  taking  care  to 
make  as  great  display  of  our  force  as  possible,  but  when  night  closed 
in  we  retired  to  the  rear.  These  tactics  were  repeated  the  next  day, 
and  the  next.  There  was  a  barn  which  stood  outside  the  Federal 
lines,  equi-distant  between  us,  which  contained  a  supply  of  forage. 
The  Federals  would  occupy  it  by  day,  but  would  be  withdrawn  at 
night,  when  my  men  would  visit  it  to  procure  food  for  their  animals. 
When  we  first  came  in  sight  of  the  enemy's  pickets,  General  Roger 
A.  Pryor,  now  a  brilliant  advocate  of  the  New  York  bar,  who  was 
at  that  time  in  Petersburg,  and  had  joined  us  as  a  volunteer,  was 
very  solicitous  that  we  should  engage  them.  But  I  would  not  allow 
it  to  be  done.  I  did  not  explain  to  him  General  Pickett's  orders, 
and  he  retired  from  what  appeared  to  be  so  purposely  and  inglorious 
a  service.  A  collision  with  my  loose  array  I  knew  might  spoil  the 


A  RUSE  OF  WAR.  383 

plan,  and  disclose  the  sliam  we  were  attempting  to  impose  on  tlic 
enemy.     Thus  things  continued  till  the  third  or  fourth  day,  when  a 
reconnoissance  in  force,  preceded  by  a  line   of  skirmishers,  issued 
from  the  Federal  lines,  and  advanced  on  the  Petersburg  road.    I  was 
informed  at  that  time  by  a  gentleman,  a  resident  of  the  neighborhood, 
that  some  colored  troops  had  visited  in  the  vicinity  of  their  camp, 
and  had  been  told  by  the  negroes  of  the  insignificant  nature  of  my 
force,  and  the  true  condition  of  affairs,  and  this  reconnoissance  had 
been  sent  to  find  out  the  truth.     My   men   had   been   broken   into 
several  small  parties,  and  scattered  along  the  enemy's  front.     "With 
one  of  them  I  fell  back  before  the  skirmishers  until  we  reached  the 
point  at  which  the  railway  and  the  highway  crossed.     There  I  halted 
my  party  and  allowed  the  skirmishers  to  approach  near,  the  conse 
quence  of  which  was  that  my  horse  was  fatally  wounded  in  the  head. 
But  I  was  soon  mounted  on  another  and  resumed  the  retreat.     While 
we  were  passing  through  a  body  of  woods,  or  rather  as  we  were 
emerging  from  it,  it  was  discovered  that  a  detachment  of  cavalry  had 
been  thrown  in  advance  of  the  skirmishers,  and  were  making  a  dash 
at  us.     A  hot  chase  ensued,  but  AVC  passed  safely  into  the  Southern 
lines,  which  had  been  established  at  no  great  distance  ahead  of  us. 
A  round  of  our  musketry  emptied  several  saddles,  and  compelled  a 
disorderly  retreat.     My  little  command  never  reassembled,  but  the 
object    had  been  achieved.      "When   I   went   to   report   to   General 
Pickett  he  received  me  cordially,  and  was  well   pleased  with    his 
game  of  bluff  with  General  Butler.     But  for  this  bold  conception  of 
Pickett's,  Petersburg  would  have  been  occupied,  Richmond  isolated, 
the  catastrophe  accelerated,  and  General  Butler  would  have  been  the 
hero  of  the  war.     It  was  his  object  to  cut  the  railroad,  as  was  proved 
by  his  attack  at  Port  AValthall  Junction,  where  he  was  repulsed  by 
the  gallant  Haygood,  as  well  as  by  the  unsuccessful  attempt  of 
Cantz's  Cavalry  Division  to  the  south  of  the  town.     Had  General 
Butler  been  informed  of  the  condition  of  things,  a  richer  prize  was 
within  his  grasp,  and  fair  Petersburg,  like  another  Helen,  would  have 
yielded  herself  his  captive.     This  was  my  only  contact  with  Pickett's 
men  during  the  bloody  war.     Soon  after  I  was  ordered  to  take  com 
mand  of  the  troops  stationed  for  the  defense  of  the  High  Bridge. 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  REYNOLDS. 


BY    GENERAL    T.    F.    M  COY. 


AFTEK  the  battle  of  Antietam, 
the  army,  being  exhausted 
from  the  extraordinary  fa 
tigues,  exposures,  and  losses 
of  the  protracted  campaigns 
of  the  past  summer,  took  po 
sition  for  rest  and  reoccupa- 
tion  on  the  late  battle-field, 
and  in  the  region  of  country 
adjacent,  north  of  the  Poto 
mac,  the  enemy  occupying 
the  country  south  of  the  river 
—the  river  being  the  general 
dividing  line  between  the 

O 

two  armies.  Reynolds'  Corps 
occupied  the  long  picket  line 
on  the  river.  Rickett's  Division,  of  which  our  brigade  was  a  part, 
was  in  this  corps.  The  brigade  commander  was  rather  of  a  dashing 
character,  an  officer  of  experience  and  gallantry,  and  had  a  keen  eye 
for  a  comfortable  position  for  his  headquarters,  and  would  run  risks 
of  capture  rather  than  deprive  himself  of  a  good  and  choice  spot  for 
this  purpose.  In  pursuance  of  this  he  fixed  his  headquarters  in  the 
little  village  of  Mercersville,  in  the  most  desirable  house,  and  right 
on  the  picket  line,  on  the  bank  of  the  river,  and  in  a  dangerous 
position,  as  the  river  at  this  point  was  both  narrow  and  shallow. 
The  camp  of  the  brigade  was  a  half  mile  in  rear  of  this  line,  and  in 
a  comparatively  safe  place.  Ordinarily,  for  an  officer  of  rank  to 
have  his  headquarters  on  or  very  near  the  picket  line,  with  the 
enemy's  line  in  rather  close  proximity,  would  not  be  regarded  as 
safe,  or  in  accordance  with  strict  military  rule.  In  this  case,  the 
river  intervening,  of  course  modified  it  materially  in  the  judgment 
of  the  officers.  Yet  an  enterprising  party  of  the  enemy,  familiar 
with  the  ground  as  they  might  have  been,  could  have  almost  any 
night  dashed  into  Mercersville,  and  carried  off  the  general  and  his 

(384) 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  REYNOLDS.  385 

staff,  and  the  reserve  picket  would  likely  have  gotten  upon  the 
ground  in  time  to  have  seen  them  vanish  beyond  the  river. 

Only  a  week  or  two  elapsed  when  our  brigade  commander 
obtained  a  leave  of  absence,  and  an  order  was  issued  by  the  division 
commander  assigning  another  officer  to  the  command.  This  necessi 
tated  a  removal  to  the  village,  and  a  more  familiar  acquaintance  with 
the  surroundings.  The  few  weeks  of  command  here  looms  up  as  a 
most  unpleasant  period  in  that  officer's  military  experience.  There 
was  nothing  at  that  time  interesting  in  or  about  the  village  ;  indeed, 
everything  almost  seemed  to  be  the  reverse.  The  citizens,  however,  so 
far  as  could  be  ascertained,  claimed  to  be  loval  to  the  old  Ha<>'. 

»•  <""^ 

Most  of  the  persons  visible  were  very  hard-looking  cases,  and  most 
of  them  lounged  about,  or  were  attracted  about,  one  or  two  very 
unattractive  taverns,  where  it  was  quite  certain  bad  whisky  was 
freely  issued,  and  perhaps  more  freely  used,  and  that,  too,  to 
the  detriment  of  morals,  health,  and  discipline,  notwithstanding 
a  "boy  in  blue"  kept  watch,  day  and  night,  musket  in  hand,  not 
very  far  from  the  spigot.  A  few  of  them,  as  well  as  many  others 
from  different  quarters,  had  passes  from  General  McOlellan,  which 
was  about  the  only  thing  that  gave  them  any  fair  degree  of  grace, 
and  on  this  ground  were  allowed  to  pass  the  river,  and  enter  the 
enemy's  lines. 

The  next  most  interesting  and  attractive  object  to  the  citizens 
of  the  vicinity,  was  one  of  the  old-fashioned  fish-baskets  in  the  middle 
<•{  the  stream,  just  opposite  the  village.  Persons  could  approach  this 
basket  along  the  wing  walls  that  formed  the  dam  from  either  side 
of  the  river;  for  this  reason,  it  was  regarded  as  affording  conve 
nience  for  any  small  party  of  the  enemy  to  enter  our  lines  with 
out  the  use  of  a  boat,  and  thus  required  at  our  hands  special 
attention.  The  commanding  officer  was  greatly  annoyed  by  per 
sons  requesting  passes  to  visit  the  fish-basket,  and  was  frequently 
troubled  to  reconcile  the  giving  of  a  pass  for  this  purpose  with  the 
general  order  from  army  headquarters — not  to  allow  any  one  to 
cross  the  river  unless  he  could  show  a  pass  signed  by  the  general-in- 
chief.  The  thing  was  as  wisely  managed  as  could  be  under  the 
peculiar  circumstances,  having  in  view  the  important  fact  of  pre 
serving  the  fish  from  getting  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  To  have 
allowed  this,  would  have  been  distressing  to  the  flesh.  The  pleasant 
recollection  remains  of  the  fact  of  the  tish  always  reaching  the  north 

«/  O 

bank  of  the  river,  and  contributing  aid  and  comfort  to  loval  and 
patriotic  appetites.     This  incident  is  mentioned  as  being  the  only 
thing  in  the  character  of  a  fish-basket  that  became  an    object  of 
25 


386  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

solicitude  during  the  war,  so  far  as  the  writer  lias  any  recollection. 
Interesting  periods,  however,  can  be  recalled  after  this  when  such  an 
object  would  have  excited  the  greatest  care  and  attention,  for  fresh 
river  fish  would  ever  be  a  welcome  and  happy  change  for  the  tough, 
changeless  army  ration  of  fresh  beef,  so  productive  of  uneasy  sleep, 
and  so  worrying  upon  the  soldiers'  digestion.  The  mention  of  fresh 
rations  brings  to  my  recollection  a  communication  received  about 
this  time  from  General  Reynolds,  who  was  at  this  early  period  of  the 
war  as  rigid  in  protecting  the  beef  and  mutton  of  the  rebel  citizens  as 
McClellan  himself ;  indeed,  in  this  he  was  but  carrying  out  the  stand 
ing  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief.  The  communication  was 
dated  Headquarters  First  Army  Corps,  October  21st,  1862,  and  in 
the  general's  own  handwriting,  and  for  this  reason  is  preserved  as  a 
precious  memento  of  our  lamented  corps  commander.  It  was  in 
these  words :  "  It  is  represented  that  some  of  your  men  have  crossed 
the  river  and  have  been  killing  sheep  belonging  to  Mr.  Shepherd. 
You  will  take  such  measures  as  to  prevent  this  at  once."  This  letter 
was  signed,  "  John  F.  Reynolds,  Brigadier  General,  Commanding," 
and  did  not  come  through  the  regular  military  channel,  the  General 
not  seeming  to  be  a  stickler  in  the  observance  of  red  tape. 

No  copy  of  the  reply  to  this  communication  was  retained,  but  a 
suitable  one  was  promptly  made,  and,  of  course,  the  general  com 
manding  the  corps  was  respectfully  informed  that  he  had  been  mis 
informed  as  to  any  of  the  soldiers  of  the  brigade  referred  to  engaging 
in  any  such  recreation,  as  they  had  not,  so  early  in  the  war,  attained 
that  degree  of  discipline  as  to  secure  subsistence  in  that  way.  It 
might  be  supposed  that  in  less  than  a  year  from  this  period,  when 
the  army  had  undergone  a  little  necessary  demoralization  in  this 
direction  and  secured  a  little  more  patriotic  wisdom  on  this  interest 
ing  point,  that  these  soldiers  would  have  accepted  a  little  subsistence 
of  this  kind ;  and  doubtless  the  general  would  have  thought  it  of  so 
contraband  a  character  as  to  have  saved  himself  the  writing,  and  his 
orderly  the  time  of  conveying,  dispatches  on  the  subject. 

For  weeks  the  army  had  been  resting,  and  at  the  same  time 
preparing  for  a  movement  against  the  enemy,  and  almost  daily 
orders  were  issued  of  a  preliminary  character.  For  the  week  previous 
to  the  movement,  we  were  kept  in  hourly,  yea,  constant,  expectancy  for 
the  final  marching  orders.  While  in  this  excited  condition,  an  orderly 
dashed  up  with  the  following  communication  from  General  Reynolds, 
dated  at  his  headquarters,  October  25th,  1862 : 

The  general  commanding  desires  you  will  question  Mrs. ,  wife  of  —     — , 

who  will  cross  to  your  headquarters  to-day,  as  to  the  position  and  movements  of  the 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  REYNOLDS.  387 

enemy,  and  forward  to  these  headquarters  all  the  information  you  may  gather  from, 
her. 

The  names  of  these  persons  are  omitted,  lest  they  might  suffer 
even  at  this  late  day  for  their  loyalty.  Mrs.  -  -  encountered  no 
difficulty  in  crossing  the  river,  and  presented  herself  ahout  ten  o'clock 
in  the  forenoon.  The  result  of  the  interview  with  her  will  appear 
in  the  following  reply  to  the  foregoing  letter,  which  was  promptly 
forwarded  to  the  general's  headquarters  : 

I  have  the  honor  to  report,  for  the  information  of  Major  General  Reynolds, 

commanding  the  corps,  that  Mrs.  • ,  named  in  your  communication  of  this 

date,  has  called  at  these  headquarters,  and  has  given  me  the  following  information: 
"I  live  ahout  four  miles  and  a  half  from  Martinshurg,  on  the  road  to  Shepherds- 
town,  in  the  lines  of  the  rebel  army.  The  rebel  infantry  all  left  that  neighborhood 
on  Thursday  night  of  this  week.  I  think  the  whole  rebel  army  was  there.  When 
they  left  they  moved  toward  Winchester.  Stuart's  cavalry  have  been  left.  The. 
number  I  do  not  know.  They  have  torn  up  the  railroad  and  everything  belonging 
to  the  road  at  Martinsburg,  and  down  toward  Kearneyville.  They  took  up  the 
cross-ties  and  burnt  them,  putting  the  rails  on  the  fire.  They  are  treating  the 
Union  citi/ens  badly,  and  using  and  destroying  their  property.''  This  is  all  of  any 
importance  that  Mrs.  —  —  seemed  to  know  in  reference  to  the  movements  and 
conduct  of  the  enemy. 

The  next  day,  the  whole  army  was  in  motion  for  the  designated 
points  on  the  river,  to  cross  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  It  was  re 
ported,  at  or  ahout  the  time,  that  for  the  reason  that  McClellan  was 
tardy  in  making  this  movement  lie  was  removed,  a  few  days  after 
crossing  into  Virginia,  from  the  command  of  the  army,  and  was  suc 
ceeded  hy  General  Burnside.  This  may  or  may  not  have  heen  the 
reason.  It  is  only  our  purpose  to  speak  of  it  as  an  interesting  fact 
that  made  a  deep  impression  at  the  time,  and  one  that  may  he  referred 
to,  after  a  lapse  of  fourteen  years,  as  an  important  and  inter 
esting  crisis  in  the  history  of  that  army,  that  did  the  greatest 
amount  of  fighting,  was  the  best  disciplined,  and  the  greatest  army 
of  the  rebellion. 

It  is  a  well  known  fact  that  the  removal  of  McClellan  caused 
an  extraordinary  sensation  in  the  army.  There  can  be  no  gainsaying 
the  fact  that  at  this  time  he  was  the  idol  chieftain  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  His  taking  leave,  a  final  leave,  of  that  great  and 
noted  army,  a  few  days  after,  at  AVarrenton,  was  an  extraordinary 
spectacle,  and  one  long  to  be  remembered  by  those  who  witnessed  it. 
In  any  army  with  less  intelligence  and  less  patriotism,  demoraliza 
tion  and  disintegration  might  have  resulted.  This  interesting  occa 
sion  was  an  illustration  of  the  oft-asserted  fact  that  American 
bayonets  think,  and  that  it  is  not  man-worship,  but  patriotism;  not 
the  hero-chieftain,  but  the  noble  good  cause,  the  flag  of  the  country 


388  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  what  that  flag  represented,  that  governed  the  rank  and  file,  and 
prompted  to  years  of  toil  and  suffering,  and  to  deeds  of  noble  daring. 

With  the  cannon's  roar  that  celebrated  this  deeply  interesting 
scene,  and  memorable  military  pageant  of  tears  and  cheers,  of  floating 
banners,  and  proudly  marching  columns,  the  period  of  "  hero  wor 
ship  "  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  passed  away  forever.  Heroes, 
it  is  true,  rose  and  fell  after  this  in  quick  succession ;  but  stern  war, 
determined,  uncompromising  war,  now  more  than  ever  became  the 
moving  power,  thought  and  cry  of  the  thinking  masses  of  the  loyal 
people  of  the  land.  The  popular  irresistible  public  sentiment  was 
impelling  the  mighty  columns  of  that  great  army  to  close  up  to  the 
now  historic  bloody  lines  of  the  Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan, 
and  there,  and  on  many  bloody  battle-fields  far  beyond,  almost 
regardless  of  whose  hand  wielded  the  sceptre  of  command,  thousands 
upon  thousands  gallantly  fought,  bled,  and  died  to  vindicate  the  flag 
of  the'  nation,  and  to  preserve  the  existence  and  unity  of  the  great 
and  good  government  transmitted  to  us  by  the  fathers  of  the  Revo 
lution.  The  great  cause  of  the  Union  loomed  up  more  and  more 
prominently  as  the  mighty  struggle  progressed,  and  at  length  Appo- 
mattox  witnessed  its  triumph,  and  to-day  more  than  forty  millions 
of  freemen  are  enjoying  its  blessed  fruits. 

As  before  remarked,  our  brigade  commander  had  no  personal 
acquaintance  with  General  Reynolds,  not  even  to  the  extent  of 
knowing  him  by  sight,  if  he  rode  along  the  lines.  It  may,  there 
fore,  be  worth  while  to  notice  the  manner  his  acquaintance  was 
formed,  as  it  may  illustrate  a  pleasant  trait  in  his  character.  The 
army  was  on  the  move.  Our  corps,  and  perhaps  one  or  two  others, 
by  different  roads,  concentrated  at  the  little  village  of  Berlin,  two 
or  three  miles  southeast  of  Harper's  Ferry,  after  having  greatly 
suffered  from  a  snow-storm  in  making  a  march  over  South  Mountain. 
The  Potomac  was  crossed  here  on  pontoons,  and  from  thence  the  line 
of  march  was  continued  down  the  London  valley,  running  parallel 
with  the  Yalley  of  the  Shenandoah,  in  which  the  rebel  army  was  mov 
ing  at  the  time.  While  on  this  movement,  in  the  heart  of  this  beauti 
ful  valley,  General  Ricketts,  commanding  our  division,  being  himself  a 
mile  or  two  in  the  advance,  communicated,  by  a  staff  officer,  an  order 
that  when  the  brigade  arrived  at  a  certain  angle  in  the  road,  upon 
which  it  was  then  moving,  that  it  should  leave  the  road  and  march 
in  another  direction,  a  diagonal  way  across  the  fields.  Before  the 
head  of  the  column  reached  this  point,  it  was  met  by  a  modest  look 
ing  officer,  entirely  alone,  exhibiting  no  special  insignia  of  rank,  and 
supposed  at  the  time  to  be  an  ordinary  staff  officer.  lie  addressed 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  REYNOLDS.  389 

the  brigade  commander  in  a  mild,  pleasant  way,  at  the  same  time 
joining  him  and  riding  in  the  same  direction,  lie  seemed  to  have 
a  knowledge  that  the  column  had  been  ordered  to  leave  the  road,  and 
said  it  was  a  wrong  or  mistaken  order,  but  did  not  assume  that  he 
had  any  authority  to  order  otherwise,  and  kept  riding  along  until  the 
two  officers  were  one  or  two  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  the  troops. 
The  strange  officer's  manner  was  observed  to  be  somewhat  peculiar, 
as  he  kept  watching  the  head  of  the  column;  and  it  being  near  the 
turning  off  point,  and  being  satisfied  that  the  brigade  commander 
was  not  going  counter  to  the  order  of  his  division  commander  at  his 
mere  suggestion,  or  request,  and  being  satisfied,  doubtless,  that  he 
was  not  regarded  as  of  much  account,  decided  it  would  be  neces 
sary  for  him  to  indicate  higher  rank  and  authority.  Turning  his 
head  again,  and  finding  that  in  another  minute  the  head  of  the 
brigade  would  change  direction,  and  leave  the  road,  unless  otherwise 
ordered,  lie  says  to  the  brigade  commander:  ''Direct  your  orderly 
to  return  to  the  column,  and  have  it  continue  its  advance  on  the 
road."  The  quiet,  dignified  manner  in  which  these  words  were 
uttered  made  an  impression  that  he  might  be  more  than  what  he 
seemed  to  be.  His  full  character  was  not  yet  understood,  and  hesi 
tation  to  comply  was  manifested.  The  orderly  having  overheard 
the  words,  and  knowing  the  officer,  had  turned  his  horse  a"ml  was 
ready,  and  anxious,  to  bear  the  order  to  the  officer  commanding  the 
leading  regiment.  As  the  crisis  in  this  little  episode  had  now  come, 
the  modest  stranger  found  it  necessary  to  assert  more  fully  his  posi 
tion  and  authority.  In  a  calm  and  moderate  tone,  peculiar  to  him, 
he  said:  ''General  Reynolds  orders  that  the  column  shall  continue 
its  march  in  this  direction."  These  words  opened  the  eves  of  the 
officer  in  command.  Xo  sooner  said  than  done.  The  orderly  was 
oil'  at  full  speed,  and  the  order  communicated  just  in  proper  time. 
The  officer  was  not  slow  in  recognizing  his  superior.  Finding  him 
self  in  the  presence,  and  in  company  with  his  corps  commander,  he 
was  no  little  alarmed  and  embarrassed,  and  being  about  to  take 
respectful  leave  and  retire  to  his  proper  place,  the  General  requested 
him  to  ride  along  in  company  with  him,  which  the  officer  was  pleased 
to  do  for  some  considerable  distance,  and  now  looks  back  upon  it  as 
one  of  the  pleasant  reminiscences  of  his  early  experience  in  the  war, 
and  as  his  first  introduction  to  an  officer  who  was  then  eminent,  and 
who  afterward  became  so  distinguished. 

Two  or  three  days  after  this  pleasant  incident,  when  our  brigade 
was  leading  the  advance,  the  day  being  warm,  dry,  and  dusty,  we 
observed  some  distance  forward  a  party  of  officers,  dismounted,  in  a 


390  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

field  skirting  the  road,  very  busily  engaged  in  efforts  to  extinguish  an 
extensive  fire,  raging  in  the  dry  grass  and  fences.  On  approaching 
nearer  we  found  the  party  to  consist  of  General  Reynolds  and  his 
staff.  It  was  now  ascertained  that  they  had,  in  their  desire  to  pre 
vent  unnecessary  devastation,  voluntarily  undertaken  to  stem  the 
advance  of  an  enemy  who,  not  despising  their  rank,  yet  seemed 
to  entertain  supreme  contempt  for  their  numbers.  It,  therefore, 
became  necessary  to  call  in  reinforcements.  The  brigade  promptly 
furnished  them,  the  fiery  enemy  was  routed,  and  the  march  resumed. 
In  this  incident  we  may  infer  the  kindness  of  heart  and  the  respect 
for  strict  observance  of  military  law  by  which  the  general  was  gov 
erned  ;  this  being  in  the  infantile  period  of  the  war,  and  when  it 
was  conducted  under  the  system  of  the  old  regulations,  which 
were  soon  found  not  to  be  well  adapted  in  certain  particulars  to  this 
peculiar  and  cruel  war.  The  close  of  this  year  seemed  to  have 
ended  such  fastidiousness.  Fences,  crops,  barns,  and  houses,  rail 
roads,  and  even  towns  were  afterward  swept  away  by  the  surging 
and  resistless  tide  of  war,  when  in  the  way  of  an  advancing  army, 
or  when  used  as  a  shield  for  the  enemy,  or  when  necessary  to  the 
subsistence  and  comfort  of  the  army. 

In  a  few  weeks,  after  the  occurrence  of  the  incident  just 
mentioned,  the  bloody  battle  of  Fredericksburg  took  place,  in  which 
Reynolds'  Corps  was  a  prominent  actor,  and  was  the  only  corps  in 
our  whole  army  that  met  with  any  considerable  degree  of  success  in 
that  great  battle.  That  corps,  in  withdrawing  from  that  sanguinary 
field,  felt  like  a  victor,  as  it  was,  indeed,  for  it  charged  upon  and 
broke  the  enemy's  lines  on  their  right,  and,  if  prompt  support  had 
been  rendered,  the  right  flank  of  Lee's  army  would  have  been  turned, 
his  position  made  untenable,  and  a  great  victory  for  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  rather  than  a  bloody  repulse,  would  have  been  the 
result. 

Twice  during  the  winter,  in  the  way  of  official  duty,  we  met 
General  Reynolds  in  his  tent  at  corps  headquarters.  Our  duty  was 
to  report  to  him  for  orders  and  instructions,  and  on  these  occasions 
the  interviews  were  brief  and  the  words  few.  lie  impressed  us  as 
being  mild  and  gentlemanly  in  manner,  and  an  officer  of  not  a  very 
numerous  class  of  old  army  officers  who  knew  how  to  treat  volunteers 
in  such  a  way  as  to  secure  their  respect  and  confidence.  The  next 
we  saw  of  Reynolds  was  at  the  great  review  of  his  corps  in  April, 
1863,  at  Belle  Plain,  by  President  Lincoln.  This  was  his  last 
review,  and  but  a  short  time  before  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville. 
In  this  movement,  for  the  first  three  days,  his  corps  was  making 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  REYNOLDS.  391 

demonstrations  against  Fredericksburg.  Here  we  saw  the  general 
cross  the  llappahannock,  on  the  pontoon  bridge,  in  gallant  style, 
under  a  heavy  tire  of  shell.  Three  days  after  this  he  visited  our 
division,  then  on  the  right  of  the  army  at  Chaneellorsville,  his  corps 
having  arrived  upon  this  battle-ground  the  evening  before,  in  time 
to  take  the  place  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  then  just  swept  from  its 
position  by  Stonewall  Jackson's  famous  flunk  attack,  in  which 
Jackson  himself  found  a  soldier's  death,  and  the  Confederacy  lost 
one  of  its  greatest  heroes.  Once  again  we  remember  seeing  General 
".Reynolds.  It  was  when  on  the  march  to  the  world-renowned  battle 
field  of  Gettysburg,  lie  was  standing  on  a  little  eminence  near  his 
headquarters,  looking,  doubtless,  with  a  just  pride  at  his  splendid 
corps,  as  it  liled  past  him  into  cam])  for  the  night.  This  was  the 
last  time  our  eves  rested  upon  that  noble  otiicer  and  patriot.  That 
vision  often  looms  up  in  the  memories  of  the  great  rebellion.  A  few 
davs  thereafter  he  fell.  A  distinguished  officer  of  his  staff  says  : 

On  the  night  before  the  battle,  General  Reynolds  retired  to  his  room  about 
midnight,  and  rose  early,  as  was  his  usual  practiee.  On  the  march  from  our  head 
quarters,  at  the  Red  Tavern,  he  "\vas  very  reticent  and  uncommunicative  to  all 
around  him,  as  was  his  wont.  ]Ie  was,  in  this  respect,  an  entirely  different  man 
from  any  other  general  olHcer  with  whom  I  served  during  the  war,  having  very 
little,  if  anything,  to  say  to  any  one,  other  than  to  communicate  to  them  Mich 
orders  as  he  desired  executed.  He  would,  while  upon  the  march,  ride  miles 
without  having  any  conversation  with  any  one.  Our  ride  to  Gettysburg  formed  no 
exception  to  this  rule.  From  this  you  can  see  that  no  conclusion  could  be  arrived 
at  as  to  what  his  feelings  and  presentiments  were  upon  that  day.  I  consider  him 
one  of  the  finest  and  most  thorough  soldiers  which  the  civil  war  brought  before  the 
country. 

The  whole  army  was  shocked  at  the  death  of  General  Reynolds. 
His  corps  deeply  felt  his  loss.  This  great  Commonwealth,  of  whom 
he  was  a  native,  mourned  over  his  death.  In  him  the  national  cause 
lost  a  powerful  supporter  and  leader.  The  officers  of  his  corps 
testified  their  appreciation  of  his  services,  and  their  high  regard  for 
him  as  their  commander  and  comrade,  by  the  erection  of  a  monument 
to  his  memory.  With  the  historian's  record  of  the  great  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  Major  General  John  F.  Reynolds'  bright  name  and 
fame  will  pass  down  to  posterity. 

Were  a  star  quenched  011  high, 

For  ages  would  its  light, 
Still  traveling  downward  from  the  sky, 

Shine  on  our  mortal  sight. 

So,  when  a  great  man  dies, 

For  years  beyond  our  ken, 
The  light  he  leaves  behind  him. 

Upon  the  paths  of  men. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FLEETWOOD. 


BY    MAJOR    H.    B.    M  OLELLAN. 


THE  services  rendered  by  the 
cavalry  of  the  armies  con 
tending  upon  the  soil  of  Vir 
ginia,  have  not  been  fully 
appreciated  by  those  who 
have  as  yet  attempted  the 
story  of  the  war.  During 
the  last  two  years  of  the  war 
no  branch  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  contributed  so 
much  to  the  overthrow  of 
Lee's  army  as  the  cavalry, 
both  that  which  operated  in 
the  Valley  of  Virginia  and 
that  which  remained  at 
Petersburg.  But  for  the 
efficiency  of  this  force,  it  is  safe  to  say,  that  the  war  would  have  been 
indefinitely  prolonged.  From  the  time  that  the  cavalry  was  concen 
trated  into  a  corps  under  General  Pleasonton,  until  the  close  of  the 
war,  a  steady  progress  was  made  in  discipline,  esprit  du  corps,  and 
numbers.  Nothing  was  spared  to  render  this  arm  complete.  Breech- 
loading  carbines  of  the  most  approved  patterns  wTere  provided  ;  horses 
and  accoutrements  wrere  never  wanting,  and  during  the  last  year  of 
the  war  Sheridan  commanded  as  fine  a  body  of  troops  as  ever  drew 
sabre. 

On  the  other  hand,  two  causes  contributed  steadily  to  diminish 
the  numbers  and  efficiency  of  the  Confederate  cavalry.  The  govern 
ment  committed  the  fatal  error  of  allowing  the  men  to  own  their 
own  horses,  paying  them  a  per  diem  for  their  use,  and  the  muster 
valuation  in  cases  where  they  were  killed  in  action ;  but  giving  no 
compensation  for  horses  lost  by  any  of  the  other  casualties  of  a 
campaign.  If  a  man's  horse  were  killed,  disabled,  or  worn  out  in 
the  service,  he  must  return  to  his  home  to  procure  another ;  and  the 
strength  of  the  command  was  constantly  reduced  below  its  reported 
(392) 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FLEETWOOD. 

'•effective  total"  by  the  large  number  of  men  absent  upon  "horse 
details/'  as  they  were  called.  Toward  the  close  of  the  war  many 
were  unable  to  remount  themselves,  and  hundreds  of  such  dismounted 
men  were  collected  in  a  useless  crowd,  which  was  dubbed  "Company 
Q/'  The  second  cause  was  the  failure  or  inability  of  the  government 
to  supply  good  arms  and  accoutrements.  Our  breech-loading  guns 
were  nearly  all  captured  from  the  enemy,  and  the  same  may  be  said 
of  the  best  of  our  saddles  and  bridles.  From  these  causes,  which  it 
was  beyond  the  power  of  any  cavalry  commander  to  remedy,  there 
was  a  steady  decline  in  the  numbers  of  the  Confederate  cavalry, 
and,  as  compared  with  the  Federal  cavalry,  a  decline  in  efficiency. 
But  the  men  remained  the  same  in  courage  and  devotion.,  and  to  the 
very  end  the  best  blood  in  the  land  rode  after  Stuart,  Hampton,  and 
the  Lees.  But  while  the  superior  efficiency  of  the  Federal  horse  is 
certainly  to  be  acknowledged,  a  Confederate  cavalryman  may  be 
pardoned  in  dissenting  from  some  of  the  statements  made  by  General 
I).  McM.  Gregg,  in  his  able  article  on  "  The  Union  Cavalry  in  the 
Gettysburg  Campaign."  In  the  tirst  place,  when  stating  the  force 
of  the  cavalry  under  Stuart's  command  in  June,  1*03,  General  Gregg 
falls  into  the  very  common  error  of  largely  over-estimating  his  adver 
sary.  He  states  that  the  Confederate  cavalry  numbered  "about  twelve 
thousand  horsemen,  divided  into  five  brigades,  with  sixteen  pieces  of 
artillery/''  The  brigade  organization  is  stated  correctly  ;  our  a  .  ilery 
consisted  of  live  batteries  of  four  guns  each — in  all  twenty  /rn..  ;  but 
in  estimating  Stuart's  horsemen  at  the  battle  of  Brandy  Station.  June 
9th,  1S<>3,  at  twelve  thousand,  General  Gregg  nearly  doubles  our 
effective  strength. 

As  Assistant  Adjutant  General  of  the  Cavalry,  it  was  within 
my  province  to  know  its  strength.  Three  grand  reviews  were  held  in 
Culpepper — on  the  22d  of  May,  and  on  the  5th  and  Sth  of  June,  18<J3. 
At  the  first  of  these  reviews  there  were  present  only  the  three  brigades 
of  Hampton,  and  the  two  Lees.  Private  memoranda,  now  in  my  pos 
session,  show  about  four  thousand  men,  exclusive  of  pickets,  in  the 
saddle  upon  that  day.  Before  the  second  review  Stuart  was  joined 
by  Robertson's  Xorth  Carolina  Brigade,  and  by  W.  E.  Jones'  Virginia 
Brigade,  and  on  the  31st  of  May,  LS63,  the  "total  effective"  of  the 
cavalry  division  was  reported  as  nine  thousand  five  hundred  and 
thirty-six.  To  rightly  estimate  the  force  with  which  Stuart  fought 
the  battle  of  the  9th  of  June,  1803,  there  must  be  deducted  from 
this  number  the  men  absent  on  special  duty — "horse  details" — the 
entire  brigade  of  Robertson,  the  Fourth  Virginia  Cavalry,  and  the 
Second  South  Carolina  Cavalry.  It  must  also  be  stated  that  of  Fitz 


394:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Lee's  Brigade  only  four  squadrons  of  sharpshooters  were  engaged, 
and  these  at  the  very  close  of  the  battle.  "When  these  deductions 
are  made,  it  will  appear  that  Stuart's  available  force  did  not  much 
exceed,  if  at  all,  six  thousand  men.  Again,  in  speaking  of  the  time 
when  General  Pleasonton  assumed  command,  General  Gregg  states : 
"  To  this  time,  for  the  reasons  heretofore  given,  the  prestige  of  suc 
cess  had  steadily  remained  with  the  rebel  cavalry  in  its  greatest  and 
more  important  undertakings ;  but  the  time  was  now  at  hand  for  its 
transfer  to  our  side,  there  '  to  remain  to  the  close  of  the  war.' 


-x-     * » 


I  propose  to  show  that  the  battle  of  the  9th  of  June,  as  a  passage- 
at-arms,  was  a  victory  for  the  Southern  cavalry.  I  could  also  show 
that  Stuart  was  not,  as  General  Gregg  states,  subsequently  defeated 
at  Aldie,  Middleburg,  and  Upperville ;  but  that  he  successfully  per 
formed  his  task  of  guarding  the  flank  of  Lee's  army  while  passing 
into  Maryland,  although  falling  back  from  Aldie  to  Upperville,  before 
a  superior  force  of  cavalry,  supported  by  at  least  seven  regiments  of 
infantry.  I  would  remind  General  Gregg  that  the  last  charge  in 
the  cavalry  battle  at  Gettysburg  was  made  by  the  Southern  cavalry ; 
that  by  this  charge  his  division  was  swept  behind  the  protection  of 
his  artillery,  and  that  the  field  remained  in  the  undisputed  possession 
of  Stuart,  save  that  from  the  opposite  hills  a  fierce  artillery  duel  was 
maintained  until  night.  I  would  remind  him  how  the  Federal 
cavalry  was  handled  after  Gettysburg,  on  the  road  between  Hagers- 
town  and  Williamsport,  when  this  "  limping  cavalry  giant "  raised 
the  siege  of  our  wagon  trains  which  were  huddled  together  on  the 
bank  of  the  Potomac.  I  would  remind  him  of  "The  Buckland 
Races,"  on  the  19th  of  October,  18G3,  when  Kilpatrick's  Division 
was  chased,  with  horses  at  full  gallop,  from  within  three  miles  of 
Warrenton  to  Buckland  Mills,  and  only  by  this  rapid  flight  escaped 
being  crushed  between  Hampton's  and  Fitz  Lee's  Brigades.  Nor 
must  the  battle  near  Trevillian's  Station,  in  June,  1864,  be  forgotten, 
where  the  entire  strength  of  the  cavalry  of  both  armies  was  concen 
trated.  Had  Sheridan  been  able  to  carry  out  his  plans,  the  speedy 
evacuation  of  Richmond  must  have  followed;  but  he  was  met  and 
successfully  opposed  by  Hampton,  and  in  a  two  days'  battle  was  so 
severely  crippled  that  he  was  compelled  to  abandon  his  designs,  and 
retire  during  the  night  to  a  place  of  safety.  Nor  can  Hampton's 
famous  "  Cattle  Raid  "  be  passed  over,  where  two  thousand  five  hun 
dred  fat  beeves  were  snatched  from  the  guardianship  of  this  same 
Federal  cavalry,  and  safely  conveyed  within  the  Confederate  lines  at 
Petersburg,  despite  very  vigorous  efforts  on  the  part  of  General 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FLEETWOOD.  395 

Gregg  himself,  if  I  mistake  not,  for  their  recovery.  Xo !  Xo  !  "TJte 
prestige  of  success"  dl<l  rest  -finally  and  forever  with  the  Federal 
horsemen,  but  there  were  many  bright  days  between  times,  when  the 
Confederate  troopers  could  exidt  in  conscious  victory  ;  and  on  the 
last  day,  glory,  as  of  the  setting  sun,  crowned  the  arms  of  the  rem 
nant  of  Fitz  Lee's  old  brigade,  when,  under  the  gallant  Munford, 
they  made,  at  the  High  Bridge,  near  Farmville,  a  successful  charge 
—the  last  charge  of  the  war.  Xo  more  accomplished  commander, 
no  harder  fighter  than  General  Gregg  was  to  be  found  in  the  Federal 
army,  and  no  one  can  afford  better  than  he  gracefully  to  acknowledge 
the  achievements  of  the  Southern  Horse. 

"The  Fight  at  Brandy  Station,''  or  "The  Battle  of  Fleetwood," 
as  Stuart  called  it,  was  one  of  the  most  splendid  passages-at-arms 
which  the  war  furnished.  General  It.  E.  Lee  was  commencing  the 
movement  of  his  army  which  resulted  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign, 
and  had  already  moved  E  well's  Corps  to  the  vicinity  of  Oulpepper 
Court-lloiise.  On  the  7th  of  June,  he  notified  General  Stuart  that 
he  would  review  his  cavalry  on  the  next  day.  This  review  was  held 
on  the  Sth  of  June,  on  the  broad  open  fields  which  lie  between 
Brandy  Station  and  Culpepper  Court-House.  ( )n  the  evening  of  the 
same  day  the  brigades  were  moved  down  toward  the  Kappahannock, 
preparatory  to  the  crossing,  which  it  was  contemplated  to  make  the 
next  day.  Fitz  Lee's  Brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Thomas  T. 
Munford,  having  charge  of  the  pickets  on  the  upper  Itappahannock, 
was,  with  the  exception  of  the  Fourth  Virginia  Cavalry,  moved 
across  the  Hazel  river.  AV.  IT.  F.  Lee's  Brigade  was  stationed  on  the 
road  to  TVelford's  ford ;  Jones'  Brigade  on  the  road  to  Beverly's  ford, 
and  Robertson's  Brigade  on  the  farm  of  John  Minor  Botts,  picketing 
the  lower  fords.  Hampton's  Brigade  was  held  in  reserve.  One 
battery  of  horse  artillery  was  sent  with  Fitz  Lee's  Brigade  across 
the  Hazel  river;  the  remaining  four  batteries  accompanied  Jones' 
Brigade.  The  object  of  the  movement  contemplated  for  the  next 
morning  was  not  to  make  an  extensive  cavalry  raid,  but  to  place  the 
command  in  such  position  as  best  to  protect  the  flank  of  our  army 
while  marching  northward.  Orders  were  issued  to  march  at  an  early 
hour  on  the  Uth,  and,  ignorant  of  any  concentration  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  on  the  opposite  side,  the  battalion  of  horse  artillery  bivou 
acked  close  to  Beverly's  ford,  in  advance  of  Jones'  Brigade.  The 
position  was  an  exposed  one,  and  nearly  resulted  in  serious  loss. 

AVith  everything  in  readiness  for  an  early  start,  Stuart  himself 
bivouacked  on  the  night  of  the  Sth,  on  Fleetwood  Hill,  so-called 
from  the  name  of  the  residence  there  situated.  The  hill  is  between 


39G  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Brandy  Station  and  the  river,  about  half  a  mile  from  the  station,  and 
commands  the  open  plain  around  it  in  every  direction.  At  the  very 
first  dawn  of  day  the  firing  of  the  pickets  at  Beverly's  ford  notified 
us  that  an  attack  had  been  made ;  and  soon  reports  came  in  from  Jones 
and  from  Robertson  that  the  enemy  had  effected  a  crossing  at  both 
Beverly's  and  Keller's  fords.  The  condition  of  the  horse  artillery 
was,  for  a  time,  exceedingly  critical.  The  advance  of  the  enemy 
was  pressed  with  vigor,  and  there  was  nothing  between  the  guns  and 
danger,  save  the  squadron  on  picket.  Guns  and  wagons  were  har 
nessed  in  haste,  and  retired  in  much  confusion,  until  the  arrival  of 
Jones'  grand  guard,  the  Seventh  Virginia,  checked  the  enemy.  ISTo 
serious  loss  occurred  save  that  Major  Beckham's  desk,  in  which  he 
had  placed  the  order  of  march  received  by  him  the  previous  night, 
was  jostled  out  of  his  wagon  in  its  hasty  retreat,  and  fell  into  the 
enemy's  hands,  thus  revealing  to  him  authoritatively  part  of  the 
information  which  he  had  come  to  obtain.  Retiring  to  the  vicinity 
of  St.  James'  Church,  the  artillery  was  placed  in  position  for  action, 
and  the  whole  of  Jones'  Brigade  having  now  been  brought  forward, 
the  advance  of  the  enemy  was  still  further  checked  until  Hampton, 
with  four  of  his  regiments,  took  position  upon  Jones'  right,  and  a 
junction  was  effected  with  "W".  II.  F.  Lee's  Brigade  upon  the  left. 
At  the  earliest  report  of  the  enemy's  advance,  Robertson  moved  to 
the  support  of  his  pickets,  and  encountered  a  party  of  the  enemy  near 
Brown's  house,  about  two  miles  from  Kelley's  ford.  This  brigade 
was  not,  however,  engaged  during  any  part  of  the  day.  With  mat 
ters  in  this  position  the  fight  continued  for  more  than  two  hours, 
with  no  decisive  result  on  either  side,  save  that  the  Confederate 
cavalry  held  their  position  against  every  attack.  It  is  the  concurrent 
opinion  of  Generals  Hampton  and  Jones,  and  of  Major  Beckham,  as 
expressed  in  their  official  reports,  that  they  could  not  have  been 
dislodged  by  the  force  which  had  developed  itself  in  their  front. 
The  enemy's  infantry  had  been  freely  used,  both  as  a  support,  and  as 
an  attacking  force,  but  the  effort  to  dislodge  our  troops  from  the  first 
position  they  assumed  near  the  church  had  entirely  failed. 

But,  meanwhile,  the  situation  was  becoming  serious  in  another 
direction,  and  that,  too,  while  we  were  ignorant  of  the  danger. 
Before  sending  Hampton  into  action,  Stuart  had  ordered  that  one 
of  his  regiments  be  detached  to  guard  our  rear  at  Brandy  Station ; 
but  learning  from  Robertson  that  a  column  of  the  enemy  was  moving 
upon  Stevensburg,  this  regiment,  the  Second  South  Carolina,  Colonel 
M.  C.  Butler,  was  ordered  to  that  point,  which  is  about  five  miles 
from  Brandy  Station.  The  Fourth  Virginia,  Colonel  Wickham,  was 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FLEET  WOOD.  397 

shortly  after  sent  in  the  same  direction.  Relying  upon  these  regi 
ments  and  upon  Robertson's  Brigade  to  protect  his  rear  from  an 
attack  by  way  of  the  lower  fords,  Stuart  proceeded  to  the  front  at 
St.  James'  Church  to  urge  on  the  battle  ;  and  as  the  field  was  geogra 
phically  so  extensive,  he  stationed  his  adjutant  (the  writer)  upon 
Fleet  wood  Hill,  directions  having  been  given  to  the  brigades  and 
detached  regiments  to  communicate  with  that  point  as  headquarters. 
Every  scrap  of  the  camp  was  removed  toward  Cul  pepper  Court- 
House,  and  there  remained  nothing  upon  the  hill  but  the  adjutant 
and  his  couriers.  A  six-pound  howitzer  from  Chew's  Battery,  under 
charge  of  Lieutenant  Carter,  which  had  been  retired  from  the  light  near 
the  river  because  its  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted,  was  halted  at 
the  bottom  of  the  hill;  a  circumstance  which  afterward  proved  to  be 
our  salvation.  Perhaps  nearly  two  hours  had  elapsed  since  Stuart  had 
mounted  for  the  front,  when  an  individual  scout  reported  to  me  that 
the  enemy  was  advancing  from  Ivellev's  ford  in  force  and  unopposed 
upon  Brandy  Station,  and  that  he  was  now  directly  in  our  rear. 
]\Tot  having  personal  acquaintance  with  the  man,  and  deeming  it 
impossible  that  such  a  movement  could  be  made  without  opposition 
from  Robertson's  Brigade,  F  ordered  the  scout  to  return  and  satisfy 
himself  by  a  closer  inspection  that  he  had  not  mistaken  some  of  our 
troops  for  the  enemy.  In  less  than  five  minutes  the  man  came  back 
with  the  report  that  T  could  now  satisfy  myself,  as  the'  enemy  was  in 
plain  view.  And  so  it  was!  Within  cannon-shot  of  the  hill,  a  long 
column  of  the  enemy  filled  the  road  which  here  skirted  the  woods, 
and  were  pressing  steadily  upon  the  railroad  station,  which  must  in 
a  few  moments  be  in  their  possession.  How  could  they  be  prevented 
from  also  occupying  the  Fleetwood  Hill,  the  key  to  the  whole  posi 
tion?  Matters  looked  serious  !  But  it  is  wonderful  what  results  can 
sometimes  be  accomplished  with  the  smallest  means.  Lieutenant 
Carter's  howitzer  was  brought  up  and  boldly  pushed  beyond  the 
crest  of  the  hill;  a  few  imperfect  shells  and  some  round  shot  were 
found  in  the  limber  chest ;  a  slow  fire  was  at  once  opened  upon  the 
march  ing  column  ;  and  courier  after  courier  was  dispatched  to  General 
Stuart  to  inform  him  of  the  peril.  It  was  all  important  to  gain  time  ; 
for  should  the  enemy  once  plant  his  artillery  upon  this  hill  it  would 
cost  many  valuable  lives  to  retake  the  position,  even  if  that  could  at 
all  be  accomplished.  "We  must  retain  this  position  or  suffer  disastrous 
defeat,  inclosed  between  the  divisions  of  Buford  and  Gregg.  But  the 
enemy  was  deceived  by  appearances.  There  was  not  one  man  left 
upon  the  hill  beside  those  belonging  to  the  howitzer  section  and 
myself;  for  I  had  sent  away  even  my  last  courier  with  an  urgent 


398  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

appeal  for  speedy  help.  Instead  of  moving  a  small  force  forward  to 
an  immediate  attack,  which  would,  of  course,  have  been  successful, 
three  rifled-guns  were  unlimbered,  and  a  fierce  cannonade  was  com 
menced,  and  continued  while  troops  were  preparing  for  the  assault. 
My  first  courier  found  General  Stuart  as  incredulous  concerning  the 
presence  of  the  enemy  in  his  rear  as  I  had  been ;  but  simultaneous 
with  my  second  message  came  the  sound  of  the  cannonading,  and 
there  was  no  longer  room  for  doubt.  The  nearest  point  from  which 
a  regiment  could  be  sent  was  Jones'  position,  not  less  than  two  miles 
distant  from  Fleet  wood.  Two  of  his  regiments,  the  Twelfth  Vir 
ginia,  Colonel  Ilarman,  and  White's  Thirty-fifth  Virginia  Battalion, 
were  immediately  withdrawn  from  his  line  and  ordered  at  a  gallop 
to  meet  this  new  danger.  But  minutes  expanded  seemingly  into 
hours  to  those  anxious  watchers  on  the  hill,  who  feared,  lest,  after 
all,  help  could  not  arrive  in  time.  But  it  did  come.  The  emergency 
was  so  pressing  that  Colonel  Harman  had  no  time  to  form  his  regi 
ment  in  squadrons,  or  even  platoons. 

He  reached  the  top  of  the  hill  as  Lieutenant  Carter  was  retiring 
his  gun  after  having  fired  his  very  last  cartridge.  Not  fifty  yards 
below  Sir  Percy  Wyndham  was  advancing  a  strong  regiment  in 
magnificent  order,  in  column  of  squadrons,  with  flags  and  guidons 
flying,  directly  upon  the  hill,  and  to  meet  this  attack  the  Twelfth 
Virginia  was  compelled  to  move  forward  instantly,  though  disordered 
by  a  hard  gallop,  and  in  column  of  fours.  The  result  was  a  recoil, 
which  extended  for  a  time  to  "White's  Battalion,  which  was  follow 
ing  close  after.  Stuart  reached  the  hill  a  few  moments  later,  and, 
satisfied  that  he  had  here  to  encounter  a  large  force  of  the  enemy, 
he  ordered  both  Jones  and  Hampton  to  withdraw  with  the  artillery 
from  the  Beverly's  ford  road  and  concentrate  upon  Fleetwood  Hill. 
And  now  the  first  serious  contest  was  for  the  possession  of  this  hill, 
and  so  stubbornly  was  this  fought  on  either  side,  and  for  so  long  a 
time,  that  all  of  Jones'  regiments,  and  all  of  Hampton's,  participated 
successively  in  the  charges  and  counter-charges  which  swept  across 
its  face.  At  one  time  Gregg  would  have  possession,  at  another 
Stuart ;  but  at  no  time  did  Gregg  retain  possession  sufficiently  long  to 
bring  up  his  guns  to  the  crest.  lie  did,  indeed,  advance  three  guns 
to  the  foot  of  the  hill ;  but  there  they  were  destined  to  remain.  On 
the  other  hand,  Stuart  did  gain  position  little  by  little.  How  fierce 
this  struggle  was,  and  with  what  determined  gallantry  fought  by 
both  sides,  may,  perhaps,  best  be  shown  by  an  extract  from  Major 
Beckham's  report  He  says  : 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FLEETWOOD.  399 

The  pieces  first  placed  on  Fleetwood  Hill  were  under  the  command  of  Lieu- 
tenaiit  Carter,  of  Chew's  Battery,  and  had  been  repeatedly  charged  by  the 
enemy  and  retaken  by  our  cavalry ;  and  at  the  time  that  the  two  gnns  of  McGre 
gor's  were  brought  toward  the  crest  of  the  hill,  it  was  very  doubtful  which  party 
had  possession  of  it.  The  two  guns  were,  however,  moved  up  rapidly,  and  scarcely 
had  they  reached  the  top  (and  before  they  could  be  put  in  position),  when  a  small 
party  of  the  enemy  charged  them.  The  charge  was  met  by  the  cannoneers  of  the 
pieces.  Lieutenant  Ford  killed  one  of  the  enemy  with  his  pistol ;  Lieutenant  Hox- 
ton  killed  one,  and  private  Sully,  of  McGregor's  Battery,  knocked  one  off  his  horse 
with  a  sponge-stall'.  Several  of  the  party  were  taken  prisoners  by  the  men  at 
the  guns. 

Aid  was  close  at  hand  for  those  gallant  cannoneers.  Cohb's 
Georgia  Legion,  under  Colonel  P.  ^L  P>.  Young,  cleared  the  hill  of 
the  enemy,  and  concerted  charges,  made  by  other  regiments  of 
Hampton's  and  Jones'  Brigades,  placed  it  securely  in  our  possession. 
And  now  covetous  eyes  were  cast  toward  the  foot  of  the  hill,  where 
stood  those  three  rifled  gnns,  and  around  them  the  battle  raged 
fiercely.  Three  times  were  they  over-ridden  by  the  Confederate 
Horse,  and  twice  Avere  they  retaken  by  their  friends.*  Put  Colonel 
Lomax,  witli  the  Eleventh  Virginia,  made  the  last  charge,  and  the 
gnns  remained  with  us.  One  was  disabled,  the  other  two  service 
able.  These  two  points  decided  the  struggle  in  our  favor,  and 
Brandy  Station  was  soon  cleared  of  its  unwelcome  visitors,  who 
were  hurried  back  along  the  road  upon  which  thev  had  advanced. 
The  pursuit  was  continued  by  Lomax  and  Hampton,  until  checked 
bv  fit <?  jii'<>  of  our  <>irn  artillery, \  for  the  dust  and  smoke  of  the  con 
flict  was  so  great  that  from  the  position  of  the  artillery,  friends 
could  not  be  distinguished  from  foes. 

Put  the  question  of  further  pursuit  of  Gregg's  Division  was 
soon  decided  for  us  by  General  Puford,  who  made  a  heavy  attack 
upon  AV.  .11.  F.  Lee's  Brigade,  upon  our  left,  beyond  the  Parbour 
House,  at  the  same  time  advancing  with  infantry  and  cavalry  through 
the  open  fields  from  the  direction  of  St.  James'  Church,  threatening 
another  attack  upon  the  Fleetwood  11  ill,  and  forming,  subsequently, 


*  This  statement  has  been  courteously  questioned  by  Colonel  Thomas,  of  the 
First  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.     My  authority  is  this:  ''Stuart  states,  in  his  report, 
that  the  Thirty-fifth  Virginia  Battalion  penetrated,  to  the   enemy's  artillery,  but 
were  driven  back."     Major   Flournoy,  commanding  the  Sixth   Virginia    Cavalry, 
states:  "We  charged  and  took  the  battery,  but  were  unable  to  hold  it."     Colonel 
Lomax,  Eleventh  Virginia  Cavalry,  says:  "  I  charged  the  enemy  on  the  right  of  the 
Culpepper  Court-House  road,  capturing  a  battery  of  three  guns  and  many  prison 
ers." — Sec  Official  Report  of  Buttles,  Eiclimonrt,  1S64.     These   circumstances  might 
easily  have  escaped  Colonel  Thomas'  notice,  on  a  field  so  confused  and  dusty. 

*  See  Reports  of  Stuart,  Hampton,  and  Lomax. 


400  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

a  junction  with  Gregg's  Division.  The  figlit  upon  the  left  was 
obstinate  and  bloody,  and  our  troops  maintained  their  ground  with 
difficulty,  until  the  opportune  arrival  of  Colonel  Munford  with  Fitz 
Lee's  Brigade,  who  attacked  the  enemy  in  flank  at  Green's  house 
and  "Welf ord's,  with  sharpshooters  and  artillery,  causing  them  to  fall 
back  toward  the  river,  upon  which  our  pickets  were  established  at 
nightfall.  Knowing  that  a  force  of  infantry  was  present  with  both 
of  the  columns  which  had  attacked  him,  and  believing  that  the 
enemy's  cavalry  alone  outnumbered  ours,  General  Stuart  had  applied 
to  General  Lee  for  an  infantry  support,  which  arrived  about  four 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  This  force,  a  portion  of  Ewell's  Corps, 
was  stationed  to  protect  the  Fleetwood  Hill,  and  to  support  the 
brigades  of  the  two  Lees  on  our  left.  But  the  battle  was  virtually 
over  before  their  arrival,  and  they  did  not  fire  a  gun.  Their  pres 
ence,  however,  revealed  to  General  Pleasonton  another  item  of  in 
formation  which  he  had  set  out  to  obtain. 

While  these  events  were  transpiring  near  Brandy  Station,  affairs 
wore  a  far  different  complexion  near  Stevensburg,  to  which  point 
Colonel  M.  C.  Butler's  Second  South  Carolina,  and  Colonel  W.  C. 
Wickham's  Fourth  Virginia  Cavalry  had  been  sent  to  oppose  the 
advance  of  Duffie's  Division.  On  his  arrival  near  Willis  Madden's 
house,  Colonel  Wickham  found  Butler  already  engaged  with  the 
enemy.  Before  dispositions  could  be  made,  either  to  receive  or  make 
an  attack,  a  charge  of  the  enemy  produced  some  confusion  in  a  por 
tion  of  the  line  of  the  Second  South  Carolina,  which  extended  to  the 
Fourth  Virginia.  The  whole  regiment  became  demoralized,  and  ran 
from  the  enemy's  charge  without  firing  a  gun.  They  were  pursued 
through  the  town  of  Stevensburg,  and  for  some  distance  beyond,  nor 
could  tlio  men  be  rallied  until  satisfied  that  the  enemy's  pursuit  had 
ceased.  In  his  report,  Stuart  says :  "  This  regiment  usually  fights 
well,  and  its  stampede  on  this  occasion  is  unaccountable."  In  fact, 
the  Fourth  Virginia  was  one  of  our  largest  and  best  regiments.  The 
men  were  deeply  humiliated  by  this  disgraceful  conduct.  Through 
their  colonel  they  presented  to  General  Stuart  an  humble  confession 
of  their  fault,  and  a  promise  that  they  would  wripe  out  their  disgrace 
upon  the  next  field  of  battle — a  promise  which  the  future  history  of 
the  regiment  fully  redeemed.  This  affair  cost  us  some  valuable  lives. 
The  bursting  of  one  shell  killed  Lieutenant  Colonel  Frank  Hampton, 
brother  of  General  Wade  Hampton,  and  Captain  Farley,  volunteer 
aide-de-camp  to  General  Stuart,  and  carried  away  the  foot  of  Colonel 
M.  C.  Butler,  necessitating  amputation  of  the  leg,  and  depriving  his 
regiment  of  his  valuable  services  for  many  months. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FLEETWOOD.  401 

Tn  summing  up  the  results  of  tliis  battle  it  must  be  remembered 
that  Robertson's  Brigade,  which  numbered  more  than  a  thousand 
men,  did  not,  at  any  time  in  the  day,  participate  in  the  lighting.* 


*  Inasmuch  as  General  Robertson  has,  in  the  Memphis  Appeal,  complained  of 
injustice  done  him  by  the  references  which  I  have  made  to  his  operations,  I  append 
his  own  re-ports  of  this  day's  work,  as  follows : 

HEADQUAETEES  CAVALRY  BRIGADE, 

June  12th,  lSb'3. 
MAJOE  II.  B.  MCCLELLAX, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General,  etc.: 

Major : — On  9th  instant,  according  to  orders,  my  brigade  proceeded  to  within 
two  miles  of  Kelley's  ford  to  check  the  enemy's  advance  upon  the  railroad,  near 
which  our  forces  were  engaged.  I  dismounted  a  portion  to  oppose  the  enemy's 
infantry  in  the  woods.  The  enemy's  cannon  had  just  opened,  when  several  orders 
were  received  to  fall  back  rapidly  to  Brandy  Station,  the  Yankees  being  in  my  rear. 
I  had  reported  their  advance  upon  Steveusburg  and  Brandy,  and  was  ordered, 
through  Lieutenant  Johnston,  to  hold  the  ground  in  my  front.  One  regiment  of 
my  brigade  was  then  ordered  to  move  rapidly  to  the  General's  headquarters,  the 
other  was  instructed  to  cover  the  right  and  rear  of  Hampton's  Brigade.  Both  regi 
ments  were,  subsequently,  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  to  repel  the  advance  of  the 
enemy's  columns,  which  finally  moved  to  the  left.  One  of  my  regiments  was  then 
ordered  in  that  direction.  I  accompanied  it,  and,  in  accordance  with  instructions, 
deployed  it  as  skirmishers,  to  hold  that  wing  until  reinforcements  should  arrive. 
The  other  regiment  remained  with  Hampton. 

My  command,  although  opposed  to  the  enemy  during  the  entire  day,  was  not 
at  any  time  actively  engaged.  Will  make  a  detailed  report. 

Very  respectfully, 

(Signed)         B.  If.  ROBERTSOX, 

Brigadier  General,  Commanding  Cavalry. 

Deeming  this  report  unsatisfactory,  General  Stuart  required  another  from 
General  Robertson,  which  was  furnished,  as  follows: 

HEADQUAETEES  CAVALRY  BRIGADE, 

June  13th,  18G3. 
MAJOR  H.  B.  MCCLELLAX, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General,  Headquarters  Cavalry  Division: 

Major  : — In  answer  to  yours  just  received,  have  the  honor  to  make  the  follow 
ing  statement : 

About  two  miles  this  side  of  Kelley's  ford,  at  Brown's  house,  I  think,  I  met 
Captain  White  falling  back  from  his  picket  line.  He  reported  that  five  regiments 
of  infantry  and  a  large  amount  of  cavalry  had  crossed  the  river,  and  were  slowly 
advancing  toward  the  railroad.  Just  then  the  enemy's  line  of  skirmishers  emerged 
from  the  woods,  and  I  at  once  dismounted  a  large  portion  of  my  command,  and 
made  such  disposition  of  my  entire  force  as  seemed  best  calculated  to  retard  their 
progress.  I  immediately  sent  scouting  parties  to  my  right,  and  went  forward 
myself  to  ascertain  what  was  transpiring  there.  I  soon  learned  that  the  enemy  was 
advancing  upon  the  Brandy  Station  road,  and  dispatched  Captain  Worthington  with 
the  information.  Soon  afterward  the  enemy  was  reported  moving  upon  Stevens- 
burg,  in  large  force.  I  ordered  Lieutenant  Holcombe  to  report  the  fact  to  the  Major 
26 


4:02  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

He  allowed  himself  to  be  occupied  in  an  almost  useless  observation 
of  the  enemy,  who  had  thrown  a  small  force  into  his  front,  after 
crossing  at  Kelley's  ford.  Nor  did  Colonel  Munford,  with  Fitz  Lee's 
Brigade,  reach  the  field  until  after  noonday,  and  only  participated, 
with  his  sharpshooters,  in  repelling  the  last  attack  of  Buford  upon 
our  left.  The  brunt  of  the  battle  was  borne  by  the  three  brigades 
of  Jones,  W.  II.  F.  Lee,  and  Hampton,  and  from  the  last  one  regiment 


General  commanding,  who  informed  me  that  a  force  had  been  sent  to  Stevensburg, 
and  that  troops  were  at  Brandy  Station.  Before  receiving  this  message,  I  had  contem 
plated  making  an  attack  in  rear,  should  it  meet  the  General's  approval.  I,  there 
fore,  sent  Lieutenant  James  Johnston  to  report  to  General  Stuart,  who  sent  me 
orders  to  hold  my  front.  A  division  of  my  force  was  impossible,  as  I  needed  them 
all.  I  consider  it  extremely  fortunate  that  my  command  was  not  withdrawn  from 
the  position  it  occupied  (which  was  a  very  strong  one),  as  the  enemy's  force,  con 
sisting  of  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry,  was  marching  directly  upon  the  right 
flank  of  our  troops,  engaged  in  front  of  Rappahannock  Station.  I  had  not  force 
sufficient  to  hold  in  check  (and  it  was  vitally  important  to  do  so)  this  body,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  follow  the  flanking  party.  All  the  facts  may  be  summed  up,  as  fol 
lows  :  Before  my  arrival  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  turned  off  to  the  points  upon 
which  they  intended  to  march.  They  had  posted  artillery,  cavalry,  and  infantry  so 
as  to  cover  this  movement,  or,  if  unopposed,  march  upon  the  railroad.  Had  I  pur 
sued  the  flanking  party,  the  road  I  was  ordered  to  defend  would  have  been  left 
utterly  exposed.  I  acted  according  to  orders,  and  the  dictates  of  judgment.  I  came 
to  this  army  resolved  that  my  official  conduct  should  meet  the  approbation  of  my 
military  superiors,  and  whenever,  in  their  opinion,  I  deserve  censure,  I  shall  most 
cheerfully  submit  to  official  investigation. 

Very  respectfully,  Major,  your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)        B.  H.  ROBERTSON, 

Brigadier  General,  Commanding  Cavalry. 
[Indorsement.] 

HEADQUARTERS  CAVALRY  DIVISION, 

June  13th,  1863. 

Respectfully  forwarded.  It  is  very  clear  that  General  Robertson  intended  to 
do  what  was  right.  At  the  time  Lieutenant  Johnston  reported  to  me,  it  was  too 
late  for  any  movement  to  have  been  made  from  General  Robertson's  front,  and  it 
would  have  been  extremely  hazardous  for  him  to  have  interposed  his  command 
between  the  enemy's  artillery,  and  the  column  of  cavalry  that  had  passed  on  his 
right  flank.  At  the  time  he  arrived  on  the  spot,  it  is  presumed  he  could  have  made  the 
detachment  to  get  to  the  front  of  the  flanking  column,  and  delay  its  progress. 

(Signed)        J.  E.  B.  STUART, 

Major  General. 

See  Reports  of  Battles,  Richmond,  1864. 

As  to  what  force  occupied  General  Robertson's  attention,  near  Brown's  house, 
I  quote  the  following  from  letters  recently  received  from  General  D.  McM.  Gregg, 
commanding  Federal  cavalry : 

"  In  reply  to  your  question  as  to  what  force  I  left  near  Kelley's  ford,  when  I 
advanced  on  Brandy  Station,  on  June  9th,  1863,  from  my  recollection.  I  would  say, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FLEET  WOOD.  403 

"was  detached.  Taking,  therefore,  General  Gregg's  statement,  that 
the  Union  cavalry  in  this  engagement  numbered  about  nine  thousand 
men,  and  that  both  his  and  Buford's  Divisions  were  supported  by 
infantry,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  General  Stuart  was  opposed  by  a 
force  which  largely  outnumbered  his  own.  As  trophies  of  the  battle 
Stuart  could  number  three  pieces  of  artillery  (a  loss  of  which  General 
Gregg  makes  no  mention),  three  regimental  and  three  company  flags, 
three  hundred  and  sixty-three  prisoners  captured,  beside  horses,  pis 
tols,  sabres,  and  carbines.  Our  total  loss,  making  an  extreme  estimate 
of  that  in  White's  Battalion,  from  which  no  report  was  received,  was 
four  hundred  and  eighty-five,  f  In  regard  to  the  loss  in  Tleasonton's 
command,  it  may  be  stated  that  one  of  the  Northern  newspapers,  of 
about  that  date,  contained  a  list  of  one  hundred  and  ninety-two 
wounded,  who  were  received  into  one  hospital  in  Alexandria  from 
this  battle.  Doubtless  many  were  placed  in  other  hospitals.  But 
add  to  this  number  the  prisoners  sent  to  Richmond,  and  we  find  a 
loss  of  live  hundred  and  fifty-live,  without  counting  those  killed  on 
the  field.  The  total  number  of  casualties  probably  exceeded  seven 
hundred  men.  The  laurel  crown  remains  with  General  Gregg,  and 
he  can  well  afford  to  acknowledge  that,  though  his  men  fought  long 
and  well,  they  met  more  than  equals  at  Brandy  Station  on  the  Uth  of 
June,  1803. 


none  at  all.  I  know  of  no  reason  why  I  should  have  done  so,  for  after  I  crossed, 
General  Russel  followed  with  about  lifteen  hundred  infantry,  and  directed  his  march 
upon  General  l.uford's  flank.'' 

And  again :  "  In  my  official  report  there  is  no  mention  of  my  having  sent  any 
cavalry  with  the  infantry  ;  if  I  sent  any  at  all,  it  must  have  been  a  mere  detachment. 
You  will  observe  that  General  Pleasoiiton  makes  110  mention  of  artillery  having 
accompanied  the  infantry." 

These  quotations  abundantly  justify  my  remarks.  General  Robertson  was 
expected  to  observe  the  road  upon  which  General  Gregg  advanced;  but  Gregg 
attained  our  rear,  and  nearly  effected  a  disastrous  surprise. 

f  See  Stuart's  report. 


THE  UNION  MEN  OF  MARYLAND. 


"  YET  truth,  which  only  doth  judge 
itself,  teacheth  that  the  inquiry  of 
truth,  which  is  the  love-making  or 
wooing  of  it,  the  knowledge  of  truth, 
which  is  the  enjoying  of  it,  is  the 
sovereign  good  of  human  nature." — 
Francis  Bacon. 

In  our  late  terrible  and 
bloody  civil  Avar,  Maryland 
was  claimed  by  both  sides. 
In  each  of  the  contending  ar 
mies  her  sons  were  to  be 
found  fighting  bravely,  and 
it  is  well  known  that  her  peo 
ple  wrere  much  divided  in 
sentiment.  The  late  Henry 
Winter  Davis  always  indig 
nantly  denied  that  a  majority  of  the  people  of  Maryland  were  ever, 
at  any  time,  on  the  side  of  secession ;  and  he  was  deeply  hurt  by  the 
suspicion  and  coldness  that  were  sometimes  shown  by  the  National 
authorities  in  their  treatment  of  his  State.  He  resented,  with  all 
the  ardor  of  his  nature,  the  wholesale  denunciation  that  not  a  few  of 
the  Northern  papers  heaped  upon  her.  He  was  grieved  that  the 
President-elect,  Mr.  Lincoln,  should  have  deemed  it  prudent  to  pass 
through  her  great  city  clandestinely  on  his  way  to  Washington  to  be 
inaugurated.  This  event  did,  indeed,  manifest  a  want  of  confidence 
in  the  city  of  Baltimore,  at  least,  if  not  in  the  State  of  Maryland. 
President-elect  Lincoln  had  intended,  after  his  reception  by  the 
Pennsylvania  Legislature,  at  Harrisburg,  on  the  afternoon  of  Feb 
ruary  22d,  1861,  to  go  to  Baltimore,  on  the  23d,  bjttlie  Northern 
Central  Railway ;  but  was,  with  difficulty,  induced  by  the  advice  of 
friends,  and  against  the  indignant  protest  of  his  military  companion, 
the  brave  Colonel  Sumner,  to  change  his  mind,  return  to  Philadel 
phia,  take  a  sleeping-car  on  the  Philadelphia,  Wilmington  and 
Baltimore  Railroad,  and  thus,  unrecognized,  to  complete  the  remaiii- 
(404) 


THE   UNION  MEN  OF  MARYLAND.  405 

dor  of  his  journey  to  the  National  capital.  His  family  went  on  the 
Northern  Central  Railway,  by  the  special  train  intended  for  him. 

It  was  charged  that  there  existed,  in  Baltimore,  a  conspiracy  to 
assassinate  the  President ;  but  I  am  not  aware  that  any  reliable  evi 
dence  has  ever  been  produced  to  sustain  the  charge.  The  Albany 
Evening  Journal,  of  that  time,  says:  "The  friends  of  Mr.  Lincoln 
do  not  question  the  loyalty  and  hospitality  of  the  people  of  Mary 
land  ;  but  they  were  aware  that  a  few  disaffected  citizens,  who  sym 
pathized  warmly  with  the  secessionists,  were  determined  to  frustrate, 
at  all  hazards,  the  inauguration  of  the  President-elect,  even  at  the 
cost  of  his  life."  The  Baltimore  Clipper,  a  strong  Union  news 
paper,  most  positively  asserted  that  there  was  no  conspiracy.  The 
Baltimore  Ainerican,  another  Union  journal,  said:  '"Ample  precau 
tions  were  taken  4o  guard  against  any  violation  of  the  public  peace. 
A  large  police  force  was  detailed  for  duty  at  the  depot,  *  *  * 
and  these  measures  of  Marshal  Kane,  even  if  they  had  failed  to 
restrain  any  expression  of  disapprobation,  would  certainly  have 
secured  Mr.  Lincoln  from  any  insult,  had  such  been  intended."  The 
whole  article  in  the  American  clearly  shows  that  that  paper  never 
thought  of  the  existence  of  any  assassination  plot,  but  attributed  the 
excitement  partly  to  the  natural  curiosity  of  the  people,  and  partly 
to  the  unpopularity  of  certain  injudicious  and  ostentatious  friends 
of  the  President,  who  wished  to  welcome  him  with  a  public  demon 
stration.  When  the  train,  in  which  the  President  was  expected, 
arrived  at  the  Northern  Central  depot,  there  was  a  large,  noisy,  and 
disorderly  crowd  there,  but  the  police  prevented  any  injury  to  the 
unpopular  persons  alluded  to.  There  was  no  appearance  of  organ 
ization,  and  there  were  no  persons  of  prominence  in  the  tumultuous 
crowd.  If,  then,  there  was  a  well-organized  plot  to  take  the  life  of 
the  President-elect,  its  leaders  could  not  have  been  present  on  that 
occasion,  nor  were  they  ever  discovered.  Most  likely  the  report 
arose  from  mere  idle  talk  and  empty  bluster.  It  did,  however, 
seriously  discredit  the  State  of  Maryland  throughout  the  North. 

This  prejudice  against  the  State  was  deepened  by  a  subsequent 
occurrence.  On  the  lUth  of  April,  1861,  two  regiments,  going  to 
Washington  in  response  to  the  President's  call,  were  assaulted  in 
the  streets  of  Baltimore  by  a  mob,  and  three  soldiers  killed  and 
several  severely  wounded.  The  Massachusetts  regiment,  by  the  help 
of  their  own  muskets,  and  under  the  protection  of  the  Mayor  and 
police,  did  succeed,  after  a  trying  ordeal,  in  getting  through  to  the 
Washington  depot.  The  other,  a  Pennsylvania  regiment,  under  the 
command  of  Colonel  Small,  was  pressed  upon  by  the  mob,  and 


406  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ordered  by  one  of  Governor  Hicks'  militia  generals  to  turn  back, 
and,  being  unarmed,  were  compelled  to  obey.  The  soldiers  of  the 
Massachusetts  regiment,  after  exercising  great  forbearance,  at  length 
fired  upon  the  crowd,  killing  several  persons,  some  of  them,  as  it 
was  alleged,  innocent  spectators.  The  excitement  throughout  the 
city  was  intense  ;  exaggerated  reports  were  circulated ;  the  number 
of  citizens  killed  wras  magnified  from  ten  to  two  hundred ;  youths 
from  sixteen  to  twenty  years  of  age,  armed  to  the  teeth,  were  seen 
running  wildly  about  the  streets.  The  thoroughfares  were  filled 
with  people  telling  and  hearing  but  one  side  of  the  story,  and  firing 
one  another  with  the  spirit  of  vengeance.  An  impromptu  mass 
meeting  assembled  in  Monument  Square  ;  the  Mayor  was  called  out ; 
the  Governor,  who  had  been  in  the  city  for  several  days,  was  sent 
for,  and  appeared ;  a  Maryland  flag  was  hoisted  o^er  his  head,  and 
his  views  clamorously  demanded.  He  responded,  by  declaring  that 
he  would  suffer  his  right  arm  to  be  torn  from  his  body  before  he 
would  raise  it  to  strike  a  sister  State.  That  night,  so  it  is  charged, 
the  Governor  agreed  to  an  order  for  the  destruction  of  the  bridges 
on  the  Philadelphia,  Wilmington  and  Baltimore,  and  the  Northern 
Central  Railroads,  in  order  to  prevent  the  passage  of  any  more 
troops  through  Maryland  to  "Washington.  It  is  but  justice  to  Gov 
ernor  Hicks  to  state,  that  he  always  denied  that  he  had  authorized 
any  such  proceeding.  However,  the  bridges  were  destroyed. 

On  Thursday,  the  18th  day  of  April,  I  went  from  Annapolis  to 
Baltimore.  I  had  expected  to  find  some  excitement  among  the 
Baltimore  people  in  consequence  of  the  assault  upon  Fort  Sumter 
and  its  surrender,  which  last  event  had  occurred  on  the  Sunday 
previous,  the  14th;  but,  to  my  regret,  I  found  the  excitement  at 
fever-heat.  The  Southern  sympathizers  were  open  and  fierce  in  the 
expression  of  their  views ;  the  Union  men  were  more  moderate,  but 
firm.  The  first  congregated  to  hear  fiery  speeches  from  their  leaders, 
and  loudly  applauded  the  condemnation  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  proclama 
tion  for  troops.  Governor  Hicks,  who  had  gone  to  Baltimore  on 
the  17th,  and  had  ascertained  the  state  of  feeling,  issued  his  procla 
mation  on  the  18th,  counseling  peace  and  neutrality  on  the  part  of 
the  people  of  Maryland.  It  had  little  or  no  effect.  It  was  not  bold 
enough  to  suit  the  the  temper  of  the  times.  It  was  something  of  a 
wet  blanket  to  the  Union  men,  and  the  secessionists  despised  it  and 
took  courage.  Thus  matters  stood  on  the  morning  of  the  19th.  No 
speaker  had  directly  counseled  an  attack  upon  the  troops  that  might 
pass  through,  but  the  incitements  were  all  in  that  direction,  and 
there  were  idle,  restless,  and  reckless  spirits  at  hand — few  it  may  be ; 


THE  UNION  MEN  OF  MARYLAND.  407 

but  enough  to  make  the  onslaught,  and  there  was  an  abundance 
of  fuel  when  once  the  flame  was  kindled.  When  the  troops  came  it 
seemed  to  he  a  surprise  to  all,  police  as  well  as  citizens ;  but  a  mob 
soon  collected  and  began  to  hoot  and  jeer,  and  finally  to  throw  stones 
and  bricks.  Some  Union  men  came  forward  and  endeavored  to 
restrain  the  crowd  and  to  protect  the  troops,  but  they  were  over 
borne,  and  the  mob  worked  its  will  with  the  results  above  given. 
Mayor  Brown,  in  a  letter,  dated  April  20th,  replying  to  Governor 
Andrews,  who  had  requested  him  to  have  the  Massachusetts  dead 
taken  care  of  and  forwarded  to  Boston,  says :  "  Xo  one  deplores 
the  sad  events  of  yesterday  in  this  city  more  deeply  than  myself ; 
but  they  were  inevitable.  Our  people  viewed  the  passage  of  armed 
troops  to  another  State  through  the  streets  as  an  invasion  of  our  soil, 
and  could  not  be  restrained." 

On  the  day  of  the  riot,  I  dined  at  Barnum's  Hotel,  where  I  had 
been  stopping  since  the  day  before.  Marshal  Kane  came  in,  and 
taking  a  seat  at  the  table  near  Mr.  Itobert  Fowler,  afterward  State 
Treasurer,  they  began  to  talk  of  the  attack  upon  the  troops,  Mr. 
Fowler  severely  blaming  the  police  department  for  not  pi-eventing 
the  perpetration  of  such  an  outrage.  The  Marshal  answered,  in 
substance,  as  follows:  "The  administration  at  Washington  was  to 
blame  for  not  giving  the  city  authorities  timely  notice  of  the  coming 
of  the  troops.  lie  could  and  would,"  he  said,  "have  arranged  to 
pass  the  troops  safely."  lie  added,  that  he  was  afraid  the  affair 
would  be  misunderstood  in  the  Xorth,  and  the  people  in  that  section, 
becoming  infuriated,  would  cry  out  for  vengeance  on  Baltimore.  I 
withdrew  before  the  conversation  was  concluded.  In  the  evening, 
during  the  progress  of  a  secession  meeting,  held  in  front  of  Bar- 
nunrs,  I  saw  Marshal  Kane  eject  from  the  hotel  three  men  who 
came  to  the  clerk's  desk  demanding  the  whereabouts  of  Senator 
Sumner.  Upon  inquiry,  I  learned  that  Mr.  Sumner  had  been  at 
the  hotel  in  the  forepart  of  the  day,  but,  by  the  advice  of  friends, 
had  withdrawn  to  a  private  house.  Colonel  Kane  appeared  to  be 
very  active  and  successful  in  his  endeavors  to  keep  the  peace.  In 
the  morning,  I  read  with  astonishment  his  famous  dispatch  to  Brad 
ley  Johnson : 

BALTIMORE,  April  19th,  1861. 

Thank  you  for  your  offer.  Bring  your  men  in  by  the  first  train,  and  we  will 
arrange  with  the  railroad  afterward.  Streets  red  with  Maryland  Hood.  Send  ex 
press  over  the  mountains  and  valleys  of  Maryland  and  Virginia  for  the  riflemen  to 
come  without  delay.  Fresh  hordes  will  be  down  on  us  to-morrow  (20th ).  We 
will  fight  them  or  die. 

GEOKGE  P.  KANE. 


408  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Colonel  Kane  may  have  been  influenced,  however,  by  the  desire 
to  shield  Baltimore  from  the  indiscriminate  violence  anticipated  by 
him  and  others  from  an  aroused  and  indignant  North. 

The  unexpected  turn  things  had  taken,  greatly  discouraged  the 
Union  men,  and  some  sought  their  homes  in  despair ;  but  I  saw  a 
large  number,  in  the  course  of  the  day  and  night,  that  were  as  firm 
and  determined  as  ever.  The  lion.  Alexander  II.  Evans  volunteered 
as  an  aide  to  the  Governor,  and  exerted  himself  as  far  as  possible  to 
rescue  him  from  the  secession  influences  by  which  he  was  surrounded 
on  that  unfortunate  day. 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th,  I  was  sent  for  by  the  Hon.  Henry 
Winter  Davis,  and  requested  to  accompany  him  to  Washington.  I 
understood  that  a  mob  had  visited  his  house  twice ;  he  was  not  at 
home,  as  he  had  just  returned  that  morning.  I  found  him  much 
agitated,  but  hopeful  and  resolute.  We  started  for  Washington  in 
the  afternoon,  driving  out  to  the  Relay,  and  taking  the  train  there. 
When  we  reached  the  Annapolis  Junction,  Mr.  Davis  said,  upon 
reflection,  he  thought  I  could  do  more  good  by  returning  to  Anna 
polis  and  "  stiffening  up  the  Governor."  On  arriving  at  Annapolis, 
I  saw  an  unusually  large  number  of  persons  at  the  depot,  and  was 
prepared  to  witness  some  demonstrations  of  secession  sympathy; 
but  all  were  as  polite  and  courteous  to  me  as  ever,  and  there  was  a 
general  expression  of  regret  at  the  occurrences  in  Baltimore.  In 
the  evening,  I  called  to  see  the  Governor.  He  was  much  prostrated 
and  very  desponding ;  complained  of  loss  of  sleep ;  said  he  had  been 
put  in  a  false  position  by  the  administration ;  that  he  w^as  a  true 
Union  man  still,  but  they  were  taking  the  ground  from  beneath  him 
by  rash  and  hasty  measures ;  that  he  supposed  all  of  us  would  be 
regarded  as  traitors,  and  Maryland  treated  as  if  she  had  attempted 
to  secede.  I  endeavored  to  reassure  him,  and  expressed  my  earnest 
sympathy  with  him  in  his  trying  position.  After  conferring  with 
him  about  some  provision  for  the  safety  of  his  family,  in  case  the 
mob  from  Baltimore  should  seek  him  in  Annapolis,  of  which,  how 
ever,  I  had  not  the  slightest  apprehension,  we  discussed  the  question 
of  convening  the  Legislature.  I  begged  him  to  adhere  to  his  former 
and  often-repeated  resolution  not  to  call  it,  but  he  was  manifestly 
inclined  to  think  the  time  had  come  to  share  his  great  responsibility 
with  that  body.  On  Sunday  night  he  made  up  his  mind,  and  on 
Tuesday  he  issued  his  proclamation,  fixing  the  26th  as  the  day  of 
meeting. 

On  Monday,  the  22d,  the  Governor  came  up  State  House  Hill, 
looking  composed  and  seeming  to  be  quite  cheerful.  I  inquired  his 


THE  UNION  MEN  OF  MARYLAND.  409 

conclusion  about  the  Legislature ;  he  replied  he  should  call  it,  and 
would  prepare  his  proclamation  immediately.  The  wish  was  then 
expressed  that  the  State  might  as  speedily  as  possible  be  filled  with 
Federal  bayonets.  There  were  several  gentlemen  standing  around, 
and  the  Governor,  putting  his  hand  on  my  shoulder,  whispered: 
"  That  is  exactly  what  I  wish."  Yet,  the  clay  before,  he  would  not 
grant  General  Butler,  who  was  in  Annapolis  harbor,  permission  to 
land  his  troops.  He  afterward  protested  against  the  seizure  of  the 
Annapolis  and  Elk  Ridge  Eailroad,  and  fixed  upon  Frederick  City 
for  the  meeting  of  the  General  Assembly,  in  order  to  free  that  body 
from  the  presence  of  Federal  troops.  He  asked  the  President  to 
send  no  mure  soldiers  into  Maryland.  He  proposed  to  the  adminis 
tration  to  submit  the  questions  between  the  Xorth  and  the  South  to 
Lord  Lvons,  the  British  Minister,  for  arbitration.  He  very  tardily 
responded  to  the  President's  call  for  troops,  and  when  he  did  so,  he 
required  an  assurance  from  the  Secretary  of  War  that  all  the  forces 
raised  in  Maryland  should  be  kept  within  her  own  borders. 

From  things  like  these  Mr.  Greeley  was  led  to  sneer  at  him  as 
the  "model  Union  Governor,1'  forgetting  that  he,  himself,  had  said  : 
"  Let  the  wayward  sisters  go.1'  There  was,  indeed,  throughout  the 
Xorth  a  prevalent  suspicion  of  Maryland  Unionism.  Even  Mr. 
Lincoln,  with  all  his  acuteness  and  all  his  means  of  knowledge,  and 
with  a  Maryland  representative  in  his  Cabinet,  harbored  doubts, 
though  he  was  very  cautious  in  expressing  them.  The  Hon.  Alex 
ander  II.  Evans,  before  mentioned,  relates  a  ludicrous  incident, 
which  serves  to  show  the  lurking  suspicion  in  the  President's  mind. 
After  the  1 9th  of  April  riot  Mr.  Evans  made  application  to  the 
President  on  behalf  of  the  L'nion  men  of  Cecil  county  for  a  thousand 
stand  of  arms.  "  You  shall  have  them,"  said  Mr.  Lincoln  ;  and  then, 
with  that  well-known,  but  indescribable  expression  playing  around 
his  mouth,  he  added,  after  a  pause,  "but  are  you  quite  certain  which 
way  they  will  point  them  ? "  It  must  be  admitted  that  appearances 
gave  room  for  doubt ;  and  yet  I  firmly  believe  that  AVinter  Davis 
was  right  in  claiming  for  a  majority  of  the  Maryland  people  a  fealty 
to  the  Union.  There  were  many  secessionists — not  a  few,  able, 
earnest,  and  fearless ;  but  the  real,  true  sentiment  of  the  mass  of  the 
people  was  on  the  other  side.  Governor  Hicks,  too,  notwithstanding 
some  mistakes,  and  despite  the  overawing  of  him  on  the  19th  of 
April,  was  a  Union  man  to  the  core.  I  knew  him  well,  and  for 
more  than  three  years  had  been  in  almost  daily  intercourse  with  him. 

In  dealing  with  the  Union  question  he  had  endeavored  to  prac 
tice  in  the  State  the  same  Fabian  tactics  that  President  Lincoln  so 


410  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

successfully  carried  out  in  liis  management  of  National  affairs.  This 
policy  on  the  part  of  the  Governor  was  a  wise  one — at  least  it  was 
so  up  to  the  18th  of  April,  1861.  lie  paid  respect  to  the  opinions 
and  humored  the  prejudices  of  the  great  body  of  his  people,  being 
himself,  in  fact,  one  of  them.  He  possessed  great  personal  popu 
larity.  His  appearance  told  much  in  his  favor.  lie  had  a  down 
right  honest  look — a  very  John  Bull  he  was — softened  with  a  most 
benevolent  expression  of  countenance.  Of  medium  stature,  thick 
set,  rather  corpulent,  with  broad  head  and  face,  strong  features, 
prominent  chin,  mouth  shutting  firmly  down  upon  molar  teeth  in 
t  front,  easy  in  address,  and  of  dignified  carriage,  he  gave  assurance  of 
a  man  that  could  do  the  State  some  service.  He  had  not  the  learn 
ing  of  the  schools,  for  he  'had  come  up  from  the  ranks,  where,  in  his 
youthful  days,  one  could  scarcely  find  even  that  little  learning  which 
Pope  calls  "  a  dangerous  thing." 

But  he  had  used  his  natural  gifts  to  some  purpose.  He  was  a 
close  observer,  and  had  studied  men  until  he  knew  well  how  to  cap 
ture  them.  Beside,  he  was  really  kind-hearted,  and  delighted  to  do 
favors.  For  years  he  had  been  the  leading  Whig  in  his  native  county 
of  Dorchester,  on  the  Eastern  Shore,  and  when  that  old  and  honored 
party  suddenly  declined  and  died,  he  joined  the  Know-Nothing  or 
American  organization,  "to  beat  the  Democrats."  lie  was  elected 
Governor,  in  1857,  and  had  given  himself  earnestly  and  faithfully 
to  the  discharge  of  his  important  duties.  At  the  breaking  out  of 
the  civil  war,  he  was  about  sixty  years  of  age,  and  in  appearance 
was  strong  and  robust,  but,  in  fact,  his  health  was  seriously  impaired ; 
and  he  had  recently  suffered  severe  family  bereavement  which  greatly 
unnerved  him.  In  the  late  Presidential  election,  Maryland  had  cast 
her  electoral  vote  for  Breckenridge,  who  had  received  not  quite  a 
thousand  more  of  the  popular  vote  than  Bell,  and  who,  if  the  nearly 
six  thousand  votes  cast  for  Douglas,  and  the  little  more  than  two 
thousand  cast  for  Lincoln  be  counted,  was  in  an  actual  minority.  A 
large  majority  of  the  secessionists  were  found  among  the  voters  for 
Breckenridge ;  but  by  no  means  were  all  who  supported  him  for 
secession,  for  such  able  and  influential  men  as  the  Hon.  Reverdy 
Johnson,  the  Hon.  John  W.  Crisfield,  and  the  Hon.  Henry  II.  Golds- 
borough,  may  be  taken  to  represent  thousands  of  others  that  stood 
boldly  for  the  integrity  of  the  Union.  There  were,  of  course,  a 
number  of  the  Bell  men  who  took  the  other  side ;  and  there  were  a 
great  many  men  that  sympathized  with  the  South,  and  yet  loved  the 
Union.  There  were  many  strong  tics  between  the  people  of  Mary 
land  and  the  people  of  the  more  Southern  States.  Beside  the  com- 


THE   UNION  MEN  OF  MARYLAND. 

mon  property  interest  in  slavery,  there  was  constant  intercourse 
between  the  people,  and  the  commercial  interests  of  the  city  of 
Baltimore  were  largely  dependent  upon  the  South.  When  the 
appeal  Avas  made  that  Maryland  must  go  Avith  Virginia,  the  Union 
men  found  it  most  difficult  to  ansAver  in  the  negative  Avith  satisfac 
tion  to  the  people;  in  truth,  while  Virginia  seemed  to  hesitate,  Gov 
ernor  Hicks  deemed  it  prudent  to  assent  to  the  proposition,  feeling 
hopeful  that  the  " Mother  of  States"  would  preserve  her  allegiance. 
The  complications  in  which  our  people  were  involved  may  be  im 
agined;  and  a  full  appreciation  of  them  would  bring  a  favorable 
judgment  both  to  the  State  and  its  Governor,  llobert  Burns  aptly 

says: 

"  What's  done  we  partly  may  compute, 
But  know  not  what's  resisted." 

Governor  Hicks  received  a  communication  from  prominent 
citizens,  shortly  after  the  election,  in  1800,  requesting  him  to  call  an 
extra  session  of  the  Legislature,  in  order  to  consider  the  condition 
of  the  country,  and  to  determine  what  course  Maryland  should  take. 
The  members  of  the  Legislature  had  been  elected  in  the  fall  of  isr>9, 
mainly  on  State  issues,  and  were  not  authorized  to  represent  the 
people  on  the  momentous  questions  pending  in  1801.  The  Governor 
promptly  refused  to  make  the  call,  lie  Avas  solicited  again  and 
a^ain,  privately  and  publicly,  by  indiyiduals  and  by  county  meetings, 
but  he  most  decidedly  declined  to  do  so.  He  resisted  all  blandish 
ments,  threats,  and  importunities.  A  commissioner  from  Missis 
sippi,  a  native  of  Maryland,  came  to  him  and  invited  the  co-operation 
of  Marvland,  but  the  Governor  declined  to  accept  the  invitation, 
lie  pursued  the  same  course  with  the  Alabama  commissioner,  speak 
ing  bold,  tirm  words  for  the  Union.  He  Avas  talking  and  writing 
constantly,  and  encouraging  and  receiving  encouragement  in  the 
interest  of  the  Union.  Many  public  gatherings  throughout  the 
State  passed  resolutions  commending  his  course.  Such  eminent 
men  as  the  Hon.  Reverdy  Johnson,  Hon.  A.  W.  Bradford,  and 
William  II.  Collins,  Esq.,  sustained  him  by  eloquent  and  powerful 
arguments,  made  through  the  press  and  directly  to  the  people. 

The  Hon.  Henry  Winter  Davis,  not  a  politic  man  like  the 
Governor,  and,  therefore,  distrusted  by  the  latter  as  imprudent  and 
rash,  declared  himself  an  unconditional  Union  man,  and  by  his 
untiring  energy,  unequaled  eloquence,  and  matchless  ability,  did 
much  to  mould  public  opinion,  and,  eArentually,  succeeded  in 
bringing  a  strong  party  to  his  own  advanced  position,  lie  never 
followed  the  people  ;  he  led  them — nor  did  he  care  to  see  IIOAV  near 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAS. 

they  were  to  him.  He  marched  straight  on,  taking  no  step  back 
ward,  and  looking  neither  to  the  right  nor  the  left.  Governor 
Hicks  admired  him  greatly,  but  shunned  him.  The  Hon.  Mont 
gomery  Blair,  who  was  the  only  prominent  man  in  Maryland  that 
had  supported  Mr.  Lincoln  in  1860,  by  his  non-partisan  course  after 
his  accession  to  the  Cabinet,  making  everything  subordinate  to  the 
preservation  of  the  Union,  obtained  great  influence  with  the 
Governor,  and  was  regarded  as  a  safe  counselor.  Both  Judge  Blair 
and  Mr.  Davis  contended  strongly  that  the  people  of  Maryland  were 
on  the  side  of  the  Union,  and  they  were  right,  for  notwithstanding 
all  the  mistakes  of  the  National  administration,  ah1  temptations, 
associations,  adverse  influences,  and  provocations,  no  considerable 
portion  of  them  ever  declared  for  secession.  Indeed,  as  far  as  I  can 
recollect,  such  a  declaration  was  confined  to  an  out-of-the-way 
meeting,  composed  of  a  mere  handful  of  men.  Even  after  the  19th 
of  April  riot,  when  things  had  a  very  bad  look  in  Baltimore,  an 
election  for  delegates  to  the  Legislature  resulted  in  a  withering 
rebuke  of  secession.  There  was  but  one  set  of  candidates,  and  they 
were  men  of  ability  and  integrity  of  character,  not  open  and  avowed 
secessionists,  but  opposed  to  coercion ;  and  yet,  in  the  midst  of  all 
the  prevailing  excitement,  they  received,  out  of  a  voting  population 
of  more  than  thirty  thousand,  only  nine  thousand  votes. 

In  May,  1861,  at  the  special  election  for  the  extra  session  of 
Congress,  all  the  Union  candidates  were  elected  except  one,  and  he 
was  beaten  by  a  "Union  and  Peace"  candidate.  In  November, 
1861,  the  Governor  and  all  the  other  members  of  the  Union  State 
ticket  were  elected,  with  a  large  majority  of  both  branches  of  the 
Legislature.  General  Butler,  in  May,  1861,  replying  to  Governor 
Andrews,  who  found  fault  with  him  for  offering  to  suppress  an 
apprehended  slave  insurrection  at  or  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Anriapolis,  declares  that  he  had  found,  by  intercourse  with  the 
people  there,  that  they  were  not  rebels,  but  a  large  majority  of 
them  strongly  for  the  Union.  He  also  expresses  confidence  in  the 
Governor. 

But,  after  all,  the  critical  time  was  between  the  election  of 
Lincoln  and  his  inauguration.  There  had  been  a  fierce  partisan 
conflict,  and  the  party  in  power  had  lost  and  expected  to  be  removed 
from  the  places  they  held  so  long.  The  expiring  Buchanan  admin 
istration  was  supine  and  inert.  Maryland  was  at  the  very  door  of 
the  capital — her  great  city  overshadowing  it.  Let  us  suppose  that 
she  had  been  disloyal,  and  that  in  all  those  months  she  had  bent  her 
energies  to  the  plotting  of  treason ;  that  her  Governor  had  come  to 


THE  UNION  MEN  OF  MARYLAND.  413 

an  understanding  with  the  Governors  of  the  other  Southern  States, 
and  perfected  arrangements  for  resistance  accordingly,  would  Mr. 
Lincoln  have  been  inaugurated  and  installed  in  power  at  Washington  ? 
Would  not  the  Confederate  authorities  have  held  the  ^National 
capital,  and,  consequently,  have  had  their  independence  acknowledged 
by  the  leading  power  of  Europe  ? 

Is  it  too  much,  then,  to  claim  for  Maryland  that  her  fidelity  to 
her  obligations  in  the  early  days  of  secession  perserved  the  National 
capital  for  the  installation  of  the  lawfully-elected  President ;  mate 
rially  shortened  the  internecine  strife,  and,  under  God,  determined 
possibly  the  ultimate  issue  of  the  mighty  contest?  When  other 
States  are  honored,  let  her  not  be  despised.  When  others  are 
mentioned  with  affection  and  gratitude,  let  her  name  not  be  left  out. 

O  ' 


LEE  IN  PENNSTL  VANIA. 


BY  GENERAL  JAMES  LOXGSTREET. 


IT  has  been  my  purpose  for 
some  years  to  give  to  the 
public  a  detailed  history  of 
the  campaign  of  Gettysburg 
from  its  inception  to  its  disas 
trous  close.  The  execution 
of  this  task  has  been  delayed 
by  reason  of  a  press  of  person 
al  business,  and  by  reason  of 
a  genuine  reluctance  that  I 
have  felt  against  anything 
that  might,  even  by  implica 
tion,  impugn  the  wisdom  of 
my  late  comrades  in  arms. 
My  sincere  feeling  upon  this 
subject  is  best  expressed  in 
the  following  letter,  which  was  written  shortly  after  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  when,  there  was  a  sly  undercurrent  of  misrepresentation 
of  my  course,  and  in  response  to  an  appeal  from  a  respected  relative, 
that  I  would  make  some  reply  to  my  accusers : 

CAMP,  CULPEPPEE,  COURT-HOUSE, 
July  24th,  1863. 

My  Dear  Uncle: — Your  letters  of  the  13th  and  14th  were  received  on  yesterday. 
As  to  our  late  battle  I  cannot  say  much.  I  have  no  right  to  say  anything,  in  fact, 
but  will  venture  a  little  for  you,  alone.  If  it  goes  to  aunt  and  cousins  it  must  be 
under  promise  that  it  will  go  no  further.  The  battle  was  not  made  as  I  would  have 
made  it.  My  idea  was  to  throw  ourselves  between  the  enemy  and  Washington, 
select  a  strong  position,  and  force  the  enemy  to  attack  us.  So  far  as  is  given  to  man 
the  ability  to  judge,  we  may  say,  with  confidence,  that  we  should  have  destroyed 
the  Federal  army,  marched  into  Washington  and  dictated  our  terms,  or,  at  least, 
held  Washington,  and  marched  over  as  much  of  Pennsylvania  as  we  cared  to,  had 
we  drawn  the  enemy  into  attack  upon  our  carefully-chosen  position  in  its  rear. 
General  Lee  chose  the  plans  adopted ;  and  he  is  the  person  appointed  to  choose  and 
to  order.  I  consider  it  a  part  of  my  duty  to  express  my  views  to  the  commanding 
general.  If  he  approves  and  adopts  them,  it  is  well ;  if  he  does  not,  it  is  my  duty 
to  adopt  his  views,  and  to  execute  his  orders  as  faithfully  as  if  they  were  my  own. 
I  cannot  help  but  think  that  great  results  would  have  been  obtained  had  my  views 
(414) 


LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA. 

been  thought  better  of;  yet  I  am  much  inclined  to  accept  the  present  condition  as 
for  the  best.  I  hope  and  trust  that  it  is  so.  Your  programme  would  all  be  well 
enough,  had  it  been  practicable,  and  was  duly  thought  of,  too.  I  fancy  that  no  good 
ideas  upon  that  campaign  will  be  mentioned  at  any  time,  that  did  not  receive  their 
share  of  consideration  by  General  Lee.  The  few  things  that  he  might  have  over 
looked  himself  were,  I  believe,  suggested  by  myself.  As  we  failed,  I  must  take  my 
share  of  the  responsibility.  In  fact,  I  would  prefer  that  all  the  blame  should  rest 
upon  me.  As  General  Lee  is  our  commander,  he  should  have  the  support  and  influ 
ence  we  can  give  him.  If  the  blame,  if  there  is  any,  can  be  shifted  from  him  to 
me,  I  shall  help  him  and  our  cause  by  taking  it.  I  desire,  therefore,  that  all  the 
responsibility  that  can  be  put  upon  me  shall  go  there,  and  shall  remain  there.  The 
truth  will  be  known  in  time,  and  I  leave  that  to  show  how  much  of  the  responsi 
bility  of  Gettysburg  rests  on  my  shoulders.  ' 

Most  affectionately  yours, 

J.  LONGSTREET. 
To  A.  B.  LOXGSTKEET,  LL.D.,  Columbus,  Ga. 

T  sincerely  regret  that  I  cannot  still  rest  upon  that  letter.  P>ut 
I  have  been  so  repeatedly  and  so  rancorously  assailed  by  those  whose 
intimacy  with  the  commanding  general  in  that  battle  gave  an  appa 
rent  importance  to  their  assaults,  that  I  feel  impelled  by  a  sense  of 
duty  to  give  to  the  public  a  full  and  comprehensive  narration  of  the 
campaign  from  its  beginning  to  its  end ;  especially  when  1  reflect 
that  the  publication  of  the  truth  cannot  now,  as  it  might  have  done 
then,  injure  the  cause  for  which  we  fonght  the  battle.  The  request 
that  I  furnish  this  history  to  the  WKKKLV  TIMES  comes  opportunely,  for 
the  appeal  just  made  through  the  press  by  a  distinguished  foreigner 
for  all  the  information  that  will  develop  the  causes  of  the  failure  of 
that  campaign,  has  provoked  anew  its  partisan  and  desultory  discus 
sion,  and  renders  a  plain  and  logical  recital  of  the  facts  both  timely 
and  important. 

After  the  defeat  of  Burnside  at  Fredericksburg,  in  December,  it 
was  believed  that  active  operations  were  over  for  the  winter,  and  1 
was  sent  with  two  divisions  of  my  corps  to  the  eastern  shore  of 
Virginia,  where  I  could  find  food  for  my  men  during  the  winter, 
and  send  supplies  to  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  I  spent 
several  months  in  this  department,  keeping  the  enemy  close  within 
his  fortifications,  and  foraging  with  little  trouble  and  great  success. 
On  May  1st,  I  received  orders  to  report  to  General  Lee  at  Freder 
icksburg.  General  Hooker  had  begun  to  throw  his  army  across  the 
Itappahannock,  and  the  active  campaign  was  opening.  I  left  Suffolk 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  hurried  my  troops  forward.  Passing  through 
Richmond,  I  called  to  pay  my  respects  to  Mr.  Sedclon,  the  Secretary 
of  War.  Mr.  Seddon  was,  at  the  time  of  my  visit,  deeply  con 
sidering  the  critical  condition  of  Pemberton's  army  at  Vicksburg, 


41 G  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR 

around  which  General  Grant  was  then  decisively  drawing  his  lines. 
He  informed  me  that  he  had  in  contemplation  a  plan  for  concen 
trating  a  succoring  army  at  Jackson,  Mississippi,  under  the  command 
of  General  Johnston,  with  a  view  of  driving  Grant  from  before 
Vicksburg  by  a  direct  issue-at-arms.  He  suggested  that  possibly  my 
corps  might  be  needed  to  make  the  army  strong  enough  to  handle 
Grant,  and  asked  me  my  views.  I  replied  that  there  was  a  better 
plan,  in  my  judgment,  for  relieving  Vicksburg  than  by  a  direct 
assault  upon  Grant.  I  proposed  that  the  army  then  concentrating  at 
Jackson,  Mississippi,  be  moved  swiftly  to  Tullahoma,  where  General 
Bragg  was  then  located  with  a  fine  army,  confronting  an  army  of 
about  equal  strength  under  General  Rosecrans,  and  that  at  the  same 
time  the  two  divisions  of  my  corps  be  hurried  forward  to  the  same 
point.  The  simultaneous  arrival  of  these  reinforcements  would  give 
us  a  grand  army  at  Tullahoma.  With  this  army  General  Johnston 
might  speedily  crush  Rosecrans,  and  that  he  should  then  turn  his  force 
toward  the  north,  and  with  his  splendid  army  inarch  through  Ten 
nessee  and  Kentucky,  and  threaten  the  invasion  of  Ohio.  My  idea 
was  that,  in  the  march  through  those  States,  the  army  would  meet 
no  organized  obstruction;  would  be  supplied  with  provisions  and 
even  reinforcements  by  those  friendly  to  our  cause,  and  would 
inevitably  result  in  drawing  Grant's  army  from  Yicksburg  to  look 
after  and  protect  his  own  territory.  Mr.  Seddon  adhered  to  his 
original  views  ;  not  so  much,  I  think,  from  his  great  confidence  in 
them,  as  from  the  difficulty  of  withdrawing  the  force  suggested  from 
General  Lee's  army.  I  was  very  thoroughly  impressed  with  the 
practicability  of  the  plan,  however,  and  when  I  reached  General  Lee 
I  laid  it  before  him  writh  the  freedom  justified  by  our  close  personal 
and  official  relations.  The  idea  seemed  to  be  a  new  one  to  him,  but 
he  was  evidently  seriously  impressed  with  it.  We  discussed  it  over 
and  over,  and  I  discovered  that  his  main  objection  to  it  was  that  it 
would,  if  adopted,  force  him  to  divide  his  army.  He  left  no  room 
to  doubt,  however,  that  he  believed  the  idea  of  an  offensive  campaign 
was  not  only  important,  but  necessary. 

At  length,  while  we  were  discussing  the  idea  of  a  western 
forward  movement,  he  asked  me  if  I  did  not  think  an  invasion  of 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  by  his  own  army  would  accomplish  the 
same  result,  and  I  replied  that  I  did  not  see  that  it  would,  because 
this  movement  would  be  too  hazardous,  and  the  campaign  in  thor 
oughly  LTnion  States  would  require  more  time  and  greater  preparation 
than  one  through  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  I  soon  discovered  that 
he  had  determined  that  he  would  make  some  forward  movement, 


LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  417 

and  I  finally  assented  that  the  Pennsylvania  campaign  might  be 
brought  to  a  successful  issue  if  he  could  make  it  offensive  in 
strategy,  but  defensive  in  tactics.  This  point  was  urged  with  great 
persistency.  I  suggested  that,  after  piercing  Pennsylvania  and 
menacing  Washington,  we  should  choose  a  strung  position,  and  force 
the  Federals  to  attack  us,  observing  that  the  popular  clamor 
throughout  the  Xorth  woidd  speedily  force  the  Federal  general  to 
attempt  to  drive  us  out.  I  recalled  to  him  the  battle  of  Fredericks- 
burg  as  an  instance  of  a  defensive  battle,  when,  with  a  few  thousand 
men,  we  hurled  the  whole  Federal  army  back,  crippling  and  demor 
alizing  it,  with  trilling  loss  to  our  own  troops;  and  Chaneellorsville 
as  an  instance  of  an  offensive  battle,  where  we  dislodged  the  Federals, 
it  is  true,  but  at  such  a  terrible  sacrifice  that  half  a  dozen  such  victo 
ries  would  have  ruined  us.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Stonewall 
Jackson  once  said  that  "'  we  sometimes  fail  to  drive  the  enemy  from 
a  position.  They  always  fail  to  drive  us."  I  reminded  him,  too,  of 
Napoleon's  advice  to  Marmont,  to  whom  he  said,  when  putting  him 
at  the  head  of  mi  invading  armv,  "Select  your  ground,  and  make1 
your  enemy  attack  you."  I  recall  these  points,  simply  because  I 
desire  to  have  it  distinctly  understood  that,  while  I  first  suggested  to 
General  Lee  the  idea  of  an  offensive  campaign,  I  was  never  per 
suaded  to  yield  my  argument  against  the  Gettysburg  campaign, 
except  with  the  understanding  that  we  were  not  to  deliver  an  offen 
sive  battle,  but  to  so  maneuvre  that  the  enemy  should  be  forced  to 
attack  us— or,  to  repeat,  that  our  campaign  should  be  one  of  offensive 
strategy,  but  defensive  tactics.  Fpon  this  understanding  my  assent 
was  given,  and  General  Lee,  who  had  been  kind  enough  to  discuss 
the  matter  with  me  patiently,  gave  the  order  of  march. 

The  movement  was  begun  on  the  od  of  June.  McLaws'  Divi 
sion  of  my  corps  moved  out  of  Fredericksburg,  for  ( 'ulpeppcr  Cuurt- 
Ilouse,  followed  by  KwelTs  Corps,  on  the  4th  and  5th  of  June. 
Hood's  Division  and  Stuart's  cavalry  moved  at  the  same  time.  On 
the  8th,  we  found  two  full  corps  (for  Pickett's  Division  had  joined 
me  then),  and  Stuart's  cavalry,  concentrated  at  Culpepper  Court- 
House.  In  the  meantime  a  large  force  of  the  Federals,  cavalry  and 
infantry,  had  been  thrown  across  the  Rappahannock,  and  sent  to 
attack  General  Stuart.  They  were  encountered  at  Brandy  Station, 
on  the  morning  of  the  (.)th,  and  repulsed.  General  Lee  says  of  this 
engagement :  "On  the  Dth,  a  large  force  of  Federal  cavalry,  strongly 
supported  by  infantry,  crossed  the  Rappahannock  at  Beverly's  ford, 
and  attacked  General  Stuart.  A  severe  engagement  ensued,  con 
tinuing  from  early  in  the  morning  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  when 
27 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  enemy  was  forced  to  recross  the  river  with  heavy  loss,  leaving 
four  hundred  prisoners,  three  pieces  of  artillery,  and  several  colors 
in  our  hands."  The  failure  of  General  Lee  to  follow  up  his  advan 
tage  by  pouring  the  heavy  force  concentrated  at  Culpepper  Court- 
House  upon  this  detachment  of  the  Federals,  confirmed  my  convic 
tions  that  he  had  determined  to  make  a  defensive  battle,  and  would 
not  allow  any  casual  advantage  to  precipitate  a  general  engagement. 
If  he  had  had  any  idea  of  abandoning  the  original  plan  of  a  tactical 
defensive,  then,  in  my  judgment,  was  the  time  to  have  done  so. 
While  at  Culpepper,  I  sent  a  trusty  scout  (who  had  been  sent  to  me 
by  Secretary  Seddon,  while  I  was  at  Suffolk),  with  instructions  to  go 
into  the  Federal  lines,  discover  his  policy,  and  bring  me  all  the  infor 
mation  he  could  possibly  pick  up.  When  this  scout  asked  me  very 
significantly  where  he  should  report,  I  replied :  "  Find  me,  wherever 
I  am,  when  you  have  the  desired  information."  I  did  this  because 
I  feared  to  trust  him  with  a  knowledge  of  our  future  movements. 
I  supplied  him  with  all  the  gold  he  needed,  and  instructed  him  to 
spare  neither  pains  nor  money  to  obtain  full  and  accurate  informa 
tion.  The  information  gathered  by  this  scout  led  to  the  most  tre 
mendous  results,  as  will  soon  be  seen. 

General  A.  P.  Hill,  having  left  Fredericksburg  as  soon  as  the 
enemy  had  retired  from  his  front,  was  sent  to  follow  Ewell,  who  had 
marched  up  the  Yalley  and  cleared  it  of  the  Federals.  My  corps 
left  Culpepper  on  the  15th,  and  with  a  view  of  covering  the  march 
of  Hill  and  Ewell  through  the  Valley,  moved  along  the  east  side  of 
the  Blue  Ridge,  and  occupied  Snicker's  and  Ashby's  gaps,  and  the 
line  of  the  Blue  Eidge.  General  Stuart  was  in  my  front  and  on 
my  flank,  reconnoitering  the  movements  of  the  Federals.  When  it 
was  found  that  Hooker  did  not  intend  to  attack,  I  withdrew  to  the 
west  side,  and  marched  to  the  Potomac.  As  I  was  leaving  the  Blue 
Eidge,  I  instructed  General  Stuart  to  follow  me,  and  to  cross  the 
Potomac  at  Shepherdstown,  while  I  crossed  at  Williamsport,  ten 
miles  above.  In  reply  to  these  instructions,  General  Stuart  informed 
me  that  he  had  discretionary  powers  from  General  Lee ;  whereupon 
I  withdrew.  General  Stuart  held  the  gap  for  a  while,  and  then 
hurried  around  beyond  Hooker's  army,  and  we  saw  nothing  more  of 
him  until  the  evening  of  the  2d  of  July,  when  he  came  down  from 
York  and  joined  us,  having  made  a  complete  circuit  of  the  Federal 
army.  The  absence  of  Stuart's  cavalry  from  the  main  body  of  the 
army,  during  the  march,  is  claimed  to  have  been  a  fatal  error,  as 
General  Lee  says :  "  No  report  had  been  received  (on  the  27th)  that 
the  enemy  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  the  absence  of  the  cavalry 


LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  410 

rendered  it  impossible  to  obtain  accurate  information."  The  army, 
therefore,  moved  forward,  as  a  man  might  walk  over  strange  ground 
with  his  eyes  shut.  General  Lee  says  of  his  orders  to  Stuart:  u  Gen 
eral  Stuart  was  left  to  guard  the  passes  of  the  mountains  and  to 
observe  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  who  lie  was  instructed  to 
harass  and  impede  as  much  as  possible,  should  he  attempt  to  cross 
the  Potomac.  In  that  event.  General  Stuart  was  directed  to  move 
into  Maryland,  crossing  the  Potomac  on  the  east  or  west  of  the  Blue 
Hidge,  as  in  his  judgment  should  be  best,  and  take  position  on  the 
right  of  our  column  as  it  advanced.-' 

My  corps  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport,  and  General  A. 
P.  II  ill  crossed  at  Shepherdstown.  ( )ur  columns  were  joined  together 
at  Ilagerstown,  and  we  marched  thence  into  Pennsylvania,  reaching 
Chambersburg  on  the  evening  of  the  27th.  At  this  point,  on  the 
night  of  the  2(,.>th,  information  was  received  by  which  the  whole 
plan  of  the  campaign  was  changed.  AVe  had  not  heard  from  the 
enemy  for  several  days,  and  General  Lee  was  in  doubt  as  to  where 
lie  was;  indeed,  we  did  not  know  that  lie  had  yet  left  Virginia.  At 
about  ten  o'clock  that  night.  Colonel  Sorrel  1,  my  chief-of-staif,  was 
waked  by  an  orderly,  who  reported  that  a  suspicious  person  had  just 
been  arrested  by  the  provost  marshal.  Upon  investigation,  Sorrell 
discovered  that  the  suspicious  person  was  the  scout  Harrison  that  I 
had  sent  out  at  Culpepper.  lie  was  dirt-stained,  travel-worn,  and 
very  much  broken  down.  After  questioning  him  sufficiently  to  find 
that  he  brought  very  important  information,  Colonel  Sorrell  brought 
him  to  my  headquarters  and  awoke  me.  He  gave  the  information 
that  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  marched  northwest,  and 
that  the  head  of  his  column  was  at  Frederick  City,  on  our  right.  I 
felt  that  this  information  was  exceedingly  important,  and  might 
involve  a  change  in  the  direction  of  our  inarch.  General  Lee  had 
already  issued  orders  that  we  were  to  advance  toward  llarrisburg. 
I  at  once  sent  the  scout  to  General  Lee's  headquarters,  and  fol 
lowed  him  myself  early  in  the  morning.  I  found  General  Lee 
up,  and  asked  him  if  the  information  brought  by  the  scout  might 
not  involve  a  change  of  direction  of  the  head  of  our  column  to 
the  right.  He  immediately  acquiesced  in  the  suggestion,  possibly 
saying  that  he  had  already  given  orders  to  that  effect.  The 
movement  toward  the  enemy  was  begun  at  once.  Hill  marched 
toward  Gettysburg,  and  my  corps  followed,  with  the  exception  of 
Pickett's  Division,  which  was  left  at  Chambersburg  by  General 
Lee's  orders.  Ewell  was  recalled  from  above — he  having  advanced 
as  far  as  Carlisle.  I  was  with  General  Lee  most  of  that  day  (the 


420  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

30th).  At  about  noon,  the  road  in  front  of  my  corps  was  blocked 
by  Hill's  Corps  and  Ewell's  wagon  train,  which  had  cut  into  the 
road  from  above.  The  orders  were  to  allow  these  trains  to  precede 
us,  and  that  we  should  go  into  camp  at  Greenwood,  about  ten  miles 
from  Chambersburg.  My  infantry  was  forced  to  remain  in  Green 
wood  until  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  1st ;  my  artillery  did  not  get 
the  road  until  two  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  2d. 

General  Lee  spent  the  night  with  us,  establishing  his  head 
quarters,  as  he  frequently  did,  a  short  distance  from  mine.  General 
Lee  says  of  the  movements  of  this  day  :  "  Preparation  had  been  made 
to  advance  upon  Ilarrisburg ;  but,  on  the  night  of  the  29th,  informa 
tion  was  received  from  a  scout  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  Potomac, 
was  advancing  northward,  and  that  the  head  of  his  column  had  already 
reached  South  Mountain.  As  our  communication  with  the  Potomac 
were  thus  menaced,  it  was  resolved  to  prevent  its  further  progress  in 
that  direction  by  concentrating  our  army  on  the  east  side  of  the 
mountains."  On  the  morning  of  the  1st,  General  Lee  and  myself 
left  his  headquarters  together,  and  had  ridden  three  or  four  miles, 
when  we  heard  heavy  firing  along  Hill's  front.  The  firing  became 
so  heavy  that  General  Lee  left  me  and  hurried  forward  to  see  what 
it  meant.  After  attending  to  some  details  of  my  march,  I  followed. 
The  firing  proceeded  from  the  engagement  between  our  advance  and 
Reynolds'  Corps,  in  which  the  Federals  were  repulsed.  This  ren 
contre  was  totally  unexpected  on  both  sides.  As  an  evidence  of  the 
doubt  in  which  General  Lee  was  enveloped,  and  the  anxiety  that 
weighed  him  down  during  the  afternoon,  I  quote  from  General  II. 
II.  Anderson  the  report  of  a  conversation  had  with  him  during  the 
engagement.  General  Anderson  was  resting  with  his  division  at 
Cashtown,  awaiting  orders.  About  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  he 
received  a  message  notifying  him  that  General  Lee  desired  to  see 
him.  He  found  General  Lee  intently  listening  to  the  fire  of  the 
guns,  and  very  much  disturbed  and  depressed.  At  length  he  said, 
more  to  himself  than  to  General  Anderson :  "  I  cannot  think  what 
has  become  of  Stuart ;  I  ought  to  have  heard  from  him  long  before 
now.  He  may  have  met  with  disaster,  but  I  hope  not.  In  the 
absence  of  reports  from  him,  I  am  in  ignorance  as  to  what  we  have 
in  front  of  us  here.  It  may  be  the  whole  Federal  army,  or  it  may 
be  only  a  detachment.  If  it  is  the  whole  Federal  force  we  must 
fight  a  battle  here ;  if  we  do  not  gain  a  victory,  those  defiles  and 
gorges  through  which  we  passed  this  morning  will  shelter  us  from 
disaster." 

AVhen  I  overtook  General  Lee,  at  five  o'clock  that  afternoon,  he 


LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  421 

paid,  to  my  surprise,  that  lie  thought  of  attacking  General  Meade 
upon  the  heights  the  next  day.  I  suggested  that  this  course  seemed 
to  be  at  variance  with  the  plan  of  the  campaign  that  had  been  agreed 
upon  before  leaving  Fredericksburg.  lie  said:  ''If  the  enemy  is 
there  to-morrow,  we  must  attack  him/'  I  replied:  "If  lie  is  there, 
it  will  be  because  he  is  anxious  that  we  should  attack  him — a  good 
reason,  in  my  judgment,  for  not  doing  so/'  I  urged  that  we  should 
move  around  by  our  right  to  the  left  of  Meade,  and  put  our  army 
between  him  and  Washington,  threatening  his  left  and  rear,  and 
thus  force  him  to  attack  us  in  such  position  as  we  might  select.  I 
said  that  it  seemed  to  me  that  if,  during  our  council  at  Fredericksburg, 
we  had  described  the  position  in  which  we  desired  to  get  the  two 
armies,  we  could  not  have  expected  to  get  the  enemy  in  a  better 
position  f«»r  us  than  that  he  then  occupied  ;  that  he  was  in  strong 
position  and  would  be  awaiting  us,  which  was  evidence  that  he 
desired  that  we  should  attack  him.  1  said,  further,  that  his  weak 
point  seemed  to  be  his  left;  hence,  I  thought  that  we-  should  move 
around  to  his  left,  that  we  might  threaten  it  if  we  intended  to 
maneuvre,  or  attack  it  if  we  determined  upon  a  battle.  I  called  his 
attention  to  the  fact,  that  the  country  was  admirably  adapted  for  a 
defensive  battle,  and  that  we  should  surely  repulse  Meade  with 
crushing  loss  if  we  would  take  position  so  as  to  force  him  to  attack 
us,  and  suggested  that,  even  if  we  carried  the  heights  in  front  of  us. 
and  drove  Meade  out,  we  should  be  so  badly  crippled  that  we  could 
not  reap  the  fruits  of  victory ;  and  that  the  heights  of  Gettysburg 
were,  in  themselves,  of  no  more  importance  to  us  than  the  ground 
we  then  occupied,  and  that  the  mere  possession  of  the  ground  was 
not  worth  a  hundred  men  to  us.  That  Meade's  army,  not  its  position, 
was  our  objective.  General  Lee  was  impressed  with  the  idea  that, 
by  attacking  the  Federals,  he  could  whip  them  in  detail.  I  reminded 
him  that  if  the  Federals  were  there  in  the  morning,  it  would  be  proof 
that  they  had  their  forces  well  in  hand,  and  that  with  Pickett  in 
Chambershurg,  and  Stuart  out  of  reach,  we  should  be  somewhat  in 
detail.  lie,  however,  did  not  seem  to  abandon  the  idea  of  attack  on 
the  next  day.  lie  seemed  under  a  subdued  excitement,  which  occa 
sionally  took  possession  of  hi  11  when  ''the  hunt  was  up/'  and 
threatened  his  superb  equipoise.  The  sharp  battle  fought  by  Hill 
and  Fwell  on  that  day  had  given  him  a  taste  of  victory.  Fpon  this 
point  I  quote  General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  who  says,  speaking  of  the  attack 
on  the  od :  "He  told  the  father  of  the  writer  [his  brother]  that  he 
was  controlled  too  far  by  the  great  confidence  he  felt  in  the  fighting 
qualities  of  his  people,  who  begged  simply  to  be  'turned  loose,1  and 


422  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

by  the  assurances  of  most  of  his  higher  officers."  I  left  General  Lee 
quite  late  on  the  night  of  the  1st.  Speaking  of  the  battle  on  the  2d, 
General  Lee  says,  in  his  official  report :  "  It  had  not  been  intended  to 
fight  a  general  battle  at  such  a  distance  from  our  base,  unless  attacked 
by  the  enemy ;  but,  finding  ourselves  unexpectedly  confronted  by 
the  Federal  army,  it  became  a  matter  of  difficulty  to  withdraw 
through  the  mountains  with  our  large  trains." 

When  I  left  General  Lee  on  the  night  of  the  1st,  I  believed 
that  he  had  made  up  his  mind  to  attack,  but  was  confident  that  he 
had  not  not  yet  determined  as  to  when  the  attack  should  be  made. 
The  assertion  first  made  by  General  Pendleton,  and  echoed  by  his 
confederates,  that  I  was  ordered  to  open  the  attack  at  sunrise,. is 
totally  false.  Documentary  testimony  upon  this  point  will  be  pre 
sented  in  the  course  of  this  article.  Suffice  it  to  say,  at  present,  that 
General  Lee  never,  in  his  life,  gave  me  orders  to  open  an  attack  at  a 
specific  hour.  He  wras  perfectly  satisfied  that,  when  I  had  my  troops 
in  position,  and  was  ordered  to  attack,  no  time  was  ever  lost.  On 
the  night  of  the  1st  I  left  him  without  any  orders  at  all.  On  the 
morning  of  the  2d,  I  went  to  General  Lee's  headquarters  at  daylight, 
and  renewed  my  views  against  making  an  attack.  lie  seemed  resolved, 
however,  and  we  discussed  the  probable  results.  We  observed  the 
position  of  the  Federals,  and  got  a  general  idea  of  the  nature  of  the 
ground.  About  sunrise  General  Lee  sent  Colonel  Tenable,  of  his 
staff,  to  General  E well's  headquarters,  ordering  him  to  make  a  recon- 
noissance  of  the  ground  in  his  front,  with  a  view  of  making  the  main 
attack  on  his  left.  A  short  time  afterward  he  followed  Colonel 
Tenable  in  person.  He  returned  at  about  nine  o'clock,  and  informed 
me  that  it  would  not  do  to  have  Ewell  open  the  attack.  lie,  finally, 
determined  that  I  should  make  the  main  attack  on  the  extreme  right. 
It  was  fully  eleven  o'clock  when  General  Lee  arrived  at  this  conclu 
sion  and  ordered  the  movement.  In  the  meantime,  by  General 
Lee's  authority,  Law's  Brigade,  which  had  been  put  upon  picket 
duty,  was  ordered  to  rejoin  my  command,  and,  upon  my  suggestion 
that  it  would  be  better  to  await  its  arrival,  General  Lee  assented.  We 
waited  about  forty  minutes  for  these  troops,  and  then  moved  forward. 
A  delay  of  several  hours  occurred  in  the  march  of  the  troops. 
The  cause  of  this  delay  was  that  we  had  been  ordered  by  General 
Lee  to  proceed  cautiously  upon  the  forward  movement,  so  as  to  avoid 
being  seen  by  the  enemy.  General  Lee  ordered  Colonel  Johnston, 
of  his  engineer  corps,  to  lead  and  conduct  the  head  of  the  column. 
My  troops,  therefore,  moved  forward  under  guidance  of  a  special 
officer  of  General  Lee,  and  with  instructions  to  follow  his  directions. 


LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  423 

I  left  General  Lee  only  after  the  line  liad  stretched  out  on  the  march, 
and  rode  along  with  Hood's  Division,  which  was  in  the  rear.  The 
march  was  necessarily  slow,  the  conductor  frequently  encountering 
points  that  exposed  the  troops  to  the  view  of  the  signal  station  on 
Hound  Top.  At  length  the  column  halted.  After  waiting  some 
time,  supposing  that  it  would  soon  move  forward,  I  sent  to  the  front 
to  inquire  the  occasion  of  the  delay.  It  was  reported  that  the  column 
was  awaiting  the  movements  of  Colonel  Johnston,  who  was  trying  to 
lead  it  bv  some  route  by  which  it  could  pursue  its  march  without 
falling  under  view  of  the  Federal  signal  station.  Looking  up  toward 
Hound  Top  I  saw  that  the  signal  station  was  in  full  view,  and,  as  we 
could  plainly  see  this  station,  it  was  apparent  that  our  heavy  columns 
was  seen  from  their  position,  and  that  further  efforts  to  conceal  our 
selves  would  be  a  waste  of  time. 

I  became  very  impatient  at  this  delay,  and  determined  to  take 
upon  myself  the  responsibility  of  hurrying  the  troops  forward.  I 
did  not  order  General  Me  Laws  forward,  because,  as  the  head  of  the 
column,  he  had  direct  orders  from  General  Lee  to  follow  the  conduct 
of  Colonel  Johnston.  Therefore,  I  sent  orders  to  Hood,  who  was  in 
the  rear  and  not  encumbered  by  these  instructions,  to  push  his 
division  forward  by  the  most  direct  route,  so  as  to  take  position  on 
my  right,  lie  did  so,  and  thus  broke  up  the  delay.  The  troops 
were  rapidly  thrown  into  position,  and  preparations  were  made  for 
the  attack.  It  may  be  proper  just  here  to  consider  the  relative 
strength  and  position  of  the  two  armies.  Our  army  was  fifty-two 
thousand  infantry ;  Meade's  was  ninety-five  thousand.  These  are  our 
highest  figures,  and  the  enemy's  lowest.  AVe  had  learned  on  the 
night  of  the  1st,  from  some  prisoners  captured  near  Seminary  Ridge, 
that  the  First,  Eleventh,  and  Third  Corps  had  arrived  by  the 
Emmetsburg  road,  and  had  taken  position  on  the  heights  in  front  of 
us,  and  that  reinforcements  had  been  seen  coming  by  the  Baltimore 
road,  just  after  the  fight  of  the  1st.  From  an  intercepted  dispatch, 
we  learned  that  another  corps  was  in  cam]),  about  four  miles  from 
the  field.  AVe  had  every  reason,  therefore,  to  believe  that  the 
Federals  were  prepared  to  renew  the  battle.  ( )nr  army  was  stretched 
in  an  elliptical  curve,  reaching  from  the  front  of  Round  Top  around 
Seminary  Ridge,  and  enveloping  Cemetery  Heights  on  the  left; 
thus  covering  a  space  of  four  or  five  miles.  The  enemy  occupied 
the  high  ground  in  front  of  us,  being  massed  within  a  curve  of  about 
two  miles,  nearly  concentric  with  the  curve  described  by  our  forces. 
His  line  was  about  one  thousand  four  hundred  yards  from  ours. 
Any  one  will  see  that  the  proposition  for  this  inferior  force  to  assault 


424  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  drive  out  the  masses  of  troops  upon  the  heights,  was  a  very 
problematical  one.  My  orders  from  General  Lee  were  "  to  envelop 
the  enemy's  left,  and  begin  the  attack  there,  following  up,  as  near  as 
possible,  the  direction  of  the  Emmetsburg  road." 

My  corps  occupied  our  right,  with  Hood  on  the  extreme  right, 
and  McLaws  next.  Hill's  Corps  was  next  to  mine,  in  front  of  the 
Federal  centre,  and  Ewell  was  on.  our  extreme  left.  My  corps,  with 
Pickett's  Division  absent,  numbered  hardly  thirteen  thousand  men. 
I  realized  that  the  fight  was  to  be  a  fearful  one  ;  but  being  assured 
that  my  flank  w^ould  be  protected  by  the  brigades  of  Wilcox,  Perry, 
Wright,  Posey,  and  Mahone,  moving  en  echelon,  and  that  Ewell  was 
to  co-operate  by  a  direct  attack  on  the  enemy's  right,  and  Hill  to 
threaten  his  centre,  and  attack  if  opportunity  offered,  and  thus 
prevent  reinforcements  from  being  launched  either  against  myself 
or  Ewell,  it  seemed  possible  that  we  might  possibly  dislodge  the 
great  army  in  front  of  us.  At  half-past  three  o'clock  the  order  was 
given  General  Hood  to  advance  upon  the  enemy,  and,  hurrying  to 
the  head  of  McLaws'  Division,  I  moved  with  his  line.  Then  was 
fairly  commenced  what  I  do  not  hesitate  to  pronounce  the  best  three 
hours'  fighting  ever  done  by  any  troops  on  any  battle-field.  Directly 
in  front  of  us,  occupying  the  peach  orchard,  on  a  piece  of  elevated 
ground  that  General  Lee  desired  me  to  take  and  hold  for  his  artillery, 
was  the  Third  Corps  of  the  Federals,  commanded  by  General  Sickles. 
My  men  charged  with  great  spirit  and  dislodged  the  Federals  from 
the  peach  orchard  with  but  little  delay,  though  they  fought  stub 
bornly.  We  were  then  on  the  crest  of  Seminary  Ridge.  The 
artillery  was  brought  forward  and  put  into  position  at  the  peach 
orchard.  The  infantry  swept  down  the  slope  and  soon  reached  the 
marshy  ground  that  lay  between  Seminary  and  Cemetery  Ridges, 
fighting  their  way  over  every  foot  of  ground  and  against  overwhelm 
ing  odds.  At  every  step  we  found  that  reinforcements  were  pouring 
into  the  Federals  from  every  side.  Xothing  could  stop  my  men, 
however,  and  they  commenced  their  heroic  charge  up  the  side  of 
Cemetery  Ridge.  Our  attack  was  to  progress  in  the  general  direc 
tion  of  the  Emmetsburg  road,  but  the  Federal  troops,  as  they  were 
forced  from  point  to  point,  availing  themselves  of  the  stone  fences 
and  boulders  near  the  mountain  as  rallying  points,  so  annoyed  our 
right  flank  that  General  Hood's  Division  was  obliged  to  make  a 
partial  change  of  front  so  as  to  relieve  itself  of  this  galling  flank 
fire.  This  drew  General  McLaws  a  little  further  to  the  right  than 
General  Lee  had  anticipated,  so  that  the  defensive  advantages  of  the 
ground  enabled  the  Federals  to  delay  our  purposes  until  they  could 


LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  425 

occupy  Little  Hound  Top,  which  they  just  then  discovered  was  the 
key  to  their  position.  The  force  thrown  upon  this  point  was  so 
strong  as  to  seize  our  right,  as  it  were,  in  a  vice. 

Still  the  battle  on  onr  main  line  continued  to  progress.  The 
situation  was  a  critical  one.  My  corps  had  been  fighting  over  an 
hour,  having  encountered  and  driven  back  line  after  line  of  the 
enemy.  In  front  of  them  was  a  high  and  rugged  ridge,  on  its  crest 
the  bulk  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  numbering  six  to  one,  and 
securely  resting  behind  strong  positions.  My  brave  fellows  never 
hesitated,  however.  Their  duty  was  in  front  of  them  and  they  met 
it.  They  charged  up  the  hill  in  splendid  style,  sweeping  everything 
before  them,  dislodging  the  enemy  in  the  face  of  a  withering  lire. 

O  O  V  4s 

When  they  had  fairly  started  up  the  second  ridge,  I  discovered  that 
they  were  suffering  terribly  from  a  tire  that  swept  over  their  right 
and  left  tianks.  I  also  found  that  my  left  Hank  was  not  protected 
by  the  brigades  that  were  to  move  en  echelon  with  it.  McLaws" 
line  was  consequently  spread  out  to  the  left  to  protect  its  Hank,  and 
Hood's  line  was  extended  to  the  right  to  protect  its  Hank  from  the 
sweeping  lire  of  the  large  bodies  of  troops  that  were  posted  on 
Hound  'Fop/'""  These  two  movements  of  extension  so  drew  mv 
forces  out,  that  T  found  myself  attacking  ( 'emetery  Hill  with  a 
single  line  of  battle  against  no  less  than  fifty  thousand  troops. 

My  two  divisions  at  that  time  were  cut  down  to  eight  or  nine 
thousand  men,  four  thousand  having  been  killed  or  wounded.  "We 
felt  at  every  step  the  heavy  stroke  of  fre>h  troops — the  sturdy 
regular  blow  that  tells  a  soldier  instantly  that  lie  has  encountered 
reserves  or  reinforcements.  We  received  no  support  at  all,  and 
there  was  no  evidence  of  co-operation  on  any  side.  To  urge  my  men 
forward  under  these  circumstances  would  have  been  madness,  and  I 
withdrew  them  in  good  order  to  the  peach  orchard  that  we  had 
taken  from  the  Federals  early  in  the  afternoon.  It  may  be  men 
tioned  here,  as  illustrative  of  the  dauntless  spirit  of  these  men,  that 


*  The  importance  of  Round  Top,  as  a  point  d'  appvi,  was  not  appreciated  until 
after  my  attack.  General  Meade  seems  to  have  alluded  to  it  as  a  point  to  be  occu 
pied,  "  if  practicable,'' but  in  such  slighting  manner  as  to  show  that  he  did  not  deem 
it  of  threat  importance.  So  it  ^vas  occupied  by  an  inadequate  force.  As  our  battle 
progressed,  pushing  the  Federals  back  from  point  to  point,  subordinate  officers  and 
soldiers,  seeking  shelter,  as  birds  ily  to  cover  in  a  tempest,  found  behind  the  large 
boulders  of  its  rock-bound  sides,  not  only  protection  but  rallying  points.  These 
reinforcements  to  the  troops  already  there,  checked  our  advance  on  the  right,  and 
some  superior  officer,  arriving  just  then,  divined  from  effect  the  cause,  and  tiirew  a 
force  into  liound  Top  that  transformed  it,  as  if  by  magic,  into  a  Gibraltar. 


42  5  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

when  General  Humphreys  (of  Mississippi)  was  ordered  to  withdraw 
his  troops  from  the  charge,  he  thought  there  was  some  mistake,  and 
retired  to  a  captured  battery,  near  the  swale  between  the  two  ridges, 
where  he  halted,  and,  when  ordered  to  retire  to  the  new  line  a  second 
time,  he  did  so  under  protest.*  Our  men  had  no  thought  of  retreat. 
They  broke  every  line  they  encountered  When  the  order  to  with 
draw  was  given,  a  courier  was  sent  to  General  Lee,  informing  him 
of  the  result  of  the  day's  work. 

Before  pursuing  this  narrative  further,  I  shall  say  a  word  or  two 
concerning  this  assault.  I  am  satisfied  that  my  force,  numbering 
hardly  thirteen  thousand  men,  encountered  during  that  three  and  a 
half  hours  of  bloody  work  not  less  than  sixty-five  thousand  of  the 
Federals,  and  yet  their  charge  was  not  checked  nor  their  line  broken 

until  we  ordered  them  to  withdraw.     Mr.  "Whitelaw  Reid,  writing  a 

o 

most  excellent  account  of  this  charge  to  the  Cincinnati  Gazette,  says : 
"It  was  believed,  from  the  terrific  attack,  that  the  whole  rebel 
army,  E well's  Corps  included,  was  massed  on  our  centre  and  left, 
and  so  a  single  brigade  was  left  to  hold  the  rifle-pits  on  the  right, 
and  the  rest  hurried  across  the  little  neck  of  land  to  strengthen  our 
weakening  lines."  He  describes,  too,  the  haste  with  which  corps 
after  corps  was  hurried  forward  to  the  left  to  check  the  advance  of 
my  two-thirds  of  one  corps.  General  Meade  himself  testifies  (see  his 
official  report)  that  the  Third,  the  Second,  the  Fifth,  the  Sixth,  and  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  all  of  the  Twelfth,  except  one  brigade,  and  part  of 
the  First  Corps,  engaged  my  handful  of  heroes  during  that  glorious 
but  disastrous  afternoon.  I  found  that  night  that  four  thousand  five 
hundred  and  twenty-nine  of  my  men,  more  than  one-third  of  their 
total  number,  had  been  left  on  the  field.  History  records  no  parallel 
to  the  fight  made  by  these  two  divisions  on  the  2d  of  July  at  Gettys 
burg.  I  cannot  refrain  from  inserting  just  here  an  account  of  the 
battle  of  the  2d,  taken  from  a  graphic  account  in  the  New  York 
World.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  correspondent  treats  the  charge  of 
my  thirteen  thousand  men,  as  if  it  were  the  charge  of  the  whole 
army.  The  account  is  as  follows  : 

He  then  began  a  heavy  fire  on  Cemetery  Hill.  It  must  not  be  thought  that  this 
wrathful  fire  was  unanswered.  Our  artillery  began  to  play  within  a  few  moments, 
and  hurled  back  defiance  and  like  destruction  upon  the  rebel  lines.  Until  six 


*  The  troops  engaged  with  me  in  the  fight  of  the  2d  were  mostly  Georgians,  as 
follows :  The  four  Georgia  brigades  of  Generals  Benning,  Anderson,  Wofibrd,  and 
Semmes,  General  Kershaw's  South  Carolina  Brigade,  General  Law's  Alabama 
Brigade,  General  Barksdale's  (afterward  General  Humphrey's)  Mississippi  Brigade, 
and  General  Kobertson's  Texas  Brigade. 


LEE  IX  PENNSYLVANIA.  427 

o'clock  the  roar  of  cannon,  the  rush  of  missiles,  and  the  bursting  of  bombs  filled  all 
the  air.  The  clangor  alone  of  this  awful  combat  might  well  have  confused  and 
awed  a  less  cool  and  watchful  commander  than  General  Meade.  It  did  not  confuse 
him.  "With  the  calculation  of  a  tactician,  and  the  eye  of  an  experienced  judge,  he 
watched  from  his  headquarters,  on  the  hill,  whatever  movement  under  the  murky 
cloud  which  enveloped  the  rebel  lines  might  lirst  disclose  the  intention  which  it 
was  evident  this  artillery  firing  covered.  About  six  o'clock  P.  M.  silence,  deep, 
awfully  impressive,  but  momentary,  was  permitted,  as  if  by  magic,  to  dwell  upon 
the  lield.  Only  the  groans — unheard  before — of  the  wounded  and  dying,  only  a 
murmur,  a  warning  memory  of  the  breeze  through  the  foliage  ;  only  the  low  rattle 
of  preparation  of  what  was  to  come  embroidered  this  blank  stillness.  Then,  as  the 
smoke  beyond  the  village  was  lightly  borne  to  the  eastward,  the  woods  on  the  left 
were  seen  filled  with  dark  masses  of  infantry,  three  columns  deep,  who  advanced  at 
a  quick  step.  Magnificent !  Such  a  charge  by  such  a  force — full  forty-live  thousand 
men,  under  Hill  and  Loiigstreet — even  though  it  threatened  to  pierce  and  annihilate 
the  Third  Corps,  against  which  it  was  directed,  drew  forth  cries  of  admiration  from 
all  who  beheld  it.  General  Sickles  and  his  splendid  command  withstood  the  shock 
with  a  determination  that  checked  but  could  not  fully  restrain  it.  Back,  inch  by 
inch,  fighting,  falling,  dying,  cheering,  the  men  retired.  The  rebels  came  on  more 
furiously,  halting  at  intervals,  pouring  volleys  that  struck  our  troops  down  in 
scores.  General  Sickles,  fighting  desperately,  was  struck  in  the  leg  and  fell.  The 
Second  Corps  came  to  the  aid  of  his  decimated  column.  The  battle  then  grew 
fearful.  Standing  firmly  up  against  the  storm,  our  troops,  though  still  outnum 
bered,  gave  back  shot  for  shot,  volley  for  volley,  almost  death  for  death.  Still  the 
enemy  was  not  restrained.  Down  he  came  upon  our  left  with  a  momentum  that 
nothing  could  check.  The  rilled  guns  that  lay  before  our  infantry  on  a  knoll  were 
in  danger  of  capture.  General  Hancock  was  wounded  in  the  thigh,  General  Gibbon 
in  the  shoulder  The  Fifth  Corps,  as  the  First  and  Second  wavered  anew,  went  into 
the  breach  with  such  shouts  and  such  volleys  as  made  the  rebel  column  tremble  at 
last.  Up  from  the  valley  behind,  another  battery  came  rolling  to  the  heights,  and 
Hung  its  contents  in  an  instant  down  in  the  midst  of  the  enemy's  ranks.  Crash! 
crash!  with  discharges  deafening,  terrible,  the  musketry  firing  went  on.  The 
enemy,  re-forming  after  each  discharge  with  wondrous  celerity  and  firmness,  still 
pressed  up  the  declivity.  AY  hat  hideous  courage  filled  the  minutes  between  the 
appearance  of  the  Fifth  Corps  and  the  advance  to  the  support  of  the  rebel  columns 
of  still  another  column  from  the  right,  I  cannot  bear  to  tell.  Men  fell,  as  the  leaves 
fall  in  autumn,  before  those  horrible  discharges.  Faltering  for  an  instant,  the  rebel 
columns  seemed  about  to  recede  before  the  tempest.  But  their  officers,  who  could 
be  seen  through  the  smoke  of  the  conflict  galloping,  and  swinging  their  swords 
along  the  lines,  rallied  them  anew,  and  the  next  instant  the  whole  line  sprang 
forward,  as  if  to  break  through  our  own  by  mere  weight  of  numbers.  A  division 
from  the  Twelfth  Corps,  on  the  extreme  right,  reached  the  scene  at  this  instant, 
and  at  the  same  time  Sedgwick  came  up  with  the  Sixth  Corps,  having  finished  a 
march  of  nearly  thirty-six  consecutive  hours.  To  what  rescue  they  came  their 
officers  saw  and  told  them.  AYeary  as  they  were,  barefooted,  hungry,  fit  to  drop  for 
slumber,  as  they  were,  the  wish  for  victory  was  so  blended  with  the  thought  of 
exhaustion  that  they  cast  themselves,  in  turn,  en  maxse  into  line  of  battle,  and 
went  down  on  the  enemy  with  death  in  their  weapons  and  cheers  on  their  lips. 
The  rebel's  camel's  back  was  broken  by  this  "  feather."  His  line  staggered,  reeled, 
and  drifted  slowly  back,  while  the  shouts  of  our  soldiers,  lifted  up  amid  the  roar  of 
musketry  over  the  bodies  of  the  dead  and  wounded,  proclaimed  the  completeness 
of  their  victory. 


428  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

It  may  be  imagined  that  I  was  astonished  at  the  fact,  that  we 
received  no  support  after  we  had  driven  the  Federals  from  the 
peach  orchard  and  one  thousand  yards  beyond.  If  General  Ewell 
had  engaged  the  army  in  his  front  at  that  time  (say  four  o'clock)  he 
would  have  prevented  their  massing  their  whole  army  in  my  front, 
and  while  he  and  I  kept  their  two  wings  engaged,  Hill  would  have 
found  their  centre  weak,  and  should  have  threatened  it  while  I 
broke  through  their  left  and  dislodged  them.  Having  failed  to 
move  at  four  o'clock,  while  the  enemy  was  in  his  front,  it  was  still 
more  surprising  that  he  did  not  advance  at  five  o'clock  with  vigor 
and  promptness,  when  the  trenches  in  front  of  him  were  vacated, 
or  rather  held  by  one  single  brigade  (as  General  Meade's  testimony 
before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  states).  Had  he 
taken  these  trenches  and  scattered  the  brigade  that  held  them,  he 
would  have  found  himself  in  the  Federals'  flank  and  rear.  His 
attack  in  the  rear  must  have  dislodged  the  Federals,  as  it  would 
have  been  totally  unexpected — it  being  believed  that  he  was  in  front 
with  me.  Hill,  charging  upon  the  centre  at  the  same  time,  would 
have  increased  their  disorder  and  we  should  have  wTon  the  field. 
But  Ewell  did  not  advance  until  I  had  withdrawn  my  troops,  and 
the  First  Corps,  after  winning  position  after  position,  was  forced  to 
withdraw  from  the  field  with  two  corps  of  their  comrades  within 
sight  and  resting  upon  their  arms.  Ewell  did  not  move  until  about 
dusk  (according  to  his  own  report).  He  then  occupied  the  trenches 
that  the  enemy  had  vacated  (see  General  Meade's  report).  The  real 
cause  of  Swell's  non-compliance  with  General  Lee's  orders  was  that 
he  had  broken  his  line  of  battle  by  sending  two  brigades  off  on  some 
duty  up  the  York  road.  General  Early  says  that  my  failure  to 
attack  at  sunrise  wras  the  cause  of  Ewell's  line  being  broken  at  the 
time  I  did  attack.  This  is  not  only  absurd,  but  impossible.  After 
sunrise  that  morning,  Colonel  Tenable  and  General  Lee  were  at 
Ewell's  headquarters  discussing  the  policy  of  opening  the  attack 
with  Ewell's  Corps.  They  left  Ewell  with  this  definite  order :  that 
he  was  to  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  support  my  attack  when  it 
was  made.  It  is  silly  to  say  that  he  was  ready  at  sunrise,  when  he 
was  not  ready  at  four  o'clock  when  the  attack  was  really  made.  His 
orders  were  to  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  co-operate  with  my  attack 
when  it  was  made.  In  breaking  his  line  of  battle  he  rendered  him 
self  unable  to  support  me  when  he  would  have  been  potential. 
Touching  the  failure  of  the  supporting  brigades  of  Anderson's 
Division  to  cover  McLaws'  flank  by  echelon  movements,  as  directed, 
there  is  little  to  be  said.  Those  brigades  acted  gallantly,  but  went 


LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  429 

astray  early  in  tlio  fight.  General  Anderson,  in  his  report,  says  :  "A 
strong  fire  was  poured  upon  our  right  Hank,  which  had  become 
detached  from  McLaws'  left/'  General  Lee,  alluding  to  the  action 
of  these  two  brigades,  says:  "But  having  become  separated  from 
McLaws,  "Wilcox's  and  "Wright's  Brigades  advanced  with  great  gal 
lantry,  breaking  successive  lines  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  and  com 
pelling1  him  to  abandon  much  of  his  artillery.  "Wilcox  reached  the 
foot  and  Wright  gained  the  crest  of  the  ridge  itself,  driving  the 
enemy  down  the  opposite  side  ;  but  having  become  separated  from 
McLaws,  and  gone  beyond  the  other  two  brigades  of  the  division 
they  were  to  attack  in  front  and  on  both  flanks,  and  compelled  to 
retire,  being  unable  to  bring  off  any  of  the  captured  artillery, 
McLaws'  left  also  fell  bach,  and  it  being  now  nearly  dark,  General 
Longstreet  determined  to  await  the  arrival  of  Pickett."  So  much 
for  the  action  of  the  first  dry. 

I  did  not  see  General  Lee  that  night.  On  the  next  morning  he 
came  to  see  me,  and,  fearing  that  he  was  still  in  his  disposition  to 
attack,  I  tried  to  anticipate  him,  by  saying:  "General,  T  have  had 
my  scouts  out  all  night,  and  I  find  that  you  still  have  an  excellent 
opportunity  to  move  around  to  the  right  of  Mcade's  army,  and 
maneuvre  him  into  attacking  us."  He  replied,  pointing  with  his  list 
at  Cemetery  Hill:  "The;  enemy  is  there,  and  I  am  going  to  strike 
him.''  I  felt  then  that  it  was  my  duty  to  express  my  convictions;  I 
said:  "General,  I  have  been  a  soldier  all  my  life.  I  have  been  with 
soldiers  engaged  in  fights  by  couples,  by  squads,  companies,  regiments, 
divisions,  and  armies,  and  should  know,  as  well  as  any  one,  what 
soldiers  can  do.  It  is  my  opinion  that  no  fifteen  thousand  men  ever 
arrayed  for  battle  can  take  that  position,''  pointing  to  ( 'emetery  Hill. 
General  Lee,  in  reply  to  this,  ordered  me  to  prepare  Pickett's  Divis 
ion  for  the  attack.  I  should  not  have  been  so  urgent  had  I  not 
foreseen  the  hopelessness  of  the  proposed  assault.  I  felt  that  I  must 
say  a  word  against  the  sacrifice  of  my  men  ;  and  then  I  felt  that  mv 
record  was  such  that  General  Lee  would  or  could  not  misconstrue 
my  motives.  I  said  no  more,  however,  but  turned  away.  The  most 
of  the  morning  was  consumed  in  waiting  for  Pickett's  men,  and 
getting  into  position.  The  plan  of  assault  was  as  follows  :  Our  artil 
lery  was  to  be  massed  in  a  wood  from  which  Pickett  was  to  charge, 
and  it  was  to  pour  a  continuous  fire  upon  the  cemetery.  Lender  cover 
of  this  fire,  and  supported  by  it,  Pickett  was  to  charge. 

Our  artillery  was  in  charge  of  General  E.  P.  Alexander,  a  brave 
and  gifted  officer.  Colonel  "Walton  was  my  chief  of  artillery ;  but 
Alexander,  being  at  the  head  of  the  column,  and  being  first  in  position, 


430  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  being,  beside,  an  officer  of  unusual  promptness,  sagacity,  and 
intelligence,  was  given  charge  of  the  artillery.  The  arrangements 
were  completed  about  one  o'clock.  General  Alexander  had  arranged 
that  a  battery  of  seven  eleven-pound  howitzers,  with  fresh  horses 
and  full  caissons^  were  to  charge  with  Pickett,  at  the  head  of  his  line, 
but  General  Pendleton,  from  whom  the  guns  had  been  borrowed, 
recalled  them  just  before  the  charge  wras  made,  and  thus  deranged 
this  wise  plan.  Never  was  I  so  depressed  as  upon  that  day.  I  felt 
that  my  men  were  to  be  sacrificed,  and  that  I  should  have  to  order 
them  to  make  a  hopeless  charge.  I  had  instructed  General  Alexan 
der,  being  unwilling  to  trust  myself  wTith  the  entire  responsibility,  to 
carefully  observe  the  effect  of  the  fire  upon  the  enemy,  and  when  it 
began  to  tell  to  notify  Pickett  to  begin  the  assault.  I  was  so  much 
impressed  with  the  hopelessness  of  the  charge,  that  I  WTote  the 
following  note  to  General  Alexander:  "If  the  artillery  fire  does  not 
have  the  effect  to  drive  off  the  enemy  or  greatly  demoralize  him,  so 
as  to  make  our  efforts  pretty  certain,  I  would  prefer  that  you  should 
not  advise  General  Pickett  to  make  the  charge.  I  shall  rely  a  great 
deal  on  your  judgment  to  determine  the  matter,  and  shall  expect  you 
to  let  Pickett  know  when  the  moment  offers." 

To  my  note  the  General  replied  as  follows :  "  I  will  only  be 
able  to  judge  the  effect  of  our  fire  upon  the  enemy  by  his  return 
fire,  for  his  infantry  is  but  little  exposed  to  view,  and  the  smoke  will 
obscure  the  wrhole  field.  If,  as  I  infer  from  your  note,  there  is  an 
alternative  to  this  attack,  it  should  be  carefully  considered  before 
opening  our  fire,  for  it  will  take  all  of  the  artillery  ammunition  we 
have  left  to  test  this  one  thoroughly ;  and,  if  the  result  is  unfavorable, 
we  will  have  none  left  for  another  effort ;  and,  even  if  this  is  entirely 
successful,  it  can  only  be  so  at  a  very  bloody  cost."  I  still  desired 
to  save  my  men,  and  felt  that  if  the  artillery  did  not  produce  the 
desired  effect,  I  \vould  be  justified  in  holding  Pickett  off.  I  wrote 
this  note  to  Colonel  Walton  at  exactly  1.30  P.  M. :  "Let  the  bat 
teries  open.  Order  great  precision  in  firing.  If  the  batteries  at  the 
peach  orchard  cannot  be  used  against  the  point  we  intend  attacking, 
let  them  open  on  the  enemy  at  Rocky  Hill."  The  cannonading 
which  opened  along  both  lines  was  grand.  In  a  few  moments  a 
courier  brought  a  note  to  General  Pickett  (who  wras  standing  near 
me)  from  Alexander,  which,  after  reading,  he  handed  to  me.  It 
was  as  follows :  "  If  you  are  coming  at  all,  you  must  come  at  once, 
or  I  cannot  give  you  proper  support ;  but  the  enemy's  fire  has  not 
slackened  at  all;  at  least  eighteen  guns  are  still  firing  from  the 
cemetery  itself."  After  I  had  read  the  note,  Pickett  said  to  me : 
"  General,  shall  I  advance  ? "  My  feelings  had  so  overcome  me  that 


LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA. 

I  would  not  speak,  for  fear  of  betraying  my  want  of  confidence  to 
him.  I  bowed  affirmation,  and  turned  to  mount  my  horse.  Pickett 
immediately  said  :  "I  shall  lead  my  division  forward,  sir.''  I  spurred 
my  horse  to  the  wood  where  Alexander  was  stationed  with  artillery. 
"When  I  reached  him.  lie  told  me  of  the  disappearance  of  the  seven 
guns  which  were  to  have  led  the  charge  with  Pickett,  and  that  his 
ammunition  was  so  low  that  he  conld  not  properly  support  the 
charge.  I  at  once  ordered  him  to  stop  Pickett  until  the  ammunition 
had  been  replenished.  lie  informed  me  that  he  had  no  ammunition 
with  which  to  replenish.  I  then  saw  that  there  was  no  help  for 
it,  and  that  Pickett  must  advance  under  his  orders.  lie  swept  past 
our  artillery  in  splendid  style,  and  the  men  marched  steadily  and 
compactly  down  the  slope.  As  they  started  up  the  ridge,  over  one 
hundred  cannon  from  the  breastworks  of  the  Federals  hurled  a  rain  of 
canister,  grape,  and  shell  down  upon  them  ;  still  they  pressed  on  until 
half  way  up  the  slope,  when  the  crest  of  the  hill  was  lit  wi;h  a  solid 
sheet  of  flame  as  the  masses  of  infantry  rose  and  lired.  "When  the 
smoke  cleared  away,  Piekett's  Division  was  gone.  Xearly  two-thirds 
of  his  men  lay  dead  on  the  Held,  and  the  survivors  were  sullenly 
retreating  down  the  hill.  Mortal  man  could  not  have  stood  that 
iire.  In  half  an  hour  the  contested  field  was  cleared  and  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg  was  over. 

"When  this  charge  had  failed,  I  expected  that,  of  course,  the 
enemy  would  throw  himself  against  our  shattered  ranks  and  try  to 
crush  us.  I  sent  my  stall  officers  to  the  rear  to  assist  in  rallying  the 
troops,  and  hurried  to  our  line  of  batteries,  as  the  only  support  that 
I  could  give  them,  knowing  that  my  presence  would  impress  upon 
every  one  of  them  the  necessity  of  holding  the  ground  to  the  last 
extremity.  I  knew  if  the  army  was  to  be  saved,  those  batteries 
must  check  the  enemy.  As  I  rode  along  the  line  of  artillery,  I 
observed  my  old  friend  Captain  Miller,  "Washington  Artillery,  of 
Sharpsburg  record,  walking  between  his  guns  and  smoking  his  pipe 
as  quietly  and  contentedly  as  he  could  at  his  camp-fire.  The  enemy's 
skirmishers  were  then  advancing  and  threatening  assault.  For  unac 
countable  reasons,  the  enemy  did  not  pursue  his  advantage.  Our 
army  was  soon  in  compact  shape,  and  its  face  turned  once  more 
toward  Virginia.  I  may  mention  here  that  it  has  been  absurdly  said 
that  General  Lee  ordered  me  to  put  Hood's  and  McLaws'  Divisions 
in  support  of  Pickett's  assault.  General  Lee  never  ordered  any  such 
thing.*  After  our  troops  were  all  arranged  for  assault,  General  Lee 


*  Colonel  Taylor  says  that  General  Lee,  in  his  presence,  gave  me  orders  to  put 
Hood's  and  McLaws'  Divisions  in  this  column  of  attack.     This  I  deny,  and  do  not 


4:32  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

rode  with  me  twice  over  the  lines  to  see  that  everything  was  arranged 

according  to  his  wishes.     lie  was  told  that  we  had  been  more  par- 

•*-, 

ticular  in  giving  the  orders  than  ever  before ;  that  the  commanders 
had  been  sent  for,  and  the  point  of  attack  had  been  carefully  desig 
nated,  and  that  the  commanders  had  been  directed  to  communicate  to 
their  subordinates,  and  through  them  to  every  soldier  in  the  com 
mand,  the  work  that  was  before  them,  so  that  they  should  nerve 
themselves  for  the  attack,  and  fully  understand  it.  After  leaving 
me,  he  again  rode  over  the  field  once,  if  not  twice,  so  that  there  was 
really  no  room  for  misconstruction  or  misunderstanding  of  his 
wishes.  lie  could  not  have  thought  of  giving  any  such  an  order. 
Hood  and  McLaws  were  confronted  by  a  largely  superior  force  of 
the  enemy  on  the  right  of  Pickett's  attack.  To  have  moved  them 
to  Pickett's  support,  would  have  disengaged  treble  their  number  of 
Federals,  who  would  have  swooped  down  from  their  rocky  fastnessps 
against  the  flank  of  our  attacking  column,  and  swept  our  army  from 
the  field.  A  reference  to  any  of  the  maps  of  Gettysburg  will  show 
from  the  position  of  the  troops  that  this  would  have  been  the  inevit 
able  result.  General  Lee  and  myself  never  had  any  deliberate  con 
versation  about  Gettysburg.  The  subject  was  never  broached  by 
either  of  us  to  the  other.  On  one  occasion  it  came  up  casually,  and 
he  said  to  me  (alluding  to  the  charge  of  Pickett,  on  the  3d),  "  Gen 
eral,  why  didn't  you  stop  all  that  thing  that  day?"  I  replied  that  I 
could  not,  under  the  circumstances,  assume  such  a  responsibility,  as 
no  discretion  had  been  left  me. 

Before  discussing  the  weak  points  of  the  campaign  of  Gettys- 


suppose  he  will  claim  that  any  one  else  heard  the  order.  If  the  reader  will  examine 
any  of  the  maps  of  Gettysburg,  he  will  see  that  the  withdrawal  of  these  two  divis 
ions  from  their  line  of  battle  would  have  left  half  of  General  Lee's  line  of  battle  open, 
and  by  the  shortest  route  to  his  line  of  supplies  and  retreat.  Fully  one-half  of  his 
army  would  have  been  in  the  column  of  assault,  and  half  of  Meade's  army  would 
have  been  free  to  sally  out  on  the  flank  of  our  column,  and  we  should  have  been 
destroyed  on  that  field  of  battle,  beyond  a  doubt.  Of  course,  if  we  assume  that 
Meade  would  place  his  army  in  line  of  battle,  and  allow  us  to  select  our  point  of 
attack,  we  could  have  massed  against  it,  and  rushed  through.  But  this  assumption 
would  be  absurd.  The  only  way  for  those  divisions  to  have  been  moved,  was  to 
have  attacked  the  heights  in  front.  But  this  attack  had  been  tried,  and  failed  the 
day  before.  If  Pickett  had  shown  signs  of  getting  a  lodgment,  I  should,  of  course, 
have  pushed  the  other  divisions  forward  to  support  the  attack.  But  I  saw  that  he 
was  going  to  pieces  at  once.  When  Colonel  Frcemantle  (Her  Majesty's  service) 
approached  me  (see  his  account),  and  congratulated  me  on  Pickett's  apparent  suc 
cess,  I  told  him  that  his  line  would  break  in  a  moment— that  he  was  not  strong 
enough  to  make  a  serious  impression.  M}r  assertion  was  correct.  To  have  rushed 
forward  my  two  divisions,  then  carrying  bloody  noses  from  their  terrible  conflict  the 
day  before,  would  have  been  madness. 


LEE  IN  PENNSYL  VAXIA.  433 

bunr,  it  is  proper  that  I  should  say  that  I  do  so  with  the  greatest 
affection  for  General  Lee,  and  the  greatest  reverence  for  his  memory. 
The  relations  existing  between  us  were  affectionate,  confidential,  and 
even  tender,  from  first  to  last.  There  was  never  a  harsh  word  be 
tween  us.  It  is,  then,  with  a  reluctant  spirit  that  I  write  a  calm  and 
critical  review  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  because  that  review  will 
show  that  our  commanding  general  was  unfortunate  at  several  points. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  General  Lee,  during  the  crisis  of  that  cam 
paign,  lost  the  matchless  equipoise  that  usually  characterized  him, 
and  that  whatever  mistakes  were  made  were  not  so  much  matters  of 
deliberate  judgment  as  the  impulses  of  a  great  mind  disturbed  by 
unparalleled  conditions.  General  Lee  was  thrown  from  his  balance 
(as  is  shown  by  the  statement  of  General  Fitzhugh  Lee)  by  too  great 
confidence  in  the  prowess  of  his  troops  and  (as  is  shown  by  General 
Anderson's  statement)  by  the  deplorable  absence  of  General  Stuart 
and  the  perplexity  occasioned  thereby.  "With  this  preface  I  proceed 
to  say  that  the  Gettysburg  campaign  was  weak  in  these  points- 
adhering,  however,  to  my  opinion  that  a  combined  movement  against 
Kosecrans,  in  Tennessee,  and  a  march  toward  Cincinnati  would  have 
given  better  results  than  could  possibly  have  been  secured  by  the 
invasion  of  Pennsylvania:  .First,  the  offensive  strategical,  but  defen 
sive  tactical,  plan  of  the  campaign,  as  agreed  upon,  should  never  have 
been  abandoned  after  we  entered  the  enemy's  country.  Second,  if 
there  ever  was  a  time  \vhen  the  abandonment  of  that  plan  could 
have  promised  decisive  results,  it  was  at  Brandy  Station,  where,  after 
Stuart  had  repulsed  the  force  thrown  across  the  river,  we  might 
have  fallen  on  that  force  and  crushed  it,  and  then  put  ourselves  in 
position,  threatening  the  enemy's  right  and  rear,  which  would  have 
dislodged  him  from  his  position  at  Fredcrieksburg,  and  given  us  the 
opportunity  for  an  effective  blow.  Third,  General  Stuart  should  not 
have  been  permitted  to  leave  the  general  line  of  march,  thus  forcing 
us  to  march  blindfolded  into  the  enemy's  country;  to  this  maybe 
attributed,  in  my  opinion,  the  change  of  the  policy  of  the  campaign. 
Fourth,  the  success  obtained  bv  the  accidental  rencontre  on  the  l.-t, 
should  have  been  vigorously  prosecuted,  and  the  enemy  should  have 
been  given  no  time  to  fortify  or  concentrate.  Fifth,  on  the  night 
of  the  1st,  the  army  should  have  been  carried  around  to  Meade's 
right  and  rear,  and  posted  between  him  and  his  capital,  and  we  could 
have  maneuvred  him  into  an  attack.  Sixth,  Avhen  the  attack  w;:s 
made  on  the  enemy's  left,  on  the  2d,  by  my  corps,  Ewell  should  have 
baen  required  to  co-operate  by  a  vigorous  movement  against  his 
right,  and  Hill  should  have  moved  against  his  centre.  Had  this 
28 


4:34  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

been  done,  his  army  would  have  been  dislodged,  beyond  question. 
Seventh,  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  it  was  not  yet  too  late  to  move  to 
the  right  and  maneuvre  the  Federals  into  attacking  us.  Eighth, 
Pickett's  Division  should  not  have  been  ordered  to  assault  Cemetery 
Ridge  on  the  3d,  as  we  had  already  tested  the  strength  of  that  position 
sufficiently  to  admonish  us  that  we  could  not  dislodge  him.  While  the 
co-operation  of  Generals  Ewell  and  Hill,  on  the  2d,  by  vigorous  assault 
at  the  moment  my  battle  was  in  progress,  would,  in  all  probability, 
have  dislodged  the  Federals  from  their  position,  it  does  not  seem 
that  such  success  would  have  yielded  the  fruits  anticipated  at  the 
inception  of  the  campaign.  The  battle,  as  it  was  fought,  would,  in 
any  result,  have  so  crippled  us  that  the  Federals  would  have  been 
able  to  make  good  their  retreat,  and  we  should  soon  have  been 
obliged  to  retire  to  Virginia  with  nothing  but  victory  to  cover  our 
waning  cause. 

The  morals  of  the  victory  might  have  dispirited  the  North,  and 
aroused  the  South  to  new  exertions,  but  it  would  have  been  nothing 
in  the  game  being  played  by  the  two  armies  at  Gettysburg.  As  to 
the  abandonment  of  the  tactical  defensive  policy  that  we  had  agreed 
upon,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  General  Lee  deeply  deplored  it  as 
a  mistake.  His  remark,  made  just  after  the  battle,  "  It  is  all  my 
fault,"  meant  just  what  it  said.  It  adds  to  the  nobility  and  magna 
nimity  of  that  remark,  when  we  reflect  that  it  was  the  utterance  of 
a  deep-felt  truth,  rather  than  a  mere  sentiment.  In  a  letter  written 
to  me  by  General  Lee,  in  January,  1864,  he  says:  "Had  I  taken 
your  advice  at  Gettysburg,  instead  of  pursuing  the  course  I  did,  how 
different  all  might  have  been."  Captain  T.  J.  Gone,  of  Houston, 
Texas,  a  gentleman  of  high  position  and  undoubted  integrity,  writes 
to  me  upon  this  same  point  as  follows  :  "Another  important  circum 
stance  which  I  distinctly  remember  was  in  the  winter  of  1864,  when 
you  sent  me  from  East  Tennessee  to  Orange  Court-House  with  dis 
patches  for  General  Lee.  Upon  my  arrival  there,  General  Lee 
asked  me  in  his  tent,  where  he  was  alone  with  two  or  three  Northern 
papers  on  his  table.  lie  remarked  that  he  had  just  been  reading  the 
Northern  official  report  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg ;  that  he  had 
become  satisfied,  from  reading  those  reports  that,  if  he  had  permitted 
you  to  carry  out  your  plans  on  the  third  day,  instead  of  making  the 
attack  on  Cemetery  Hill,  we  would  have  been  successful."  I  can 
not  see,  as  has  been  claimed,  why  the  absence  of  General  Lee's 
cavalry  should  have  justified  his  attack  on  the. enemy.  On  the  con 
trary,  while  they  may  have  perplexed  him,  I  hold  that  it  was  addi 
tional  reason  for  his  not  hazarding  an  attack.  At  the  time  the  attack 


LEE  IX  PENNSYLVANIA.  435 

was  ordered,  we  were  fearful  that  our  cavalry  had  been  destroyed. 
In  case  of  a  disaster,  and  a  forced  retreat,  we  should  have  had  nothing 
to  cover  our  retreat.  When  so  much  was  at  stake  as  at  Gettysburg, 
the  absence  of  the  cavalry  should  have  prevented  the  taking  of  any 
chances. 

As  to  the  failure  of  Stuart  to  move  with  the  army  to  the  west 
side  of  the  Blue  Bidge,  I  can  only  call  attention  to  the  fact  that 
General  Lee  gave  him  discretionary  orders.  lie  doubtless  did  as  he 
thought  best.  Hud  no  discretion  been  given  him,  he  would  have 
known  and  fallen  into  his  natural  position — my  right  flank.  But 
authority  thus  given  a  subordinate  general,  implies  an  opinion  on 
the  part  of  the  commander  that  something  better  than  the  drudgery 
of  a  march  along  our  flank  might  be  open  to  him,  and  one  of  General 
Stuart's  activity  and  gallantry  should  not  be  expected  to  fail  to  seek 
it.  As  to  E  well's  failure  to  prosecute  the  advantage  won  on  the  1st, 
there  is  little  to  be  said,  as  the  commanding  general  was  on  the  field. 
I  merely  (juote  from  his  (General  E well's)  official  report,  lie  says: 
"The  enemy  had  fallen  back  to  a  commanding  position  that  Avas 
known  to  us  as  Cemetery  Hill,  south  of  Gettysburg,  and  quickly 
showed  a  formidable  front  there.  On  entering  the  town,  I  received 
a  message  from  the  commanding  general  to  attack  the  hill,  if  I  could 
do  so  to  advantage.  I  could  not  bring  artillery  to  bear  on  it ;  all  the 
troops  with  me  were  jaded  by  twelve  hours'  marching  and  fighting, 
and  1  was  notified  that  General  Johnson  was  close  to  the  town  with 
his  division,  the  only  one  of  my  corps  that  had  not  been  engaged, 
Anderson's  Division,  of  the  Third  Corps,  having  been  halted  to  let 
them  pass.  Cemetery  Hill  was  not  assailable  from  the  town,  and  I 
determined,  with  Johnson's  Division,  to  take  possession  of  a  wooded 
hill  to  my  left,  on  a  line  with  and  commanding  Cemetery  Hill. 
Before  Johnson  got  up  the  Federals  were  reported  moving  to  our 
left  flank — our  extreme  left— and  I  could  see  what  seemed  to  be  his 
skirmishers  in  that  direction.  Before  this  report  could  be  investiga 
ted  by  Lieutenant  T.  T.  Turner,  of  my  staff,  and  Lieutenant  Robert 
Early,  sent  to  investigate  it,  and  Johnson  placed  in  position,  the 
night  was  far  advanced."  General  Lee  explains,  his  failure  to  send 
positive  orders  to  Ewell  to  follow  up  the  flying  enemy  as  follows: 
"The  attack  was  not  pressed  that  afternoon,  the  enemy's  force  being 
unknown,  and  it  being  considered  advisable  to  await  the  arrival  of 
the  rest  of  our  troops.  Orders  were  sent  back  to  hasten  their  march, 
and,  in  the  meantime,  every  effort  was  made  to  ascertain  the  numbers 
and  positions  of  the  enemy,  and  iind  the  most  favorable  point  to 
attack." 


436  ANNALS  OF-THE  WAS. 

Pursuit  "pell-mell"  is  sometimes  justified  in  a  mere  retreat. 
It  is  the  accepted  principle  of  action  in  a  rout.  General  Early,  in 
liis  report  of  this  day's  work,  says  "  the  enemy  had  been  routed." 
lie  should,  therefore,  have  been  followed  by  everything  that  could 
have  been  thrown  upon  his  heels,  not  so  much  to  gain  the  heights, 
which  were  recognized  as  the  rallying  point,  but  to  prevent  his  rally 
ing  at  all  in  time  to  form  lines  for  another  battle.  If  the  enemy 
had  been  routed,  this  could  and  should  have  been  done.  In  the 
"Military  Annals  of  Louisiana"  (Napier  Bartlett,  Esq.),  in  the 
account  of  this  rout,  he  says :  u  Hays  had  received  orders,  through 
Early,  from  General  Ewell  (though  Lee's  general  instructions  were  sub 
sequently  the  reverse)  to  halt  at  Gettysburg,  and  advance  no  further 
in  case  he  should  succeed  in  capturing  that  place.  But  Hays  now 
saw  that  the  enemy  were  coming  around  by  what  is  known  as  the 
Baltimore  road,  and  were  making  for  the  heights — the  Cemetery 
Ridge.  This  ridge  meant  life  or  death,  and  for  the  possession  of  it 
the  battles  of  the  2d  and  3d  were  fought.  *  *  *  Owing  to  the 
long  detour  the  enemy  was  compelled  to  make,  it  was  obvious  that 
he  could  not  get  his  artillery  in  position  on  the  heights  for  one  or 
two  hours.  The  immediate  occupation  of  the  heights  by  the  Con 
federates,  who  were  in  position  to  get  them  at  the  time  referred  to, 
was  a  matter  of  vital  importance.  Hays  recognized  it  as  such,  and 
presently  sent  for  Early.  The  latter  thought  as  Hays,  but  declined 
to  disobey  orders.  At  the  urgent  request  of  General  Hays,  how 
ever,  he  sent  for  General  Ewell.  When  the  latter  arrived,  many 
precious  moments  had  been  lost.  But  the  enemy,  who  did  not  see 
its  value  until  the  arrival  of  Hancock,  had  not  yet  appeared  in  force." 
General  Hays  told  me,  ten  years  after  the  battle,  that  he  "  could  have 
seized  the  heights  without  the  loss  of  ten  men."  Here  we  see  Gen 
eral  Early  adhering  to  orders  when  his  own  conviction  told  him  he 
shoiild  not  do  so,  and  refusing  to  allow  General  Hays  to  seize  a 
point  recognized  by  him  as  of  vast  importance,  because  of  technical 
authority,  at  a  moment  when  he  admitted  and  knew  that  disregard 
of  the  order  would  only  have  made  more  secure  the  point  at  issue 
when  the  order  was  given. 

Before  closing  this  article,  I  desire  to  settle  finally  and  fully  one 
point,  concerning  which  there  has  been  much  discussion,  viz. :  The 
alleged  delay  in  the  attack  upon  the  2d.  I  am  moved  to  this  task, 
not  so  much  by  an  ambition  to  dissolve  the  cloud  of  personal  mis 
representation  that  has  settled  about  my  head,  as  by  a  sense  of  duty 
which  leads  me  to  determine  a  point  that  will  be  of  value  to  the 
historian.  It  was  asserted  by  General  Pendleton,  with  whom  the 


LEE  IX  PENNSYLVANIA.  437 

carefulness  of  statement  or  deliberateness  of  judgment  lias  never 
been  a  characteristic,  but  who  has  been  distinguished  for  the  unre 
liability  of  his  memory,  that  General  Lee  ordered  me  to  attack  the 
enemy  at  sunrise  on  the  2d.  General  J.  A.  Early  has,  in  positive 
terms,  indorsed  this  charge,  which  I  now  proceed  to  disprove.  I 
have  said  that  I  left  General  Lee  late  in  the  night  of  the  1st,  and 
that  he  had  not  then  determined  when  the  attack  should  be  made; 
that  I  went  to  his  headquarters  early  the  next  morning,  and  was  with 
him  for  some  time;  that  lie  left  me  early  after  sunrise  and  went  to 
Ewell's  headquarters,  with  the  express  view  of  seeing  whether  or 
not  the  main  attack  should  be  made  then,  and  that  he  returned 
about  nine  o'clock;  and  that  after  discussing  the  ground  for  some 
time,  he  determined  that  I  should  make  the  main  attack,  and  at 
eleven  o'clock  gave  me  the  order  to  prepare  for  it.  1  now  present 
documents  that  sustain  these  assertions. 

The  first  letter  that  1  offer  is  from  Colonel  \Y.  II.  Taylor,  of 
General  Lee's  staff.  It  is  as  follows: 

NORFOLK,  VA..  April  2Sth,  1875. 

T>ear  d'oicrftl — -T  have  received  your  letter  of  the  20th  instant.  T  have  not 
read  the  article  of  Avhich  you  speak,  nor  have  I  e\rr  seen  uny  copy  of  (General 
Pendleton's  address:  indeed,  I  have  read  little  or  nothing  of  "what  lias  been  written 
since  the  Avar.  In  the  first  place,  because  I  conld  not  span-  the  time,  and  in  the. 
second,  of  those  of  Avhose  "writings  I  luiA'e  heard,  J  deem  but  very  few  entitled  to  any 
attention  Avhatever.  I  can  only  say,  that  1  never  before  heard  of  the  "sunrise, 
attack"  yon  were  to  have  made,  as  charged  by  (General  LYndleton.  If  such  an 
order  Avas  given  you  I  never  knew  of  it.  or  it  has  strangely  escaped  my  memory.  I 
think  it  more  than  probable  that  if  General  Lee  had  had  your  troops  available  the 
evening  previous  to  the  day  of  which  yon  speak,  he  Avon  Id  have  ordered  an  early 
attack:  but  this  does  not  touch  the  point  at  issue.  I  regard  it  as  a  great  mistake 
on  the  part  of  those  Avho.  perhaps  because  of  political  differences.  n<»\v  undertake  to 
criticise  and  attack  your  war  record.  Such  conduct  is  most  un^eii-Tons,  ;nid  I  am 
sure  meets  the  disapprobation  of  all  good  Confederates  with  Avhom  T  have  had  the 
pleasure  of  associating  in  the  daily  walks  of  life.  Yours,  Ax-ry  respectfully, 

W.  H.  TAYLOR. 
To  GEXEKAL,  LOXGSTREET. 

The  next  letter  is  from  Colonel  Charles  Marshall,  of  General 
Lee's  staff,  who  has  charge  of  all  the  papers  left  by  General  Lee.  It 
is  as  follows : 

BALTIMORE,  Mn.,  May  7th,  1875. 

Drftr  Grncral— Your  letter  of  the  20th  ultimo  A\  as  ivct -ived,  and  should  have 
had  an  earlier  re-ply,  but  for  my  engagements  preventing  r.ie  from  looking  at  my 
papers  to  find  Avhat  I  could  on.  the  subject.  I  have  no  peivo-ml  r'->  ollcction  of  the 
order  to  Avhieh  you  refer.  It  certainly  Avas  not  conveyed  by  me,  nor  is  there  any 
thing  in  General  Lee's  official  report  to  show  the  attack  on  the  2d  was  expected  by 
him  to  begin  earlier,  except  that  he  notices  that  there  Avas  not  proper  concert  of 
action  on  that  day.  '  Respectfully, 

CHARLES  MARSHALL. 
To  GEXEEAL  LOXGSTREET,  New  Orleans. 


438  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Then  a  letter  from  General  A.  S.  Long,  who  was  General  Lee's 
Military  Secretary : 

BIG  ISLAND,  BEDFORD,  VA.,  May  31st,  1875. 

Dear  General — Your  letter  of  the  20th  ultimo,  referring  to  an  assertion  of 
General  Pendleton's,  made  in  a  lecture  delivered  several  years  ago,  which  was 
recently  published  in  the  Southern  Historical  Society  Magazine  substantially  as 
follows :  "  That  General  Lee  ordered  General  Longstreet  to  attack  General  Meade 
at  sunrise  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  July,"  has  been  received.  I  do  not  recollect 
of  hearing  of  an  order  to  attack  at  sunrise,  or  at  any  other  designated  hour,  pending 
the  operations  at  Gettysburg  during  the  first  three  days  of  July,  1863.  *  *  * 

Yours,  truly,  A.  S.  LONG. 

To  GENERAL  LONGSTREET. 

I  add  the  letter  of  Colonel  Tenable,  of  General  Lee's  staff, 
which  should  of  itself  be  conclusive.  I  merely  premise  it  with  the 
statement  that  it  was  fully  nine  o'clock  before  General  Lee  returned 
from  his  reconnoissance  of  E well's'  lines  : 

UNIVERSITY  OF  VIRGINIA,  May  llth,  1875. 
GENERAL  JAMES  LOXGSTREET: 

Dear  General — Your  letter  of  the  25th  ultimo,  with  regard  to  General  Lee's 
battle  order  on  the  1st  and  2d  of  July  at  Gettysburg,  was  duly  received.  I  did  not 
know  of  any  order  for  an  attack  on  the  enemy  at  sunrise  on  the  2d,  nor  can  I  believe 
any  such  order  was  issued  by  General  Lee.  About  sunrise  on  the  2d  of  July  I  was 
sent  by  General  Lee  to  General  Ewell  to  ask  him  what  he  thought  of  the  advantages 
of  an  attack  on  the  enemy  from  his  position.  (Colonel  Marshall  had  been  sent  with 
a  similar  order  on  the  night  of  the  1st.)  General  Ewell  made  me  ride  with  him 
from  point  to  point  of  his  lines,  so  as  to  see  with  him  the  exact  position  of  things. 
Before  he  got  through  the  examination  of  the  enemy's  position,  General  Lee  came 
himself  to  General  Ewell's  lines.  In  sending  the  message  to  General  Ewell,  General 
Lee  was  explicit  in  saying  that  the  question  was  whether  he  should  move  all  the 
troops  around  on  the  right,  and  attack  on  that  side.  I  do  not  think  that  the  errand 
on  which  I  was  sent  by  the  commanding  general  is  consistent  with  the  idea  of  an 
attack  at  sunrise  by  any  portion  of  the  army.  Yours,  very  truly, 

CHAS.  S.  VENABLE. 

I  add  upon  this  point  the  letter  of  Dr.  Cullen,  Medical  Director 
of  the  First  Corps : 

EICHMOND,  VA.,  May  18th,  1875. 
GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET: 

Dear  General — Yours  of  the  16th  ult.  should  .have  received  my  immediate 
attention,  but  before  answering  it,  I  was  desirous  of  refreshing  my  memory  of  the 
scenes  and  incidents  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign  by  conversation  with  others  who 
were  with  us,  and  who  served  in  different  corps  of  the  command.  It  was  an  astound 
ing  announcement  to  the  survivors  of  the  First  Army  Corps  that  the  disaster  and 
failure  at  Gettysburg  was  alone  and  solely  due  to  its  commander,  and  that  had  he 
obeyed  the  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief  that  Meade's  army  would  have  been 
beaten  before  its  entire  force  had  assembled,  and  its  final  discomfiture  thereby  made 
certain.  It  is  a  little  strange  that  these  charges  were  not  made  while  General  Lee 
was  alive  to  substantiate  or  disprove  them,  and  that  seven  years  or  more  were  per 
mitted  to  pass  by  in  silence  regarding  them.  You  are  fortunate  in  ^eing  able  to 


LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  439 

call  upon  the  Adjutant  General  and  the  two  confidential  officers  of  General  Lee's 
staff  for  their  testimony  in  the  case,  and  I  do  not  think  that  you  will  have  any 
reason  to  fear  their  evidence.  They  knew  every  order  that  was  issued  for  that 
battle,  when  and  where  attacks  were  to  be  made,  who  were  slow  in  attacking,  and 
who  did  not  make  attacks  that  were  expected  to  be  made.  I  hope,  for  the  sake  of 
history  and  for  your  brave  military  record,  that  a  quietus  will  at  once  be  put  on 
this  subject.  I  distinctly  remember  the  appearance  in  our  headquarter  camp  of  the 
scout  who  brought  from  Frederick  the  first  account  that  General  Lee  had  of  the 
definite  whereabouts  of  the  enemy ;  of  the  excitement  at  General  Lee's  headquarters 
among  couriers,  quartermasters,  commissaries,  etc.,  all  betokening  some  early  move 
ment  of  the  commands  dependent  upon  the  news  brought  by  the  scout.  That  after 
noon  General  Lee  was  walking  with  some  of  us  in  the  road  in  front  of  his  headquarters, 
and  said :  "  To-morrow,  gentlemen,  we  will  not  move  to  Harrisburg  as  we  expected, 
but  will  go  over  to  Gettysburg  and  see  what  General  Meade  is  after."  Orders  had 
then  been  issued  to  the  corps  to  move  at  sunrise  on  the  morning  of  the  next  day, 
and  promptly  at  that  time  the  corps  was  put  on  the  road.  The  troops  moved  slowly 
a  short  distance,  when  they  were  stopped  by  E  well's  wagon  trains  and  Johnson's 
Division  turning  into  the  road  in  front  of  them,  making  their  way  from  some  point 
north  to  Cash  town,  or  Gettysburg.  How  many  hours  we  we're  detained  I  am  unable 
to  say,  but  it  must  have  been  many,  for  I  remember  eating  a  lunch  or  dinner  bo  lore 
moving  again.  Being  anxious  to  see  you  I  rode  rapidly  by  the  troops  ( who,  as  soon 
as  they  could  got  into  the  road,  pushed  hurriedly  by  us,  also),  and  overtook  you 
about  dark  at  the  hill  this  side  of  Gettysburg,  about  half  a  mile  from  the  town. 
You  had  boon  at  the  front  with  General  Leo,  and  were  returning  to  your  camp,  a 
mile  or  two  back.  I  spoke  very  exultingly  of  the  victory  wo  wore  thought  to  have 
obtained  that  day,  but  was  surprised  to  find  that  you  did  not  take  the  same  cheerful 
view  of  it  that  I  did  ;  and  presently  you  remarked,  that  it  would  have  been  better 
had  we  not  fought  than  to  have  left  undone  what  we  did.  You  said  that  the  enemy 
were  left  occupying  a  position  that  it  would  take  the  whole  army  to  drive  them 
from,  and  then  at  a  great  sacrifice.  We  soon  reached  the  cam}),  throe  miles,  perhaps, 
from  Gettysburg,  and  found  the  column  near  by.  Orders  were  issued  to  bo  ready 
to  inarch  at  "daybreak,"  or  some  earlier  hour,  next  morning.  About  throe  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  while  the  stars  wore  shining,  you  left  your  headquarters  and  rode 
to  General  Lee's,  where  I  found  you  sitting  with  him  <ifi<  r  ximr/xc  looking  at  the 
enemy  on  Cemetery  Hill.  I  rode  then  into  Gettysburg,  and  was  gone  some  two 
hours,  and  when  I  returned  found  you  still  witli  General  Lee.  At  two  or  three 
o'clock  in  the  day  I  rode  with  you  toward  the  right,  when  you  wore  about  to  attack, 
and  was  with  you  in  front  of  the  poach  orchard  when  Hood  began  to  move  toward 
Round  Top.  General  Hood  was  soon  wounded,  and  I  removed  him  from  the  field 
to  a  house  near  by.  I  am  yours,  very  truly, 

J.  S.  D.  CULLEX. 

1  submit  next  an  extract  from  the  official  report  of  General  It. 
II.  Anderson  : 

Upon  approaching  Gettysburg,  I  was  directed  to  occupy  the  position  in  line  of 
battle  which  had  first  been  vacated  by  Tender's  Division,  and  to  place  one  brigade 
and  battery  of  artillery  a  mile  or  more  on  the  right.  "Wilcox's  Brigade  and  Captain 
Boss'  battery,  of  Lane's  battalion,  were  posted  in  the  detached  position,  while  the 
other  brigades  occupied  the  ground  from  which  Fender's  Division  had  first  been 
moved.  "We  continued  in  position  until  the  morning  of  the  2d,  when  I  received 
orders  to  take  up  a  new  line  of  battle,  on  the  right  of  Fender's  Division,  about  a 


440  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAS. 

mile  and  a  half  further  forward.  In  taking  the  new  position,  the  Tenth  Alabama 
Regiment,  Wilcox's  Brigade,  had  a  sharp  skirmish  with  the  body  of  the  enemy  who 
had  occupied  a  wooded  hill  on  the  extreme  right  of  my  line.  *  *  *  Shortly 
after  the  line  had  been  formed,  I  received  notice  that  Lieutenant  General  Long- 
street  would  occupy  the  ground  on  my  right,  and  that  his  line  would  be  in  a 
direction  nearly  at  right  angles  with  mine,  and  that  he  would  assault  the  extreme 
left  of  the  enemy  and  drive  him  toward  Gettysburg. 

From  a  narrative  of  General  McLaws,  published  in  1873, 1  copy 
the  following : 

On  the  30th  of  June,  I  had  been  directed  to  have  my  division  in  readiness  to 
follow  General  Swell's  Corps.  Marching  toward  Gettysburg,  which  it  was  intimated 
we  would  have  passed  by  ten  o'clock  the  next  day  (the  1st  of  July),  my  division 
was  accordingly  marched  from  its  camp  and  lined  along  the  road  in  the  order  of 
march  by  eight  o'clock  the  1st  of  July.  When  the  troops  of  Ewell's  Corps  (it  was 
Johnson's  Division  in  charge  of  Ewell's  wagon  trains,  which  were  coming  from 
Carlisle  by  the  road  west  of  the  mountains)  had  passed  the  head  of  my  column,  I 
asked  General  Longstreet's  staff  officer,  Major  Fairfax,  if  my  division  should  follow. 
He  went  off  to  inquire,  and  returned  with  orders  for  me  to  wait  until  Ewell's  wagon 
train  had  passed,  which  did  not  happen  until  after  four  o'clock  P.  M.  The  train  was 
calculated  to  be  fourteen  miles  long,  when  I  took  up  the  line  of  march  and  continued 
marching  until  I  arrived  within  three  miles  of  Gettysburg,  where  my  command 
camped  along  a  creek.  This  was  far  into  the  night.  My  division  was  leading  Long- 
street's  Corps,  and,  of  course,  the  other  divisions  come  up  later.  I  saw  Hood's  Divi 
sion  the  next  morning,  and  understood  that  Pickett  had  been  detached  to  guard  the 
rear.  While  on  the  march,  about  ten  o'clock  at  night,  I  met  General  Longstreet 
and  some  of  his  staff  coming  from  the  direction  of  Gettysburg,  and  had  a  few 
moments  conversation  with  him.  He  said  nothing  of  having  received  an  order  to 
attack  at  daylight  the  next  morning.  Here,  I  will  state,  that  until  General  Pendle- 
ton  mentioned  it  about  two  years  ago,  when  he  was  on  a  lecturing  tour,  after  the 
death  of  General  Lee,  I  never  heard  it  intimated  even  that  any  such  order  had  ever 
been  given. 

I  close  the  testimony  on  this  point  by  an  extract  from  a  letter 
from  General  Hood.  He  writes : 

I  arrived  with  my  staff  in  front  of  the  heights  of  Gettysburg  shortly  after  day- 
break,  as  I  have  already  stated,  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  July.  My  division 
soon  commenced  filing  into  an  open  field  near  me,  when  the  troops  were  allowed 
to  stack  arms  and  rest  until  further  orders.  A  short  distance  in  advance  of  this 
point,  and  during  the  early  part  of  the  same  morning,  we  were  both  engaged  in 
company  with  Generals  A.  P.  Hill  and  Lee  in  observing  the  position  of  the 
Federals.  General  Lee,  with  coat  buttoned  to  the  throat,  sabre  belt  around  his 
waist,  and  field-glasses  pendant  at  his  side,  walked  up  and  down  in  the  shade  of 
large  trees  near  us,  halting,  now  and  then,  to  observe  the  enemy.  He  seemed  full 
of  hope,  yet  at  times  buried  in  deep  thought.  Colonel  Freeman  tie,  of  England,  was 
esconced  in  the  forks  of  a  tree  not  far  off,  with  glasses  in  constant  use,  examining 
the  lofty  position  of  the  Federal  army.  General  Lee  was  seemingly  anxious  that 
you  should  attack  that  morning.  He  remarked  to  me :  "  The  enemy  is  here,  and 
if  we  do  not  whip  him,  he  will  whip  us."  You  thought  it  better  to  await  the 
arrival  of  Pickett's  Division,  at  that  time  still  in  the  rear,  in  order  to  make  the 
attack,  and  you  said  to  me,  subsequently,  while  we  were  seated  together  near  the 


LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA. 

trunk  of  a  tree :  "  General  Lee  is  a  little  nervous  this  morning.  He  wishes  me  to 
attack.  I  do  not  wish  to  do  so  without  Pickett.  1  never  like  to  go  into  a  battle 
with  one  boot  oilV 

Having  thus  disproved  the  assertions  of  Messrs.  Pendleton  and 
Early  in  regard  to  this  rumored  order  for  a  sunrise  attack,  it  appears 
that  they  are  worthy  of  no  further  recognition  ;  but  it  is  difficult  to 
pass  beyond  them  without  noting  the  manner  in  which,  by  their 
ignorance,  they  marred  the  plans  of  their  chief  on  the  Held  of  battle. 
Mr.  Pendleton  robbed  Pickett's  Division  of  its  most  important 
adjunct,  fresh  field  artillery,  at  the  moment  of  its  severest  trial,  and 
thus  frustrated  the  wise  and  brilliant  programme  of  assault  planned 
by  General  Alexander,  and  without  the  knowlekge  of  that  officer. 
(See  narrative  of  General  Alexander  in  the  Southern  Historical 
JloiitJJ;/  for  September,  1877.)  General  Early  broke  up  General 
Lee's  line  of  battle  on  the  :M  of  July  by  detaching  part  of  his 
division  on  some  uncalled-for  service,  in  violation  of  General  Lee's 
orders,  and  thus  prevented  the  co-operative  attack  of  Ewell,  ordered 
by  General  Lee. 

It  is  proper  to  discuss  briefly,  at  this  point,  the  movements  of 
the  third  day.  The  charge  of  that  day,  as  made  by  General  Pickett, 
was  emphatically  a  forlorn  hope.  The  point  designated  by  General 
Lee  as  the  point  of  attack,  seemed  to  be  about  one  mile  from  where 
he  and  I  stood  when  lie  <rave  his  orders.  I  asked  him  if  the  distance 

O 

that  we  had  to  overcome  under  a  terrific  fire  was  not  more  than  a 
mile.  lie  replied:  '*.Xo,  it  is  not  more  than  fourteen  hundred 
yards.''  So  that  our  troops,  when  they  arose  above  the  crest,  had  to 
advance  this  distance  under  the  fire  of  about  half  of  the  Federal 
army  before  they  could  fire  a  shot.  Anything  less  than  thirty 
thousand  fresh  veterans  would  have  been  vainly  sacrificed  in  this 
attempt.  The  force  given  me  for  this  work  was  Pickett's  Division 
(or  rather  a  part  of  it),  about  five  thousand  five  hundred  men,  fresh 
and  ready  to  undertake  anything.  My  supporting  force  of  probably 
eight  thousand  men,  had  bloody  noses  and  bruised  heads  from  the 
fight  of  the  previous  day,  and  were  not  in  physical  condition  to 
undertake  such  desperate  work.  When  fresh  they  were  the  equals 
of  any  troops  on  earth  ;  but  every  soldier  knows  that  there  is  a  great 
difference  be^veen  fresh  soldiers  and  those  who  have  just  come  otit 
of  a  heavy  battle.  It  has  been  charged  that  the  delay  of  the  attack 
on  the  3d  was  the  cause  of  the  failure  of  Ewell  to  co-operate  with 
Pickett's  attack.  Colonel  Taylor  says  that  Ewell  was  ordered  to 
attack  at  the  same  time  with  me,  mine  being  the  main  attack.  lie 
says :  *'  General  Long-street's  dispositions  were  not  completed  as 


442  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

soon  as  was  expected.  General  Ewell,  who  had  orders  to 

co-operate  with  General  Longstreet,  and  who  was,  of  course,  not 
aware  of  any  impediment  to  the  main  attack,  having  reinforced 
General  Johnson,  during  the  night  of  the  2d,  ordered  him  forward 
early  the  next  morning.  In  obedience  to  these  instructions,  General 
Johnson  became  hotly  engaged  before  General  Ewell  could  be 
informed  of  the  halt  that  had  been  called  upon  our  right." 

Let  us  look  at  the  facts  of  this.  Instead  of  "  making  this  attack 
at  daylight,"  General  Ewell  says :  "  Just  before  the  time  fixed  for 
General  Johnson's  advance,  the  enemy  attacked  him  to  regain  the 
works  captured  by  Stuart  the  evening  before."  General  Meade,  in 
his  official  report,  says :  "  On  the  morning  of  the  3d,  General  Geary, 
having  returned  during  the  night,  attacked,  at  early  dawn,  the  enemy, 
and  succeeded  in  driving  him  back,  and  reoccupying  his  former 
position.  A  spirited  contest  was  maintained  along  this  portion  of 
the  line  all  the  morning,  and  General  Geary,  reinforced  by  Wharton's 
Brigade,  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  maintained  his  position,  and  inflicted 
very  severe  loss  on  the  enemy."  Now  to  return  to  my  end  of  the  line. 
At  about  sunrise  General  Lee  came  to  me  and  informed  me  that 
General  Pickett  would  soon  report  to  me,  and  then  ordered  that  his 
troops  were  to  be  used  as  a  column  of  assault,  designating  the  point 
of  assault,  and  that  portions  of  the  Third  Corps  were  to  be  used  in 
support.  About  seven  o'clock  General  Pickett  rode  forward  and 
stated  that  his  troops  would  soon  be  upon  the  field,  and  asked  to  be 
assigned  his  position.  Colonel  W.  "W.  "Wood,  of  Pickett's  Division, 
in  his  account  of  the  day,  says :  "  If  I  remember  correctly,  Pickett's 
Division  and  the  artillery  were  all  in  position  by  eleven  A.  M." 
Hence,  we  see  that  General  Geary  attacked  General  Ewell  at  least 
one  hour  before  I  had  received  my  orders  for  the  day ;  that  at  the 
very  moment  of  my  receiving  these  instructions  General  Ewell  was 
engaged  in  a  "  spirited  contest ; "  that  this  contest  had  continued 
several  hours  before  General  Pickett's  troops  came  upon  the  field, 
and  that  the  contest  was  virtually  over  before  General  Pickett  and 
the  artillery  were  prepared  for  the  battle.  When  these  arrangements 
were  completed,  and  the  batteries  ordered  to  open,  General  Ewell 
had  been  driven  from  his  position,  and  not  a  footstep  was  made  from 
any  other  part  of  the  army  in  my  support.  That  there  may  have 
been  confusion  of  orders  on  the  field  during  the  second  and  third 
days,  I  am  not  prepared  to  deny ;  but  there  was  nothing  of  the  kind 
about  the  headquarters  of  the  First  Corps. 

I  have  not  seen  the  criticism  of  the  Comte  de  Paris  upon  the 
campaign,  but  I  gather  from  quotations  that  he  adduced  as  one  of 


LEE  IN  PENNSYL  rANIA.  443 

tlic  objections  to  the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  that  the  Federals 
would  do  superior  righting  upon  their  own  soil.  The  Confederates, 
whom  I  have  read  after,  deny  that  this  is  true.  Although  not 
technically  correct,  the  Gointe  is  right  in  the  material  point.  The 
actual  righting  on  the  rield  of  Gettysburg,  by  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  was  not  marked  by  any  unusual  gallantry,  but  the  positions  that 
it  occupied  were  held  with  much  more  than  the  usual  tenacity  of 
purpose. 

There  is  little  to  say  of  the  retreat  of  General  Lee's  army  to  the 
Potomac.  "When  we  reached  South  Mountain,  on  our  retreat,  we 
learned  that  the  Federal  cavalry  was  in  strong  force,  threatening  the 
destruction  of  our  trains  then  collecting  at  Williamsport,  and  that  it 
was  also  intercepting  our  trains  on  the  road,  and  burning  some  of  our 
wagons.  Upon  the  receipt  of  this  intelligence  General  Lee  ordered 
me  to  inarch  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the  relief  of  our  trains.  By  a 
forced  march  we  succeeded  in  clearing  the  road,  and  reached 
Williamsport  in  time  to  save  our  supply  trains.  We  then  took 
position  covering  the  crossing  there  and  at  Falling  Water,  a  short 
distance  below.  As  the  other  corps  arrived  they  were  assigned 
positions,  and  we  went  to  work  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  strengthen 
our  line  with  rield  works.  On  the  18th,  General  Lee  informed  me 
that  the  river  had  fallen  sufficiently  at  Williamsport  to  allow  us  to 
ford,  and  that  the  bridge  at  Falling  "Water  had  been  repaired,  and 
that  he  would,  that  night,  recross  the  river  with  his  entire  army.  I 
suggested,  as  a  matter  of  convenience,  and  to  avoid  confusion,  that 
it  might  be  better  to  pass  the  trains  over  that  night,  with  everything 
not  essential  to  battle,  and  let  his  troops  remain  in  position  until  the 
night  of  the  14th  ;  that,  if  the  rest  of  his  line  was  as  strong  as  mine, 
we  could  easily  repulse  any  attack  that  might  be  made,  and  thus 
recover  some  of  the  prestige  lost  by  the  discomfiture  at  Gettysburg. 
After  we  crossed  the  Potomac  we  soon  found  that  the  Federals  were 
pushing  along  the  west  side  of  the  P>lue  Ridge,  with  the  purpose  of 
cutting  off  our  retreat  to  Richmond.  General  Lee  again  sent  my 
corps  forward  to  prevent  this  effort  on  the  part  of  General  Meade, 
and  \ve  succeeded  in  clearing  the  way  and  holding  it  open  for  the 
Third  Corps,  that  followed  us.  General  Fwell,  however,  was  cut  off, 
and  was  obliged  to  pass  the  mountains  further  south.  The  First 
Corps  reached  Culpepper  Court-House  on  the  24th. 

In  the  month  of  August,  1803,  while  lying  along  the  Rapiclan, 
I  called  General  Lee's  attention  to  the  condition  of  our  affairs  in  the 
West,  and  the  progress  that  was  being  made  by  the  army  under 
General  Rosecrans  in  cutting  a  new  line  through  the  State  of  Geor- 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

gia,  and  suggesting  that  a  successful  march,  such  as  he  had  started  on, 
would  again  bisect  the  Southern  country,  and  that  when  that  was 
done  the  war  would  he  virtually  over.  I  suggested  that  he  should 
adhere  to  his  defensive  tactics  upon  the  Eapidan,  and  reinforce  from 
his  army  the  army  lying  in  front  of  Ilosecrans — so  that  it  could  crush 
that  army,  and  then  push  on  to  the  West,  lie  seemed  struck  with 
these  views,  but  was  as  much  opposed  to  dividing  his  army  as  he 
was  in  the  spring  when  I  first  suggested  it.  He  wrent  down  to  liich- 
mond  to  arrange  for  another  offensive  campaign  during  the  fall. 
While  there  several  letters  passed  between  us,  only  two  of  which  I 
have  preserved  in  connected  form.  The  result  of  this  correspon 
dence  was,  however,  that  I  was  sent  with  two  divisions — Hood's  and 
McLaws' — to  reinforce  our  army  then  in  Georgia.  The  result  of 
this  movement  w^as  the  defeat  of  Rosecrans,  at  Chickamauga,  when 
the  last  hope  of  the  Confederacy  expired  with  the  failure  of  our 
army  to  prosecute  the  advantage  gained  by  this  defeat.  The  letters 
are  appended  herewith : 

(Confidential.)  [Copy.] 

RICHMOND,  August  31st,  1863. 
LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  J.  LONGSTREET, 

Headquarters  Army  of  West  Virginia: 

General — I  have  wished  for  several  days  past  to  return  to  the  army,  but  have 
been  detained  by  the  President.  He  will  not  listen  to  my  proposition  to  leave  to 
morrow. 

I  hope  you  will  use  every  exertion  to  prepare  the  army  for  offensive  operations, 
and  improve  the  condition  of  men  and  animals.  I  can  see  nothing  better  to  be 
done  than  to  endeavor  to  bring  General  Meade  out  and  use  our  efforts  to  crush  his 
army  while  in  the  present  condition. 

The  Quartermaster's  Department  promise  to  send  up  three  thousand  bushels  of 

corn  per  day,  provided  the  cars  can  be  unloaded  and  returned  without  delay.     I 

hope  you  will  be  able  to  arrange  it  so  that  the  cars  Avill  not  be  detained.     "With  this 

supply  of  corn,  if  it  can  be  maintained,  the  condition  of  our  animals  should  improve. 

Yery  respectfully  and  truly  yours, 

[Signed]  R.  E.  LEE, 

General. 

[Copy.] 

HEADQUARTERS,  September  2d,  1863. 

General — Your  letter  of  the  31st  is  received.  I  have  expressed  to  Generals 
Ewell  and  Hill  your  wishes,  and  am  doing  all  that  can  be  done  to  be  well  prepared 
with  my  own  command.  Our  greatest  difficulty  will  be  in  preparing  our  animals. 

I  don't  know  that  we  can  reasonably  hope  to  accomplish  much  here,  by  offen 
sive  operations,  unless  we  are  strong  enough  to  Cross  the  Potomac.  If  we  advance 
to  meet  the  enemy  on  this  side,  he  will,  in  all  probability,  go  into  one  of  his  niaiiy 
fortified  positions.  These  we  cannot  afford  to  attack. 

I  know  but  little  of  the  condition  of  our  affairs  in  the  "West,  but  am  inclined 
to  the  opinion  that  our  best  opportunity  for  great  results  is  in  Tennessee.  If  we 
could  hold  the  defensive  here  with  two  corps,  and  send  the  other  to  operate  in 


LEE  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  445 

Tennessee,  with  that  army,  I  think  that  we  could  accomplish  more  than  by  an 
advance  from  here. 

The  enemy  seems  to  have  settled  down  upon  the  plan  of  holding  certain  points 
by  fortifying  and  defending,  while  he  concentrates  upon  others.  It  seems  to  me 
that  this  must  succeed,  unless  we  concentrate  ourselves,  and  at  the  same  time  make 
occasional  show  of  active  operations  at  all  points. 

I  kno\v  of  no  other  means  of  acting  upon  that  principle  at  present,  except  to 
depend  upon  our  fortifications  in  Virginia,  and  concentrate  with  one  corps  of  this 
army,  and  such  as  may  be  drawn  from  others,  in  Tennessee,  and  destroy  Eosecrans' 
army. 

I  feel  assured  that  this  is  practicable,  and  that  greater  advantages  will  be  gained 
than  by  any  operations  from  here. 

I  remain,  general,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 
[Signed]  JAMES  LOXGSTKEET, 

Lieut.  Geuoral. 

GENERAL  R.  E.  LEE,  Commanding,  etc. 

It  will  l>e  noticed  by  those  who  have  watched  the  desultory 
controversy  maintained  upon  this  subject,  that  after  I  had  proved 
the  fallacy  of  General  Pendleton's  and  General  Early's  idea  of  a 
sunrise  attack,  they  fall  back  upon  the  charge  that  I  delayed  bring 
ing  my  troops  into  action,  waiving  all  question  of  an  order  from 
General  Lee.  I  have  shown  that  I  did  not  receive  orders  from  Gen 
eral  Lee  to  attack  until  about  eleven  o'clock  on  the  iM  ;  that  I  imme 
diately  began  my  dispositions  for  attack;  that  I  waited  about  forty 
minutes  for  Law's  Brigade,  by  General  Lee's  assenting  authoritv; 
that  by  especial  orders  from  General  Lee,  my  corps  marched  into 
position  by  a  circuitous  route,  under  the  direction  and  conduct  of 
Colonel  Johnson,  of  his  stall:  of  engineers;  that  Colonel  Johnson's 
orders  were  to  keep  the  march  of  the  troops  concealed,  and  that  I 
hurried  Hood's  Division  forward  in  the  face  of  those  orders,  throw 
ing  them  into  line  by  a  direct  march,  and  breaking  up  the  delay  oc 
casioned  by  the  orders  of  General  Lee.  I  need  only  add  that  every 
movement  or  halt  of  the  troops  on  that  day  was  made  in  the  imme 
diate  presence  of  General  Lee,  or  in  his  sight— certainly  within  the 
reach  of  his  easy  and  prompt  correction.  I  quote,  in  this  connection, 
the  order  that  I  issued  to  the  heads  of  departments  in  my  corps  on 
the  1st.  I  present  the  order  as  issued  to  Colonel  "Walton,  of  the 
artillery,  similar  orders  having  been,  issued  to  the  division  com 
manders  : 

[Order.] 

HEADQUARTERS  FIRST  ARMY  CORPS, 
NEAR  GETTYSBURG,  July  18 — 5.30  P.  M. 

Colonel — The  commanding   general  desires  you  to  come  on  to-night  as  fast  as 
you  can,  without  distressing  your  men  or  animals.     Hill  and  Ewell  have  sharply 


416  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

engaged  the  enemy,  and  you  will  be  needed  for  to-morrow's  battle.     Let  us  know 
where  you  will  stop  to-night.    *    *    *        Respectfully, 

G.  M.  SORRELL, 

A.  A.  General. 

To  COLONEL  J.  B.  WALTON,  Chief  of  Artillery. 

I  offer,  also,  a  report  made  by  General  Hood  touching  this  march. 
He  says : 

While  lying  in  camp  near  Chambersburg,  information  was  received  that  Hill 
and  Ewell  were  about  to  come  into  contact  with  the  enemy  near  Gettysburg.  My 
troops,  together  with  McLaws'  Division,  were  at  once  put  in  motion,  upon  the  most 
direct  road  to  that  point,  which  we  reached,  after  a  hard  march,  at  or  before  sunrise 
on  July  the  2d.  So  imperative  had  been  our  orders  to  hasten  forward  with  all 
possible  speed,  that  on  the  march  my  troops  were  allowed  to  halt  and  rest  only 
about  two  hours  during  the  night  from  the  1st  to  the  2d  of  July. 

It  appears  to  me  that  the  gentlemen  who  made  the  above-men 
tioned  charges  against  me  have  chosen  the  wrong  point  of  attack. 
With  their  motives  I  have  nothing  to  do ;  but  I  cannot  help  suggest 
ing  that  if  they  had  charged  me  with  having  precipitated  the  battle, 
instead  of  having  delayed  it,  the  records  might  have  sustained  them 
in  that  my  attack  was  made  about  four  hours  before  General  E  well's. 
I  am  reminded,  in  this  connection,  of  what  a  Federal  officer,  who 
was  engaged  in  that  battle,  said  to  me  when  we  were  talking  over 
the  battle,  and  the  comments  it  had  provoked.  He  said :  "  I  cannot 
imagine  how  they  can  charge  you  with  being  late  in  your  attack,  as 
you  were  the  only  one  that  got  in  at  all.  I  do  not  think  their  charge 
can  be  credited." 

In  conclusion,  I  may  say  that  it  is  unfortunate  that  the  discussion 
of  all  mooted  points  concerning  the  battle  was  not  opened  before  the 
deatli  of  General  Lee.  A  word  or  two  from  him  would  have  settled 
all  points  at  issue.  As  it  is,  I  have  written  an  impartial  narrative  of 
the  facts  as  they  are,  with  such  comments  as  the  nature  of  the  case 
seemed  to  demand. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG. 


BY    MAJOR    GENERAL    ALFRED    PLEASONTON. 


THE  history  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  in  the  Gettys 
burg  campaign  has  never 
been  written.  That  army 
was  unfortunate  in  having 
two  commanders.  General 
Hooker  having  been  relieved 
at  Frederick  City.  Maryland, 
about  a  week  before  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg,  by  Genera] 
Meade.  General  Meade1  s  re 
port  of  the  campaign  embraces 
only  the  time  he  was  in  com 
mand,  and,  as  a  consequence, 
the  operations  of  the  army  up 
to  Frederick  City  are  not  re 
corded,  except  in  subordinate  reports.  As  the  commander  of  the 
Cavalry  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  I  occupied  the  same  per 
sonal  relations  to  the  commanders  of  that  army — Generals  Hooker 
and  Meade — that  General  Longstreet  held  with  General  Lee.  I, 
therefore,  feel  constrained  to  review  the  campaign  of  Gettysburg,  as 
presented  by  General  Longstreet,  to  enable  the  public  to  arrive  at  a 
proper  understanding  of  the  relative  merits  of  the  armies  of  the 
Xorth  and  South  in  that  campaign.  General  Longstreet  states  that 
on  the  3d  of  June,  1S63,  the  movement  of  General  Lee's  army  from 
Fredericks!)  urg  commenced,  and  that  on  the  8th  two  full  corps  and 
Stuart's  cavalry  were  concentrated  at  Culpepper  Court-IIouse.  lie 
further  says :  wi  That  on  the  9th  of  June,  a  large  force  of  Federals, 
cavalry  and  infantry,  had  been  thrown  across  the  Rappahannock,  and 
sent  to  attack  Stuart.  They  were  encountered  at  Brandy  Station,  on 
the  morning  of  the  9th,  and  repulsed."  General  Longstreet  also 
expresses  the  opinion  that  if  there  was  an  occasion  which  justified 
General  Lee  in  departing  from  his  plan  of  campaign,  viz.,  offensive 
strategy  and  defensive  tactics,  it  was  at  this  battle  of  Beverly  ford, 

(447) 


448  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  that  Lee  should  have  fallen  upon  this  command  with  his  whole 
force  and  crushed  it. 

Now  for  the  facts  on  our  side.  General  Hooker,  having  received 
reports  from  different  sources  early  in  June,  1863,  that  General  Lee 
was  quietly  withdrawing  his  army  from  Fredericksburg  toward  Cul- 
pepper  Court-House,  wanted  positive  information  on  the  subject ; 
so  he  directed  me  to  make  a  reconnoissance  in  force  toward  Cul- 
pepper,  to  attack  the  enemy,  if  necessary,  and  force  him  to  display 
his  infantry ;  but  not  to  return  without  positive  information  of  Lee's 
whereabouts.  My  command  consisted  at  this  time  of  two  divisions 
of  cavalry  and  six  batteries  of  horse  artillery,  and  I  suggested  to 
General  Hooker,  in  view  of  what  he  required,  that  I  should  be  rein 
forced  with  some  infantry.  The  General  told  me  to  take  what 
infantry  I  wanted,  but  not  to  fail,  as  he  considered  the  information 
to  be  obtained  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  coming  campaign. 
I  selected  three  thousand  infantry,  under  Generals  Ames  and  D.  A. 
Russell.  On  the  8th  of  June,  I  directed  General  Gregg  to  cross 
the  Rappaliannock  at  Kelly's  ford,  at  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the 
9th,  with  the  Second  Division  of  cavalry  and  Russell's  infantry,  while 
I  would  cross  with  Buford's  Division  of  cavalry  and  Ames'  infantry, 
and  join  him  at  Brandy  Station.  The  two  fords  were  about  eight 
miles  apart,  Brandy  Station  being  nearly  in  the  apex  of  the  triangle, 
three  miles  south  of  the  river,  and  a  good  position  from  which  to 
operate  on  Culpepper,  in  case  it  became  necessary  to  move  in  that 
direction.  The  movement  was  a  reconnoissance  in  force  to  gain 
information.  It  was  my  duty  not  to  seek  a  fight  and  not  to  avoid 
one — to  distribute  my  force  in  such  manner  as  to  give  the  best  oppor 
tunities  for  obtaining  the  information  desired ;  at  the  same  time  to 
be  within  supporting  distance  in  case  of  an  action,  and  to  withdraw 
and  report  to  General  Hooker  as  soon  as  my  task  was  accomplished. 
The  evening  of  the  8th  of  June  a  heavy  rain  laid  the  dust  and 
enabled  me  to  place  the  command  near  Beverly  ford  without  attract 
ing  the  notice  of  the  enemy.  To  my  surprise,  General  Lee  had  no 
pickets  on  the  north  side  of  the  Rappahanriock.  I  ordered  my  com 
mand  to  bivouac  without  fires,  and  be  ready  at  four  o'clock  in  the 
morning.  The  next  morning,  with  Colonel  Davis,  of  the  Eighth 
New  York  Cavalry,  who  was  to  lead  the  advance,  I  reconnoitred  the 
ford,  and  found  the  circumstances  favorable  for  a  surprise  of  the 
enemy  on  the  opposite  side,  in  case  he  was  there  in  force. 

The  north  bank  of  the  river  commanded  the  southern,  and,  with 
the  exception  of  a  few  cavalry  pickets,  scattered  up  and  down  the 
river,  nothing  was  to  be  seen.  The  roaring  of  the  water  over  the 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  449 

dam  just  above  the  ford  would  prevent  the  sound  of  cavalry  from 
being  heard  in  making  the  passage  of  the  river,  while  a  dense  fog 
on  the  river,  extending  some  distance  on  the  other  side  to  the  posi 
tion  occupied  by  the  enemy's  mounted  pickets,  would  screen  from 
observation  any  body  of  troops  while  crossing.  It  was  decided, 
therefore,  to  attack  immediately,  and,  if  possible,  capture  the 
enemy's  pickets  and  supports  before  the  main  body  could  be  notified 
of  the  movement.  Accordingly,  at  five  o'clock,  Colonel  Davis  gal 
lantly  led  the  Eighth  Xew  York  Cavalry  through  the  ford,  and, 
charging  the  reserve  of  the  pickets,  took  them  by  surprise,  and, 
after  a  short  resistance,  they  were  overpowered.  Most  unfortu 
nately,  at  that  moment  the  captain  of  the  picket  rode  up  to  Colonel 
Davis  and  shot  him  through  the  head,  but  was  immediately  killed 
by  ]  htvis1  adjutant.  The  death  of  Colonel  Davis  caused  a  temporary 
delay ;  but,  hearing  of  it,  I  crossed  the  river,  and  was  soon  to  the 
front.  By  this  time  at  least  three  regiments  were  over — a  sufficient 
force  to  hold  the  position  until  the  entire  command  should  cross. 
On  the  north  side  I  had  placed  three  batteries  in  a  position  which 
commanded  our  flanks,  and  the  crossing  was  completed.  It  was  at 
this  time  a  trooper  fired  a  blank  cartridge  from  a  battery  in  their 
rear,  and  this  roused  the  sleeping  soldiers  of  Stuart's  cavalry. 
Stuart's  headquarters  were  not  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from 
the  ford,  and  we  pushed  our  advance  with  such  vigor  that  we  cap 
tured  it,  with  a  copy  of  his  orders  and  other  important  papers 
indicating  the  campaign  Lee  intended  to  make.  In  obedience  to 
his  orders,  Stuart  was  to  have  crossed  Beverly  ford  that  morning  to 
destroy  the  railroad  to  Alexandria,  for  the  purpose  of  delaying  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  in  its  movement  north ;  while  that  Lee  intended 
to  cross  the  Potomac  in  the  neighborhood  of  Poolesville  and  the 
Monocacy,  from  the  other  communications  captured,  was  evident. 

Stuart,  stung  at  being  surprised,  soon  had  his  command  in  action, 
and  did  some  splendid  fighting  that  day  to  recover  his  position.  The 
whole  of  my  line  was  engaged  at  once,  and  for  a  time  it  was  charge 
and  counter-charge.  Nothing  could  have  been  finer  than  the  gal 
lantry  displayed  by  the  troops  on  both  sides  ;  but  my  command  knew 
they  had  gained  an  advantage,  and  they  were  determined  to  keep  it. 
The  desperate  attacks  of  Stuart  could  not  move  them.  I  had  suffi 
cient  information,  after  the  capture  of  Stuart's  headquarters,  to  have 
authorized  the  withdrawal  of  my  command  to  the  north  side  of  the 
river,  but  hearing  General  Gregg's  guns  in  the  direction  of  Brandy 
Station,  and  knowing  he  would  expect  me  to  connect  with  him  in 
that  vicinity,  I  directed  General  Buford  to  advance  his  right,  while 
29 


450  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  left  was  extended  in  the  direction  of  Brandy  Station.  The 
enemy's  cavalry,  well  supplied  with  artillery,  fought  with  great 
stubbornness,  and  it  was  one  o'clock  in  the  day  before  I  made  any 
communication  with  Gregg.  He  informed  me  that  he  had  been 
actively  engaged  all  day ;  that  the  enemy  were  running  trains  full 
of  infantry  from  Culpepper  to  Brandy  Station,  and  massing  them  in 
the  woods  near  the  residence  of  John  Minor  Botts.  Gregg  was  then 
directed  to  withdraw  and  recross  the  river  at  the  railroad  bridge, 
which  he  did  without  difficulty.  I  held  my  position,  covering 
Beverly  ford,  until  Gregg's  crossing  was  assured,  and  then  with 
drew.  The  last  gun  was  fired  at  seven  in  the  evening. 

Such  was  the  action  of  Beverly  ford,  which  General  Longstreet 
calls  Brandy  Station.  It  was  a  reconnoissance  in  force,  in  which 
some  of  the  hardest  fighting  of  the  war  had  to  be  done.  It  accom 
plished  more  than  was  expected,  by  not  only  establishing  the  fact 
that  Lee  was  at  Culpepper  in  force,  but  it  apprised  General  Hooker 
of  General  Lee's  intention  to  invade  the  North.  In  reporting  to 
General  Hooker  the  result  of  my  reconnoissance,  I  stated  I  was  of 
the  opinion  that  Stuart  was  not  now  likely  to  cross  the  river.  The 
General,  however,  thought  it  best  for  my  command  to  remain  in  the 
vicinity  of  Warrenton  Junction  until  the  16th  of  June,  and  Stuart 
never  made  any  attempt  to  cross  the  river  during  that  time.  Such, 
then,  was  one  result  of  the  attack  on  the  9th.  A  second  result  was 
to  change  the  direction  of  Lee's  army  toward  the  Shenandoah,  instead 
of  attempting  to  cross  the  Potomac  near  Washington,  forcing  that 
army  to  operate  on  an  exterior  line.  The  third  result  was  to  give 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  the  initiative,  based  on  the  knowledge  of 
General  Lee's  intentions.  Did  General  Lee  know  that  Stuart's 
papers  had  been  lost  ?  Did  he  or  Stuart  suppose  they  were  in  my 
possession?  At  all  events,  General  Longstreet's  experienced  mili 
tary  sagacity  impressed  him  with  the  necessity  of  changing  the  plan 
of  campaign,  and  with  their  whole  force  make  a  determined  effort 
to  crush  me.  No  ordinary  attack,  which  had  been  repulsed,  would 
have  been  considered  by  Longstreet  as  worthy  of  any  such  distin 
guished  attention.  I  claim,  therefore,  that  the  services  of  the  nine 
thousand  splendid  soldiers  of  my  command  could  not  have  been 
more  brilliant  or  more  important  to  the  army  and  the  country  in 
their  results. 

'On  the  evening  of  the  1 6th  of  June,  the  cavalry  corps  encamped 
near  Manassas,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  occupying  positions 
between  that  point  and  Fairfax  Court-House.  After  consultation 
with  General  Hooker  it  was  decided  that  I  should  proceed  by  the 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  451 

way  of  Aldie,  through  the  Bull  Run  mountains,  into  London  Valley, 
to  ascertain  if  Lee's  army  or  any  portion  of  it  were  in  that  vicinity. 
I  started  early  on  the  17th,  made  a  long  march  of  twenty-five  miles, 
and  about  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  shortly  after  we  had  entered 
the  pass,  met  the  enemy's  cavalry  coming  through.  After  a  hard 
fight  for  several  hours,  we  drove  them  back  to  the  west  side  of  the 
mountains.  On  the  ISth  and  19th,  we  were  again  engaged,  and 
forced  them  beyond  Middleburg,  about  nine  miles  from  Aldie,  and 
on  the  21st,  advancing  with  Buford  on  the  road  to  Union,  and  Gregg 
on  the  Upperville  road,  we  swept  the  London  Valley  to  the  base  of 
the  Blue  Ridge,  fighting  our  way  the  whole  distance.  Near  Upper 
ville  the  fighting  was  severe,  several  brigades,  on  each  side,  being 
engaged  in  charging  each  other ;  but  such  was  the  dash  and  spirit  of 
our  cavalry  that  the  enemy  could  not  withstand  it,  and  retreated 
through  Ashby's  gap  badly  worsted.  General  Buford,  on  the  right, 
sent  some  parties  to  the  top  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  they  reported 
large  masses  of  infantry  and  camps  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  toward 
Winchester.  There  being  no  infantry  in  the  London  Valley,  it  was 
evident  General  Lee  did  not  intend  to  cross  the  Potomac  lower  down 
than  Shepherdstown.  These  facts  were  reported  to  General  Hooker 
on  the  night  of  the  21st  of  June,  and  he  shortly  after  set  the  army 
in  motion  for  the  vicinity  of  Frederick  City,  Maryland,  Buford's 
Division  of  cavalry  taking  up  a  position  at  Middletown,  to  the  west 
of  Frederick  City. 

I  desire,  here,  to  call  attention  to  General  Longstreet's  statement, 
in  which  he  ignores  all  the  operations  of  Stuart's  cavalry  from  the 
17th  to  the  21st  of  June.  General  Longstreet  states  that  he 
was  occupying  Ashby's  and  Snickers  gaps  at  that  time  with  his 
corps,  and  communicated  with  General  Stuart.  He  knew,  there 
fore,  that  General  Stuart  had  been  most  actively  engaged  from 
the  17th  of  June,  attempting  to  push  through  the  Bull  Run 
mountains,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  whereabouts  of  General 
Hooker's  army.  Stuart  had  been  doing  his  best  to  execute  General 
Lee's  orders,  which  were  "to  harass  the  enemy,  and  to  impede 
him  as  much  as  possible  should  he  attempt  to  cross  the  Poto 
mac.''  Such  were  General  Lee's  orders  to  Stuart,  and  to  ex 
ecute  them  it  was  his  first  duty  to  find  out  where  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  located.  This  he  was  doing  when  he  attempted 
to  pass  the  Bull  Run  mountains ;  but,  unfortunately  for  Stuart,  the 
enemy  harassed  him  so  much,  and  drove  him  back  into  Ashby's  gap 
in  such  condition  that  he  was  unable  to  reach  the  Potomac  in  time 
to  see  the  enemy  cross.  General  Stuart,  at  Ashby's  gap  on  the  21st 


452  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  June,  was  as  ignorant  of  the  position  of  Hooker's  army  as  were 
Generals  Lee  and  Longstreet,  on  the  27th  of  June,  at  Chambersburg. 
That  Lee  and  Longstreet  should  have  hurried  on  to  Chambersburg 
under  such  conditions,  is  best  explained  by  the  ancient  adage : 
"  Whom  the  gods  wish  to  destroy  they  first  make  mad."  Generals 
Lee  and  Longstreet  lay  great  stress  on  the  absence  of  Stuart's  cavalry 
as  one  of  the  principal  causes  of  failure  of  the  campaign  on  their 
side.  I  have  shown  that  the  two  divisions  of  the  cavalry  corps  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  effectually  prevented  Lee's  cavalry 
from  obtaining  any  information  in  Virginia  with  reference  to  the 
movements  of  that  army.  Now,  on  arriving  at  Frederick  City, 
Maryland,  my  corps  was  reinforced  by  a  third  division,  commanded 
by  Kilpatrick,  Custer,  and  Farnsworth,  and  it  is  assuming  nothing 
to  assert  that  what  had  been  done  by  my  two  divisions  in  Virginia 
could  be  accomplished  by  three  divisions  with  more  ease  and  certainty 
in  Maryland. 

Two  days  after  I  arrived  at  Frederick  City,  General  Meade 
relieved  General  Hooker  of  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac.  On  assuming  the  command,  General  Meade  sent  for  me,  and 
in  strong  terms  deprecated  the  change  in  commanders  with  a  battle 
so  near  at  hand,  acknowledged  his  ignorance  with  regard  to  the  army 
in  general,  and  said  he  would  be  obliged  to  depend  a  great  deal  upon 
me  to  assist  him.  Our  relations  were  of  the  most  cordial  and  friendly 
character,  and  I  soon  gave  him  to  understand  my  views,  for  we  then 
knew  that  Lee's  army  was  moving  towrard  Chambersburg.  I  told 
him  that  Lee  would  make  for  Gettysburg,  and  that  if  he  seized  that 
position  before  we  could  reach  it  we  should  have  hard  work  to  get 
him  out,  and  that  to  prevent  his  doing  so  wrould  depend  more  on  the 
cavalry  than  anything  else.  I  called  his  attention  to  a  division  of 
cavalry  near  Frederick  City,  which  he  might  place  under  my  com 
mand,  and  I  would  like  to  have  officers  I  would  name  specially 
assigned  to  it,  as  I  expected  to  have  some  desperate  work  to  do. 
The  General  assented  to  my  request,  and  upon  my  naming  the  officers, 
he  immediately  telegraphed  to  have  them  appointed  brigadier  gener 
als.  This  was  his  first  dispatch  to  Washington,  and  in  the  after 
noon  he  received  the  reply  making  the  appointments,  and  directing 
the  officers  to  be  assigned  at  once.  They  were  Custer,  Merritt,  and 
Farnsworth ;  all  three  young  captains,  and  two  of  them,  Custer  and 
Farnsworth,  my  aides-de-camp.  While  the  General  and  myself  were 
in  conversation  in  reference  to  the  campaign  a  second  dispatch  was 
brought  him,  stating  that  Stuart,  with  his  cavalry,  were  making  a 
raid  near  Washington  City,  and  had  cut  the  wires,  so  that  we  had  no 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  453 

telegraphic  communication.  I  laughed  at  this  news,  and  said  Stuart 
has  served  us  better  than  he  is  aware  of;  we  shall  now  have  no 
instructions  from  the  aulic  council  until  we  have  a  battle.  General 
Meade,  however,  took  the  matter  very  seriously ;  thought  I  should 
take  all  the  cavalry  and  capture  Stuart ;  that  the  government  would 
expect  him  to  do  so.  I  assured  him  that  Lee  was  of  more  importance 
to  us  than  Stuart ;  the  latter  was  in  a  false  position  and  useless  to  Lee, 
and  that  it  was  a  maxim  in  war  never  to  interfere  with  the  enemy 
when  he  was  making  a  false  move.  That  Stuart  could  only  join  Lee 
by  recrossing  the  Potomac,  which  would  occupy  so  much  time  as  to 
prevent  his  being  in  the  next  battle ;  or  he  must  pass  round  to  the 
north  of  our  army,  in  which  event  I  should  have  the  cavalry  so 
placed  that  he  would  not  be  able  to  escape  us.  General  Meade  then 
decided  to  leave  the  affair  with  me,  and,  as  I  expected,  three  or  four 
days  after,  near  a  place  called  Hanover,  Kilpatrick's  Division  met 
Stuart's  command  loaded  down  with  plunder,  which  was  recaptured, 
and,  after  a  severe  tight,  Stuart  was  compelled  to  make  such  a  detour 
that  he  only  joined  Lee  at  Gettysburg  on  the  second  day  of  the  bat 
tle,  July  L>d. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  in  motion  by  the  28th  of  June, 
moving  north  from  Frederick  City.     In  arraii<nnir  the  line  of  march 

O  */  O         O 

of  the  different  corps,  I  was  impressed  with  the  idea  that  General 
Meade  considered  that  General  Lee  would  move  toward  Harrisburg1 

o 

and  cross  the  river  in  that  vicinity.  He  spoke  of  it  to  me  more  than 
once.  I  could  not  believe  it,  although  General  Longstreet  states 
that,  at  one  time,  General  Lee  did  entertain  that  idea.  The  general 
line  of  march  of  the  army  was  too  much  to  the  cast  for  a  rapid  con 
centration  on  Gettysburg,  and  believing  that  General  Lee  understood 
the  advantages  of  that  position  as  well  as  I  did,  I  was  determined  to 
occupy  it  first.  I,  therefore,  ordered  Buford,  with  the  first  division 
of  cavalry,  to  move  from  Middletown  by  the  way  of  Emmettsburg 
to  Gettysburg,  and  to  hold  that  position  at  all  hazards  until  the 
army  could  support  him.  In  obedience  to  these  orders,  Buford 
arrived  at  Gettysburg  on  the  afternoon  of  June  30th,  and  obtaining 
information  that  Lee  was  in  force  on  the  Cashtown  road,  he  moved 
out  on  that  road  some  four  miles  beyond  Gettysburg,  and  encamped 
for  the  night.  Early  next  morning  General  A.  P.  Hill  attacked  him 
in  force,  but  the  nature  of  the  ground  was  such  that  Buford,  with 
his  splendid  fighting,  restrained  the  superior  force  against  him  until 
Reynolds  and  Howard  and  others  came  up,  and  saved  the  position  to 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  General  Longstreet  states  that  this  ren 
contre  "  was  totally  unexpected  on  both  sides."  The  above  statement 


4:54:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAS. 

shows  that  the  General  is  mistaken  in  supposing  the  rencontre  was 
unexpected  on  our  side.  Buford's  judgment  in  believing  he  would 
be  attacked  in  heavy  force  on  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  July,  and 
going  out  four  miles  to  meet  it  the  night  before,  was  what  saved  to  us 
the  position.  Had  he  waited  an  attack  at  Gettysburg,  he  would  have 
been  driven  from  the  place  before  any  support  could  have  arrived. 

General  Meade  had  his  headquarters  on  the  1st  of  July  at  a 
place  called  Taneytown,  about  eighteen  miles  to  the  east  of  Gettys 
burg.  It  was  about  noon  of  that  day  I  received  a  dispatch  from 
General  Buford,  stating  the  enemy  had  attacked  him  in  force  early 
that  morning  four  miles  from  Gettysburg ;  that  he  had  fought  them 
desperately  for  several  hours  to  retard  their  progress  ;  that  Howard, 
with  the  Eleventh  Corps,  and  Reynolds,  with  the  First  Corps,  had 
arrived  on  the  field ;  that  Reynolds  had  been  killed  while  bringing 
his  corps  into  action ;  there  appeared  to  be  no  directing  head,  and  if 
General  Meade  expected  to  secure  that  position,  the  sooner  he 
marched  the  army  there  the  better.  I  immediately  showed  this 
dispatch  to  General  Meade,  when  he  decided  to  move  on  Gettys 
burg,  and  sending  for  General  Hancock,  whose  corps  was  nearest  to 
Gettysburg,  he  ordered  him  to  proceed  at  once  to  that  point,  directing 
his  corps  to  follow  him,  and  to  take  command  of  the  forces  engaged. 
At  the  same  time  orders  were  sent  to  the  different  corps  of  the  army 
to  march  on  Gettysburg  without  delay.  The  time  occupied  in  making 
these  arrangements  detained  General  Meade  until  after  dark,  when 
we  proceeded  to  Gettysburg,  and  arrived  at  General  Howard's  head 
quarters  on  Cemetery  Hill  after  midnight. 

At  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  July,  General  Meade 
requested  me  to  ride  over  the  position  with  him,  and  we  \vere 
engaged  in  that  duty  until  ten  o'clock,  by  which  time  the  disposition 
of  the  different  corps,  as  they  should  arrive,  had  been  decided.  In 
examining  the  position,  General  Meade  was  strongly  impressed  that 
our  right  was  our  weakest  place,  and  on  both  the  2d  and  3d  of  July 
he  gave  it  his  attention.  On  the  3d,  during  the  artillery  combat  on 
our  left,  he  took  a  position  on  a  high  mound  between  the  right  and 
left  flanks,  watching  our  right,  and  expecting  a  heavy  attack  in  that 
direction.  I  had  six  batteries  of  horse  artillery  in  reserve,  and  in 
case  our  right  had  given  way,  these  batteries  were  to  be  sent  to  its 
support.  But  finding  our  right  could  not  hold  its  own,  and  our 
batteries  on  the  left  had  suffered,  these  splendid  batteries  were 
placed  in  position  on  the  left  in  time  to  meet  General  Pickett's 
charge.  I  am  not,  therefore,  surprised  when  General  Longstreet 
states,  "  That  when  the  smoke  cleared  away  Pickett's  Division  was 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  455 

gone,"  and  "  that  mortal  man  could  not  have  stood  that  fire."  I  do 
not  propose  to  follow  General  Longstreet  through  the  details  of  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg.  The  charges  of  the  Southern  soldiers  on  the 
2d  and  3d  of  July  were  magnificent,  and  did  them  the  highest  honor. 
But  this  was  not  war.  Kapoleon  I.  laid  down  the  maxim  that  a 
general  who  disregards  the  principles  of  war  at  the  commencement 
of  a  campaign,  finds  himself  overwhelmed  by  the  consequences  when 
the  crisis  of  battle  arrives.  The  campaign  of  Gettysburg  is  a  good 
illustration  of  the  truth  of  this  maxim.  General  Lee  violated  the 
principles  of  strategy,  and  the  results  forced  him  to  disregard  those 
of  tactics,  and  when  after  the  repulse  of  his  troops  on  the  third  day, 
lie  said,  "it  was  all  my  fault,"  he  nobly  declared  the  true  verdict  in 
the  case. 

The  battle  of  Gettysburg  was  over,  and  in  speaking  of  the  sub 
sequent  events  of  the  campaign,  I  do  so  with  reluctance.  I  was  in 
the  position  to  form  a  correct  opinion  of  the  failure  of  the  army  to 
follow  General  Lee,  having  been  the  constant  companion  of  General 
Meade  from  the  time  he  assumed  the  command  at  Frederick  City. 
In  justice  to  the  General,  I  can  state  he  did  not  desire  the  command, 
and  considered  it  hazardous  to  change  commanders  at  that  time,  and 
his  position  was  far  more  difficult  than  it  would  have  been  had  lie 
been  assigned  the  command  at  the  commencement  of  the  campaign. 
Personally  very  brave,  an  excellent  corps  commander,  General 
Meade  had  not  that  grasp  of  mind,  when  thrown  into  a  new  and 
responsible  position,  to  quickly  comprehend  and  decide  upon  import 
ant  events  as  they  occurred.  lie  required  time  to  come  to  a  decision, 
and  this  indulgence  an  active  campaign  never  allows  to  a  command 
ing  general.  From  the  time  he  assumed  command  of  the  army  until 
after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  the  most  important  events  were 
occuring  with  such  rapidity,  and  with  such  resistless  force,  that  his 
decisions  were  the  consequences  of  these  events  rather  than  the 
operations  of  his  individual  intelligence. 

From  the  suddenness  of  the  repulse  of  the  last  charge  on  July 
3d,  it  became  necessary  for  General  Meade  to  decide  at  once  what  to 
do.  I  rode  up  to  him,  and,  after  congratulating  him  on  the  splendid 
conduct  of  the  army,  I  said :  "  General,  I  will  give  you  half  an  hour 
to  show  yourself  a  great  general.  Order  the  army  to  advance,  while 
I  will  take  the  cavalry,  get  in  Lee's  rear,  and  we  will  finish  the  cam 
paign  in  a  week."  lie  replied :  "  How  do  you  know  Lee  will  not 
attack  me  again  ;  we  have  done  well  enough."  I  replied  that  Lee 
had  exhausted  all  his  available  men  ;  that  the  cannonade  of  the  two 
last  days  had  exhausted  his  ammunition ;  he  was  far  from  his  base 


456  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  supplies ;  and,  by  compelling  him  to  keep  his  army  together,  they 
must  soon  surrender,  for  he  was  living  on  the  country.  To  this  the 
General  did  not  reply,  hut  asked  me  to  ride  up  to  the  Round  Top 
with  him ;  and  as  we  rode  along  the  ridge  for  nearly  a  mile,  the 
troops  cheered  him  in  a  manner  that  plainly  showed  they  expected 
the  advance.  When  we  reached  the  Round  Top  everything  was 
still  in  Lee's  position  with  the  exception  of  a  single  battery  which 
was  firing  upon  some  of  our  skirmishers  to  prevent  their  advancing. 
I  was  so  impressed  with  the  idea  that  Lee  was  retreating  that  I  again 
earnestly  urged  General  Meade  to  advance  the  army ;  but  instead  of 
doing  so,  he  ordered  me  to  send  some  cavalry  to  ascertain  the  fact. 
Gregg's  Division  of  cavalry  started  soon  after,  and  at  eight  o'clock 
the  next  morning  I  received  his  report,  stating  that  he  was  twenty- 
two  miles  on  the  Cashtown  road,  and  that  the  enemy  was  not  only 
retreating,  but  it  was  a  rout,  the  road  being  encumbered  with 
wounded  and  wagons  in  the  greatest  confusion. 

On  this  report  the  two  other  divisions  of  cavalry  were  sent  to 
intercept  and  harass  Lee  in  crossing  the  Potomac ;  but  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  did  not  leave  Gettysburg  for  four  or  five  days  after, 
and  then  passed  by  the  way  of  South  Mountain  to  the  Antietam 
creek.  In  consequence  of  heavy  rains  the  Potomac  river  was  so 
much  swollen  that  Lee  could  not  cross,  and  the  two  armies  were 
again  brought  face  to  face  for  two  days.  General  Meade  declined 
to  attack,  and  Lee's  army  escaped.  The  cavalry  rendered  important 
service  after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  in  pursuit.  They  captured 
large  trains  of  wagons,  many  prisoners,  and  were  in  such  position 
that,  had  General  Meade  followed  Lee  on  the  4th  of  July,  the  sur 
render  of  Lee  would  have  been  unavoidable. 

The  two  great  objective  points  of  the  war  were  Washington  and 
Richmond.  Had  Lee's  army  captured  Washington  and  held  it,  the 
South  would  have  been  recognized  by  the  nations  of  Europe,  and  the 
war  would  have  been  continued  by  the  Korth  under  the  greatest 
disadvantages.  When  the  army  of  the  Potomac  entered  Richmond, 
the  Southern  cause  was  considered  lost  in  Europe,  and  the  South 
surrendered.  The  recognition  of  the  South  by  foreign  governments 
entered  largely  into  the  political  and  military  operations  of  the  gov 
ernment  at  Richmond  ;  and  the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania  by  General 
Lee,  in  1863,  cannot  properly  be  explained  by  military  reasons  alone. 
The  attempt  to  do  this  is  the  weak  point  of  General  Longstreet's 
defense  of  that  campaign.  The  chances  of  that  campaign  from  a 
military  point  of  view  were  so  much  against  General  Lee,  and  the 
General  himself  was  so  conscious  of  them,  that  his  effort  to  prosecute 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  457 

it  can  only  clearly  be  understood  when  it  is  assumed  the  necessities 
of  the  South  were  so  great  as  to  compel  the  government  at  Richmond 
to  direct  the  movement  in  order,  if  possible,  to  hasten  their  recogni 
tion  by  France  and  England.  In  the  first  place,  Lee's  army  was  not 
in  a  condition  to  make  that  campaign  a  success.  A  month  before, 
at  Chancellorsville,  he  had  lost  his  ablest  lieutenant,  Stonewall 
Jackson,  and  the  flower  of  his  army.  His  army  never  recovered 
from  that  blow.  It  caused  General  Longstreet  to  say,  "  Such  was 
the  terrible  sacrifice,  that  half  a  dozen  such  victories  would  have 
ruined  us."  The  battle  of  Chancellorsville  was'  properly  the  begin 
ning  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  and  should  be  so  considered  in 
reviewing  the  military  operations  of  the  two  armies.  The  Army  of 
the  Potomac  never  was  in  finer  order  than  in  June,  when  it  moved 
from  Fredericksburg,  and  it  was  ably  handled  throughout  the  cam 
paign,  and  until  after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 

The  army  had  three  roads  to  concentrate  on  Gettysburg,  viz. : 
the  Emmettsbiirg  road,  the  Taneytown  road,  and  the  Baltimore 
pike,  and  could  naturally  arrive  there  before  Lee's  army,  coniino- 

IT  *.  «,    "  JT> 

from  Chambersburg,  on  a  single  road  through  Cashtown.  On  the 
night  of  the  1st  of  July,  we  had  more  troops  in  position  than  Lee, 
and  from  that  time  victory  was  assured  to  us.  Had  Lee  attacked  on 
the  morning  of  the  2d,  lie  would  have  been  repulsed,  as  lie  was  when 
lie  did  attack.  The  failure  of  Lee  to  make  any  impression  on  our 
right,  which  General  IMeade  expected  on  both  days,  the  iM  and  3d 
of  July,  showed  that  General  Lee  Avas  either  too  weak,  or  did  not 
have  his  army  well  in  hand.  As  to  General  Lee  maneuvring  to  our 
left,  the  supposition  shows  the  ignorance  existing  of  our  position  and 
the  nature  of  the  country.  I  had  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  one  in 
rear  of  our  position,  and  one  on  Lee's  right  flank.  This  cavalry 
would  have  held  Lee  in  check  in  any  such  movement,  while  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  from  Cemetery  Hill  would  have  swept  down 
and  turned  Gettysburg  into  an  Austrelitz.  It  would  have  been  far 
better  for  General  Lee  and  his  army  if  they  could  have  realized  that 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  possessed  generals  fully  equal  to  their  own  ; 
that  the  mobility  of  the  army  for  marching  and  maneuvring  was 
equal,  if  not  superior,  to  theirs,  and  that,  in  point  of  equipment, 
endurance,  and  tenacity,  they  were  their  superiors.  It  is  one  of  the 
wisest  maxims  of  war,  ''Never  to  hold  an  enemy  in  contempt/'  The 
South  suffered  for  the  violation  of  this  rule  the  most  bitter  mortifi 
cation  and  suffering,  and  none  more  so  than  the  gallant  men  who 
strove  to  wring  victory  from  despair  at  Gettysburg. 

Three  serious  blunders  deprived  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  of 


458  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  best  fruits  of  their  labors.  The  first  of  these  was  the  change  of 
commanders  a  few  days  before  the  battle.  This  delayed  the  move 
ments  of  the  army,  and  was  near  losing  us  the  position  at  Gettys 
burg.  It  was  singular  that  a  government  that  claimed  "never  to 
swap  horses  while  crossing  a  stream "  should  have  done  so  in  the 
most  important  crisis  of  the  war.  The  second  blunder  was  the 
neglect  of  the  government  to  send  fifty  thousand  of  the  seventy 
thousand  men  around  Washington,  by  the  way  of  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Railroad,  to  the  south  of  the  Potomac,  to  oppose  the  crossing 
of  Lee.  With  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  his  rear,  and  fifty 
thousand  men  to  oppose  his  crossing,  the  war  in  Virginia  would 
have  ended  in  1863,  instead  of  1865.  The  third  blunder  was  the 
refusal  of  General  Meade  to  follow  the  enemy  after  the  repulse  on 
the  3d  of  July.  This  lost  the  army  all  the  advantages  for  which 
they  had  toiled  and  struggled  for  many  long  and  weary  days ;  but  it 
could  not  detract  from  the  glorious  distinction  and  honor  of  the 
gallant  soldiers  who  had  humbled  the  best  and  proudest  army  the 
South  ever  put  into  the  field. 

The  campaign  of  Gettysburg  was  the  best  campaign  of  the  war 
on  the  Northern  side.  It  was  conducted  on  the  truest  principles  of 
war,  as  established  by  the  greatest  masters,  viz. :  to  separate  the 
enemy  from  his  base  while  securing  your  own  base  of  operations. 
That  the  results  of  the  campaign  did  not  include  the  surrender  of 
Lee's  army,  was  due  to  the  action  and  inaction  of  the  government  at 
Washington,  and  is  another  illustration  of  the  matchless  equipoise 
of  great  minds  disturbed  by  unparalleled  conditions,  so  graphically 
described  by  General  Longstreet  in  his  instance  of  General  Lee  at 
Gettysburg.  While  our  Southern  friends  are  discussing  their  cam 
paign  of  Gettysburg,  I  would  call  their  attention  to  a  notable 
circumstance,  viz. :  that  in  the  campaign  of  General  Grant,  from 
Culpepper  to  Richmond,  General  Lee  pursued  the  same  strategy  and 
same  tactics  adopted  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  campaign 
of  Gettysburg.  While  General  Grant  is  open  to  the  severest 
criticism,  in  a  military  point  of  view,  for  operating  on  an  exterior 
line,  and  leaving  his  adversary  secure  in  his  communications  and 
bases  of  supplies  (precisely  the  blunder  committed  by  Lee  in  his 
Gettysburg  campaign),  Lee's  reputation  as  a  general  rests  on  the 
splendid  defense  of  Richmond,  which  he  conducted  in  the  years 
1864  and  1865.  The  immense  loss  of  life  in  General  Grant's 
campaign  against  Richmond  wras  due  to  his  violation  of  the  princi 
ples  of  war.  The  two  campaigns  are  good  illustrations  that  neither 
governments  or  generals  can  disregard  the  fundamental  principles  of 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  459 

war,  without  suffering  immense  sacrifices  and  with  uncertain  results 
of  success. 

To  close  as  I  began,  that  justice  had  not  been  done  to  the 
cavalry  in  the  campaign  of  Gettysburg,  the  above  review,  in  my 
opinion,  clearly  shows  it.  I  can  say  they  had  greater  opportunities 
for  distinction  than  their  companions  in  arms,  and  they  so  fully 
availed  themselves  of  these  advantages  that,  without  their  services, 
the  record  of  the  campaign  would  be  like  the  play  of  u  Hamlet " 
with  the  part  of  Hamlet  left  out.  Further,  the  renown  for  all  that 
is  great  and  glorious  in  cavalry  warfare  they  established  for  them 
selves  in  that  campaign,  made  them  the  peers  of  the  famous  troopers 
of  the  Great  Frederick,  and  the  splendid  horsemen  who  swept  over 
the  plains  of  Europe  led  by  the  white  plume  of  the  dashing  Murat. 


VAN  DORN,  THE  HERO  OF  MISSISSIPPI. 

BY   MAJOR   GENERAL   DABNEY    H.    MAURY. 


GENERAL  EARL  VAN  DORN 
was,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
writer,  the  most  remarkable 
man  the  State  of  Mississippi 
has  ever  known.  My  ac 
quaintance  with  him  began 
in  Monterey,  in  the  fall  of 
1846.  He  was  aide-de-camp 
then  to  General  Persifor  F. 
Smith,  and  was  one  of  the 
most  attractive  yonng  fellows 
in  the  army.  He  used  to 
ride  a  beautiful  bay  Andalu- 
sian  horse,  and  as  he  came 
galloping  along  the  lines,  with 
his  yellow  hair  waving  in  the 
wind,  and  his  bright  face  lighted  with  kindliness  and  courage,  we  all 
loved  to  see  him.  His  figure  was  lithe  and  graceful,  his  stature  did 
not  exceed  five  feet  six  inches,  but  his  clear  blue  eyes,  his  firm  set 
mouth,  writh  white  strong  teeth,  his  well  cut  nose  with  expanding 
nostrils,  gave  assurance  of  a  man  whom  men  could  trust  and  follow. 
No  young  officer  came  out  of  the  Mexican  war  writh  a  reputation 
more  enviable  than  his.  After  the  close  of  that  war  he  resumed  his 
duties  and  position  in  the  infantry  regiment  of  which  he  was  a  lieu 
tenant.  In  1854  the  Second  Cavalry  was  organized,  and  Yan  Dorn 
was  promoted  to  be  major  of  the  regiment.  lie  conducted  several 
of  the  most  important  and  successful  expeditions  against  the  Coman- 
ches  we  have  ever  made,  and  in  one  of  them  was  shot  through  the 
body,  the  point  of  the  arrow  just  protruding  through  the  skin.  No 
surgeon  was  at  hand.  Yan  Dorn,  reflecting  that  to  withdraw  the 
arrow  would  leave  the  barbed  head  in  his  body,  thrust  it  on  through, 
and  left  the  surgeon  little  to  do.  When  the  States  resumed  their 
State  sovereignty,  he  took  a  bold  and  efficient  part  in  securing  to 
Texas,  where  he  was  serving,  all  of  the  war  material  within  her 
(460) 


VAN  DORN,  THE  HERO  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI.  461 

borders.  Early  in  the  war  lie  was  ordered  to  join  the  army  under 
General  Joe  Johnston  at  Manassas ;  whence  soon  after,  in  February, 
1801,  he  was  ordered  to  take  command  of  the  Trans-Mississippi 
Department. 

I  was  associated  with  him  in  this  command  as  chief  of  his  staff, 
and  saw  him  daily  for  many  months.  lie  had  conceived  the  bold 
project  of  capturing  St.  Louis  and  transferring  the  war  into  Illinois, 
and  was  actively  engaged  in  preparing  for  this  enterprise  when  he 
was  summoned  by  General  Price  to  Boston  Mountain,  where  the 
forces  of  Price  and  McCulloch  lay  in  great  need  of  a  common 
superior — for  these  two  generals  could  not  co-operate  because  of 
questions  of  rank.  Therefore,  Van  Dorn  promptly  responded  to 
Price's  summons,  and  in  a  few  hours  was  in  the  saddle  and  on  his 
way  to  Van  Buren.  I  went  with  him,  and  one  aide-de-camp,  an 
orderly,  and  my  servant  man  Jem  made  up  our  party.  Van  Dorn 
rode  a  tine  thoroughbred  black  mare  he  had  brought  from  Virginia. 
I  was  mounted  on  a  sorrel  I  had  bought  in  Pocahontas  a  few  hours 
before  we  set  out.  Except  my  sorrel  mare,  Van  Dorn's  black  mare 
was  the  hardest  trotter  in  the  world,  and  as  we  trotted  fifty-live  miles 
every  day  for  live  or  six  days,  we  had  a  very  unusual  opportunity  of 
learning  all  that  a  hard  trotter  can  do  to  a  man  in  a  long  day's  march. 
Had  it  not  been  that  we  slept  every  night  in  a  feather  bed,  that 
soothed  our  sore  bones  and  served  as  a  poultice  to  our  galled  saddle 
pieces,  we  would  have  been  permanently  disabled  for  cavalry  service 
forever.  My  boy  Jem  alone  enjoyed  that  trip.  lie  rode  in  the 
ambulance  all  day  and  slept  ad  libitum  day  and  night  ;  and  except 
when  he  got  a  ducking  by  the  upsetting  of  a  canoe  in  Black  river, 
he  was  as  happy  as  ever  he  had  been  since  the  last  herring  season  on 
the  Potomac.  The  battle  of  Elk  Horn  disturbed  Jem's  equilibrium 
even  more  than  the  upsetting  of  the  canoe.  The  excitement  of 
imminent  danger,  which  was  never  a  pleasing  emotion  to  Jem,  was 
kept  up  at  Elk  Horn  much  longer  than  in  Black  river,  and  I  could 
not  find  him  for  three  days — not,  indeed,  until  we  accidentally  met 
on  the  route  of  our  retreat,  when,  I  must  say,  he  showed  great  delight 
at  "*'  meeting  up  "  with  me  again,  and  took  to  himself  no  little  credit 
for  the  skill  with  which  he  had  conducted  the  movements  of  that 
ambulance  for  the  past  three  days.  It  had  contained  all  of  our 
clothing,  and  blankets,  and  camp  supplies,  of  no  little  value  to 
hungry  and  wearied  warriors.  The  blankets  and  clothing  were  all 
right,  but  we  found  nothing  whatever  for  the  inner  man.  Jem  was 
cheerful,  and  cordial,  and  comfortable,  but  we  never  could  ascertain 
where  he  had  the  ambulance  from  the  time  the  first  shot  was  fired 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

until  the  moment  we  encountered  him  in  full  retreat,  and  with  the 
last  sound  of  the  battle  died  out  in  the  distance  behind  him. 

Yan  Dorn  had  planned  the  battle  of  Elk  Horn  well ;  he  had 
moved  so  rapidly  from  Boston  Mountain,  with  the  forces  of  Price 
and  McCulloch  combined,  that  he  caught  the  enemy  unprepared, 
and  with  his  divisions  so  far  separated  that,  but  for  the  inevitable 
indiscipline  of  troops  so  hastily  thrown  together,  he  would  have 
destroyed  the  whole  Federal  army.  By  the  loss  of  thirty  minutes 
in  reaching  Bentonville,  we  lost  the  cutting  off  of  Sigel  with  seven 
thousand  men,  who  were  hurrying  to  join  the  main  body  on  Sugar 
creek.  But  we  pushed  him  hard  all  that  day;  and  after  he  had 
closed  upon  the  main  body,  Van  Dorn,  leaving  a  small  force  to 
occupy  the  attention  in  front,  threw  his  army,  by  a  night  march, 
quite  around  the  Federal  army,  and  across  their  only  road  by  which 
retreat  to  Missouri  could  be  effected,  lie  handled  his  forces  well — 
always  attacking,  always  pressing  the  enemy  back.  When  he  heard 
of  the  death,  in  quick  succession,  of  the  three  principal  commanders 
of  his  right  wing — McCulloch,  Mclntosh,  and  Ilebert — and  the 
consequent  withdrawal  from  the  attack  of  that  whole  wing,  he  only 
set  his  lips  a  little  firmer;  his  blue  eyes  blazed  brighter,  and  his 
nostrils  looked  wider,  as  he  said,  "  Then  we  must  press  them  the 
harder!"  And  he  did,  too;  and  he  had  everything  moving  finely 
by  sundown,  and  all  the  enemy's  line  before  us  in  full  retreat  at  a 
run,  and  falling  back  into  their  wagon  trains ;  when,  by  misappre 
hension  on  the  part  of  the  commander  with  our  advanced  troops, 
the  pursuit  was  arrested,  our  forces  withdrawn  from  the  attack  to 
go  into  bivouac,  and  the  enemy  was  permitted  to  quietly  reorganize 
his  army  and  prepare  for  a  combined  attack  upon  us  in  the  morning. 
During  the  night,  we  found  that  most  of  our  batteries  and  regiments 
had  exhausted  their  ammunition,  and  the  ordnance  train,  with  all 
the  reserve  ammunition,  had  been  sent  away,  fifteen  miles  back,  on 
the  road  along  which  we  had  come,  and  the  enemy  lay  between. 
There  was  nothing  left  for  Yan  Dorn  but  to  get  his  train  on  the 
road  to  Yan  Buren,  and  his  army  off  by  the  same  route,  and  to  fight 
enough  to  secure  them.  This  he  did,  and  marched  away  unmolested. 

Arrived  at  Yan  Buren,  Yan  Dorn  addressed  himself  to  the 
completion  of  the  reorganization  of  his  army,  thenceforth  known  as 
the  Army  of  the  West ;  and  it  was  there  he  gave  an  illustration  of 
true  magnanimity — very  rarely  known  in  ambitious  men — by  the 
offer  he  made  to  move  with  all  his  forces  to  reinforce  General  Sidney 
Johnston  at  Corinth.  By  this  he  surrendered  the  great  independent 
command  of  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department,  and  all  the  plans  he 


VAN  DOEN,  THE  HERO   OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI.  463 

had  formed,  for  the  sake  of  his  views  of  the  best  interests  of  their 
common  country,  and  became  a  subordinate  commander  of  an  army 
corps  instead  of  the  commander-in-chief  of  an  army.  He  hoped  to 
reach  Johnston  in  time  for  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  and  had  he  done  so, 
would  have  given  a  very  different  result  to  that  critical  battle.  But 
Shiloh  had  been  fought,  and  our  army,  under  Beauregard,  was 
occupying  the  works  of  Corinth  when  Vail  Dorn,  with  the  Army  of 
the  West,  sixteen  thousand  effectives,  reached  that  point.  "We  lay- 
near  Corinth  more  than  six  weeks,  and  three  times  offered  battle 
to  Ilalleck,  who,  with  one  hundred  thousand  men,  was  cautiously 
advancing  as  if  to  attack  us.  Three  times  our  army,  forty  thousand 
strong,  marched  out  of  its  intrenchments  and  advanced  to  meet 
Ilalleck  and  give  him  battle,  but  every  time  he  drew  back  and 
declined  it.  In  every  council  Van  Dorii's  voice  was  for  war.  May 
30th,  18(>2,  Beauresrard  evacuated  his  works  in  a  masterly  manner, 

O  V  ' 

and  inarched  south,  unmolested,  to  Tupelo,  when  he  halted  the  army 
and  held  it  ready  for  battle.  In  June,  Van  Dorn  was  ordered  to  go 
to  Vicksburg,  which  was  threatened  with  attack,  and  was  in  poor 
condition  for  defense.  He  evinced  here  great  energy  and  ability. 
He  repulsed  the  enemy's  fleet,  put  the  place  in  a  good  condition  of 
defense,  occupied  Port  Hudson,  and  there  erected  such  works  as 
enabled  us  for  a  year  longer  to  control  the  Mississippi  river  and  its 
tributaries,  so  as  to  keep  open  free  intercourse  with  the  trans- 
Mississippi,  whence  large  supplies  for  the  armies  on  this  side  were 
drawn.  He  organized  an  expedition  against  Baton  lioiige  during 
this  time,  which,  but  for  the  cholera,  which  swept  oil'  half  of  the 
force,  and  the  untimely  breaking  down  of  the  ram  ''Arkansas'" 
engine,  when  almost  within  range  of  the  town,  would  have  been  a 
brilliant  and  complete  success. 

After  this,  Van  Dorn  urged  General  Price,  who  had  been  ]eft  at 
Tupelo  with  the  Army  of  the  West,  when  Bragg  moved  to  Chatta 
nooga,  to  unite  all  their  available  forces  in  Mississippi,  carry  Corinth 
by  assault,  and  sweep  the  enemy  out  of  AVest  Tennessee,  This, 
unfortunately,  Price,  under  his  instructions,  could  not  then  do.  Our 
combined  forces  would  then  have  exceeded  twenty-five  thousand 
effectives,  and  there  is  110  doubt  as  to  the  results  of  the  movement. 
Later,  after  Breckenridge  had  been  detached  with  six  thousand  men, 
and  Price  had  lost  about  four  thousand  on  the  luka  expedition 
(mainly  stragglers),  the  attempt  on  Corinth  was  made.  Its  works 
had  been  greatly  strengthened,  and  its  garrison  greatly  increased. 
Van  Dorn  attacked  with  his  usual  vigor  and  dash.  His  left  and 
centre  stormed  the  town,  captured  all  the  guns  in  their  front,  and 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

broke  Rosecrans'  centre.  The  division  comprising  our  right  wing 
remained  inactive,  so  that  the  enemy,  believing  our  right  was  merely 
making  a  feint,  detached  Stanley,  with  six  thousand  fresh  men,  from 
his  left  and  drove  us  out  of  the  town. 

Never  was  a  general  more  disappointed  than  Van  Dorn ;  but 
no  man  in  all  our  army  wras  so  little  shaken  in  his  courage  by  the 
result  as  he  was.  I  think  his  was  the  highest  courage  I  have  ever 
known.  It  rose  above  every  disaster,  and  he  never  looked  more 
gallant  than  when  his  broken  army,  in  utter  disorder,  was  streaming 
through  the  open  woods  which  then  environed  Corinth  and  its  for 
midable  defenses.  However  much  depression  all  of  us  showed  and 
felt,  he,  alone,  remained  unconquered ;  and  if  he  could  have  gotten 
his  forces  together,  would  have  tried  it  again.  But  seeing  that  was 
impossible,  he  brought  Lovell's  Division,  which,  not  having  assaulted, 
was  unbroken,  to  cover  the  rear  and  moved  back  to  GhewTalla,  seven 
miles  west  of  Corinth,  encouraging  officers  and  men  to  re-form  their 
broken  organizations  as  we  marched  along.  Xo  sooner  did  he  halt 
at  Che  walla  than  he  gave  orders  to  move  in  the  morning  to  attack 
the  enemy  at  Rienzi.  But  the  condition  of  two  of  his  three  divi 
sions  was  such  that  the  generals  advised  against  attempting  any  new 
aggressive  movement  until  we  could  re-form  and  re-fit  our  com 
mands.  Hy  division  had  marched  from  Chewalla  to  attack  Corinth 
with  four  thousand  eight  hundred  muskets  the  day  but  one  before. 
We  left  in  the  approaches,  and  the  very  central  defenses  of  Corinth, 
two  tho'usand  officers  and  men,  killed  or  wounded;  among  them 
were  many  of  my  ablest  field  and  company  officers.  The  Missou- 
rians  had  lost  almost  as  heavily ;  Lovell's  Division  alone,  not  having 
attacked  the  works  at  all,  came  off  with  but  a  trifling  loss.  It  was, 
therefore,  decided  to  move  down  to  Ripley  by  the  route  we  had  so 
lately  come  over  in  -such  brave  array,  and  with  such  high  hopes. 
But  before  dawn  the  next  morning,  Yan  Dorn  had  moved  the  cav 
alry  and  pioneers  on  the  road  to  Rienzi,  still  resolved  to  capture  that 
place,  and  march  around  immediately  and  attack  Corinth  from  the 
opposite  direction. 

The  plan  was  worthy  of  Charles  XII.,  and  might  have  been 
successful ;  and  Yan  Dorn  only  abandoned  it  when  convinced  that 
he  would  inevitably  lose  his  wagon  train,  and  that  the  army  would 
feel  he  was  rash.  A  friend  said  to  him  finally :  "  Yan  Dorn,  you  are 
the  only  man  I  ever  saw  who  loves  danger  for  its  own  sake.  When 
any  daring  enterprise  is  before  you,  you  cannot  adequately  estimate 
the  obstacle  in  your  way."  He  replied :  "  While  I  do  not  admit  the 
correctness  of  your  criticism,  I  feel  how  wrong  I  shall  be  to  imperil 


VAN  DORN,  THE  HERO   OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI.  465 

this  army  through  my  personal  peculiarities,  after  what  such  a  friend 
as  you  have  told  me  they  are,  and  I  will  countermand  the  orders  and 
move  at  once  on  the  road  to  Itipley."  Few  commanders  have  ever 
been  so  beset  as  Van  Dorn  was  in  the  forks  of  the  llatchie,  and  very 
few  would  have  extricated  a  beaten  army  as  he  did  then.  One  with 
a  force  stated  at  ten  thousand  men,  headed  him  at  the  llatchie 
bridge,  while  Eosecrans,  with  twenty  thousand  men,  was  attacking 
his  rear  at  the  Tuscumbia  bridge,  only  rive  miles  oif.  The  whole 
road  between  was  occupied  by  a  train  of  near  four  hundred  wagons, 
and  a  defeated  army  of  about  eleven  thousand  muskets.  But  Van 
Dorn  was  never,  for  a  moment,  dismayed,  lie  repulsed  Ord,  and 
punished  him  severely;  while  he  checked  Rosecrans  at  the  Tus 
cumbia  until  he  could  turn  his  train  and  army  short  to  the  left,  and 
cross  the  llatchie  by  the  Boneyard  road,  without  the  loss  of  a  wagon. 

By  ten  1\  M.  his  whole  army  and  train  were  safely  over  the 
llatchie,  and  with  a  full  moon  to  light  us  on  our  way  we  briskly 
marched  for  liipley,  where  we  drew  up  in  line  of  battle  and  awaited 
the  enemy;  but  he  not  advancing,  we  marched  to  Holly  (Springs. 
When,  in  November,  Van  Dorn  checked  (Grant's  advance,  lie  then 
occupied  the  works  on  the  Tallahatchie,  which  he  held  for  a  month 
— Grant's  force  was  sixty  thousand,  Van  Dorn's  was  sixteen  thousand. 
lie  then  retired  behind  the  Yallabusha  to  Grenada,  and  awaited 
Grant's  advance  until  Christmas  eve,  1M'J:>?  when,  leaving  the  army 
at  Grenada,  tinder  Loring's  command,  he  moved  with  two  thousand 
horse  around  Grant's  army,  swooped  down  upon  Holly  Springs, 
captured  the  garrison,  destroyed  three  months'  stores  for  sixty 
thousand  men,  and  defeated  Grant's  whole  campaign  and  compelled 
him  to  abandon  Mississippi.  From  that  time  Van  Dorn  resumed 
his  proper  i'olc  as  a  general  of  cavalry,  in  which  he  had  no  superior 
in  either  army.  His  extrication  of  his  cavalry  division  from  the 
bend  of  Duck  river,  equaled  his  conduct  in  the  forks  of  the  llatchie. 

In  the  spring  of  1803,  he  was  the  chief  commander  of  the 
cavalry  of  Bragg's  army,  then  at  Tullahoma  ;  he  had  as  brigade 
commanders  Armstrong,  Jackson,  Cosby,  and  Martin,  and,  with 
about  eight  thousand  men,  was  preparing  to  move  across  the  Ohio. 
His  command  was  bivouacked  in  the  fertile  region  of  Middle  Ten 
nessee.  His  headquarters  were  at  Spring  Hill,  and  almost  daily  he 
would  engage  the  enemy  with  one  of  his  brigades  while  the  other 
three  were  carefully  drilled.  His  horses  were  in  fine  order  and  his 
men  in  better  drill,  discipline  and  spirit  than  our  cavalry  had  ever 
been.  lie  was  assassinated  just  as  he  was  about  to  move  on  the 
most  important  enterprise  of  his  life.  I  believe  that  in  him  we  lost 
30 


466  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  greatest  cavalry  soldier  of  his  time.  His  knowledge  of  roads 
and  country  was  wonderful.  He  knew  how  to  care  for  his  men  and 
horses.  His  own  wants  were  few;  his  habits  simple  ;  he  was  ener 
getic  and  enduring ;  he  deferred  everything  to  his  military  duty ;  he 
craved  glory  beyond  everything — high  glory ;  there  was  no  stain  of 
vain  glory  about  anything  he  ever  did  or  said.  As  the  bravest  are 
ever  the  greatest,  so  wras  he  simple  and  kind,  and  gentle  as  a  child. 
I  remember  one  evening  on  our  ride  across  Arkansas,  we  stopped  at 
the  hospitable  house  of  an  old  gentlemen  (Dr.  Williams)  about  one 
day's  march  this  side  of  Yan  Buren.  We  were  sitting  on  the  portico 
— Yan  Dorn  and  I — when  a  little  child  came  out  to  us ;  he  called 
her  to  him,  and  soon  had  her  confidence,  and  as  she  told  him,  in 
her  child-like  way,  that  she  was  an  orphan,  and  spoke  of  her  mother, 
lately  dead,  his  eyes  filled  with  tears,  and  I  noticed  that  he  slipped 
into  her  hand  the  only  piece  of  gold  he  owned,  and  asked  her  to  get 
with  it  something  to  remember  him  by. 

The  pre-eminent  quality  of  his  military  nature  was  that  he  was 
unconquerable.  Whether  defeated  or  victorious,  he  always  controlled 
his  resources.  As  Napoleon  said  of  De  Soix,  he  was  all  for  war  and 
glory ;  and  he  had  a  just  idea  of  glory.  There  was  no  self-seeking 
in  him,  and  he  would  die  for  duty  at  any  moment.  His  personal 
traits  were  very  charming.  His  person  was  very  handsome ;  his 
manners  frank  and  simple ;  with  his  friends  he  was  genial,  and  some 
times  convivial ;  but  never  did  I  know  him  to  postpone  his  duty  for 
pleasure,  or  to  pursue  conviviality  to  a  degree  unbecoming  a  gentle 
man.  Take  him  for  all  in  all,  he  was  the  most  gallant  soldier  I  have 
ever  known. 


THE  RIGHT  FLANK  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


BY    COLONEL    "WILLIAM    BROOKE-RAWLE. 


IT  is  but  natural  that  the  bat 
tle  which  proved  to  be  the 
turning  point  of  the  Rebel 
lion  should  attract  more  at 
tention,  and  be  more  thor 
oughly  studied,  than  any 
other.  To  some,  it  may  seem 
late  in  the  day  to  discuss  a 
new  phase  of  that  fearful 
struggle;  but  to  those  still 
living  who  there  '*  assisted," 
the  whole  subject  is  one  of 
interest. 

The  u  History  of  the  Civil 
War  in  America,"  by  the 
Comte  de  Paris,  has  been 
written  to  the  end  of  the  year  1802,  with  a  degree  of  ability  which 
is  remarkable.  In  his  search  for  the  truth  concerning  the  campaign 
of  Gettysburg,  for  his  forthcoming  volume,  that  author  lias  loosened 
an  avalanche  of  newspaper  and  manuscript  communications,  especially 
from  "  our  friends  on  the  other  side,"  and  he  may  well  hesitate  before 
attempting  to  reconcile  the  many  disputed  questions  which  have 
arisen.  So  peculiar  do  the  views  of  some  writers  appear  to  us,  that 
we  begin  to  distrust  the  memory  of  those  days,  and  almost  to  question 
the  general  belief  that  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  was  a  victory  for  the 
Union  arms.  Some  might  be  led  to  suppose  that  the  dissensions 
among  the  Confederate  leaders,  rather  than  the  ability  with  which 
General  Meade  handled  his  noble  army,  brought  about  the  results  of 
the  battle.  Indeed,  it  is  almost  becoming  doubtful  to  the  minds  of 
many  of  the  participants  in  the  battle  whether  they  were  even 
present — so  different  from  their  recollections  of  the  events  do  recent 
representations  appear. 

It  has  been  insinuated  by  a  gallant  Confederate  officer  (Major 
II.  B.  McClellan,  Assistant  Adjutant  General  on  the  staff  of  General 

(407) 


468  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

J.  E.  B.  Stuart),  who,  if  indeed  he  were  present,  might  be  presumed 
to  have  been  in  a  position  to  judge  correctly,  that  the  cavalry 
operations  on  the  right  flank  of  the  Union  army  at  Gettysburg 
resulted  victoriously  for  his  cause.  That  this  was  not  the  case,  will 
be  shown  conclusively. 

But  little  has  been  written  of  the  operations  of  the  cavalry 
during  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  So  fierce  was  the  main  engage 
ment,  of  which  the  infantry  bore  the  brunt,  that  the  "  affairs  "  of  the 
cavalry  have  almost  passed  unnoticed,  yet  on  the  right  flank  there 
occurred  one  of  the  most  beautiful  cavalry  fights  of  the  war,  and  one 
most  important  in  its  results.  It  may  be  confidently  asserted  that, 
had  it  not  been  for  General  D.  McM.  Gregg  and  the  three  brigades 
under  his  command  on  the  Bonaughtown  road,  on  July  3d,  1863, 
that  day  would  have  resulted  differently,  and,  instead  of  a  glorious 
victory,  the  name  of  "  Gettysburg  "  would  suggest  a  state  of  affairs 
which  it  is  not  agreeable  to  contemplate.  The  neglect  with  which 
this  portion  of  the  battle  has  been  treated  is  due,  in  a  great  degree, 
to  the  want  of  that  self-assertion  which  was  not  uncommon  among 
the  officers  of  our  Cavalry  Corps.  The  skilful  leader,  gallant  officer, 
and  accomplished  gentleman  who  was  in  command  on  the  right 
flank,  has  allowed  his  modesty  and  retiring  disposition  to  stand  in 
the  way  of  his  claiming  for  himself  and  his  division  the  laurels  to 
which  they  are  entitled.  The  Second  Cavalry  Division,  moreover, 
was  not  a  favorite  among  the  newspaper  correspondents.  None  of 
them  were  attached  nominally  to  its  staff,  nor  allowed  in  its  camps, 
or  among  its  men — for  its  commander  saw  the  mischief  wrhich  they 
worked.  He  was  appreciated  the  more  for  his  rule,  but  there  are 
instances  of  others  thereby  gathering,  in  the  ephemeral  records  of 
the  times,  the  glory  which  he  had  rightly  earned,  well  knowing  that 
no  public  denial  would  come  from  him.  It  is  but  tardy  justice 
which  is  now  being  done  to  him  and  his  command,  and  the  import 
ance  of  the  operations  on  the  right  flank  was  never  brought  before 
the  public  until  the  recent  appearance  of  Major  Carpenter's  able 
article,  containing  extracts  from  the  official  report  of  the  Con 
federate  General  Stuart,  which  is  of  infinite  importance  to  the  true 
history  of  the  battle,  but  which  the  War  Department,  for  some 
reason,  has  hitherto  refused  to  the  public.* 


*  There  has  existed  a  wide-spread  supposition  that  Stuart  and  his  cavalry 
were  not  even  present  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  This  is  partly  owing  to  the  fact 
that,  after  the  battles  of  Aldie  and  Upperville,  Stuart  became  separated  from  Lee's 
army,  and  was  prevented  from  joining  it,  or  from  being  of  any  assistance  to  its 


THE  RIGHT  FLANK  AT  GETTYSBURG.  409 

General  Meade,  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle,  merely  refers 
to  the  fact  that,  on  the  3d  of  July,  "  General  Gregg  was  engaged 
with  the  enemy  on  our  extreme  right,  having  passed  across  the 
Baltimore  pike  and  Bonaughtown  road  and  boldly  attacked  the 
enemy's  left  and  rear;'  and  in  his  dispatches  of  that  date  he  tele 
graphed  in  the  evening  to  'Washington:  u  My  cavalry  have  been, 
engaged  all  day  on  both  flanks  of  the  enemy,  harassing  and  vigor 
ously  attacking  him  with  great  success,  notwithstanding  they  encoun 
tered  superior  numbers,  both  cavalry  and  infantry.'7  Swinton,  in  his 
"Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,'1  states  that  "  during  the 
action  (July  3d)  the  cavalry  had  been  operating  on  the  flanks — Kil- 
patrick's  Division  on  the  left,  and  Gregg's  Division  on  the  right," 
and,  in  a  note,  "the  scope  of  this  work  does  not  permit  the  recital 
of  the  details  of  the  numerous  cavalry  affairs."  And  Bates,  in  his 
"History  of  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,"  which  contains  some  good 
material,  gives  a  few  lines  to  an  account  of  the  operations  on  the 
right  Hank,  correct  in  the  main,  but  he  erroneously  locates  Stuart 
with  his  cavalry  on  the  right  of  the  Confederate  line. 

In  the  oiKcial  maps  of  the  battle-field,  recently  published  by  the 
"War  Department,  the  responsible  duty  of  designating  thereon  the 
positions  of  the  different  portions  of  the  contending  armies,  has  been 
assigned  to  Mr.  John  B.  Bachelder.  lie  also  has  paid  but  little 
attention  in  his  studies  of  the  battle  to  the  operations  of  the  cavalrv, 
but  in  a  memorandum,  apparently  accounting  for  the  absence  from 
other  places  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  command  of  General  Stuart, 
he  makes  a  half-hidden  mention  of  u  Gregg's  Cavalrv""  on  the  maps, 
both  of  the  2d  and  3d  of  July,  as  being  engaged  on  those  days  out 
side  their  limits.  He  lias  fallen  into  error  even  in  designating  the 
roads  on  which  those  forces  met.  This  may,  in  some  degree,  be 
owing  to  the  fact,  that  the  official  surveys,  from  which  the  maps 
were  prepared,  have  not  been  extended  sufficiently  far  to  the  cast  to 
cover  the  Held  of  the  operations,  though  an  equivalent  quantity  of 


commander  during  its  movements  preceding  the  battle,  by  the  interposition  of 
Gregg's  and  Kilpiit rick's  Cavalry.  Stuart  was  thereby  compelled  to  make  a  wide 
detour,  only  reaching  Lee  on  the  2d  of  July  ;  and,  owing  to  this  separation,  and  the 
loss  of  the  "  eyes  and  ears  "  of  his  army,  Lee  had,  to  a  great  extent,  to  move  in  the 
dark.  To  the  fact  of  Stuart's  absence  from  Lee's  army,  many  recent  Confederate 
writers  have  attributed  the  resulst  of  the  campaign,  while  others  maintain  that  the 
two  brigades,  under  Generals  Robertson,  and  Jones,  which  did  not  accompany  Stuart 
upon  his  independent  movement,  were  amply  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  observa 
tion. 


470  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

country  to  the  west,  upon  which  no  events  of  consequence  occurred, 
has  been  included.* 

Even  among  cavalry  officers  a  want  of  appreciation  has  been 
shown.  General  Pleasonton,  who,  though  nominally  commanding 
the  Cavalry  Corps  at  the  time,  was  not  with  any  of  his  divisions, 
but,  according  to  his  own  account,  near  General  Meade  in  the  rear 
of  the  infantry  line  of  battle,  instructing  his  distinguished  chief 
u  how,  in  half  an  hour,  to  show  himself  a  great  general,"  has  recently 
written  an  article  giving,  an  outline  of  the  valuable  services  of  the 
cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  preceding  the  battle  of  Gettys 
burg,  lie  omits  entirely  to  mention  the  important  part  it  took  in  the 
battle  itself.  Though  concluding  in  a  general  way  with  a  glowing 
tribute  to  its  services,  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  from  what  he  writes 
whether  any  portion  of  the  corps  of  which  he  was  the  commander  was 
actually  engaged. 

And  finally,  General  Custer,  who  was  temporarily  serving  under 
General  Gregg  with  his  brigade,  forwarded  independently  an  official 
report  of  the  movements  of  his  command,  which,  in  some  of  its 
statements,  is  not  entirely  ingenuous.  In  the  account  referred  to,  he 
has  taken  to  himself  and  his  Michigan  Brigade  alone,  the  credit 
which,  to  say  the  least,  others  were  entitled  to  share. 


*  Since  this  article  was  first  published,  the  following  letter  has  been  received 
which,  in  justice  to  Mr.  Bachelder,  is  now  given  in  full : 

OFFICE  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  ENGINEERS, 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  December  10th,  1878. 
COLONEL  WILLIAM  BBOOKE-RAWLE, 

Sir — Your  letter  of  13th  ultimo,  transmitting  an  account  of  the  operations  of 
the  cavalry  command  of  General  David  McM.  Gregg  during  the  battle  of  Gettys 
burg,  was  referred  to  Mr.  John  B.  Bachelder,  who  was  employed  by  the  War 
Department  to  plot  the  positions  of  the  troops  on  the  maps  of  Gettysburg  battle 
field,  and  has  been  return'ed  endorsed  as  follows : 

"  In  answer  to  the  letter  of  Mr.  William  Brooke-Rawle,  I  have  the  honor  to 
say  that  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  from  the  removed  position  of  the  field  of  operations 
of  Gregg's  Cavalry,  it  was  found  impracticable  to  embrace  it  in  the  general  survey 
of  the  field  without  reducing  the  scale  to  an  extent  which  would  have  defeated  the 
object  of  the  map,  and  this  is  the  more  to  be  regretted,  as  this  affair  was  one  of  the 
most  brilliant  features  of  the  battle,  and,  it  is  not  improbable,  saved  the  army  from 
disaster.  It  was  spoken  of  at  the  time,  and  I  have  always  understood  that  a  separate 
survey  of  Gregg's  field  would  be  made  whenever  an  appropriation  was  granted  for 
that  purpose,  which  I  heartily  recommend. 

"  I  am,  sir,  yours  with  respect, 

"  JNO.  B.  BACHELDER." 
Very  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

Brigadier  General,  Chief  of  Engineers. 


THE  RIGHT  FLANK  AT  GETTYSBURG.  471 

The  story  of  Gregg's  fight  lias  never  been  told.  The  task  of 
telling  it  now  has  devolved  upon  the  writer,  who  would  have  pre 
ferred  that  some  other  and  abler  hand  had  undertaken  it.  As  it  is, 
tlio  following  has  at  least  the  merit  of  being  written  by  one  who 
witnessed  and  participated  in  the  events  which  he  attempts  to 
describe,  and  whose  comrades  are  ready  to  sustain  him  in  that  which 
he  relates. 

In  the  movements  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  after  crossing 
that  river  in  pursuit  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  the  Cavalry 
Corps  uf  the  former,  with  its  three  divisions,  operated  in  front  and 
on  the  ilanks.  General  Buford,  with  the  First  Division,  took  the 
left  flank,  General  Kilpatrick,  with  the  Third  Division,  the  centre, 
and  General  Gregg,  with  the  Second  Division,  which  was  the  last 
of  the  army  to  leave  Virginia,  the  right  flank.  This  disposition  was 
maintained  as  well  as  conld  be,  but  when  the  column  of  Stuart  was 
struck,  Kilpatrick  was  followed  up  by  Gregg.  In  the  concentration 
upon  Gettysburg,  Gregg,  with  the  First  and  Third  Brigades  of  his 
division,  left  Hanover  at  daybreak  on  the  2d  of  July,  and  about 
noon  took  position  on  the  Bonaughtown  (or  Hanover)  mad,  near  its 
intersection  with  the  Salem  Church  (or  Low  Dutch)  road,  and  about 
three  miles  from  the  town.  The  First  Brigade,  commanded  by 
Colonel  John  B.  Melntosh,  of  the  Third  Pennsylvania  Cavalry, 
consisted  of  his  own  regiment  and  the  First  Xew  Jersey  and 
First  .Maryland  Cavalry  regiments,  and  Captain  A.  M.  liandoFs 
Light  Battery  F  of  the  First  (regular)  Artillery,  four  guns.  It  was 
temporarily  depleted  of  one-half  its  strength  by  the  loss  of  the  First 
Pennsylvania  and  First  Massachusetts  Cavalry  regiments,  which  had 
been  detached  for  service  with  the  Reserve  Artillery  and  the  Sixth 
Corps  respectively.  The  Third  Brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  J. 
Irvin  Gregg,  of  the  Sixteenth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  consisted  of  his 
own  regiment  and  the  Fourth  Pennsylvania,  First  Maine,  and  Tenth 
Xew  York  Cavalry  regiments.  In  addition  to  Randal's  Battery,  a 
section  of  the  volunteer  battery  belonging1  to  the  Purnell  Leirion 

</  o       o  a 

was  with  the  division  until  the  night  of  the  2d  of  July.  This  sec 
tion,  in  the  hurrying  movements  of  concentration,  had  become 
separated  from  its  proper  command,  and  had  been  found,  some  days 
before,  wandering  around  the  country  entirely  on  its  own  account. 
General  Gregg  took  it  along  with  him,  and  showed  it  some  marching 
which  astonished  its  fat  and  sleek  horses  and  well-conditioned  men. 
The  Second  Brigade  of  the  division,  under  Colonel  Pennock  Iluey, 
of  the  Eighth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  had,  on  the  1st  of  July,  been 
sent  to  Westminster,  Maryland,  to  guard  the  army  trains. 


472  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Since  crossing  the  Potomac  on  the  27th  of  June,  the  column 
had  marched  steadily  day  and  night.  Previously,  it  had  been  on 
incessant  duty  since  the  opening  of  the  campaign  on  the  9th  of  June 
at  Brandy  Station,  and  now,  having  been  for  many  days  without  food 
or  forage,  the  division  arrived  with  wearied  men  and  jaded  horses 
upon  the  lield  of  Gettysburg.  Its  numerical  strength  had,  moreover, 
been  considerably  reduced,  for  many  horses  and  men  had  dropped 
from  exhaustion  along  the  road.  So  much  so  was  this  the  case  that, 
in  some  regiments,  it  became  necessary  to  consolidate  the  companies, 
reducing  the  number  of  squadrons  in  each  to  three  or  four. 

Upon  reaching  the  Bonaughtown  road,  pickets  were  thrown  out, 
connecting  with  the  infantry  on  the  left,  and  extending  well  to  the 
right  of  the  road.  The  remainder  of  the  command  sought  a  little 
rest  and  shelter  from  the  scorching  heat,  while  from  the  ridges  of 
hills  could  be  seen  the  conflict  between  the  infantry  and  artillery  of 
the  opposing  armies.  About  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening  a  line  of 
Confederate  infantry  skirmishers  moved  along  our  front,  covering 
their  main  column,  which  proved  to  be  a  portion  of  Johnson's  Division 
of  Swell's  Corps,  advancing  to  the  attack  of  Gulp's  Hill.  Screened 
by  Brinkerhoff's  Ridge  from  the  position  occupied  by  the  cavalry, 
the  enemy  were  not,  at  first,  observed  by  the  pickets,  but  a  party  of 
Confederate  officers,  making  a  reconnoissance  to  the  summit  of  the 
ridge  where  it  crosses  the  Bonaughtown  road,  disclosed  their  approach. 
The  section  of  the  Purnell  Battery,  in  position  on  the  road  near  the 
Howard  house,  planted  two  shells  in  their  midst.  At  the  same 
moment,  those  portions  of  Mclntosh's  Brigade  which  were  not 
unsaddled,  and  which  were  drawn  up  near  the  Little  house,  mounted 
and  moved  forward.  Several  squadrons  of  the  Third  Pennsylvania 
and  First  Xew  Jersey  plunged  down  the  hill  and  across  Cress'  Run, 
then  dismounted  and  deployed  at  the  double  quick.  Coming  to  the 
summit  of  BrinkerhofPs  Ridge,  the  enemy's  line  of  infantry  was 
observed  approaching  also  at  a  run.  Along  the  summit  there  was  a 
stone  wall,  which  each  party  at  once  saw  would  command  possession 
of  the  field,  and  each  redoubled  its  efforts  to  secure  it.  The  cavalry 
men,  however,  reached  it  first — the  enemy  being  but  some  ten  yards 
off — and  poured  in  a  volley  from  their  carbines  which  checked  the 
advance  of  their  adversaries.  The  enemy,  after  some  ineffectual 
attempts  to  take  the  wall,  retired  to  a  more  sheltered  position,  about 
two  hundred  yards  off,  and  heavy  firing  was  kept  up  until  after 
nightfall.  In  the  meantime,  some  of  the  artillery  with  the  division 
was  employed  upon  the  columns  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  which 
could  be  seen  moving  towards  Gulp's  Hill  in  support  of  the  bloody 


THE  EIGHT  FLANK  AT  GETTYSBURG.  4.73 

struggle  for  its  possession.  About  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening,  in 
accordance  with  orders  from  headquarters,  General  Gregg  withdrew 
the  skirmish  line,  substituting  a  picket  line  from  the  First  Xew 
Jersey,  and  moved  his  command  over  to  the  Baltimore  pike,  where 
it  took  position  on  the  south  side  of  White  Run,  in  the  rear  of  the 
Reserve  Artillery,  and  remained  there  during  the  night* 

On  the  morning  of  July  3d,  General  Gregg  was  directed  to 
resume  his  position  on  the  right  of  the  infantry  line,  and  make  a 
demonstration  against  the  enemy.  Finding  General  Ouster's  Brigade 
of  the  Third  Cavalry  Division  occupying  his  position  of  the  previous 
day  on  the  Bonaughtown  road,  Gregg  placed  his  two  brigades  to  the 
left  of  Ouster's  line,  covering  the  right  of  the  Twelfth  Oorps.  A 
regiment  was  dismounted  and  deployed  for  some  distance  into  the 
wood.-  without  finding  anything  in  front.  Scarcely  had  this  been  done, 
however,  when,  about  noon,  a  dispatch  from  the  commander  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  to  General  Meade,  was  placed  in  General  Gregg's 
hands,  notifying  him  that  a  large  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  been 
observed,  from  Cemetery  Hill,  moving  towards  the  right  of  our  line. 
At  the  same  time  an  order  from  General  Pleasonton,  commanding 
the  Cavalry  Corps,  was  received,  directing  that  Ouster's  Brigade 
should  at  once  join  its  division  (Ivilpatrick's)  on  the  left.  Accord 
ingly,  Mclntosh's  Brigade  was  ordered  to  relieve  Ouster's,  and  to 
occupy  his  position  on  the  right  of  the  Bonaughtown  road,  west  of 
the  Salem  Church  road. 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  positions  of  the  opposing  forces,  it 
becomes  necessary  to  examine  the  official  report  of  General  J.  E.  B. 
Stuart,  now  in  the  possession  of  the  War  Department,  but  which 
has  never  been  published  in  full.  After  mentioning  that  his  advance 
(Hampton's  Brigade)  had  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  Gettysburg,  on 
July  2d,  just  in  time  to  repulse  an  attempt  by  some  of  our  cavalry 
(under  Kilpatriek)  to  reach  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  line,  by  way  of 
Ilunterstown,  Stuart  proceeds  to  state  that  he  took  position  on  the  York 
and  Ileidlersburg  roads.  On  the  morning  of  the  3d,  he  moved  forward 
to  a  new  position  to  the  left  of  General  E well's  left,  and  in  advance 
of  it,  where,  from  the  elevated  ground,  there  was  a  view  of  the 
country  for  many  miles.  lie  was  thus  enabled  to  render  E well's  left 
secure,  and  at  the  same  time  to  command  a  view  of  the  routes  lead 
ing  to  the  rear  of  our  lines.  His  purpose,  as  he  himself  states,  was 
to  effect  a  surprise  on  the  rear  of  our  main  line  of  battle,  and  it  is 


-Tliis  position  is  within  the  limits  of  the  official  maps,  but  no  mention  is 
made  of  the  two  brigades  thereon. 


474  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

obvious  that  he  intended  to  accomplish  this  by  way  of  the  Baltimore 
pike,  and  the  roads  hereafter  described,  simultaneously  with  Pickett's 
attack  in  front.  In  the  concentration  of  his  forces  for  this  object, 
however,  Hampton's  and  Fitzhugh  Lee's  Brigades,  as  he  further 
states,  unfortunately  debouched  into  open  ground,  disclosing  the 
movement,  and  causing  the  corresponding  movement  of  a  large  force 
of  our  cavalry,  and  to  this  Stuart  attributes  his  want  cf  success. 
Although  checked  in  his  original  design,  nevertheless,  he  adds: 
"  Had  the  enemy's  main  body  been  dislodged,  as  was  confidently 
hoped  and  expected"  (by  Pickett's  charge)  "I  was  in  precisely  the 
right  position  to  discover  it  and  improve  the  opportunity.  I  watched 
keenly  and  anxiously  the  indications  in  his  rear  for  that  purpose, 
while  in  the  attack  which  I  intended  (which  was  forestalled  by  our 
troops  being  exposed  to  view),  his  cavalry  would  have  separated  from 
the  main  body,  and  gave  promise  of  solid  results  and  advantages." 

Stuart  acknowledges  that  the  position  which  he  held  was  very 
strong,  and  he  is  fully  justified  in  his  description  of  it.  A  country  cross 
road  branches  off  from  the  York  turnpike  about  two  and  a  half  miles 
from  Gettysburg,  and  runs  in  a  southeasterly  direction  towards  the 
Salem  Church  road,  which  connects  the  York  and  Baltimore  turn 
pikes.  About  half  the  distance  to  the  Salem  Church  road,  and  a 
mile  from  it,  the  road  crosses  Cress'  Run,  and  then  rises  to  the  ridge 
mentioned  by  Stuart,  and  known  as  Cress'  Ridge.  A  moderately  thick 
piece  of  woods  on  the  right,  (as  Stuart's  line  faced)  ends  at  the  crest  of 
the  ridge,  affording  protection  and  cover  to  the  supports  of  the  battery 
which  was  subsequently  placed  there.  Screened  by  the  piece  of  woods, 
and  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  cross-road,  is  a  large  open  space  on 
the  Stallsmith  farm,  where  the  Confederate  leader  was  enabled  to 
mass  and  maneuvre  his  cavalry  without  its  being  observed  from  our 
position. 

Gregg's  position  was  as  inferior  to  Stuart's  as  the  general  line 
occupied  by  the  main  body  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was 
to  that  occupied  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  As  Stuart  says,  the 
wThole  country  for  miles  lay  at  his  feet.  The  Salem  Church  road 
crosses  the  Bonaughtown  road  nearly  at  right  angles,  about  three 
and  a  half  miles  southeast  of  Gettysburg,  at  the  Reever  house,  and 
continues  on  about  two  miles  further  until  it  reaches  the  Baltimore 
pike  about  one  and  three-fourths  miles  southeast  of  its  crossing  over 
Rock  creek  and  the  rear  of  centre  of  our  main  line  of  battle.* 


*A  country  road,  parallel  with  the  Salem  Church  road,  and  from  a  half  mile 
to  a  mile  nearer  Gettysburg,  runs  from  the  Bonaughtown  road,  at  the  Howard 


THE  RIGHT  FLANK  AT  GETTYSBURG.  475 

About  three-fourths  ol  a  mile  northeast  from  the  intersection  of  the 
Salem  Church  and  Bonaughtown  roads,  the  cross-road  above  men 
tioned  branches  off  to  the  northwest,  towards  Stuart's  position  and 
the  York  pike.  A  piece  of  woods,  which,  since  the  battle,  has  been 
reduced  in  extent,  covered  the  intersection  of  the  Salem  Church 
road  and  the  cross-road  on  the  side  towards  the  enemy's  position, 
extending  about  equi-distant  on  each  road  from  a  lane  leading  down 
to  John  Hummers  house  and  farm  buildings  on  the  north,  to  the 
Lott  house  on  the  south,  a  total  distance  of  about  a  half  mile  or 
more.  One  side  of  this  woods  faced  the  northwest  and  the  enemy's 
position.  Between  the  ridge  on  which  the  Ilecver  house  stands,  and 
along  which  the  Salem  Church  road  runs,  and  the  higher  ridge 
occupied  by  h'tuart,  but  nearer  the  latter,  is  a  small  creek  known  as 
Little's  run,  shirtir.g  from  the  spring-house  at  Hummcl's.  The 
open  ground  between  the  two  ridges,  which  was  comparatively 
level,  and  which  extended  about  a-half  mile  in  width,  by  a  mile 
in  length,  afforded  an  excellent  opportunity  for  the  maneuvring 
of  cavalry.  The  Hummel  farm  buildings,  eventually,  became  the 
key  point  of  the  Held,  which  lies  about  three  miles  east  of  Get 
tysburg. 

The  force  under  Gregg  numbered  about  five  thousand  men, 
though  not  more  than  three  thousand  were  actually  engaged  in  the 
fight  which  occurred  on  the  ground  described.  It  consisted  of  the 
three  regiments  of  Mclntosh's  Brigade,  Irvin  Gregg's  Brigade,  and 
Ouster's  Brigade,  which,  as  will  appear,  remained  on  the  held.  This 
last,  known  as  the  "Michigan  Brigade/'  was  composed  of  the  First, 
Fifth,  Sixth,  and  Seventh  Michigan  Cavalry  regiments,  commanded 
by  Colonels  Town,  Alger,  Gray,  and  Mann,  respectively,  and  Light 
Battery  M,  of  the  Second  (regular)  Artillery,  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  A.  C.  M.  Pcnnington.  On  the  other  hand,  Stuart  had 
with  him,  as  he  states  in  his  report,  Hampton's,  Fitzhugh  Lee's,  and 
AV.  II.  F.  Lee's  Brigades  of  cavalry,  to  which  was  added,  for  the  pro 
posed  movements  of  the  day,  Jenkins'  Brigade  of  cavalry  armed  as 
mounted  infantry  with  Entield  muskets.  This  entire  force  has  been 


house,  along  the  valley  of  Cress'  Run,  and  strikes  the  Baltimore  pike  by  the  bridge 
over  White  Run,  less  than  a  mile  southeast  of  the  bridge  over  Rock  Creek,  near 
which  latter,  by  Powers'  Hill,  were  the  Reserve  Artillery,  and  the  ammunition 
trains.  This,  being  a  more  direct  one  than  the  Salem  Church  road,  was  used  by 
our  troops  for  operating  between  the  Baltimore  pike  and  the  Bonaughtown  road, 
and,  consequently,  the  rear  of  our  main  line  of  battle  was  even  more  accessible  by 
this  than  by  the  road  above  described. 


476  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

estimated  by  reliable  Confederate  authority  at  between  six  thousand 
and  seven  thousand  men.* 

"When  Mclntosh,  with  his  command,  came  upon  the  ground, 
shortly  before  one  o'clock,  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  Custer,  he 
found  the  latter  in  position,  facing  Gettysburg,  near  the  junc 
tion  of  the  Bonaughtown  and  Salem  Church  roads,  and  covering 
them.  In  his  official  report  of  the  battle,  Custer  mistakes  the  names 
of  the  roads  on  which  he  held  position.  He  erroneously  calls  the 
Hanover  or  Bonaughtown  road  the  York  pike,  and  the  Salem  Church 
road  the  Oxford  road.  He  states,  however : 

At  an  early  hour  on  the  morning  of  the  3d,  I  received  an  order,  through  a 
staff  officer  of  the  brigadier  general  commanding  the  division,  to  move,  at  once,  my 
command,  and  follow  the  First  Brigade  on  the  road  leading  from  Two  Taverns  to 
Gettysburg.  Agreeably  to  the  above  instructions,  my  column  was  formed  and 
moved  out  on  the  road  designated,  when  a  staff  officer  of  Brigadier  General  Gregg, 
commanding  Second  Division,  ordered  me  to  take  my  command  and  place  it  in 
position  on  the  pike  leading  from  York  to  Gettysburg,  which  position  formed  the 
extreme  right  of  our  battle  on  that  day.  Upon  arriving  at  the  point  designated,  I  im 
mediately  placed  my  command  in  position,  facing  toward  Gettysburg.  At  the  same 
time  I  caused  recounoissances  to  be  made  on  my  front,  right  and  rear,  but  failed  to 
discover  any  considerable  force  of  the  enemy.  Everything  remained  quiet  till  ten 
A.  M.,  when  the  enemy  appeared  on  my  right  flank,  and  opened  upon  me  with  a 
battery  of  six  guns.  Leaving  two  guns  and  a  regiment  to  hold  my  first  position, 
and  cover  the  road  leading  to  Gettysburg,  I  shifted  the  remaining  portion  of  my 
command,  forming  a  new  line  of  battle  at  right  angles  to  my  former  line.  The 
enemy  had  obtained  correct  range  of  my  new  position,  and  were  pouring  solid  shot 
and  shell  into  my  command  with  great  accuracy.  Placing  two  sections  of  Battery 
M,  Second  (regular)  Artillery,  in  position,  I  ordered  them  to  silence  the  enemy's  bat 
tery,  which  order,  notwithstanding  the  superiority  of  the  enemy's  position,  was  success 
fully  accomplished  in  a  very  short  space  of  time.  My  line,  as  it  then  existed,  was 
shaped  like  the  letter  L,  the  shorter  branch,  formed  of  the  section  of  Battery  M,  sup 
ported  by  four  squadrons  of  the  Sixth  Michigan  Cavalry,  faced  towards  Gettysburg, 
covering  the  Gettysburg  pike ;  the  long  branch,  composed  of  the  remaining  two 
sections  of  Battery  M,  Second  Artillery,  supported  by  a  portion  of  the  Sixth  Mich 
igan  Cavalry,  on  the  right,  while  the  Seventh  Michigan  Cavalry,  still  further  to  the 
right  and  in  advance,  was  held  in  readiness  to  repel  any  attack  the  enemy  might 
make  coming  on  the  Oxford  road.  The  Fifth  Michigan  Cavalry  was  dismounted, 
and  ordered  to  take  position  in  front  of  my  centre  and  left.  The  First  Michigan 
Cavalry  was  held  in  columns  of  squadrons  to  observe  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 


*  It  seems,  however,  that  a  disinterested,  and,  therefore,  more  reliable  authority 
— the  Comte  de  Paris — has  estimated  the  numbers  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  at  from 
one-third  to  one-half  greater  than  those  given  above.  It  has  been  well  said  by  a 
recent  writer,  referring  to  the  statement  made  by  Stuart  in  his  report  that  the 
two  brigades,  which  did  not  accompany  him  into  Pennsylvania,  were  strong  in 
point  of  numbers :  "As  a  rule,  the  forces  on  the  Southern  side  are  made  out  to  be 
so  nearly  non-existent,  that  one  thinks  of  them  as  a  shadowy  army,  like  the  ghostly 
troops  which  pass  before  the  Emperor  in  the  French  picture  of  the  Revue  des  J/orts." 


THE  RIGHT  FLANK  AT  GETTYSBURG.  4-77 

I  ordered  fifty  men  to  be  sent  one  mile  and  a  half  on  the  Oxford  road,  while  a  de 
tachment  of  equal  size  was  sent  one  mile  and  a  half  on  the  road  leading  from 
Gettysburg  to  York,  both  detachments  being  under  the  command  of  the  gallant 
Major  Webber,  who,  from  time  to  time,  kept  me  so  well  informed  of  the  movements 
of  the  enemy  that  I  was  enabled  to  make  my  dispositions  with  complete  success. 

At  twelve  o'clock,  an  order  was  transmitted  to  me  from  the  brigadier  general 
commanding  the  division,  by  one  of  his  aides,  directing  me,  upon  being  relieved  by 
a  brigade  from  the  Second  Division,  to  move  with  my  command  and  form  a  junc 
tion  with  the  First  Brigade,  on  the  extreme  left.  On  the  arrival  of  the  brigade  of  the 
Second  Division,  commanded  by  Colonel  Mclutosh,  I  prepared  to  execute  the  order. 

The  remaining  portions  of  his  account  require  re-statement  for 
reasons  already  mentioned. 

Upon  notifying  Ouster  of  the  orders  to  relieve  him,  Mclntosh 
inquired  as  to  his  picket  line  and  the  position  and  force  of  the  enemy. 
Nothing  was  said  as  to  any  previous  tiring,  and  everything  was  quiet 
at  the  time.  Cnster  reported,  however,  that  the  enemy  were  all 
around,  and  that  an  attack  might  be  expected  at  any  moment  from 
the  right  and  rear.  The  First  Xew  Jersey,  under  Major  P>eaumont, 
was  at  once  ordered  out,  mounted,  to  relieve  ('lister's  lines,  and  took 
position  in  the  woods  on  the  Salem  Church  road,  facing  to  the 
northwest.  The  Third  Pennsylvania,  under  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Jones,  and  First  Maryland,  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Deems,  were 
drawn  up  in  close  columns  of  squadrons  in  a  clover  field  west  of  the 
Lott  house,  awaiting  developments.  AVhile  in  this  position,  and  a 
few  minutes  after  one  o'clock,  the  tremendous  artillery  tiring  which 
preceded  Picke'tt's  attack  began.  Xot  being  in  the  line  of  tire,  how 
ever,  the  officers  and  men  of  the  brigade,  while  allowing  their  horses 
to  graze,  looked  with  amazement  upon  the  magnificent  spectacle. 

As  soon  as  the  Michigan  Brigade  had  withdrawn  from  the  field 
for  the  purpose  of  joining  Ivilpatrick  near  Round  Top,  Mclntosh, 
who  had  looked  well  over  the  ground,  determined  to  ascertain  what 
force  was  in  his  front  without  waiting  to  be  attacked.  Accordingly, 
about  two  o'clock,  he  ordered  Major  Beaumont  to  deploy  a  strong 
skirmish  line  of  the  First  Xew  Jersey,  and  move  it  forward,  under 
Major  Janeway,  towards  the  wooded  crest,  about  half  a  mile  in  front 
of  him,  and  a  short  distance  beyond  Eummel's,  expecting  there  to 
find  the  enemy.  This  movement  was  a  signal  for  the  deployment  of 
a  skirmish  line  from  Hummel7 s  barn,  where  a  strong  picket  force 
had  been  concealed,  and  which  at  once  occupied  a  line  of  fences  a 
short  distance  to  the  south.  The  First  Xew  Jersey,  which  had 
reached  a  stone  and  rail  fence  parallel  with  that  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  was  dismounted  and  reinforced  from  the  woods,  and  imme 
diately  became  hotly  engaged.  Two  squadrons  of  the  Third  Penn 
sylvania,  under  Captains  Treichel  and  Rogers,  were  deployed, 


478  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

dismounted,  to  the  left  in  the  open  fields,  and  another  squadron  of 
the  same  regiment,  under  Captain  Miller,  deployed,  mounted,  to  the 
extreme  right  of  the  whole  line,  along  the  edge  of  the  woods  covering 
the  cross-road,  above  mentioned,  which  ran  towards  the  enemy's 
position.*  One  squadron  of  the  First  New  Jersey,  under  Captain 
Hart,  remained  drawn  up,  mounted,  in  the  woods,  in  support  of  the 
line.  To  meet  this  movement,  the  -Confederate  skirmish  line  was 
strongly  reinforced  from  the  woods  in  the  rear  by  dismounted  men, 
and  a  battery  was  placed  in  position  on  the  wooded  crest  back  of  the 
Hummel  house,  and  to  the  left  of  the  cross-road. 

The  Confederate  battery  now  opened  fire,  and  Mclntosh  sent 
back  for  Randol  and  his  guns,  at  the  same  time  informing  General 
Gregg  of  the  state  of  affairs,  that  he  wras  engaged  with  a  greatly 
superior  force,  and  requesting  that  Colonel  Irvin  Gregg's  Brigade 
be  sent  up  at  the  trot  to  support  him.  That  brigade  was  yet  some 
distance  off,  and  Gregg,  meeting  Custer  on  the  march  in  the  opposite 
direction,  ordered  him  to  return  and  reinforce  Mclntosh,  and  to 
remain  on  the  ground  until  the  Third  Brigade  could  be  brought  up. 
Custer,  ever  ready  for  a  fight,  was  not  loth  to  do  so.  Wheeling  his 
column  about,  he  moved  up  at  once  to  Mclntosh's  support,  and 
General  Gregg,  coming  upon  the  field,  took  command  of  the  forces. 
In  the  meantime,  the  enemy  attempted  to  force  our  lines  on  the 
right,  but  their  charge  was  gallantly  repulsed  by  Miller's  squadron 
of  the  Third  Pennsylvania,  and  Hart's  squadron  of  the  First  Kew 
Jersey,  in  the  woods. 

The  enemy  having  filled  the  large  barn  at  Hummel's  with 
sharpshooters,  who,  while  picking  off  our  men,  were  completely 
protected  from  our  fire,  Captain  Kandol,  upon  coming  on  the  ground, 
placed  a  section  of  his  battery  of  three-inch  light  ordnance  guns, 
under  Lieutenant  Chester,  in  position,  well  to  the  front,  on  the  edge 
of  an  orchard,  some  distance  to  the  left  and  beyond  the  Reever 
house,  and  opened  upon  it.  Shell  after  shell  struck  the  building, 
soon  compelling  the  enemy  to  abandon  it,  and  as  they  did  so,  the 
centre  of  our  line  advanced  and  occupied  the  enemy's  line  of  fences 
and  some  of  the  outbuildings.  Having  thus  pierced  their  line,  a 
force  was  sent  out  to  take  the  enemy  in  flank,  while  the  left  centre 
moved  up  to  the  line  of  fences,  driving  back  the  portions  of  Jenkins' 
Brigade  which  had  occupied  it.  This  movement  caused  the  left  of 
the  enemy's  line,  held  by  portions  of  Hampton's  and  Fitzhugh  Lee's 


*  Captain  Walsh's  squadron  of  the  Third  Pennsylvania  had  been  sent  out  on 
picket  duty  still  further  to  the  right,  but  was  not  actively  engaged  in  the  light. 


THE  RIGHT  FLANK  AT  GETTYSBURG.  479 

brigades,  dismounted,  to  give  way  also,  and  tlieir  position  was  at  once 
taken.  The  left,  the  centre,  and  the  right  centre  of  our  line  was 
thus  advanced,  while  the  right  still  rested  on  the  woods  on  the  cross 
road,  and  the  Sixth  Michigan  went  into  position  along  Little's  Run, 
on  the  left  rear  of  Trek-hel's  and  Rogers'  squadrons,  occupying  the 
space  thus  opened,  at  the  same  extending  to  the  left  so  as  to  cover 
the  Bonaughtown  road.  Pennington's  Battery  of  six  guns,  upon 
arriving  on  the  ground,  went  into  position  on  the  side  of  the 
Bonaughtown  road,  a  short  distance  west  of  the  Spangier  house, 
and  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  yards  to  the  left  and  rear  of 
Chester's  section.  Between  the  two  Randol  placed  his  second  sec 
tion,  under  Lieutenant  Kinney,  of  the  First  Connecticut  Heavy 
Artillery,  an  officer  of  the  Reserve  Artillery  staff,  who  had  volun 
teered  to  serve  with  the  battery.  By  the  accuracy  of  tlieir  firing 
and  superior  range,  RaiidoFs  guns  soon  silenced  the  enemy's  battery 
on  the  crest  beyond  Rummers,  near  the  cross-road,  and  Peimington's, 
some  guns  in  position  more  to  our  left. 

AVhen  the  ammunition  of  the  First  Xew  Jersey  and  Third  Penn 
sylvania  was  becoming  exhausted,  the  Fifth  Michigan,  armed  with 
Spencer  repeating  carbines,  was  ordered  to  relieve  them,  and  moved 
up,  dismounted,  to  the  front,  along  a  fence  which  intersected  the 
Held  lengthwise  running  at  right  angles  to  the  skirmish  line.  The 
left  came  up  the  line  occupied  by  Treichel's  and  Rodgers'  squadrons 
of  the  Third  Pennsylvania,  behind  a  fence  which  was  slightly  retired 
from  that  occupied  by  the  First  Xew  Jersey  ;  but  before  the  right 
could  reach  the  more  advanced  fence  occupied  by  the  First  .New 
Jersey,  a  dismounted  regiment  from  ~\V.  11.  F.  Lee's  .Brigade 
advanced  in  line  to  the  support  of  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  who 
were  about  to  be  cut  off  by  the  detachment  sent  out  from  Rummers, 
and  made  a  terrific  onslaught  along  the  line.  Treichel's  and  Rogers' 
squadrons  of  the  Third  Pennsylvania,  and  that  portion  of  the  Fifth 
Michigan  which  had  reached  their  line,  held  the  ground  stubbornly. 
After  a  while,  when  the  fire  had  slackened,  Treichel  and  Rogers, 
who  had  been  ordered  to  retire  when  the  Fifth  Michigan  came  up, 
endeavored  to  withdraw  tlieir  men.  The  enemy,  believing  it  a 
symptom  of  retreat,  advanced.  The  Third  Pennsylvanians  came 
back  upon  the  line,  and  again  and  again  this  was  repeated. 

The  First  Xew  Jersey  remained  at  the  line  of  fences  until  the 
last  cartridge  was  used  and  the  last  pistol  emptied,  and  then  fell  back 
upon  the  supports  in  the  woods.  This  movement  was  taken  advant 
age  of  by  the  enemy,  and  the  First  Virginia  was  at  once  ordered 
forward  for  a  mounted  charge  upon  our  right  centre.  As  it  was 


480  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR, 

seen  to  start,  Mclntosh  rode  over  quickly  to  the  Lott  house,  where 
he  had  left  the  First  Maryland  prepared  for  such  an  emergency. 
Gregg,  however,  upon  coming  on  the  field,  had  moved  the  regiment 
over  to  the  right  of  the  Salem  Church  road,  to  guard  more  effectually 
that  important  quarter.  The  Seventh  Michigan,  which  was  to  take 
its  place,  was  just  then  coming  on  the  field  from  the  direction  of  the 
Reever  house  in  column  of  fours.  Ouster,  who  was  near,  also  saw 
the  emergency,  ordered  close  column  of  squadrons  to  be  formed  at 
the  gallop,  and  advanced  with  it  to  meet  the  attack. 

As  the  First  New  Jersey  fell  back,  the  right  of  the  two  Third 
Pennsylvania  squadrons,  and  that  portion  of  the  Fifth  Michigan 
which  had  reached  them,  swung  back  behind  the  fence  which  ran 
parallel  with  the  line  of  the  charging  column  and  intersecting  the 
field  lengthwise. 

The  Seventh  Michigan,  a  new  regiment,  advanced  boldly  to 
meet  the  First  Virginia,  but  on  coming  up  to  the  stone  and  rail 
fence,  instead  of  pushing  across  it,  began  firing  with  their  repeating 
carbines.  The  First  Virginia  came  on  in  spite  of  the  heavy  fire  until 
it  reached  the  fence  from  the  other  side.  Both  regiments  fought 
face  to  face  across  the  fence  with  their  carbines  and  revolvers,  while 
a  scorching  fire  was  centred  upon  the  First  Virginia  from  either 
flank.  The  enemy's  dismounted  line  also  came  up,  and  assisted  the 
First  Virginia  to  pass  the  fence,  whereupon  the  Seventh  Michigan 
gave  way  in  disorder,  the  enemy  following  in  close  pursuit. 

The  First  Virginia,  becoming  strung  out  by  this  movement,  was 
exposed  to  a  terrific  fire  from  the  two  batteries  in  front,  and  from 
the  heavy  skirmish  lines  on  the  flanks,  while  some  of  the  Fifth 
Michigan,  who  had  succeeded  in  mounting,  advanced  to  assist  the 
Seventh.  It  was  more  than  even  their  gallantry  could  stand,  and 
the  First  Virginia  fell  back  on  the  supports  which  were  fast  advanc 
ing  to  its  assistance.  This  was  about  three  o'clock. 

Just  then  there  appeared  in  the  distance,  turning  the  point  of 
woods  on  the  cross-road  by  the  Stallsmith  farm,  a  brigade  of  cavalry.* 
It  was  manifest  to  every  one  that,  unless  this,  the  grandest  attack  of 
all  was  checked,  the  day  w-ould  go  hard  with  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac.  It  was  Stuart's  last  reserve  and  his  last  resource,  for,  if  the 
Baltimore  pike  was  to  be  reached,  and  havoc  created  in  our  rear,  the 
critical  moment  had  arrived,  as  Pickett  was  even  then  moving  up  to 
the  assault  of  Cemetery  Ridge. 


*  Stuart,  in  his  official  report,  states  that  this  force  consisted  of  the  First 
North  Carolina  Cavalry,  and  Jeff  Davis  Legion,  but  that  gradually  the  greater  por 
tion  of  his  command  became  involved  in  the  hand-to-hand  fighting. 


THE  RIGHT  FLAXK  AT  GETTYSBURG.  481 

In  close  columns  of  squadrons,  advancing  as  if  in  review,  with 
sabres  drawn  and  glistening  like  silver  in  the  bright  sunlight,  the 
spectacle  called  forth  a  murmur  of  admiration.  It  was,  indeed,  a 
memorable  one.  Chester,  being  nearest,  opened  at  once  with  his 
section,  at  the  distance  of  three-fourths  of  a  mile.  Penningtoii  and 
Kinney  soon  did  the  same.  Canister  and  percussion  shell  were  put 
into  the  steadily  approaching  columns  as  fast  as  the  guns  could 
lire.  The  dismounted  men  fell  back  to  the  right  and  left,  and  such 
as  could  got  to  their  horses.  The  mounted  skirmishers  rallied  and 
fell  into  line.  Then  Gregg  rode  over  to  the  First  Michigan,  which, 
as  it  had  come  upon  the  field  some  time  before,  had  formed  close 
column  of  squadrons  between  and  supporting  the  batteries,  and 
ordered  it  to  charge.  As  Town  ordered  sabres  to  be  drawn 
and  the  column  to  advance,  Custer  dashed  up  with  similar  orders, 
and  placed  himself  at  its  head.  The  two  columns  drew  nearer  and 
nearer,  the  Confederates  outnumbering  their  opponents  as  three  or 
four  to  one.  The  gait  increased — first  the  trot,  then  the  gallop. 
Hampton's  battle-flag  floated  in  the  van  of  the  brigade.  The  orders 
of  the  Confederate  officers  could  be  heard  by  those  in  the  woods  on 
their  left:  "Keep  to  your  sabres,  men,  keep  to  your  sabres!''  for 
the  lessons  they  had  learned  at  Brandy  Station  and  at  Aldie  had  been 
severe.  There  the  cry  had  been  :  "  Put  up  your  sabres !  Draw  your 
pistols  and  fight  like  gentlemen!''  But  the  sabre  was  never  a 
favorite  weapon  with  the  Confederate  cavalry,  and  now,  in  spite  of 
the  lessons  of  the  past,  the  warnings  of  the  present  were  not  heeded 
by  all. 

As  the  charge  was  ordered  the  speed  increased,  every  horse  on 
the  jump,  every  man  yelling  like  a  demon.  The  columns  of  the 
Confederates  blended,  but  the  perfect  alignment  was  maintained. 
Chester  put  charge  after  charge  of  canister  into  their  midst,  his  men 
bringing  it  up  to  the  guns  by  the  armful.  The  execution  was  fear 
ful,  but  the  long  rents  closed  up  at  once.  As  the  opposing  columns 
drew  nearer  and  nearer,  each  with  perfect  alignment,  every  man 
gathered  his  horse  well  under  him,  and  gripped  his  weapon  the  tighter. 
Though  ordered  to  retire  his  guns,  towards  which  the  head  of  the 
assaulting  column  was  directed,  Chester  kept  on  until  the  enemy 
were  within  fifty  yards,  and  the  head  of  the  First  Michigan  had  come 
into  the  line  of  his  fire.  Staggered  by  the  fearful  execution  from 
the  two  batteries,  the  men  in  the  front  line  of  the  Confederate 
column  drew  in  their  horses  and  wavered.  Some  turned,  and  the 
column  fanned  out  to  the  right  and  left,  but  those  behind  came 
pressing  on.  Custer,  seeing  the  front  men  hesitate,  waved  his  sabre 
31 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  shouted,  "  Come  on,  you  "Wolverines !  "  and  with  a  fearful  yell 
the  First  Michigan  rushed  on,  Ouster  four  lengths  ahead. 

Mclntosh,  as  he  saw  the  Confederate  column  advancing,  sent 
his  Adjutant  General,  Captain  Walter  S.  Newhall,  to  the  left,  with 
orders  to  Treichel  and  Rogers  to  rally  their  men  for  a  charge  on  the 
flank  as  it  passed.  But  sixteen  men  could  get  their  horses,  and  with 
five  officers  they  made  for  the  battle-flag.  Newhall,  back  once 
more  with  the  men  of  his  own  regiment,  who,  as  he  knew  well, 
would  go  anywhere,  and  sharing  the  excitement  of  the  moment, 
rushed  in,  by  the  side  of  Treichel  and  Rogers,  at  the  head  of  the 
little  band.  Miller,  whose  squadron  of  the  Third  Pennsylvania  was 
already  mounted,  and  had  rallied,  fired  a  volley  from  the  woods  on 
the  right,  as  the  Confederate  column  passed  parallel  with  his  line, 
but  one  hundred  yards  off,  and  then,  with  sabres  drawn,  charged 
down  into  the  overwhelming  masses  of  the  enemy. 

The  small  detachment  of  the  Third  Pennsylvania,  under  Treichel 
and  Rogers,  struck  the  enemy  first,  all  making  for  the  color-guard. 
Newhall  was  about  seizing  the  flag  when  a  sabre  blow,  directed  at 
his  head,  compelled  him  to  parry  it.  At  the  same  moment  the 
color-bearer  lowered  his  spear  and  struck  Newhall  full  in  the  face, 
tearing  open  his  mouth  and  knocking  him  senseless  to  the  ground. 
Every  officer  and  nearly  every  man  in  the  little  band  was  killed  or 
wounded,  although  some  succeeded  in  cutting  their  way  clear  through. 
Almost  at  the  same  moment  Miller,  with  his  squadron  of  the  Third- 
Pennsylvania,  struck  the  left  flank  about  two-thirds  of  the  way  down 
the  column.  Going  through  and  through,  he  cut  off  the  rear  portion 
and  drove  it  back  past  Rummel's,  almost  up  to  the  Confederate 
battery,  and  nothing  but  the  heavy  losses  which  he  had  suffered  and 
the  scattering  of  his  men  prevented  his  going  further,  wounded 
though  he  was. 

In  the  meantime,  the  two  columns  had  come  together  with,  a  crash 
— the  one  led  by  Hampton  and  Fitz  Lee  (for  he,  too,  was  there),  and  the 
other  by  Custer — and  were  fighting  hand-to-hand.  Mclntosh,  with  his 
staff  and  orderlies,  and  such  scattered  men  from  the  Michigan  and  other 
regiments  as  he  could  get  together,  charged  in  with  their  sabres. 
For  minutes,  which  seemed  like  hours,  amid  the  clashing  of  the 
sabres,  the  rattle  of  the  small-arms,  the  frenzied  imprecations,  the 
demands  to  surrender,  the  undaunted  replies,  and  the  appeals  for 
mercy,  the  Confederate  column  stood  its  ground.  Captain  Thomas 
of  the  staff,  seeing  that  a  little  more  was  needed  to  turn  the  tide, 
cut  his  way  over  to  the  woods  on  the  right,  where  he  knew  he  could 
find  Hart,  with  his  fresh  squadron  of  the  First  New  Jersey.  In  the 


THE  RIGHT  FLANK  AT  GETTYSBURG.  483 

melee,  near  the  colors,  was  an  officer  of  high  rank,  and  the  two 
headed  the  squadron  for  that  part  of  the  fight.  They  came  within 
reach  of  him  with  their  sabres,  and  then  it  was  that  Wade  Hampton 
was  wounded. 

By  this  time  the  edges  of  the  Confederate  column  had  begun 
to  fray  away,  and  the  outside  men  to  draw  back.  As  Hart's  squad 
ron,  and  the  other  small  parties  who  had  rallied  and  mounted,  charged 
down  from  all  sides,  the  enemy  turned.  Then  followed  a  pell-mell 
rush,  our  men  in  close  pursuit.  Many  prisoners  were  captured,  and 
many  of  our  men,  through  their  impetuosity,  were  curried  away  by 
the  overpowering  current  of  the  retreat.* 

The  pursuit  was  kept  up  past  Hummel's,  and  the  enemy  were 
driven  back  into  the  woods  beyond.  The  line  of  fences  and  the 
farm  buildings  which  constituted  the  key-point  of  the  field,  and 
which,  in  the  beginning  of  the  fight,  had  been  in  the  possession  of 
the  enemy,  remained  in  ours  until  the  end.  All  serious  fighting  for 
the  day  was  over,  for  Pickett's  simultaneous  assault  had  also  been 
repulsed,  and  the  victory  along  the  line  was  complete.  Skirmishing, 
and  some  desultory  artillery  firing,  was  kept  up  at  intervals  by  both 
forces  until  after  nightfall,  these  disturbances  being  caused  by  the 
enemy's  endeavors  to  recover  their  killed  and  wounded,  who  were 
lying  thickly  strewn  over  the  field  in  our  possession.  At  dark  Stuart 
withdrew  to  the  York  pike,  preparatory  to  covering  the  retreat  of 
Lee's  army  towards  the  Potomac.  In  the  evening,  Ouster's  Brigade 
was  ordered  to  join  its  division.  Gregg  remained  all  night  in  pos 
session  of  the  field,  and  in  the  morning  started  in  pursuit  of  the 
retreating  enemy. 

The  losses  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  were  unmistakably  heavy, 
but  have  not  been  ascertained.  General  Gregg  reported  the  losses  in 
his  division  to  be  one  officer  and  thirty-three  enlisted  men  killed,  seven 
teen  officers  and  forty  enlisted  men  wounded,  and  one  officer  and 
one  hundred  and  three  enlisted  men  missing — total,  one  hundred 
and  ninety-five.  These  losses  were  suffered  principally  by  the  Third 
Pennsylvania  and  First  Xew  Jersey  Cavalry  regiments,  which  had 
borne  the  brunt  of  the  fighting  of  the  division.  By  the  time  the 
Third  Brigade  had  come  up,  the  Michigan  Brigade  had  gotten  so 


*  The  successful  result  of  this  magnificent  cavalry  charge  was  attributed  by  the 
victors  to  the  steadiness  and  efficiency  with  which  they  used  the  sabre,  en  masse, 
against  greatly  superior  numbers  of  the  enemy,  many  of  whom  had  exchanged  that 
weapon  for  the  revolver.  It  should  be  a  strong  point,  in  the  present  discussions,  in 
favor  of  the  retention  of  the  sabre  as  a  cavalryman's  weapon, 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

deeply  into  the  fight  that  it  could  not  be  withdrawn.  The  Third 
Brigade  had,  consequently,  been  held  in  reserve  close  at  hand  during 
the  fight,  drawn  up  in  position  south  of  the  Bonaughtown  road,  on 
either  side  of  the  Salem  Church  road. 

Ouster,  in  his  official  report,  stated  his  losses  to  be  nine  officers 
and  sixty-nine  enlisted  men  killed,  twenty-five  officers  and  two  hun 
dred  and  seven  enlisted  men  wounded,  and  seven  officers  and  two 
hundred  and  twenty-five  enlisted  men  missing — total,  five  hundred 
and  forty-two. 

It  has  been  claimed  that  Gregg's  figlit  at  Gettysburg  was  the 
finest  cavalry  fight  of  the  war.  To  borrow  the  language  of  Ouster 
in  his  report  of  it:  "I  challenge  the  annals  of  warfare  to  produce  a 
more  brilliant  or  successful  charge  of  cavalry  than  the  one  just 
recounted." 


LBE  AND  GRANT  IN  THE  WILDERNESS. 


BY    GENERAL    C.    M.    WILCOX. 


OF  the  many  officers  of  dis 
tinction  in  tlie  Union  army,  to 
whom  independent  and  sepa 
rate  commands  were  intrusted, 
in  popular  opinion  Xortli, 
G-eneral  Grant  was  regarded 
as  the  most  successful,  and  in 
abilities  the  ablest;  and  for 
services  rendered  rewarded, 
both  by  Congress  and  the 
President,  in  a  manner  leav 
ing  no  doubt  as  to  the  high 
appreciation  in  which  they 
were  held,  lie  was  promoted 
to  the  grade  of  lieutenant 
general,  and  assigned,  on  the 
10th  of  March,  IbO-i,  by  President  Lincoln,  to  the  command  of  the 
armies  of  the  United  States.  This  order  placed,  subject  to  his  will, 
more  armed  men  than  any  general  of  modern  times  ever  commanded. 
The  object  to  be  accomplished  by  this  law  of  Congress,  and  order 
of  the  President,  concentrating  the  whole  military  power  of  the 
oS'orth  in  one  officer,  was  the  speedy  overthrow  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy,  and  the  subjugation  of  its  people.  To  effect  this,  Ilich- 
nioncl  must  be  taken ;  but  preliminary  to  this,  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  must  be  either  destroyed  or  captured.  The  annihilation  of 
this  army,  the  main  support  of  the  Confederacy,  was  esteemed  by 
General  Grant  as  his  especial  privilege,  as  it  was  his  duty;  and  to 
facilitate  this,  he  established  his  headquarters  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  ;  so  that,  while  giving  a  general  supervision  to  other  armies, 
he  could  personally  control  and  direct  the  movements  of  this  par 
ticular  one,  charged,  in  his  opinion,  with  the  highest  mission. 

The  reputation  of  General  Grant,  before  serving  in  Virginia, 
was  due  mostly  to  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson  and  Vicksburg; 
and  while,  in  a  strictly  military  point  of  view,  neither  can  be  con- 

(485) 


486  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

sidered  as  very  remarkable,  yet  each  was  followed  by  very  decided, 
solid  gains  to  the  North.  The  first  led  to  the  evacuation  of  Nash 
ville,  Tennessee,  and  transferring  the  Union  forces  to  the  west  of 
the  Tennessee  river ;  the  last,  followed  speedily  by  the  surrender  of 
Port  Hudson,  virtually  closed  the  Mississippi  to  the  Confederacy 
and  cut  it  in  twain.  Credit  is  due  to  General  Grant  for  knowing 
where  to  direct  his  blows.  Battles  in  which  the  greatest  numbers 
are  engaged,  and  most  brilliant  victories  won,  are  not  always  fol 
lowed  by  the  best  results  to  the  fortunate  side.  When  General 
Grant  was  assigned  to  duty  as  above  stated,  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  commanded  by  General  Meade,  lay  in  Culpepper  county,  Vir 
ginia,  and,  confronting  it,  across  the  Rapidan,  was  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia.  These  armies  had,  with  two  exceptions,  held 
the  above  positions  since  early  in  August  following  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg.  The  first  was  in  October,  when  General  Lee,  although 
much  reduced  by  detaching  Longstreet  South,  crossed  the  Rapidan 
and  advanced  on  Meade.  The  latter  retired  rapidly,  not  halting 
until  he  had  crossed  Bull  Run.  During  this  retreat  of  Meade  a 
collision  occurred  at  Bristoe  Station  between  three  of  Hill's  Brigades 
and  the  Fifth  Corps,  in  which  the  former  were  worsted.  General 
Lee  returned  to  the  Rapidan,  and  Meade  to  his  old  camp  in  Culpep 
per.  The  latter  part  of  November  (the  second  exception),  Meade 
crossed  the  Rapidan  below  the  Confederate  right.  General  Lee 
changed  front  immediately,  and  moved  rapidly  to  meet  him.  A 
slight  skirmish  occurred  late  in  the  afternoon.  Next  morning  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  took  position  in  the  rear  of  Mine  run. 
The  Union  forces  confronted  it  a  week,  retired  at  night,  hurried 
back  to  the  Rapidan,  and  recrossed  into  Culpepper  without  a  battle 
but  losing  prisoners. 

During  the  winter,  while  on  the  Rapidan,  General  Lee's  troops 
—A.  P.  Hill's  Corps — extended  up  the  river  as  far  as  Liberty  mills, 
six  miles  above  Orange  Court-House ;  Swell's  Corps  on  the  right, 
below  Clarke's  Mountain,  which  was  eight  miles  from  Orange; 
Longstreet,  after  his  return  from  East  Tennessee,  remained  near 
Gordonsville,  eight  miles  in  rear.  In  general,  while  on  the  Rapidan, 
the  troops  were  not  regularly  and  well  supplied  with  good  and  suffi 
cient  rations,  nor  was  their  clothing  of  the  best ;  their  mwale  was, 
nevertheless,  excellent,  and  when  spring  came  the  camp  was  enlivened 
by  the  resuming  of  military  exercises,  drills,  etc.  In  April,  without 
any  orders  being  given,  there  was  a  sending  to  the  rear,  by  officers, 
of  extra  baggage,  and  a  general  but  quiet  preparation  for  the  coining 
campaign,  soon  to  be  inaugurated  early  in  May.  There  was  at  length 


LEE  AND  GRANT  IN  THE   WILDERNESS,  487 

a  little  stir  among  ordnance  officers,  a  more  than  usual  activity  among 
those  of  the  medical  department ;  and  finally,  May  3d,  an  order  was 
issued  to  have,  in  the  language  of  the  camp,  "three  days'  cooked 
rations,"  thus  putting  an  end  to  all  supense.  The  Rapidan  Hows 
within  a  mile  of  Orange  Court-House,  runs  little  south  of  east,  and 
empties  into  the  Rappabannock  eight  miles  above  Fredericksburg. 
Two  roads,  the  old  pike  and  plank,  connect  Orange  Court-House 
and  Fredericksburg ;  they  diverge  at  the  Court-House,  the  first  runs 
between  the  latter  and  the  Rapidan,  somewhat  parallel,  but  at  times 
two  and  a  half  miles  or  more  apart ;  come  together  near  Chancellors- 
ville,  soon  separate  again,  but  unite  within  six  or  seven  miles  at 
Tabernacle  Church,  and  from  that  to  Fredericksburg  there  being 
but  one,  the  plank  road.  It  would  not  be  uninteresting  to  know  the 
strength  and  organization  of  the  two  armies  on  the  eve  of  entering 
upon  this,  their  final,  longest,  most  active,  and  laborious  campaign. 
The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  numbered,  of  all  arms,  fifty  thou 
sand  ;  forty-two  thousand  of  this  aggregate  was  infantry,  divided  into 
three  corps  of  three  divisions  each — the  three  corps  commanders  and 
seven  of  the  nine  division  commanders  being  West  Point  graduates. 
The  cavalry  commander,  the  chief  engineer,  chief  of  artillery,  (quarter 
master  and  commissary,  were  all  graduates  ;  the  medical  director  had 
been  a  surgeon  in  the  United  States  Army. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  reported  by  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  be  one  hundred  and  forty-one  thousand  one  hundred  and 
sixty-six,  composed  .of  three  corps,  Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth,  to 
which  the  Xinth  had  recently  been  joined.  It  is  probable  that 
the  strength  of  this  army  actually  present  may  differ  from  that  given 
in  the  Secretary's  report — may  have  been  less.  Without  know 
ing  the  strength  of  the  cavalry  and  artillery,  they  may  be  estimated 
approximatively  ;  and  these  two  arms,  together  with  the  overestimate 
of  the  War  Department,  may  be  stated  at  twenty  thousand,  leaving 
one  hundred  and  twenty-one  thousand  one  hundred  and  sixty-six  for 
the  infantry.  The  Second  and  Fifth  Corps  had  each  four  divisions ; 
the  other  two,  three  each.  The  corps  commanders  and  chiefs-of-staff 
of  tins  army  were  graduates  of  the  Academy ;  most  of  the  division 
commanders  are  believed  to  have  been  graduates.  In  addition  to  su 
periority  of  numbers,  the  Federals  were  better  fed,  clothed,  armed,  and 
equipped,  and  had  the  means  of  providing  for  the  sick  and  wounded 
in  a  manner  the  Confederates  could  not.  In  all  these  essentials  Avith 
them  were  no  deficiencies  ;  their  transportation  was  better,  the  con 
dition  of  artillery  and  cavalry  horses  was  better,  as  well  as  the  more 
abundant  means  of  keeping  them  in  that  state.  General  Grant  is 


488  ANNALS  OF  THE   WAR. 

credited  with  the  following  words,  and  it  is  believed  they  expressed 
his  design :  "  To  hammer  continuously  against  the  armed  force  of 
the  enemy  and  his  resources,  until  by  mere  attrition,  if  nothing  else," 
etc.  These  words  make  the  impression  that  General  Grant  believed 
he  had  a  serious  undertaking  on  hand,  and  if  his  plan  did  not  propose 
to  make  a  sixty  or  ninety  days'  affair  of  it,  it  certainly  did  clearly 
indicate  that  his  armies  were  to  fight  as  long  as  there  was  a  man  left, 
or  an  armed  enemy  to  oppose.  General  Grant,  after  deliberating 
whether  he  should  cross  the  Rapidan  above  General  Lee's  left  or 
below  his  right  flank,  decided  upon  the  latter,  which  he  is  reported 
to  have  said,  would  "  force  him  back  toward  Richmond,  somewhere 
to  the  north  of  which  he  hoped  to  have  a  battle."  It  will  be  seen 
that  he  had  mistaken  his  adversary.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
now  directed  by  General  Grant,  began  to  move,  twelve  A.  M:,  on  the 
4th  of  May,  for  the  lower  fords  of  the  Rapidan.  The  Second  Corps 
(Hancock's)  being  nearest  the  river,  marched  to  Ely's  ford,  while 
Sedgwick's.  and  Warren's  (Sixth  and  Fifth  Corps)  moved  to  Ger- 
rnanna  ford,  six  miles  above,  the  last  two  corps  preceded  by  Wilson's 
cavalry ;  and  by  one  P.  M.  of  the  4th,  "Warren's  (Fifth)  Corps  had 
crossed  on  a  pontoon  bridge,  and,  continuing  his  march,  halted  near 
the  intersection  of  the  old  pike  and  Germanna  ford  road,  and  went 
into  bivouac.  Sedgwick's  (Sixth)  Corps  crossed  later  in  the  after 
noon,  and  camped  near  the  ford.  "Wilson's  cavalry  advanced  up 
the  old  pike  to  watch  any  move  of  the  Confederates  from  that 
quarter.  Hancock,  preceded  by  Gregg's  cavalry,  crossed  at  Ely's 
ford,  and  by  nine  A.  M.  on  the  4th,  was  at  Chancellorsvillc ;  there 
went  into  bivouac,  having  thrown  the  cavalry  forward  toward 
Todd's  Tavern  and  Fredericksburg. 

It  is  well  to  observe  how  accurately  posted  General  Lee  was  as 
to  the  designs  of  the  enemy,  whose  movement  began  at  twelve  A.  M., 
while  his  own  followed  in  a  few  hours — commencing  at  sunup  in 
some  cases,  and  earlier  in  others.  General  Lee's  troops  moved  by 
the  right  flank ;  two  divisions  of  Hill's  Corps  (Ileth's  and  Wilcox's) 
down  the  plank  road  toward  Fredericksburg,  and  bivouacked  near 
dark  at  Yidierville.  Wilcox  had  made  a  long  march,  having  been 
six  miles  above  the  Court-IIouse.  Ewell's  Corps  moved  on  the  old 
pike,  and  halted  for  the  night  near  Locust  Grove.  Anderson's 
Division,  of  Hill's  Corps,  remained  behind  to  guard  certain  fords 
on  the  Rapidan.  Longstreet's  two  divisions  moved  from  Gordons- 
ville,  to  follow,  after  reaching  the  plank  road,  in  the  rear  of  Hill. 
The  army,  that  had  been  much  separated,  for  convenience  of  passing 
the  winter,  was  now  being  concentrated  as  it  converged  upon  the 


LEE  AND  GRANT  IN  THE   WILDERNESS.  489 

enemy;  and  all  in  good  spirits,  notwithstanding  the  heavy  odds 
known  to  be  against  them.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  5th, 
Gregg's  cavalry  was  ordered  toward  Hamilton's  crossing,  and  the 
Second  Corps  moved  toward  Shady  Grove,  its  right  reaching  out  in 
the  direction  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  under  orders  for  Parker's  store,  on 
the  plank  road.  Warren's  (Fifth)  Corps  moved  toward  this  store, 
extending  his  right  out  in  the  direction  of  Sedgwick,  at  or  near  the 
old  Wilderness  tavern,  to  which  place  he  was  to  move  as  soon  as 
the  road  was  free  of  other  troops.  With  such  orders,  it  was  clear 
that  no  immediate  encounter  with  the  Confederates  was  anticipated  ; 
their  Hank  being  turned,  it  was  probably  believed,  as  before  stated, 
that  they  would  fall  back  toward  Richmond.  The  different  columns 
of  the  l"n ion  army  began  to  move  as  ordered.  "Warren  was  nearest 
the  Confederates,  but  he  was  ignorant,  of  their  close  proximity;  for 
the  cavalry,  that  had  been  ordered  forward  on  the  old  pike  the 
preceding  afternoon  to  observe  the  approach  of  the  enemy  in  that 
direction,  had,  late  in  the  evening,  been  recalled,  and  sent  on  a  scout 
up  the  plank  road  as  far  as  Parker's  store.  This  store  was  near  ten 
miles  from  Vidierville.  The  Confederates  were  on  the  march  quite 
as  early  the  morning  of  the  5th — K  we  11  on  the  old  pike,  Jlill  con- 
t  inn  in:;1  on  the  plank  road,  Johnson's  Division  leading  the  advance, 
with  Kwell  and  Heth's  .Division  leading  with  Hill.  Hill's  troops 
had  advanced  beyond  Mine  run  some  miles,  when  several  shots  were 
heard  far  to  the  right,  and  soon  after  others  directly  in  front.  This 
firing  was  repeated,  and  at  times  in  vivacity  almost  equal  to  an 
active  infantry  skirmish.  That  on  the  right  was  believed  to  be 
between  the  cavalry  of  the  two  armies  on  or  near  the  Catharpin 
road,  while  that  in  front  was  between  Kirkland's  Brigade,  of  lleth's 
Division,  and  the  enemy's  cavalry,  mostly  dismounted.  The  fire  in 
front  occasioned  but  little  delay.  A  few  of  the  enemy's  dead  and 
wounded  were  seen  on  the  roadside  as  the  troops  moved  on.  Xear 
Parker's  store,  the  flank  of  the  column.  Avas  struck  by  a  small  body 
of  cavalry.  They  disappeared  at  once  in  a  dense  thicket ;  but  a 
regiment  (Thirty-eighth  Xortli  Carolina,  Colonel  Asjiford)  of  Scales' 
Brigade,  Wilcox's  Division,  remained  at  this  point  until  the  wagons 
had  passed. 

Warren,  to  guard  Sedgwick's  right  flank,  and  at  the  same  time 
for  his  own  protection  as  he  moved  from  Germanna  ford,  ordered 
Griffin's  Division  forward  on  the  old  pike,  while  the  remainder  of 
the  corps,  with  Crawford's  Division  leading,  moved  on  a  neighborhood 
road  toward  Parker's  store.  It  was  not  long  before  Griffin  met  the 
Confederates ;  and  as  Crawford  approached  the  plank  road,  he  met 


490  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  cavalry  coming  to  tlie  rear,  reporting  them  advancing  on  that 
road  also.  Reports  of  General  Lee's  troops  being  on  each  of  these 
two  roads  having  been  made,  Crawford  was  ordered  to  halt,  and 
informed  that  Griffin  and  Wadsworth  would  attack  on  the  old  pike. 
Getty's  Division,  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  took  position  on  the  plank 
road.  The  historian  Swinton  states  this  to  have  been  at  8.20  A.  M. 
Hill's  two  divisions  were  at  least  eight  or  nine  miles  from  Parker's 
store  at  this  hour.  Ewell's  Corps  bivouacked  the  night  of  the  4th 
nearer  the  enemy  than  Hill  had,  and,  resuming  the  march  early  the 
morning  of  the  5th,  were  first  to  engage  the  Federals.  He  had 
marched  eight  or  nine  miles.  When  the  head  of  his  column  passed 
a  short  distance  beyond  a  road  that  left  the  old  pike  and  lead  to 
Germanna  ford,  the  enemy  was  discovered  to  be  in  front.  Johnson's 
Division  was  formed  in  line  to  the  left  of  the  old  pike,  across  the 
road  running  to  Germanna  ford,  and  was  the  first  to  receive  the 
attack,  made  with  such  force  and  spirit  that  Johnson's  right  brigade 
(General  John  M.  Jones)  was  forced  back,  and  General  Jones  and 
his  aide,  Lieutenant  Early,  in  endeavoring  to  restore  order,  were 
both  killed.  Battle's  Brigade,  of  Eodes'  Division,  on  the  right  of 
Jones'  Brigade,  shared  a  like  fate.  Jones'  Brigade  was  believed  by 
its  division  commander  to  have  been  forced  back  in  consequence  of 
the  artillery  having  been  changed  in  position  or  withdrawn  without 
his  knowledge.  The  other  brigades  of  Johnson's  Division  held 
their  ground.  Early's  Division  was  ordered  up,  and  Gordon's 
Brigade  of  this,  with  Doles',  Daniels',  and  Ramseur's  brigades  of 
Rodes'  Division — Gordon  on  the  right — advanced  and  drove  the 

O 

enemy  back  some  distance.  Johnson,  in  the  meantime,  was  fighting 
heavily  and  successfully.  Quite  a  number  of  prisoners  and  two 
pieces  of  artillery  were  captured. 

After  the  Federals  had  been  driven  back  there  was  a  pause  in 
the  fighting,  when  Hays'  Brigade  of  Early's  Division  moved  around 
to  the  extreme  left  of  Johnson's  Division,  in  order  to  take  part 
in  the  general  forward  movement ;  the  brigade  advanced,  but,  from 
oversight,  was  not  supported,  and  was  withdrawn.  Later,  Pegram's 
Brigade  was  ordered  to  the  left  of  Hays,  and  was  assailed  with 
vigor,  but  repulsed  the  enemy,  inflicting  heavy  losses.  In  Ewell's 
Corps,  Brigadier  Generals  John  M.  Jones  and  Leroy  A.  Stafford 
were  killed,  and  Brigadier  General  John  Pegram  wounded.  The 
Federals  had  engaged  Griffin's  and  Wadsworth's  Divisions,  supported 
by  Robinson's  Division  and  McCandless'  Brigade,  of  Crawford's 
Division — all  of  Fifth  Corps.  When  Warren's  advance  up  the  old 
pike  was  arrested,  and  the  reported  movement  of  the  Confed- 


LEE  AND  GRANT  IN  THE  WILDERNESS.  491 

erates  down  tlie  plank  road  had  caused  Crawford  to  halt  before 
it  was  reached,  Generals  Grant  and  Meade  had  (according  to  Mr. 
Swinton)  just  reached  the  old  Wilderness  tavern,  and  each  of  these 
generals  believed  Warren  had  but  a  small  force  in  his  front,  for 
General  Lee's  flank  having  been  turned,  he  could  not,  in  their  opin 
ion,  have  the  boldness  to  assume  the  offensive.  It  was  under  such 
impressions  that  Warren  received  a  peremptory  order  "to  brush 
away  the  small  force  in  his  front" — and  thus  the  battle  began.  The 
same  historian  states  that  at  about  nine  A.  M.  General  Meade, 
addressing  some  officers  near  him,  said :  "  They  have  left  a  division 
to  fool  us  here,  while  they  concentrate  and  prepare  a  position  toward 
the  Xorth  Anna ;  and  what  I  want  is  to  prevent  those  fellows  from 
getting  back  to  Mine  run."  If  General  Meade  was  correctly 
quoted,  it  is  evident  that  Mine  run  called  up  disagreeable  reminis 
cences  ;  lie  had  been  much  criticised  in  the  Northern  press — and 
many  think  justly — for  not  attacking  the  Confederates  while  in 
position  on  that  stream  the  December  preceding.  But  had  Generals 
Grant  and  Meade  so  willed,  by  being  a  little  more  active,  they  could 
have  had  the  Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  Corps,  probably  ninety 
thousand  infantry,  all  on  Mine  run,  where  it  crossed  the  plank  road, 
by  or  before  sundown  on  the  fourth,  and  would  have  been  within  a 
short  distance  of  Hill's  two  divisions  and  in  rear  of  KwelTs  right. 

General  Warren  failed  "to  brush  away  the  small  force  in  his 
front,"  and  it  was  only  this  failure  that  corrected  the  errors  into  which 
Generals  Grant  and  Meade  had  fallen  in  supposing  General  Lee 
would  retire  toward  Richmond  without  a  battle;  and  after  this 
failure  on  the  part  of  Warren  to  carry  out  his  orders,  Hancock, 
who  had  moved  to  Shady  Grove,  was  recalled,  and  ordered  to  rejoin 
the  other  corps,  and  Sedgwick  to  take  position  on  the  right  of 
Warren.  Hancock  arrived  at  three  P.  M.,  and  formed  in  double 
line  in  front  of  the  Brock  road,  and  Ijecjan  to  Intrench  at  once ;  but 
before  completing  the  work  was  ordered  to  attack  the  enemy  on  the 
plank  road,  and  drive  him  back  to  Parker's  store.  It  will  be  seen 
that  Hancock,  like  Warren,  failed  in  carrying  out  his  orders.  There 
was  some  interval,  near  two  and  a  half  hours,  between  the  fighting 
on  the  old  pike  and  that  on  the  plank  road.  Artillery  and  musketry 
had  been  heard  on  the  former  and  ceased,  leaving  the  result  not 
satisfactorily  known ;  but  as  the  firing  had  receded  in  E well's  front, 
the  inference  was  that  he  had  the  better  of  Warren.  There  was  no 
communication  between  Hill's  two  divisions  on  the  plank  road  and 
Swell's  Corps  on  the  old  pike,  and  the  intervening  distance  was  un 
certain.  The  head  of  Hill's  column  had  been  brought  to  a  halt  a  little 


492  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

before  three  P.  M.  The  Federals  were  known  to  be  in  great  strength 
in  the  immediate  vicinity.  General  Lee  felt  some  uneasiness  at  the 
separation  of  these  two  corps.  Ileth's  Division  took  position  in 
line  of  battle  across  the  plank  road,  and  Wilcox  was  ordered  to  go 
with  his  division  through  the  woods  in  the  direction  of  the  old  pike 
and  open  communication  with  Ewell.  Ten  or  fifteen  minutes  before 
this  order  to  Wilcox  was  given,  a  line  of  the  enemy's  skirmishers 
came  out  into  an  open  space  of  several  acres,  within  less  than  two 
hundred  yards  of  Generals  Lee,  II  ill,  and  Heth.  Seeing  these 
officers  and  the  soldiers  near  by,  they  retired  at  once  into  the  wood 
without  firing.  These  skirmishers  had  come  from  the  direction  in 
which  Wilcox  had  to  move. 

Wilcox' s  move  through  the  dense  woods  was  slow  for  the  first 
half  mile  ;  then  came  a  field  of  that  width,  and  about  a  house,  several 
hundred  yards  distant  in  front,  in  this  field,  a  party  of  the  enemy 
was  seen.  One  of  his  (Wilcox's)  regiments  was  ordered  forward  at 
a  run,  and  captured  twenty  or  thirty,  several  officers  being  of  the 
number.  Two  of  Wilcox's  Brigades  (McGowan's  and  Scales')  were 
left  in  the  woods,  near  the  the  fence  of  the  field,  and  reported  by 
him  to  General  Lee.  From  the  house  there  was  a  good  view  of  the 
old  "Wilderness  tavern ;  the  Federals  could  be  seen  about  it.  This 
was  also  reported,  and  Wilcox  passed  on  with  his  brigades  in  quest 
of  Swell's  right ;  crossed,  a  short  distance  beyond  the  house,  Wilder 
ness  run;  rose  up  in  a  field  beyond,  and  into  woods  to  the  front  and 
left,  five  or  six  hundred  yards,  his  two  brigades  were  ordered ;  but  in 
a  second  field,  and  to  the  right  of  these  woods,  Gordon's  Brigade, 
the  right  of  Swell's  Corps,  was  found.  Wilcox  had  hardly  spoken 
to  General  Gordon  when  volleys  of  musketry  were  heard  in  the 
woods.  He  rode  rapidly  to  rejoin  his  brigades,  but  near  the  woods 
met  a  courier  from  General  Lee,  bringing  orders  for  him  to  return 
with  all  possible  speed  to  the  plank  road,  as  Heth  was  attacked — the 
enemy  known  to  be  in  heavy  force.  The  two  brigades  were  recalled 
at  once,  and  returned  with  a  little  over  three  hundred  prisoners. 
The  musketry  was  heard  in  considerable  volume  on  the  plank  road, 
and  as  Wilcox  recrossed  the  open  field,  the  enemy  could  be  seen 
moving  toward  this  road ;  his  two  brigades  left  near  the  field  had 
been  recalled,  and  when  he  arrived  on  the  field  of  battle  one  of  them 
(McGowan's)  had  already  been  ordered  in,  and  the  other  (Scales') 
soon  followed — the  former  across  the  road  at  right  angles,  the  latter 
to  the  right  of  it,  where  the  firing  then  seemed  heaviest.  The  troops 
engaged  could  not  be  seen,  the  rattle  of  musketry  alone  indicating 
where  the  struggle  was  severest,  and  the  points  to  which  the  rein- 


LEE  AND  GRANT  IN  THE   WILDERNESS.  403 

forcing  brigades  should  be  sent.  A  third  brigade  (Thomas',  of 
Wilcox's  Division)  was  ordered  on  the  left  of  the  road  to  take 
position  on  the  left  of  Ileth,  and  fought  in  line  nearly  parallel  to  the 
road.  The  enemy  were  in  the  rear  of  the  left  of  Ileth.  Thomas 
did  not  get  into  position  on  his  left.  The  fourth  and  last  brigade  of 
Wilcox's  (Lane's)  went  in  on  the  right  of  the  road  and  extreme  right 
of  the  line,  the  musketry  now  raging  furiously  on  the  entire  front. 
Wilcox  rode  forward  down  the  road,  found  that  McGowan's  Brigade 
had  swept  like  a  gale  through  the  woods,  driving  back  all  before  it, 
and  was  much  in  advance  of  our  lines,  both  on  the  right  and  left. 
It  was  deemed  prudent  to  recall  it  to  the  main  line.  The  firing,  and 
of  the  severest  kind,  continued  till  after  dark,  and  then  slackened 
till  eight,  and  soon  after  died  out.  The  two  divisions  had  held  their 
ground,  and  captured  a  few  prisoners.  Xo  artillery  was  used  on  this 
road  by  the  Confederates  ;  two  pieces,  believed  to  have  been  used  by 
the  Federals,  were  passed  over  in  the  road  by  McGowan's  Brigade. 

On  the  plank  road  lleth's  and  Wilcox's  divisions,  eight  brigades, 
about  thirteen  thousand  muskets,  fought.  Of  these  eight  brigades, 
four  were  from  Korth  Carolina,  one  from  South  Carolina,  one  from 
Georgia  and  Mississippi  each,  one  made  up  of  Virginia  and  Tennessee 
troops.  Contending  against  these  on  the  Union  side  were,  first, 
Getty's  Division,  Sixth  Corps,  soon  reinforced  by  Birney's  and 
Mott's  Divisions,  of  the  Second  Corps ;  next,  and  before  five  P.  M., 
Carroll's  and  Owen's  Brigades,  of  Gibbon's  Division,  Second  Corps; 
following  these  were  two  brigades  of  Barlow's  Division,  Second 
Corps;  late  in  the  afternoon  Wadsworth's  Division  and  Baxter's 
Brigade,  of  Robinson's  Division,  Fifth  Corps.  The  statement  made 
as  to  Federal  troops  engaged  on  the  two  roads,  and  throughout  the 
two  days'  collision,  is  taken  mostly  from  Swinton's  "History  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac."  General  Lee's  infantry  was  composed  of 
nine  divisions ;  one  (Pickett's)  was  absent  below  Richmond,  and  not 
included  in  the  estimate  of  forty-two  thousand  for  the  infantry. 
This  would  give  an  average,  therefore,  of  five  thousand  two  hundred 
and  fifty  to  each  one  of  the  eight  divisions  with  General  Lee.  Wil 
cox's  and  lleth's  were  in  excess  of  this  average,  the  division  of  the 
former  having  seven  thousand  two  hundred  muskets  present.  In 
E  well's  Corps  were  two  of  the  weakest  divisions,  Early 's  and  John 
son's.  Llodes'  Division  of  this  corps  was  the  strongest  in  the  army ; 
but  one  brigade  of  this,  Johnson's,  was  absent  in  ^orth  Carolina. 
Hoke's  Brigade,  of  Early's  Division,  was  also  absent  at  Hanover 
Junction.  Three  of  the  eight  divisions  of  infantry  were  absent  on 
the  5th — Anderson's,  of  Hill's  Corps,  and  two  of  Longstreet's. 


494  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

There  was  less  than  twenty-six  thousand  Confederate  infantry  present 
at  the  first  day's  battle.  If  our  estimate  of  the  infantry  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  be  correct,  ninety  thousand  of  these  were  present  on 
this  day.  Ewell  had  about  eleven  thousand  muskets;  opposed  to 
these  were  Griffin's  and  Wadfiworth's  Divisions,  Fifth  Corps,  sup 
ported  by  Robinson's  Division  and  McCandless'  Brigade,  of  Craw 
ford's  Division,  of  the  same  corps.  It  has  been  seen  that  Heth's 
Division  alone  received,  on  the  plank  road,  the  first  attack,  and  bore 
the  brunt  of  it  till  the  arrival  of  Wilcox's  brigades  (McGowan's  and 
Scales'),  to  be  soon  followed  by  Thomas'  and  Lane's  Brigades,  and 
that  these  reinforcing  brigades  were  sent  in  on  such  points  as  were 
believed  to  be  most  sorely  pressed,  or  where  they  could  be  best  used. 
"When  the  battle  closed  Wilcox  was  in  front,  and  his  line  much  dis 
jointed — one  brigade  had  fought  nearly  parallel  to  the  road. 

The  historian  Swinton,  referring  to  this  contest  on  the  plank 
road,  after  it  had  been  going  on  an  hour  or  two,  says :  "  The  heavy 
firing  borne  to  the  ears  of  Generals  Grant  and  Meade,  at  the  old 
Wilderness  tavern,  attested  the  severity  of  the  conflict  that  was 
going  on  at  this  important  junction  of  roads  (old  pike  and  Brock 
roads).  It  was  judged  that  the  pressure  on  Hancock  might  be 
relieved  by  sending  a  force  from  Warren's  Corps  to  strike  through 
the  forest  southward,  and  fall  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  Hill."  As 
there  was  about  one  and  a  half  miles  between  Ewell  and  Hill,  and 
fully  a  half  mile  of  this  an  open  field,  in  full  view  of  the  old  field, 
and  bald  hill  near  the  old  Wilderness  tavern,  and  as  there  was  not 
a  skirmish  line,  nor  a  piece  of  artillery,  or  even  a  vidette  in  this 
space,  this  move,  or  one  on  EwelPs  right  flank,  might  have  been 
made  at  any  time  during  the  battle ;  and  the  chances  were  that  it 
could  have  been  made  successfully  if  directed  with  ordinary  skill 
and  courage ;  in  fact,  with  the  supposed  preponderance  of  numbers 
present  on  the  Union  side,  both  Ewell  and  Hill  could  have  been 
attacked  in  flank  and  rear  at  the  same  time.  About  nine  o'clock 
General  Wilcox,  from  a  partial  examination  made  under  difficulties — 
thick  woods  and  darkness  of  the  night — but  mainly  from  reports  of 
his  officers,  learned  that  his  line  was  very  irregular  and  much  broken 
and  required  to  be  re-arranged.  He  repaired  to  General  Lee's  tent, 
intending  to  report  the  condition  of  his  front,  and  to  suggest  that 
a  skirmish  line  be  left  where  the  front  then  was,  the  troops  be  retired 
a  short  distance,  and  the  line  rectified.  General  Lee,  at  the  time, 
was  not  over  two  hundred  yards  from  the  point  General  Wilcox 
had  fixed  for  his  own  headquarters  during  the  night,  and  was 
not  over  four  hundred  yards  from  where  the  battle  had  been 


LEE  AND  GRANT  IN  THE  WILDERNESS.  495 

fought.  As  General  "Wilcox  entered  the  tent,  General  Lee  remarked 
that  he  had  made  a  complimentary  report  of  the  conduct  of  the  two 
divisions  on  the  plank  road,  and  that  he  had  received  a  note  (holding 
it  in  his  hand)  from  General  Anderson,  stating  that  he  would  bivouac 
at  Yidierville  for  the  night ;  but,  he  continued,  "  he  has  been  in 
structed  to  move  forward;  he  and  Longstreet  will  be  up,  and  the 
two  divisions  that  have  been  so  actively  engaged  will  be  relieved 
before  day."  General  AVilcox,  hearing  this,  made  no  suggestions 
about  the  line,  as  he  was  to  be  relieved  before  day.  The  failure  to 
rearrange  his  line  and  the  delay  in  the  arrival  of  the  three  rear  divi 
sions,  was  near  proving  fatal  to  the  Confederates. 

By  ten  P.  M.  all  was  quiet;  occasionally  a  man  that  had  been 
sent  to  the  rear  on  some  errand,  would  be  seen  returning  to  the 
front.  It  seemed  almost  impossible  to  realize  that  so  fierce  a  battle 
had  been  fought  and  terminating  only  two  hours  before,  or  that  so 
many  armed  men  were  lying  almost  within  reach,*  ready  to  spring 
forward  at  early  dawn  to  renew  the  bloody  work.  The  night  was 
clear  and  cloudless,  but  with  the  tall  forest  trees  and  thick  underwood 
nothing  could  be  seen  save  the  road  along  which  the  wounded  were 
now  no  longer  borne.  A  line  had  been  determined  in  the  early 
hours  of  the  night  on  which  it  would  be  suggested  the  newly  arrived 
troops  should  form;  but  twelve,  two,  three  o'clock  came,  and  half- 
past  three,  and  no  reinforcements.  An  order  was  then  sent  to  the  rear 
for  the  pioneers  to  come  to  the  front  with  axes,  spades,  etc.,  to  fell 
trees  and  construct  works.  It  was  daylight  before  they  came,  and 
the  enemy  was  found  to  be  too  close  to  permit  their  use.  Clear 
daylight  had  come,  but  no  reinforcing  divisions.  The  struggle  was 
renewed  early  in  the  morning  of  the  Gth  by  Ewell  striking  the 
enemy  on  his  extreme  right  flank  (Seymour's  Brigade),  and  involving 
the  whole  of  the  right  two  divisions,  Wright's  and  Rickett's,  of  the 
Sixth  Corps.  This  attack  was  followed  soon  by  Hancock  advancing 
a  heavy  force  on  the  plank  road.  On  this  the  Confederates  were  in 
no  condition  either  to  advance  or  resist  an  attack.  "Wilcox,  in  front, 
was  in  an  irregular  and  broken  line ;  Ileth's  men  had  slept  close  in 
rear,  without  regard  to  order.  The  corps  commander  had  informed 
General  Ileth  that  the  two  divisions  would  be  relieved  before  day, 


"x"  At  an  early  hour  of  the  night,  after  the  battle  was  over,  Colonel  Baldwin,  of 
the  First  Massachusetts  Regiment,  stepped  a  short  distance  to  the  front  to  get  a 
drink  of  water  from  a  stream  quite  near,  and  found  himself  in  the  midst  of  Con 
federates,  and  was  made  a  prisoner.  Colonel  Davidson,  Seventh  Xorth  Carolina 
Regiment,  became  a  prisoner  to  the  Union  forces  in  the  same  manner,  and  near  the 
same  place. 


496  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  hence  this  unfortunate  condition  of  affairs  at  this  critical  mo 
ment.  The  tree-tops  were  already  tinged  with  the  early  rays  of  the 
rising  sun,  but  the  enemy  lay  quiet ;  at  length  the  sun  itself  was  seen 
between  the  boughs  and  foliage  of  the  heavy  forest,  and  on  the 
plank  road  the  Confederates,  eager  to  catch  at  straws  in  their  unpre 
pared  state,  began  to  have  hopes  that  the  Federals  would  not  advance ; 
but  these  were  soon  dispelled.  A  few  shots  were  heard  on  "Wilcox's 
right,  and  the  firing  extended  rapidly  along  to  the  left,  to  the  road 
and  across  this,  and  around  to  his  extreme  left,  which  was  consider 
ably  in  rear  of  his  line  on  the  right  of  the  road.  The  musketry 
increased  rapidly  in  volume,  and  was  soon  of  the  heaviest  kind. 
Heth's  men  hurried  to  the  rear,  preparatory  to  re-forming  line ;  the 
badly  formed  line  of  Wilcox  received,  unaided,  this  powerful  column, 
which  soon  enveloped  its  flank.  The  fighting  was  severe  as  long  as 
it  lasted.  Swinton  says  of  it,  "  an  hour's  severe  fighting." 

While  the  firing  was  severe  on  the  flank,  a  dense  mass  of  Federals 
poured  into  the  road  from  the  thickets  on  either  side,  and  the  Con 
federates  began  to  yield.  Wilcox  rode  back  rapidly  to  General  Lee, 
found  him  where  he  had  been  the  night  before,  and  reported  the  con 
dition  of  his  command.  His  response  was,  "  Longstreet  must  be  here ; 
go  bring  him  up."  Galloping  to  the  road,  the  head  of  his  corps, 
Kershaw's  Division  was  met,  and  ordered  to  file  at  once  to  the  right 
and  get  into  line  as  quickly  as  possible,  for  fear  his  division  would 
be  forced  back  on  it  while  forming.  Less  than  a  brigade  had  left 
the  road  when  Longstreet  in  person  arrived.  He  was  informed 
where  General  Lee  would  be  found — wdthin  one  hundred  and  fifty 
yards.  In  the  open  space — old  field — where  General  Lee's  tent  was 
at  9  P.  M.,  and  where  he  reappeared  so  early  in  the  morning,  was 
artillery — one  or  two  batteries — on  a  gentle  swell  of  the  surface,  in 
front  descending  and  open  for  several  hundred  yards1;  the  enemy 
were  not  within  one  hundred  and  fifty  or  two  hundred  yards  of  these 
guns.  When  Wilcox's  men  had  fallen  to  the  rear  sufficiently  to 
enable  the  guns  to  be  used,  they  were  directed  into  the  woods, 
obliquely  across  the  plank  road ;  the  enemy  on  the  road  could  not 
see  the  guns.  Wilcox's  men,  while  Kershaw  was  uncovering  the 
plank  road,  and  before  Fields'  Division  formed  on  the  left  of  it, 
filed  off  the  plank  road  and  took  position  a  half  mile  to  the  left, 
between  EweH'a  right  and  the  troops  on  the  plank  road,  filling  up  in 
part  this  long  intervening  unoccupied  space.  Later,  Heth's  Division 
took  position  on  his  right. 

An  extract  will  be  made  from  Swinton,  as  he  is  often  quoted, 
and,  as  far  as  my  information  goes,  is  in  general  quite  accurate ;  in 


LEE  AND   GRANT  IN  THE   WILDERNESS.  497 

the  extract  will  be  found  errors,  but  it  would  appear  that  he  is  hardly 
responsible  for  them.  Page  430  he  says  :  u  General  Lee  began  the 
action  by  striking  Grant's  right  flank,  and  some  little  while  before 
the  time  ordered  by  Grant  for  renewal  of  the  battle  ;*'  and  again  he 
says:  "But  as  the  left  was  the  point  at  which,  by  common  consent, 
the  fiercest  dispute  took  place,  I  shall,  first  of  all,  set  forth  the 
sequence  of  events  on  that  flank.  When,  at  5  A.  M.,  Hancock 
opened  his  attack  by  an  advance  of  his  two  right  divisions  under 
Birney,  together  with  Getty's  command  (Owen's  and  Carroll's 
Brigades,  Gibbon's  Division,  supporting),  and  pushed  forward  on 
the  right  and  left  of  the  Orange  plank  road,  the  onset  was  made 
with  such  vigor,  and  Lee  was  yet  so  weak  on  that  flank,  owing  to 
the  non-arrival  of  Longstreet,  that  for  a  time  it  seemed  as  though  a 
great  victory  would  be  snatched.  At  the  same  time  Hancock  opened 
a  direct  attack,  Wadsworth's  Division  (Fifth  Corps)  assailed  his  flank, 
took  up  the  action  and  fought  its  way  across  that  part  of  the  Second 
Corps  posted  on  the  right  of  the  plank  road.  The  combined  attack 
overpowered  the  Confederates,  and  after  an  hour's  severe  contest 
the  whole  hostile  front  was  carried,  and  Hill's  Divisions  under  Wil- 
cox  and  lleth  were  driven  for  a  mile  and  a  half  through  the  woods, 
under  heavy  loss,  and  back  to  the  trains,  and  artillery,  and  Confed 
erate  headquarters."  This  author,  in  a  note  at  the  bottom  of  page 
431,  says:  "I  use  no  stronger  language  than  that  employed  by 
General  Longstreet  in  a  description  he  gave  the  writer  of  the  situa 
tion  of  affairs  at  the  moment  of  his  arrival.'1  This  combined  attack 
of  great  strength  was  met  by  Wilcox's  Division  alone  :  it  was  followed 
by  the  enemy  less  than  three  hundred  yards,  filed  out  of  the  road  to 
the  left  before  it  had  reached  the  point  where  Ivershaw's  Division 
was  then  getting  into  line  on  the  right,  and  moved  over  to  the  left 
as  before  explained.  Had  it  been  forced  back  one  and  a  half  miles 
it  would  have  run  over  Longstreet's  command  inarching  by  the  flank. 
It  was  not  possible  for  General  Longstreet,  reaching  the  field  at  the 
time  he  did,  to  have  known  from  what  point  and  how  far  Wilcox's 
troops  had  been  forced  back.  The  telegram  of  General  Lee  explain 
ing  this  affair,  he  never  saw,  and  may  never  have  even  heard  of  it  at 
the  time.  It  was  as  follows  :  "Ileth's  and  Wilcox's  Divisions,  in  the 
act  of  being  relieved,  were  attacked  by  the  enemy  and  thrown  into 
some  confusion.-'' 

After  Wilcox  was  forced  back,  the  enemy  did  not  press  forward, 

as  it  was  believed  he  would,  but  made  a  halt,  probably  to  rectify 

alignments,  no   doubt  much  broken.     At  all    events,  this  was    the 

supposition  ;  but,  whatever  the  cause — whether  real  or  imaginary— 

32 


498  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

it  afforded  ample  time  for  Anderson  to  arrive,  and  for  Longstreet  to 
form,  and  when  Hancock  renewed  the  advance,  he  was  repulsed.  It 
was  about  nine  A.  M.  when  the  advance  was  resumed,  according  to 
Mr.  Swinton,  "to  meet  a  bitter  opposition,  and,  although  furious 
lighting  took  place,  he  gained  nothing."  After  this  checking  of 
Hancock,  there  was  a  lull  in  the  contest  for  an  hour  or  more ;  when, 
a  little  after  twelve  M.,  Longstreet  moved  forward,  attacked  Han 
cock's  left,  and  drove  it  back  (Mott's  Division  and  a  brigade  of 
another  division)  in  the  wildest  confusion.  The  whole  line,  as  far 
as  the  plank  road,  was  forced  back,  and  re-formed  on  the  line  from 
which  it  had  advanced  in  the  morning.  In  this  fight  General 
Wadsworth  was  mortally  wounded.  He  lived  two  or  three  days. 
On  the  right  of  the  road,  the  Confederate  left,  General  Longstreet 
was  severely  wounded,  and  Brigadier  General  Jenkins  killed — these 
two  by  our  own  fire  on  the  right  of  the  road.  There  was  now  a 
suspension  of  hostilities  till  four  P.  M.,  when  the  Confederates 
advanced  again — this  time  against  Hancock  in  his  first  position  of 
the  morning.  His  left  was  driven  back,  and  his  iiitrenchments 
carried,  the  troops  forced  from  them  retiring  in  great  disorder 
toward  Chancellorsville.  The  Confederates  were  much  disinte 
grated  and  too  weak  to  hold  what  had  been  gained,  and  were  driven 
out.  The  contest  now  ended  on  the  plank  road,  the  two  lines  being 
(on  the  plank  road)  where  each  was  when  the  battle  began.  Nothing 
had  been  gained  by  the  enemy ;  his  losses  had  far  exceeded  those  of 
the  Confederates  The  battle  of  the  6th  closed  with  Ewell  making 
a  second  attack  on  the  right  flank  and  rear  of  the  TInioii  army.  This 
was  ma.de  by  Gordon's  Brigade,  of  Early's  Division,  and  Johnson's 
Brigade,  of  Hodes'  Division.  These  brigades,  Gordon's  leading, 
struck  the  Federals  (Rickett's  Division)  on  its  right  flank,  doubling 
it  up  and  causing  great  confusion.  At  the  same  time,  Pegranrs 
Brigade,  of  Early's  Division,  advanced  and  attacked  in  front.  A 
large  number  of  prisoners  were  captured;  among  these  were  two 
general  officers,  Seymour  and  Shaler.  This  ended  the  struggle  of 
the  day.  On  this  flank  it  had  commenced,  as  has  been  seen,  early 
in  the  morning ;  but  the  main  battle  on  the  5th  was  on  the  plank 
road.  With  the  Confederates,  there  were  more  troops  engaged  on 
the  plank  road  (Kershaw's,  Fields',  and  Anderson's  divisions)  on  the 
6th,  and  less  on  the  old  pike.  It  was  the  same  with  the  Federals.  On 
the  Union  side,  early  in  the  morning,  on  the  plank  road,  there  was  the 
same  force  as  on  the  previous  evening ;  but  after  AVilcox  was  forced 
back,  Getty's  Division  was  held  in  the  rear,  and  Stephenson's  Divi 
sion,  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  thrown  forward.  Leasure's  Brigade,  of  the 


LEE  AND  GEAXT  IX  THE   WILDEEXESS.  499 

Kmtli  Corps,  was  also  engaged.  On  the  pike,  early  in  the  morning 
of  the  Oth,  were  Rickett's  and  Wright's  Divisions,  Sixth  Corps  ;  in  the 
afternoon,  Rickett's  and  the  greater  part  of  the  Sixth  Corps ; 
Burnside's  Corps  (Xinth),  with  the  exception  of  Stephenson's 
Division  and  Leasure's  Brigade,  not  engaged.  A  body  of  troops, 
on  the  Oth,  appeared  in  front  of  Wilcox's  Division,  then  between 
Ewell  and  the  Confederates,  on  the  plank  road ;  a  few  shots  from  a 
battery  was  all  that  was  used  against  them.  They  were  supposed  to 
be  of  the  Xinth  Corps. 

Such  was  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness.  The  impression  lias 
been  made  that  the  Federals  attacked  the  Confederates  in  a  position 
carefully  selected.  The  latter  had  no  advantage  of  position,  as  it 
has  been  seen  that  the  two  armies  fought  where  they  met.  (  hi  the 
plank  road,  the  Confederates  had  no  cover,  save  that  of  the  woods, 
until  the  7th;  the  battle  ceased  on  the  Oth.  And  this  was  common 
to  the  two  armies.  It  was  different  on  this  road  with  the  .Federals. 
On  the  old  pike,  the  Federals  were  covered  by  works;  the  Confed 
erates,  if  at  all,  slightly  so.  It  would  have  shown  but  little  enterprise 
on  the  part  of  the  former,  with  their  superiority  of  numbers,  to  have 
allowed  the  latter  to  intrench  in  their  immediate  presence.  It  has 
been  seen  that  the  Confederates  acted  on  the  offensive  in  the  battle 
as  often  as  the  Federals.  If  the  latter  attacked  on  the  old  pike  and 
the  plank  road  on  the  5th,  and  renewed  the  attack  on  the  morning 
of  the  Oth  on  the  latter,  the  Confederates  began  the  battle  of  the  Oth 
by  attacking  the  enemy's  right;  and  on  the  plank  road.  Long-street 
made  a  vigorous  attack,  and  in  the  midst  of  success  was  wounded 
seriously.  Later  in  the  day,  the  attack  was  renewed  on  the  plank 
road,  and  intrenchments  carried;  and  yet  later,  the  Federal  right 
attacked.  The  battle  of  the  Wilderness  was  a  Confederate  victory. 
General  Grant  had  crossed  the  Kapidan  below  the  right  flank  of 
General  Lee,  and  purposed  to  pass  through  the  Wilderness  toward 
Gordonsville,  and  down  the  railroad  to  Richmond.  He  hoped  to 
have  a  battle  to  the  north  of  Richmond,  after  having  made  his 
way  through  the  Wilderness.  General  Meade  was  fearful  the  Xorth 
Anna  would  be  reached  by  the  Confederates  and  fortified,  and  was 
also  anxious  lest  they  would  get  back  to  Mine  run,  ten  miles  in  rear 
of  where  the  Wilderness  battle  was  fought.  Having  fought  two 
days,  General  Grant  left  General  Lee's  front  in  the  night  of  the 
7th,  and  moved  off  by  his  left  flank,  and  not  in  the  direction 
proposed. 

About  nine  A.  M.  on  the  5th  of  May,  Generals  Grant  and 
Meade  rode  up  to  the  old  Wilderness  tavern  ;  this  was  the  first 


500  AXXALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

appearance  of  tlie  former  in  what  is  called  the  Wilderness  by  citizens 
of  Orange  and  Spottsylvania  counties,  Virginia.     lie  was,  personally, 
wholly    ignorant   of   this   section    of    Virginia,    with    its   peculiar 
features.     That  he  was  not  familiar  with  its  topography,  the  follow 
ing  extract  from  his  official  report  of  this  "battle  will  show :  "  Early 
011  the  5th,  the  advance,  the  Fifth  Corps,  Major  General  G.  Iv. 
Warren  commanding,  met  the  enemy  outside  his  intrenchments  near 
Mine  run."     And  after  giving  details  of  the  battle,  says :  "  On  the 
morning  of  the  Tth,  reconnoissances  showed  that  the  enemy  had 
fallen  behind  his  intrenched  line,  with  pickets  to  the  front,  covering 
a  part  of  the  battle-field."     Mine  run,  at  the  date  of  the  battle  of 
the  Wilderness,  wras  well  known  North  as  the  place  where  Generals 
Lee  and  Meade  confronted  each  other  for  a  week  the  winter  previous, 
and  it  is  also  well  known  that  the  latter  retired  without  a  battle,  and 
upon  the  grounds  that  the  Mine  run  line  was  one  of  strength.    General 
Grant's  statement  that  the  enemy  were  met  outside  his  intrenchments 
near  Mine  run  carries  with  it  the  inference  that  it  was  in  the  imme 
diate  vicinity  of  this  intrenched  position  that  General  Lee  was  met ; 
and  the  further  statement,  "reconnoissances  made  on  the  morning  of 
the  Tth  showed  they  had  fallen  behind  their  intrenched  line,  with 
pickets  covering  a  part   of  the  battle-field,"  makes  the  impression 
that  General  Lee  had  sought  the  protection  of  the  Mine  run  line. 
General  Meade  and. the  Army  of   the  Potomac  knew  Mine  run  was 
ten  or  twelve  miles  in  rear  of  the  Wilderness  battle-field ;  he  and  his 
army  had  passed  an  entire  week  near  this  run,  made  generally  known 
to  the  country  by  his  army  retiring  from  it  without  fighting.     The 
country  about  and  near  it  was  as  well  known  to  his  army  as  to  that 
commanded  by  General  Lee ;  the  Ninth  Corps  only  were  strangers 
in  this  section  of  Virginia. 

Again,  General  Grant  in  his  report,  says :  "  From  this "  (Gen 
eral  Lee  having  fallen  behind  his  intrenched  line,  and  Mine  run 
being  supposed  to  be  the  line)  "  it  was  evident  to  my  mind  that  the 
two  days'  fighting  had  satisfied  him  of  his  inability  to  further  main 
tain  the  contest  in  the  open  field,  notwithstanding  his  advantage  in 
position,  and  he  would  await  an  attack  behind  his  works."  And  the 
inference  legitimately  drawn  is,  that  it  was  an  indisposition  on  his 
part  to  attack  General  Lee  in  this  (Mine  run)  position,  which  had 
been  regarded  by  General  Meade  as  too  formidable  to  assail,  that 
made  him  hesitate  and  finally  abandon  General  Lee's  front,  leaving 
scores  of  his  dead  tmburied,  and  move  off,  not  in  the  direction  of 
Richmond,  with  the  view,  no  doubt,  of  drawing  General  Lee  out  of 
this  strong  Mine  run  line.  Of  the  casualties  of  the  two  armies,  those 


LEE  AND   GRANT  IX  THE   WILDERNESS.  501 

of  tlie  Confederates  are  not  known  to  the  writer  with  sufficient  accu 
racy  to  venture  a  statement ;  Init  those  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
can  be  ascertained  by  referring  to  the  report  of  the  Surgeon  General 
of  the  army;  they  are  there  given  in  detail,  and  it  will  be  seen,  upon 
examination,  that  the  losses  on  the  5th  and  Oth  of  May — killed, 
wounded,  and  missing — when  added,  amount  to  thirty-seven  thousand 
seven  hundred  and  thirty-seven;  and  if  to  this  prisoners  be  added, 
the  entire  loss  to  the  Union  side  was  over  forty  thousand.  "\Vith 
losses  so  appalling  in  his  first  two  days'  collision  with  the  Army 
of  Xorthern  Virginia,  and  believing  his  adversary  to  be  under  cover 
of  the  impregnable  Mine  run  lines,  General  Grant  abandoned  the 
Wilderness  and  uncovered  General  Lee's  front  by  moving  oil'  by 
his  left  ilank,  commencing  the  march  soon  after  nightfall  of  the  7th. 


THE  "OLD  CAPITOL"  PRISON. 

BY    COLONEL    N.    T.    COLBY. 


THAT  which  is  commonly 
known  as  the  Old  Capitol 
Prison,  and  which  figured  so 
conspicuously  in  the  history 
of  the  late  war,  consisted, 
really,  of  two  separate  and 
distinct  edifices,  locally  known 
by  the  names  of  the  Old  Cap 
itol  and. the  Carroll  buildings, 
and  were  situated,  the  first, 
on  the  corner  of  Pennsylvania 
avenue  and  East  First  street, 
and  the  other  on  the  corner 
of  Maryland  avenue  and  East 
First — a  block  apart,  and  both 
facing  the  Capitol  building 
and  East  Capitol  Park.  The  "Old  Capitol"  was  so  named  from 
having  been  the  temporary  meeting-place  of  both  Houses,  I  believe, 
after  the  destruction  of  the  Capitol  buildings  by  the  English  under 
Ross,  in  the  war  of  1812,  and  the  other  from  its  having  been  the 
property  of  the  Carroll  family,  descendants  of  him  of  Carrollton — 
vide  the  signatures  to  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  Of  course 
the  use  to  which  they  were  devoted  in  the  late  war  was  far  enough 
from  that  for  which  they  were  originally  constructed,  and,  in  fact,  in 
their  earlier  and  better  days,  they  earned,  historically,  a  higher  repu 
tation  than  many  more  pretentious  Washington  edifices.  The  Old 
Capitol,  especially,  after  its  abandonment  by  Congress,  was  occupied 
as  a  fashionable  boarding-house,  and  was  largely  patronized  by  the 
"  creme  de  la  creme  "  of  the  Southern  dwellers  in  Washington.  The 
great  original  nullifier,  Calhoun,  boarded  here,  and  from  out  its  doors 
went  the  gallant,  but  ill-fated,  Commodore  Decatur,  the  morning  he 
met  his  enemy,  Barron,  at  Bladensburg,  in  the  duel  that  cost  him  his 
life.  No  brick  walls,  old  or  new,  in  the  capital,  have  shut  in  stranger 
episodes  and  vicissitudes  of  life  than  these,  and,  I  doubt  not,  each  of 
(502) 


THE  "OLD  CAPITOL"  PEISOX.  503 

its  four  stories  could  many  a  tale  unfold  worthy  special  record  of  life 
at  our  Xational  Capital  in  those  comparatively  primitive  days.  At  the 
breaking  out  of  our  civil  war  they  were  not  occupied,  having,  for 
lack  of  care,  fallen  into  that  neglected,  down  at  the  heel,  slipshod 
condition  of  many  buildings  in  Washington  then,  and  there  existed 
in  their  appearance  little  evidence  either  of  their  past  greatness  or 
future  notoriety.  Both  buildings  were  of  a  size  to  indicate  that  they 
were  built  either  for  very  large  families,  with  many  servants  (which 
is  probable,  inasmuch  as  they  were  erected  in  the  days  when  slavery 
made  servants  plentiful),  or  for  boarding-houses,  and  contained  in  all 
forty  or  fifty  rooms  each— many  of  them  fjuite  large.  Their  tenant- 
less  condition,  added  to  their  roominess  and  locution,  doubtless, 
recommended  them  to  a  government  suddenly  and  unexpectedly 
called  upon  to  provide  a  place  of  confinement  for  many  prisoners, 
and  little  outlay  was  needed  to  fit  them  for  the  purpose,  as  they 
always  depended  more  upon  the  vigilance  and  care  of  the  guards  for 
the  safe  keeping  of  prisoners  than  upon  bolts  and  bars.  To  be  sure, 
there  were  iron  bars  at  some  of  the  windows;  but  as  they  were  onlv 
inserted  in  the  soft  wood  of  the  window  frames  it  will  be  seen  that 
they  were  only  an  apparent,  and  not  real  addition  to  security.  Locks 
were  attached  to  each  door,  and,  with  some  addition  to  the  cooking 
apparatus,  the  hotel  was  ready  for  its  guests.  A  guard  of  about 
sixty  men,  under  the  command  of  a  captain  or  lieutenant,  was  daily 
detailed  from  a  neighboring  infantry  regiment,  to  each  prison,  doing 
regular  guard  duty,  two  hours  on  and  four  off,  day  and  night. 

The  character  of  the  prisoners  was  a  matter  of  wide  variation, 
differing  in  this  particular  from  any  other  place  of  confinement. 
Especially  is  this  true  of  the  Old  Capitol,  where  were  held  the  priso 
ners  of  State  particularly,  such  as  parties  charged  Avith  active  disloy 
alty  at  the  Xorth,  bounty  frauds,  counterfeiters  of  United  States 
notes  and  other  issues,  contractors  who  had  swindled  the  government, 
and,  I  doubt  not,  men  who  were  arrested  by  detectives  upon  trumped- 
up  charges  simply  to  blackmail  them,  and  who  were  wholly  inno 
cent.  In  fact,  it  would  be  quite  unfair  to  assume  that  because  one 
had  been  a  prisoner  here,  that  he  was,  therefore,  a  criminal,  for  I  met 
Tint  a  ij  gentlemen  there,  as  prisoner s,  too,  whose  claims  to  regard  as 
gentlemen  and  men  of  refinement  and  social  standing  is  to-d<uj  wide 
ly  honored.  Per  contra,  there  were  a  few,  and  but  a  few,  who 
gravitated  naturally  to  a  prison.  In  saying  this  I  refer  strictlv  to 
the  civil  prisoners,  as  among  the  prisoners  of  war  there  was  the  usual 
variety  of  humanity — generally  of  the  better  class — as  very  few 
privates  of  the  Southern  army  found  their  way  here,  except  they 


504:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

were  special  cases,  either  awaiting  trial  by  court-martial  or  under 
sentence,  and  temporarily  held  there  for  the  convenience  of  the  gov 
ernment.  Thus  it  was  the  pleasure  of  the  authorities  to  regard 
those  captured  from  Mosby's  following  ("guerrillas")  as  special 
cases,  and  I  had  some  twenty  of  them — rough,  dirty,  ill-looking  cus 
tomers  they  were — in  a  large  room  on  the  fourth  floor  of  the  Old 
Capitol,  fronting  on  the  street.  They  were  a  turbulent  and  unruly 
set,  and  often  amused  themselves  by  throwing  bricks  (taken  from  an 
old  fireplace  in  their  room)  at  the  sentinels  on  the  pavement  under 
neath  their  window,  and,  in  one  or  two  cases,  barely  escaped  killing 
them.  All  other  means  failing,  and  provoked  at  last,  I  notified  them 
that  I  had  given  orders  to  the  guard  to  fire  on  any  one  showing  him 
self  at  the  window,  and  that  they  were  responsible  for  it,  and  for  the 
result.  I  am  happy  to  say  no  one  was  injured,  although  they  tested 
both  the  obedience  and  correct  aim  of  the  sentinel  by  putting  one 
of  their  old  hats  on  a  stick  and  pushing  it  up  to  the  window  and 
getting  a  ball  through  it — but  the  brick  throwing  was  ended. 

It  is  proper  to  say,  in  this  connection,  that  there  was  no  means 
of  punishing  a  refractory  prisoner — as  there  were  no  "dungeons"  in 
either  prison — nor  did  I  ever  see  a  prisoner  ironed  beyond  being 
handcuffed,  and  that  only .  in  very  few  cases  and  for  a  temporary 
purpose,  and  not  once  as  a  punishment.  The  food  served  was  a 
soldier's  full  ration,  cooked,  and  many  purchased  at  neighboring 
restaurants  (by  written  order)  anything  they  wished,  even  wine  and 
cigars ;  the  privilege  of  so  buying,  however,  being  mostly  confined 
to  civilians,  who  often  had  plenty  of  money,  which  officers  or  soldiers 
rarely  had.  Of  course,  the  money  and  valuables  of  each  prisoner  was 
taken  from  him  on  his  entrance  to  the  prison,  and  a  receipt  given  him 
by  the  superintendent,  but  he  was  at  liberty  to  draw  it  for  legitimate 
uses  as  pleased  him.  Knives  were  also  taken  from  the  prisoners, 
and  upon  assuming  the  command  of  the  prisons  I  receipted  for,  to 
my  predecessor,  among  other  valuables,  something  like  a  hundred 
thousand  dollars  in  money  and  United  States  bonds  and  &full  bushel 
of  pocket-knives !  I  speak  thus  accurately  of  the  measure  as  they 
were  contained  in  two  half-bushel  measures,  fairly  level  full,  being 
those  belonging  to  prisoners  then  in  confinement,  as  well  as  to  many 
hundreds  who  had  been  released  or  sent  elsewhere  and  forgotten  to 
ask  for  them.  A  noted  English  hotel  thief,  who  was  held  by  the 
authorities  as  a  witness,  gave  up  on  his  admission  to  the  prison  about 
five  thousand  dollars'  worth  of  jewelry,  mostly  diamonds,  and  naively 
answered  tny  query  as  to  where  he  got  them  by  saying  concisely, 
"  prigged  'em,"  i.  <?.,  stole  them.  He  was  a  gentlemanly-looking 


THE  "  OLD  CAPITOL  "  PRISON.  505 

fellow,  and  seemed  actually  to  believe  his  profession  as  matter  of 
fact  as  any  other,  and  frankly  admitted  it.  A  Jew  was  arrested  and 
brought  to  prison  charged  with  having  come  through  the  army  lines 
from  l)ixie,  and  upon  being  searched,  previous  to  assignment  to 
quarters,  was  found  to  be  wrapped  in  a  long  piece  of  muslin  in 
which  several  hundred  dollars  in  gold  pieces  were  carefully  sewed, 
and  his  misery  in  seeing  them  ripped  ruthlessly  from  their  hiding 
place  was  extreme,  equaled  only  by  the  scorn  which  he  regarded  my 
receipt  for  the  much-loved  hoard.  After  a  trial  which  restored  him 
to  freedom,  however,  he  presented  his  scorned  acknowledgment,  and 
thought  better  of  it  when  it  returned  to  his  possession  his  treasure. 
The  Avar  had  made  money  plenty,  and  it  often  fell  temporarily  into 
strange  and  unaccustomed  hands,  and  from  prisoners  charged  with 
bounty  frauds  I  received  as  high  as  twenty  or  thirty  thousand  dollars 
in  nutes  and  bonds — the  results,  doubtless,  of  their  rascality.  The 
jealousy  of  the  authorities  regarding  the  safe-keeping  of  this  large 
amount  of  money  is  illustrated  by  the  following  incident :  Standing 
in  the  prison  yard  upon  one  occasion  while  a  detachment  of  prisoners 
were  taking  their  daily  airing,  I  was  approached  by  one  who  begged 
a  few  minutes'  conversation,  the  substance  of  which,  after  a  slight 
preface,  was  the  offer  of  live  hundred  dollars  (which  he  held  my 
receipt  for,  having  given  it  up  on  his  admission)  if  I  would  allow 
him  to  write  a  letter  and  forward  it  to  its  destination  'inir<:<t<L  Tell 
ing  him  I  would  communicate  with  him  in  regard  to  the  matter 
later,  he  went  to  his  room,  from  which  I  summoned  him  within  an 
hour  by  the  corporal  of  the  guard  and  confined  him  alone  in  a  small 
room  on  the  ground  floor,  without  windows,  save  in  the  door,  and 
kept  him  there  a  week  on  strict  bread  and  water  diet,  and  a  few 
days  after  he  was  released  from  prison  upon  an  order  from  the  AVar 
Department.  Kor  did  I  learn  till  long  after  that  he  was  a  Secret 
Service  Agent  and  imprisoned  specially  to  make  me  the  offer  he 
did,  and  that  his  report  of  his  success  was  received  with  roars  of 
laughter  from  his  superior  officers. 

The  fidelity  with  which  the  prisons  were  guarded  is  attested  by 
the  few  escapes  that  occurred,  only  two  that  were  successful  taking 
place  during  my  command  of  over  a  year.  One  from  Carroll  Prison 
of  a  Virginia  colonel,  who  lowered  himself  from  a  third-story  window 
with  a  rope  made  from  his  blanket ;  which  rope,  by  the  way,  proved 
too  short,  and  came  near  proving  fatal  to  both  life  and  escape.  The 
night  selected  for  the  attempt  was  dark  and  rainy,  and  he  carefully 
descended  hand  over  hand  till  he  felt  the  end  of  the  rope  ;  to  reascend 
was  impossible,  and  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  drop,  which  he 


506  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

did,  coming  down  on  the  pavement  with  a  crash  within  six  feet  of 
the  sentinel  with  his  loaded  musket.  Probably  no  sweeter  sound 
ever  fell  on  the  ear  of  that  colonel  than  the  dull,  unmeaning  click  of 
the  gun,  which  (doubtless  owing  to  the  rain)  missed  fire  when  leveled 
at  his  breast,  the  muzzle  scarce  a  yard  away ;  and  ere  aid  could  come, 
he  bounded  off  into  the  darkness  and  disappeared.  The  attempt  was 
gallant  enough  to  have  proved  a  permanent  success,  but  he  was 
returned  to  me  by  General  Lew  Wallace,  within  a  month,  having 
been  retaken  in  Baltimore. 

Attempted  escapes  were  more  numerous,  however,  some  of  them 
of  such  a  nature  as,  I  think,  to  much  interest  the  reader.  One, 
especially,  borders  on  the  marvelous,  and  yet  I  vouch  for  its  entire 
accuracy,  and  can  substantiate  it  fully  from  documents  now  in  my 
possession.  It  is  as  follows :  A  citizen  of  Maryland,  whom,  for  the 
purpose  of  this  narrative  we  will  name  Brown,  was  arrested  and  sent 
to  the  Old  Capitol,  charged  with  having  killed  a  Union  soldier  in  an 
affray  during  a  drinking  spree ;  and,  as  he  was  well  known  to  be  an 
ardent  sympathizer  with  the  Southern  cause,  it  was  inferred  that  he 
was  influenced  by  that  motive  in  the  killing — but  with  this  our  story 
has  nothing  to  do.  He  was  an  uneducated,  ignorant,  superstitious 
man — probably  a  sample  of  "poor  white  trash"  of  the  South — and, 
as  the  result  shows,  easily  imposed  upon.  He  was  assigned  to  a 
room  on  the  fourth  floor,  in  which  there  was  already  an  occupant, 
who  seemed  ill-pleased  to  share  his  bed  and  board  with  a  new  comer, 
whose  appearance  he  evidently  did  not  admire.  However,  nolens 
volenS)  Brown  was  and  must  be  his  room-mate,  as  the  crowded  con 
dition  of  the  building  made  other  disposition  impossible,  and  thus 
was  developed  a  plan  to  be  rid  of  him,  purely  devilish,  as  follows : 
For  a  few  days  he  manifested  a  friendly  disposition  toward  Brown 
until  he  succeeded  in  winning  his  confidence.  Then,  one  day,  upon 
returning  to  the  room  after  a  visit  to  the  prison  yard,  he  informed 
Brown  that  he  had  overheard  the  colonel  commanding  the  prisons 
giving  orders  preparatory  to  his  (Brown's)  execution  by  shooting,  to 
take  place  the  next  morning.  Believing  this  absurd  tale,  the  effect 
on  Brown  was  terrible,  and  so  thoroughly  was  he  frightened  that  he 
dashed  about  the  room  with  wild  cries  of  anguish  and  despair,  and 
it  was  with  much  difficulty  his  companion  could  quiet  him  sufficiently 
to  reveal  a  plan  which  he  pretended  he  had  safely  arranged  for  his 
escape  from  the  impending  doom.  Escape!  it  was  heaven,  and 
Brown  listened  with  an  eager  ear  to  anything  that  promised  half  a 
chance,  and  with  credulity  marvelous,  as  the  doom  to  him  was  fright 
ful.  Brown  was  then  told  that  his  room-mate  had  long  followed  the 


THE  "OLD  CAPITOL"  PS  ISO  X.  507 

profession  of  an  acrobat  in  a  circus,  and,  consequently,  could  explain 
how  it  was  possible  to  jump  from  any  place,  however  far  the  distance, 
without  injury,  and  it  consisted,  simply,  in  always  starting  from  a 
spring  board.  All  that  was  necessary  was  to  get  the  board,  jump 
into  the-  yard  beneath,  scale  the  fence  surrounding  it,  and  he  was  free. 
And  the  half-crazed  Brown  agreed.  Taking  up  one  of  the  iioor- 
planks,  about  two  o'clock  that  morning,  they  ran  it  noiselessly  out  of 
the  window,  securing  one  end  firmly  to  the  window-sill.  The  night 
was  dark,  but  the  gas-lights  in  the  yard  below  flickered  on  the  paved 
surface  of  the  ground,  which  echoed  to  the  measured  tread  of  the 
sentinels  as  they  paced  their  midnight  rounds.  Bidding  his  mate 
"good-bye,"  Brown  slowly  emerged  from  the  window  on  his  hands 
and  knees,  crawling  toward  the  extreme  end  of  the -narrow  plank — 
bending  more  and  more  with  his  weight  over  the  dizzy  height. 
Beaching,  at  length,  the  end,  he  carefully  arose  into  a  standing 
position,  and,  following  his  instructor's  orders,  he  began  to  spring 
the  board  more  and  more  rapidly,  h'nally  bounding  upward  as  high 
as  the  impetus  thus  acquired  would  carry  him,  and  then  down,  down 
through  the  yielding  air  to  the  stones  beneath.  AVith  terrible  swift 
ness,  just  missing  the  point  of  a  sentinel's  bayonet  as  he  passed, 
he  struck  the  pavement.  The  guard,  amazed  and  frightened, 
fled  the  length  of  the  yard,  and  Brown,  unhurt,  sprang  to  his  feet 
and  dashed  in  headlong  night  toward  a  pair  of  steps  leading  to  the 
top  of  a  shed,  upon  which,  however,  was  located  another  sentinel, 
who  successfully  stopped  his  further  efforts.  Kot  a  bone  was  broken, 
and  he  sustained  no  visible  injury  worthy  of  mention.  Yet  the  leap 
could  not  have  been  less  than  forty  or  fifty  feet,  and  the  landing  place 
a  stone  paved  yard.  His  brain,  however,  was  affected  by  the  shock, 
and  not  long  after  he  was  shot  and  killed  by  one  of  the  guards  while 
attempting  another  escape — an  attempt  like  the  one  above  narrated, 
which  no  sane  person  would  have  dared,  and  the  poor  fellow  met 
the  very  fate  he  so  madly  strove  to  escape. 

Of  the  secret  agents  or  spies  in  the  service  of  the  rebel  govern 
ment,  there  were  some  who  achieved  notoriety  at  least,  and  they 
were  well  represented  at  the  Old  Capitol,  both  male  and  female. 
Among  the  latter  was  Belle  Boyd,  who  left  the  impression  with  those 
with  whom  she  came  in  contact  of  a  woman  governed  more  by 
romance  and  love  of  notoriety  than  actual  regard  for  the  Southern 
cause.  Undeniably  good-looking,  with  a  fine  figure,  and  merry  dispo 
sition,  she  could  have  been  dangerous  had  she  possessed  equal  good 
sense  and  good  judgment.  I  believe  the  extent  of  the  damage  she 
inflicted  on  the  Northern  cause  was  in  tempting  from  his  loyalty  a  sub- 


508  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAS. 

ordinate  officer  of  the  navy,  whom  it  was  affirmed  she  married.  lie 
also  found  his  way  to  the  prison,  from  which  he  dictated  a  challenge 
to  the  editor  of  the  Washington  Star,  for  some  rather  scornful  allu 
sions  to  himself  and  wife.  They  were  both  "  light  weights  "  in  the 
profession. 

Mrs.  Baxley  was  a  woman  of  far  different  character — educated, 
remarkably  intelligent  and  cultivated,  and  with  a  steady  courage  any 
man  might  envy.  She  was  a  shrewd  plotter  of  mischief  to  the  Xorth, 
and  utterly  fearless  in  its  execution.  Her  intense  hatred  of  a 
Yankee,  with  her  whole-souled  devotion  to  the  Southern  cause,  often 
impelled  her  beyond  the  line  of  propriety  and  discretion,  even  to  the 
verge  of  the  ridiculous — never,  however,  to  the  peril  of  the  cause  she 
loved.  The  first  time  my  attention  was  called  to  her  case  was  by  a 
note  handed  me  by  one  of  the  guards,  directed  to  the  colonel  com 
manding  the  prisoners,  asking  me  to  bring  her  an  armful  of  wood! 
Of  course,  it  meant  defiance  and  insult,  but  provoked  only  a  smile ; 
and  the  next  "  break  out "  of  her  irrepressible  hatred  to  Yankeedom 
had  a  tinge  of  tragedy  rather  than  comedy.  It  was  thus  :  Going  once 
to  the  window  of  her  room  (which  was  located  on  the  second-story  of 
the  building),  she  began  a  scathing  and  contemptuous  criticism  of 
the  sentinel  underneath,  until,  goaded  by  her  tongue,  he  threatened 
to  fire  at  her  if  she  did  not  desist  and  leave  the  window.  "  Fire, 
then,  you  Yankee  scoundrel !  You  were  hired  to  murder  women,  and 
here  is  an  opportunity  to  exercise  your  trade,"  wras  the  reply.  Stung 
by  the  words,  and  thinking  to  frighten  her,  he  raised  his  piece,  but 
aimed  above  her  head,  and  fired,  the  ball  crashing  through  the 
window  over  her.  Not  a  muscle  stirred  as  she  still  coolly  faced  the 
window  as  before,  saying,  contemptuously:  "A  shot  worthy  a 
Yankee  ;  load  and  try  another."  She  was  arrested  while  within  our 
army  lines  searching  for  her  son,  who  had  been  wounded  and  cap 
tured  in  one  of  the  great  battles.  lie  was  sent  to  the  prison  where 
his  mother  was,  and  she  had  the  privilege  of  seeing  him  often  and 
of  standing  by  his  bedside  when  he  died.  lie  was  buried  from  the 
prison  and  lies  in  the  Congressional  Cemetery,  his  mother  being 
allowed  to  accompany  his  remains  to  their  last  resting  place.  She 
was  accompanied  to  the  cemetery  in  the  same  carriage  by  Mrs.  Snr- 
ratt  (who  was  afterward  hanged  for  complicity  with  President  Lin 
coln's  assassination),  and  a  couple  of  guards  detailed  for  the  purpose. 
Mrs.  Surratt  was  a  large  fleshy  woman,  and  when  first  sent  to  the 
prison  was  not  supposed  to  be  guilty  of  any  tiling  very  serious,  or 
that  could  involve  a  risk  to  her  life.  Her  daughter  was  her  frequent 
visitor,  and  always  was  permitted  to  see  her.  At  her  trial  she  was 


THE  "  OLD  CAPITOL  "  PRISON.  509 

removed  from  the  Old  Capitol,  to  which  she  never  returned,  having 
been  tried,  condemned,  and  executed  at  the  Old  Armory. 

The  murder  of  the  President  brought  many  unexpected  guests 
to  the  prison,  among  whom  I  remember  Junius  Brutus  Booth,  a 
brother  of  Wilkes  Booth;  John  S.  Clarke,  the  renowned  comedian; 
Mr.  Ford,  of  Baltimore,  owner  of  Ford's  Theatre,  in  Washington, 
where  Lincoln  was  shot;  Dr.  Mudd,  who  set  the  broken  limb  of  the 
flying  assassin,  and  who  repented  therefor  in  the  Dry  Tortugas; 
Spangler,  the  stage  carpenter,  who  held  a  ready  saddled  horse  at  the 
back  door  of  the  theatre  for  Booth's  escape,  and  many  others  supposed 
to  have  possible  connection  with,  or  knowledge  of,  the  assassination. 
I  gave  to  Junius  Brutus  Booth  the  knowledge  of  the  death  of  his 
brother  Wilkes,  and  the  circumstances  attending  it,  to  which  he  sadly 
and  sorrowfully  answered,  ''Poor,  misguided  boy." 

On  the  night  of  the  murder  of  Lincoln  there  were  eight  hundred 
rebel  officers  in  Carroll  Prison,  and  I  need  hardly  say  it  was  crowded 
to  its  utmost  capacity.  Every  grade  of  rank,  from  a  second  lieutenant 
to  a  major  general,  had  its  representative,  and,  as  a  rule,  they  were  an 
intelligent,  gentlemanly  set  of  men,  and,  as  I  thought,  worthy  a  better 
cause.  T  announced  to  them  myself  the  news  that  fell  so  like  a 
thunderbolt  on  the  country  of  the  cowardly  murder  of  the  President; 
and  to  their  honor,  I  record  it,  that  with  two  exceptions  they  united 
in  condemning  the  act,  and  regretting  its  occurrence  most  heartily. 

AVliile  Carroll  Prison  was  thus  crowded,  it  was  attacked  by  a 
mob,  and  came  near  furnishing  a  bloody  sequel  to  the  death  of 
Lincoln.  It  was  when  daily  expectation  of  the  announcement  of  the 
capture  of  his  murderer  was  awaited  with  intense  interest,  that  a 
sergeant  and  two  privates  were  sent  in  charge  of  two  prisoners, 
civilians,  from  the  headquarters  of  the  Provost  Marshal, 'Col  on  el 
Ingraham,  to  deliver  them  at  Carroll  Prison,  and  it  was  surmised 
and  believed  that  the  prisoners  were  Booth  and  an  accomplice. 
Instantly,  they  were  followed  by  a  crowd  that  rapidly  increased  in 
numbers  and  fierceness,  till  it  seemed  that  the  death  of  the  entire 
party  was  inevitable.  A  mounted  orderly,  by  another  street,  brought 
notice  of  their  coming,  and  a  warning  to  be  prepared.  But  thirty 
men  were  to  be  spared,  and  they  were  at  once  drawn  up  before  the 
entrance,  and  the  orderly  dispatched  for  more  troops.  Presently, 
the  mob  came  in  sight — a  dense  mass,  numbering  thousands — while 
just  l>ef ore  them,  driven  like  chaff  before  a  gale,  was  the  sergeant 
and  his  men,  running,  but  bravely  keeping  their  trust,  always  sur 
rounding  and  defending  the  prisoners — now  struck  down  by  some 
missile,  but  instantly  up  again,  making  straight  to  the  shelter  of  the 


510  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

prison,  which  at  last  they  reached,  bloody  and  bruised  —  all  of 
them,  especially  the  prisoners,  half  dead  with  blows  and  fright. 
Then  the  mob,  cheated  of  its  prey,  crowded  the  street  witli  fierce 
yells,  and  began  hurling  stones  at  the  windows,  and,  finally,  at  the 
little  force  still  guarding  the  front  doors,  till  the  ominous  clicking  of 
the  gun-locks  began  to  intimate  that,  with  or  without  the  orders  of 
their  officers,  they  would  fire  in  self-defense.  Anxiously  they  looked 
for  the  coming  of  assistance ;  but,  compelled  at  last  to  either  give  up 
their  trust  or  to  attack,  they  suddenly  deployed  as  skirmishers,  and, 
with  leveled  bayonets,  sprang  forward  at  the  word  of  command  upon 
the  rioters,  who,  dismayed  and  surprised,  fled  down  the  streets  and 
alleys — not  one  being  killed,  and  but  few  wounded  with  the  bayonet. 
The  prisoners,  I  need  not  add,  were  not  Booth,  or  connected  in  any 
way  with  his  crime,  but  they  barely  escaped  with  life. 

The  number  of  prisoners  in  "  Carroll,"  as  I  said  before,  at  this 
time,  was  the  most  serious  test  of  its  capacity,  and  wTas  the  result  of 
some  difficulty  in  obtaining  speedy  transportation  for  them  to  the 
prison  depots  further  North  and  West.  Many  friends  of  the  South 
ern  officers  confined  here  came  to  see  them,  and,  in  all  cases,  so  far 
as  my  knowledge  goes,  were  permitted  to  see  them,  and  provide 
them  with  much-needed  comforts ;  and,  more  than  that,  I  allowed,  in 
one  case  at  least,  a  young  major,  who  met  here  for  the  first  time  in 
four  years  his  lady  love  and  intended  wife,  to  accompany  her  home 
to  tea,  only  asking  his  word  of  honor  that  he  would  return  at  a  given 
hour,  which  he  punctually  did.  His  name  has  escaped  my  memory ; 
but  if  the  few  hours  of  pleasure  he  enjoyed  upon  that  occasion  be 
not  yet  gratefully  remembered,  then  is  he  an  ungrateful  man.  I 
recall,  also,  with  pleasure  now,  that  I,  in  testifying  before  a  House 
committee,  appointed  to  consider  the  propriety  of  retaliating  the 
treatment  our  poor  fellows  received  at  Andersonville  and  other 
Southern  prisons,  condemned  it  as  unworthy  the  name  of  any 
Christian  people.  When  at  last  the  order  came  to  send  away  nearly 
all  the  eight  hundred,  I  stood  near  the  door  as  they  marched  out,  and, 
with  hardly  one  exception,  they  shook  me  by  the  hand,  in  saying 
their  "  good-bye,"  and  expressed  their  sense  of  the  kind  treatment 
they  had  received. 

Governor  Yance,  of  North  Corolina,  Governor  Letcher,  of 
Virginia,  and  Governor  Brown,  of  Georgia,  were,  for  a  few  months, 
recipients  of  the  hospitalities  of  the  Old  Capitol,  and  endured  the 
tedium  of  prison  life  with  the  patient  courage  of  tme-hearted  men. 
Before  the  breaking  out  of  the  war,  and  while  the  propriety  of  seces 
sion  was  being  discussed  in  North  Carolina,  Governor  Yance  came 


THE  "  OLD   CAPITOL  "  PItlSOX.  511 

out  strong  against  it,  stumping  nearly  the  whole  State  in  favor  of 
"*  the  Union  as  it  was."  Finding  it  in  vain,  and  called  upon  to  decide 
between  "  the  devil  and  the  deep  sea,"'  or  in  other  words,  whether 
he  would  he  politically  and  socially  ostracized  by  his  friends,  who 
had  always  stood  staunchly  by  him  in  the  State  where  he  was  born, 
reared,  and  educated,  or  go  in  with  them  in  an  undertaking  which 
he  foresaw  would  fail,  like  many  another  good  man  in  the  South  he 
chose  to  live  or  fall  among  friends.  "Who  could  blame  him  {  lie 
saw  the  failure  and  scorned  to  evade  the  result  by  changing  to  a 
Unionist,  as  many  far  less  worthy  did,  feeling  that  he  had  deliber 
ately  incurred  the  risk,  and  willing,  deliberately,  to  expiate  it.  Pos 
sessing  a  keen  perception  of  the  humorous,  cheerful,  ready  witted, 
with  a  vigorous  intellect,  a  story-teller  par  excellence — surpassing 
even  Senator  Xye— and,  really,  the  best  extempore  speaker  for  any 
and  all  occasions,  with  or  without  notice,  carrying  always  his  audience 
like  a  whirlwind — such  was  Governor  Zebuloii  IJ.  Vance,  the  pet  and 
pride  of  the  old  Xorth  State. 

I  cannot  refrain  from  an  anecdote  of  himself,  illustrative  of  the 
commencement  of  his  political  life  and  his  popularity  with  all  classes 
in  his  native  State,  as  he  himself  related  it.  It  was  after  his  first 
election  to  a  seat  in  the  House  of  Representatives  in  Washington, 
and  at  about  the  age  of  thirty-eight  years,  lie  had  attended  the  full 
session,  and  on  his  journey  home  had  arrived  at  the  end  of  railway 
travel,  and  was  obliged  to  finish  the  journey  by  staging  across  the 
country.  Full  of  the  pride  of  being  a  member  of  Congress,  and  to 
see  and  be  seen,  he  mounted  a  seat  outside  the  coach  with  the  driver 
of  the  vehicle,  and  awav  they  rolled  behind  four  sorry-looking1  steeds. 

*/  i/  t/ 

The  Jehu  was  evidently  of  the  earth  earthy,  of  the  stable  odorous,  a 
ragged,  seedy  specimen  of  his  order,  and  in  strong  contrast  to  our 
friend,  the  Governor,  who  sat  by  his  side,  dressed  in  the  more  decor 
ous  results  of  a  fashionable  Washington  tailor — and  no  doubt  happy 
in  so  being.  Pride,  however,  was  destined  to  the  usual  fall,  the 
author  of  which  humiliation  being  close  at  hand.  A  tall,  cadaver 
ous,  lank,  pale  specimen  of  the  race  known  as  "  clay  banks,"  was 
sleepily  leaning  against  a  fence  as  they  passed.  lie  was  shirtless 
and  ragged,  and  his  remnant  of  broad-brimmed  hat  sank  ungracefully 
over  and  about  his  long  hair,  the  only  laudable  use  for  which  was  to 
cover  his  dirty  neck  and  face.  Gravely  he  saluted  the  driver,  with 
'*  Good-morning,  Mr.  Jobson,"  and  then  lifting  lazily  his  eyes  on  Vance, 
he  became  suddenly  galvanized  with  an  unexpected  recognition,  to 
which  he  gave  vent  with,  a  "  Hell's  blazes,  Zeb  Vance,  is  that  yeow  ? ?' 
The  Governor  avers  he  did  the  rest  of  that  journey  as  an  inside  pas- 


512  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Governor  Letcher  was  a  fine  specimen  of  a  Virginian,  frank, 
dignified,  courteous,  and  generous,  firm  and  unchangeable  in  liis 
deliberate  and  matured  purpose,  and  of  inflexible  integrity  and 
honor. 

General  Edward  Johnson  occupied  the  same  room  with  the 
above-mentioned  Governors,  and  also  a  gentleman  from  Savannah 
named  Lamar,  and  they  exhausted  thoroughly  every  means  in  their 
power  to  avert  the  tedium  of  confinement.  Governor  Vance,  once 
looking  from  his  window  into  the  East  Capitol  Park,  said,  with  a 
sigh,  "  How  I  would  like  to  stretch  iny  limbs  with  a  brisk  walk  over 
there."  I  replied,  by  saying,  "  Put  on  your  hat,  then,"  and  suiting 
the  action  to  the  word,  he  did  so,  and  I  led  him  down  stairs  and  past 
the  guard,  and  away  he  went  and  enjoyed  his  stroll  hugely,  returning 
in  a  few  hours  safe  to  his  hotel. 

One  evening  there  arrived  from  the  War  Department  an  order 
to  prepare  for  the  reception  of  (as  near  as  I  can  recollect)  one  hundred 
and  fifty  prisoners,  who  were  coming  from  Baltimore,  nearly  all  of 
whom  were  to  be  placed  in  solitary  confinement  and  not  allowed  to 
communicate  with  each  other.  Now,  every  room  in  both  prisons 
was  occupied,  and  to  cany  out  the  command  was  simply  impossible, 
and  I  did  not  attempt  it.  Their  arrival  was  a  fresh  surprise,  for  the 
prisoners  were  some  of  the  principal  business  men  of  Baltimore,  with 
their  employees — such  gentlemen  as  Messrs.  Johnson,  Button  &  Co., 
Hamilton  Easter  &  Co.,  "Weesenfelt  &  Co.,  Charles  E.  Waters  &  Co., 
and  many  more.  They  were  arrested  by  a  leading  detective  for 
alleged  selling  of  goods  to  be  run  through  the  blockade.  I  believe 
there  was  not  a  guilty  man  in  the  number,  and  that  it  was  a  put  up 
job  by  the  astute  detectives,  who  knew  that,  being  gentlemen  of 
wealth,  they  could  extort  money  from  them  by  sufficient  squeezing. 
Their  coming  brought  a  good  influence  in  many  ways,  and  many  a 
poor  devil  then  confined,  with  neither  friends  or  money,  could  testify 
to  their  liberality  and  generosity,  and  benefited  by  the  ill  wind  that 
blew  these  gentlemen  into  durance  vile. 


TORPEDO  SERVICE  AY  CHARLESTON  HARBOR. 


BY    GENERAL    G.    T.    BEAUREGAED. 


Ox  my  return  to  Charleston, 
in  September,  ISO:?,  to  assume 
command  of  the  Department 
of  South  Carolina  and  Georgia, 

I  found  the  defenses  of  those 
two  States  in  a  bad  and  in 
complete  condition,  includ 
ing  defective  location  and 

O 

arrangement  of  works,  oven 
at  Charleston  and  Savannah. 
Several  points— such  as  the 
mouths  of  the  Stono  and 
Edisto  rivers,  and  the  head 
waters  of  Broad  river  at  Port 
Royal — I  found  unprotected; 
though,  soon  after  the  fall  of 
Fort  Suniter,  in  ISfil,  as  I  was  about  to  be  detached,  T  had  desig 
nated  them  to  be  properly  fortiiied.  A  recommendation  had  even 
been  made  by  my  immediate  predecessor  that  the  outer  defenses  of 
Charleston  harbor  should  be  given  up,  as  untenable  against  the 
iron-dads  and  monitors  then  known  to  be  under  construction  at  the 
North,  and  that  the  water  line  of  the  immediate  city  of  Charleston 
should  be  made  the  sole  line  of  defense.  This  course,  however,  not 
having  been  authorized  by  the  Richmond  authorities,  it  was  not 
attempted,  except  that  the  fortifications  of  Cole's  Island — the  key 
to  the  defense  of  the  Stono  river — was  abandoned,  and  the  harbor 
in  the  month  of  the  Stono  left  open  to  the  enemy,  who  made  it  their 
base  of  operations.  Immediately  on  my  arrival  I  inspected  the 
defenses  of  Charleston  and  Savannah,  and  made  a  requisition  on 
the  AVar  Department  for  additional  troops  and  heavy  guns  deemed 
necessary;  but  neither  could  be  furnished,  owing,  it  was  stated,  to 
the  pressing  wants  of  the  Confederacy  at  other  points.  Shortly 
afterward,  Florida  was  added  to  my  command,  but  without  any 
increase  of  troops  or  guns,  except  the  few  already  in  that  State  ;  and, 
33  (513) 


514:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

later,  several  brigades  were  withdrawn  from  me,  notwithstanding  my 
protest,  to  reinforce  the  armies  of  Virginia  and  Tennessee. 

As  I  have  already  said,  I  found  at  Charleston  an  exceedingly 
bad  defensive  condition  against  a  determined  attack.  Excepting 
Fort  Moultrie,  on  Sullivan's  Island,  the  works  and  batteries  covering 
Charleston  harbor,  including  Fort  Sumter,  were  insufficiently  armed, 
and  their  barbette  guns  without  the  protection  of  heavy  traverses. 
In  all  the  harbor  works,  there  were  only  three  ten-inch  and  a  few 
eight-inch  columbiads,  which  had  been  left  in  Forts  Sumter  and 
Moultrie  by  Major  Anderson,  and  about  a  dozen  rifle  guns — 
unbanded  thirty-two-pounders,  made  by  the  Confederates — which 
burst  after  a  few  discharges.  There  were,  however,  a  number  of 
good  forty-two-pounders  of  the  old  pattern,  which  I  afterward  had 
rifled  and  banded.  I  found  a  continuous  floating  boom  of  large 
timbers,  bound  together  and  interlinked,  stretching  across  from  Fort 
Sumter  to  Fort  Moultrie.  But  this  was  a  fragile  and  unreliable 
barrier,  as  it  offered  too  great  a  resistance  to  the  strong  current  of 
the  ebb  and  flood  tide  at  full  moon,  especially  after  southeasterly 
gales,  which  backed  up  the  wraters  in  the  bay,  and  in  the  Ashley  and 
Cooper  rivers.  It  was  exposed,  therefore,  at  such  periods,  to  be 
broken,  particularly  as  the  channel  bottom  was  hard  and  smooth, 
and  the  light  anchors  which  held  the  boom  in  position  were  con 
stantly  dragging— a  fact  which  made  the  breaking  of  the  boom  an 
easy  matter  under  the  strain  of  hostile  steamers  coming  against  it 
under  full  headway.  For  this  reason,  the  engineers  had  proposed 
the  substitution  of  a  rope  obstruction,  which  would  be  free  from 
tidal  strain,  but  little  had  been  done  toward  its  preparation.  I, 
therefore,  soon  after  assuming  command,  ordered  its  immediate 
completion,  and,  to  give  it  protection  and  greater  efficiency,  directed 
that  two  lines  of  torpedoes  be  planted  a  few  hundred  yards  in  advance 
of  it.  But  before  the  order  could  be  carried  out,  a  strong  southerly 
storm  broke  the  timber  boom  in  several  places,  leaving  the  channel 
unprotected,  except  by  the  guns  of  Forts  Sumter  and  Moultrie. 
Fortunately,  however,  the  Federal  fleet  made  no  effort  to  enter  the 
harbor,  as  it  might  have  done  if  it  had  made  the  attempt  at  night. 
A  few  days  later  the  rope  obstruction  and  torpedoes  were  in  position, 
and  so  remained,  without  serious  injury,  till  the  end  of  the  war. 

The  rope  obstruction  was  made  of  two  heavy  cables,  about  five 
or  six  feet  apart,  the  one  below  the  other,  and  connected  together 
by  a  network  of  smaller  ropes.  The  anchors  were  made  fast  to  the 
lower  cable,  and  the  buoys  or  floats  to  the  upper  one.  The  upper 
cable  carried  a  fringe  of  smaller  ropes,  about  three-fourths  of  an 


TORPEDO  SERVICE  IN  CHARLESTON  HARBOR.  515 

inch  in  diameter  by  fifty  feet  long,  which  floated  as  so  many 
"  streamers  "  on  the  surface,  destined  to  foul  the  screw  propeller  of 
any  steamer  which  might  attempt  to  pass  over  the  obstruction. 
Shortly  after  these  cables  were  in  position,  a  blockade-runner,  in 
attempting  at  night  to  pass  through  the  gap  purposely  left  open 
near  the  Sullivan  Island  shore,  under  the  guns  of  Fort  Moultrie, 
and  of  the  outside  batteries,  accidentally  crossed  the  end  of  the  rope 
obstruction,  when  one  of  the  streamers  got  entangled  around  the 
shaft,  cliecking  its  revolutions.  The  vessel  was  at  once  compelled 
to  drop  anchor  to  avoid  drifting  on  the  torpedoes  or  ashore,  and 
afterward  had  to  be  docked  for  the  removal  of  the  streamer  before 
she  could  again  use  her  propeller.  The  torpedoes,  as  anchored, 
floated  a  few  feet  below  the  surface  of  the  water  at  low  tide,  and 
were  loaded  with  one  hundred  pounds  of  powder,  arranged  to 
explode  by  concussion — the  automatic  fuse  employed  being  tho 
invention  of  Captain  Francis  I).  Lee,  an  intelligent  young  engineer 
officer  of  my  general  staff,  and  now  a  prominent  architect  in  St. 
Louis.  The  fuse  or  firing  apparatus  consisted  of  a  cylindrical  lead 
tube  with  a  hemispherical  head,  the  metal  in  the  head  being  thinner 
than  at  the  sides.  The  tube  was  open  at  the  lower  extremity,  whero 
it  was  surrounded  by  a  flange  ;  and,  when  in  place,  it  was  protected 
against  leakage  by  means  of  brass  couplings  and  rubber  washers.  It 
was  charged  as  follows:  In  its  centre  was  a  irhiss  tube  filled  with 

O  O 

sulphuric  acid,  and  hermetically  sealed.  This  was  guarded  by 
another  glass  tube,  sealed  in  like  manner,  and  both  were  retained  in 
position  by  means  of  a  peculiar  pin  at  the  open  end  of  the  leaden 
tube ;  the  space  between  the  latter  and  the  glass  tube  was  then  filled 
with  a  composition  of  chlorate  of  potassu  and  powdered  loaf  sugar, 
with  a  quantity  of  rifle  powder.  The  lower  part  of  the  tube  was 
then  closed  with  a  piece  of  oiled  paper.  Great  care  had  to  be  taken 
to  ascertain  that  the  leaden  tube  was  perfectly  water-tight  under 
considerable  pressure.  The  torpedo  also  had  to  undergo  the  most 
careful  test.  The  firing  of  the  tube  was  produced  by  bringing  the 
thin  head  in  contact  with  a  hard  object,  as  the  side  of  a  vessel ;  the 
indentation  of  the  lead  broke  the  glass  tubes,  which  discharged  the 
acid  on  the  composition,  firing  it,  and  thereby  igniting  the  charge  in 
the  torpedo.  The  charges  used  varied  from  sixty  to  one  hundred 
pounds  rifle  powder,  though  other  explosives  might  have  been  more 
advantageously  used  if  they  had  been  available  to  us.  Generally, 
four  of  the  fuses  were  attached  to  the  head  of  each  torpedo,  so  as 
to  secure  the  discharge  at  any  angle  of  attack.  These  tiring  tubes 
or  fuses  were  afterward  modified  to  avoid  the  great  risk  consequent 


516  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

upon  screwing  them  in  place,  and  of  having  them  permanently 
attached  to  the  charged  torpedo.  The  shell  of  the  latter  was  thinned 
at  the  point  where  the  tube  was  attached,  so  that,  under  water 
pressure,  the  explosion  of  the  tube  would  certainly  break  it  and 
discharge  the  torpedo;  though,  when  unsubmerged,  the  explosion 
of  the  tube  would  vent  itself  in  the  open  air  without  breaking  the 
shell.  In  this  arrangement,  the  tube  was  of  brass,  with  a  leaden 
head,  and  made  water-tight  by  means  of  a  screw  plug  at  its  base. 
Both  the  shell  and  the  tube  being  made  independently  water-tight, 
the  screw  connection  between  the  two  was  made  loose,  so  that  the 
tube  could  be  attached  or  detached  readily  with  the  fingers.  The 
mode  adopted  for  testing  against  leakage  was  by  placing  them  in 
a  vessel  of  alcohol,  under  the  glass  exhaust  of  an  air-pump.  When 
no  air  bubbles  appeared  the  tubes  could  be  relied  on.  Captain  Lee 
had  also  an  electric  torpedo,  which  exploded  by  concussion  against 
a  hard  object ;  the  electric  current,  being  thus  established,  insured 
the  discharge  at  the  right  moment. 

Captain  Lee  is  the  inventor  also  of  the  "spar-torpedo"  as  an 
attachment  to  vessels,  now  in  general  use  in  the  Federal  navy.  It 
originated  as  follows :  He  reported  to  me  that  he  thought  he  could 
blow  up  successfully  any  vessel  by  means  of  a  torpedo  carried  some 
five  or  six  feet  under  water  at  the  end  of  a  pole  ten  or  twelve  feet 
long,  which  should  be  attached  to  the  bow  of  a  skiff  or  row-boat.  I 
authorized  an  experiment  upon  the  hulk  of  an  unfinished  and  con 
demned  gunboat  anchored  in  the  harbor,  and  loaded  for  the  purpose 
with  all  kinds  of  rubbish  taken  from  the  "  burnt  district "  of  the 
city.  It  was  a  complete  success ;  a  large  hole  was  made  in  the  side 
of  the  hulk,  the  rubbish  being  blown  high  in  the  air,  and  the  vessel 
sank  in  less  than  a  minute.*  I  then  determined  to  employ  this 
important  invention,  not  only  in  the  defense  of  Charleston,  but 
to  disperse  or  destroy  the  Federal  blockading  fleet,  by  means  of  one 
or  more  small,  swift  steamers,  with  low  decks,  and  armed  only  with 
"  spar-torpedoes  "  as  designed  by  Captain  Lee.  I  sent  him  at  once 
to  Richmond,  to  urge  the  matter  on  the  attention  of  the  Confederate 
Government.  He  reported  his  mission  as  follows : 


*  Since  writing  the  above,  I  have  been  informed  by  Captain  F.  Barrett,  United 
States  Navy,  that  he  had  invented  the  same  "  spar-torpedo  "  in  the  first  year  of  the 
war,  but  it  had  not  been  applied  by  the  Federals.  In  the  spring  of  1862,  I  had 
also  recommended  its  use  to  General  Lovell,  for  the  defense  of  New  Orleans,  by 
arming  river  boats  with  it,  to  make  night  attacks  on  the  enemy's  fleet — but  it  was 
proposed  to  use  it  above  water. 


TORPEDO  SERVICE  IN  CHARLESTON  HARBOR.         .        517 

In  compliance  with  your  orders,  I  submitted  the  drawing  of  my  torpedo  and  a 
vessel  with  which  I  propose  to  operate  them,  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  While  he 
heartily  approved,  he  stated  his  inability  to  act  in  the  matter,  as  it  was  a  subject 
that  appertained  to  the  navy.  He,  however,  introduced  me  and  urged  it  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy.  The  Secretary  of  War  could  do  nothing,  and  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  would  not,  for  the  reason  that  I  was  not  a  naval  officer,  under  his  com 
mand.  So  I  returned  to  Charleston  without  accomplishing  anything.  After  a 
lapse  of  some  months,  I  was  again  sent  to  Richmond  to  represent  the  matter  to  the 
government,  and  I  carried  with  me  the  indorsement  of  the  best  officers  of  the  navy. 
The  result  was  the  transfer  of  an  unfinished  hull,  on  the  stocks  at  Charleston, 
which  was  designed  for  a  gunboat — or  rather  floating  battery,  as  she  was  not 
arranged  for  any  motive  power,  but  was  intended  to  be  anchored  in  position.  This 
hull  was  completed  by  me,  and  a  second-hand  and  much  worn  engine  was  obtained 
in  Savannah,  and  placed  in  her.  Notwithstanding  her  tub-like  model  and  the 
inefficiency  of  her  engine,  Captain  Carl  in,  commanding  a  blockade-runner,  took 
charge  of  her  in  an  attack  against  the  "  New  Ironsides."  She  was  furnished  with 
a  spar  designed  to  carry  three  torpedoes  of  one  hundred  pounds  each.  The  lateral 
spars  suggested  by  you,  Captain  Carlin  declined  to  use,  as  they  would  interfere  very 
seriously  with  the  movements  of  the  vessel,  which,  even  without  them,  could  with 
the  utmost  difficulty  stem  the  current.  The  boat  was  almost  entirely  submerged, 
and  painted  gray  like  the  blockade-runners,  and,  like  them,  made  no  smoke,  by 
burning  anthracite  coal.  The  night  selected  for  the  attack  was  very  dark,  and  the 
"  New  Ironsides  "  was  not  seen  until  quite  near.  Captain  Carlin  immediately  made 
for  her  ;  but  her  side  being  oblique  to  the  direction  of  his  approach,  he  ordered  his 
steersman,  who  was  below  deck,  to  change  the  course.  This  order  was  misunder 
stood,  and,  in  place  of  going  the  "  bow  on,"  as  was  proposed,  she  ran  alongside  of 
the  "New  Ironsides'1  and  entangled  her  spar  in  the  anchor-chain  of  that  vessel. 
In  attempting  to  back,  the  engine  hung  on  the  centre,  and  some  delay  occurred 
before  it  was  pried  oil*.  During  this  critical  period,  Captain  Carlin,  in  answer  to 
threats  and  inquiries,  declared  his  boat  to  be  the  Live  Yankee,  from  Port  IJoyal, 
with  dispatches  for  the  admiral.  This  deception  was  not  discovered  until  after 
Carlin  had  backed  out  and  his  vessel  was  lost  in  the  darkness. 

Shortly  after  tin's  hold  attempt  of  Captain  Carlin,  in  the  summer 
of  1SC»3,  to  blow  up  the  "Xew  Ironsides,"  Mr.  Theodore  Stoney,  Dr. 
Itavenel,  and  other  gentlemen  of  Charleston,  had  built  a  small  cigar- 
shaped  boat,  which  they  called  the  "  David/'  It  had  been  specially 
planned  and  constructed  to  attack  this  much-dreaded  naval  Goliath, 
the  "  Xew  Ironsides/'  It  was  about  twenty  feet  long,  with  a  diameter 
of  five  feet  at  its  middle,  and  was  propelled  by  a  small  screw  worked 
by  a  diminutive  engine.  As  soon  as  ready  for  service,  I  caused  it  to 
be  fitted  with  a  u  Lee  spar-torpedo,"  charged  with  seventy-five  pounds 
of  powder.  Commander  TVr.  T.  Glassel,  a  brave  and  enterprising 
officer  of  the  Confederate  States  Xavy,  took  charge  of  it,  and  about 
eight  o'clock  one  hazy  night,  on  the  ebb  tide,  with  a  crew  of  one 
engineer,  J.  II.  Tomb  ;  one  fireman,  James  Sullivan ;  and  a  pilot, 
J.  A\r.  Cannon,  he  fearlessly  set  forth  from  Charleston  on  his  peril 
ous  mission — the  destruction  of  the  "  Xew  Ironsides."  I  may  note  that 


518  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

this  iron-clad  steamer  threw  a  great  deal  more  metal,  at  eacli  broad 
side,  than  all  the  monitors  together  of  the  fleet ;  her  fire  was  delivered 
with  more  rapidity  and  accuracy,  and  she  was  the  most  effective 
vessel  employed  in  the  reduction  of  Battery  Wagner. 

The  " David"  reached  the  "New  Ironsides"  about  ten  o'clock 
P.  M.,  striking  her  with  a  torpedo  about  six  feet  under  water,  but 
fortunately  for  that  steamer,  she  received  the  shock  against  one  of 
her  inner  bulkheads,  which  saved  her  from  destruction.     The  water, 
however,  being  thrown  up  in  large  volume,  half -filled  her  little  assail 
ant  and  extinguished  its  fires.     It  then  drifted  out  to  sea  with  the 
current,  under  a  heavy  grape  and  musketry  fire  from  the  much- 
alarmed  crew  of  the  "New  Ironsides."     Supposing  the  "David" 
disabled,  Glassel  and  his  men  jumped  into  the  sea  to  swim  ashore ; 
but  after  remaining  in  the  water  about  one  hour  he  was  picked  up 
by  the  boat  of  a  Federal  transport  schooner,  whence  he  was  trans 
ferred  to  the  guardship  "  Ottawa,"  lying  outside  of  the  rest  of  the 
fleet.     lie  was  ordered  at  first,  by  Admiral  Dahlgren,  to  be  ironed, 
and  in  case  of  resistance,  to  be  double  ironed ;  but  through  the  inter 
cession  of  his  friend,   Captain  "W".  D.  Whiting,   commanding  the 
"  Ottawa,"  he  was  released  on  giving  his  parole  not  to  attempt  to 
escape  from  the  ship.     The  fireman,  Sullivan,  had  taken  refuge  on 
the  rudder  of  the  "New  Ironsides,"  where  he  was  discovered,  put  in 
irons  and  kept  in  a  dark  cell  until  sent  with  Glassel  to  New  York, 
to  be  tried  and  hung,  as  reported  by  Northern  newspapers,  for  using 
an  engine  of  war  not  recognized  by  civilized  nations.     But  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States  has  now  a  torpedo  corps,  intended 
specially  to  study  and  develop  that  important  branch  of  the  military 
service.     After  a  captivity  of  many  months  in  Forts  Lafayette  and 
Warren,  Glassel  and  Sullivan  were  finally  exchanged  for  the  captain 
and  a  sailor  of  the  Federal  steamer  "Isaac  Smith,"  a  heavily-armed 
gunboat  which  was  captured  in  the  Stono  river,  with  its  entire  crew 
of  one  hundred  and  thirty  officers  and  men,  by  a  surprise  I  had  pre 
pared,  with  field  artillery  only,  placed  in  ambuscade  along  the  river 
bank,  and  under  whose  fire  the  Federal  gunners  were  unable  to  man 
and  use  their  powerful  guns.     Captain  Glassel's  other  two  compan 
ions,  Engineer  Tomb  and  Pilot  Cannon,  after  swimming  about  for 
a  while,  espied  the  "  David "  still  afloat,  drifting  with  the  current ; 
they  betook   themselves  to   it,  re-lit  the  fires  from   its  bull's-eye 
lantern,  got  up  steam  and  started  back  for  the  city ;  they  had  to 
repass  through  the  fleet  and  they  received  the  fire  of  several  of  its 
monitors  and  guard-boats,  fortunately  without  injury.     With  the 
assistance  of  the  flood  tide  they  returned  to  their  point  of  departure, 


TORPEDO  SERVICE  IN  CHARLESTON  HARBOR.  519 

at  the  Atlantic  wharf,  about  midnight,  after  having  performed  one 
of  the  most  daring  feats  of  the  war.  The  "  New  Ironsides  "  never 
fired  another  shot  after  this  attack  upon  her.  She  remained  some 
time  at  her  anchorage  off  Morris  Island,  evidently  undergoing  repairs ; 
she  was  then  towed  to  Port  Royal,  probably  to  tit  her  for  her  voyage 
to  Philadelphia,  where  she  remained  until  destroyed  by  fire  after  the 
war. 

Nearly  about  the  time  of  the  attack  upon  the  "  New  Ironsides  " 
by  the  "  David,"  Mr.  Horace  L.  Ilunley,  formerly  of  New  Orleans, 
but  then  living  in  Mobile,  offered  me  another  torpedo-boat  of  a 
different  description,  which  had  been  built  with  his  private  means. 
It  wras  shaped  like  a  fish,  made  of  galvanized  iron,  was  twenty  feet 
long,  and  at  the  middle  three  and  a  half  feet  wide  by  five  deep. 
From  its  shape  it  came  to  be  known  as  the  "fish  torpedo-boat." 
Propelled  by  a  screw  worked  from  the  inside  by  seven  or  eight  men, 
it  was  so  contrived  that  it  could  be  submerged  and  worked  under 
water  for  several  hours,  and  to  this  end  was  provided  with  a  fin  on 
each  side,  worked  also  from  the  interior.  By  depressing  the  points 
of  these  fins  the  boat,  when  in  motion,  was  made  to  descend,  and  by 
elevating  them  it  was  made  to  rise.  Light  was  afforded  through  the 
means  of  bull's-eyes  placed  in  the  man-holes.  Lieutenant  Payne, 
Confederate  States  Navy,  having  volunteered  with  a  crew  from  the 
Confederate  Navy,  to  man  the  fish-boat  for  another  attack  upon  the 
"New  Ironsides,"  it  was  given  into  their  hands  for  that  purpose. 
While  tied  to  the  wharf  at  Fort  Johnston,  whence  it  was  to  start 
under  cover  of  night  to  make  the  attack,  a  steamer  passing  close  by 
capsized  and  sunk  it.  Lieutenant  Payne,  who,  at  the  time,  was  stand 
ing  in  one  of  the  man-holes,  jumped  out  into  the  water,  which,  rush 
ing  into  the  two  openings,  drowned  two  men  then  within  the  body 
of  the  boat.  After  the  recovery  of  the  sunken  boat  Mr.  Ilunley 
came  from  Mobile,  bringing  with  him  Lieutenant  Dixon,  of  the 
Alabama  volunteers,  who  had  successfully  experimented  with  the 
boat  in  the  harbor  of  Mobile,  and  under  him  another  naval  crew 
volunteered  to  work  it.  As  originally  designed,  the  torpedo  was  to 
be  dragged  astern  upon  the  surface  of  the  water ;  the  boat,  approach 
ing  the  broadside  of  the  vessel  to  be  attacked,  was  to  dive  beneath 
it,  and  rising  to  the  surface  beyond,  continue  its  course,  thus  bringing 
the  floating  torpedo  against  the  vessel's  side,  when  it  would  be  dis 
charged  by  a  trigger  contrived  to  go  off  by  the  contact.  Lieutenant 
Dixon  made  repeated  descents  in  the  harbor  of  Charleston,  diving 
under  the  naval  receiving  ship  which  lay  at  anchor  there.  P>ut  one 
day  when  he  was  absent  from  the  city  Mr.  Ilunley,  unfortunately, 


520  ANNALS  OF  TEE  WAR. 

wishing  to  handle  the  boat  himself,  made  tlie  attempt.  It  was  readily 
submerged,  but  did  not  rise  again  to  the  surface,  and  all  on  board 
perished  from  asphyxiation.  When  the  boat  was  discovered,  raised 
and  opened,  the  spectacle  was  indescribably  ghastly ;  the  unfortunate 
men  were  contorted  into  all  kinds  of  horrible  attitudes ;  some  clutch 
ing  candles,  evidently  endeavoring  to  force  open  the  man-holes; 
others  lying  in  the  bottom  tightly  grappled  together,  and  the  black 
ened  faces  of  all  presented  the  expression  of  their  despair  and  agony. 
After  this  tragedy  I  refused  to  permit  the  boat  to  be  used  again  ;  but 
Lieutenant  Dixon,  a  brave  and  determined  man,  having  returned  to 
Charleston,  applied  to  me  for  authority  to  use  it  against  the  Federal 
steam  sloop-of-war  "  Ilousatonic,"  a  powerful  new  vessel,  carrying 
eleven  guns  of  the  largest  calibre,  which  lay  at  the  time  in  the  north 
channel  opposite  Beach  Inlet,  materially  obstructing  the  passage  of 
our  blockade-runners  in  and  out.  At  the  suggestion  of  my  chief -of- 
staff,  General  Jordan,  I  consented  to  its  use  for  this  purpose,  not  as 
a  submarine  machine,  but  in  the  same  manner  as  the  "  David."  As 
the  "  Ilousatonic "  was  easily  approached  through  interior  channels 
from  behind  Sullivan's  Island,  and  Lieutenant  Dixon  readily  pro 
cured  a  volunteer  crew,  his  little  vessel  was  fitted  with  a  Lee  spar 
torpedo,  and  the  expedition  was  undertaken.  Lieutenant  Dixon, 
acting  with  characteristic  coolness  and  resolution,  struck  and  sunk 
the  "Ilousatonic"  on  the  night  of  February  17th,  1864;  but  unhap 
pily,  from  some  unknown  cause,  the  torpedo  boat  was  also  sunk,  and 
all  with  it  lost.  Several  years  since  a  "  diver,"  examining  the  wreck 
of  the  "  Ilousatonic,"  discovered  the  fish-boat  lying  alongside  of  its 
victim. 

From  the  commencement  of  the  siege  of  Charleston  I  had  been 
decidedly  of  the  opinion  that  the  most  effective  as  well  as  least  costly 
method  of  defense  against  the  powerful  iron-clad  steamers  and  moni 
tors  originated  during  the  late  war,  was  to  use  against  them  small 
but  swift  steamers  of  light  draught,  very  low  decks,  and  hulls  iron- 
claded  down  several  feet  below  the  water  line;  these  boats  to  be 
armed  with  a  spar-torpedo  (on  Captain  Lee's  plan),  to  thrust  out  from 
the  bow  at  the  moment  of  collision,  being  inclined  to  strike  below 
the  enemy's  armor,  and  so  arranged  that  the  torpedo  could  be  imme 
diately  renewed  from  within  for  another  attack ;  all  such  boats  to  be 
painted  gray  like  the  blockade-runners,  and,  when  employed,  to  burn 
anthracite  coal,  so  as  to  make  no  smoke.  But,  unfortunately,  I  had 
not  the  means  to  put  the  system  into  execution.  Soon  after  the  first 
torpedo  attack,  made  as  related,  by  the  "  David  "  upon  the  "  ISTew 
Ironsides,"  I  caused  a  number  of  boats  and  barges  to  be  armed  with 


TORPEDO  SERVICE  IN  CHARLESTON  HARBOR.  521 

spar-torpedoes  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  in  detail  the  enemy's 
gunboats  resorting  to  the  sounds  and  harbors  along  the  South  Caro 
lina  coast.  Bnt  the  Federals,  having  become  very  watchful,  sur 
rounded  their  steamers  at  night  with  nettings  and  floating  booms,  to 
prevent  the  torpedo  boats  from  coining  near  enough  to  do  them  any 
injury.  Even  in  the  outer  harbor  of  Charleston,  where  the  block- 
aders  and  their  consorts  were  at  anchor,  the  same  precaution  was 
observed  in  calm  weather. 

The  anchoring  of  the  large  torpedoes  in  position  was  attended 
with  considerable  danger.  While  planting  them  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Cooper  and  Ashley  rivers  (which  form  the  peninsula  of  the  city  of 
Charleston),  the  steamer  engaged  in  that  duty  being  swung  around 
by  the  returning  tide,  struck  and  exploded  one  of  the  torpedoes  just 
anchored.  The  steamer  sank  immediately,  but,  fortunately,  the  tide 
being  low  and  the  depth  of  the  water  not  great,  no  lives  were  lost. 
In  lSO.'>-4,  Jacksonville,  Florida,  having  been  evacuated  by  the  Con 
federates,  then  too  weak  to  hold  it  longer,  the  Federal  gunboats 
frequently  ran  up  the  St.  John's  river  many  miles,  committing  depre 
dations  along  its  banks.  To  stop  these  proceedings,  I  sent  a  party 
from  Charleston  under  a  staff  officer,  Captain  Pliny  Bryan,  to  plant 
torpedoes  in  the  channels  of  that  stream.  The  result  was  the 
destruction  of  several  large  steamers,  and  a  cessation  of  all  annoyance 
on  the  part  of  others.  In  the  bay  of  Charleston,  and  adjacent 
streams,  I  had  planted  about  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  torpedoes, 
and  some  fifty  more  in  other  parts  of  my  department.  The  first 
torpedoes  used  in  the  late  Avar  were  placed  in  the  James  river,  below 
Richmond,  by  General  G.  R.  Raines,  who  became  afterward  chief  of 
the  Torpedo  Bureau.  Mr.  Barbarin,  of  Xew  Orleans,  placed,  also, 
successfully,  a  large  number  of  torpedoes  in  Mobile  Bay  and  its 
vicinity. 

To  show  the  important  results  obtained  by  the  use  of  torpedoes 
by  the  Confederates,  and  the  importance  attached  now  at  the  Xorth 
to  that  mode  of  warfare,  I  will  quote  here  the  following  remarks  from 
an  able  article  in  the  last  September  number  of  the  Galaxy,  entitled, 
"Has  the  Day  of  Great  Xavies  Past?"  The  author  says:  "The 
real  application  of  submarine  warfare  dates  from  the  efforts  of  the 
Confederates  during  the- late  war.  In  October,  1862,  a  'torpedo 
bureau'  was  established  at  Richmond,  which  made  rapid  progress  in 
the  construction  and  operations  of  these  weapons  until  the  close  of 
the  war  in  1SG5.  Seven  Union  iron-clads,  eleven  wooden  war  vessels, 
and  six  army  transports  were  destroyed  by  Southern  torpedoes,  and 
many  more  were  seriously  damaged.  This  destruction  occurred,  for 


522  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  most  part,  during  the  last  two  years  of  the  war,  and  it  is  sug 
gestive  to  think  what  might  have  been  the  influence  on  the  Union 
cause  if  the  Confederate  practice  of  submarine  warfare  had  been 
nearly  as  efficient  at  the  commencement  as  it  was  at  the  close  of  the 
war.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say,  respecting  the  blockade  of  the 
Southern  ports,  that  if  not  altogether  broken  up,  it  would  have  been 
rendered  so  inefficient  as  to  have  commanded  no  respect  from 
European  powers,  while  the  command  of  rivers,  all  important  to  the 
Union  forces  as  bases  of  operations,  would  have  been  next  to 
impossible. 

•*  *  *  •*  •*  -x-  * 

"  Think  of  the  destruction  this  infernal  machine  effected,  and 
bear  in  mind  its  use  came  to  be  fairly  understood,  and  some  system 
introduced  into  its  arrangement  only  during  the  last  part  of  the  war. 
During  a  period  when  scarcely  any  vessels  were  lost,  and  very  few 
severely  damaged  by  the  most  powerful  guns  then  employed  in 
actual  war,  we  find  this  long  list  of  disasters  from  the  use  of  this  new 
and,  in  the  beginning,  much  despised  comer  into  the  arena  of  naval 
warfare.  But  it  required  just  such  a  record  as  this  to  arouse  naval 
officers  to  ask  themselves  the  question,  'Is  not  the  days  of  great 
navies  gone  forever  ? '  If  such  comparatively  rude  and  improvised 
torpedoes  made  use  of  by  the  Confederates  caused  such  damage,  and 
spread  such  terror  among  the  Union  fleet,  what  will  be  the  conse 
quence  when  skilful  engineers,  encouraged  by  governments,  as  they 
have  never  been  before,  diligently  apply  themselves  to  the  perfecting 
of  this  terrible  weapon?  The  sucesses  of  the  Confederates  have 
made  the  torpedo,  which  before  was  looked  on  with  loathing — a 
name  not  to  be  spoken  except  contemptously — a  recognized  factor 
in  modern  and  naval  warfare.  On  all  sides  we  see  the  greatest 
activity  in  improving  it." 

I  shall  now  refer  briefly  to  the  use  in  Charleston  harbor  of  rifle 
cannon  and  iron-clad  floating  and  land  batteries.  In  the  attack  on 
Fort  Sumter,  in  1861,  these  war  appliances  were  first  used  in  the 
United  States.  When  I  arrived  at  Charleston,  in  March  of  that  year, 
to  assume  command  of  the  forces  there  assembling,  and  direct  the 
attack  on  Fort  Sumter,  I  found  under  construction  a  rough  floating 
battery,  made  of  palmetto  logs,  under  the-  direction  of  Captain  Ham 
ilton,  an  ex-United  States  naval  officer.  He  intended  to  plate  it 
with  several  sheets  of  rolled-iron,  each  about  three-quarters  of  an 
inch  thick,  and  to  arm  it  with  four  thirty-two-pounder  carronades. 
He  and  his  battery  were  so  much  ridiculed,  however,  that  he  could, 
with  difficulty,  obtain  any  further  assistance  from  the  State  govern- 


TORPEDO  SERVICE  IN  CHARLESTON  HARBOR.  523 

nient.  He  came  to  me  in  great  discouragement,  and  expressed,  in 
vivid  terms,  his  certainty  of  success,  and  of  revolutionizing  future 
naval  warfare,  as  well  as  the  construction  of  war  vessels.  I  approved, 
of  Captain  Hamilton's  design,  and,  having  secured  the  necessary 
means,  instructed  him  to  finish  his  battery  at  the  earliest  moment 
practicable.  This  being  accomplished  before  the  attack  on  Fort 
Sumter  opened,  early  in  April  I  placed  the  floating  battery  in  posi 
tion  at  the  western  extremity  of  Sullivan's  Island  to  enfilade  certain 
barbette  guns  of  the  fort  which  could  not  be  reached  effectively  by 
our  land  batteries.  It,  therefore,  played  an  important  part  in  that 
brief  drama  of  thirty-three  hours,  receiving  many  shots  without  any 
serious  injury.  About  one  year  later,  in  Hampton  roads,  the  "'  Mer- 
rimac,"  plated  and  roofed  with  two  layers  of  railroad  iron,  met  the 
"Monitor"  in  a  momentous  encounter,  which  first  attracted  the 
attention  of  the  civilized  world  to  the  important  change  that  iron- 
plating  or  "  armors  "  would  thenceforth  create  in  naval  architecture 
and  armaments.  The  one  and  a  half  to  two  inch  plating  used  on 
Captain  Hamilton's  floating  battery  lias  already  grown  to  about 
twelve  inches  thickness  of  steel  plates  of  the  best  quality,  put  together 
with  the  utmost  care,  in  the  effort  to  resist  the  heaviest  rifle-shots 
now  used.  About  the  same  time  that  Captain  Hamilton  was  con 
structing  his  floating  battery,  Mr.  C.  II.  Steven,  of  Charleston  (who, 
afterward,  died  a  brigadier  general  at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga), 
commenced  building  an  iron-clad  land  battery  at  Cumming's  Point, 
the  northern  extremity  of  Morris  Island,  and  the  point  nearest  to 
Fort  Sumter — that  is,  about  thirteen  hundred  yards  distant.  This 
battery  was  to  be  built  of  heavy  timbers  covered  with  one  layer  of 
railroad  iron,  the  rails  well  fitted  into  each  other,  presenting  an 
inclined,  smooth  surface  of  about  thirty-five  degrees  to  the  fire  of 
Sumter ;  the  surface  was  to  be  well  greased,  and  the  guns  were  to 
fire  through  small  embrasures  supplied  with  strong  iron  shutters. 
I  approved  also  of  the  plan,  making  such  suggestions  as  my  experi 
ence  as  an  engineer  warranted.  This  battery  took  an  active  part  in 
the  attack,  and  was  struck  several  times ;  but,  excepting  the  jam 
ming  and  disabling  one  of  the  shutters,  the  battery  remained  unin 
jured  to  the  end  of  the  fight. 

From  Cumming's  Point  also,  and  in  the  same  attack,  was  used 
the  first  rifled  cannon  fired  in  America.  The  day  before  I  received 
orders  from  the  Confederate  Government,  at  Montgomery,  to  demand 
the  evacuation  or  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter,  a  vessel  from  England 
arriving  in  the  outer  harbor,  signaled  that  she  had  something 
important  for  the  Governor  of  the  State.  I  sent  out  a  harbor  boat, 


524  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

which  returned  with  a  small  Blakely  rifled-gun,  of  two  and  a  half 
inches  diameter,  with  only  fifty  rounds  of  ammunition.     I  placed  it 
at  once  behind  a  sand-bag  parapet  next  to  the  Steven  battery,  where 
it  did  opportune  service  with  its  ten-pound  shell  while  the  ammuni 
tion    lasted.     The   penetration   of    the   projectiles   into   the   brick 
masonry  of  the  fort  was  not  great  at  that  distance,  but  the  piece  had 
great  accuracy,  and  several  of  the  shells  entered  the  embrasures 
facing  Morris  Island.     One  of  the  officers  of  the  garrison  remarked 
after  the  surrender,  that  when  they  first  heard  the  singular  whizzing, 
screeching  sound  of  the  projectile,  they  did  not  understand  its  cause 
until  one  of  the  unexploded  shells  being  found  in  the  fort  the  mys 
tery  was  solved.     As  a  proof  of  the  rapid  strides  taken  by  the 
artillery  arm  of  the  service,  I  shall  mention  that  two  years  later  the 
Federals  fired  against  Fort  Sumter,  from  nearly  the  same  spot,  rifle 
projectiles  weighing  three  hundred  pounds.     Meantime  I  had  re 
ceived  from  England  two  other  Blakely  rifled  cannon  of  thirteen 
and  a  quarter  inches  calibre.     These  magnificent  specimens  of  heavy 
ordnance  were,  apart  from  their  immense  size,  different  in  construc 
tion  from  anything  I  had  ever  seen.     They  had  been  bored  through 
from  muzzle  to  breech ;  the  breech  was  then  plugged  with  a  brass 
block,  extending  into  the  bore  at  least  two  feet,  and  into  which  had 
been  reamed  a  chamber  about  eighteen  inches  in  length  and  six  in 
diameter,  while  the  vent  entered  the  bore  immediately  in  advance  of 
this  chamber.     The  projectiles  provided  were  shells  weighing,  when 
loaded,  about  three  hundred  and  fifty  pounds,  and  solid  cylindrical 
shots  weighing  seven  hundred  and  thirty  pounds ;  the  charge  for  the 
latter  was  sixty  pounds  of  powder.     The  first  of  these  guns  received 
was  mounted  in  a  battery  specially  constructed  for  it  at  "  The  Bat 
tery,"  at  the  immediate  mouth  of  Cooper  river,  to  command  the 
inner  harbor.     As  no  instructions  for  their  service  accompanied  the 
guns,  and  the  metal  between  the  exterior  surface  of  the  breech  and 
the  rear  of  the  inner  chamber  did  not  exceed  six  to  eight  inches, 
against  all  experience  in  ordnance,  apprehensions  were  excited  that 
the  gun  would  burst  in  firing  with  so  large  a  charge  and  such  weight 
of  projectile.     Under  the  circumstances  it  was  determined  to  charge 
it  with  an  empty  shell  and  the  minimum  of  powder  necessary  to 
move  it ;  the  charge  was  divided  in  two  cartridges,  one  to  fit  the 
small  rear  chamber,  and  the  other  the  main  bore.     The  gun  was  fired 
by  means  of  a  long  lanyard  from  the  bomb-proof  attached  to  the 
battery ;  and,  as  apprehended,  it  burst  at  the  first  fire,  even  with  the 
relatively  small  charge  used ;  the  brass  plug  was  found  started  back 
at  least  the  sixteenth  of  an  inch,  splitting  the  breech  with  three  or 
four  distinct  cracks,  and  rendering  it  useless. 


TORPEDO  SERVICE  IN  CHARLESTON  HARBOR.  525 

"With  such  a  result  I  did  not  attempt,  of  course,  to  mount  and 
use  the  other,  but  assembled  a  board  of  officers  to  study  the  principle 
that  might  be  involved  in  the  peculiar  construction,  and  to  make 
experiments  generally  with  ordnance.  The  happy  results  of  the 
extensive  experiments  made  by  this  board  with  many  guns  of 
different  calibre,  including  muskets,  and  last  of  all  with  the  other 

O 

Elakeiy,  was  that  if  the  cartridge  were  not  pressed  down  to  the 
bottom  of  the  bore  of  a  gun,  and  a  space  were  thus  left  in  rear  of 
the  charge,  as  great  a  velocity  could  be  imparted  to  the  projectile 
with  a  much  smaller  charge,  and  the  gun  was  subject  to  less  abrupt 
strain  from  the  explosion,  because  this  air-chamber,  affording  certain 
room  for  the  expansion  of  the  gases,  gave  time  for  the  in>jvtia,  of  the 
heavy  mass  of  the  projectile  to  be  overcome  before  the  full  explosion 
of  the  charge,  and  opportunity  was  also  given  for  the  ignition  of  the 
entire  charge,  so  that  no  powder  was  wasted  as  in  ordinary  gunnery. 
When  this  was  discovered  the  remaining  lUakely  was  tried  from  a 
skid,  without  any  cartridge  in  the  rear  chamber.  It  tired  both  pro 
jectiles,  shell  and  solid  shot,  with  complete  success,  notwithstanding 
the  small  amount  of  metal  at  the  extremity  of  the  breech.  I  at  once 
utilized  this  discovery.  AVe  had  a  number  of  eight-inch  columbiads 
(remaining  in  Charleston  after  the  capture  of  Sumter  in  1S<J1),  which 
contained  a  powder-chamber  of  smaller  diameter  than  the  calibre  of 
the  gun.  The  vent  in  rear  of  this  powder-chamber  was  plugged, 
and  a  new  vent  opened  in  advance  of  the  powder-chamber,  leaving 
the  latter  to  serve  as  an  air-chamber,  as  in  our  use  of  the  Blakely 
gun.  They  were  then  rilled  and  banded,  and  thus  turned  into 
admirable  guns,  which  were  effectively  employed  against  the  Federal 
iron-dads.  I  am  surprised  that  the  new  principle  adapted  to  these 
guns  has  not  been  used  for  the  heavy  ordnance  of  the  present  day,  as 
it  would  secure  great  economy  in  weight  and  cost.  The  injured 
Blakely  gun  was  subsequently  thoroughly  repaired,  and  made  as 
efficient  as  when  first  received. 

In  the  year  1851,  while  in  charge  as  engineer  of  the  fortifications 
of  Louisiana,  I  attended  a  target  practice  with  heavy  guns  by  the 
garrison  of  Fort  Jackson,  on  the  Mississippi  river,  the  object  fired  at 
being  a  hogshead  floating  with  the  current  at  the  rate  of  about  four 
and  a  half  miles  an  hour.  I  was  struck  with  the  difficulties  of 
trailing  or  traversing  the  guns — forty-two  pounders  and  eight-inch 
columbiads — and  with  the  consequent  inaccuracy  of  the  firing. 
Reflecting  upon  the  matter,  I  devised  soon  afterward  a  simple 
method  of  overcoming  the  difficulty  by  the  application  of  a  "rack 
and  lever"  to  the  wheels  of  the  chassis  of  the  guns;  and  I  sent 


526  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

drawings  of  the  improvement  to  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  General 
Totten,  who  referred  them,  with  his  approval,  to  the  Chief  of  Ord 
nance.     In  the  course  of  a  few  weeks  the  latter  informed  me  that 
his  department  had  not  jet  noticed  any  great  obstacle  in  traversing 
guns  on  moving  objects,  and  therefore  declined  to  adopt  my  inven 
tion.     When  charged,  in  1861,  with  the  Confederate  attack  on  Fort 
Smnter,  I  described  this  device  to  several  of  my  engineer  and  artil 
lery  officers ;  but  before  I  could  have  it  applied  I  was  ordered  to 
Virginia  to  assume  command  of  the  Confederate  force  then  assem 
bling  at  Manassas.     Afterward,  on  my  return  to  Charleston,  in  1862, 
one  of  rny  artillery  officers,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Yates,  an  intelligent 
and  zealous  soldier,  applied  this  principle  (modified,  however)  to  one 
of  the  heavy  guns  in  the  harbor  with  such  satisfactory  results  that  I 
gave  him  orders  to  apply  it  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  all  guns  of  that 
class  which  we  then,  had   mounted.     By  April   6th,   1863,  when 
Admiral  Dupont  made  his   attack   on   Fort    Sumter   with   seven 
monitors,  the  "New  Ironsides,"  several  gunboats  and  mortar  boats, 
our  heaviest  pieces  had  this  traversing  apparatus  adapted  to  their 
chassis,  and  the  result  realized  fully  our  expectations.     However  slow 
or  fast  the  Federal  vessels  moved  in  their  evolutions,  they  received  a 
steady  and  unerring  fire,  which  at  first  disconcerted  them,  and  at  last 
gave  us  a  brilliant  victory — disabling  five  of  the  monitors,  one  of 
which,  the  "  Keokuk,"  sunk  at  her  anchors  that  night.     It  is  pertinent 
for  me,  professionally,  to  remark,  that  had  this  Federal  naval  attack  on 
Fort  Sumter  of  the  6th  of  April,  1863,  been  made  at  night,  while  the 
fleet  could  have  easily  approached  near  enough  to  see  the  fort — a 
large,  lofty  object,  covering  several  acres — the  monitors,  which  were 
relatively  so  small  and  low  on  the  water,  could  not  have  been  seen 
from  the  fort.     It  would  have  been  impossible,  therefore,  for  the 
latter  to  have  returned  writh  any  accuracy  the  fire  of  the  fleet,  and 
this  plan  of  attack  could  have  been  repeated  every  night  until  the 
walls  of  the  fort  should  have  crumbled  under  the  enormous  missiles, 
which  made  holes  two  and  a  half  feet  deep  in  the  walls,  and  shattered 
the  latter  in  an  alarming  manner.     I  could  not  then  have  repaired 
during  the  day  the  damages  of  the  night,  and  I  am  confident  now, 
as  I  was  then,  that  Fort  Sumter,  if  thus  attacked,  must  have  been 
disabled  and  silenced  in  a  few  days.     Such  a  result  at  that  time 
would  have  been  necessarily  followed  by  the  evacuation  of  Morris 
and  Sullivan's  Islands,  and,  soon  after,  of  Charleston  itself,  for  I  had 
not  yet  had  time  to  complete  and  arm  the  system  of  works,  including 
James  Island  and  the  inner  harbor,  which  enabled  us  six  months  later 
to  bid  defiance  to  Admiral  Dahlgren's  powerful  fleet  and  Gilinore's 
strong  land  forces. 


GREGG^S  CAVALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG. 


BY    MAJOR    J.    EDWARD    CARPENTER. 


LITTLE  has  been  written  of 
the  stubborn  fight  which  took 
place  on  the  3d  of  July,  1SG3, 
on  the  right  of  the  Union 
line  at  Gettysburg,  between 
the  cavalry  command  of 
General  David  McM.  Gregg, 
and  that  of  the  Confederate 
Chief  of  Cavalry,  General  J. 
E.  1).  Stuart.  In  an  article 
published  in  the  WEEKLY 
TIMES  of  March  31st,  1877, 
entitled,  "The  Union  Cavalry 
in  the  Gettysburg  Cam 
paign,"  by  General  Gregg,  it 
is  stated : 

On  the  3d,  during  that  terrific  fire  of  artillery  which  preceded  the  gallant  but 
unsuccessful  assault  of  Pickett's  Division  on  our  line,  it  was  discovered  that  Stuart's 
cavalry  was  moving  to  our  right  with  the  evident  intention  of  passing  to  the  rear 
to  make  a  simultaneous  attack  there.  What  the  consequence  of  the  success  of  this 
movement  would  have  been,  the  merest  tyro  in  the  art  of  war  will  understand. 
When  opposite  our  right,  Stuart  was  met  by  General  Gregg  with  two  of  his  brigades 
(Colonels  Mclntosh  and  Irvin  Gregg)  and  Ouster's  Brigade  of  the  Third  Division; 
and,  on  a  fair  field,  there  was  another  trial  between  two  cavalry  forces,  in  which 
most  of  the  lighting  was  done  in  the  saddle,  and  with  the  trooper's  favorite  weapon — 
the  sabre.  Without  entering  into  the  details  of  the  light,  it  need  only  be  added  that 
Stuart  advanced  not  a  pace  beyond  where  he  was  met ;  but,  after  a  severe  struggle, 
which  was  only  terminated  by  the  darkness  of  the  night,  he  withdrew,  and  on  the 
morrow,  with  the  defeated  army  of  Lee,  was  in  retreat  to  the  Potomac. 

Iii  reply  to  this,  Major  II.  B.  McClellan,  who  was  Assistant 
Adjutant  General  on  the  staff  of  General  Stuart,  writes  in  the  same 
paper,  October  20th,  1877: 

I  would  remind  General  Gregg  that  the  last  charge  in  the  cavalry  battle  at 
Gettysburg  was  made  by  the  Southern  cavalry ;  that  by  this  charge  his  division 
was  swept  behind  the  protection  of  his  artillery,  and  that  the  field  remained  in  the 

(527) 


528  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

undisputed  possession  of  Stuart,  save  that  from  the  opposite  hills  a  fierce  artillery 
duel  was  maintained  until  night.* 

Let  us  examine  by  the  light  of  the  official  reports  of  the  com 
manding  officers  of  the  contending  forces  these  conflicting  state 
ments,  and  discover  where  the  victory  really  remained,  or  who  was 
defeated — Gregg  or  Stuart. 

General  Gregg,  in  his  official  report,  dated  July  25th,  1863,  to 
Lieutenant  Colonel  A.  J.  Alexander,  Assistant  Adjutant  General 
Cavalry  Corps,  says : 

At  twelve  M.  I  received  a  copy  of  a  dispatch  from  the  commander  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps  to  the  Major  General  commanding  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  that 
large  columns  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  were  moving  towards  the  right  of  our  line. 
At  the  same  time  I  received  an  order  from  Major  General  Pleasonton,  through  an 
aide-de-camp,  to  send  the  First  Brigade  of  the  Third  Division  to  join  General  Kil- 
patrick  on  the  left.  The  First  Brigade  of  my  division  was  sent  to  relieve  the  brigade 
of  the  Third  Division.  This  change  having  been  made,  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers 
displayed  by  the  enemy  was  evidence  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  gained  our  right, 
and  were  about  to  attack  with  the  view  of  gaining  the  rear  of  our  line  of  battle. 
The  importance  of  stubbornly  resisting  an  attack  at  this  point,  which,  if  success 
ful,  would  have  been  productive  of  the  most  serious  consequences,  determined  me  to 
retain  the  brigade  of  the  Third  Division  until  the  enemy  were  driven  back.  General 
Custer,  commanding  the  brigade,  satisfied  of  the  intended  attack,  was  well  pleased 
to  remain  with  his  brigade. 

Then  follows  a  description  of  the  disposition  of  his  troops  and 
the  arrangement  of  his  line  of  battle.  The  report  then  proceeds : 

At  this  time  the  skirmishing  became  very  brisk  on  both  sides,  and  an  artil 
lery  fire  was  begun  by  the  enemy  and  ourselves.  During  the  skirmish  of  the  dis 
mounted  men  the  enemy  brought  upon  the  field  a  column  for  a  charge.  The  charge  of 
this  column  was  met  by  the  (Seventh)  Michigan  cavalry  of  the  First  Brigade,  Third 
Division,  but  not  successfully.  The  advantage  gained  in  this  charge  was  soon 
wrested  from  the  enemy  by  the  gallant  charge  of  the  First  Michigan,  of  the  same 
brigade.  This  regiment  drove  the  enemy  back  to  his  starting  point. 


*  It  is  remarkable  that,  among  the  numerous  accounts  from  Confederate  sources, 
of  the  operations  of  General  Stuart's  cavalry  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  published 
among  these  "Annals  of  the  War,"  until  the  appearance  of  this  statement  by  Major 
McClellan,  mention  has  not  been  made  of  the  part  taken  by  Stuart  in  the  actual 
battle.  Knowledge  of  this  is  certainly  essential  to  a  correct  understanding  of  the 
great  struggle.  One  might  imagine  that  Maj  or  McClellan's  assertion  had  been  thrust 
forward  as  a  feeler,  to  ascertain  whether  there  was  any  one  to  take  up  the  gauntlet 
for  General  Gregg  and  his  command,  who,  for  many  years,  have  rested  content  with 
their  achievements  without  boasting,  and,  if  there  were  none  ready  to  do  so,  to 
claim  unequivocally  a  victory. 

The  very  able  paper  of  Colonel  Brooke-Rawle,  on  "  The  Right  Flank  at  Gettys 
burg,"  which  appears  in  this  series,  furnishes  the  reader  a  careful,  reliable,  and 
truthful  account  of  the  engagement  between  Gregg  and  Stuart. 


GREGG'S  CATALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  529 

Other  charges  were  made  by  the  columns  of  the  enemy,  but  in  every  instance 
•were  they  driven  back.  Defeated  at  every  point,  the  enemy  withdrew  to  his  left, 
and  in  passing  the  wood  in  which  the  First  New  Jersey  Cavalry  was  posted,  that 
regiment  gallantly  and  successfully  charged  the  Hank  of  his  column.  Heavy  skir 
mishing  was  still  maintained  by  the  Third  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  with  the  enemy, 
and  was  continued  until  nightfall.  During  the  engagement,  a  portion  of  this 
regiment  made  a  very  handsome  and  successful  charge  upon  one  of  the  enemy's 
regiments.  The  enemy  retired  his  columns  behind  his  artillery,  and  at  dark  with 
drew  from  his  former  position.  At  this  time  I  was  at  liberty  to  relieve  the  First 
Brigade,  Third  Division,  which  was  directed  to  join  its  division.  Our  own  and  the 
enemy's  loss,  during  this  engagement,  was  severe.  Ours,  one  officer  killed,  seven 
teen  officers  wounded,  and  one  officer  missing;  enlisted  men  killed,  thirty-three: 
wounded,  forty  ;  missing,  one  hundred  and  three. 

On  the  morning  of  the  4th,  I  advanced  to  the  enemy's  position,  but  found  him 
gone.  Following  toward  Hunterstown,  I  found  many  of  his  wounded  abandoned. 
From  these  we  learned  that  the  enemy  had  been  severely  punished  and  his  loss 
heavy.  One  general  officer  of  the  enemy  was  seriously  wounded. 

It  will  l)e  seen  that  General  Gregg  fought  a  defensive  tight. 
That  "the  importance  of  totiifjbornly  resisting  an  attack  at  this  point, 
which,  it'  successful,  would  have  heen  productive  of  the  most  serious 
consequences,"  determined  him  "to  retain  the  brigade  of  the  Third 
Division  until  the  enemy  were  driven  back."  This,  then,  was  all 
that  he  strove  to  accomplish — to  drive  the  enemv  hack  in  case  he 
should  attack.  Again,  Gregg's  report  says:  "Other  charges  were 
made  by  the  columns  oi  the  enemv,  but  in  everv  instance  were1  thev 
drtrri,  l<irl\  Defeated  at  every  point  the;  enemy  withdrew  to  his 
left,"  etc.  If,  then,  Gregg  succeeded  in  resisting  the  attack  made 
upon  him  by  Stuart,  it  is  evident  that  the  victory  belongs  to  and 
was  properly  claimed  bv  him. 

Let  us  no\\-  rum  to  the  official  report  of  General  Stuart,  which 
is  dated  August  L'oth,  ls<;:j,  and  is  addressed  to  Colonel  K.  II.  Chil- 
ton,  Chief -of -Staff,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  The  report,  after 
detailing  the  movements  of  Stuart's  forces  prior  to  his  arrival  in  the 
vicinity  of  Gettysburg,  gives  the  following  account  of  his  operations 
during  the  battle  :* 


;:  The  portion  of  General  Stuart's  report  referring  to  the  operations  of  his 
command  (hiring  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  is  now  for  the  first  time  printed.  The 
original  report,  in  the  possession  of  the  War  Department,  is  one  connected 
paper,  giving  a  history  of  the  part  taken  by  his  troopers  from  the  very  beginning 
to  the  close  of  the  campaign.  That  portion  of  the  report  which  refers  only  to 
Stuart's  operations  after  Gettysburg,  commencing  wilh  the  paragraph  next  to  the 
last  of  the  extract  here  quoted,  "during  the  night  of  the  3d,"  etc..  was  published 
by  the  Southern  Historical  Society  (Vol.  II.,  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers, 
page  6f»  as  an  entire  report,  and  is  entitled  "General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart's  Koport  of 
Operations  after  Gettysburg.''  It  may  be  unjust  to  the  editors  of  that  magazine  to 
34 


530  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

My  advance  reached  Gettysburg  July  2d,  just  in  time  to  thwart  amove  of 
the  enemy's  cavalry*  upon  our  rear  by  way  of  Hunterstown,  after  a  fierce  engage 
ment,  in  which  Hampton's  Brigade  performed  gallant  service,  a  series  of  charges 
compelling  the  enemy  to  leave  the  field  and  abandon  his  purpose.  I  took  my 
position  that  day  on  the  York  and  Heidelburg  roads,  on  the  left  wing  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia. 

On  the  morning  of  the  3d  of  July,  pursuant  to  instructions  from  the  com 
manding  general  (the  ground  along  our  line  of  battle  being  totally  impracticable 
for  cavalry  operations),  I  moved  forward  to  a  position  to  the  left  of  General  Swell's 
left,  and  in  advance  of  it,  where  a  commanding  ridge  completely  controlled  a  wide 
plain  of  cultivated  fields  stretching  toward  Hanover  on  the  left,  and  reaching  to 
the  base  of  the  mountain  spurs,  among  which  the  enemy  held  position.  My  com 
mand  was  increased  by  the  addition  of  Jenkins'  Brigade,  who,  here,  in  the  presence 
of  the  enemy,  allowed  themselves  to  be  supplied  with  but  ten  rounds  of  ammuni 
tion,  although  armed  with  the  most  approved  Enfield  muskets. 

I  moved  this  command  and  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  secretly  through  the  woods  to  a 
position,  and  hoped  to  effect  a  surprise  upon  the  enemy's  rear.  But  Hampton's  and 
Fitz  Lee's  brigades,  which  had  been  ordered  to  follow  me,  unfortunately  debouched 
into  open  ground,  disclosing  the  movement,  and  causing  a  corresponding  movement 
of  a  large  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry.  Having  been  informed  that  Generals 
Hampton  and  Lee  were  up,  I  sent  for  them  to  come  forward,  so  that  I  could  show 
them,  at  a  glance,  from  the  elevated  ground  I  held,  the  situation,  and  arrange 
for  further  operations.  My  message  was  so  long  in  finding  General  Hampton  that 
he  never  reached  me,  and  General  Lee  remained,  as  it  was  deemed  inadvisable,  at 
the  time  the  message  wTas  delivered,  for  both  to  leave  their  commands. 

Before  General  Hampton  had  reached  where  I  was,  the  enemy  had  deployed 
a  heavy  line  of  sharpshooters,  and  were  advancing  towards  our  position,  which  was 
very  strong.  Our  artillery  had,  however,  left  the  crest,  which  it  was  essential  for 
it  to  occupy,  on  account  of  being  too  short  range  to  compete  with  the  longer-range 
guns  of  the  enemy  ;  but  I  sent  orders  for  its  return.  Jenkins'  Brigade  was  chiefly 
employed  dismounted,  and  fought  with  decided  effect  until  the  ten  rounds  were 
expended,  and  then  retreated,  under  circumstances  of  difficulty  and  exposure, 
which  entailed  the  loss  of  valuable  men.  The  left,  where  Hampton's  and  Lee's 
brigades  were,  by  this  time  became  heavily  engaged  as  dismounted  skirmishers. 

My  plan  was  to  employ  the  enemy  in  front  with  sharpshooters,  and  move  a 
command  of  cavalry  upon  their  left  flank  from  the  position  lately  held  by  me,  but 
the  falling  back  of  Jenkins'  men  (that  officer  was  wounded  the  day  previous,  before 
reporting  to  me,  and  his  brigade  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Ferguson,  Sixteenth 
Virginia  Cavalry)  caused  a  like  movement  of  those  on  the  left,  and  the  enemy, 
sending  forward  a  squadron  or  two,  were  about  to  cut  off  and  capture  a  portion  of 
our  dismounted  sharpshooters. 

To  prevent  this,  I  ordered  forward  the  nearest  cavalry  regiment  (one  of  W.  H. 
F.  Lee's)  quickly  to  charge  this  force  of  cavalry.  It  was  gallantly  done,  and  about 
the  same  time  a  portion  of  General  Fitz  Lee's  command  charged  on  the  left,  the 
First  Virginia  Cavalry  being  most  conspicuous.  In  these  charges  the  impet- 


suggest  that  the  cause  of  truth  is  not  advanced  by  the  publication  of  the  tail-end 
of  General  Stuart's  report,  which  chronicles  the  events  of  his  successful  flight  into 
Virginia,  and  by  consigning  to  oblivion  that  portion  which  narrates  the  defeat  of 
his  forces  in  the  greatest  effort  made  by  him  during  the  campaign — the  battle  itself. 
*  Under  Kilpatrick. 


GREGG'S  CAVALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  531 

uosity  of  these  gallant  fellows,  after  two  weeks  of  hard  marching  and  hard  fighting 
on  short  rations,  was  not  only  extraordinary,  but  irresistible.  The  enemy's  masses 
vanished  before  them  like  grain  before  the  scythe,  and  that  regiment  elicited  the 
admiration  of  every  beholder,  and  eclipsed  the  many  laurels  already  won  by  its 
gallant  veterans.  Their  impetuosity  carried  them  too  far,  and  the  charge  being 
very  much  prolonged,  their  horses,  already  jaded  by  hard  marching,  failed  under  it. 
Their  movement  was  too  rapid  to  be  stopped  by  couriers,  and  the  enemy  perceiving 
it,  were  turning  upon  them  with  fresh  horses.  The  First  Xorth  Carolina  Cavalry  and 
Jeff  Davis  Legion  were  sent  to  their  support,  and  gradually  this  hand-to-hand 
lighting  involved  the  greater  portion  of  the  command,  till  the  enemy  was  driven 
from  the  field,  which  was  now  raked  by  their  artillery,  posted  about  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  off,  our  officers  and  men  behaving  with  the  greatest  heroism  throughout. 
Our  own.  artillery  commanding  the  same  ground,  no  more  hand-to-hand  light 
ing  occurred,  but  the  wounded  were  removed  and  the  prisoners  i  a  large  number) 
taken  to  the  rear.  The  enemy's  loss  was  unmistakably  heavy — numbers  not 
known.  Many  of  his  killed  and  wounded  fell  into  our  hands.  That  brave  and 
distinguished  officer,  Brigadier  General  Hampton,  was  seriously  wounded  twice  in 
this  engagement.  Among  the  killed  was  Major  Connor,  a  gallant  and  efficient 
officer  of  the  Jell'  Davis  Legion.  Several  officers  and  many  valuable  men  were 
killed  and  wounded,  whose  names  it  is  nof  now  in  my  power  to  furnish,  but  which.it  is 
hoped,  will  be  ultimately  furnished  in  the  reports  of  regimental  and  brigade  com 
manders. 

Notwithstanding  the  favorable  results  obtained,  I  would  have  preferred  a 
different  method  of  attack,  as  already  indicated,  but  I  soon  saw  that  entanglement, 
by  the  force  of  circumstances  narrated,  was  unavoidable1,  and  determined  to  make 
the  best  fight  possible.  General  Fit/  Lee  was  always  in  the  right  place,  and  con 
tributed  his  usual  conspicuous  share  to  the  success  of  the  day.  Both  he  and  the 
gallant  First  Virginia  begged  me.  after  the  hot  encounter,  to  allow  them  to  take 
the  enemy's  battery,  but  I  doubted  the  practicability  of  the  ground  for  such  a 
purpose. 

During  this  day's  operations  I  held  such  a  'position  as  not  only  to  render 
Ewell's  left  entirely  secure,  where  the  firing  of  my  command,  mistaken  for  that  of 
the  enemy,  caused  some  apprehension,  but  commanded  a  view  of  the  routes  leading 
to  the  enemy's  rear.  Had  the  enemy's  main  body  been  dislodged,  as  was  confidently 
hoped  and  expected.  I  was  in  precisely  the  right  position  to  discover  it,  and  improve 
the  opportunity.  I  watched  keenly  and  anxiously  the  indications  in  his  rear  for 
that  purpose  ;  while  in.  the  attack  which  I  intended,  'which  was  forestalled  by  our 
troops  being  exposed  to  view,  i  his  cavalry  would  have  separated  from  the  main  body, 
and  gave  promise  of  solid  results  and  advantages.  After  dark  I  directed  a  with 
drawal  to  the  York  road,  as  our  position  was  so  far  advanced  as  to  make  it  hazard 
ous  at  night,  on  account  of  the  proximity  of  the  enemy's  infantry. 

During  the  night  of  the  od  of  July,  the  commanding  general  withdrew  the 
main  body  to  the  ridges  west  of  Gettysburg,  and  sent  word  to  me  to  that  effect,  but 
his  messenger  missed  me.  I  repaired  to  his  headquarters  during  the  latter  part  of  the 
night,  and  received  instructions  as  to  the  new  line,  and  sent,  in  compliance  there 
with,  a  brigade  (Fitz  Lee's)  to  Cash  town  to  protect  our  trains  congregated  there. 
My  cavalry  and  artillery  Avere  somewhat  jeopardized  before  1  got  back  to  my  com 
mand  by  the  enemy's  having  occupied  our  late  ground  before  my  command  could 
be  notified  of  the  change.  Xone,  however,  were  either  lost  or  captured. 

During  the  4th,  which  was  quite  rainy,  written  instructions  were  received 
from  the  commanding  general  as  to  the  order  of  march  back  to  the  Potomac 


532  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

It  appears,  then,  according  to  his  own  narrative,  that  General 
Stuart  moved  his  command  and  W.  II.  F.  Lee's  secretely  through 
the  woods  to  a  position,  "and  lioped  to  effect  a  surprise  iipon  the- 
enemy's  rear"  Did  he  accomplish  his  object  \  Stuart  further  says : 
u  M v  plan,  was  to  employ  the  enemy  in  front  with  sharpshooters,  and 
move  a  command  of  cavalry  upon  their  left  flank  from  a  position 
lately  held  by  me.'-  But  in  the  next  sentence,  he  proceeds  to  state 
the  reasons  why  this  plan  was  not  successful,  and  further  on  in  the 
report  he  squarely  acknowledges  his  failure : 

Notwithstanding  the  favorable  results  obtained,  I  would  have  preferred  a  dif 
ferent  mode  of  attack,  as  already  indicated,  but  I  soon  saw  that  entanglement 
by  the  force  of  circumstances  narrated,  was  unavoidable,  and  determined  to  make 
the  best  fight  possible.  Had  the  enemy's  main  body  been  dislodged,  as 

was  confidently  hoped  and  expected,  I  was  in  precisely  the  right  position  to  discover 
it  and  improve  the  opportunity.  I  watched  keenly  and  anxiously  the  indications 
in  his  rear  for  that  purpose ;  while  in  the  attack  which  I  intended,  which  was 
forestalled  by  our  troops  being  exposed  to  view,  his  cavalry  would  have  separated 
from  the  main  body,  and  gave  promise  of  solid  results  and  advantages.  After  dark 
I  directed  a  withdrawal  *  *  My  cavalry  and  artillery  were  somewhat  jeopar 
dized  before  I  got  back  to  my  command  by  the  enemy's  having  occupied  our  late 
ground. 

A  nice  discrimination  is  not  required  to  detect  throughout 
Stuart's  report  a  desire  to  explain  why  his  attack  upon  Gregg  was 
unsuccessful.  First,  his  column  debouched  into  the  open  ground, 
and  gave  notice  of  his  intended  attack  to  his  enemy ;  next,  the  rout 
of  Jenkins'  Brigade  caused  a  like  movement  to  those  on  the  left ; 
then  the  impetuosity  of  the  First  Virginia  carried  them  too  far,  and 
their  horses  failed  under  it,  and  finally,  a  withdrawal  to  the  York 
road  was  directed  by  Stuart,  because  his  advanced  position  was 
hazardous  on  account  of  the  proximity  of  the  enemy's  infantry. 
The  two  reports  are  harmonious  in  that  one  (Gregg's)  claims  to  have 
successfully  resisted  an  attack,  and  the  other  (Stuart's)  admits  that 
he  was  not  successful  in  his  operations  against  the  right  and  rear  of 
the  Union  line.  The  reports  seem  to  conflict  somewhat  in  their 
statements  regarding  the  result  of  the  charges  made  by  certain  con 
tending  regiments,  but  an  analysis  of  the  statements  made  by  each, 
will  go  far  toward  harmonizing  them,  and  the  truth  may  easily  be 
eliminated.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  it  is  a  weakness  of 
human  nature  to  cover  up  our  failures,  as  far  as  possible,  and  to  set 
forth  our  successes  prominently.  Especially  is  this  true  when  we 
feel  and  know  that  everything  has  been  done  to  insure  success  that 
a  more  than  ordinary  prudence,  ability,  and  bravery  could  dictate. 


GREGG'S  CAVALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  533 

There  can  be  but  one  opinion  of  the  fighting  qualities  of  Gen 
eral  Stuart's  command  at  Gettysburg.  Those  who  opposed  his 
attempt  to  reach  the  rear  of  the  Union  lines,  have  every  reason  to 
remember  the  valor  and  intrepidity  of  his  troopers.  But  in  Gregg, 
he  had  "  a  Roland  for  his  Oliver,"  and  in  a  fair  light,  in  an  open 
field,  with  no  surprise  on  the  one  side  or  the  other,  he  was,  in  plain 
language,  simply  defeated  in  all  that  he  undertook  to  accomplish — 
and  the  more  one  seeks  for  the  truth  on  this  subject  the  more  cer 
tainly  must  he  come  to  this  conclusion.  1  was  not  aware,  until  I 
had  read  Major  McClellan\s  article,  before  alluded  to,  that  there  had 
been  a  claim  to  a  victory  over  Gregg,  at  Gettysburg,  made  by  Stuart. 
The  results  of  the  battle  were  so  overwhelmingly  on  the  side  of 
Gregg,  it  would  seem,  that  the  blindest  prejudice  alone  could  con 
strue  the  victory  to  his  opponent. 

Stuart  describes  the  charge  of  one  of  AV.  II.  F.  Lee's  regiments 
and  a  portion  of  Fit/  Lee's  command,  including  the  First  Virginia 
Cavalry,  as  very  successful — "  the  enemy's  masses  vanished  before 
them  like  grain  before  the  scythe;"  but  he  adds,  "their  impetuosity 
carried  them  too  far,"  "their  horses,  already  jaded,"  "failed  under 
it."  "The  First  .North  Carolina  Cavalry  and  Jell'  Davis  Legion 
were  sent  to  their  support,  and  gradually  this  hand-to-hand  lighting 
involved  the  greater  portion  of  the  command,"  etc.  Here  is  a  halt' 
hidden  acknowledgment  that  after  the  lirst  charge,  which  Givgg 
admits  was  not  successfully  met  by  the  Seventh  Michigan  Regiment, 
the  attacking  column  was  obliged  to  retire.  In-fore  the  charge  of  the 
First  Michigan  Regiment.  The  difference  between  the  reports  of 
the  two  commanders  here  being  that  Stuart  mentions  the  repulse  in 
the  mildest  language,  while  Gregg  writes  of  it  in  glowing  terms: 
"The  advantage  gained  in  this  charge  was  soon  wrested  from  the 
enemy  by  the  gallant  charge  of  the  First  Michigan  Cavalry  of  the 
same  brigade.  This  regiment  drove  the  enemy  back  to  his  starting 
point." 

There  remains  only  to  consider  the  statement  made  by  each 
general  that  his  opponent  was  in  the  end  obliged  to  withdraw. 
Gregg  says  :  "Defeated  at  every  point,  the  enemy  withdrew  to  his 
left.v  "Heavy  skirmishing  was  still  maintained  by  the  Third  Penn 
sylvania  Cavalry  with  the  enemy,  and  was  continued  until  nightfall." 
"The  enemy  retired  his  columns  behind  his  artillery,  and  at  dark 
withdrew  from  his  former  position;''  and  on  this  subject  Stuart 
writes:  "  Gradually  this  hand-to-hand  fighting  involved  the  greater 
portion  of  the  command,  till  the  enemy  was  driven  from  the  field, 
which  was  now  raked  by  their  artillery,  posted  about  three-quarters 


534  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  a  mile  off."  "  Our  own  artillery  commanding  the  same  ground, 
no  more  liand-to-hand  fighting  occurred,  but  the  wounded  were 
removed,  and  the  prisoners  (a  large  number)  taken  to  the  rear." 

Stuart's  artillery  commanding  the  same  ground  as  Gregg's,  no 
more  hand-to-hand  fighting  occurred ;  in  other  words,  Stuart's  forces 
were  withdrawn  from  the  attack,  the  attempt  to  carry  Gregg's 
position  having  utterly  failed.  These  words  admit  of  no  other 
construction.  Stuart's  was  the  attacking  force.  If  Gregg  had  been 
driven  from  the  field,  why  did  not  Stuart  carry  out  his  confessedly 
intended  plan,  and  march  to  the  rear  of  the  Federal  line  of  battle  ? 
The  sentence  which  follows  the  statement  that  no  more  hand-to- 
hand  fighting  occurred,  "but  the  wounded  were  removed  and  the 
prisoners  taken  to  the  rear,"  is  a  quasi  confession  that  we  were 
repulsed,  but  we  succeeded  in  removing  our  prisoners  and  wounded. 
So  that,  even  in  these  apparently  opposite  statements,  we  find 
sufficient  in  Stuart's  report  to  prove  the  correctness  of  Gregg's. 

The  facts  summed  up,  then,  are  these :  Stuart,  on  the  3d  of 
July,  attempted  to  reach  the  rear  of  the  Federal  line  of  battle, 
but,  encountering  Gregg's  command,  after  a  stubborn  fight,  in 
which  the  first  mounted  charge  of  Stuart's  troopers  was  partially 
successful,  he  was  utterly  and  entirely  defeated,  and,  under  cover  of 
night,  retreated  from  his  position  before  his  successful  antagonist. 

A  word  as  to  one  or  two  facts.  Major  McClellan  states  that 
the  last  charge  in  the  cavalry  battle  at  Gettysburg  was  made  by 
Southern  cavalry,  and  that  by  this  charge  his  (Gregg's)  division  was 
swept  behind  the  protection  of  his  artillery,  and  that  the  field  remained 
in  the  undisputed  possession  of  Stuart,  save  that  an  artillery  duel  was 
maintained  until  night.  In  each  of  these  statements  Major  McClellan 
has  fallen  into  error.  The  last  charge  was  not  made  by  the  Southern 
cavalry,  unless  it  can  be  said  that  a  repelling  charge  is  not  a  charge. 
Every  charge  made  by  Stuart's  cavalry  on  that  day  was  met,  and  met 
successfully,  by  a  counter-charge.  !N~or  were  Gregg's  troops  at  any 
time  on  that  day  swept  behind  the  protection  of  his  artillery.  The 
Seventh  Michigan  Regiment  was  driven  about  half  way  across  the 
open  field  in  which  the  charge  of  the  First  Virginia  and  the  other 
troops  mentioned  in  Stuart's  report  was  made,  but  before  it  reached 
General  Gregg's  artillery  the  attacking  column  was  in  flight,  pursued 
by  the  First  Michigan  and  portions  of  the  Third  Pennsylvania  and 
First  New  Jersey  Cavalry. 

The  field  did  not  remain  in  Stuart's  possession.  After  the 
mounted  charges  had  ceased,  no  part  of  Stuart's  command  occupied 
any  portion  of  the  field  except  the  line  of  skirmishers,  which  was 


GREGG'S  CAVALRY  AT  GETTYSBURG.  535 

deployed  a  short  distance  in  front  of  the  crest  mentioned  in  his 
report,  and  immediately  after  dark  General  Stuart  withdrew  his 
command.  General  Gregg  occupied  the  field  of  the  hand-to-hand 
fight  and  held  possession  of  it  during  the  night.  General  Custer,  in 
his  official  report,  writes  :  '*  AVe  held  possession  of  the  field  until  dark, 
during  which  time  we  collected  our  dead  and  wounded/'  It  was 
true,  then,  that  "Stuart  advanced  not  a  pace  heyond  where  he  was 
met/'  and  the  victory  remained  with  General  Gregg. 


CONFEDERATE  NEGRO  ENLISTMENTS. 


BY    EDWARD    SPENCER. 


No  circumstances  connected 
with  the  late  war  caused  more 
surprise,  perhaps,  than  the 
general  conduct  of  the  slave 
population  of  the  South  du 
ring  the  whole  contest.  This 
surprise  was  common  to  the 
people  of  both  sections,  for 
there  were  few  persons  at  the 
North  who  did  not  expect, 
and  at  the  South  who  did  not 
fear,  a  servile  insurrection  as 
the  Federal  armies  penetrated 
deeper  into  the  Southern  ter 
ritory.  The  people  of  the 
South  did  not,  of  course,  have 
any  great  opinion  of  the  negroes'  courage,  but  still  they  felt  appre 
hensive  about  the  women  and  children  left  at  home,  and  fearful,  too, 
in  regard  to  neglected  plantation  work ;  and  ike  fact  of  this  appre 
hension  is  embodied  in  all  the  draft  schemes  and  conscription  laws 
of  the  Confederacy,  which,  both  under  the  State  government  regimen, 
and  later  under  the  general  conscription  system,  made  specific  pro 
vision  for  a  certain  line  of  exemptions,  looking  to  the  peace  and 
good  order  of  the  plantations,  and  keeping  the  negroes  at  work. 
These  exemptions  included  detailed  officers  and  veterans,  home 
guards,  etc.,  and,  even  in  the  last  and  severest  conscription  law 
passed  in  the  fall  of  1864,  one  overseer  was  exempted  ufor  each 
plantation  containing  over  fifteen  able-bodied  male  slaves." 

On  the  other  hand,  a  slave  insurrection  was  counted  on  at  the 
North  as  one  factor  in  the  war.  It  was  deprecated,  of  course ;  it  was 
not  invited,  but  it  was  still  looked  for,  and  the  Emancipation  Proc 
lamation  was  calculated  upon  as  a  means  of  inciting  the  negroes  to 
strike  for  their  freedom.  Those  who  will  examine  the  periodicals  of 
the  period — the  Atlantic  Monthly,  for  instance ;  the  Continental 
(636) 


CONFEDERATE  NEGRO  ENLISTMENTS.  537 

etc. — will  find  them  teeming  with  historical  instances 
written  up  of  slaves  who  had  so  risen.  The  Atlantic^  in  particular, 
in  urging  the  Emancipation  Proclamation,  took  occasion  to  give,  as 
arguments  for  it,  detailed  accounts  of  the  revolt  of  Spartacus,  of  the 
Maroons,  of  Xat.  Turner's  outbreak,  etc.;  all  showing  the  wish  that 
was  father  to  the  thought.  Butler  speculated  in  this  sort  of  busi 
ness  at  Fortress  Monroe  and  Xew  Orleans,  and  Hunter  tried  it  in 
South  Carolina  and  Florida.  Higginson's  regiment  at  P>eanfort  was 
intended  to  be  a  nucleus  for  the  negro  rising  which  was  looked  for 
on  the  Carolina  coast. 

The  negroes,  however,  refused  to  disturb  the  Confederates  with 
any  tire  in  the  rear.  Thev  behaved  in  the  most  exemplary  manner 
everywhere.  Where  the  Federal  armies  settled  down  they  came  in 
in  large  numbers,  and  established  their  camps  upon  the  fringes  of  the 
army,  playing  the  parts  of  "intelligent  contrabands"  to  perfection. 
They  told  miraculous  stories,  and  brought  in  no  end  of  "grape-vine"1 
intelligence  for  the  divertissement  of  the  newspaper  correspondents, 
and  the  yol>emoiwhex\  but  they  were  disgustingly  apathetic  on  the 
subject  of  striking  "blows  for  liberty/5  Thev  had  no  tight  in  them, 
in  fact,  and.  when  they  came  into  cam]),  had  no  idea  of  any  other 
freedom  than  freedom  from  work  and  free  rations.  The  best  of  the; 
negroes,  where  they  could,  stayed  at  home  and  worked  along  as 
usual,  and  there  was  no  general  enlistment  of  the  negroes  until  the 
substitute  brokers  began  to  buy  them  up,  and  put  them  in  the  army 
by  wholesale. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  negroes  behaved  very  well,  and 
that  the  Confederate  people  had  a  lively  and  very  grateful  appre 
ciation  of  the  fact.  There  is  evidence  enough  and  to  spare  of  this. 
I  have  before  me  a  curious  pamphlet,  ""Marginalia;  or,  (ileanings 
from  an  Army  Xote-book,"  by  ''Personne,"  army  correspondent  of 
the  Charleston  C<tnr'n-/\  published  at  Columbia,  S.  C.,  in  1S04-,  which 
abounds  with  instances  and  recitals  of  the  good  conduct  of  the  negroes. 
Thus,  "Personne"  relates  the  story  of  Daniel,  a  slave  of  Lieu 
tenant  Bellinger,  who  was  shot  to  pieces  trying  to  take  his  master's 
sword  to  him,  in  the  fort  at  Secessionville,  during  the  assault  on  that 
post,  and  he  says:  "'Such  instances  of  genuine  loyalty  have  their 
parallel  nowhere  so  frequently  as  in  the  pages  of  Southern  history, 
and  gives  a  liut  contradiction  to  all  the  partial  and  puritanical  state 
ments  ever  made  by  Mrs.  Stowe  and  her  tribe  of  worshiping  aboli 
tionists."  "  The  fidelity  of  our  negroes,"  this  writer  says,  in  another 
place,  "has  been  a.s  much  a  subject  of  gratification  to  us  as  of 
surprise  to  the  enemy.  It  has  been  thought  that  every  slave  would 


538  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

gladly  avail  himself  of  an  opportunity  to  regain  liis  freedom ;  but 
the  prophets  have,  been  disappointed." 

General  John  B.  Gordon,  United  States  Senator  from  Georgia, 
who  used  to  own  several  plantations  and  a  great  many  slaves,  in  his 
testimony  before  the  Ku-Klux  Investigating  Committee,  in  July, 
1871,  spoke  in  the  strongest  terms  of  the  good  conduct  of  the  South 
ern  negroes  during  and  after  the  war.  He  said  that  "they  have  be 
haved  so  well  since  the  war  that  the  remark  is  not  uncommon  in  Geor 
gia,  that  no  race,  relieved  from  servitude  under  such  circumstances 
as  they  were,  would  have  behaved  so  well."  As  for  their  conduct 
during  the  war,  when  he  was  asked  about  that,  General  Gordon  said : 

Well,  sir,  I  had  occasion  to  refer  just  now  to  a  little  speech  which  I  made  at 
Montgomery,  Alabama,  where  General  Clanton  also  spoke.  He  and  I  both  struck 
on  that  train  of  thought.  I  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  citizens  of  the  South 
owed  it  to  the  negroes  to  educate  them.  One  of  the  things  which  I  mentioned,  and 
which  General  Clanton  also  mentioned,  was  the  behavior  of  the  negroes  during  the 
war;  the  fact  that  when  almost  the  entire  white  male  population,  old  enough  to 
bear  arms,  was  in  the  army,  and  large  plantations  were  left  to  be  managed  by  the 
women  and  children,  not  a  single  insurrection  had  occcurred,  not  a  life  had  been 
taken;  and  that,  too,  when  the  Federal  armies  were  marching  through  the  country 
with  freedom,  as  it  was  understood,  upon  their  banners.  Scarcely  an  outrage 
occurred,  on  the  part  of  the  negroes,  at  that  time.  *  *  '  The  negroes  were 
aware  that  the  contest  would  decide  whether  they  were  to  be  slaves  or  freemen.  I 
told  my  slaves  of  it  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  I  think  that  the  negroes  gen 
erally  understood  that  if  the  South  should  be  whipped  freedom  would  be  the  result. 

The  negroes,  in  fact,  as  General  Gordon  said,  were  happy 
because  they  were  treated  kindly  and  had  few  cares.  They  were 
attached  to  their  masters,  with  whom  they  had  been  associated  all 
their  lives,  being  naturally  an  amiable,  good-tempered  race,  with 
very  strong  local  attachments,  and  very  affectionate  to  their  kinsmen 
and  those  they  were  used  to  look  up  to.  They  have  an  ardent  clan- 
sense,  and  the  master  used  to  be  revered  as  the  head  of  the  sept. 
This  was  the  case  everywhere,  except  on  the  large  coast  plantations, 
where  the  negroes  seldom  saw  a  white  man,  were  brutalized,  of  low 
intelligence,  speaking  a  language  of  their  own,  scarcely  to  be  under 
stood  by  the  whites.  These  negroes,  like  those  of  Cuba,  were  only 
half  naturalized  and  had  many  of  their  old  barbarian  African  habits 
and  instincts;  but  elsewhere  the  case  was  different.  As  General 
Gordon  said : 

In  the  upper  part,  of  the  State,  where  I  was  raised,  the  negro  children  and  the 
white  children  have  been  in  the  habit  of  playing  together.  My  companions,  when 
I  was  being  raised,  were  the  negro  boys  that  my  father  owned.  We  played  marbles, 
rode  oxen,  went  fishing,  and  broke  colts  together ;  a  part  of  my  fun  was  to  play 
with  those  colored  boys.  The  negro  girls — those  who  were  raised  about  the  house — 


CONFEDERATE  NEGRO  ENLISTMENTS.  539 

were  raised  very  much  as  the  white  family  was  raised.  They  were  raised  in  the 
family',  and,  of  course,  the  intelligence  of  the  family  extended,  in  some  meesure,  to 
the  negroes. 

These  house  servants  considered  themselves  to  "belong  to  de 
fam'ly,"  and  no  people  in  the  world  have  such  an  acute  aristocratic 
pride  as  the  negroes.  The  good  family  slaves  looked  down  with 

f  o  «/ 

ineffable  contempt  upon  "de  pore  white  trash,''  and  they  do  so  still. 
A  great  part  of  the  lordly  airs  which  negro  legislators  have  put  on 
of  late  years  proceeds  from  their  contempt  for  the  carpet-baggers, 
whom  they  consider  as  being  of  the  " trash "  species.  AVade  Hamp 
ton's  old  body-servant  was  senator  from  Columbia,  South  Carolina, 
and  used  to  make  Tim  Hurley  stand  about,  and  treated  Chamberlain, 
and  Moses,  and  Scott  with  huge  disdain;  but  he  touches  his  hat  to 
his  old  master  to  this  day,  and  all  the  former  slave  negroes  have  the 
same  sort  of  recognition  for  "de  quality,"  under  no  matter  what 
adverse  circumstance,  that  the  Irish  peasantry  have  for  their  lineal 
descendants  of  the  O'Drieirs  and  the  O'Shaughnessey's  who  used  to 
rule  over  them  with  rods  of  iron. 

Strong  friendships  and  the  utmost  familiarity  of  personal  rela 
tionship  grew  out  of  this  life-long  intercourse  between  the  house 
servants  and  their  masters;  and  a  great  many  body-servants  not 
only  followed  their  masters  to  the  field,  and  devoted  themselves  to 
their  service  in  the  tenderest  way,  but  fought,  bled,  and  died  for 
them.  There  are  some  touching  instances  of  this  intercourse  and 
this  devotion  which  are  worth  relating.  AVlien  General  Joseph  E. 
Johnston  was  at  Jackson,  at  the  Lamar  House,  in  the  full  tide  of  a 
brilliant  reception,  an  old  negro  woman,  in  a  coarse  sunboimet,  with 
a  cotton  umbrella  under  her  arm,  rapped  at  the  door,  and  asked: 
"Is  dis  Mr.  Johnston's  room?"  "Yes."  "Mr.  Joe  Johnston's 
room  T'  "  1  es."  "I  wants  to  see  him,  den  ;"  and  in  marched  the 
old  lady,  going  up  to  the  distinguished  soldier,  and  laying  her  hand 
familiarly  upon  his  epauleted  shoulder.  Johnston  turned,  a  look  of 
surprise  and  gladness  overspread  his  face,  he  took  both  the  bony, 
bird-claw  hands  warmly  in  his  own,  and  exclaimed:  "Whv,  Aunt 
Judy  Paxton!  v  The  old  negress  scanned  his  features  witli  tears  in 
her  eyes,  and  at  last  said,  in  a  querulous  treble,  made  touching  with 
undisguised  emotion  :  "  Mister  Joe,  you  is  gittin'  old."  Then,  patting 
his  hand,  the  old  nurse  turned  half  apologetically  to  the  assemblage, 
and  said:  -'Dis  here's  my  own  boy.  Many's  de  time  I's  toted  you 
in  dese  yere  arms  ;  didn't  I,  honey  i "  Such  a  scene  would  be  strange 
elsewhere,  but  it  was  not  so  in  the  South.  The  artless  sense  of  equality 
grew  out  of  the  strongest  sort  of  affectionate  regard. 


540  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

General  Gordon,  in  the  testimony  cited  above,  said : 

The  very  kindliest  relations  exist  between  the  old  masters  and  their  former 
servants.  I  could  give,  from  my  own  personal  knowledge,  instances  of  the  very 
tenderest  expressions  of  kindness  and  enthusiastic  demonstrations  of  love  on  the 
part  of  negroes  for  their  old  masters.  In  one  case,  a  body -servant  of  mine  came  a 
long  distance  to  see  me.  After  having  been  captured  by  the  Federal  army  in 
Georgia,  and  staying  with  them  for  months,  he  came  back  to  me  j  ust  after  the 
surrender,  and  told  me  he  preferred  to  serve  me  rather  than  have  his  freedom,  if 
he  must  be  separated  from  me,  though  he  wanted  his  freedom.  His  wife  was  my 
wife's  chambermaid.  She  wanted  to  go  with  me  to  Brunswick.  She  had  been 
raised  by  my  wife,  and  had  been  raised  very  much  as  my  wife  was.  I  had  paid  an 
enormous  price  for  her  husband  after  my  marriage,  so  as  to  have  him  with  his  wife. 
I  had  been  offered  $2,500  for  him,  which  I  had  refused  to  take.  I  would  not  have 
sold  him  at  all,  any  more  than  I  would  have  sold  my  brother.  These  two  negroes 
were  anxious  to  go  with  us  to  Brunswick,  but  I  had  but  little  money,  and  was 
unable  to  take  them.  On  my  return  to  that  portion  of  Georgia,  two  years  after 
ward,  I  walked  from  my  father's  house  a  mile  before  breakfast  to  their  little  cabin 
to  see  them.  When  I  got  to  the  door  the  woman  was  sitting  at  the  breakfast- 
table.  As  I  opened  the  door  she  was  in  the  act  of  drinking  coffee  from  a  saucer. 
In  her  excitement  at  seeing  me,  she  let  the  saucer  fall  upon  the  floor,  sprang  to  me, 
gathered  me  in  her  arms,  and  sank  at  my  feet,  crying :  "  Massa  John,  I  never  knew 
who  my  friends  were  before." 

These  are  two  instances  from  the  associations  of  two  leading 
Confederates.  Take  another,  from  General  Lee's  life,  to  show  the 
Caleb  Balderstone  sort  of  devotion  with  which  these  house  servants 
used  to  guard  their  masters'  interests.  It  is  from  "  Personne's " 
pamphlet,  and  relates  to  the  last  year  of  the  war,  when  provisions 
were  scarce,  and  the  General  himself  only  had  meat  twice  a  week : 

Having  invited  a  number  of  gentlemen  to  dine  with  him,  the  commander- 
in-chief,  in  a  fit  of  extravagance,  ordered  a  sumptuous  repast  of  cabbage  and 
middling.  The  dinner  was  served,  and,  behold,  a  great  pile  of  cabbage,  and  a  bit 
of  middling,  about  four  inches  long  and  two  inches  across.  The  guests,  with  com 
mendable  politeness,  unanimously  declined  middling,  and  it  remained  in  the  dish 
untouched.  Next  day,  General  Lee,  remembering  the  delicate  tid-bitthat  had  been 
so  providentially  preserved,  ordered  his  servant  to  bring  him  "  that  middling."  The 
man  hesitated,  scratched  his  head,  and  finally  owned  up :  "  De  fac  is,  Marse  Eobert, 
dat  dar  middlin'  was  borrowed  middlin'.  We  all  didn't  have  nary  a  spec,  so  I  done 
borrowed  it,  an'  now  I  done  paid  it  back  to  de  man  whar  I  got  it  from,  sar." 

This  servant  was  a  true  Southern  family  darkey,  with  all  the 
pride  of  his  connections  in  him.  He  was  like  the  waiter  at  the 
Southern  hotel  where  the  abolitionist  lecturer  put  up,  and  who  was 
so  impassive  and  unresponsive  to  the  enthusiast's  praises  of  freedom 
and  horror  of  slavery,  that  at  last  the  latter  cried:  "Leave  me! 
leave  me !  I  cannot  endure  the  spectacle  of  such  obtuseness  after 
such  misfortune.  Go !  I  will  not  be  waited  upon  by  one  who  is  a 
slave  indeed!"  "Excuse  me,  master,"  said  the  negro,  "I'd  like 


CONFEDERATE  NEGRO  ENLISTMENTS. 

worry  much  to  'commodate  you,  sar,  but  Fse  'sponsible  for  de 
spoons,  sar."  General  Lee's  servant  was  responsible,  in  liis  own 
opinion,  for  the  good  appearance  of  his  master's  table,  and  if  he  had 
not  been  able  to  secure  the  bacon,  he  would  have  suffered  as  many 
agonies  as  Louis  XIV.'s  grand  valet  did  when  the  turbot  did  not 
come  in  time  to  be  served  at  the  king's  banquet. 

The  devotion  of  this  class  of  negroes,  many  of  whom  followed 
their  masters  to  the  field,  was  only  exceeded  by  their  pride  in  their 
families  and  place.  John  Robinson,  a  Savannah  pilot,  attached  to  a 
"Nassau  blockade-runner,  was  two  or  three  times  captured,  but  retained 
his  loyalty  through  all,  and  always  returned  to  his  old  master  and  his 
old  master's  family.  His  master  was  killed  in  the  defense-  of  .Fort 
Me  A  lister,  and  John  was  taken  to  Fort  Lafayette,  and  kept  prisoner 
for  eight  months,  while  every  persuasion,  and  a  hundred  dollars  a 
month  wages,  were  oil'ered  him  to  enter  the  Federal  service,  but  he 
continued  staunch.  In  one  of  the  battles  near  Petersburg,  a,  slave 
in  a  Federal  regiment  saw  his  former  young  master  on  the  iield  in 
danger.  He  threw  down  his  musket,  and  ran  to  him  and  carried 
him  into  the  Confederate  ranks.  There  are  repeated  instances  of 
negroes  on  the  plantations  concealing  and  saving  their  master's 
property  at  great  personal  hazard  to  themselves;  burying  cotton  and 
plate,  and  guarding  the  caches  faithfully.  "When  the  war  broke  out, 
John  Campbell,  the  well-known  horse-racer,  went  to  Mobile,  leaving 
his  stables  in  Kentucky  in  charge  of  a  slave.  Four  years  later,  when 
( 'ampbell  returned,  a  poor  man,  his  negro  had  all  the  horses  and  their 
increase  waiting  for  his  master,  and  in  the  very  best  condition.  There 
was  nothing  to  prevent  this  faithful  fellow  from  making  away  with 
all  of  Campbell's  property. 

This  class  of  negroes  in  the  South  knew  that  the  war  would  set 
them  free,  as  General  Gordon  said,  but  they  did  not  want  much  to 
be  free.  Xot  that  they  wanted  to  be  slaves  at  all,  but  they  looked 
down  upon  and  despised  the  condition  of  the  free  negroes  whom 
they  saw  around  them,  and  they  considered  that  the  Federals,  in 
waring  upon,  their  ''families'''  were  waring  upon  themselves.  They 
got  bravely  over  this  sort  of  thing  very  shortly  after  the  war  ended, 
but  they  were  sincere  in  the  feeling  during  the  war,  and  would  have 
fought,  nay,  did  fight  sometimes,  by  the  side  of  their  masters.  A 
good  many  of  these  servants  who  followed  their  masters  afield,  albeit 
not  fond  of  bullets,  are  known  to  have  now  and  then  taken  "  hot 
shots"  at  the  "Yankees/'  Lieutenant  Shelton's  man  Jack,  of  the 
Thirteenth  Arkansas,  fell  at  his  master's  side1  at  the  battle  of  1V1- 
inont.  AVhen  Jack  was  shot,  Jack's  son  took  his  rifle  and  went  to 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  field  to  avenge  his  "daddy."  Major  White,  of  the  Alabama 
battalion  that  bore  his  name,  had  a  negro  servant  who  risked  his  life 
to  bear  off  his  master's  body  from  the  field  when  he  was  shot  down, 
and  after  the  funeral  he  took  his  master's  horse  and  effects,  and  rode 
home  with  them,  over  a  thousand  miles,  to  the  old  plantation.  A 
Florida  negress  illustrated  the  principle  of  "family"  pride  which  is 
characteristic  of  the  race,  in  a  quaint  and  touching  way.  Her  young 
masters,  both  lads,  were  conscripted  and  ordered  to  Pensacola.  As 
they  were  taking  tearful  leave  of  friends  and  home,  the  old  "  mammy  " 
said  :  "  Now,  young  marsters,  stop  dis  hyar  cryin' ;  go  and  fight  f er 
yo'  country  like  men,  and  mind,  don't  disgrace  de  family  nor  me 
nuther." 

I  could  accumulate  columns  of  this  sort  of  anecdotes,  all  well  au 
thenticated,  but  what  I  have  given  will  more  than  suffice.  The  Con 
federates  found  by  experience  that  the  negroes,  as  a  rule,  were  faith 
ful  and  w^ell  behaved,  and  they  trusted  them  in  some  things  a  great 
deal.  This  was  especially  the  case  with  the  slave  owners.  Between 
the  poor  whites,  however,  and  the  negroes,  there  was  no  sort  of 
sympathy  nor  confidence,  and  this  circumstance  alone  would  have 
prevented  the  Confederate  Government  from  originally  putting  the 
negroes  in  the  field,  if  it  had  ever  entertained  such  an  idea.  But, 
indeed,  no  such  idea  was  entertained.  They  were  willing  to  use  the 
negroes  for  teamsters,  cooks,  etc.,  and  did  so  use  them  to  a  consider 
able  extent  from  the  first.  Later  on,  as  men  grew  scarcer,  it  became 
the  custom  to  make  requisitions  upon  communities  for  slaves  to  work 
upon  fortifications  and  upon  government  farms,  in  the  salt-works, 
powder  factories,  nitre  bureaus,  etc.,  but  there  was  no  thought  of 
putting  them  in  the  field  until  long  after  they  had  been  extensively 
enlisted  in  the  Federal  army,  and  the  phrase,  "the  colored  troops 
fought  bravely,"  had  passed  into  a  proverb. 

In  fact,  the  Confederates  had  no  sort  of  opinion  of  the  bravery 
of  the  colored  troops,  and  even  at  the  last  nothing  but  sheer  necessity 
drove  them  to  think  of  the  race  as  food  for  po\vder.  In  the  Rich 
mond  Examiner,  in  1863,  at  the  time  the  colored  troops  began  to  be 
sent  to  the  field  in  the  Federal  forces,  there  was  a  very  bumptious 
burlesque  of  the  negro  soldiers'  bill,  the  favorite  measure  of  Thad. 
Stevens.  The  editor  said,  in  that  high  and  mighty  style  which  was 
peculiar  (happily)  to  this  sheet  alone : 

Enlightened  Europe  may  turn  from  the  sickening  horrors  of  a  servile  insurrec 
tion,  invoked  by  the  madmen  at  Washington,  to  a  phase  of  this  war,  as  it  will  be 
waged  next  summer,  which,  when  depicted  with  historical  accuracy  and  physio 
logical  fidelity,  can  scarcely  fail  to  relieve  its  fears  as  to  the  future  of  the  white  race 


CONFEDERATE  NEGRO  ENLISTMENTS.  543 

at  the  South,  and  conduce,  in  no  small  degree,  to  the  alleviation  of  any  epigastric 
uneasiness  that  Exeter  Hall  may  experience  in  regard'  to  the  corporeal  welfare  of 
the  colored  brethren.  The  fate  of  the  negro,  of  the  white  population  at  the  South, 
and  of  the  Northern  army,  respectively,  will  be  decided  in  a  brief  contest,  which 
will  occur  about  the  middle  of  next  June,  and  which  we  will  describe  as  gravely 
and  succinctly  as  possible.  On  the  1st  of  April,  fifty  thousand  negroes,  who  have 
been  previously  drilled  in  various  camps  of  instruction,  will  be  debarked  at  Acquia 
creek.  But  it  will  require  at  least  six  weeks  of  incessant  toil  to  perform  this  simple 
feat.  It  is  at  last  accomplished.  The  skirmishers  of  the  grand  colored  division  are 
thrown  out.  They  deploy. 

The  voice  of  an  overseer  calling  hogs  is  heard  in  a  distant  field.  They  rally 
in  the  reserve.  No  rebels  being  visible,  they  are  again  thrown  forward.  They  feel 
for  the  enemy,  but  he  is  not  to  be  felt.  They  lire  at  nothing,  iifly  feet  in  the  air, 
and  hit  it  every  time.  The  rebels  being  thus  driven  to  their  earthworks,  the  grand 
colored  division  advances  at  the  pas  de  charge,  singing  a  Methodist  refrain,  to  storm 
the  enemy's  position,  and  to  carry  the  crest  at  all  hazards.  Of  a  sudden,  the  artillery 
of  A.  I'.  Hill's  command  belches  forth  a  hurricane  of  shell  and  shrapnell.  There  is 
a  rising  of  wool,  as  of  quills  upon  the  fretful  porcupine,  under  the  caps  of  dusky 
brigadiers  and  sooty  major  generals;  there  is  a  simultaneous  effusion  of  mellifluous 
perspiration  from  I ii'iy  thousand  tarry  hides;  there  is  a  display  of  ivory  like  lifty 
thousand  ilashes  of  lightning;  fifty  thousand  pairs  of  charcoal  knees  are  knocking 
together  at  the  sell-same  moment  a  scattering,  as  if  all  the  blackbirds, 

crows,  and  buzzards  in  creation  had  taken  wings  at  once.  To  a  man  the  Northern 
army  lies  prostrate  in  the  held,  asphyxiated  by  the  insufferable  odor  bequeathed  to 
the  atmosphere  by  the  dead,  departed  host.  For  a  like  cause,  the  rebel  army  is  in 
full  retreat  to  liichmond.  Solitary  and  alone,  with  his  nose  in  his  hand,  A.  P.  Hill 
surveys  the  silent  scene. 

The  Examiner  to  the  contrary,  notwithstanding,  the  negroes 
stood  lire  pretty  well,  and  made  tolerably  good  subsidiary  troops  in 
the  .Federal  army — much  better  than  ordinary  militia — and  they  did 
most  valuable  work  bv  enabling;  the  veterans  to  be  concentrated  for 

t.  O 

important  services.  The  Confederates  found  this  out,  and,  after 
bciiiL»-  made  very  angry  at  being1  confronted  with  their  own  slaves. 

i  O     i/  O 

and  being  shot  down  by  them,  they  fell  to  thinking  the  matter  over 
very  seriously. 

E  cannot  discover  exactly  when  it  was  that  the  idea  of  enlisting 
negro  ,-oldiers  in  the  Confederacy  was  tirst  broached,  but  I  iind  the 
Mobile  IiMjister,  before  the  middle  of  October,  ISU-A,  claiming  that 
"a  year  ago"  it  had  referred  to  the  important  reserve  power  of 
resistance  which  the  Confederacy  would  be  able  to  call  upon  in  the 
last  extremity,  in  the  persons  of  its  slaves.  The  Register  says  the 
subject  '*is  now  actively  discussed/'1  It  docs  not  consider  that  the 
time  lias  yet  arrived  for  such  a  step,  and,  anyhow,  it  was  too  late  in 
the  season  to  undertake  such  a  thing*  then.  .l>ttt  the  policy  of  the 

O  «/ 

government  ought  to  be  settled  in  regard  to  the  matter,  and  prepara 
tions  made  for  the  next  campaign.  And  from  the  date  of  this  article 
the  matter  came  to  be  generally  discussed,  and  there  was  a  rapid 


544  ANNALS  OF  THE   WAR. 

revolution  of  public  feeling  on  the  subject.  At  first  everybody  was 
extremely  hostile  to  such  a  movement,  and  the  soldiers  particularly. 
But  three  or  four  circumstances  combined  to  make  a  rapid  change  in 
the  public  sentiment.  In  the  first  place,  by  an  act  of  the  Confeder 
ate  Congress,  approved  February  17th,  1864,  there  were  some  thirty 
thousand  or  forty  thousand  slaves  drafted  into  the  army  as  cooks, 
teamsters,  trainsmen  and  the  like,  and  the  soldiers  found  that  they 
not  only  got  along  very  well  with  Cuffee,  but  that  he  saved  them  no 
end  of  work  and  trouble,  was  handy,  amiable,  liked  the  service  well 
enough,  and  was  not  without  a  spirit  of  adventure.  Some  of  the 
negro  teamsters  did  a  little  amateur  fighting  now  and  then,  and  they 
showed  themselves  very  skilful  in  plundering  a  battle-field. 

Slavery,  too,  was  on  its  last  legs  as  October  colled  by.  The 
enemy  had  possession  of  more  than  half  the  Confederate  territory, 
and  wherever  they  marched  they  set  the  negroes  free.  Slaves  had 
lost  their  market  value  even  in  Richmond,  where,  when  sugar  was 
selling  at  from  eight  dollars  and  a  half  to  eleven  dollars  and  eighty- 
seven  cents  per  pound,  coffee  at  twelve  dollars,  tea  at  forty-two  dol 
lars,  bicarbonate  of  soda  at  five  dollars  and  thirty-seven  cents,  flour 
at  three  hundred  and  fifty  dollars,  and  a  china  dinner  and  tea  set 
brought  two  thousand  four  hundred  and  fifty  dollars  at  auction,  good, 
likely  negroes  brought  only  from  four  thousand  five  hundred  dollars 
to  six  thousand  dollars.  (Richmond  Sentinel,  October  28th,  1864.) 
This,  in  gold  rates,  and  estimating  flour  at  six  dollars  per  barrel, 
would  make  negroes  only  seventy-five  dollars  to  one  hundred  dollars 
apiece,  or  about  one-tenth  their  price  at  the  beginning  of  the  Avar. 
People  saw  from  this  heavy  discount  that  slavery  was  doomed,  and 
a  good  many  patriotic  planters  were  quite  willing  to  sell  their  slaves 
to  the  Confederate  Government,  and  take  their  chances  in  Confeder 
ate  States  bonds  in  preference  to  negroes.  Another  thing  was  that 
of  the  Confederate  Congress  that  met  at  Richmond  for  the  last  time 
in  the  second  week  of  November,  1864 — (it  adjourned  sine  die  on 
the  17th  of  March,  1865) — more  than  half  the  members  represented 
constituencies  in  which  slavery  was  practically  rubbed  out  by  the 
war  process.  The  Senators  and  Representatives  of  Missouri,  Ken 
tucky,  Arkansas,  Tennessee,  Louisiana,  Florida,  and  parts  of  Georgia, 
Alabama,  and  Mississippi,  knew  that  their  constituents'  slaves  were 
gone,  and  they  had  no  particular  reason  for  wishing  to  save  the  slaves 
of  other  sections  yet  uninvaded  by  the  enemy. 

Still,  although  the  question  began  to  be  debated  actively,  and 
the  army  showed  itself  in  favor  of  the  movement,  there  was  no  con 
certed  serious  attempt  to  concentrate  public  opinion  in  regard  to  it 


CONFEDERATE  NEGRO  ENLISTMENTS.  515 

until  the  latter  part  of  October,  1.8fU.  Two  events  at  that  time  sud 
denly  waked  the  Confederates  to  the  gravity  of  their  situation. 
Sherman  began  his  march  to  the  sea,  and  the  elections  in  Ohio, 
Indiana,  and  Pennsylvania  showed  the  rebels  that  McClellan  was 
certain  to  be  defeated  for  the  Presidency,  and  that  Lincoln  would 
give  them  four  years  more  of  war  unless  they  surrendered.  The 
Confederates  hoped  much  from  McClellan's  election  ;  they  were  san 
guine  that  he  would  be  elected,  and  their  disappointment  was  pro 
portionately  great.  The  march  of  Sherman  in  the  same  way  showed 
them  what  Grant  had  several  times  insisted  upon,  that  the  Confed 
eracy  was  like  an  empty  egg-shell — all  its  powers  of  resistance  had 
been  drained  to  keep  the  frontier  line  strong. 

From  this  time  forth,  then,  even  the  most  sanguine  began  to  lose 
all  hope,  and  those  who  still  believed  in  a  successful  resistance  knew 
that  it  could  only  be  made  by  a  consecration  of  every  possible 
resource  of  the  country  to  that  one  object.  Hence  the  idea  of 
employing  slaves  as  soldiers  immediately  began  to  take  shape  and 
proportion,  and  the  agitation  of  it  became  active  and  unremitting. 
The  people  of  .Richmond  had  become  acquainted  with  the  negro  in 
a  semi-military  capacity  since  the  passage  of  the  act  of  February  1  7th, 
1S(!4,  k>  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  army  by  the  employment  of 
free  negroes  and  slaves  in  certain  capacities."  I'nder  that  act  there 
had  not  only  been  large  enlistments  of  negroes  for  camp  duties  and 
cooks,  teamsters,  etc.,  but  there  were  also  heavy  requisitions  made 
upon  the  surrounding  country  for  slaves  to  work  upon  the  fortifica 
tions.  These,  when  drafted,  were  organized  into  large  gangs,  and 
quartered  in  and  around  the  city,  under  military  discipline.  In  the 
early  morning  these  gangs  used  to  be  marched  through  the  citv  on 
their  way  to  their  work  on  the  fortifications,  shouldering  their  picks 
and  shovels,  and  trotting  along  at  a  regulation  step.  They  are  fat 
and  saucy  and  greasy,  full  of  laugh  and  song,  and  they  kept  step 
instinctively  as  they  sang  their  own  versions  of  "Dixie"  and  "John 
Brown's  Body,''  rapping,  castanet-wise,  upon  the  pavements  with 
the  wooden  soles  of  their  huge  and  shapeless  canvas  shoes.  Many 
a  Richmond  mother,  as  she  heard  the  bacon-colored  gangs  clatter  by 
her  door,  thought  of  her  own  ragged,  half-starved  boy  in  the  trenches 
at  Petersburg,  and  said  to  herself :  "If  the  cause  demands  him-  as 
food  for  powder,  why  not  send  out  these  for  the  Yankees  to  shoot 
at,  also  ? " 

Butler,  at  this  very  time,  had  ten  thousand  Virginia  negroes  at 
work  cutting  his  Dutch  Gap  canal,  about  which  the  Richmond 
people  gave  themselves  much  needless  excitement,  since  they  might 
35 


546  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

have  known  that  the  more  nearly  the  doughty  General's  works 
approached  the  point  of  completion  (and  of  danger)  the  more  it 
would  be  sure  to  flag.  But  the  thought  must  have  occurred  to  many 
at  Richmond  that,  if  Butler  could  employ  these  ten  thousand  negroes 
to  cut  a  way  into  Richmond  for  him,  what  sort  of  paralysis  was  it 
that  prevented  the  Confederate  Government  from  equally  employing 
ten  thousand  or  fifty  thousand  negroes  to  keep  him  out  of  that  city? 
A  sure  sign  that  this  question  had  then  begun  to  ferment  actively  in 
the  public  mind,  may  be  got  from  the  fact  that  at  this  time  "the 
opposition"  opened  fire  against  the  enlistment  of  negroes.  The 
II olden  party  in  North  Carolina,  and  their  Raleigh  organ,  the  Stand 
ard,  the  ultra  States'  Rights  party,  represented  by  the  Richmond 
Examiner  and  Charleston  JHercury,  by  Wigfall  and  obstreperous 
Congressmen  like  him,  and  the  pure  obstructionists,  like  Henry  S. 
Foote  and  Governor  Brown,  of  Georgia,  and,  in  a  lesser  degree, 
Alexander  II.  Stephens,  began  to  murmur  and  denounce.  If  the 
Confederacy,  they  said,  could  not  be  saved  except  by  such  means  as 
these,  it  was  not  worth  saving.  To  which  the  natural  reply  of  the 
administration  party  was  that,  if  the  Confederate  people  preferred 
to  give  up  their  liberties  sooner  than  give  up  their  slaves,  the  cause 
was  practically  hopeless.  The  enlistment  party,  in  fact,  as  the  oppo 
sition  knew,  contemplated  a  step  further.  They  were  willing,  sooner 
than  be  subjugated,  to  abolish  slavery  entirely,  and  ask  to  be  restored 
to  the  old  colonial  relationship  to  England,  provided  that  country 
could  not  otherwise  be  induced  to  recognize  the  Confederacy.  This, 
probably,  was  a  dernier  resort,  which  President  Davis  would  have 
unflinchingly  contemplated ;  but  he  had  no  sooner  broached  the  sub 
ject  in  the  Richmond  Sentinel  than  the  storm  of  indignation  with 
which  it  was  received  showed  him  his  mistake,  and  no  more  was  said 
about  it,  except  by  the  anti-enlistment  party  in  the  Confederate 
Congress,  who  made  use  of  it  in  their  steady  antagonism  to  the 
administration  policy. 

It  must  be  said,  however,  in  justice  to  the  Confederate  people, 
that  the  social  difficulties  of  the  negro  enlistment  problem  engaged 
their  attention  much  more  deeply  than  the  probable  monetary  losses. 
An  article  on  this  subject  in  the  Sentinel  of  November  2d,  copied 
from  the  able  Lynchburg  Republican,  put  this  side  of  the  case  very 
strongly.  We  cannot  ask  these  negroes  to  fight  for  us,  it  in  sub 
stance  said,  unless  we  give  them  their  freedom ;  but  that  involves 
the  freedom  of  their  children  and  families  also,  and  so  we  not  only 
abolitionize  the  country,  but  convert  it  into  a  sort  of  free-negro 
paradise,  with  the  bottom  rail  on  top — for  the  negroes,  if  we  sue- 


CONFEDERATE  NEGRO  ENLISTMENTS.          5^7 

coed,  will  be  the  saviors  of  tlie  country.  "  Instead  of  being  a  war 
for  the  freedom  of  the  white  man,  it  will  degenerate  into  a  war  for 
the  freedom  and  equality  of  the  slaves/'  It  would  be  better,  the 
Republican  argued,  to  accept  Lincoln's  than  this  sort  of  abolition. 

^Nevertheless,  the  die  was  cast.  The  army  could  not  be 
recruited  any  more,  owing  to  the  apatlity  and  discontent  of  the 
people,  and  General  Lee,  it  is  now  known,  said  the  cause  was 
lost  unless  he  was  efficiently  reinforced  before  the  winter  ended. 
The  Confederate  Congress  met  on  Monday,  Xovember  7th,  at  noon, 
and  as  soon  as  it  was  organized  the  message  of  President  Davis 
was  received.  In  this  paper,  admirably  written,  with  character 
istic  courage  and  directness  he  met  and  stated  the  question  of  the 
hour.  Referring  to  the  act  of  February  17th,  of  the  previous  Con 
gress,  which,  he  said,  was  less  effective  than  it  was  expected  to  be, 
he  remarked:  "But  my  present  purpose  is  to  invite  your  considera 
tion  to  the  propriety  of  a  radical  modification  in  the  theory  of  this 
law/'  The  slave,  he  said,  was  to  be  viewed  not  only  as  property, 
but  as  a  person  under  the  law.  His  services  to  the  State  increased 
in  value  in  proportion  as  he  became  a  veteran.  For  this  he  should 
be  rewarded,  as  well  as  his  master.  He  would  not  advise  anything 
further  just  now  than  the  equitable  determination  of  these  relations. 
He  was  opposed,  at  present,  to  the  general  levy  and  arming  of  slaves 
as  soldiers.  "But  should  the  alternative  ever  be  presented  of  subju 
gation,  or  of  the  employment  of  the  slave  as  a  soldier,  there  seems 
no  reason  to  doubt  what  then  should  be  our  decision."  In  the  mean 
time,  he  would  recommend  the  training  of  forty  thousand  negroes 
for  duties  under  the  act  of  February  17th.  This  message,  in  which 
the  duty  of  the  State  to  the  slaves  as  persons  was  fairly,  and  fully, 
and  ably  stated,  opened  the  whole  question  at  once,  and  henceforth 
the  history  of  negro  enlistments  is  recorded  in  the  proceedings  of 
the  Confederate  Congress  and  the  State  Legislatures.  The  soldiers 
in  the  different  camps,  as  soon  as  the  question  was  agitated  among 
them,  gave  it  their  hearty  approval,  and  adopted  resolutions  to  that 
effect.  The  poor  fellows  were  so  hard  bested  that  they  welcomed 
any  measure  which  promised  them  a  modicum  of  relief. 

Hon.  James  A.  Seddon,  Secretary  of  "War,  in  his  report,  sup 
plemented  Mr.  Davis'  message  with  some  still  stronger  recommenda 
tions  of  his  own.  The  slaves,  he  said,  had  even  a  stronger  interest 
in  the  victory  of  the  Confederates  than  the  white  people.  The 
latter  risked  their  political  independence,  but  the  former  their 
very  existence  as  a  race.  If  the  cruel  enemies  of  the  South  should 
triumph,  they  would  extinguish  the  negroes  in  a  few  years,  as  they 


548  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

had  already  extinguished  the  Indians.  lie  recommended  that  the 
States  which  had  absolute  and  exclusive  control  of  the  matter,  should 
legislate  at  once  with  a  view  to  the  contingency  of  negro  enlist 
ments.  On  the  next  day,  in  the  Confederate  Congress,  Senator  G. 
A.  Henry,  of  Tennessee,  and  Representative  Wickham,  of  Virginia, 
introduced  bills  to  extend  and  perfect  the  operations  of  the  act  of 
February  17th,  1864. 

The  opposition  now  began  to  take  the  field,  alarmed  at  the 
progress  which  the  matter  had  already  made  in  public  opinion. 
The  Italeigh  Confederate,  in  a  dispassionate  article,  praises  the  pro 
posed  enlargement  of  the  teamster  enlistment,  temporizes  in  regard 
to  the  constitutional  and  organic  question,  but  opposes  peremptorily 
the  negro  soldier  enlistment  programme.  Governor  Vance,  of 
North  Carolina,  in  his  annual  message  to  the  Legislature  of  that 
State,  took  strong  ground  in  opposition  to  the  measure.  The  thing 
was  totally  inadmissible,  he  said.  It  was  opposed  to  the  theory  of 
the  Southern  government,  and  was  inexpedient  and  unwise  beside. 
It  may  be  remarked  here,  that  there  were,  all  along,  in  the  South, 
two  parties,  and  two  sets  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the  war,  and  the 
conduct  of  it — one  party,  of  which  Mr.  Davis  was  the  representative 
and  leader,  looking  upon  it  as  a  social  revolution  and  a  struggle  for 
existence ;  the  other,  represented  by  Mr.  Stephens,  Mr.  Henry  S. 
Foote,  Mr.  Vance,  and  many  others,  regarding  it  rather  as  a  political 
movement.  In  the  view  of  the  former  party,  any  means  to  promote 
the  success  of  the  cause  which  was  so  vital,  were  admissible ;  but  the 
latter  party  were  disposed  to  measure  the  means  they  employed  for 
resistance  by  the  rule  of  expediency.  The  former,  as  soon  as  the 
case  grew  to  be  desperate,  wanted  to  arm  the  slaves,  or  resume 
colonial  dependence ;  the  latter,  as  soon  as  independence  eluded 
their  grasp,  proposed,  negotiations,  and  wanted  to  "  settle  "  the  thing 
by  peace  congresses,  or  even  by  submission  according  to  protocol. 
The  distinction  here  made  should  be  carefully  noted,  for  the  Con 
federacy  was  finally  broken  to  pieces  upon  this  rock.  Mr.  Davis 
carried  his  point  of  war  at  any  prjce,  and  his  opponents  henceforth 
bent  their  united  energies  to  paralyze  his  exertions.  He  was  not  the 
wisest  of  politicians,  nor  the  best  of  generals ;  but  his  sincerity  and 
intensity  of  purpose  elevated  him  far  above  the  half-hearted  people 
around  him  as  a  promoter  of  vigorous,  and,  consequently,  successful 
war.  In  spite  of  his  patronage  of  Bragg  and  Hood,  and  his  opinion- 
ativeness  generally,  it  is  tolerably  certain  that,  if  Davis  had  made 
himself  dictator,  he  would  have  been  able  to  carry  on  the  war  for 
still  another  year. 


CONFEDERATE  NEGRO  ENLISTMENTS.  5-±9 

There  had  been  already,  some  weeks  before  the  meeting*  of  the 
Confederate  Congress,  an  important  conference  of  the  governors  of 
the  different  States,  at  Augusta,  Georgia,  October  17th,  at  which  the 
subject  under  consideration  had  been  freely  discussed,  but  without 
positive  action.  Governor  Smith,  of  Virginia,  in  his  message  to  the 
Virginia  Legislature,  December  7th,  now  took  the  ground  that  the 
time  had  come  to  put  the  slaves  in  the  Held,  and  to  sacrifice  slavery 
to  the  cause  of  independence.  The  slaveholders  should  take  the 
initiative  in  this,  in  order  that  people  might  no  longer  say,  as  they 
had  been  saying,  that  this  "  was  the  rich  man's  war;''  and  Governor 
Smith  gave  plenty  of  other  good  reasons  why  the  negroes  should  be 
made  soldiers  of.  The  tiniinel  of  the  l<»th  quotes,  with  approval, 
the  remarks  of  the  St.  Louis  Republican  upon  the  language  attributed 
to  Lincoln,  that  the  war  could  not  be  carried  on  "according  to  Demo 
cratic  arithmetic,''  u then,  if  the  rebels  put  two  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  slave  negroes  in  the  Held,  they  cannot  be  conquered, 
according  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  arithmetic.''  Senator  Hunter,  of  Vir 
ginia,  who  was  constantly  and  throughout  opposed  to  the  policy  of 
negro  enlistments,  introduced  a  bill  into  the  Confederate  Congress, 
on  December  Uth,  to  regulate  impressments.  ( )n  the  same  day, 
Governor  Bonham,  of  South  Carolina,  sent  his  message  to  the 
Legislature  of  that  State,  in  which  he  denied  the  authority  of  the 
Confederate  Government  to  enlist  slaves,  as  well  as  the  expediency 
of  such  enlistments.  The  "reserved  rights  of  States''  played  a  big 
part  in  these  last  days  of  the  Confederacy,  when  all  who  valued  their 
persons  or  their  property  more  than  they  did  the  u  cause,''  were 
sedulous  to  contrive  means  to  save  them. 

Events,  public  opinion,  and  the  newspapers,  meantime,  moved 
much  more  swiftly  than  the  Confederate  Congress.  The  limits  of 
the  Confederacy  were  being  narrowed  continually  by  the  Federal 
arms,  and  there  were  great  and  bitter  dissensions  at  Kichmond,  and 
throughout  what  was  left  of  the  Confederacy.  The  politicians 
wrangled,  the  contractors  robbed,  the  government  was  helpless,  the 
soldiers  starved.  The  columns  of  the  Sentinel,  for  six  weeks  from 
December  13th,  are  doleful  reading  indeed.  During  this  period. 
Congress  approached  the  matter  of  negro  enlistments  in  many 
ways,  but  never  had  the  courage  to  grapple  with  it.  There  were 
bills  to  pay  for  slaves,  to  regulate  impressments,  etc.,  to  create  negro 
home  guards,  but  the  bull  was  never  taken  resolutely  by  the  horns. 
But,  in  the  meantime,  the  dissatisfaction  grew,  the  pressure  from 
the  camps  increased,  the  area  of  the  Confederacy  diminished,  and 
with  the  appreciation  of  slavery  as  a  money  interest.  On  the  28th 


550  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  January,  1865,  the  Confederate  House,  for  the  first  time,  went 
into  secret  session  on  the  subject  of  negro  enlistments,  and  there  the 
discussions  formally  began.  The  proposition  was,  at  first,  to  impress 
forty  thousand  negroes  for  menial  service  in  the  army.  On  the  30th, 
a  proviso,  offered  by  J.  M.  Leach,  of  Xorth  Carolina  (one  of  the 
obstructionists),  that  none  of  the  negroes  so  impressed  should  be  put 
in  the  army,  was  voted  down. 

On  February  2d,  Gholson,  of  Virginia,  in  the  House,  and  on 
the  4th,  Orr,  of  South  Carolina,  in  the  Senate  (both  of  them  obstruc 
tionists),  tried,  but  failed,  to  carry  propositions  to  the  effect  that  the 
enlistment  policy  was  disheartening  and  demoralizing,  and  would 
divide  the  Confederacy.  On  the  other  hand,  Conrad,  of  Louisiana, 
and  Brown,  of  Mississippi,  botli  introduced  propositions  which 
recited  the  contrary.  In  fact,  as  has  been  said  before,  the  represen 
tatives  of  invaded  States  were  generally  for  arming  the  negroes, 
those  of  States  not  overrun  for  the  contrary  policy.  These  proposi 
tions  were  duly  referred,  and  I  find  that  the  subject  was  actively 
discussed  in  secret  session  of  both  houses  on  the  4th,  6th,  7th,  and 
8th.  On  the  9th,  the  Senate  rejected  Senator  Brown's  enlistment 
proposition.  On  the  llth  of  February  there  was  a  great  public 
meeting  in  Richmond,  at  which  Secretary  Benjamin  and  Senator 
Henry  both  spoke  in  zealous  and  earnest  advocacy  of  the  enlistment 
programme,  and  on  the  13th,  there  were  two  new  bills  introduced 
by  Mr.  Oldham,  of  Texas,  and  Mr.  Barksdale,  of  Mississippi,  looking 
to  negro  enlistments.  Senator  Oldham's  bill  was  offered  in  the 
Senate,  and  was  not  heard  of  again.  In  the  House,  a  motion  to 
reject  Barksdale's  bill  was  defeated  by  a  two-thirds  vote.  This  bill 
provided  for  the  enlistment  of  slaves  by  their  masters,  and  did  not 
reward  them  with  their  freedom  for  volunteering — in  fact,  there  was 
no  volunteering  about  it.  They  were  to  be  sent  to  fight  the  Yankees 
as  they  had  been  sent  to  work  on  the  defenses. 

On  the  15th,  the  subject  of  enlistments  came  up  in  the  Virginia 
Legislature,  which,  on  the  17th,  adopted  resolutions  recommending 
the  enlistment  policy.  It  was  not,  however,  until  the  27th  that  this 
Legislature  voted  to  instruct  its  Senators  to  vote  for  the  measure  in 
the  Confederate  Congress.  The  subject  was  ardently  discussed  in 
secret  session  of  that  Congress  from  the  17th  to  the  25th.  In  this 
interval,  the  soldiers  from  Mississippi,  Virginia,  South  Carolina, 
Tennessee,  and  Texas,  and  elsewhere,  declared  in  favor  of  the  new 
policy,  and  a  letter  of  General  Lee's  was  published  looking  to  the 
same  end.  In  that  letter  the  illustrious  commander-in-chief  said  that 
he  considered  the  measure  "  not  only  expedient  but  necessary."  If 


CONFEDERATE  NEGRO  ENLISTMENTS.  551 

the  Confederates  did  not  make  use  of  the  slaves  the  Federals  would. 
The  Confederacy  was  too  weak  in  men  to  stand  long  the  pressure  of 
war  waged  in  its  present  tremendous  shape.  The  negroes  had  the 
physical  powers  and  the  habits  of  discipline  to  make  good  soldiers, 
and,  with  proper  training,  their  efficiency  would  be  unquestionable. 
They  would  make  willing  soldiers,  provided  emancipation  was  their 
reward. 

In  spite  of  this  letter,  however,  the  Senate  defeated  the  measure 
again  on  the  25th,  but  on  the  1st  of  March,  Barksdale's  resolution, 
materially  amended,  came  up  in  the  House  and  was  passed.  "Wigfall, 
Hunter,  Caperton,  Miles,  and  other  leaders  opposed  the  enlistment 
policy  savagely,  but,  still,  when  the  bill  of  Barksdale  finally  came  up 
in  the  Senate,  Hunter  and  Caperton  voted  for  it,  even  while  speaking 
against  it.  The  vote  in  the  Senate  on  the  linal  passage  of  the  bill, 
March  7th,  1805,  was  as  follows: 

YEAS — 'Messrs.  l>rown,  Burnett,  Caperton,  Henry,  Hunter,  Oldham,  Semmes, 
Sims,  and  \V;its;m — 9. 

NAYS— Messrs,  l.armvel],  Graham,  Johnson  (Ga.i,  Johnson  (Mo.),  Maxwell, 
Orr,  Vert,  and  Wigfull— 8. 

Thus,  the  instructions  of  the  Virginia  Legislature,  by  compelling 
Hunter  and  Caperton  to  vote  contrary  to  their  opinions,  carried  the 
bill  through. 

This  bill  enacted  that  in  order  to  secure  additional  forces  to 
repel  invasion,  etc.,  the  President  be  authorized  to  ask  for  and 
accept  from  slave  owners  the  services  of  as  many  able-bodied  slaves 
as  he  thinks  expedient ;  the  same  to  be  organized  by  the  commander- 
in-chief  under  instructions  from  the  AVar  Department,  and  to  receive 
the  same  rations  and  compensation  as  other  troops.  If  a  sufficient 
number  of  troops  cannot  thus  be  secured,  the  President  is  authorized 
to  conscript  three  hundred  thousand  men  without  regard  to  color. 
There  is  no  provision  for  emancipation  or  for  volunteering,  except 
that  the  last  section  says : 

That  nothing  in  this  act  shall  he  construed  to  authorize  a  change  in  the  rela 
tion  which  the  said  slaves  shall  bear  toward  their  owners,  except  by  the  consent  of 
the  owners  and  of  the  States  in  which  they  may  reside,  ami  in  pursuance  of  the 
laws  thereof. 

This  measure  was,  of  course,  ineffective.  It  did  not  embody  the 
views  of  Mr.  Davis,  nor  of  General  Lee,  nor  of  the  Virginia  Legisla 
ture.  It  was  comparatively  useless  as  a  means  to  reinforce  the  army 
immediately,  and  this  was  the  more  singular,  since  it  was  now  well 
known  in  Richmond  that  General  Lee  had  told  the  Virginia  Legisla- 


552  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ture  that,  unless  he  was  reinforced  he  could  not  maintain  the  struggle 
any  longer  than  the  opening  of  the  spring  campaign.  Nothing  can 
reveal  more  forcibly  the  selfish  narrow-mindedness  and  jealousy  of 
the  slave-holding  interests  than  this  bill. 

Still,  if  there  had  been  time  to  do  it,  Jefferson  Davis  would 
have,  doubtless,  conscripted  the  three  hundred  thousand  negroes 
which  the  law  empowered  him  to  call  for.  Bat  there  was  not  time. 
The  House  concurred  in  the  Senate  amendments  on  the  9th,  by  a 
vote  of  thirty-nine  to  twenty-seven,  and  the  bill  was  promptly  ap 
proved  on  March  13th.  On  the  15th,  the  Adjutant  General's  office 
gave  authority  to  Majors  J.  W.  Pegram  and  T.  B.  Turner,  to  raise  a 
company  or  companies  of  negro  volunteers  at  Richmond,  and  muster 
them  into  the  service.  These  volunteers  were  called  for  under  the 
several  acts  of  the  Confederate  Congress  and  the  Legislature  of  Vir 
ginia,  and  every  man  was  called  upon  to  constitute  himself  a  recruit 
ing  officer.  The  rendezvous  wTas  established  at  Smith's  factory, 
Twenty-first  street,  between  Main  and  Carey  streets.  But  this  call 
was  only  made  on  the  10th  of  March,  and  Richmond  was  evacuated 
on  April  2d,  while  Lee's  surrender  took  place  on  the  9th.  The 
Confederate  Congress  adjourned  sine  die  on  the  17th,  and  the  last 
issue  of  the  Richmond  Sentinel,  my  authority  in  these  matters,  is 
dated  April  1st,  when  Sheridan  had  already  forced  Lee's  lines.  Mr. 
Lincoln,  apparently,  did  not  think  much  of  the  impressment  and 
enlisting  of  slaves.  He  said,  in  a  speech  made  at  Washington  011  the 
17th  of  March,  that  the  negro  could  not  stay  at  home  and  make 
bread  and  fight  at  the  same  time,  and  he  did  not  care  much  which 
duty  was  allotted  to  him  by  the*  Confederates.  "  We  must  now  soon 
see  the  bottom  of  the  rebels'  resources." 

We  hear  not  much  more  of  the  negro  enlistment  question.  The 
papers  urge  the  importance  of  dispatch,  patience,  discipline.  The 
Twenty-first  street  recruiting  office  apparently  got  on  well,  and  an 
other  office  was  opened  successfully  in  Lynchburg.  A  portion  of  the 
recruits  of  Messrs.  Pegram  and  Turner  went  into  camp  on  the  north 
side  about  the  27th  of  March.  The  Lynchburg  papers  published  a 
circular  of  citizens  of  Roanoke  county,  pledging  themselves  to  eman 
cipate  such  of  their  negroes  of  the  military  age  as  would  volunteer 
to  enlist,  and,  on  the  28th,  the  Adjutant  General's  office  at  Richmond 
published  its  regulations  in  regard  to  negro  enlistments.  The  pro 
visions  were  merely  formal,  and  did  not  vary  from  the  regulation 
orders  except  in  one  particular :  the  negroes,  as  enlisted,  were  to  be 
enrolled  only  in  companies,  under  the  control  of  the  inspector  general, 
as  the  government  did  not  contemplate  at  that  time  the  formation  of 
either  regiments  or  brigades  of  negroes. 


CONFEDERATE  NEGRO  ENLISTMENTS.  553 

The  Confederate  negro  soldiers  never  went  into  action.  On 
March  30th,  31st,  and  April  1st,  the  Sentinel  reports  the  enemy 
"  massed  in  heavy  force  on  our  right,"  cavalry  skrmishes  at  Dinwid- 
die  Court-House,  heavy  lighting  on  our  right,  tremendous  artillery 
firing,  pertinacious  assaults  upon  Gordon,  a  great  battle  with  no  par 
ticulars,  and  then — the  curtain  descends  for  good  and  all,  and  there 
is  no  more  Southern  Confederacy,  much  less  enlistment  of  negro 
volunteers  and  conscripts  to  do  battle  for  it. 

Would  they  have  fought  for  it  \  If  enlisted  six  months  earlier 
would  they  have  been  able  to  turn  the  tide  of  defeat  ?  Who  knows? 
Who  can  tell?  People  have  before  now  both  fought  and  voted  to 
enslave  themselves — people  are  doing  the  same  thing  every  day.  It 
is,  perhaps,  fortunate  that  the  negroes  were  not  enlisted  in  time  to 
prolong  the  long  agony  of  the  Southern  Confederacy. 


HO  W  JEFFERSON  DA  VIS  WAS  O  VERTAKEN. 


BY   MAJOR   GENERAL   JAMES    HARRISON    WILSON. 


ON  the  first  Sunday  of  April, 
1865,  while  seated  in  St. 
Paul's  Church,  in  Richmond, 
Jefferson  Davis  received  a 
telegram  from  Lee,  announc 
ing  the  fall  of  Petersburg,  the 
partial  destruction  of  his 
army,  and  the  immediate  ne 
cessity  for  flight.  Although 
he  could  not  have  been  en 
tirely  unprepared  for  this  in 
telligence,  it  appears  that  he 
did  not  receive  it  with  self- 
possession  or  dignity;  but 
with  tremulous  and  nervous 
haste,  like  a  weak  man  in  the 
hour  of  misfortune,  he  left  the  house  of  worship  and  hurried  home, 
where  he  and  his  personal  staff  and  servants  spent  the  rest  of  the  day 
in  packing  their  personal  baggage.  At  nightfall  everything  was  in 
readiness ;  even  the  gold  then  remaining  in  the  Treasury,  not  exceeding 
in  all  forty  thousand  dollars,  was  packed  among  the  baggage,*  and 


*  In  a  recent  article  Mr.  Reagan  says:  "  If  it  is  meant  by  this  statement  simply 
that  the  money  in  the  Treasury  (gold  and  all)  was  taken,  with  the  archives  of 
public  property,  away  from  Richmond  by  the  proper  department  officers,  the  state 
ment  is  correct;  but  if  it  is  meant  by  this  insidious  form  of  statement  to  be  under 
stood  that  this,  or  any  other  public  money,  was  taken  from  Richmond  in  Mr.  Davis' 
baggage,  then  the  statement  is  wholly  untrue." 

I  quote  from  the  historian  of  " The  Lost  Cause"  again  in  full  (the  italics  are 
mine) :  "  He  nervously  prepared  at  his  house  his  private  baggage,  and  he  never  ven 
tured  in  the  streets  until,  under  cover  of  the  night,  he  got,  unobserved,  on  the  train 
that  was  to  convey  him  from  Richmond.  He  did  not  forget  the  gold  in  the  Treasury  ; 
that,  amounting  to  less  than  forty  thousand  dollars,  it  had  been  proposed  some  days 
before,  in  Congress,  to  distribute  as  largesses  to  the  discontented  soldiers;  but  Mr.  Davis 
had  insisted  upon  reserving  it  for  exigencies,  and  it  was  noio  secured  in  his  baggage. 
He  did  not  forget  his  sword.  That,  a  costly  present  from  some  of  his  admirers  in 
(554) 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  555 

under  cover  of  darkness  the  President  of  the  Confederacy,  accom 
panied  l>v  three  members  of  his  Cabinet — Breckenridge,  Benjamin, 
and  Reagan— drove  rapidly  to  the  train  which  had  been  prepared  to 
cany  them  from  Richmond.  This  train,  it  is  said,  was  the  one 
which  had  carried  provisions  to  Amelia  Court-House  for  Lee's  hard- 
pressed  and  hungry  army ;  and,  having  been  ordered  to  Richmond, 
had  taken  those  supplies  to  that  place,  where  they  were  abandoned 
for  a  more  ignoble  freight.*  As  a  matter  of  course,  the  starving 
rebel  soldiers  suffered,  but  Davis  succeeded  in  reaching  Danville  in 
safety,  where  he  rapidly  recovered  from  the  fright  he  had  sustained, 
and  astonished  his  followers  by  a  proclamation  as  bombastic  and 
empty  as  his  fortunes  were  straitened  and  desperate. f 


England,  hud  been  sent  to  the  Richmond  urmory  for  some  repairs ;  it  was  abandoned 
to  the  lire  there.  The  lu.st  seen  of  this  relic  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  was  a 
twisted  and  gnarled  stem  of  steel,  on  private  exhibition  in  a  lager  beer  saloon  in 
Richmond,  garnished  with  a  certificate  that  it  was  what  remained  of  .Jeff  Davis' 
sword,  and  that  the  curiosity  might  be  purchased  for  two  hundred  dollars.  Mr. 
Davis  was  accompanied  at  the  first  stage  of  his  ilight  by  some  of  his  personal  staff 
and  three  members  of  his  Cabinet — General  Breckenridge,  Secretary  of  ^"ar;  Mr. 
Benjamin,  Secretary  of  State,  and  Mr.  Reagan,  Postmaster  General.  His  wife  was 
in  North  Carolina."  (Pages  508  and  509.) 

Just  what  the  historian  means  by  this  extract  I  leave  Mr.  Reagan  and  Mr. 
Davis  to  reconcile  with  the  facts.  The  declaration  is  explicit  that  Mr.  Davis  had 
insisted  in  reserving  it  (the  gold)  "for  exigencies,  and  it  was  now  secured  in  his 
baggage." 

"::"  This  statement  rests  upon  newspaper  report,  which  I  have  not  time  to  verify. 

f  In  support  of  the  substantial  accuracy  of  this  narrative,  I  quote,  from  the 
"Life  of  Jefferson  Davis,  with  a  Secret  History  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  Gath 
ered  Behind  the  Scenes  in  Richmond,"  by  Edward  A.  Pollard,  author  of  "  The  Lost 
Cause,"  etc.,  an  octavo  volume  bearing  the  imprint  of  the  National  Publishing 
Company,  1869 : 

"In  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  April,  General  Lee  saw  his  line  broken  at  three 
points,  at  each  of  which  a  whole  Federal  corps  had  attacked,  and  all  day  long  the 
enemy  was  closing  on  the  works  immediately  enveloping  Petersburg.  But  the 
work,  decisive  of  the  war,  was  done  in  two  hours.  At  eleA'en  o'clock  in  the  morning 
General  Lee  wrote  a  dispatch  to  President  Davis,  at  Richmond,  advising  him  that 
the  army  could  not  hold  its  position,  and  that  preparations  should  be  made  to 
evacuate  the  Capital  at  night.  *  *  No  sound  of  the  battle — not  an  echo,  not 

a  breath — had  yet  reached  the  doomed  city.  It  was  a  lovely  Sabbath  day,  and 
Richmond  basked  in  its  beauty  and  enjoyed  more  than  usual  remission  from  the 
cares  of  the  week.  (Page  487.) 

"Ladies  dressed  in  old  finery,  in  which  the  fashions  of  many  years  were 
mingled,  were  satisfied  to  make  a  display  at  St.  Pauls  about  equal  to  the  holiday 
wardrobes  in  better  days  of  the  negroes  at  the  African  Church.  At  the  former 
church  worshiped  Mr.  Davis.  lie  now  sat  stiff  and  alone  in  'the  President's 
pew,' — where  no  one  outside  his  family  had  ever  dared  to  intrude  since  Mrs.  Davis 
had  ordered  the  sexton  to  remove  two  ladies  who  had  ventured  there,  and  who,  on 


556  ANNAL8  OF  THE  WAR. 

turning  their  faces  to  the  admonition  to  leave,  delivered  before  the  whole  congrega 
tion,  had  proved,  to  the  dismay  and  well-deserved  mortification  of  the  President's 
wife,  to  be  the  daughters  of  General  Lee.  *  *  '  In  the  midst  of  the  services  a 
man  walked  noisily  into  the  church,  and  handed  the  President  a  slip  of  paper.  Mr. 
Davis  read  the  paper,  rose  and  walked  out  of  the  church  without  agitation,  but  his 
face  and  manner  evidently  constrained."  (Page  488.) 

Then  follows  a  dramatic  description  of  the  tumultuous  scene  which  took  place 
during  the  day  and  evening  in  Richmond  : 

"A  scene  never  to  be  forgotten  in  the  memories  of  Richmond.  The  night  was 
hoarse  with  the  roar  of  the  great  fight.  But  where,  in  this  dramatic  and  tumultuous 
scene,  was  President  Davis?  When  he  had  received  news  of  Lee's  defeat  he  had 
slunk  from  his  pew  in  St.  Paul's  Church,  and  while  the  fountains  of  his  government 
were  being  broken  up,  and  the  great  final  catastrophe  had  mounted  the  stage,  the 
principal  actor  was  wanting ;  he,  the  President,  the  leader,  the  historical  hero,  had 
never  shown  his  face,  had  never  spoken  a  word,  was  satisfied  to  prepare  secretly  a 
sumptuous  private  baggage,  and  to  ily  from  Richmond — a  low,  unnoticed  fugitive — 
under  cover  of  the  night.  In  such  scenes  a  great  leader  is  naturally  sought  for  by 
the  love  and  solicitude  of  his  people ;  there  are  words  of  noble  farewell  to  his  coun 
trymen  ;  there  are  touching  souvenirs  of  parting  with  his  officers.  But  there  were 
none  of  these  in  Mr.  Davis'  case.  *  *  #  He  did  not  show  himself  to  the  public, 
as  a  great  leader  might  be  expected  to  do  in  such  a  supreme  calamity ;  he  attempted 
no  inspiration,  comfort,  or  advice ;  hid  in  his  house,  busy  only  with  his  private 
preparations,  inquired  of  by  no  one,  without  any  mark  of  public  solicitude  for  him, 
without  the  least  notice  from  popular  sympathy  or  anxiety,  the  unhappy,  degraded 
President  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  never  showed  his  face  in  the  last  catastrophe 
of  his  Capital  until  he  stole  on  the  cars  that  were  to  bear  him  to  a  place  of  safety, 
and  lied  from  the  doomed  city,  unmarked  among  the  meanest  of  its  fugitives.  He 
left  no  word  of  tender  or  noble  farewell  for  Richmond,  and  the  last  souvenir  of  his 
power  was  an  order  to  burn  the  city  that  for  four  years  had  given  him  shelter, 
countenance,  and  hospitality.  *  *  There  was  no  last  council  of  conference. 

All  that  there  was  of  deliberative  assembly — all  that  remained  of  the  once  proud 
and  loquacious  government  of  Jefferson  Davis — was  to  appoint  the  rendezvous  and 
time  for  flight,  the  Cabinet  members  being  instructed  to  meet  the  President  at  the 
Danville  depot  a  little  before  midnight."  (See  pages  491  and  492;  also,  second 
paragraph  on  page  508.) 

After  instituting  a  comparison  between  Jefferson  Davis  and  Rienzi,  the  last  of 
the  Roman  tribunes,  in  which  he  says :  "  They  failed  alike,  from  the  same  ignorance 
of  government,  the  same  ill  distribution  of  obstinacies  and  weakness,  haughty 
refusals  in  one  instance  and  mean  compliance  in  another,  the  same  repulse  of  coun 
selors,  the  same  paltry  intrigues  of  the  closet  and  boudoir,  the  same  contempt  of 
fortune,  presuming  upon  its  favors  as  natural  rights  or  irrevocable  gifts,"  Mr. 
Pollard  goes  on  to  add : 

"  Rienzi,  at  another  time,  attempted  to  escape  from  his  capital  in  the  disguise 
of  a  baker.  Jefferson  Davis'  effort  to  escape  was  perhaps  not  less  mean  in  its  last 
resources.  But  Rienzi  did  what  the  chief  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  did  not  do ; 
and  at  the  last  he  was  unwilling  to  leave  his  capital  without  at  least  the  dignity  of 
an  adieu;  without  some  words  addressed  to  the  people;  without  something  of  invo 
cation  not  to  be  omitted  in  any  extremity  of  despair,  or  to  be  forgotten  in  any  haste 
of  personal  alarm.  We  have  seen  that  Jefferson  Davis  fled  from  Richmond,  without 
a  word  of  public  explanation,  with  none  of  that  benediction  or  encouragement  which 
a  great  leader  is  expected  to  impart  to  his  people  in  such  a  catastrophe.  He  escaped 
with  the  ignominy  of  an  obscure,  mean  fugitive,  if  not  positively  in  the  character  of 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  557 

It  is  stated,  upon  what  appears  to  be  good  authority*,  that  Davis 
had,  many  weeks  before  Lee's  catastrophe,  made  fci  the  most  careful 
and  exacting  preparations  for  his  escape,  discussing  the  matter  fully 
with  his  Cabinet,  in  profound  secrecy ;  and  deciding  that  in  order  to 
secure  the  escape  of  himself  and  his  principal  officers,  the  4  Slienan- 
doah'  should  be  ordered  to  cruise  oil'  the  coast  of  Florida,  to  take 
the  fugitives  on  board."  These  orders  were  sent  to  the  rebel  cruiser 
many  days  before  Lee's  lines  were  broken.  It  was  thought  that  the 
party  might  make  an  easy  and  deliberate  escape  in  the  way  agreed 
upon,  as  the  communications  with  the  Florida  coast  were  at  that 
time  scarcely  doubtful,  and  once  on  the  swift  sailing  "  Slienandoah," 
the  most  valuable  remnant  of  the  Anglo-Confederate  navy,  "  they 


a  deserter.  Some  explanation  has  been  offered  of  his  singular  neglect  on  this  occa 
sion  of  those  whom,  in  his  day  of  power,  he  was  accustomed,  after  the  affectation  of 
a  fond  and  paternal  ruler,  to  call  '  his  people,'  in  the  statement  that  the  govern 
ment  at  Richmond  had  no  expectation  of  Lee's  disaster,  and  was  thus  painfully 
hurried  in  its  evacuation  of  the  Capital."  (Page  504.) 

*  Mr.  Reagan  asserts,  in  an  article  recently  published,  that  he  does  not  believe 
"that  any  such  a  subject  was  considered  or  discussed  by  Mr.  Davis  or  any  member 
of  his  Cabinet,  at  any  time  before  or  after  the  surrender  of  General  Lee."  Tra 
versing  this  statement,  and  the  one  that ''the  government  at  Richmond  had  no 
expectation  of  Lee's  disaster,  and  was  thus  painfully  hurried  in  its  evacua 
tion  .of  its  capital/'  Mr.  Pollard  says,  in  the  work  from  which  I  am  quoting: 
"The  statement  is  untrue,  and  the  excuse  is  unavailing.  The  writer  well 
knows,  what  has  not  heretofore  been  imparted  to  public  curiosity,  that  Jefferson 
Davis  had,  many  weeks  before  Lee's  catastrophe,  ma<le  the  mo*t  careful  and  exacting 
preparations  for  his  escape.  The  matter  had  been  fully  consulted  with  his  Cabinet, 
in  profound  secrecy;  and  it  had  been  agreed  that,  to  secure  the  escape  of  the  Presi 
dent  and  his  principal  officers,  the  "Slienandoah"  should  be  ordered  to  cruise  off 
the  coast  of  Florida,  to  take  the  distinguished  fugitives  on  board,  who  had  selected 
the  coast  for  their  exit  from  the  Confederacy,  and  their  extrication  from  its  falling 
fortunes.  These  orders  had  been  sent  to  the  Confederate  cruiser  many  days  before 
Lee's  lines  were  broken.  It  was  calculated  that  in  the  last  resource  of  the  surren 
der  of  Lee's  army,  and  of  the  neutralization  of  other  organized  forces  of  the  Con 
federacy,  the  President's  party  might  make  an  easy  and  deliberate  escape  in  the 
way  agreed  upon,  as  the  communications  with  the  Florida  coast  were  then  scarcely 
doubtful,  and  once  on  the  "Slienandoah,''  a  fast  sailer,  the  most  valuable  remnant 
of  the  Confederate  navy,  they  might  soon  obtain  an  asylum  on  a  foreign  shore. 
Other  preparations  were  made  for  the  flight ;  all  the  papers  of  the  government  were 
revised  and  marked  for  destruction,  abandonment  or  preservation,  according  to 
their  contents;  and  even  Mr.  Davis'  private  baggage  was  put  in  order  for  transpor 
tation.  Of  course,  the  public  knew  nothing  of  these  preparations,  and  it  did  not 
even  suspect  them."  (Pages  504.  505,  506,  and  507.)  I  do  not  undertake  to  decide 
as  to  whether  Mr.  Pollard  or  Mr.  Reagan  is  more  worthy  of  belief.  My  aim  is 
merely  to  give  the  authority  upon  which  I  make  the  statements  in  this  narrative. 
The  declarations  of  Mr.  Pollard  are  sufficiently  explicit  to  justify  me  in  their 
quotation. 


558  ANNAIS  OF  THE  WAR. 

might  soon  obtain  an  asylum  on  a  foreign  shore."  When  Davis 
and  his  companions  left  Richmond  in  pursuance  of  this  plan,  they 
believed  that  Lee  could  avoid  surrender  only  a  short  time  longer. 
A  few  days  thereafter  the  news  of  this  expected  calamity  reached 
them,  when  they  turned  their  faces  again  toward  the  South.* 


*  In  reference  to  the  incidents  which  followed  upon  Mr.  Davis'  flight  from 
Goldsboro',  North  Carolina,  I  again  quote  from,  the  historian  of  "The  Lost  Cause:" 
"  The  resumption  of  Mr.  Davis1  flight  toward  the  South  was  in  consequence  of 
what  had  taken  place  in  his  interview  with  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard.  It  was 
an  interview  of  inevitable  embarrassment  and  pain.  The  two  generals  were  those 
who  had  experienced  most  of  the  prejudice  and  injustice  of  the  President;  he  had 
always  felt  aversion  for  them,  and  it  would  have  been  an  almost  impossible  excess 
of  Christian  magnanimity  if  they  had  not  returned  something  of  resentment  and 
coldness  to  the  man  who,  they  believed,  had  arrogantly  domineered  over  them,  and 
more  than  once  sought  their  ruin.  We  have  seen  how  unceremoniously  and  cruelly 
Johnston  had  been  hustled  off  the  stage  of  Atlanta.  True,  he  had  now  been  restored 
to  command ;  but  under  circumstances  which  made  it  no  concession  to  the  public 
and  no  favor  to  him,  for  he  was  restored  only  to  the  conduct  of  a  campaign  that  was 
already  lost,  and  put  in  command  of  a  broken  and  disorganized  force  that  Sherman 
had  already  driven  through  two  States.  When,  some  time  before,  public  sentiment 
was  demanding  his  return  to  service,  he  wrote  bitterly  that  he  was  quite  sure  that 
if  the  authorities  at  Richmond  restored  him  to  command,  they  were  resolved  not  to 
act  toward  him  in  good  faith  and  with  proper  support,  but  to  put  him  in  circum 
stances  where  defeat  was  inevitable,  and  thus  confirm  to  the  populace  the  military 
judgment  of  the  President.  He  had  no  reason  to  thank  Mr.  Davis  for  his  present 
command  in  the  forests  of  North  Carolina,  where  the  President  had  now  come  to 
him  to  ask  little  less  than  a  miracle  at  his  hands.  As  for  General  Beauregard,  his 
painful  relations  with  Mr.  Davis  had  been  public  gossip  ever  since  the  battle  of 
Manassas.  There  had  been,  too,  a  recently  unpleasantness,  fresh  in  the  minds  of 
both,  on  account  of  General  Beauregard  having  evacuated  Charleston  against  the 
orders  of  the  President,  although  what  idea  the  latter  could  have  had,  within  the 
limits  of  sanity,  in  attempting  to  hold  this  city  after  Sherman's  army  had  flanked  it, 
is  difficult  to  imagine. 

"  These  three  men  were  now  to  meet  to  consult  of  the  condition  of  the  country, 
and  the  occasion  invoked  that  they  should  rise  above  personal  feelings  in  the  circum 
stances  of  a  great  public  sorrow  and  anxiety.  There  was  obtained  for  the  interview 
a  mean  room  on  the  second  floor  of  a  house  owned  by  a  Confederate  officer.  Mr. 
Davis  sat  cold,  dignified,  evidently  braced  for  an  unpleasant  task.  He  spoke  in  a 
musing,  absent  way,  and  it  was  remarked  that,  while  speaking,  he  never  looked 
toward  either  commander,  his  eyes  being  amused  by  a  strip  of  paper  which  he  was 
twisting  in  his  hands.  His  heart  must  have  beat  with  a  great  anxiety,  for  he  must 
have  known  how  much  depended  on  these  generals  countenancing  his  plans  of  con 
tinuing  the  war;  and  yet  he  spoke  as  one  who  had  merely  resolved  to  state  his  case, 
and  who  cared  not  to  influence  the  decision  one  way  or  the  other.  It  was  as  if  he 
had  said  openly  to  his  generals :  '  If  you  decide  to  continue  the  war,  to  keep  your 
armies  in  the  field,  well  and  good;  but  understand,  it  is  no  obligation  conferred 
upon  me,  and  I  shall  regard  it  as  no  concession  to  me.'  And  yet  his  heart  secretly 
hung  on  their  replies,  and  beneath  his  cold  exterior  the  practised  eye  might  have 
seen  the  deep  uuder-play  of  the  nerve,  the  flutter  of  the  suppressed  emotion. 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  559 

Breckenridge,  the  Secretary  of  AYar,  was  sent  to  confer  with  John 
ston,  but  found  him  only  in  time  to  assist  in  drawing  up  the  terms 
of  his  celebrated  capitulation  to  Sherman.  The  intelligence  of  this 
event  caused  the  rebel  chieftain  to  renew  his  night,  but  while  hurry 
ing  onward,  some  fatuity  induced  him  to  change  his  plans  and  to 


"  The  President  spoke  at  length.  General  Johnston  sat  at  as  great  a  distance 
from  him  as  the  room  allowed.  He  was,  evidently,  impatient;  he  knew  what  was 
coming;  he  had  anticipated  all  that  the  President  said  before  he  had  come  into  the 
room,  and  lie  listened  as  one  oppressed  with  the  fulness  and  readiness  of  reply. 
Yet,  when  the  President  stopped  speaking,  lie  remained  profoundly  silent.  '  General 
Johnston,'  Mr.  Davis  said,  'we  should  like  to  now  hear  your  views.'  It  was  a  reply 
that  came  with  a  bluntness  and  deiiance  that  brought  a  sudden  color  to  the  cheeks 
of  the  President.  'Sir,'  blurted  out  General  Johnston, 'my  views  are,  that  our 
people  are  tired  of  war,  feel  themselves  whipped,  and  will  not  light! '  In  these  few 
words  he  had  said  all  that  was  necessary ;  and  he  spoke  them  suddenly,  without 
preface.  But  he  continued  to  speak  in  short,  decisive,  jerky  sentences,  as  if  in  haste 
to  deliver  his  mind.  He  suggested  that  the  enemy's  military  power  and  resources 
were  now  greater  than  they  had  ever  been.  What  could  the  President  hope  to 
oppose  to  them  in  the  present  demoralized  condition  of  the  South?  'My  men,'  he 
said,  '  are,  daily,  deserting  in  large  numbers,  and  are  taking  my  artillery  teams  to 
aid  their  escape  to  their  homes.  Since  Lee's  defeat,  they  regard  the  war  as  at  an  end. 
If  I  march  out  of  North  Carolina  her  people  will  all  leave  my  ranks.  It  will  be  the 
same  as  I  proceed  south  through  South  Carolina  and  Georgia,  and  I  shall  expect  to 
retain  no  man  beyond  the  by-road  or  cow-path  that  leads  to  his  house.  My  small 
force  is  melting  away  like  snow  before  the  sun,  and  I  am  hopeless  of  recruiting  it. 
We  may,  perhaps,  obtain  terms  which  we  ought  to  accept.'  A  silence  ensued.  It 
was  broken  by  the  President  saying,  in  a  low,  even  tone:  'What  do  you  say,  Gen 
eral  Beau  regard?'  '  I  concur  in  all  General  Johnston  has  said,' he  replied.  There 
was  another  pause  in  the  conversation,  when,  presently,  General  Johnston,  as  if 
regretting  the  cruel  plainness  of  his  remarks,  and  thinking  he  had  wounded  enough 
the  unhappy  President,  who  was  still  twisting,  abstractedly,  the  piece  of  paper  in 
his  hands,  proceeded  to  suggest,  at  some  length,  the  hope  of  getting  favorable  terms 
from  the  enemy.  He  thought  it  would  be  legitimate,  and  according  with  military 
usage  for  him  to  open  a  correspondence  with  General  Sherman,  to  see  how  far  the 
generals  in  the  field  might  go  in  arranging  terms  of  peace.  Mr.  Davis  could  not  but 
be  sensible  of  the  wisdom  of  this  suggestion,  although  he  listened  coldly  to  it,  and 
it  was  very  little  of  consolation  for  the  destruction  of  such  towering  and  grotesque 
hopes  as  he  had  brought  into  the  inter  vie  w.  General  Breckenridge,  who  had  been 
present  at  the  whole  of  the  interview,  now  ventured  to  advise  that  General  John 
ston  should,  at  once,  and  on  the  spot,  address  a  letter  to  Sherman  to  prepare  an 
interview.  '  Xo,'  replied  General  Johnston — probably  anxious  to  show  a  mark  of 
deference  to  the  President,  out  of  pity  for  the  mortification  already  inflicted  upon 
him — '  let  the  President  dictate  the  letter.'  The  letter,  proposing  a  suspension  of 
hostilities,  was  dictated  by  the  President.  And  thus,  Mr.  Davis  himself  virtually 
subscribed  the  token  of  submission  of  the  Confederate  army,  second  in  importance 
and  numbers  to  that  of  Lee,  yet  unwilling  to  go  further  in  the  sequel  and  to  write 
gracefully  his  entire  submission  to  the  inevitable. 

"On  the  16th  of  April,  the  President,  his  staff  and  Cabinet  left  Greensboro'.  It 
was  a  slow  travel,  in  ambulances  and  on  horseback,  and  the  dejection  of  the  party 


560  ANNALS  OF  TEE  WAR. 

adopt  the  alternative  of  trying  to  push  through  the  Southwest 
toward  the  region  which  he  fondly  believed  to  be  yet  under  the  domina 
tion  of  Forrest,  Taylor,  and  Kirby  Smith,  and  within  which  he  hoped 
to  revive  the  desperate  fortunes  of  the  rebellion.  He  confided  his 
hopes  to  Breckenridge,  and  when  he  reached  Abbeville,  South  Caro- 


was  visible  enough.  Mr.  Davis  was  the  first  to  rally  from  it.  When  he  and  his 
companions  had  left  Richmond,  it  was  in  the  belief  of  the  majority  that  Lee  could 
avoid  surrender  but  a  few  days  longer,  and  with  the  intention,  as  we  have  already 
said,  of  making  their  way  to  the  Florida  coast,  and  embarking  there  for  a  foreign 
land.  The  President  had  clung,  at  Danville,  to  the  hope  that  Lee  might  effect  a 
retreat  to  Southwestern  Virginia,  and  he  had  remained  there  long  enough  to  see 
that  hope  disappointed.  Again,  when  he  had  sought  General  Johnston's  demoral 
ized  arid  inconsiderable  army,  it  had  been  from  a  feeble  diversion  of  hope  that  it 
might  not  yield  to  the  example  of  Lee's  surrender,  and  that,  under  the  inspiration 
of  the  presence  and  the  direct  command  of  the  President,  it  might  be  induced  to 
keep  the  field.  That  expectation  had  been  brought  to  a  painful  end,  and  it 
appeared  as  if  the  President  would  be  recommitted  now  to  the  original  design  of 
fleeing  the  Confederacy,  and  would  now  make  an  earnest  effort  to  escape.  But  his 
mind  was  disordered  and  undecided.  It  was  distressing  to  see  how  he  hesitated 
between  assured  safety  in  flight  from  the  country,  and  the  possible  h  ope  that  the 
cause  of  the  Confederacy  might  not  be  beyond  redemption.  Anyhow,  there  were 
no  signs  yet  that  he  was  pursued  by  the  enemy,  and  he  had  appeared  to  consider 
himself  sure  of  ultimately  making  good  his  escape  after  he  had  once  got  out  of  sight 
of  Richmond.  He  had  shown  great  trepidation  in  getting  out  of  the  Capital,  but  in 
the  leisure  of  a  journey,  unmolested  by  pursuit,  and  entertained  by  the  fresh  air 
and  pleasing  sights  of  spring,  he  had  time  to  recover,  to  some  extent,  his  self-posses 
sion,  and  to  cast  about  for  something  to  be  saved  from  the  wreck  of  his  hopes. 

"In  the  meditations  of  his  journey  through  Xorth  Carolina,  the  fugitive  Presi 
dent,  although  anxious  for  his  personal  safety,  appears  to  have  conceived  the  alter 
native  of  venturing  to  the  Southwest,  within  reach  of  the  forces  of  Taylor  and  For 
rest,  in  the  hope  of  reviving  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy  within  a  limited  terri 
tory.  He  suggested  the  alternative  to  General  Breckenridge,  as  they  traveled 
together,  after  the  news  of  Johnston's  surrender,  but  received  only  an  evasive  reply, 
the  latter  not  sharing  his  hopes,  but  unwilling  to  mortify  them  by  a  candid  declara 
tion  of  opinion.  Mr.  Davis  was  remarkable  for  a  sanguine  temperament,  but  it  was 
that  which  we  observe  in  weak  characters,  '  hoping  against  hope,'  fickle,  flaring, 
extravagant,  rather  than  that  practical  energy  which  renews  itself  on  disaster,  and 
conquers  fortune.  The  vision  he  had  conjured  up  of  a  limited  Confederacy  around 
the  mouths  of  the  Mississippi  might  have  looked  plausible  upon  paper,  but  it  was 
fatally  defective  in  omitting  the  moral  condition  of  the  South.  The  unhappy 
President  had  not  yet  perceived  that  he  had  lost  the  faculty  of  encouraging  others, 
that  the  Southern  people  were  in  despair,  and  that  wherever  he  might  go  he  would 
find  their  countenances  averted,  their  hopes  abandoned,  and  their  thoughts  already 
committed  to  submission.  But  he  was  to  realize  very  shortly  how  morally  deserted 
and  practically  helpless  he  was.  His  first  discovery  of  it  was  at  Abbeville,  South 
Carolina,  where  occured  one  of  the  most  pathetic  scenes  in  history,  over  which  the 
tenderness  and  charity  of  some  of  the  actors  have  been  disposed  to  draw  the  curtain, 
committing  its  sorrows  to  secrecy. 


SOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  561 

lina,  lie  called  a  council  of  war  to  deliberate  upon  the  plans  which 
he  had  conceived  for  regenerating  what  had  now  become  in  fact 
"  The  Lost  Cause."  This  council  was  composed  of  Generals  Breck- 
cnridge,  Bragg,  and  the  commanders  of  the  cavalry  force  which  was 
then  escorting  him.  All  united  that  it  was  hopeless  to  struggle 


"  Mr.  Davis  reached  Abbeville  on  the  1st  of  May.  So  far  he  had  been  accom 
panied  by  the  fragments  of  rive  brigades,  amounting  in  number  to  less  than  one 
thousand  men,  and  reorganized  into  two  battalions,  at  the  front  and  in  the  rear  of 
the  long  train  which  signaled  his  flight  and  foolishly  obstructed  his  effort  at  escape. 
There  were  already  painful  evidences  of  the  demoralization  of  the  escort,  and  the 
story  told  almost  at  every  mile,  by  stragglers  from  Johnston's  command,  was  not 
calculated  to  inspire  them.  At  Abbeville,  Mr.  Davis  resolved  upon  a  council  of  war. 
It  was  composed  of  the  five  brigade  commanders,  and  General  Braxton  Bragg  (for 
the  year  past  the  '  military  adviser '  of  the  President)  was  admitted  to  the  last 
scene  of  the  deliberations  of  the  lost  cause. 

<;  In  the  council  Mr.  Davis  spoke  with  more  than  his  accustomed  facility  and 
earnestness,  inspired  by  hope,  but  without  volubility  or  extravagance.  He  made  a 
statement  of  surpassing  plausibility.  The  South,  he  declared,  was  suffering  from  a 
panic ;  it  yet  had  resources  to  continue  the  war ;  it  was  for  those  who  remained 
with  arms  in  their  hands  to  give  an  example  to  reanimate  others ;  such  an  act  of 
devotion,  beside  being  the  most  sublime  thing  in  history,  might  yet  save  the 
country,  and  erect  again  its  declining  resolution. 

"  '  It  is  but  necessary,'  he  said,  '  that  the  brave  men  yet  with  me  should  renew 
their  determination  to  continue  the  war ;  they  will  be  a  nucleus  for  rapid  reinforce 
ments  and  will  raise  the  signal  of  rcanimation  for  the  whole  country.'  No  one  of 
the  council  answered  him  at  length ;  the  replies  of  the  commanders  were  almost 
sunk  to  whispers;  the  scene  was  becoming  painful,  and  it  was  at  last  agreed  that 
each  in  his  turn  should  announce  his  decision.  Each  answered  slowly,  reluctantly", 
in  the  negative.  The  only  words  added  were  that,  though  they  considered  the  war 
hopeless,  they  would  not  disband  their  men  until  they  had  guarded  the  President  to  a, 
place  of  safety.  '  No,'  exclaimed  Mr.  Davis,  passionately,  '  I  will  listen  now  to  no 
proposition  for  my  safety.  I  appeal  to  you  for  the  cause  of  the  country.'  Again  he 
urged  the  commanders  to  accept  his  views. 

"  '  We  were  silent,'  says  General  Basil  Duke,  one  of  the  council,  '  for  we  could 
not  i'gree  with  him,  and  we  respected  him  too  much  to  reply.' 

"  Mr.  Davis  yet  stood  erect,  raised  his  hands  to  his  head,  as  if  in  pain,  and  sud 
denly  exclaiming,  'All  hope  is  gone ! '  added  haughtily,  '  I  see  that  the  friends  of 
the  South  are  prepared  to  consent  to  her  degradation ; '  and  then,  sweeping  the 
company  with  a  proud  and  despairing  glance,  he  attempted  to  pass  from  the  room. 
But  the  blow  was  too  much  for  his  feeble  organization.  His  face  was  white  with 
anger  and  disappointment,  and  the  mist  of  unshed  tears  was  in  his  eyes — tears 
which  pride  struggled  to  keep  back.  The  sentiment  that  all  was  lost  went  through 
his  heart  like  the  slow  and  measured  thrust  of  a  sword  ;  as  the  wound  sunk  into  it 
it  left  him  speechless ;  loose  and  tottering,  he  would  have  fallen  to  the  floor,  had  not 
General  Breckenridge  ended  the  scene  by  leading  him  faltering  from  the  room.  In 
a  dead  and  oppressive  silence  the  deserted  leader,  the  fallen  chief,  secured  a  decent 
retreat  for  agonies  which  tears  only  could  relieve. 

"  It  was  the  last  council  of  the  Confederacy.  The  hateful  selfishness  which 
originates  in  the  attempt  of  each  individual  to  extricate  himself  from  a  common 
36 


562  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

longer,  but  they  added  that  they  would  not  disband  their  men  till 
they  had  guarded  their  chieftain  to  a  place  of  safety.     This  was  the 


misfortune  soon  broke  out,  no  longer  restrained  by  the  presence  of  the  President. 
The  soldiers  were  discharged,  but  they  clamored  that  they  had  no  money  to  take 
them  home.  What  of  the  Treasury  gold  that  remained  was  divided  among  them. 
So  fearful  were  they  of  marauders  that  many  buried  their  coin  in  the  woods  and  in 
unfrequented  places.  With  the  disbandment  of  the  troops  Mr.  Benjamin  suggested 
a  separation  of  the  Cabinet  officers  from  the  President,  making  an  excuse  that  so 
large  a  party  would  advertise  their  flight  and  increase  the  chances  of  capture.  Mr. 
Davis  was  left  to  make  his  way  to  Georgia,  Postmaster  General  Reagan  continuing 
to  journey  with  him,  and  General  Breckenridge  only  to  a  point  where  he  thought  it 
convenient  to  leave  for  Florida.  There  were  also  in  the  party  two  or  three  of  his 
staff  officers  and  a  few  straggling  soldiers,  who  still  kept  up  some  show  of  an  escort. 
Mrs.  Davis  had  already  preceded  her  husband  to  Georgia,  and  he  now  traveled 
slowly,  and  almost  desolately,  on  horseback,  having  arranged  that  she  should  await 
him  in  the  town  of  Washington. 

"  From  this  place  the  now  hunted  President  was  soon  driven  again  on  his 
journey  by  news  of  the  occupation  of  Augusta.  He  had  also  received  news  of  the 
assassination  of  President  Lincoln,  and  that  event,  he  declared,  confirmed  his  reso 
lution  not  to  leave  the  country.  He  inferred  from  the  newspapers  that  he  was 
accused  as  an  accomplice  in  the  crime,  and  he  remarked  to  one  of  his  staff  officers 
that  he  '  would  prefer  death  to  the  dishonor  of  leaving  the  country  under  such  an 
imputation.'  But  with  such  a  sentiment,  it  will  occur  to  the  reader  that  it  would 
have  been  noble  and  decorous  for  Mr.  Davis  to  have  surrendered  himself  at  the 
nearest  Federal  post  and  to  have  demanded  a  trial.  It  would  have  placed  him  in  a 
grand  and  winning  attitude,  one  becoming  a  great  man,  one  honorable  to  himself 
and  the  South,  and  redeeming  him  more  than  anything  else  in  the  eyes  of  the  world. 
But,  unfortunately,  he  accepted  the  base  alternative  of  continuing  his  flight,  and 
that,  too,  with  the  artifice  of  a  mean  disguise. 

"  On  continuing  his  journey,  accompanied  by  his  wife,  whom  he  had  overtaken 
at  Washington,  it  was  determined  that  the  President  and  his  friends  should  there 
after  travel  as  an  emigrant  party.  Mr.  Reagan  was  still  in  his  company.  General 
Breckenridge  had  left  outside  the  town  of  Washington,  taking  with  him  forty-five 
Kentucky  soldiers,  a  straggling  remnant  of  Morgan's  Brigade.  Ten  mounted  men 
had  offered  to  escort  Mrs.  Davis,  and  although  they  had  accepted  their  paroles, 
justly  considered  that  they  might  protect  a  distressed  lady  from  marauders.  All 
tokens  of  the  President's  importance,  in  dress  and  air,  were  left  aside ;  a  covered 
wagon,  pack-mule,  and  cooking  utensils,  were  provided  at  Washington ;  and  it  was 
designed  that  Mr.  Davis,  his  wife,  and  his  wife's  sister,  should  pass  as  a  simple 
country  family,  emigrating  from  Georgia,  and  having  fallen  in  with  straggling 
soldiers  for  their  protection.  Mr.  Davis'  dignity  was  laid  aside  without  much  diffi 
culty.  Carlisle  said :  'A  king  in  the  midst  of  his  body-guard,  with  all  his  trumpets, 
war-horses,  and  gilt  standard-bearers,  will  look  great,  though  he  be  little ;  but  only 
some  Roman  Carus  can  give  audience  to  satrap  ambassadors  while  seated  on  the 
ground,  with  a  woolen  cap,  and  supping  on  boiled  peas,  like  a  common  soldier.' 
Mr.  Davis,  in  the  dress  of  a  country  farmer,  had  none  of  these  traces  of  imperialism 
which  cling  to  those  '  born  to  purple.'  His  features,  just  and  handsome,  without 
being  remarkable,  were  those  which  might  command  by  assumed  airs,  or  might  be 
practiced  to  particular  expressions,  but  scarcely  those  which  could  assert  superiority 
without  an  effort  and  at  a  glance.  He  incurred  but  little  chance  of  detection  in  the 
dress  he  had  assumed  of  an  honest,  well-to-do  emigrant." 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  503 

last  council  of  the  Confederacy.  Davis,  who  had  hitherto  com 
manded  with  all  the  rigor  of  an  autocrat,  found  himself  powerless 
and  deserted.  From  this  day  forth  he  was  little  better  than  a  fugi 
tive,  for  although  his  escort  gave  him  and  his  wagon  train  nominal 
company  and  protection  till  he  had  reached  the  village  of  "Washing 
ton,  just  within  the  northeastern  boundary  of  Georgia,  they  had 
long  since  learned  the  hopelessness  of  further  resistance,  and  now 
began  to  despair  even  of  successful  flight.  A  division  of  ^National 

o  1  ~ 

cavalry,  under  Stoneman,  and  a  brigade  under  Palmer,  had  already 
burst  from  the  mountains  of  Xorth  Carolina,  and  were  in  hot  pursuit ; 
while  rumors  reached  him  of  another  mounted  force,  sweeping  destruc 
tively  through  Alabama  and  Georgia,  cutting  oft',  by  its  wide  extended 
march,  the  only  route  to  the  trans-Mississippi  and  the  far  Southwest. 
In  order  that  we  may  properly  understand  the  difficulties  which 
were  now  rapidly  encompassing  Davis,  and  which  ultimately  led  to 
his  capture,  let  us  leave  him  at  Little  Washington  and  consider  the 
movements  of  the  force  then  marching  through  Alabama  and  Geor 
gia.  It  consisted  of  three  divisions  of  cavalry,  each  nearly  live  thou 
sand  strong,  an  aggregate  of  nearly  fifteen  thousand  men,  all  splen 
didly  mounted,  armed,  and  equipped,  and,  what  was  better  still, 
inspired  by  the  belief  tbat  they  were  invincible.  It  will  be  remem 
bered  that  after  the  capture  of  Selma,  on  April  2d  (which  took  place 
at  nightfall  of  the  very  Sunday  that  Davis  fled  from  Richmond), 
and  the  passage  of  the  victorious  cavalry  to  the  south  side  of  the 
Alabama,  their  march  was  directed  to  the  eastward  by  the  way  of 
Montgomery,  Columbus,  AVest  Point,  and  Macon  ;  while  a  detached 
brigade,  under  Croxton,  moved  rapidly  in  the  same  direction,  by  a 
more  northern  route,  through  Jasper,  Talladega,  and  La  Grange. 
The  limits  of  this  sketch  forbid  a  detailed  narrative  of  how  these 
gallant  troopers  captured  the  last  stronghold  of  the  Confederacy, 
pausing  in  their  march  to  raise  the  National  flag  over  the  first  rebel 
capitol;  how  the  astonished  rebel  ladies  at  the  beautiful  village  of 
Tuskegee  bedecked  their  horses  with  flowers  as  a  reward  for  perfect 
discipline  and  good  behavior;  how  they  spared  one  printing  press, 
claimed  by  a  strong-mined  woman,  upon  the  condition  that  "she  and 
her  descendants,  unto  the  fourth  generation,  should  permit  nothing 
but  Bibles,  Testaments,  and  school  books  to  be  printed  upon  it,"  and 
destroyed  another,  which  had  fled  from  them  already  through  four 
States ;  or  how  two  of  Iowa's  most  gallant  soldiers,  "Winslow  and 
Xoble,  led  by  the  intrepid  General  Upton,  under  the  cover  of  dark 
ness,  broken  only  by  the  incessant  flash  of  fifty-two  cannons,  carried 
the  works  which  covered  the  bridges  across  the  Chattahoochee  river 


564:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

at  Columbus.  A  thousand  incidents  of  daring  and  hardihood  and  a 
thousand  scenes  of  exciting  incident  might  be  described.  The  flash 
and  roar  of  artillery,  the  terrible  crash  of  the  breech-loading  carbines, 
the  headlong  charge  and  shout  of  armed  men,  the  neighing  of  war- 
horses,  the  wild  excitement  of  victory,  the  confusion  of  night  fight 
ing,  the  burning  of  military  stores  and  store-houses,  the  building  of 
bridges,  the  passage  of  rivers  in  the  light  of  burning  cotton  bales 
and  gin-houses,  and  last,  though  not  least,  the  appealing  faces  of  the 
colored  people,  who  hailed  the  advancing  Union  cavalry  with  trans 
ports  of  delight,  and  whose  eyes  were  blinded  with  tears  as  the 
hurrying  squadrons  passed  into  the  darkness,  not  heeding  their 
prayer  to  be  led  out  of  the  land  of  bondage,  all  conspire  to  make 
this  one  of  the  most  exciting  campaigns  of  the  entire  war. 

On  the  evening  of  the  llth  day  of  April,  while  the  cavalry 
corps  was  marching  from  Selma  to  Montgomery,  an  officer  of  the 
advance  guard  sent  in  copies  of  the  Montgomery  papers  of  the  6th 
and  7th,  containing  brief  accounts  of  the  operations  of  General 
Grant  about  Petersburg,  and  from  which,  making  allowance  for 
rebel  suppressions,  it  was  supposed  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had 
gained  a  decisive  victory.  It  was  stated  that  Davis  and  the  rebel 
government  had  already  gone  to  Danville,  but  that  their  cause  was 
not  yet  lost.  On  the  14th  and  15th  information  was  received  con 
firmatory  of  Lee's  defeat,  and  the  evacuation  of  Richmond.  It  was 
also  reported  that  Grant  was  pressing  the  rebel  army  back  upon 
Lynchburg.  From  these  facts,  together  with  the  many  rumors  from 
all  quarters,  indicative  of  unusual  excitement  among  the  rebels,  there 
was  little  room  to  doubt  that  they  had  met  with  a  great  disaster  in  Vir 
ginia  ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  course,  no  definite  or  reliable  information  as 
to  the  extent  of  the  disaster  or  the  probable  course  that  would  be 
adopted  by  the  rebel  government  could  obtained.  It  was  assumed, 
however,  that  the  rebel  leaders  would  either  endeavor  to  concentrate 
the  remnant  of  their  forces  in  North  Carolina,  and  make  further 
head  against  our  armies,  or  that  they  would  disband  and  endeavor  to 
save  themselves  by  flight.  In  either  case  it  was  clearly  our  duty  to 
close  in  upon  them  by  the  line  upon  which  we  were  moving,  with 
the  greatest  possible  rapidity,  so  as  to  join  in  the  final  and  decisive 
struggle,  assist  in  sweeping  up  the  fragments  of  the  wreck,  and  cap 
ture  such  important  persons  as  might  seek  safety  in  flight.  Accord 
ingly  our  march  from  Montgomery  to  Macon,  a  distance  of  two 
hundred  and  thirty-five  miles,  including  the  passage  of  the  Chatta- 
hoochee  and  Flint  rivers,  and  the  capture  of  the  two  fortified  towns 
of  Columbus  and  West  Point,  was  made  in  less  than  six  days.  In 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  5G5 

order  to  cover  the  widest  possible  front  of  operations,  and  to  obtain 
such  information  in  regard  to  hostile  movements  as  might  enable  us 
to  act  advisedly,  detachments  were  sent  off  to  the  right  and  left  of 
the  main  column,  scouting  in  all  directions.  At  Macon,  we  were 
arrested  by  the  armistice  concluded  between  Generals  Sherman  and 
Johnston,  though  not  till  after  the  city  had  fallen  into  our  possession. 

During  my  conference  with  Generals  Cobb  and  G.  W.  Smith,  on 
the  evening  of  the  20th  of  April,  I  received  conclusive  information 
in  regard  to  Lee's  surrender,  and  the  course  of  events  in  Virginia. 
The  commanding  officer  of  our  advanced  guard,  moving  rapidly, 
had  taken  possession  of  this  place,  and  after  securing  his  prisoners, 
had  conlined  the  generals  in  a  building  occupied  by  them  as  head 
quarters.  On  my  arrival,  late  at  night,  at  the  place  where  the  lead 
ing  officers  were  confined,  General  Cobb  protested  in  the  strongest 
manner  against  his  capture,  claiming  the  protection  of  the  alleged 
armistice.  For  reasons  not  necessary  to  recapitulate  here,  I  declined 
to  entertain  this  protest,  and  decided  to  hold  him  and  his  command 
as  prisoners  of  war;  but  remarked,  "If  an  armistice  is  in  force, 
there  must  be  some  reason  for  it,  and  I  can  imagine  none  which  will 
justify  it  except  the  capture  or  destruction  of  Lee's  army/'  This 
remark  drawing  out  no  reply,  I  asked  squarely  if  Lee  had  sin-ren 
dered.  Cobb  still  declined  to  answer,  whereupon  T  turned  to  G.  W. 
Smith,  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  and  formerly  in  the  regular  army, 
and  repeated  the  question,  remarking  that  my  future  course  would 
depend  materially  upon  his  reply.  Smith  also  hesitated,  but  seeing 
that  it  was  wiser  to  be  frank,  he  acknowledged  that  Lee's  army  had 
been  defeated  and  compelled  to  surrender.  I  replied  at  once,  "If 
that  is  the  case,  every  man  killed  hereafter  is  a  man  murdered," 
adding,  ik  I  shall  govern  my  command  in  accordance  with  this  prin 
ciple,  and  shall  wait  here  a  reasonable  time  for  specific  orders  from 
General  Sherman/'  General  Cobb,  in  a  subsequent  conversation  with 
me,  remarked  that  the  relations  established  at  West  Point  seemed  to 
be  like  those  of  Free  Masonry,  adding,  "When  you  asked  me  if 
Lee  had  surrendered,  I  stood  silent,  and  no  consideration  could  have 
induced  me  to  confirm  your  suspicions  in  reference  to  that  matter; 
but  when  you  turned  to  General  Smith  with,  the  same  question,  he 
answered  frankly  and  without  hesitation,  telling  you  the  whole  truth 
as  clearly  and  without  equivocation  as  if  he  hud  been  under  oath/' 
It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  Cobb  was  a  politician  and  the 
other  a  soldier. 

The  situation  of  my  command  was  peculiar.     Originally  organ 
ized  as  a  corps  under  General  Sherman,  the  commanding  general 


566  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  and  not  having  been 
transferred,  it  still  formed  a  legitimate  part  of  his  command,  wherever 
he  might  be.  It  will  be  remembered  that  General  Sherman,  with  the 
main  body  of  his  army,  was  at  that  time  in  North  Carolina,  moving 
northward.  Before  leaving  North  Alabama,  he  had  instructed  ine 
to  report,  with  my  entire  corps,  except  Kilpatrick's  Division,  to 
"  Major  General  George  II.  Thomas,  to  assist  in  the  operations  against 
Hood.  It  was  the  intention  of  General  Sherman,  however,  as 
developed  in  frequent  conversations  with  me  while  lying  at  Gayles- 
ville,  Alabama,  in  October,  1864,  that  as  soon  as  Hood  could  be 
disposed  of,  and  the  cavalry  could  be  reorganized  and  remounted, 
I  should  gather  together  every  man  and  horse  that  could  be  made 
fit  for  service,  and  march  through  the  richer  parts  of  Alabama  and 
Georgia,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  railroad  communications 
and  supplies  of  the  rebels,  and  bringing  my  force  into  the  theatre  of 
operations,  toward  which  all  of  our  great  armies  were  then  moving. 
In  the  campaign  terminating  at  Macon,  I  had  actually  started  under 
the  direct  instructions  of  General  Thomas,  but  with  the  "  amplest 
latitude  of  an  independent  commander,"  transmitted  through  him 
from  General  Grant,  the  Commander-in-chief.  I  found  myself  cut 
off  from  all  communication  with  these  generals,  but  liable  to  receive 
orders  from  either  or  all  of  them,  and  from  the  Secretary  of  War  in 
addition.  My  paramount  duty  was  clearly  to  take  care  of  the  public 
interests  first,  and  to  reconcile  orders  afterward,  should  they  come  in 
conflicting  terms  from  different  directions. 

In  anticipation  of  a  final  break  up  of  the  rebel  forces,  we  had 
already  determined  to  keep  a  sharp  look  out  for  Davis  and  the 
leading  authorities.  As  soon  as  I  became  satisfied,  by  information 
received  by  telegraph,  in  a  short  time,  from  General  Sherman,  that 
he  had  actually  concluded  an  armistice,  and  intended  it  to  apply  to 
my  command,  I  felt  bound  to  observe  it,  but  only  iipon  condition 
that  the  rebels  should  also  comply  with  its  provisions  in  equal  good 
faith,  or  that  I  should  not  be  ordered  by  higher  authority  to  disregard 
it.  One  of  its  provisions  was  that  neither  party  should  make  any 
change  in  the  station  of  troops  during  the  continuance  of  the  armis 
tice.  My  command,  therefore,  remained  in  camp,  but  was  kept  on 
the  alert,  ready  to  move  in  any  direction.  Having  heard  from 
citizens,  however,  that  Davis,  instead  of  observing  the  armistice, 
was  making  his  way 'toward  the  South  with  an  escort,  I  took  posses 
sion  of  the  railroads,  and  sent  scouts  in  all  directions,  in  order  that 
I  might  receive  timely  notice  of  his  movements.  The  armistice  was 
declared  null  and  void  by  the  Secretary  of  War ;  but,  at  least  one 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  507 

day  before  I  had  been  advised  of  tins,  through  General  Thomas,  I 
received  from  General  Sherman  a  dispatch,  in  cipher,  informing  me 
of  the  formal  termination  of  hostilities  by  the  surrender  of  General 
Johnston,  and  all  the  forces  under  his  command  east  of  the  Chatta- 
hoochee.  This  \vas  on  the  27th  of  April.  Immediately  afterward, 
I  disposed  of  mv  troops  for  the  purpose  of  taking  possession  of  the 
important  points  in  Georgia,  and  paroling  the  rebel  prisoners,  who 
might  have  to  pass  through  them  in  order  to  reach  their  homes.  I 
felt  certain,  from  what  I  could  learn,  that  Davis  and  his  Cabinet 
would  endeavor  to  escape  to  the  west  side  of  the  Mississippi  river, 
notwithstanding  the  armistice  and  capitulation  ;  and,  therefore,  gave 
instructions  to  the  different  detachments  of  the  corps  to  look  out  for 
and  capture  him,  and  all  other  persons  of  rank  or  authority  with 
whom  they  might  come  in  contact. 

On  the  ^sth  of  April,  General  Upton  was  ordered,  with  a 
detachment  of  his  division,  to  proceed  by  rail  to  Augusta,  while  the 
rest  of  the  division,  under  General  Winslow,  was  ordered  to  march 
by  the  most  direct  route  to  Atlanta,  a  regiment  under  Colonel  Fg- 
gleston  having  been  sent  by  rail  to  that  place  immediately  after  the 
receipt  of  the  telegram  just  mentioned  from  General  Sherman. 
General  F.  M.  McCook,  with  a  detachment  of  seven  hundred  men, 
was  directed  to  proceed  by  rail  to  Albany,  Georgia,  and  march 
thence  by  the  most  direct  route  to  Tallahassee,  Florida,  while 
General  Croxton,  with  the  remainder  of  this  divi.-ion,  was  held  at 
Macon,  with  orders  issued  subsequently  to  watch  the  line  of  the 
( )cniulgee  river  from  the  month  of  Yellow  creek  to  Macon.  General 
Minty,  commanding  the  Second  Division — General  Long  having 
been  wounded  at  Selma — was  directed,  about  the  same  time,  to 
send  detachments  to  Cmhbert  and  Eufaula,  and  to  watch  the  line 
of  the  Ocmulgee,  from  the  right  of  the  First  Division  to  Abbeville, 
and  as  much  of  the  Flint  and  Chattahoochee,  to  the  rear,  as  prac 
ticable.  The  ostensible  object  of  this  disposition  of  troops  was  to 
secure  prisoners  and  military  stores,  and  to  take  possession  of  the 
important  strategic  points  and  lines  of  communication;  but  the 
different  commanders  were  directed  to  keep  a  vigilant  watch  for 
Davis  and  other  members  of  the  rebel  government. 

The  first  direct  information  of  Davis'  movements  reached  me 
on  the  *2?>(l  of  April,  from  a  citizen,  now  a  prominent  lawyer  and 
politician  in  Georgia,  who  had  seen  him  at  Charlotte,  ^North  Carolina, 
only  three  or  four  days  before,  and  had  learned  that  he  was  on  his 
way,  with  a  train  and  an  escort  of  cavalry,  to  the  South,  intending, 
as  was  then  understood,  to  go  to  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department. 


568  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Tliis  information  was  regarded  as  entirely  trustworthy,  and  hence 
the  officers  in  charge  of  the  different  detachments  afterward  sent 
out  were  directed  to  dispose  of  their  commands  so  as  to  have  all 
roads  and  crossings  vigilantly  watched.  It  wras  thought,  at  first, 
that  Davis  would  call  about  him  a  select  force,  and  endeavor  to 
escape  by  inarching  to  the  westward  through  the  hilly  country  of 
Northern  Georgia.  To  prevent  this,  Colonel  Eggleston  was  directed 
to  watch  the  country  in  all  directions  from  Atlanta.  General  A.  J. 
Alexander,  with  the  Second  Brigade  of  Upton's  Division,  was 
directed  by  General  Winslow  to  scout  the  country  to  the  northward 
as  far  as  Dalton,  or  until  he  should  meet  the  troops  under  General 
Steedman  operating  in  that  region.  Beginning  his  march  from 
Macon,  General  Alexander,  at  his  own  request,  was  authorized  to 
detach  an  officer  and  twenty  picked  men,  disguised  as  rebel  soldiers, 
for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  definite  information  of  Davis'  move 
ments.  This  party  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant 
Joseph  O.  Yoeman,  First  Ohio  Cavalry,  and  at  the  time  acting 
inspector  of  the  brigade.  Verbal  instructions  were  also  given  to 
other  brigade  and  division  commanders  to  make  similar  detachments. 
General  Croxton  was  directed  to  send  a  small  party  toward  Talladega, 
by  the  route  upon  which  he  had  marched  from  that  place ;  while 
Colonel  Eggleston  was  directed  to  send  another  party  by  rail  to 
West  Point.  By  these  means  it  was  believed  that  all  considerable 
detachments  of  rebels  would  be  apprehended,  and  that  such  informa 
tion  might  be  obtained  as  would  enable  us  to  secure  the  principal 
rebel  leaders,  if  they  should  undertake  to  pass  through  the  country 
under  military  escort. 

It  is,  perhaps,  proper  to  state,  that  in  declaring  the  armistice  of 
Sherman  void,  the  Secretary  of  War  had  directed  that  my  command 
should  resume  active  operations  and  endeavor  to  arrest  the  fugitive 
rebel  chiefs.  He  sent  numerous  telegrams  urging  the  greatest  pos 
sible  exertions,  but  as  we  had  already  anticipated  orders,  and  disposed 
of  our  forces  to  the  best  possible  advantage,  there  was  nothing  left 
but  to  notify  him  of  what  we  had  dore,  and  to  assure  him  that 
unless  Davis  should  undertake  to  escape  as  an  individual  fugitive, 
we  had  no  doubt  of  securing  him.  After  a  rapid  march  toward  the 
upper  crossings  of  the  Savannah  river,  in  Northeastern  Georgia, 
Yoeman  with  his  detachment,  looking  as  much  like  rebels  as  the 
rebels  themselves,  joined  Davis'  party  escorted  by  five  small  brigades 
of  cavalry,  and  continued  with  them  several  days,  watching  for  an 
opportunity  to  seize  and  carry  off  the  rebel  chief ;  but  this  daring 
purpose  was  frustrated  by  the  vigilance  of  the  rebel  escort.  At 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  569 

Washington,  Georgia,  the  rebel  authorities  heard  that  Atlanta  was 
occupied  by  our  troops,  and  that  they  could  not  pass  that  point 
without  a  light.  They  halted,  and  for  a  short  time  acted  with  irreso 
lution  in  regard  to  their  future  course.  The  cavalry  force  which  had 
remained  true  to  Davis,  probably  numbering  two  thousand  men,  now 
became  mutinous  and  declined  to  go  any  further.  They  were  dis 
banded  and  partially  paid  off  in  coin  which  had  been  brought  to  that 
point  in  wagons.  Lieutenant  Yoeman  lost  sight  of  Davis  at  this  time, 
but  dividing  his  party  into  three  or  four  detachments,  sought  again  to 
obtain  definite  information  of  the  fallen  chieftain's  movements,  but 
for  twenty-four  hours  was  unsuccessful.  Persevering  in  his  efforts, 
however,  he  became  convinced  that  Davis  had  relinquished  his  idea 
of  going  into  Alabama,  and  would  probably  try  to  reach  the  Gulf  or 
South  Atlantic  coast,  and  escape  by  sea.  This  was  a  correct  conclu 
sion,  and,  as  has  been  shown,  was  the  identical  plan  adopted  before 
leaving  Richmond.  Relying  upon  his  judgment,  Yoeman  sent 
couriers  with  this  information  to  General  Alexander,  and  by  him  it 
was  duly  transmitted  to  me  at  Macon.  The  same  conclusion  had 
already  been  forced  upon  me  by  information  derived  from  various 
other  sources.  With  railroad  communication  through  most  of 
Northern  Georgia,  and  with  a  division  of  four  thousand  Kational 
cavalry  operating  about  Atlanta,  it  would  have  been  next  to  impos 
sible  for  a  party  of  fugitives,  however  small,  to  traverse  that  region 
by  the  ordinary  roads ;  and  from  the  nature  of  the  case  this  must 
have  been  clear,  even  to  Davis.  After  carefully  considering  all  the 
circumstances,  I,  therefore,  became  convinced  that  he  would  either 
ilee  in  disguise,  unattended,  or  endeavor  to  work  his  way  southward 
into  Florida.  With  the  view  of  frustrating  this  plan,  I  now  directed 
all  the  crossings  of  the  Ocmulgee  river,  from  Atlanta  to  llawkins- 
ville.  to  be  watched  with  renewed  vigilance. 

'  O 

On  the  evening  of  May  Otli,  having  received  the  intelligence 
sent  in  by  Yoeman,  I  directed  General  Croxton  to  select  the  best 
regiment  in  his  division  and  to  send  it  under  its  best  officer,  with 
orders  to  march  eastward,  by  the  way  of  Jeffersonville,  to  Dublin, 
on  the  Oconee  river,  with  the  greatest  possible  speed,  scouting  the 
country  well  to  the  northward,  and  leaving  detachments  at  the  most 
important  cross-roads,  with  instructions  to  keep  a  sharp  look  out  for 
all  detachments  of  rebels.  By  these  means  it  was  hoped  that  Davis' 
line  of  march  would  be  intercepted  and  his  movements  discovered, 
in  which  event  the  commanding  officer  was  instructed  to  follow  it, 
wherever  it  might  lead,  until  the  fugitives  should  be  overtaken  and 
captured.  General  Croxton  selected  for  this  purpose  the  First  Wis- 


570  ANNALS  OF  TEE  WAR. 

consin  Cavalry,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Henry  Ilarnden, 
an  officer  of  age,  experience,  and  resolution.  During  that  day  and 
the  next,  the  conviction  that  Davis  would  try  to  escape  into  Florida 
became  BO  strong,  that  I  sent  for  General  Minty,  commanding  the 
Second  Division,  and  directed  him  also  to  select  his  best  regiment, 
and  order  it  to  march  without  delay  to  the  southeastward  along  the 
northern  bank  of  the  Ocnmlgee  river,  watching  all  the  crossings 
between  Hawkinsville  and  the  mouth  of  the  Ohoopee  river.  In 
case  of  discovering  the  trail  of  the  fugitives,  they  were  directed  to 
follow  it  to  the  Gulf  coast,  or  till  they  should  overtake  and  capture 
the  party  of  whom  they  were  in  pursuit.  General  Minty  selected 
his  own  regiment,  the  Fourth  Michigan  Cavalry,  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Pritchard,  an  excellent  and  spirited  officer.  In 
the  meantime,  General  Upton,  at  Augusta,  had  sent  me  a  dispatch 
advising  me  to  offer  a  reward  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  for 
the  capture  of  Davis,  urging  that  the  Secretary  of  War  would 
approve  my  action,  and  that  it  would  induce  even  the  rebels  to 
assist  in  making  the  capture.  Not  caring,  however,  to  assume  the 
responsibility  of  committing  the  government  in  this  way,  I  authorized 
him  to  issue  a  proclamation  offering  a  reward  of  one  hundred  thou 
sand  dollars  to  be  paid  out  of  such  money  as  might  be  found  in  the 
possession  of  Davis  or  his  party.  This  was  done,  and  copies  scattered 
throughout  the  country  as  early  as  the  6th  of  May. 

As  soon  as  it  was  known  at  Atlanta  that  Davis'  cavalry  escort 
had  disbanded,  General  Alexander,  with  five  hundred  picked  men 
and  horses,  of  his  command,  crossed  to  the  right  or  northern  bank  of 
the  Chattahoochee  river,  occupied  all  the  fords  west  of  the  Atlanta 
and  Chattanooga  Railroad,  watched  the  passes  of  the  Altoona  moun 
tains,  and  the  main  crossings  of  the  Etowah  river,  and  with  various 
detachments  of  his  small  command  patrolled  the  principal  roads  in 
that  region  day  and  night,  until  he  received  new^s  of  Davis'  capture 
in  another  quarter.  The  final  disposition  of  our  forces  may  be 
described  as  follows:  General  Upton,  with  parts  of  two  regiments, 
occupied  Augusta,  and  kept  a  vigilant  watch  over  the  country  in  that 
vicinity,  informing  me  by  telegraph  of  everything  important  which 
came  under  his  observation.  General  Winslow,  with  the  larger  part 
of  Upton's  Division,  occupied  Atlanta,  and  scouted  the  country  in  all 
directions  from  that  place.  General  Alexander,  with  five  hundred 
picked  men,  patrolled  the  country  north  of  the  Chattahoochee,  while 
detachments  occupied  Griffin  and  Jonesboro',  closely  watching  the 
crossing  of  the  Ocmulgee,  and  scouting  the  country  to  the  eastward. 
Colonel  Eggleston,  commanding  the  post  of  Atlanta,  had  also  sent  a 


HO  W  JEFFERSON  DA  VIS  WA  S  0  VEE  TA  KEN.  571 

detachment  to  West  Point,  to  watch  the  Alabama  line  in  that  quarter. 
General  Croxton,  with  the  main  body  of  the  First  Division,  in 
reserve  near  Macon,  had  sent  a  detachment  to  the  mountain  region 
of  Alabama,,  marching  by  the  way  of  Carrolton  to  Talladega,  another 
through  Northeastern  Georgia  toward  Xorth  Carolina,  and  was  also 
eiiirafed  in  watchinir  the  Ocmuloree  from  the  ri<dit  of  Upton's 

*""*»     0  v"">  ^  OX 

Division  to  Macon,  and  in  scouting  the  country  to  his  front  and  rear. 
General  Minty,  commanding  the  Second  Division,  Avith  the  main 
body  well  in  hand,  also  near  Maeon,  was  scouting  the  country  to  the 
southeast,  watching  the  lower  crossings  of  the  Ocmulgee,  and  had 
small  parties  at  all  the  important  points  on  the  Southwestern  Tlail- 
road,  and  in  Western  and  Southwestern  Georgia.  Detachments  of 
the  Seventh  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  occupied  Cuthbert,  Fufaula, 
Columbus  and  Bainbridge,  and  kept  a  vigilant  watch  over  the  lower 
Flint  and  Chattahoochee,  while  General  McCook,  with  a  detachment 
of  his  division  at  Albany,  and  seven  hundred  men  between  there 
and  Tallahassee,  Florida,  was  scouting  the  country  to  the  north  and 
eastward.  We  also  had  rail  and  telegraphic,  communication  from 
my  headquarters  at  Macon  with  Atlanta,  Augusta,  West  Point, 
Milledgeville,  Albany  and  Fufaula,  and,  linally.  Palmer,  in  hot 
haste,  was  approaching  the  line  of  the  Savannah  from  South  Carolina 
with  one  brigade.  P>v  inspecting  the  map  for  a  moment  it  will  be 
seen  that  our  troops,  amounting  to  fifteen  thousand  horsemen,  were 
occupying  a  well  defined  and  almost  continuous  line  from  Kingston, 
Georgia,  to  Tallahassee,  Florida,  with  detachments  and  scouts  well 
out  in  all  directions  to  the  front  and  rear.  With  vigilance  on  the 
part  of  the  troops,  it  is  difficult  to  perceive  how  Davis  and  his  party 
could  possibly  have  hoped  to  escape.  From  the  time  they  were 
reported  at  Charlotte  till  their  capture,  we  were  kept  informed  of 
their  general  movements,  and  were  enabled  thereby  to  dispose  of  our 
forces  in  such  a  manner  as  to  render  the  capture  morally  certain. 
Humors  came  in  from  all  directions,  but  by  carefully  weighing  them 
the  truth  became  sufficiently  manifest  to  enable  us  to  act  with  confi 
dence.  The  rebels  at  that  time  had  ceased  to  care  for  Davis,  and, 
in  the  hope  that  he  would  prove  to  be  an  acceptable  offering  for 
their  own  sins,  they  seemed  to  be  not  unwilling  that  he  should  be 
caught. 

In  pursuance  of  his  instructions,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ilarnden, 
with  three  officers  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  of  the  First 
Wisconsin  Cavalry,  left  Macon,  Georgia,  on  the  evening  of  May  Oth, 
1805,  and  marched  rapidly  during  the  whole  night,  by  way  of 
Jeil'ersonville,  toward  Dublin,  on  the  ( )conee  river.  At  Jefferson- 


572  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ville,  Colonel  Ilarnden  left  one  officer  and  thirty  men,  with  orders 
to  scout  the  country  in  all  directions  for  reliable  information  in 
regard  to  the  route  which  Davis  had  taken.  With  the  remainder  of 
his  small  command,  he  continued  the  march  till  tlje  next  evening, 
reaching  Dublin  at  about  seven  o'clock.  During  the  night  and  day 
he  had  sent  out  scouts  and  small  parties  on  all  the  side  roads,  in  the 
hope  of  finding  the  trail  of  the  party  for  whom  he  was  looking ;  but 
nothing  of  importance  occurred  until  after  he  had  bivouacked  for 
the  night.  The  white  inhabitants  of  Dublin  expressed  entire  igno 
rance  and  indifference  in  regard  to  the  movement  of  important 
rebels,  but  were  unusually  profuse  in  their  offers  of  hospitality  to 
Colonel  Ilarnden.  This  being  a  trait  in  Southern  character  which 
the  Colonel  had  never  seen  manifested  so  decidedly  before,  its 
exhibition  at  that  time  and  place  aroused  his  suspicions,  and  they 
were  strengthened  by  the  unusual  commotion  among  the  colored 
people.  He,  therefore,  declined  all  offers  of  hospitality,  and 
bivouacked  with  his  command  in  the  outskirts  of  the  village,  taking 
precautionary  measures  to  ascertain,  if  possible,  what  strange  thing 
had  happened  in  that  vicinity.  Although  he  displayed  great  tact 
and  vigilance,  he  gained  no  valuable  intelligence  till  about  mid 
night,  at  which  time  he  was  aroused  by  a  negro  man,  who  had  stolen 
secretly,  at  that  late  hour,  to  his  camp,  for  the  purpose  of  telling 
him  that  Davis,  with  his  -wife  and  family,  had  passed  through 
Dublin  that  day,  going  south,  on  the  river  road.  The  negro  reported 
that  he  had  assisted  the  party  in  question  to  cross  from  the  east  to 
the  west  side  of  the  river,  that  they  had  eight  wagons  with  them, 
and  that  another  party,  without  wagons,  had  gone  southward  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Oconee  river.  His  information  seems  to  have  been 
of  the  most  explicit  and  circumstantial  character.  He  had  heard  the 
lady  called  "  Mrs.  Davis,"  and  a  gentleman,  riding  a  "  spirited  bay 
horse,"  spoken  of  as  "  President  Davis,"  adding  that  "  Mr.  Davis " 
had  not  crossed  the  river  at  the  regular  ferry  with  the  rest  of  the 
party,  but  had  gone  about  three  miles  lower  down,  and  crossed  on 
a  small  flatboat,  and  rejoined  the  party  with  the  wagons  near  the 
outskirts  of  the  town,  and  that  they  had  all  gone  toward  the  south 
logether.  This  colored  man  had  evidently  made  careful  and  dis 
creet  observation  of  all  that  took  place,  and  told  his  story  so 
circumstantially  that  Colonel  Ilarnden  could  not  help  believing  it. 
The  ferryman  wTas  called  up,  and  examined,  but,  either  through 
stupidity  or  design,  succeeded  in  withholding  whatever  he  knew  in 
regard  to  the  case. 

But,  in  view  of  the  facts  already  elicited,  after  detailing  Lieu- 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  573 

tenant  Lane  and  sixty  men  to  remain  at  Dublin,  and  to  scout  the 
country  in  all  directions,  particularly  toward  the  sea-coast.  Colonel 
Harnden  and  the  rest  of  his  party,  not  exceeding,  in  all,  seventy- 
five  men,  took  to  horse,  at  an  early  hour  in  the  morning,  and  began 
the  pursuit  of  Athe  party  just  mentioned.  Five  miles  south  of 
Dublin,  he  obtained  information,  from  a  woman  of  the  country, 
living  in  a  cabin  by  the  roadside,  which  left  him  no  room  to  doubt 
that  he  was  on  the  track  of  Davis  in  person.  lie  dispatched  a 
messenger  to  inform  General  Croxton  of  his  good  fortune,  and 
pushed  rapidly  in  pursuit;  but  the  courier  lost  his  way,  and  did  not 
succeed  in  reaching  Macon  till  some  time  after  the  news  of  Davis' 
capture  had  been  received.  The  trail  on  which  the  fugitives  were 
traveling  led  southward  through  an  almost  trackless  region  of  pine 
forests,  intersected  by  swamps  and  sluggish  streams,  with  here  and 
there,  at  rare  intervals,  the  cabin  of  a  family  of  "poor  white  folks" 
or  fugitive  negroes,  and,  therefore,  affording  but  little  food  for 
either  man  or  beast.  The  rain  began  to  fall  toward  noon,  and,  as 
there  was  no  road  entitled  to  the  name,  the  tracks  of  the  wagon 
wheels  upon  the  sandy  soil  were  soon  obliterated;  but,  after  a  long 
search,  a  citizen  was  impressed,  and  compelled  to  act  as  guide  till 
the  trail  was  again  discovered.  The  pursuit  was  continued  with 
renewed  vigor;  but,  as  the  wagon  tracks  were  again  lost  in  the 
swamps  of  Alligator  creek,  the  pursuing  party  were  again  delayed 
till  another  unwilling  citizen  could  be  found  to  guide  them  to  the 
path  upon  which  the  trail  was  again  visible.  Colonel  llarnden 
reports  this  day  to  have  been  one  of  great  toil  to  both  men  and 
horses,  as  they  had  marched  forty  miles  through  an  almost  unbroken 
forest,  most  of  the  time  under  a  beating  rain,  or  in  the  water  up  to 
their  saddle  girths.  They  bivouacked,  after  dark,  on  the  borders 
of  a  dark  and  gloomy  swamp,  and  sleeping  on  the  ground,  without 
tents,  during  the  night,  they  were  again  drenched  with  rain. 

Before  daylight  of  the  Oth,  they  renewed  their  march,  their 
route  leading  almost  southwest  through  swam])  and  wilderness  to 
Brown's  ferry,  where  they  crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  Ocmulgee 
river.  The  bed  of  the  river  was  too  treacherous  and  its  banks  too 
steep  to  permit  the  crossing  to  be  made  by  swimming,  which  would 
have  been  most  expeditious,  so  the  impatient  colonel  had  to  use  the 
ferry-boat ;  and,  in  his  hurry  to  ferry  his  command  over  rapidly,  the 
boat  was  overloaded,  and  a  plank  near  the  bow  sprung  loose,  causing 
the  boat  to  leak  badly.  Xo  means  were  at  hand  with  which  to  make 
repairs,  and  hence  lighter  boat  loads  had  to  be  carried.  This  pro 
longed  the  crossing  nearly  two  hours.  During  this  delay,  Colonel 


574  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Ilarnden  learned  from  the  ferryman  that  the  party  he  was  pursuing 
had  crossed  about  one  o'clock  that  morning,  and  were  only  a  few 
hours  ahead  of  him  on  the  road  leading  to  Irwinsville.  He  also 
learned  from  the  ferryman  several  facts  apparently  trivial  in  them 
selves,  but  which,  taken  with  what  he  already  knew,  were  strongly 
confirmatory  of  the  belief  that  he  was  on  the  right  track.  At  Abbe 
ville,  a  village  of  three  families,  he  halted  to  feed,  and  just  as  he  was 
renewing  his  march  he  met  the  advance  guard  of  the  Fourth  Michigan 
Cavalry,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Pritchard  commanding,  moving  south 
easterly  on  the  road  from  Hawkinsville.  Ordering  his  detachment 
to  continue  its  march,  Colonel  Ilarnden  rode  to  meet  Colonel 
Pritchard,  and  after  recounting  his  orders,  gave  him  such  information 
in  regard  to  Davis'  movements  as  he  had  been  able  to  gather.  This 
was  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  After  a  conversation 
between  these  officers,  the  precise  details  of  which  are  variously 
reported,  they  separated,  Colonel  Ilarnden  to  rejoin  his  command, 
already  an  hour  or  more  in  advance,  and  Colonel  Pritchard  continuing 
his  march  along  the  south  side  of  the  Ocmulgee.  It  will  be  remem 
bered  that  Colonel  Pritchard  began  his  march  from  the  vicinity  of 
Macon,  on  the  evening  of  May  7th,  under  verbal  orders  given  him 
by  General  Minty,  in  pursuance  of  instructions  from  corps  headquar 
ters.  His  attention  was  particularly  directed  to  the  crossings  of  the 
Ocmulgee  river,  between  Hawikinsville  and  Jacksonville,  near  the 
mouth  of  the  Ohoopee,  with  the  object  of  intercepting  Davis  and 
such  other  rebel  chiefs  as  might  be  making  their  way  out  of  the 
country  by  the  roads  in  that  region.  He  had,  however,  not  gone 
more  than  three  miles  from  Abbeville  before  he  obtained  from  a 
negro  man  (perhaps  the  same  one  which  Ilarnden  had  met  pre 
viously)  such  additional  information  in  regard  to  the  party  as 
convinced  him  that  it  was  his  duty  to  join  in  the  pursuit.  In  this 
he  was  clearly  right,  and  had  he  done  otherwise  would  have  been 
censurable  for  negligence  and  want  of  enterprise.  Colonel  Ilarnden 
having  informed  him  that  he  had  force  enough  to  cope  with  Davis, 
Colonel  Pritchard  determined  to  march  by  a  more  circuitous  route 
toward  Irwinsville.  Why  he  did  not  send  a  courier  on  the  trail 
pursued  by  Colonel  Ilarnden,  to  notify  the  latter  of  his  newly- 
formed  plan,  has  not  been  explained.  This  would  probably  have 
prevented  the  collision  which  afterward  occurred  between  his  regi 
ment  and  that  of  Colonel  Ilarnden,  and  would  not  have  rendered  the 
capture  of  Davis  less  certain.  Ko  reflection  upon  the  conduct  of 
Colonel  Pritchard  is  intended  b^  this  remark,  for  it  is  believed  that 
this  omission  was  simply  an  oversight,  which  might  have  occurred 


110 W  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  575 

to  any  confident  and  zealous  officer  in  tlie  lieat  and  anxiety  of  the 
hour. 

In  carrying  out  the  plan  which  he  had  adopted,  Colonel 
Pritchard  selected  from  his  regiment  seven  officers  and  one  hundred 
and  twenty-eight  men,  his  object  being  to  get  his  very  best  troopers 
and  fleetest  horses,  and  at  four  o'clock  begun  the  pursuit,  leaving  the 
remainder  of  his  regiment  under  command  of  Captain  Hathaway, 
wit! i  orders  to  picket  the  river  and  scout  the  country  in  accordance 
with  previous  instructions.  The  route  pursued  by  Colonel  Pritchard 
led  down  the  river  southeasterly  nearly  twelve  miles  to  a  point  oppo 
site  AVilcox's  mill,  and  thence  southwest  for  a  distance  of  eighteen 
miles,  through  an  unbroken  forest  to  Irwinsville,  the  county  seat  of 
Irwin  county.  He  reached  the  village  at  one  A.  M.  of  the  loth,  and 
after  causing  great  excitement  among  the  women,  by  representing 
his  command  as  the  rear  guard  of  Davis'  party,  he  succeeded  in 
restoring  quiet,  and  learned  that  the  party  he  was  searching  for  had 
encamped  that  night  at  dusk  about  a  mile  and  a  half  north  of  the 
village,  on  the  Abbeville  road.  Having  secured  a  negro  guide,  he 
turned  the  head  of  his  column  northward,  and,  after  moving  cau 
tiously  to  within  a  half  mile  of  the  camp,  halted  his  main  body  and 
dismounted  twenty-five  men  under  Lieutenant  Purinton.  This 
party  was  directed  to  move  noiselessly  through  the  woods  to  the 
north  side  of  the  camp,  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  a  position  in  its 
rear,  and  preventing  the  possibility  of  escape;  also,  in  the  hope  that 
it  might  possibly  interpose  itself  between  Davis  and  his  escort.  In 
case  of  discovery  by  the  enemy  Lieutenant  Purinton  was  directed  to 
begin  the  attack  from  wherever  he  might  be,  while  Colonel  Pritchard 
would  charge  upon  the  camp  along  the  main  road.  Purinton  having 
reached  the  point  assigned  him  without  giving  an  alarm,  the  attack 
was  delayed  till  the  first  appearance  of  dawn,  at  which  time  Colonel 
Pritchard  put  his  troops  again  in  motion,  and  continued  his  march 
to  within  a  few  rods  of  the  camp  undiscovered.  Having  assured 
himself  of  his  position,  he  dashed  upon  the  camp  without  further 
delay,  and  in  a  few  moments  had  secured  its  occupants  and  effects, 
and  placed  a  guard  of  mounted  men  around  the  camp,  with  dis 
mounted  sentries  at  the  tents  and  wagons.  Xo  resistance  was 
offered,  because  the  enemy,  in  fancied  security,  had  posted  no  sentries, 
and  were,  therefore,  taken  in  their  beds  completely  by  surprise. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  the  dash  of  Colonel  Pritchard  and 
his  detachment,  but  before  the  prisoners  had  been  actually  secured, 
sharp  firing  began  in  the  direction  of  Abbeville,  and  only  a  short 
distance  from  the  camp.  This  turned  out  to  be  an  engagement 


576  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

between  a  party  under  Lieutenant  Purinton  and  the  detachment  of 
the  First  Wisconsin  Cavalry,  under  Colonel  Harnden,  who,  it  seems, 
had  followed  the  rebel  trail  the  night  before  till  it  was  no  longer 
distinguishable  in  the  dark,  had  gone  into  camp  only  two  or  three 
miles  behind  the  party  he  had  been  pursuing  so  long,  and  had 
renewed  the  pursuit  in  the  morning  as  soon  as  he  could  see  to  march. 
Both  Colonel  Pritchard  and  Colonel  Harnden  were  informed  that 
Davis  had  been  reported  as  having  with  him  a  well-armed  body 
guard,  variously  estimated  at  from  ten  to  fifty  picked  men.     Sup 
posing  from  this  that  he  had  determined  to  sell  his  life  dearly,  they 
expected  and  were  prepared  for  desperate  resistance.     The  sergeant 
in  command   of   Ilarnden's   advanced  guard  had  orders  to  move 
rapidly,  and  as  soon  as  he  discovered  the  enemy  to  wheel  about  and 
give  notice  to  the  colonel,  following  closely  behind.     The  sergeant 
had  not  gone  more  than  two  miles  when  he  was  challenged  by  an 
unknown  party,  found  across  the  road  a  short  distance  ahead  ;  obey 
ing  orders  literally,  he  wheeled  about  without  answering  the  chal 
lenge  and  notified  Colonel  Harnden,  who  at  once  pressed  forward 
with  his  troopers  divided  into  two  detachments,  one  on  the  road  and 
the  other  moving  through  the  forest.    In  the  collision  which  occurred 
the  men  of  both  regiments  seemed  inspired  by  the  greatest  courage 
and  determination,  but  the  Michigan  men,  being  outnumbered,  were 
pressed  back  rapidly.     Owing  to  the  darkness  it  was  several  minutes 
before  either  party  discovered  that  they  were  fighting  friends  instead 
of  the  enemy.     The  discovery  was  finally  made  by  the  capture  or 
surrender  of  one  of  the  Michigan  men.     In  this   unfortunate   affair 
two  men   of  the   Fourth  Michigan  wrere  killed,  and   one   officer 
wounded,  while  three  men  of  the  First  Wisconsin  were  severely  and 
several  slightly  wounded.     It  is  difficult,  under  the  circumstances  as 
detailed,  to   perceive   how  this  accident  could  have  been  avoided. 
Colonel  Harnden  certainly  had  no  means  of  knowing  and  no  reason  to 
suspect  that  the  party  whom  he  found  in  his  front  were  any  other 
than  the  rebels  he  had  been  pursuing,  while  Colonel  Pritchard  claims, 
and  no  doubt  justly,  that  he  had  cautioned  Lieutenant  Purinton  par 
ticularly  to  keep  a  sharp  look  out  for  the  First  Wisconsin,  which  he 
knew  would  approach  from  that  direction.     The  hurry  with  which 
the  corps  was  subsequently  mustered  out  of  service,  and  the  absence 
of  the  principal  officers,  prevented  an  investigation  of  the  details  of 
this  affair,  and  the  circumstances  which  led  to  it.     At  this  late  day 
nothing  more  can  be  said  of  them  than  what  is  contained  in  the 
official  documents  on  file  in  the  War  Department,  except  that  not 
the   slightest   blame   was   ever  intended  to   be  cast  upon  Colonel 


J10W  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  577 

Ilarnden,  as  seems  to  have  been  at  one  time  assumed  by  tlic  com 
mission  convened  by  the  Secretary  of  AVar  for  the  purpose  of  award 
ing  the  prize  offered  for  the  capture  of  Davis. 

During'  the  skirmish  just  described,  the  adjutant  of  the  Fourth 
Michigan  Cavalry,  Lieutenant  J.  G.  Dickinson,  after  having  looked 

Ot/'  O 

on  the  security  of  the  rebel  camp,  and  sent  forward  a  number  of  the 
men  who  had  straggled,  was  about  to  go  to  the  front  himself,  when 
his  attention  was  called,  by  one  of  his  men,  "to  three  persons  dressed 
in  female  attire,''  who  had,  apparently,  just  left  one  of  the  large 
tents  near  by,  and  were  moving  toward  the  thick  woods,  lie  started 
at  once  toward  them  and  called  out  "Halt!''  but,  not  hearing  him, 
or  not  caring  to  obey,  they  continued  to  move  off.  Just  then  they 
were  confronted  by  three  men,  under  direction  of  Corporal.  Munger, 
coming  from  the  opposite  direction.  The  corporal  recognized  one 
of  the  persons  as  Davis,  advanced  with  carbine,  and  demanded  his  sur 
render.  The  three  persons  halted,  and  by  the  actions  of  the  two 
who  were  afterward  ascertained  to  be  women,  all  doubt  as  to  the 
identity  of  the  third  person  was  removed.  The  individuals  thus 
arrested  were  found  to  be  Miss  llowell,  Mrs.  Davis,  and  Jefferson 
Davis.  As  they  walked  back  to  the  tent,  Lieutenant  Dickinson 
observed  that  Davis1  top  boots  were  not  entirely  covered  by  his 
disguise,  and  that  this  fact  led  to  his  recognition  by  Corporal 
Munger.'" 


~x~  The  following  account  of  Davis'  capture  is  taken  from  Pollard's  work,  pre 
viously  mentioned:  "But  the  last  device  of  the  distinguished  fugitive,  the  only  one 
in  which  he  had  shown  any  ingenuity,  and  had  confessed  his  real  anxiety  for  escape, 
was  in  vain,  and  he  was  captured  three  days' journey  from  Washington.  He  had 
scarcely  expected  to  fall  in  with  any  enemy  north  of  the  Chattahoochee  river,  the 
boundary  of  the  '  Department  of  the  Southwest,'  and  there  he  had  designed  to  part 
with  his  wife,  and  to  commit  her  to  her  journey  to  the  ' Shenandoah.'  He  was 
overtaken  by  a  small  body  of  Federal  cavalry,  originally  sent  out  to  post  a  skirmish 
line  through  that  part  of  Georgia  reaching  to  Augusta,  but  now  diverted  to  his 
pursuit.  The  wicked  and  absurd  story  that  Mr.  Davis  was  captured  disguised  in 
female  attire  is  scarcely  now  credited.  He  was  aroused  in  the  early  gray  of  the 
morning  by  a  faithful  negro  servant  (the  same  who  has  since  attended  his  broken 
fortunes ),  who  had  been  awakened  by  the  sound  of  firing  in  the  woods.  The  Presi 
dent  had  not  laid  off  his  clothes,  and,  in  a  moment,  he  had  issued  from  the  tent 
where  he  had  been  sleeping.  The  woods  were  rilled  with  mounted  troops,  ill-defined 
in  the  mist  of  the  breaking  morning,  and,  noticing  that  they  were  deploying  as  if 
to  surround  the  camp,  he  quickly  imagined  their  character  and  design,  and  returned 
within  the  tent,  either  to  alarm  Mrs.  Davis,  or  there  to  submit  decently  to  capture. 
She  besought  him  to  escape,  and,  urging  him  to  an  opening  in  the  tent,  threw  over 
his  shoulders  a  shawl  which  he  had  been  accustomed  to  wear.  His  horse,  a  fleet 
and  spirited  one,  was  tied  to  a  tree  at  some  distance.  He  was  within  a  few  steps  of 

37 


578  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Again  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  this  extract  is  made  from 
a  work,  the  materials  for  which  were  "  gathered  behind  the  scenes  in 
Richmond,"  I  leave  the  reader  to  decide  for  himself  how  trustworthy 
this  authority  may  be.  I  have  no  wish  to  do  Mr.  Davis,  or  his  apol 
ogist,  an  injustice,  and  still  less,  if  possible,  to  do  violence  to  the  facts 
of  history. 

It  will  be  observed  that  even  Mr.  Pollard  admits  that  Mrs. 
Davis  besought  her  husband  to  escape,  and  "  urging  him  to  an  open 
ing  in  the  tant,  threw  over  his  shoulders  a  shawl  which  he  had  been 
accustomed  /o  wear." 

The  friends  of  Davis,  immediately  after  his  capture  became 
known,  strenuously  denied  that  he  was  disguised  as  a  woman,  and 
many  good  people,  particularly  those  of  rebel  proclivities,  looked 
upon  this  denial  as  settling  the  question  for  good  and  all.  It  is, 
therefore,  necessary  to  detail  the  proofs  upon  which  this  story  rests, 
as  well  as  to  specify  the  exact  articles  of  woman's  apparel  which 
constituted  the  disguise.  It  is  stated  by  Lieutenant  Dickinson,  in 
writing,  that  the  rebel  chieftain  was  one  of  the  three  persons 
"dressed  in  woman's  attire,"  and  that  he  had  "a  black  mantle 
wrapped  about  his  head,  through  the  top  of  which  could  have  been 
seen  locks  of  his  hair."  Captain  G.  W.  Lawton,  Fourth  Michigan 
Cavalry,  who  published  an  account  of  the  capture  in  the  Atlantic 


the  animal  that  might  have  borne  him  out  of  danger,  when  a  Federal  soldier  halted 
him  and  demanded  to  know  if  he  was  armed. 

"  In  relating  the  encounter  afterward,  in  his  prison  at  Fortress  Monroe,  Mr. 
Davis  reported  himself  as  saying :  '  If  I  were  armed,  you  would  not  be  living  to 
ask  the  question.'  If  he  did  say  so,  it  was  a  sorry  bravado,  and,  as  none  of  his 
captors  appear  to  have  recollected  such  words  of  defiance,  we  are  permitted  to  hope 
that  Mr.  Davis'  memory  is  at  fault,  and  that  he  submitted  to  his  fate  really  with 
more  dignity  than  he  claims  for  himself.  While  he  was  parleying  with  the  soldier. 
Colonel  Pritchard,  commanding  the  body  of  cavalry,  rode  up,  and,  addressing  him 
by  name,  demanded  his  surrender.  Not  one  of  his  escort  or  companions  came  to 
his  aid.  He  submitted,  walked  back  to  the  tent,  and,  in  the  presence  of  his  wife, 
asked  Colonel  Pritchard  that  she  might  continue  her  journey.  The  reply  of  the 
Colonel  was  that  his  orders  were  to  arrest  all  the  party.  Mr.  Davis  rejoined  with 
sarcasm :  '  Then,  sir,  what  has  been  said  is  true  ;  your  government  does  make  war 
upon  women  ! '  These  were  the  only  words  of  displeasure  or  of  bitterness  in  the 
dialogue  of  the  capture.  The  unhappy  prisoner,  after  these  words,  was  coldly 
silent.  Asking  no  questions  of  his  fate,  not  intruded  upon  by  any  curiosity  of  his 
captors,  conversing  only  with  the  faithful  and  devoted  wife,  from  whom  he  was  not 
yet  divided,  and  whose  whispers  of  affectionate  solicitude,  by  his  side,  were  all  to 
lighten  the  journey,  he  rode  moodily  in  the  cavalcade  back  to  Macon,  where  first 
he  was  to  learn  the  extent  of  his  misery,  and  to  commence  the  dread  career  of  the 
penalties  he  had  accumulated  by  four  long  and  bitter  years  of  wax."  (Pages  513  to 
524  inclusive.) 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  579 

3font7i1y  for  September,  1865,  asserts  explicitly,  upon  the  testimony 
of  the  officers  present,  that  Davis,  in  addition  to  his  full  suit  of  Con 
federate  gray,  had  on  "  a  lady's  waterproof  (cloak),  gathered  at  the 
waist,  with  a  shawl  drawn  over  the  head,  and  carrying  a  tin  pail/' 
Colonel  Pritchard  says,  in  his  official  report,  that  he  received  from 
Mrs.  Davis,  on  board  the  steamer  Clyde,  off  Fortress  Monroe,  "  a 
waterproof  cloak  or  robe ''  of  dark  or  almost  black  waterproof  stuff 
which  was  worn  by  Davis  as  a  disguise,  and  which  was  identified  by 
the  men  who  saw  it  on  him  at  the  time  of  the  capture,  lie  secured 
the  "other  part"' of  the  disguise  the  next  day.  It  consisted  of  a 
small  black  shawl,  with  a  red  border  four  or  five  inches  deep,  which 
was  identified  in  a  similar  manner  by  Mrs.  Davis  and  the  soldiers. 
A  convincing  circumstance  in  this  connection  should  be  mentioned. 
Colonel  Pritchard,  in  looking  over  the  wrappings  on  board  the 
steamer  for  the  shawl  in  question,  picked  out  one  like  it,  but  not 
the  identical  one,  when  little  Jeff,  a  bright  boy  of  seven  or  eight 
years,  with  the  artlessness  of  childhood,  said:  "That  isn't  the  shawl 
my  papa  had  on  when  captured  ;  this  is  the  one,"  picking  up  another. 
Various  partisans  and  friends  of  Davis  still  persist  in  denying  that 
he  was  captured  in  the  disguise  of  a  woman  ;  but  in  their  efforts  to 
explain  away  the  story  they  have  confirmed  it  in  all  its  essential 
parts.  Colonel  Harrison,  of  his  staff,  in  a  newspaper  article  pub 
lished  shortly  after  the  capture,  admits  that  Mrs.  Davis  had  thrown 
over  him  a  "dressing  gown/' 

] Between  the  various  explanations  which  have  appeared  from 
time  to  time,  nearly  all  of  the  truth  has  been  told,  for  Davis  certainly 
had  on  both  the  shawl  and  waterproof,  the  former  folded  triangularly 
and  pulled  down  over  his  hat,  and  the  latter  buttoned  down  in  front 
and  covering  his  entire  person  except  the  feet.  In  addition  to  this 
he  carried  a  small  tin  pail  and  was  accompanied  by  his  wife* and  his 
wife's  sister,  one  on  each  side,  both  of  them  claiming  him  as  a  female 
relative,  and  both  trying  to  impose  him  upon  the  soldiers  as  such. 
The  articles  of  the  disguise  are  now  in  the  keeping  of  the  Adjutant 
General  of  the  Army  at  Washington,  and  I  am  assured  by  him  that 
they  correspond  in  all  respects  to  the  description  given  of  them. 
From  the  foregoing,  it  will  be  seen  that  Davis  did  not  actually  have 
on  crinoline  or  petticoats,  but  there  is  no  doubt  whatever  that  he 
sought  to  avoid  capture  by  assuming  the  dress  of  a  woman,  or  that 
the  ladies  of  the  party  endeavored  to  pass  him  off  upon  his  captors 
as  one  of  themselves.  Many  loyal  men  have  declared  that  Davis 
should  have  been  tried  by  drum-head  court-martial  and  executed ; 
but  what  new  disgrace  could  the  gallows  inflict  upon  the  man  who 


580  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

hid  himself  under  the  garb  of  woman,  when,  if  ever,  he  should  have 
shown  the  courage  of  a  hero  ? 

Shortly  after  the  recognition  of  Davis  by  his  captors,  Colonels 
Pritchard  and  Harnden  rode  up  to  where  the  group  were  standing. 
Davis,  recognizing  them  as  officers,  asked  which  of  them  was  in  com 
mand.  As  these  officers  were  lieutenant  colonels  of  different  regi 
ments,  belonging  to  different  brigades  of  different  divisions,  and  had, 
therefore,  probably  never  before  met,  except  casually,  much  less 
compared  dates  of  commissions,  they  were  somewhat  taken  aback  at 
the  question,  and  hesitated  what  answer  to  make.  Whereupon  Davis 
upbraided  them  with  ignorance,  reproached  them  with  unchivalrous 
conduct  in  hunting  down  women  and  children,  and  finally  declared, 
with  the  air  and  manners  of  a  bravo,  that  they  could  not  have  caught 
him  but  for  his  desire  to  protect  "  his  women  and  children."  "  How 
would  you  have  prevented  it,  Mr.  Davis  ? "  said  Colonel  Pritchard. 
"  Why,  sir,  I  could  have  fought  you,  or  eluded  you."  "As  for  fight 
ing  us,"  replied  the  Colonel,  "  we  came  prepared  for  that ;  it  would 
have  saved  us  some  trouble,  and,  doubtless,  you  a  good  deal ;  but  as 
for  i  eluding  us,'  I  don't  think  your  garb  is  very  well  adapted  to  rapid 
locomotion."  In  addition  to  Davis  and  his  family,  Colonel  Pritchard's 
detachment  captured,  at  the  same  time,  John  II.  Reagan,  rebel  Post 
master  General,  Colonel  B.  N.  Harrison,  private  secretary,  Colonels 
Lubbock,  and  Johnston,  aides-de-camp  to  Davis,  four  inferior  officers 
and  thirteen  private  soldiers,  besides  Miss  Howell,  two  waiting-maids, 
and  several  colored  servants. 

This  brings  us  again  to  the  question  of  Davis'  disguise  at  the 
time  of  his  capture,  touching  which  I  submit  the  following  letter, 
wrritten  by  J.  G-.  Dickinson,  late  Adjutant  Fourth  Michigan  Cavalry, 
to  the  Detroit  Tribune : 

I  have  read  John  H.  Reagan's  letter  to  Governor  Porter,  in  the  publication 
you  exhibited  to  me.  It  contains  severe  criticisms  upon  published  statements  of 
General  James  H.  Wilson,  concerning  the  flight,  capture,  and  disguise  of  Jefferson 
Davis.  I  remember  Mr.  Reagan,  who  was  captured  with  Davis.  I  had  the  honor 
of  being  with  General  Pritchard,  as  Adjutant  of  the  Fourth  Michigan  Cavalry,  at 
the  capture,  and  personally  took  part  in  the  arrest  of  Davis,  while  he  was  attempting 
to  escape,  disguised  in  female  attire.  There  has  never  been  any  doubt  or  denial 
from  any  authentic  source,  expressed  or  asserted,  to  my  knowledge,  respecting  the 
disguise  and  attempted  escape  of  Mr.  Davis,  until  Mr.  Reagan's  letter  appeared ; 
and  Mr.  Reagan  does  not  speak,  regarding  the  disguise,  upon  his  own  knowledge. 
The  facts  wrere  wrell  known,  and  often  repeated,  in  our  camp,  to  interested  inquirers, 
by  those  having  personal  knowledge  of  them. 

The  first  report  of  the  capture  was  made  to  Major  Robert  Burns,  Assistant 
Adjutant  General  of  General  R.  H.  G.  Minty's  staft'.  I  drew  the  report,  immedi 
ately  after  our  return  to  Macon,  for  Captain  John  C.  Hathaway,  commanding  the 
regiment  while  Colonel  Pritchard  was  absent  in  charge  of  the  prisoners  on  the  way 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS   WAS  OVERTAKEN.  581 

to  "Washington.  I  made  a  full  written  statement  of  the  facts  for  General  Wilson, 
at  the  request  of  Major  Van  Antwerp,  his  aide-de-camp,  and  another  statement  to 
General  John  Robertson,  Adjutant  General  of  Michigan.  The  facts  are  beyond 
dispute  respecting  the  female  disguise.  I  know  all  about  it,  because  I  saw  it,  and, 
assisted  by  Corporal  Hunger,  and  others  present,  arrested  Jefferson  Davis  when  he 
teas  in  such  female  disguise.  Mr.  Reagan  did  not  then  see  him  ;  but  there  were 
several  Confederate  officers  present  who  did  see  the  arrest,  and  made  no  effort  to 
aid  their  chief. 

The  facts  concerning  the  capture  and  the  disguise  are  well  remembered  by 
those  present,  many  of  whom  are  now  living  in  this  State.  The  part  I  took  in  the 
immediate  capture  of  Jefferson  Davis  I  shall  not  soon  forget.  I  think  we  acted 
witli  magnanimity  and  care  toward  the  fallen  chief  of  the  Confederacy.  '  He  could 
have  been  detained  at  the  spot  where  arrested,  for  the  gaze  of  all  his  officers,  family, 
and  escort,  but  he  was  permitted  to  retire  to  his  tent,  and  disrobe  from  his  female 
disguise. 

Jeff  Davis,  and  all  who  were  captured  with  him,  well  know  that  great  kind 
ness,  and  fair  consideration,  such  as  were  due  to  a  prisoner  of  his  importance,  were 
extended  to  him  by  every  member  of  our  command;  and  nothing  was  done  or  said, 
except  what  was  necessary  for  his  security  and  conduct.  Though  he  called  us  vile 
names  at  first.  I  think  he  subsequently  behaved  himself. 

Immediately  upon  the  charge  into  the  camp,  Captain  Charles  T.  Hudson, 
leading  the  advance  guard,  passed  well  through  the  camp,  and  our  colonel  following, 
swung  round,  enveloping  the  entire  camp.  In  this  movement,  I  met.  in  front  of  a 
small  ily  tent,  Colonel  Harrison,  Davis' private  secretary  (as  I  afterward  learned). 
I  stopped,  and  made  inquiry  as  to  their  force  in  camp,  and,  while  lie  was  replying, 
I  heard  some  one  calling  me.  I  turned,  and  saw  Private  Andrew  Bee,  of  L  Com 
pany,  who,  pointing  to  three  persons  dressed  in  female  apparel,  at  some  distance, 
and  moving  away,  called  out  to  me,  "Adjutant,  there  goes  a  man  dressed  in  woman's 
clothes."  I  started  at  once  after  them,  calling  out  "Halt ! ''  repeatedly,  and  reaching 
them  just  as  several  troopers,  in  charge  of  Corporal  Hunger,  dashed  up,  bringing 
their  carbines  ready  for  use.  The  fugitives  halted;  Mrs.  Davis  threw  her  arms 
around  her  husband's  shoulders,  and  the  lady  close  to  him  formed  a  shield,  which 
was  respected.  I  noticed  several  Confederate  officers  near:  one,  a  tall  fellow,  was, 
apparently,  very  excited. 

Davis  had  on  a  black  dress,  and,  though  it  did  not  fit  fairly  at  the  neck,  it 
covered  his  form  to  the  boots;  the  boots  betrayed  his  disguise.  .A  black  shawl 
covered  his  head  and  shoulders.  His  identity  was  confirmed  by  the  removal  of  the 
shawl  from  his  face.  I  promptly  directed  him  to  retire  to  his  quarters,  and  ordered 
Corporal  Hunger  to  place  the  men  with  him,  and  keep  careful  guard. 

I  then  started  to  report  to  Colonel  Pritchard,  but  Mrs.  Davis  called  to  me  and 
I  dismounted  a  moment  to  hear  her.  She  asked  me  what  we  were  going  to  do  with 
Mr.  Davis,  and  whether  she  and  the  escort  would  be  taken  with  him.  I  replied 
that  Colonel  Pritchard  would  see  to  the  disposal  of  the  party.  She  then  made  some 
other  requests  relative  to  the  preservation  of  her  baggage.  I  think  Lieutenant 
Perry  J.  Davis,  our  quartermaster,  then  came  up,  and  I  mounted  and  left  her  with 
him. 

I  reported  to  Colonel  Pritchard.  as  prompt!}'  as  I  could,  the  circumstances  of 
the  capture,  and  what  I  had  done  as  to  the  guard.  In  the  meantime,  Davis  had 
disrobed  and  come  out,  the  guard  retaining  him  in  custody,  and  when  Colonel 
Pritchard  and  staff  approached,  he  called  to  him.  I  was  near  to  him,  but  do  not 
remember  the  exact  language  used,  further  than  that  Davis  characterized  our  com 
mand  as  ''  a  set  of  thieves  and  vandals,  for  attacking  a  train  of  women  and  children.'' 


582  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

I  know  the  colonel  spoke  quite  sharply  to  him,  but  his  exact  language  I  will  not 
attempt  to  state,  as  the  colonel  will  answer  for  that.  I  know  he  had  been  informed 
of  the  disguise  by  me. 

I  have  the  names  of  several  of  the  men  of  our  regiment  who  were  present  at 
the  capture,  and  I  think  Lieutenant  James  Vernor,  of  Detroit,  has  their  address. 

J.  G.  DICKINSON, 

Late  Adjutant  Fourth  Michigan  Cavalry. 

Through  the  kindness  of  Major  Robert  Burns,  of  Kalamazoo, 
Michigan,  I  am  enabled  also  to  quote  the  statements  of  Private 
Andrew  Bee,  Corporal  George  Munger,  and  William  P.  Stedman, 
and  an  extract  from  a  letter  of  Captain  Charles  T.  Hudson,  all  of  the 
Fourth  Michigan  Cavalry,  together  with  a  letter  from  Major  Burns 
himself,  commenting  upon  these  documents.  It  will  be  seen  that 
there  is  a  close  agreement  between  all  these  parties  (they  actually 
made  the  capture),  and  their  statements  are  conclusive  as  to  the 
question  of  the  disguise.  It  will  be  observed  that  none  of  them  say 
anything  whatever  about  petticoats,  and  that  no  officer  has  ever 
alleged  that  any  such  garment  was  used.  The  newspapers  which  pub 
lished  the  first  accounts  are  solely  responsible  for  the  very  natural 
assumption  that  a  man  disguised  in  his  wife's  clothing  would  not  for 
get  the  important  item  of  the  petticoat.  The  letters  are  as  follows : 

OCTOBER  19th,  1877. 

On  the  morning  of  May  10th,  1865, 1  was  one  of  the  fourteen  men  under  Lieuten 
ant  J.  G.  Dickinson  who  were  dismounted  by  order  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Pritchard, 
and  directed  to  enter  and  guard  the  camp  in  which  Jefferson  Davis  and  party  were 
supposed  to  be.  I  was  the  first  man  who  entered  it,  and  immediately  went  to  the 
first  of  three  tents  standing  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  road,  and  raised  the  flap 
to  enter  it.  Mrs.  Davis,  from  the  inside  of  the  tent,  requested  me  to  go  back,  "  as 
there  were  ladies  in  there  who  were  not  dressed."  This  I  could  see  for  myself,  she 
being  in  her  night-gown,  barefooted  and  bareheaded.  I  stepped  back  to  the  outside 
and  waited  there  a  few  minutes.  Very  soon  two  persons  who  looked  like  women, 
but  who  really  were  Jefferson  Davis  and  his  sister-in-law  (Miss  Howell),  appeared 
from  the  tent,  Miss  Howell  carrying  a  tin  pail.  In  the  meantime,  the  firing  between 
the  First  Wisconsin  and  the  Fourth  Michigan  could  be  heard,  and  the  bullets  were 
flying  over  the  camp.  Lieutenant  Dickinson  was  walking  up  and  down  in  front  of 
the  three  tents,  very  much  excited,  with  a  white  blanket  over  his  arm,  listening  to 
the  firing.  Just  as  Miss  Howell  and  Mr.  Davis  appeared  he  was  approaching  the 
first  tent,  from  which  they  came,  and  she  said  to  him :  "  Please,  lieutenant,  let  me 
and  my  grandmother  go  to  the  brook  to  get  ourselves  washed."  Dickinson  imme 
diately  turned  to  me,  and  said :  "  Never  mind  them  women  folks,  Andrew  Bee ; 
come  here  and  guard  them  officers,"  referring  to  some  rebel  officers,  among  whom 
were  Private  Secretary  Johnston  (he,  doubtless,  meant  Harrison)  and  General  Rea 
gan,  who  had  just  come  out  of  the  second  tent.  Just  then  a  white  servant  girl 
came  out  of  the  first  tent,  Mrs.  Davis  remaining  in  to  dress  or  attend  the  children, 
of  whom  there  were  three. 

The  three  "women"  (Mr.  Davis,  Miss  Howell,  and  the  servant  girl)  then 
started  for  the  brook,  Mr.  Davis  stooping  over,  as  a  very  old  woman  would,  so  that 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS   WAS  OVERTAKEN.  583 

his  head  was  not  on  a  level  with  Miss  Howell's,  but  was  lower.  Mr.  Davis  had  on 
a  black  morning  gown,  belted  at  the  waist,  and  reaching  to  his  ankles,  a  shawl  over 
his  head,  beard,  and  shoulders,  and  a  black  cloth  under  the  shawl,  covering  his 
forehead.  They  had  got  about  six  or  eight  rods  from  the  tent  when  I,  who  had 
been  watching  them  all  the  time,  saw  that  the  old  woman  had  on  boots.  I  at  once 
said  to  Dickinson:  "See!  that  is  Jeff,  himself !  That  is  no  woman!  That  is  old 
Jeff  Davis !  "  and  started  on  the  run  after  them.  As  I  got  up  to  them,  I  exclaimed: 
"  Halt !  Damn  you,  you  can't  get  any  further  this  time ! "  Mrs.  Davis  at  that 
moment  came  running  out  of  the  tent,  and  when  she  reached  Mr.  Davis,  .she  put 
her  arms  around  his  neck  and  said:  "Guard!  do  not  kill  him!"  At  the  same 
instant  Corporal  Hunger,  of  Company  C,  mounted,  came  from  another  direction 
and  headed  Davis.  I  said  to  him  :  "  Never  mind,  Hunger,  I  will  take  care  of  that 
old  gentleman  myself.''  Lynch  and  Bullard  were  quite  near  at  the  time.  Hunger 
was  the  second  man  who  saw  and  recognized  Davis.  Next  to  Hunger  Avas  Lynch, 
who  had  been  foraging  around  near  the  second  tent,  and  who  had  already  secured 
Mr.  Davis'  bay  horse,  with  the  pistol-holsters  filled  with  gold  coin. 

The  only  portion  of  the  face  of  Hr.  Davis  which  could  be  seen,  when  he  was 
disguised,  were  the  eyes  and  the  nose,  he  covering  the  moustache,  mouth,  and  beard 
witli  the  shawl,  held  closed  with  one  hand.  After  Hr.  Davis  was  halted,  he  did  not 
attempt  any  further  disguise,  but  soon  returned  to  his  tent. 

ANDREW  BEE. 

PAW-PAW,  October  15th,  1877. 

Dear  Sir : — Your  letter,  of  September  28th,  came  to  hand  in  due  time,  but  I 
have  neglected  to  answer  it  until  now.  You  wanted  a  full  statement  of  the  capture 
of  Jeff  Davis,  as  I  remembered  it  to  be.  It  has  been  some  time  since  the  capture, 
but  I  will  give  you  as  full  an  account  of  the  matter  as  I  can.  I  don't  know  as  I 
can  give  you  the  conversation  of  Davis,  just  as  it  was,  but  think  I  can  give  you  the 
substance.  It  was  between  twelve  and  one  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  Hay  10th, 
16G5,  and  as  soon  as  we  got  within  a  few  rods  of  the  camp  the  regiment  was  halted 
and  a  portion  was  dismounted,  and  advanced  partly  around  the  camp,  and  there 
waited  for  day;  and,  as  soon  as  it  commenced  to  get  light,  the  dismounted  men 
charged  on  the  camp,  and  the  mounted  men  followed  after.  I  was  among  the 
mounted  men,  and  as  we  came  into  camp  I  saw  a  horse  that  I  thought  was  better 
than  my  own,  and  I  stopped  to  exchange,  Corporal  George  Hunger  stopping  with 
me.  I  dismounted  to  change  the  saddle  from  my  horse  to  the  other.  As  I  was  about 
to  buckle  the  girth,  I  saw  what  I  supposed  to  be  some  women  leaving  camp,  and 
spoke  to  Hunger  and  told  him  they  ought  to  be  stopped,  and  he  rode  out  and  halted 
them.  I  followed  after  as  soon  as  I  could  mount.  When  Hunger  overtook  them, 
Hrs.  Davis  turned  and  said:  "  We  are  going  to  the  spring  after  water."  Hunger 
told  her  she  would  have  to  go  back,  and  at  the  same  time  rode  around  in  front  of 
them.  Davis  saw  that  he  was  caught,  and  threw  off  his  shawl  and  waterproof. 
Hrs.  Davis  threw  her  arms  around  his  neck  and  said :  "  Don't  shoot  him  !  "  Davis 
said  :  "  Let  them  shoot !  I  might  as  well  die  here  as  anywhere ! "  I  think  he  asked 
if  "there  was  a  man  among  us."  About  this  time  Adjutant  Dickinson  and  some 
others  came  up  and  took  him  in  charge.  In  regard  to  what  he  had  on,  as  near  as  I 
can  recollect,  it  was  a  waterproof  skirt,  and  a  dark  shawl  over  his  head  and  shoul 
ders.  He  was  about  twenty-five  rods  from  camp  when  stopped.  I  was  one  of  the 
guards  that  went  to  Fortress  Monroe  with  Davis,  and  from  there  we  were  ordered 
to  Washington,  where  a  statement  of  the  capture  was  made  before  the  Secretary  of 
War  by  George  Hunger,  Crittendcn,  Andrew  Bee,  and  myself.  You  will  find  that 
statement  the  same  as  this,  or  nearly  so. 

JAHES  F.  BULLARD. 


584:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

DETKOIT,  December,  1873. 

To  the  Editor  of  the  Tribune : — Then,  as  daylight  began  to  appear,  the  advance 
were  sent  to  capture  the  camp.  We  rode  into  camp  without  starting  a  person  until 
our  men  gave  a  yell  that  soon  made  a  stir.  I  halted  my  horse  near  the  largest  tent. 
Some  of  the  boys  were  about  to  go  into  it,  but  were  stopped  by  the  request  of  a 
woman  inside,  saying  that  there  were  undressed  ladies  there.  Soon  after  a  woman 
came  to  the  door  of  the  tent  and  asked  the  men  who  were  near  if  the  servants 
could  not  go  out  after  some  water.  Consent  was  given,  when  there  came  out  of  the 
tent  a  colored  woman  and  a  tall  person  wearing  a  waterproof  dress  and  a  small 
shawl  around  the  head,  and  carrying  a  tin  pail  on  the  arm.  I  was  well  satisfied 
that  the  tall  person  was  Davis,  but  I  was  at  the  side  of  the  tent  and  several  of  our 
men  in  front,  and,  as  the  servants  left  the  tent  in  front,  I  supposed  that  Davis  would 
be  stopped  by  some  of  them.  But  such  was  not  the  case,  for  the  two  passed  entirely 
by  all  of  the  men.  Then  I  put  my  horse  to  a  gallop  to  overtake  them.  At  the 
same  time  I  saw  two  mounted  men  riding  toward  the  servants  from  the  Louisville 
road.  The  two  mounted  men  were  Hunger,  of  Company  C,  and  the  other  I  took 
for  Tibbet,  of  E  Company.  Davis  then  halted  and  turned  to  go  back  to  the  tent. 

WILLIAM  P.  STEDMAN, 

Company  B,  Fourth  Michigan  Cavalry. 

Captain  Charles  T.  Hudson,  Fourth  Michigan  Cavalry,  writes  to 
the  Detroit  Tribune,  July  24th,  1875,  as  follows : 

I  was  not  the  first  to  see  our  distinguished  captive,  nor  did  I  see  him  in  his 
disguise  at  all.  Several  claim  that  honor,  and,  I  have  no  doubt,  all  speak  the  truth. 
On  our  way  back  to  Macon,  however,  Mrs.  Davis  told  me,  and  I  will  use  her  own 
words :  "  I  put  my  waterproof  cloak  and  shawl  on  Mr.  Davis  upon  the  impulse  of 
the  moment,  not  knowing,  or  having  time  to  think,  what  else  to  do,  in  hopes  he 
might  make  his  escape  in  that  disguise ;  and  I  only  did  what  any  true  wroman 
might  have  done  under  similar  circumstances."  This  was  told  me  by  Mrs.  Davis  in 
the  course  of  conversation  on  our  way  back  to  Macon  while  halting  to  feed  and  rest 
our  horses,  she  being  in  the  ambulance  at  the  time.  Therefore,  although  I  did  not 
see  Mr.  Davis  in  the  disguise  of  a  wToman,  I  had  Mrs.  Davis'  word  that  she  did  dis 
guise  him  that  he  might  make  his  escape.  If  further  proof  is  wanting,  let  me  add, 
that  upon  our  arrival  at  Fortress  Monroe  with  our  prisoners,  acting  under  orders  of 
the  Secretary  of  War,  I  was  sent  on  board  of  the  Clyde,  then  lying  in  Hampton 
Roads,  to  get  the  shawl  (the  waterproof  having  been  obtained  the  day  previous  by 
Colonel  Pritchard)  worn  by  Davis  at  the  time  of  his  capture.  Upon  making  known 
my  business  to  Mrs.  Davis,  she  and  Mrs.  Clement  C.  Clay,  particularly  the  latter, 
flew  into  a  towering  rage,  and  Mrs.  Clay,  stamping  her  foot  on  the  deck  of  the  vessel, 
advised  Mrs.  Davis  to  "  shed  her  blood  before  submitting  to  further  outrage."  After 
telling  Mrs.  Davis  that  my  orders  were  imperative,  and  that  she  had  better  submit 
gracefully  to  my  demands,  she  became  somewhat  pacified,  and  said  she  "  had  no  other 
wrappings  to  protect  her  from  the  inclemency  of  the  weather."  I  then  told  her  I 
would  go  ashore  and  buy  her  a  shawl,  which  I  did,  paying  six  dollars  for  it.  Upon 
presenting  it  to  her,  she  held  it  up,  and,  with  scorn  and  contempt,  turned  to  Mrs. 
Clay  and  exclaimed,  "  a  common  nigger's  shawl."  She  then  handed  me  two  shawls 
very  similar  in  appearance  and  told  me  to  take  my  choice,  adding  that  she  did 
dress  Mr.  Davis  in  her  attire  and  would  not  deny  it,  at  the  same  time  expressing 
great  surprise  that  the  Secretary  of  War  should  want  her  clothing  to  exhibit,  as  if 
she  had  not  already  been  sufficiently  humiliated. 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS   WAS  OVERTAKEN.  585 

The  letter  of  Corporal  Hunger,  directed  to  Colonel  Burns,  is  as 

follows : 

SCHOOLCRAFT,  Michigan,  October  29th,  1877. 

Dear  Sir : — Yours  of  the  20th,  asking  for  a  statement  of  my  participation  in  the 
capture  of  Davis- ,  is  at  hand.  I  have  had  a  great  many  calls  for  a  statement  from 
almost  every  State  in  the  Union.  I  just  received  one  from  the  Tribune  office  last 
week.  I  thought  I  would  not  say  anything  about  it.  There  has  been  a  great  deal 
said  by  different  ones  regarding  the  capture  of  Davis.  They  all  seem  to  differ  more 
or  less.  If  I  should  make  a  statement  it  would  not  correspond  with  all.  Colonel 
Fritehard's  statement  is  as  near  right  as  any  I  have  seen  as  regards  Davis'  disguise. 
Davis  had  on  a  lady's  waterproof  cloak  or  dress,  and  a  red  and  black  (or  black 
and  white)  shawl,  thrown  over  his  head  and  shoulders  over  a  suit  of  gray  clothes, 
and  a  pair  of  cavalry  boots.  I  don't  know  if  Dickinson  ordered  Bee  to  let  the 
woman  pass  or  not,  only  what  I  heard  the  morning  of  the  capture.  I  believe  Bee 
was  on  guard  at  the  tent.  I  did  not  see  Dickinson  until  after  Davis  was  taken  back 
to  the  tent  and  had  taken  off  his  disguise.  Dickinson  might  have  halted  Davis,  but 
not  in  my  hearing ;  he  certainly  did  not  stop.  He  was  about  four  rods  from  the  tent 
when  I  first  saw  him.  Bullo-rd  and  I  were  changing  horses,  as  we  used  to  do  some 
times  when  we  found  better  ones.  Bullard  had  just  thrown  his  saddle  on  his  horse. 
I  was  just  buckling  my  girth  when  I  saw  the  three  women,  as  I  supposed  them  to  be, 
who  afterward  proved  to  be  Davis,  Mrs.  Davis,  and  Miss  Howell.  I  said  to  Bullard, 
"  Those  women  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  go  out  of  camp  ;  you  go  and  stop  them." 
Bullard  said, '' You  go;  you  have  your  saddle  on.'1  I  mounted  my  horse,  rode 
around  in  front  of  the  party,  and  said  to  them,  "  Where  are  you  going  ?''  Mrs.  Davis 
said,  "  With  my  old  mother  after  some  water."  [Mrs.  Davis  had  a  pail  on  her  arm.] 
I  said,  "  What  is  she  doing  with  those  boots  on  ?  "  When  I  saw  his  boots  I  cocked 
my  gun  and  laid  it  across  my  saddle.  Mrs.  Davis  put  her  hand  over  Davis'  face 
and  said,  "  Don't  shoot  ;  you  may  not  admire  Mr.  Davis'  principles,  but  he  is  a 
reverend  man.''  That  is  all  that  was  said  there.  As  soon  as  Bullard  buckled  his 
saddle  he  rode  up  to  where  we  were.  He  heard  the  most  of  this  conversation.  We 
went  back  to  the  tent  with  them.  There  Davis  took  off  his  disguise  and  said  he 
thought  our  government  more  magnanimous  than  to  be  chasing  up  women  and 
children.  This  is  as  near  right  as  I  could  see  it  at  the  time. 

GEORGE  MUXGER. 

The  following  letter  from  Colonel  Burns  explains  itself : 

KALAMAZOO,  October  21st,  1877. 

My  Dear  General: — Inclosed  you  will  find  some  further  memoranda  in  regard 
to  the  Davis  disguise  question.  On  Friday  evening  Bee  came  to  my  house  and 
made  and  signed  the  statement,  a  copy  of  which  I  inclose.  He  had  received  a  letter 
from  the  editor  of  the  Detroit  Tribune  on  the  same  subject,  requesting  that  he  should 
put  his  recollections  of  the  matter  into  shape  and  send  to  him.  Bee  is  a  Norwegian, 
of  very  little  or  no  education,  and  his  accent  and  "patois"  are  so  strong  that  it  is 
hard  work  to  understand  him.  There  was  no  shaking  him.  in  any  of  the  statements 
he  made,  but  he  insisted  that  each  one  was  literally  true.  He  was  very  positive  as 
to  the  exact  words  used  by  Dickinson.  Dickinson's  English,  undoubtedly,  was 
better  than  Bee's  memory.  They  agree  in  substance  with  my  memoranda  of  the 
circumstances,  and  go  to  show  that  Dickinson  was  deceived  in  supposing  they  were 
all  women. 

As  to  the  "morning  gown"  Mr.  Davis  had  on,  Bee  says  it  was  a  long  black 
gown,  such  as  he  has  seen  gentlemen  wear  in  the  South,  with  a  belt  on,  and  very  long. 


5SG  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

If  Davis  had  come  out  of  the  tent  erect,  with  that  gown  on,  and  no  shawl,  he  would 
have  thought  nothing  of  the  matter,  having  seen  gentlemen  in  them  before,  though 
he  had  always  supposed  they  had  nc  coats  on  under  them.  He  was  very  positive 
also  as  to  the  words  used  by  Miss  Ho  well,  and  as  to  the  "  form  bowed  down  "  of 
Davis.  I  understand  that  one  of  the  points  made  by  Davis'  apologists,  is  that  he 
was  arrested  the  moment  he  stepped  out  of  the  tent.  Bee  explicitly  denies  that.  I 
asked  him  how  far  Davis  had  got  from  the  tent  before  he  was  halted,  when  he  at 
first  said  "  about  twenty  rods."  Upon  my  request  that  he  would  be  more  definite  he 
pointed  out  a  building  about  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  feet  from  where  we  sat, 
and  said :  "  Just  about  as  far  as  that  building."  He  insists  that  he  was  the  first 
man  to  recognize  Davis,  and  this  because  he  suspected  something  wrong  when  the 
three  moved  away  from  the  tent.  The  letter  from  Bullard  was  written  to  me  at 
my  request,  and  speaks  for  itself.  He,  too,  gives  Davis  a  good  start,  as  does  also 
Stedman.  Stedman  corroborates  pretty  closely  Bee's  story  as  to  what  occurred  in  front 
of  the  tent.  These  statements  were  made  by  "  the  boys  "  without  any  knowledge 
of  what  the  other  was  saying  or  writing,  and  agree  pretty  well  in  the  main.  Bee 
says  he  does  not  recollect  any  such  man  as  Stedman,  though  he  may  have  been 
present.  I  did  not  ask  him  anything  about  Stedman  until  after  he  had  finished  and 
signed  his  "  version."  I  have  written  to  George  Hunger,  corporal  of  C  Company, 
and  expect  to  get  his  story  in  a  few  days.  Being  somewhat  interested  in  the 
question,  I  have,  whenever  I  came  across  anything  in  the  papers  relating  to  it,  been 
in  the  habit  of  cutting  it  out  and  pigeon-holing  it.  Among  the  others  the  following 
from  the  Raleigh  (North  Carolina)  News,  of  August  20th  (1877,  I  think,  though  I 
will  not  be  certain  as  to  the  year),  published  by  the  other  side.  It  was  signed  by 
James  H.  Jones,  Davis'  colored  coachman :  "  It  has  been  stated  that  Mr.  Davis  had 
on  a  hoopskirt,  and  was  otherwise  disguised  as  a  woman.  This  is  wholly  false. 
He  was  dressed  in  his  ordinary  clothing,  with  cavalry  boots  drawn  over  his  pants,  a 
waterproof  over  his  dress-coat,  a  shaAvl  thrown  over  his  shoulders,  and  on  his  head 
a  broad-brim  white  or  drab  Texas  hat.  He  had  not  an  article  of  female  wear  about 
his  person."  The  chief  point  of  difference  between  Jones  and  the  others  appears  to 
be  the  location  of  the  shawl  only. 

I  saw  Colonel  Pritchard  at  Allegan,  on  Friday  morning,  and  he  says  that  he, 
too,  has  received  various  letters  on  the  subject,  which  he  expects  to  answer,  and  will 
lean  far  toward  the  woman  disguise  side  of  the  qi  .estion.  Various  conversations  he 
had  with  Mrs.  Davis,  he  says,  will  substantiate  the  fact 'that  she  denied  nothing. 

Many  thanks  for  your  account  in  the  WEEKLY  TIMES  of  our  great  ride.  It 
is  very  interesting. 

Yours,  very  truly, 

EGBERT  BURNS. 
MAJOE  GENERAL  J.  H.  WILSON,  St.  Louis. 

After  quoting  the  foregoing  documents,  which  all  candid 
readers  will  admit  to  be  entirely  conclusive  on  the  question  of  the 
disguise,  I  have  only  to  add  that  all  the  statements  made  by  me 
herein,  or  elsewhere  (not  only  in  reference  to  this  question  but  to 
the  question  of  the  behavior  of  Davis  at  the  time  of  his  capture),  are 
based  upon  the  written  and  verbal  reports  made  by  the  officers  and 
men  immediately  after  the  events  to  which  they  referred.  This  is 
especially  true  of  the  conversation  which  was  held  by  Mr.  Davis  with 
Colonel  Pritchard  and  Colonel  Ilarnden. 


HOW  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  587 

As  soon  as  breakfast  could  be  prepared,  Colonel  Pritcliard, 
preceded  by  Colonel  Ilarnden,  began  his  return  march,  with 
prisoners  and  wagons,  for  Macon,  about  one  hundred  and  twenty 
miles  to  the  northwest  of  Irwinsville.  The  next  day,  he  met  a 
courier,  with  copies  of  the  President's  proclamation,  offering  a 
reward  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  for  the  capture  of  Davis. 
This  proclamation  had  been  received  and  promulgated  on  the  9th, 
and  hence  the  officers  in  the  pursuit  of  Davis  were  in  no  way 
inspired  by  the  promise  which  it  contained.  They  performed  their 
part  from  a  higher  sense  of  duty,  and  too  much  praise  cannot  be 
awarded  to  Colonels  Pritchard  and  Ilarnden,  or  to  the  officers  and 
men  of  their  regiments  who  participated  in  the  pursuit.  Colonel 
Pritchard  arrived  at  Macon  on  the  afternoon  uf  the  13th,  and 
reported  at  once,  with  his  prisoners,  at  corps  headquarters.  When 
the  cavalcade  reached  the  city,  the  streets  were  thronged  by  crowds 
of  rebel  citizens,  but  not  one  kind  greeting  was  extended  to  the 
deserted  chieftain  or  his  party.  A  good  dinner  was  prepared  and 
given  to  them  by  my  servants,  and,  after  three  or  four  hours'  rest, 
thev  were  sent,  under  strong  escort,  toward  the  Xorth,  by  way  of 
Atlanta,  Augusta,  and  Savannah,  arrangements  for  which  had  been 
already  made,  in  pursuance  of  orders  from  Washington.  Colonel 
Pritchard,  with  a  detachment  of  his  regiment,  was  directed  to 
deliver  his  prisoner  safely  into  the  custody  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
I  also  placed  in  his  charge  the  person  of  Clement  C.  Clay,  Jr.,  for 
whose  arrest  a  reward  had  been  offered  by  the  President.  Mr.  Clay 
surrendered  himself  at  Macon,  about  the  llth  of  May,  having 
informed  me  by  telegraph,  from  Western  Georgia,  the  day  before, 
that  he  would  start  for  my  headquarters  without  delay.  Alexander 
II.  Stephens,  Vice  President  of  the  Confederacy,  was  arrested  by 
General  Upton,  at  Crawfordsville,  about  the  same  time,  and  also 
placed  in  charge  of  Colonel  Pritchard;  but  he  and  Davis  were  not 
brought  into  personal  contact,  both  expressing  the  desire  that  they 
might  be  spared  that  pain.  General  Upton  was  charged  with 
making  the  necessary  arrangements  for  forwarding  the  prisoners 
and  escort  safely  to  Savannah,  to  the  department  of  General 
Gil  more. 

In  order  to  cut  off  all  hope  of  escape,  an  escort  of  twenty-five 
picked  men  were  specially  charged  with  the  safety  of  Davis,  while 
eight  hundred  men,  divided  between  three  trains  of  cars,  one  pre 
ceding  and  one  following  the  one  that  Davis  was  on,  were  sent  as 
far  as  Augusta,  to  thwart  any  attempt  which  might  be  made  to 
rescue  the  distinguished  prisoners.  This  was  merely  an  excess  of 


588  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

precaution ;  it  is  not  known  that  a  single  man  in  the  South  desired, 
or  would  have  dared,  to  undertake  his  release,  although  that  region 
was  thronged  with  thousands  of  rebel  soldiers  on  their  way  home. 
Xo  accident,  or  delay  of  any  kind,  occurred  during  the  trip  to 
Savannah,  where  a  gunboat  was  already  in  waiting.  The  prisoners 
were  taken  on  board  at  once,  and  delivered  at  Fortress  Monroe,  for 
safe  keeping,  on  the  22d  of  May.  My  command  had  also  arrested 
Mr.  Mallory,  the  rebel  Secretary  of  the  Kavy,  Mr.  Hill,  Senator, 
and  Joseph  E.  Brown,  Governor  of  Georgia.  Breckenridge  and 
Toombs  managed  to  escape,  by  traveling  alone,  and  as  rapidly  as 
possible — the  former  having  passed  through  Tallahassee,  Florida, 
only  a  few  hours  before  the  arrival  of  General  McCook  at  that 
place.  Both  of  his  sons  were  captured,  and,  after  a  few  days' 
detention,  were  paroled. 

When  Davis  arrived  at  Macon,  he  looked  bronzed,  but  hardy 
and  vigorous,  and  had  entirely  recovered  his  equanimity  and  easy 
bearing.  After  he  had  dined,  I  had  an  interview  with  him,  lasting 
over  an  hour,  during  which  he  talked  freely  and  pleasantly  about  a 
variety  of  subjects.  He  asked  about  the  different  professors  at 
AVest  Point,  discussing  their  merits  and  peculiarities  with  spirit  and 
good-humor,  showing  clearly  that  he  had  neither  forgotton  them 
nor  his  own  experience  as  a  cadet.  Thence  he  was  led  to  the 
discussion  of  his  own  generals.  He  spoke  in  the  highest  terms  of 
Lee,  declaring  him  to  be  the  ablest,  most  courageous,  and  the  most 
aggressive ;  in  short,  the  most  worthy  of  all  his  lieutenants.  He 
condemned  the  generalship  of  Johnston,  and  charged  him  with 
timidity  and  insubordination.  He  ridiculed  the  pedantry  of  Beau- 
regard,  and  deprecated  the  gallant  rashness  of  Hood.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  expressed  his  admiration  for  the  surprising  skill  and 
persistency  of  Grant,  the  brilliancy  of  Sherman,  and  the  solid 
qualities  of  Thomas.  In  the  course  of  our  conversation,  he  referred 
to  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  his  untimely  death,  speaking  of  him  in  terms  of 
respect  and  high  personal  regard.  He  seemed  to  regret  particularly 
that  Mr.  Johnson  had  succeeded  to  the  Presidency,  adding  that  both 
he  and  the  Southern  people  would  find  him  much  more  implacable 
and  vindictive  than  Mr.  Lincoln.  He  remarked,  in  reference  to  the 
reward  offered  for  his  arrest,  as  an  accomplice  in  the  assassination, 
that,  while  he  was  surprised  that  such  a  charge  should  have  been 
brought  against  him,  he  had  no  serious  apprehension  of  trouble 
therefrom.  In  this  connection,  he  said  :  "  I  doubt  not,  General,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  will  bring  a  much  more  serious 
charge  against  me  than  that,  and  one  which  it  will  give  me  much 


HOW  JEFFEESOX  DAVIS  WAS  OVERTAKEN.  589 

greater  trouble  to  disprove  " — evidently  alluding  to  that  of  treason. 
Other  subjects  were  mentioned,  and  during  the  conversation  he  sent 

for  and   introduced   his   little  bov.      His  conduct  throughout  was 

«/  o 

dignified,  and  eminently  self-possessed.  He  spoke  with  great  pre 
cision,  and  with  more  than  an  ordinary  degree  of  suavitv,  but, 
withal,  producing  upon  me  the  impression  that  he  was  acting,  and 
not  unnaturally,  a  borrowed  character.  After  learning  the  disposi 
tion  that  I  was  ordered  to  make  of  him,  he  said:  "I  suppose,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  that  Colonel  Pritchard  is  to  be  my  custodian 
hereafter  as  heretofore,  and  I  desire  to  express  my  satisfaction  at 
this,  for,"  continued  he,  "it  is  my  duty  to  say  that  Colonel  Pritchard 
has  treated  me  with  marked  courtesy  and  consideration.  I  have  no 
fault  to  find  with  him,  and  hope  you  will  tell  him  so.  I  should  do 
so  myself  but  for  the  fact  that  it  might  look  like  a  prisoners  effort 
to  make  fair  weather  with  his  captors."  lie  spoke  particularly  of 
the  dignity  and  self-possession  of  Colonel  Pritchard,  and  did  not 
conceal  a  regret  that  he  had  not  been  so  fortunate  in  his  own  conduct 
at  the  time  of  his  capture. 

The  body  of  this  article  was  prepared,  from  official  documents 
and  private  memoranda,  shortly  after  the  end  of  the  Avar,  when  the 
events  referred  to  were  fresh  in  mv  mind.  In  re-writ iiiir  it  now,  I 

v  »~^ 

have  striven  to  set  down  naught  in  malice,  and  am  sure  that  my 
narrative  has  not  been  colored  in  the  slightet  degree  by  the  fact  that 
the  principal  persons  whom  it  concerns  were  leaders  of  the ''lost 
cause."  I  have  gathered  all  the  information  that  could  be  had,  and, 
such  as  it  is,  I  now  submit  it  to  the  public  as  my  contribution  to  the 
history  of  the  last  days  of  the  Confederacy,  feeling  fully  assured  that 
it  cannot  be  controverted  in  any  essential  particular. 


THE  BLACK  HORSE  CAVALRY. 


BY    COLONEL   JOHN    SCOTT. 


THE  Black  Horse  Cavalry  was 
organized,  or  rather  first  set  in 
line,  by  Captain  D.  H.  Jones*, 
United  States  Army,  after 
ward  a  Confederate  general, 
at  Waterloo,  on  the  Rappa- 
hannock  river,  in  Fauquier 
county,  Virginia,  on  the  18th 
of  June,  1859,  the  anniver 
sary  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo. 
On  that  day,  so  auspicious  for 
the  liberties  of  mankind,  did 
this  command  come  into  ex 
istence  which  was  destined  to 
act  so  distinguished  and  im 
portant  a  part  in  the  pro 
longed  effort  to  establish  the  independence  of  a  Southern  Republic. 
Already  had  the  storm-cloud  began  to  gather,  the  hurricane  to  lower 
in  the  distance,  and  the  organization  of  the  Black  Horse  Cavalry  was 
the  first  step  which  was  taken  in  Fauquier  county  to  meet  the  prog 
nosticated  war.  The  first  captain  elected  wras  John  Scott,  a  planter, 
residing  in  the  neighborhood  of  Warrenton,  and  the  author  of  "  The 
Lost  Principle."  Robert  Randolph,  a  young  lawyer  of  the  Warren- 
ton  bar,  was  chosen  first  lieutenant ;  Charles  II.  Gordon,  a  planter, 
residing  near  Bealton,  was  elected  second  lieutenant.  The  non 
commissioned  officers  were :  William  R.  Smith,  first  sergeant,  who 
was  during  the  war  elected  a  lieutenant  of  the  command,  and  was 
afterward  one  of  the  most  distinguished  captains  of  Mosby's  Partisan 
Battalion,  but  was  killed,  sword  in  hand,  in  a  night  attack  on  a  Federal 
camp  at  Harper's  Ferry ;  James  II.  Childs  was  elected  second  sergeant ; 
Richard  Lewis  was  elected  third  sergeant ;  Robert  Mitchell  was  elected 
fourth  sergeant.  The  corporals  were :  Wellington  Millon,  Madison 
Tyler,  N.  A.  Clopton,  and  M.  K.  James.  These  were  all  young  gentle 
men  of  the  first  respectability,  and  were  either  themselves  planters  or 
(590) 


THE  BLACK  HORSE  CAVALRY.  591 

the  sons  of  planters.  The  rank  and  file  were  composed  of  young  men 
of  the  same  social  material  with  the  officers.  Among  them  were  to  be 
found  James  Keith,  now  well  known  as  one  of  the  ablest  and  most 
distinguished  judges  in  Virginia,  and  "William  II.  Payne,  a  leading 
member  of  the  Virginia  bar,  who,  during  the  war,  rose  to  be  a 
brigadier  general  in  Stuart's  cavalry  division.  Another,  a  young 
lawyer  of  brilliant  promise,  was  Thomas  Gordon  Pollock,  the  son  of 
the  author  of  u  The  Exode,"  a  sublime  production,  and  on  his  mother's 
side  was  sprung  from  the  heroic  blood  of  the  Lees.  During  the  war 
he  was  transferred,  with  the  rank  of  captain,  to  the  staff  of  Brigadier 
General  James  L.  Kemper,  and  fell  in  storming  Cemetery  Heights. 
When  it  was  discovered,  in  the  spring  of  1800,  that  the  law  allowed 
a  third  lieutenant  to  the  command,  an  election  was  held  in  the  town 
of  AVarrenton  to  fill  the  vacant  post.  There  were  several  candidates, 
but  the  captain  requested  the  men  to  elect  A.  1).  Payne,  which  was 
done;  for  at  that  early  period  he  discerned  in  him  those  high  mili 
tary  qualities  which,  in  the  h'eld,  he  afterward  displayed.  He  has 
survived  the  war,  and  is  now  a  distinguished  member  of  the  AVar- 
renton  bar. 

The  first  service  which  the  command  was  ordered  to  perform 
was  to  report  to  Governor  Henry  A.  Wise,  at  Charlestown,  Virginia, 
at  which  point  were  being  collected  the  volunteer  companies  of  the 
State  to  insure  the  execution  of  John  P>rown  and  his  associates. 
AVhen  the  command  reached  Piedmont  station,  now  Delaplane,  on 
the  Manassas  llailroad,  it  fell  in  with  the  "Mountain  Bangers/'  a 
cavalry  company,  which  Captain  Turner  Ash  by,  afterward  so  bril 
liant  a  lignro  in  the  Confederate  army,  had  recruited  in  Upper  Fail- 
end  or.  Together  these  companies  marched  by  night,  fording  the 
deep  and  rapid  Shenandoah,  and  reported  at  daylight  the  next 
morning  to  the  Governor  at  Charlestown.  A  detachment  of  the 
Black  Horse  escorted  the  prisoners  to  the  place  of  execution,  while 
the  rest  of  the  command  was  employed  in  keeping  clear  the  streets, 
for  it  was  feared  even  at  the  last  moment  that  an  attempt  would  be 
made  to  rescue  Brown.  Upon  the  return  of  the  command  to  "Wur- 
renton,  the  ladies  of  that  patriotic  town  received  them  graciously, 
and  gave  in  their  honor  a  handsome  ball.  So  early  was  the  strong 
and  lasting  covenant  made  between  the  women  and  the  soldiers  of 
the  South ! 

The  John  Brown  war,  as  the  people  called  it,  gave  an  immense 
impulse  to  the  secession  sentiment  of  Virginia,  and  when  South 
Carolina  seceded  and  coercion  was  talked  of,  the  captain  of  the 
Black  Horse  immediately  tendered  his  command  to  Governor  Pick- 


592  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ens.  This  act  proved  to  be  in  advance  of  the  popular  feeling,  and 
many  murmurs  were  excited ;  but  it  was  ratified  by  the  command  at 
its  next  meeting. 

About  the  time  of  the  formation  of  the  Southern  Republic,  at 
Montgomery,  fearing  that  Virginia  would  not  take  part  in  the  move 
ment,  the  captain  of  the  Black  Horse  relinquished  his  command, 
and  was  commissioned  captain  in  the  army  of  the  Confederate  States. 

On  the  16th  of  April,  1861,  the  day  before  the  Ordinance  of 
Secession  was  passed  by  Virginia,  orders  were  received  by  Lieuten 
ant  Randolph,  commanding  the  Black  Horse  Cavalry,  and  by  Cap 
tain  Ashby,  to  assemble  their  respective  commands  and  proceed, 
without  delay,  to  Harper's  Ferry.  The  object  of  this  expedition 
was  to  capture  the  stores  and  munitions  of  war  collected  at  that 
place,  so  necessary  to  the  Confederates  in  the  struggle  in  which  they 
were  about  to  engage.  Success  depended  upon  secresy  and  dispatch, 
and  every  available  means  was  employed  to  collect  the  commands. 
By  ten  o'clock  at  night  the  Black  Horse  had  left  their  homes,  not  to 
return  for  four  weary  years — many  of  them  never.  "With  light 
hearts  they  marched,  in  happy  ignorance  of  the  future,  until,  when 
within  a  few  miles  of  their  destination,  they  heard  the  explosion  of 
the  arsenal.  When  this  sound  fell  on  their  ears,  they  felt  that  they 
had  been  thwarted  in  the  object  of  the  expedition.  But  on  their 
arrival  things  were  found  not  so  bad  as  apprehension  had  painted. 
The  rifle  works  on  the  Shenandoah,  it  is  true,  were  entirely  destroyed, 
but  the  fire  in  the  musket  machine-shops  had  been  arrested  after 
about  a  third  of  the  machinery  had  been  wholly  or  partially  destroyed. 
The  building  in  which  the  manufactured  arms  were  deposited  con 
tained  over  twenty  thousand  stand  of  Minnie  rifles  and  rifled  mus 
kets,  of  which  about  seven  thousand  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
captors  uninjured,  and  many  others  in  a  condition  that  admitted  of 
repair.  A  large  proportion  of  the  hands  employed  wrere  sent,  with 
the  uninjured  machinery,  to  an  armory  established  in  North  Caro 
lina.  The  Black  Horse  Cavalry,  after  remaining  several  days  on 
picket  duty  at  Harper's  Ferry,  was  ordered  on  similar  service  to 
Berlin  bridge,  -which  crosses  the  Potomac  from  the  county  of  Lou- 
don.  It  wTas  while  the  command  were  at  Harper's  Ferry  that  Major 
Thomas  J.  Jackson,  of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  wras  ordered, 
by  Governor  Letcher,  to  take  command,  and  the  high  reputation 
which  he  had  won  in  the  Mexican  war  inspired  the  volunteers  with 
cheerfulness  and  confidence. 

From  Berlin  bridge,  the  Black  Horse  was  ordered  back  to 
"Warrenton,  where  the  vacant  captaincy  was  filled  by  the  election  of 


THE  BLACK  HORSE  CAVALRY.  593 

William  II.  Payne,  heretofore,  as  before  stated,  a  private  in  the 
command.  This  gentleman  was,  at  that  time,  a  member  of  the 
"Warrenton  bar,  and  had  been,  along  with  Captain  B.  II.  Shackle- 
ford,  a  Secession  candidate  for  the  State  Convention  which  cut  the 
ties  which  bound  the  Commonwealth  to  the  Federal  body.  His 
genius,  gallantly,  and  recognized  devotion  to  the  Southern  cause 
pointed  him  out  for  the  vacant  post.  Captain  Payne  marched  his 
command  to  the  Fauquier  Springs,  where  it  was  mustered  into  the 
Confederate  service,  and  from  that  point  conducted  it  to  Manassas, 
where,  together  with  a  few  other  companies,  it  formed  the  nucleus 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  with  which,  through  all  vicissi 
tudes,  it  remained  until  the  final  day  of  dissolution  at  Appomattox 
Court-House.  At  the  time  when  a  raid  was  made  by  Captain  Tomp- 
kins,  of  the  Federal  army,  on  Fairfax  Court-House,  where  the 
lamented  Captain  John  Quincey  Ma  IT  was  killed,  the  Black  Horse, 
at  the  request  of  their  captain,  were  ordered  to  that  point,  from 
which  they  performed  much  arduous  scouting  duty,  and  became  well 
known  to  the  enemy.  Upon  the  advance  of  General  McDowell,  the 
Black  Horse  rejoined  the  army  at  Manassas.  On  the  4th  of  July, 
in  an  attempt  to  ambuscade  a  detachment  of  the  enemy,  two  mem 
bers  were  killed  and  several  wounded  by  the  mistaken  tire  of  a 
South  Carolina  regiment  of  infantry.  In  the  memorable  battle  of 
the  21st  of  July,  in  which  so  absolute  a  victory  was  won  by  the 
Confederate  arms,  the  Black  Horse  Cavalry  distinguished  itself  in 
the  pursuit  of  the  ilying  enemy,  and  the  next  day  were  thanked  by 
President  Davis  in  a  speech.  Soon  after  the  battle  of  Manassas,  the 
Black  Horse  Cavalry  was  selected  by  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
commanding  the  army,  to  be  his  body-guard.  In  this  capacity  it 
received  Prince  Xapoleon  and  his  suite,  consisting  of  Count  Sartiges 
and  others,  upon  their  visit  to  the  Confederate  army,  escorted  them 
to  the  general's  headquarters,  and  was,  the  next  day,  the  escort  at  a 
review  of  the  army  at  Centreville. 

In  the  fall  of  1861  the  command  was  incorporated  in  the  Fourth 
Virginia  Cavalry,  when  Captain  William  II.  Payne  was  promoted  to 
be  major  of  the  regiment,  and  Lieutenant  Robert  Randolph  succeeded 
to  the  captaincy,  but  was  soon  after  detached  to  form  the  body-guard 
of  General  Earl  Van  Dorn,  commanding  a  division  at  Manassas. 
When  General  Earl  Van  Dorn  was  assigned  to  an  independent  com 
mand  in  the  further  South,  he  made  an  unsuccessful  application  to 
be  allowed  to  carry  the  Black  Horse  with  him.  In  the  spring  of 
18G3  the  command  accompanied  General  Johnston  to  Vorktown, 
and  on  the  march  was  employed  as  scouts  in  the  rear,  and  as  guides 
38 


591  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

to  the  brigade  and  division  commanders,  on  account  of  their  famili 
arity  with  the  roads,  water-courses,  and  points  suitable  for  camping. 
When  the  army  reached  Culpepper  county  it  was  reported  that  the 
enemy,  under  General  Sumner,  had  advanced  as  far  as  Warrenton 
Junction.     General  Stuart  ordered  a  detail  of   ten  of   the  Black 
Horse  to  change  overcoats  with  the  Governor's  Guard,  theirs  being 
of  a  dark  hue,  and  recrossing  the  Rappahannock  to  report  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy.     This  detail  did  not  rejoin  the  command  until 
the  march  from  Richmond  to  the  Peninsula.     The  Fourth  Virginia 
Cavalry  was  kept  behind  the  earthworks,  extending  from  Yorktown 
to  James  river,  until  General  Johnston  began  to  withdraw  his  forces. 
The  regiment  was  then  sent  to  Yorktown,  and  brought  up  the  Con 
federate  rear  from  that  point  of  our  lines.     As  soon  as  McClellan 
discovered  that  the  rifle-pits  in  his  front  had  been  vacated,  he  pressed 
forward  and  overtook  the  Fourth  Regiment  about  a  mile  and  a  half 
before  it  reached  Fort  Magruder.     On  this  ground,  the  next  day, 
the  principal  part  of  the  battle  of  Williamsburg  was  fought — one  of 
the  best  contested  of  the  war,  the  number  of  troops  on  the  Confed 
erate  side  being  taken  into  account.     The  Fourth  halted  and  then 
slowly  fell  back,  passing  Fort  Magruder.     The  Federals  followed, 
and  when  they  reached  the  edge  of  the  woods,  ran  out  Gibson's 
Battery  to  engage  a  Confederate  battery  in  the  fort.     At  the  same 
time  a  company  of  the  Richmond  Howitzers,  stationed  on  elevated 
ground  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  road,  also  engaged  the  Federal 
battery,  and  a  brisk  cannonade  was  exchanged.     General  Johnston, 
who  occupied  a  favorable  position  for  observation,  discovered  that 
Gibson's  Battery  was  worsted  in  the   encounter  and  ordered  the 
Fourth  Virginia  to  charge.     The  regiment  was  already  stripped  for 
the  fight,  and  passing  Fort  Magruder  in  a  rapid  charge,  captured  the 
Federal  battery.     Leaving  a  few  men  to  take  care  of  the  capture, 
the  regiment  proceeded  by  that  road  into  a  dense  wood,  the  lanoLxm 
either  side  of  it  being  too  miry  for  the  operations  of  cavalry.     At 
about  two  hundred  yards  after  entering  the  woods,  where  the  road 
made  a  sudden  turn,  the  regiment  ran  upon  a  large  body  of  opposing 
cavalry,  when  Colonel  Wickham  ordered  it  to  fall  back  to  the  edge 
of  the  woods.     In  the  execution  of  this  movement  Colonel  Wickham 
was  pierced  by  a  sabre,  and  a  color-bearer  had  his  flag  wrenched  from 
his  hands. 

Colonel  Wickham,  being  disabled  from  his  wound,  relinquished 
the  command  of  the  regiment  to  Major  Payne.  Toward  nightfall 
the  command  was  moved  back  to  AVilliarnsburg,  and  camped  for  the 
night.  The  next  day  the  Fourth  Virginia  occupied  in  the  line  of 


THE  BLACK  HORSE  CAVALRY.  505 

battle  the  vacant  space  between  Fort  Magruder  and  the  redoubt  to 
its  riii'ht.  The  Federal  skirmishers  advanced  against  this  part  of  the 
line,  and  took  position  in  some  timber  which  had  been  cut  down  the 
past  winter.  They  opened  a  destructive  lire  upon  the  regiment  by 
which  several  were  killed  and  wounded — among  them  Major  Payne, 
very  severely.  He  was  conveyed  to  a  hospital  in  "Williamsburg,  and 
fell  into  the  enemy's  hands  when  the  Southern  army  withdrew. 
Finding  that  the  cavalry  could  not  cope  upon  terms  of  advantage 
witli  sharpshooters  thus  posted,  the  regiment  was  relieved  by  infantry 
and  moved  further  to  the  right  of  the  line  of  battle. 

After  the  battle  of  Williamsburg  the  Confederate  army  con 
tinued  its  retreat  on  Richmond,  the  cavalry  protecting  the  rear.  The 
Black  Horse  participated  in  the  dangers  and  hardships  of  this  service, 
in  performing  which  they  were  compelled  to  subsist  on  parched  corn. 
Near  .Hanover  Court-House,  while  on  picket  duty,  the  Black  Horse 
assisted  in  checking  the  pursuit  of  General  Branch's  Xorth  Carolina 
troops  by  Fitz  John  Porter,  who  had  overpowered  and  badly  worsted 
them,  and  in  this  ell'ort  lost  many  men  wounded  and  prisoners.  The 
command  took  part  in  Stuart's  raid  around  McClellan's  army  as  it 
lay  he-fore  Richmond,  which  was  esteemed  at  the  time  a  brilliant  and 
hazardous  feat,  and  participated  in  the  light  at  the  old  church  in 
Hanover,  where  the  gallant  Captain  Latane  was  killed. 

The  regiment  to  which  the  Black  Horse  was  attached  was  now, 
for  a  time,  camped  near  Hanover  Court-IIouse,  and  while  here  an 
interesting  incident  took  place.  An  English  officer,  who  warmly 
sympathized  with  the  Southern  cause,  presented,  at  Nassau,  to  a 
captain  in  the  Confederate  navy  a  rifle  of  beautiful  workmanship, 
which  he  desired  him,  on  his  return  to  Richmond,  ''to  present  to  the 
bravest  man  in  the  Confederate  army.''  The  naval  officer,  embar 
rassed  by  the  scope  of  his  commission,  and  not  knowing,  to  be  sure, 
where  he  should  find  the  bravest  soldier  in  the  Southern  army, 
thought  he  could  best  fulfil  his  commission  by  giving  the  rifle  to 
Captain  Robert  Randolph,  to  be  by  him  presented  to  the  bravest 
man  in  the  Black  Horse  Cavalry.  But  Captain  Randolph  was  as 
much  embarrassed  in  the  execution  of  this  commission  as  the  naval 
captain  had  been,  for  how  was  it  possible  for  any  one  to  say  in  that 
command  who  was  the  bravest  man  \  Robert  Martin  was  the  first 
sergeant,  and  in  that  capacity  had  displayed  the  highest  qualities  of 
a  soldier,  and  had,  in  consequence,  won  the  esteem  and  respect  of 
both  men  and  officers.  Robert  Martin,  too,  was  foremost  in  every 
fight.  lie  appeared  to  court  danger  for  itself,  and  it  seemed  there 
was  nothing  he  so  little  valued  as  life.  To  him,  by  <reneral  consent, 

^  •/      O 

therefore,  the  rifle  was  awarded  as  "  the  bravest  of  the  brave.'' 


596  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

About  this  time  General  Lee,  having  heard  that  Burnside  had 
been  moved  by  sea  from  North  Carolina,  and  was  at  Fredericksburg, 
sent  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  which  embraced  the  Black  Horse,  to  make 
a  reconnoissance  in  that  direction.  The  command  saw  active  service 
and  gained  valuable  information  for  the  General,  and  on  its  return 
to  Hanover  Court-House,  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain  having  been 
fought,  it  was  ordered  to  join  in  the  pursuit  of  Pope.  The  Fourth 
Regiment  crossed  the  Rappahannock  at  Wallis'  ford,  and,  marching 
through  farms,  regardless  of  roads,  came  into  the  main  road  from 
Culpepper  Court-IIouse  to  Fredericksburg,  and  turning  to  the  right, 
attacked  the  cavalry  protecting  Pope's  extreme  left  and  drove  it 
across  the  Rappahannock  at  Ellis'  mill.  Turning  toward  Brandy 
Station,  on  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad,  the  command 
found  that  General  Lee,  with  Longstreet's  Corps,  had  established 
his  headquarters  at  Willis  Madden's  house.  Continuing  its  march, 
it  crossed  the  railroad  and  rejoined  Stuart,  who,  with  Jackson's 
Corps,  pursued  the  enemy  to  the  crossings  of  the  Rappahannock  at 
the  railroad  bridge  and  Beverly's  ford.  Thus  were  the  two  armies 
again  confronting  each  other,  but  on  opposite  sides  of  the  river.  In 
this  situation  General  Lee,  with  the  ultimate  purpose  of  forcing  an 
action,  marched  his  army  by  the  left  flank,  and  crossing  the  Hazel 
river  into  what  is  known  as  the  Little  Fork  of  Culpepper,  grouped 
his  whole  army  on  the  Upper  Rappahannock,  opposite  the  Fauquier 
Springs. 

But  Stuart's  Cavalry,  during  this  movement,  had  been  detached 
from  the  army,  and  crossing  the  Rappahannock  at  Waterloo,  the  first 
drill-ground  of  the  Black  Horse,  passed  through  Warrenton,  and 
attacked,  in  the  rear  of  Pope's  army,  Catlett's  Station  at  midnight, 
thus  striking  his  line  of  communication  with  his  base  of  supply. 
This  brilliant  exploit  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Pope's  headquarter 
wagons,  the  destruction  of  large  army  stores,  and  the  capture  of 
many  prisoners. 

Upon  the  return  of  the  cavalry  to  the  army,  across  the  Rappa 
hannock,  the  Black  Horse  was  assigned  to  duty  at  the  headquarters 
of  Jackson,  who  was  about  to  make  his  celebrated  flank  and  rear 
movements  on  Pope's  army,  which  culminated  in  the  second  battle 
of  Manassas. 

It  had  been  the  purpose  of  the  Confederate  commander,  when 
he  took  position  on  the  Upper  Rappahannock,  to  cross  his  army  at 
the  Fauquier  Springs,  and  occupying  Lee's  ridge  and  the  adjacent 
highlands,  to  compel  Pope  to  deliver  battle  at  some  point  between 
Warrenton  and  Bealton.  With  this  object  in  view  he  had  crossed 


THE  BLACK  HORSE  CAVALRY.  597 

Earlv's  Brigade,  of  E well's  Division,  on  what  is  known  as  the  Sandy 
Ford  clam,  u  point  two  miles  below  the  Springs,  to  protect  the  men 
engaged  in  repairing  the  bridge  at  the  Springs,  over  which  the  army 
was  to  pass.  But  this  able  plan  was  defeated  by  heavy  rains,  which 
fell  the  night  before,  and  swelled  the  river  to  such  an  extent  as  to 
interrupt  work  on  the  bridge.  This  enforced  delay  enabled  the 
Federal  general  to  anticipate  his  opponent  in  the  occupation  of 
Lee's  ridge,  and  secured  to  him  the  advantage  of  position  which 
Lee  had  been  maneuvring  to  obtain.  Prompted  by  his  military 
genius,  Lee  determined  to  cross  the  Rappahaimock  higher  up,  at 
Unison's  ford,  and  marching  through  Upper  Fauquier  to  gain  Pope's 
rear  and  compel  him  to  engage  battle  on  other  ground  than  that  on 
which  the  Federal  army  was  so  strongly  posted.  In  pursuance  of 
this  plan,  Jackson  began  his  movement  through  the  country  above 
designated,  until  he  struck  Pope's  line  of  communication  at  Bristow 
Station  and  Manassas  Junction,  as  Stuart  had  before  struck  it  at 
Catlett's  Station.  But  the  blow  delivered  by  Jackson  was  a  far 
more  serious  one;  for,  in  order  to  regain  his  lost  ground,  the  Federal 
commander  was  compelled  to  fight  the  second  battle  of  Manassas. 
"When  Jackson  struck  the  railroad  at  Bristow  Station,  where  the 
sound  of  his  cannon  first  apprised  Pope  of  his  whereabouts,  he  left 
General  Ewell  to  guard  the  crossings  of  Broad  run.  lie  then  moved 
down  the  railroad  to  Manassas,  where  he  captured,  in  addition  to 
several  trains  of  cars,  a  large  amount  of  armv  supplies,  all  of  which 
were  destroyed,  except  such  as  could  be  applied  to  immediate  use. 
When  this  capture  was  first  reported  to  the  enemy,  it  was  supposed 
to  have  been  made,  by  one  of  Stuart's  raiding  parties,  and  in  conse 
quence  a  Xew  Jersey  brigade  of  infantry,  stationed  below  Manassas, 
was  ordered  up  to  retake  the  place.  Possessed  with  this  belief,  the 
command  marched  to  within  a  short  distance  of  the  fortifications, 
when  it  was  found  that  it  had  to  cope  with  Jackson's  infantry, 
instead  of  Stuart's  cavalry.  The  guns  from  the  fortification  opened 
upon  the  advancing  Federals  in  front,  while  on  their  left  flank  they 
were  assailed  by  Braxton's  Battery.  In  this  trying  situation  the 
brigade  behaved  in  a  soldierly  manner,  and  marched  from  the  field 
with  ranks  unbroken  and  colors  flying.  But  when  they  reached  the 
woods  they  broke  when  they  were  charged  by  a  detachment  of 
twenty  of  the  Black  Horse,  commanded  by  Jackson  in  person,  and 
many  prisoners  were  taken. 

Noiselessly  and  swiftly  Jackson  traversed  the  country  between 
Ilinson's  ford  and  Bristow  Station.  With  such  caution  was  his 
march  conducted,  under  the  shelter  of  forest  lands,  by  day,  no  camp- 


598  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

fires  being  allowed  by  night  to  indicate  the  presence  of  an  army,  that 
the  enemy  were  kept  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  important  move 
ment.  The  perilous  expedition,  and  the  responsibility  which  attached 
to  it,  did  not  depress  the  General,  but  acted  rather  like  an  elixir  upon 
him.  His  spirits  rose  high,  and  he  relayed  much  from  his  silent  and 
austere  mood.  On  the  march  he  conversed  freely  with  Lieutenant 
A.  D.  Payne,  whose  roused  spirit  kindled  with  his  own  at  the 
approaching  conflict,  when  a  second  time  a  great  battle  wras  to  be 
fought  on  the  border  land  of  the  hostile  republics.  The  General 
used  few  words,  but  probed  his  subject  to  the  bottom.  His  con 
versation  wras  chiefly  about  the  war,  and  he  expressed  himself  freely 
about  the  merits  of  the  officers  of  the  Federal  army,  but  with  more 
reserve  as  to  the  Confederate  officers.  They  were  passing  through 
the  country  of  General  Turner  Ashby's  nativity,  and  were  at  one 
time  near  the  place  of  his  birth  and  the  scenes  of  his  early  life. 
Ashby,  but  a  little  before,  and  while  attached  to  Jackson's  army,  had 
been  killed,  about  the  close  of  the  magnificent  campaign  in  the 
Yalley.  The  career  of  the  deceased  officer  had  been  brief,  but  as 
glorious  as  the  morning  star  before  it  brightens  into  the  perfect  day. 
In  a  single  sentence,  Jackson  photographed  this  peerless  soldier,  who 
has  been  so  justly  compared,  for  generosity  arid  courage,  to  the 
immortal  Black  Prince.  He  said :  "Ashby  was  born  a  soldier,  and 
I  feel  his  loss  now.  He  was  a  man  of  intuitive  military  perception ; 
his  judgment  was  never  surpassed." 

At  The  Plains,  a  village  on  the  Manassas  Railroad,  about  four 
miles  east  of  Salem,  Lieutenant  A.  D.  Payne,  with  thirty  men,  was 
sent  back  to  guide  and  accompany  General  Lee,  who  was  with 
Longstreet's  Corps,  while  Captain  Randolph,  with  the  rest  of  the 
Black  Horse  command,  remained  with  Jackson.  The  lieutenant 
retraced  his  steps,  and  reported  to  General  Lee  as  he  was  crossing 
the  Rappahannock  at  Hinson's  mill.  The  troops  were  hurried  on 
in  the  direction  of  Salem,  the  track  over  which  Jackson  had  just 
passed,  and  encamped  for  the  night  between  that  point  and  Orlean. 
General  Lee  made  his  headquarters  at  Prospect  Hill,  the  seat  of  the 
late  Dr.  Jaquelin  A.  Marshall,  and  was  then  the  residence  of  his 
family.  With  his  staff,  the  General  found  quarters  in  the  house, 
but  Lieutenant  Payne  and  his  men  camped  in  the  yard.  By  some 
unaccountable  neglect,  the  main  highway,  leading  past  Prospect  Hill 
from  Orlean  to  Waterloo,  and  from  thence  to  Warrenton,  had  not 
been  picketed  nor  guarded,  so  that  there  was  that  night  between 
the  Confederate  general  and  the  Federal  army,  which  lay  scattered 
between  Waterloo  and  Warrenton  Junction,  nothing  but  this  open 


THE  BLACK  HORSE  CAVALRY.  599 

highway.  In  this  exposed  condition  things  remained  for  several 
hours,  when  it  was  discovered  by  Colonel  Charles  Marshall,  the 
vigilant  aide-de-camp  of  General  Lee.  About  midnight,  with  con 
sternation,  he  aroused  Lieutenant  Payne,  and  communicated  the 
fact  to  him,  and  that  the  nearest  brigade  was  a  mile  distant.  With 
his  whole  force,  all  the  roads  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy  were 
picketed ;  but,  fortunately,  the  enemy  were  not  apprised  of  the 
General's  exposed  position,  and  the  night  passed  without  alarm. 
The  next  day,  just  before  the  head  of  the  column  arrived  at  Salem, 
information  was  brought  to  General  Lee  that  a  body  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  were  approaching  that  place.  Lieutenant  Payne,  with  his 
small  detachment,  was  thrown  forward  to  reconnoitre,  for  the  rest 
of  Stuart's  cavalry  were  with  Jackson.  He  dashed  into  the  village, 
but  was  soon  driven  out  by  overwhelming  numbers,  and  he  endea 
vored,  but  without  success,  to  entice  them  into  an  ambuscade 
prepared  for  them  by  General  Longstreet.  During  the  skirmishing 
which  took  place  with  the  Federal  cavalry,  several  prisoners  were 
captured,  from  whom  information  was  gained  that  Lieutenant  Payne 
had  struck  Buford's  Brigade  of  Federal  cavalry,  who,  having  cap 
tured  some  of  Jackson's  stragglers,  had  heard  from  them,  for  the 
first  time,  of  his  movement.  The  next  day  General  Lee  reached 
Thorough  fare  gap,  but  did  not  succeed  in  forcing  a  passage  through 
it  till  late  in  the  evening.  During  the  entire  day  he  was  uneasy 
for  Jackson's  safety,  and,  in  the  evening,  requested  Lieutenant 
Payne  to  send  him  a  soldier  who  was  acquainted  with  the  passes  of 
Bull  Run  mountains.  The  man  was  stripped  of  all  the  indicia  of  a 
soldier,  and,  dressed  in  the  garb  of  a  countryman,  was  mounted  on 
a  lame  horse  and  a  wagon  saddle.  Thus  equipped,  he  was  started 
with  a  dispatch  for  Jackson,  concealed  on  his  person,  and  was 
directed,  at  every  hazard,  and  with  all  celerity,  to  deliver  it. 

Later,  Lee  directed  Lieutenant  Payne  to  make  a  reconnoissance 
to  the  rear  of  the  force  opposing  him  at  Thoroughfare  gap,  and 
report  without  delay.  Taking  with  him  a  party  of  five  or  six 
trusty  men,  the  gallant  officer  made  a  detour  to  the  right,  and 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  turnpike,  which  connects  Warrenton  with 
Alexandria,  near  Xew  Baltimore,  about  nine  o'clock  at  night. 
From  that  point,  he  proceeded  down  the  turnpike,  and,  mixing  with 
the  enemy,  discovered  that  they  were  retiring  rapidly  toward  Gaines 
ville.  This  highly  important  information  he  quickly  communicated 
to  the  Confederate  general,  at  the  residence  of  Colonel  Robert 
Beverlv.  The  next  day,  about  noon,  in  advance  of  Lon^street's 

i  v  >  O 

march,  this  detachment  of  the  Black  Horse  opened  communications 


600  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

with  Jackson's  Corps,  near  Groveton,  a  place  on  the  TTarrenton 
turnpike,  below  New  Baltimore.  As  soon  as  the  two  corps  of  the 
Confederate  army  were  again  united,  Lieutenant  Payne,  with  his 
detachment,  was  ordered  to  report  to  his  command.  The  Black 
Horse,  thus  consolidated,  took  part  in  the  great  battle  of  the  30th, 
the  Second  Manassas,  in  which  General  Pope  was  as  disastrously 
defeated  as  McDowell  had  been  on  the  same  ground.  In  this 
engagement,  many  members  of  the  Black  Horse  were  fatally 
wounded,  among  them  Erasmus  Helm,  Jr.,  than  whom  there  was 
no  braver  soldier  nor  more  charming  gentleman. 

The  second  battle  of  Manasses  continued  through  three  days, 
and  was  unsurpassed  for  severity  by  any  fought  during  this  bloody 
war.  The  effect  of  the  heavy  rain,  which  had  prevented  Lee  from 
crossing  his  army  at  the  Fauquier  Springs,  was  now  experienced  in 
all  its  force ;  for  Pope,  in  this  prolonged  struggle,  was  heavily 
reinforced  from  McClellan's  army  transported  from  Harrison's  Land 
ing,  which  could  not  have  been  done  had  the  battle  taken  place  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  Rappahannock  according,  as  we  have  seen,  to 
Lee's  first  design.  The  Federal  army,  having  been  routed  from 
every  position  it  had  occupied  in  the  battle,  retreated  into  the  strongly 
intrenched  camp  at  Centreville,  whose  fortifications  had  been  con 
structed  by  the  combined  skill  of  Johnston  and  Beauregard  during 
the  first  winter  of  the  war,  and  now  a  second  time  offered  its  shelter 
to  a  broken,  defeated  and  demoralized  Federal  army.  On  Sunday 
morning,  while  the  victorious  army  was  recruiting  its  wearied  virtue 
and  binding  up  its  wounds,  Lee  and  Jackson,  sitting  on  a  fallen  tree, 
were  engaged  in  close  consultation.  Their  horses  were  grazing  at  a 
short  distance,  when  an  alarm  was  given  that  the  Federal  cavalry 
were  approaching.  The  two  generals  sprang  for  their  horses,  but 
failed  to  secure  them,  and  in  doing  so  Lee  fell  forward  and  so  injured 
his  hands  as  to  be  compelled  to  ride  in  an  ambulance  through  the 
ensuing  Maryland  campaign  with  his  hands  bandaged  and  in  a  sling. 
At  this  critical  moment  two  privates  of  the  Black  Horse  tendered 
their  horses  and  the  officers  were  again  mounted.  But  it  proved  to 
be  a  false  alarm.  At  noon  the  Confederates  began  to  march  to 
Pope's  rear,  at  Centreville,  passing  Sudley  church  and  Cub  run 
bridge,  the  object  being  again  to  interrupt  Pope's  communications, 
and  compel  a  renewal  of  the  conflict.  When  the  Federal  general 
discovered  this  movement  he  moved  out  of  the  ramparts  at  Centre 
ville,  and  with  disorganized  masses  recommenced  his  retreat  toward 
the  Potomac.  From  the  crest  of  a  high  hill  Jackson  saw  the  retreat 
ing  columns,  and,  at  the  same  time,  observed  a  detachment  of  the 


THE  BLACK  HORSE  CA  T  'A  L  E  Y.  (]  0 1 

Federal  army  as  it  was  taking  position  behind  the  Independent  and 
unfinished  Manassas  Railroad.  This  was  evidently  a  force  thrown 
out  to  protect  the  Federal  retreat.  Jackson  immediately  attacked  it, 
but  wirh  an  inadequate  force,  and  the  tight  at  Chantilly  took  place, 
which  lasted  until  night.  It  is  left  to  the  future  historian  to  inquire 
why  the  entire  strength  of  the  Confederate  army  was  not  employed 
against  the  retreating  columns  of  the  enemy.  Perhaps  it  was  because 
Fate  had  declared  against  the  establishment  of  the  Southern  Repub 
lic,  and  it  was  by  such  means  that  her  conclusions  were  to  be 
wrought  out. 

Flushed  by  this  victory,  it  was  determined  to  cross  the  Potomac 
and  carry  the  war  into  the  enemy's  country.  If  this  military  policy 
had  been  adopted  as  promptly  after  the  first  victory  at  Manassas,  it 
is  clear  that  the  Confederate  States  would  have  been  triumphant  in 
the  war.  The  sound  policy  of  secession  would  then  have  been  vindica 
ted,  and  have  marked  the  beginning  of  a  great  nation  instead  of  being 
hawked  at  as  a  "perfidious  bark  built  in  the  eclipse"  that  lias 
wrecked  the  fortunes  of  a  people. 

The  army  marched  for  Edwards'  ferry.  Along  the  route  tlicre 
was  manifested  by  the  people  the  greatest  curiosity  and  desire  to  see 
their  great  General — "Stonewall  Jackson,"  as  he  had  been  baptized 
on  the  battle-field.  Groups  would  be  collected  on  the  road,  composed 
of  all  ages  and  both  sexes,  black  and  white  crowded  together.  Y\  nen 
Jackson  would  be  pointed  out  to  them  they  would  send  up  a  great 
shout,  and  the  General,  lifting  his  cap,  would  gallop  away  from  the 
applause.  In  this  connection  an  amusing  incident  occurred  which 
created  no  little  merriment,  and  exemplifies  the  liberties  his  soldiers 
would  sometimes  take  with  "Old  Stonewall/'  as  they  called  their 
darling.  The  IVlaek  Horse  sent  forward  one  of  their  members  to  ride 
as  near  to  Jackson  as  military  etiquette  would  allow.  .He  was,  by  all 
odds,  the  ugliest  fellow  in  the  command  ;  indeed,  the  Black  Horse 
used  to  brag  that  he  was  the  ugliest  fellow  in  either  army.  AVhen 
the  next  admiring  crowd  was  passed,  and  they  demanded  to  see  the 
great  captain,  this  soldier  was  pointed  out  to  them.  AVhen  they 
shouted  and  cheered  he  halted,  and,  with  the  utmost  complaisance, 
received  their  compliments.  Jackson,  of  course,  had  galloped  on  as 
usual.  AVhen  the  General,  turnino-  in  his  saddle,  saw  what  was  Groins 

O  <"?  £"> 

on  he  was  greatly  amused,  and  the  joke  was  repeated  until  the  nov 
elty  wore  off. 

The  Black  Horse  accompanied  Jackson  in  his  expedition  to 
William  sport,  Martinsburg,  and  Harper's  Ferry.  At  the  latter  place 
he  employed  the  pen  of  Lieutenant  A.  D.  Payne  to  copy  his  order 


602  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAE. 

of  assault  to  be  delivered  to  his  officers — orders  which  were  never 
acted  on,  as  the  place  was  surrendered  hefore  the  assaulting  columns 
began  their  work.  The  General  remained  at  Harper's  Ferry  till  a 
late  hour  of  the  night,  disposing  of  the  prisoners  and  the  material  of 
war  which  he  had  captured.  lie  then  started,  escorted  by  Lieutenant 
Payne,  with  a  detachment  of  twenty  of  his  command,  to  reach  Lee's 
headquarters  at  Sharpsburg,  leaving  his  army  to  follow.  At  day 
break,  a  little  out  of  the  town,  the  party  halted,  and  built  a  fire  in  a 
skirt  of  woods.  Here  Jackson  slept  while  a  party  was  sent  to  dis 
cover  the  position  of  Lee's  headquarters.  As  soon  as  this  fact  was 
reported  to  him  he  joined  the  general  commanding.  The  next  day 
the  battle  of  Sharpsburg  was  fought,  during  which  the  Black  Horse 
acted  as  aides  and  couriers.  In  Jackson's  report  of  this  campaign  he 
extols  the  conduct  of  this  command,  naming  and  complimenting  its 
officers. 

When  the  Confederate  army  recrossed  the  Potomac,  General 
Stuart  made  strenuous  efforts  to  have  the  Black  Horse  restored  to 
the  cavalry  division.  He  wanted  them  to  accompany  his  raid  around 
McClellan's  army  at  Harper's  Ferry,  where  it  lay  gathering  strength 
for  another  invasion  of  Virginia.  But  Jackson  would  not  agree  to 
Stuart's  proposal.  He  said :  "  I  know  the  Black  Horse,  and  can 
employ  the  greater  part  of  the  command  for  staff  duty."  In  this 
raid  Stuart  took  with  him  fifteen  squadrons  of  horse,  composed  of 
details  from  his  regiments,  one  of  which  the  writer  of  this  com 
manded.  The  raiders  crossed  an  obscure  ford  of  the  Potomac,  above 
Harper's  Ferry,  General  Wade  Hampton,  with  a  battery  of  horse 
artillery,  being  in  the  van,  and  camped  that  night  at  Chambcrsburg. 
The  next  day  they  passed  through  Emmettsburg  on  their  return  to 
the  Potomac,  and,  marching  all  night,  early  the  ensuing  day  reached 
White's  ford  of  the  Potomac,  below  Harper's  Ferry,  having  thus 
made  the  circuit  of  the  Federal  army.  But  here  Stuart  encountered 
a  formidable  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  stationed  to  oppose  his 
passage  of  the  river.  Without  hesitation,  and  with  that  undaunted 
courage  which  he  showed  on  every  battle-field,  he  drove  the  enemy 
before  him,  rapidly  threw  his  command  over  the  river,  without  so 
much  as  losing  a  horse-shoe,  and  marched  off  for  the  army  headquar 
ters  as  the  artillery  of  the  enemy  was  taking  position  on  the  heights 
he  had  just  evacuated.  As  he  passed  their  camps  the  infantry  cheered 
him,  a  compliment  they  were  always  slow  to  pay  the  cavalry. 

When  McClellan  crossed  the  river  at  Harper's  Ferry,  Lee  was 
encamped  at  Winchester.  Jackson  then  restored  the  Black  Horse 
to  its  place  in  the  cavalry  division,  for  Stuart  was  ordered  to  throw 


THE  BLACK  HOUSE  CAVALRY.  603 

himself  in  front  of  the  advancing  columns  of  McClellan,  and  delay 
his  march  until  Lee  could  again  interpose  between  the  Federal  army 
and  Richmond.  In  obedience  to  this  order,  Stuart  crossed  the  P>lne 
Ridge  into  London  county,  and  heavily  skirmished  with  the  Federal 
advance  through  that  county  and  Upper  Fauquier.  At  Union,  near 
the  dividing  line  of  the  counties,  he  held  his  position  so  well  that  it 
was  nut  until  the  evening  of  the  second  day  that  he  was  compelled 
to  relinquish  it.  At  Upperville,  Markham,  and  Barbee's  cross-roads, 
Stuart  made  stands  until  compelled  to  retreat  by  the  pressure  of 
numbers.  In  the  meantime,  Lee  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge,  at  Chester 
gap.  and  took  position  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Rappahannock.  He 
was  there  informed  that  McClellan  had  been  relieved,  and  Burnside 
promoted  to  the  command  of  the  Federal  army,  and  that  he  had 
indicated  his  intention  of  marching  toward  Fredericksbnrg.  Lee 
again  put  his  army  in  motion,  and  posted  it  on  the  Spottsylvania 
Heights,  at  Fredericksburg,  and  confronted  Burnside  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river.  The  LTiiion  army  again  suffered  defeat,  and  again 
changed  its  general. 

In  the  winter  of  1863,  while  General  Hooker  was  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  Rappahannock,  the  Black  Horse  was  detached  from  the 
Fourth  Virginia  Cavalry,  and  ordered  to  Lower  Fauquier  and  Staf 
ford  county  to  report  the  enemy's  movements  to  General  Lee. 
During  this  time  the  command  performed  many  brilliant  exploits  in 
its  numerous  encounters  with  the  enemy,  captured  three  hundred 
prisoners,  and  minutely  reported  Hooker's  movements.  Its  services 
were  handsomely  acknowledged  by  General  Lee  and  General  Stuart 
in  general  orders. 

An  incident  that  occurred  at  this  time  illustrates  the  nature  of 
this  service.  General  Fitz  Lee,  with  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  had 
crossed  the  Rappahannock,  at  Kelly's  ford,  and  moving  down  the 
north  bank  of  the  river,  had  driven  the  enemy's  pickets  to  Avithin 
three  miles  of  Falmouth.  At  Ilartwood  church  he  captured  a 
number  of  prisoners,  and  detailing  a  guard  of  men,  whose  horses 
were  in  a  weak  and  crippled  condition,  ordered  Lieutenant  A.  D. 
Payne  to  take  command  and  conduct  them  to  the  army,  crossing  at 
the  United  States  ford.  But  he  informed  him  that  he  woidd,  in  all 
probability,  fall  in  with  a  company  of  Confederate  cavalry  which  had 
been  on  picket.  After  proceeding  about  two  miles,  Lieutenant 
Payne  came  suddenly  on  a  body  of  cavalry  drawn  up  in  the  road, 
and  discovered,  after  calling  to  know  to  which  flag  they  belonged, 
that  they  were  a  squadron  of  the  enemy.  He  immediately  turned 
about,  and,  ordering  the  guard  to  shoot  any  prisoner  who  should 


C04  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

attempt  to  escape,  endeavored  to  return  to  Fitz  Lee.  Finding  him 
self  rapidly  pursued,  he  turned  off  the  main  road,  but  soon  encoun 
tered,  drawn  up  in  line,  another  force  of  Federal  cavalry.  lie 
passed  very  near  to  them,  and,  much  to  his  relief,  succeeded  in 
reaching  his  brigade.  There  he  informed  Major  Morgan,  of  the 
First  Virginia  Cavalry,  of  the  perils  he  had  escaped,  and  directed 
him  to  the  place  where  he  would  find  the  squadron  he  had  last  seen. 
Major  Morgan  at  once,  with  an  adequate  force,  repaired  to  the  spot, 
finding  the  enemy  occupying  the  same  position,  who  at  once  sur 
rendered.  Wlien  Morgan  returned  with  his  prisoners,  Lieutenant 
Payne  inquired  of  their  commander  why  he  did  not  attempt  to 
rescue  the  prisoners.  The  officer  replied,  "I  was  only  waiting  to 
surrender,  for  we  were  all  too  much  excited  to  see  that  the  greater 
part  of  your  force  were  prisoners."  Lieutenant  Payne  replied  :  "I 
was  not  quite  that  far  gone ;  but  if  you  had  made  an  attack  I  should 
have  been  compelled  to  withdraw  the  guard  and  let  the  prisoners 
go." 

.  When  Fitz  Lee  returned  to  his  position  on  the  left  flank  of  the 
army,  Captain  Randolph,  again  in  command  of  the  Black  Horse, 
gave  permission  to  ten  or  a  dozen  of  the  men  to  follow  the  march 
of  the  enemy  toward  Fredericksburg  and  pick  up  stragglers  and 
horses.  This  they  did  for  some  distance,  but  finding  neither  men 
nor  horses,  the  party  returned.  Two  of  them,  however,  "  Old  Blaze  " 
and  Joe  Boteler,  concluded  to  follow  the  hunt  yet  longer.  A  narra 
tive  of  their  adventures  may  prove  interesting,  and  will  at  least  show 
how  such  work  may  be  done.  Near  the  Stafford  line  they  stopped 
at  Mrs.  II.'s  and  applied  to  have  their  canteens  filled  with  brandy. 
This  the  old  lady  positively  refused  to  do,  saying :  "  You  are  in 
danger  enough,  without  adding  to  it  by  drink."  But  she  relented 
when  they  promised  to  bring  her  back  "  six  Yankees." 

And  this  is  how  they  complied  with  their  engagement.  Between 
Spotted  tavern  and  Hartwood  church,  the  scouts  charged  with  a  yell 
a  small  party  of  the  enemy  and  succeeded  each  in  capturing  a  mounted 
cavalryman.  These  prisoners  were  disarmed  and  dismounted,  and 
ordered  to  remain  on  the  roadside  until  the  captors  should  return.  To 
induce  them  to  do  so,  they  were  told  that  there  was  a  force  in  the  woods 
who  would  capture  them  if  they  attempted  to  escape.  Depositing  the 
arms  and  horses  with  a  citizen,  the  scouts  continued  their  ride  in  the 
same  direction.  Soon  they  came  in  sight  of  the  rear  guard  of  a 
cavalry  force,  and,  taking  advantage  of  a  body  of  wood  to  conceal 
their  numbers,  charged  with  a  shout.  This  hurried  the  retreat,  and 
two  of  them,  who  had  straggled,  were  taken  prisoners.  A  little 


THE  BLACK  HOUSE  CAVALRY.  G05 

further  on  they  met  a  soldier  in  blue,  who  proved  to  be  an  Irish 
man,  and  not  suspecting  an  enemy,  was  easily  added  to  their  list  of 
captures,  lie-tracing  their  steps,  they  called  for  the  hoives  and  arms 
they  had  left,  and,  to  their  surprise,  found  their  rirst  capture  waiting 
for  them  bv  the  wayside.  Remounting  them  on  their  own  steeds, 
thev  met  a,  little  bov,  who  informed  them  that  there  were  "  three 
Yankee  cavalrymen''  at  his  uncle's,  who  lived  a  mile  from  the  road. 
The  horses  were  a  temptation  which  the  scouts  could  not  resist,  but 
the  difficulty  was  how  to  dispose  of  their  rive  prisoners  while  they 
went  to  secure  them.  Knowing  two  ladies  zealous  for  the  cause, 
they  prevailed  upon  them  to  furnish  a  supper  for  the  captured 
soldiers,  but  to  delay  in  its  preparation  until  their  return.  As  for 
tune  would  have  it,  there  were  at  the  house  two  citizens  who  we're 
charged  with  having  taken  the  oath.  The  captured  horses  and  arms 
having  been  secreted,  with  the  exception  of  two  carbines,  these  were 
loaded  and  given  to  the  suspected  citizens,  and  they  were  ordered  to 
stand  guard  at  the  door.  They  were  frankly  told  of  the  suspicion 
that  attached  to  them,  and  that  if  they  allowed  the  prisoners  to 
escape  they  would  be  sent  to  Castle  Thunder.  The  scouts  followed 
their  boy  guide  to  his  uncle's  gate.  One  of  them  entered  by  the 
front  door  while  his  companion  went  around  to  the  rear.  As  he 
entered  the  sitting-room  on  the  first  iloor  he  found  three  I'uioii 
soldiers.  They  sprang  for  their  arms,  Avhich  they  had  left  in  the 
hall,  but  the  other  scout  coming  to  his  companion's  assistance,  thev 
were  forced  to  surrender.  One  of  them  proved  to  be  a  courier  of 
Colonel  Kellogg,  of  the  Eighteenth  Pennsylvania,  and  had  on  his 
person  valuable  dispatches.  The  next  step  was  to  secure  the  horses, 
which  having  done,  the  Confederates  returned  with  their  additional 
prisoners  and  relieved  the  citizen  guard.  Supper  over,  the  party 
started  for  the  Confederate  camp,  but  stopped  at  a  house  on  the 
road,  where  the  prisoners  were  allowed  to  >leep  until  daylight. 
Passing  Mrs.  JL.'s,  where  they  had  been  supplied  with  their  brandy, 
they  exhibited  their  eight  prisoners,  two  more  than  they  had 
promised  to  bring.  As  they  entered  camp  with  their  captures,  they 
were  warmly  congratulated  by  their  comrades,  and  sent  forward  by 
Captain  Randolph  to  General  Stuart's  headquarters.  AVhen  told  of 
the  adventures  of  the  scouts,  the  General  expressed  great  satisfaction, 
but  remarked  it  was  the  first  time  in  his  experience  he  had  ever 
known  whisky  or  brandy  entitled  to  be  put  on  the  credit  side  of  the 
sheet. 

In  the  ensuing  campaign  of  1S03,  the  Black  Horse  constituted 
a  part  of  Stuart's  cavalry  division,  and  participated  in  the  battle  of 


G06  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Cliancellorsville,  the  severe  fight  at  Brandy  Station,  and  in  all  the 
movements  conducted  by  Stuart  to  mask  the  movements  of  Lee's 
army  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia  as  it  was  being  marched  for  the 
invasion  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania.  At  Aldie,  in  the  county 
of  Loudon,  the  Black  Horse,  under  command  of  Lieutenant  A.  I). 
Payne,  covered  itself  with  glory.  The  Southern  cavalry  had  been 
pressing  the  pursuit  from  the  direction  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  during 
the  day,  and  had  brought  the  enemy  to  a  stand  at  a  point  on  the 
Middleburg  road  two  miles  from  Aldie,  and  at  an  equal  distance 
from  that  place  on  the  Snickersville  road,  these  two  roads  converg 
ing  at  Aldie.  Colonel  Mumford  was  in  advance  with  the  Fourth 
Regiment,  the  Black  Horse  being  the  leading  squadron.  He  halted 
his  command,  and  taking  with  him  two  pieces  of  artillery,  he  ordered 
Lieutenant  A.  D.  Payne  to  follow  with  his  command.  He  posted 
the  artillery  on  a  prominent  point  in  the  angle  formed  by  the  two 
roads,  and  commenced  firing  011  the  enemy  who  were  advancing  in 
large  numbers  on  the  Snickersville  turnpike.  To  capture  the  guns 
placed  in  this  exposed  position  the  Federals  sent  forward  a  regiment 
of  Massachusetts  infantry.  In  this  critical  position  of  his  guns,  Colonel 
Munf ord  ordered  Lieutenant  Payne,  who  had  not  with  him  more  than 
thirty  of  his  men,  the  rest  being  scattered  as  videttes,  to  charge  the 
advancing  column  of  cavalry,  but  never  expecting,  as  he  afterward 
said,  to  see  one  of  them  return  alive.  Lieutenant  Payne  formed  his 
men  in  the  turnpike  in  a  column  of  fours,  and  down  upon  the  enemy 
he  rode  wTith  a  loud  cheer,  the  dust  concealing  the  insignificant  nature 
of  his  force.  The  regiment,  thus  deceived  by  the  boldness  and  im 
petuosity  of  the  attack,  fired  at  random  and  was  thrown  into  confu 
sion.  A  number  of  prisoners  were  captured  before  they  discovered 
their  error,  and  returned  to  the  attack.  But  the  object  of  the  cavalry 
charge  had  been  attained  and  the  guns  were  withdrawn  in  safety, 
and  the  timely  arrival  of  the  rest  of  the  brigade  saved  the  detach 
ment  from  destruction. 

When  Stuart  discovered  Hooker's  intention  to  cross  the  Poto 
mac  at  Edwards'  ferry,  he  left  two  brigades  of  cavalry  posted  between 
Lee  and  the  Federal  army  to  continue  to  perform  outpost -duty,  while 
with  the  rest  of  his  division  he  moved  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  and  placed  himself  between  the  Federal  army  and  Washing 
ton.  This  he  effected,  crossing  the  Bull  Run  mountain,  and,  after 
raiding  through  Prince  "William  and  Fairfax  counties,  recrossed  the 
railroad  at  Burk's  Station,  where  he  found  a  large  store  of  forage  of 
great  value  to  his  tired  animals.  From  this  point  he  marched  to 
the  Potomac,  at  Senecca  falls,  where,  as  the  fording  was  deep,  the 


THE  BLACK  HORSE  CAVALRY.  GOT 

caissons  were  emptied  and  the  bombshells  carried  over  by  cavalrymen 
in  their  hands.  After  capturing  a  canalboat  laden  with  commissary 
stores,  Stuart  proceeded  to  Ilockville,  in  the  direction  of  Washington 
City.  Here  a  large  Union  Hag  was  flying,  which  he  would  not 
allow  his  men  to  pull  down,  saying  he  was  not  fighting  the  flag,  but 
his  real  motive  was  that  he  wanted  it  as  a  decoy.  From  llockville 
several  regiments  were  sent  in  the  direction  of  Washington,  who 
captured  the  long  wagon-train  so  often  spoken  of  in  connection  with 
this  campaign.  It  was  drawn  by  more  than  an  hundred  mules,  and 
seemed  a  rich  prize  ;  but  it  proved  in  the  end  a  serious  disadvantage, 
for  it  retarded  the  movements  of  the  command,  beside  requiring 
a  large  detail  of  men.  This  raid  produced  great  consternation  among 
the  enemy,  and  drew  from  Meade's  army  all  his  available  cavalry  to 
oppose  it.  But  for  this  encumbrance  Stuart  could  to  better  advant 
age  have  engaged  the  enemy,  and  destroyed,  or,  at  least,  interrupted 
the  communications  with  Washington  and  Baltimore.  At  Westmin 
ster,  eighteen  miles  west  of  Baltimore,  the  Fourth  Virginia  Regiment 
charged  a  regiment  of  Federal  cavalry,  driving  a  portion  of  it  toward 
Baltimore,  and  the  rest  toward  Frederick.  From  this  point  Stuart  pro 
ceeded  to  Hanover,  in  Pennsylvania,  where  he  engaged  a  large  cavalry 
force  under  General  Kilpatrick.  In  this  tight  the  Second  Xorth  Caro 
lina  Regiment  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  AVilliam  II. 
Payne,  formerly  captain  of  the  Hlack  Horse.  He  bore  himself  with 
conspicuous  gallantry,  and  was  taken  prisoner  in  a  charge  which  he 
led,  the  regiment  sustaining  considerable  loss  in  killed  and  wounded. 
The  effort  of  Kilpatrick  to  detain  Stuart  was  foiled  by  this  fight,  and 
he  moved  on  to  Carlisle  barracks,  which,  with  his  artillery,  he  set  on 
fire.  From  Carlisle  the  Southern  cavalry  marched  to  Gettysburg, 
and  took  position  on  Lee's  left,  near  Huntersville.  They  took  part 
in  the  battle  on  the  memorable  3d  of  July,  18(53,  in  which  the  South 
ern  Confederacy  received  its  death  wound.  Upon  Meade's  advance 
into  Virginia,  Lee  retired  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Rapidan,  with 
headquarters  at  Orange  Court-House,  where  he  remained  until 
October  llth.  Tie  then  determined  to  assume  the  offensive. 

With  this  intent  he  ordered  General  Fitz  Lee,  with  whom  the 
Black  Horse  was  serving,  to  cross  the  Rapidan  at  Raccoon  and  Mor 
ton's  fords,  where  he  found  himself  face  to  face  with  Buford's 
cavalry  division.  In  the  fight  which  ensued,  the  Black  Horse  lost 
some  of  its  bravest  men,  and  the  Fourth  Virginia  two  of  its  most 
gallant  officers.  This  spirited  attack,  combined  with  an  attack  by 
General  Lomax's  Brigade,  compelled  Buford's  retreat  to  the  direction 
of  Stevensburg,  closely  pursued  by  Lomax.  Captain  Randolph,  in 


608  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

command  of  the  Black  Horse,  with  some  other  men  from  the  regi 
ment,  arrived  at  Stevensburg  as  the  Third  Virginia  Cavalry  had  been 
repulsed.  Being  in  line  of  battle  he  charged  the  Federals  with  great 
spirit,  and  drove  them  back  on  their  dismounted  line.  Captain 
Randolph  then  ordered  his  men  to  fall  back  a  few  hundred  yards  in 
an  open  field,  and  there  rallied  them  around  their  colors,  under  a 
heavy  fire  of  the  enemy.  By  this  gallant  conduct  a  large  number  of 
the  Third  Virginia,  with  their  lieutenant  colonel,  were  rescued.  For 
this  service  General  Fitz  Lee  complimented  Captain  Randolph  in 
high  terms,  and  said  it  was  the  most  beautiful  sight  he  had  ever 
witnessed.  This  commendation  was  greatly  valued  by  the  command, 
but  it  had  been  dearly  bought  by  the  loss  of  many  of  its  bravest 
members.  General  Fitz  Lee  continued  the  pursuit  of  Meade  as  far  as 
Bull  run,  who,  occasionally,  turned  upon  his  pursuers,  and  punished 
their  audacity,  as  at  Bristow  Station.  General  R.  E.  Lee  fell  back 
to  the  Rappahannock,  General  Fitz  Lee  on  the  railroad,  and  Stuart, 
with  Hampton's  Division,  on  the  turnpike,  bringing  up  the  rear. 
As  soon  as  Fitz  Lee  crossed  the  river  he  sent  two  of  the  Black 
Horse  back  to  watch  the  enemy's  advance,  and  report  his  progress 
in  rebuilding  the  railroad,  but  with  permission  to  take  any  other 
men  with  them  they  might  select.  They  crossed  the  river  and 
recruited  Sergeant  Joseph  Reid,  of  the  Black  Horse,  a  man  remark 
able  even  in  that  army  and  in  that  command  for  sagacity,  calmness 
in  the  moment  of  danger,  and  a  lion-like  courage.  Having  collected 
much  valuable  information  the  party  reported  to  General  Fitz  Lee, 
who  ordered  Sergeant  Reid  to  take  command -of  his  scouts  operating 
in  Lower  Fauquier,  Prince  William,  and  Stafford  counties.  So  well 
did  he  perform  this  hazardous  service,  that  he  has  left  with  the 
people  of  those  localities  many  a  thrilling  tale  of  his  daring  and  hair 
breadth  escapes.  In  consequence  of  information  sent  by  Sergeant 
Reid,  that  the  Federal  army  was  moving  toward  the  Rappahannock, 
furnished  with  eight  days'  cooked  rations,  and  sixty  rounds  of  ammu 
nition,  General  Lee  withdrew  to  the  south  side  of  the  Rapidan. 
During  this  movement  Meade  advanced  to  Mine  run,  in  Spottsylva- 
nia,  where  an  undecided  affair  took  place  between  the  two  armies, 
the  Fourth  Virginia  Cavalry  holding  Roberson's  ford  on  the  Rapidan 
and  repelling  the  efforts  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  to  effect  a  passage  of 
the  river  at  that  point.  From  this  point  the  Black  Horse,  with  the 
exception  of  Sergeant  Reid's  party,  wrere  sent  to  Upper  Fauquier 
and  Loudon  counties  to  observe  and  report  the  enemy's  movements, 
on  which  duty  they  remained  during  the  winter,  at  the  close  of 
which  they  were  ordered  to  report  to  the  regiment  at  Orange  Court- 


THE  BLACK  HORSE  CAVALRY.  609 

House.  In  the  spring  of  1864,  before  Grant,  who  now  commanded 
the  Union  army,  began  his  forward  movement,  General  Sedgwick 
made  a  reconnoissance  in  force  in  the  direction  of  Madison  Court- 
House,  and  was  met  by  A.  P.  Hill's  Corps.  In  the  collision  which 
ensued  Second  Lieutenant  Marshall  James,  one  of  the  most  gallant 
officers  of  the  Black  Horse,  with  a  small  detachment,  greatly  distin 
guished  himself.  In  the  latter  part  of  April  the  cavalry  corps 
marched  to  Fredericksburg  and  took  position  on  the  right  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  In  May  they  broke  camp  to  meet 
Grant's  advance  from  Culpepper  into  the  Wilderness  by  way  of 
Germanna  ford. 

On  the  4th  and  5th  of  May  were  fought  the  battles  of  the  Wil 
derness,  after  which  Grant  commenced  upon  Richmond  his  cele 
brated  movement  by  his  left  flank.  The  Black  Horse  engaged  in 
the  desperate  lighting  which  lasted  for  several  days,  in  which  the 
cavalry  was  employed  to  stem  the  torrent  of  Grant's  advance  until 
the  infantry  could  be  marched  around  to  his  front.  During  these 
engagements  the  Black  Horse  lost  heavily  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners.  Among  the  latter  was  a  young  Englishman  by  the  name 
of  Alston,  who  had  crossed  the  sea  to  join  this  command.  He  was 
as  gallant,  in  army  phrase,  as  they  make  them,  and  true  to  the  cause 
for  which  he  had  staked  his  life.  While  in  prison  his  friends  in 
England  sought  to  procure  his  release,  and  the  Federal  authorities 
were  willing  to  set  him  at  liberty  upon  condition  of  his  returning 
home  and  taking  no  further  part  in  the  war.  But  Alston  would  not 
consent  to  be  separated  from  his  comrades.  He  was,  in  due  course 
of  time,  exchanged,  but  died  in  Richmond  before  he  could  rejoin 
his  command. 

On  Sunday,  May  8th,  the  Southern  cavalry  were  driven  back 
to  a  position  near  Spottsylvania  Court-House,  where  they  formed  a 
thin  screen,  behind  which  the  infantry  was  concealed.  The  enemy 
advanced  in  full  confidence  of  encountering  only  the  force  they  had 
been  driving,  from  cover  to  cover,  since  earliest  dawn,  but  they  were 
met  by  a  murderous  fire  from  a  long  line  of  battle,  which  sent  some 
of  them  to  the  rear,  but  stretched  most  of  them  on  the  field.  The 
day  after  the  battle  of  Spottsylvania  Court-House,  Captain  A.  D. 
Payne  ordered  two  of  his  chosen  scouts  to  report  for  duty  to  the 
general  commanding.  They  were  directed  to  approach  as  near 
Chancellorsville  as  possible  and  report  whether  the  troops  that  had 
been  stationed  at  that  point  had  been  moved  toward  Spottsylvania 
Court-House,  and  to  discover,  if  possible,  at  what  point  Grant  was 
concentrating  his  army.  The  scouts,  being  entirely  unacquainted 
39 


610  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

with  the  country,  were  sent  to  General  Early,  in  the  hope  of  obtain 
ing  a  guide.  But  while  Early  could  not  furnish  them  a  guide,  he 
concerted  with  them  signals,  which,  being  communicated  to  the 
pickets,  would  enable  them  to  re-enter  his  camp  at  any  hour  of  the 
night,  and  himself  conducted  them  through  the  lines  of  General 
Joe  Davis'  Brigade.  Protected  by  the  darkness,  they  soon  found 
themselves  in  the  midst  of  Grant's  moving  army,  and  made  the 
discovery  that  the  troops  from  Chancellorsville  had  been  moved  up 
to  Spottsylvania  Court-House,  and  that  the  centre  of  Grant's  camp 
was  south  thirty  degrees  east  from  a  particular  house  which  had  been 
marked  on  General  Lee's  diagram  of  the  country,  and  furthermore 
that  the  Federals  were  throwing  up  earthworks.  As  soon  as  this 
information  was  communicated  to  General  Lee,  he  turned  to  his  map, 
and,  drawing  the  line  as  the  scout  had  reported,  appeared  greatlv 
pleased.  He  said  to  the  officers  around  him :  "  I  am  in  the  right 
position." 

On  the  evening  of  the  9th,  the  cavalry  followed  Sheridan  in  his 
raid  on  Richmond,  and  had  desperate  fighting  with  his  rear  guard. 
On  the  10th,  the  Black  Horse,  under  command  of  Captain  A.  D. 
Payne,  charged  a  party  of  the  enemy  and  captured  a  number  of 
prisoners.  On  the  llth,  the  Confederate  cavalry,  still  in  pursuit  of 
Sheridan,  renewed  the  fight  at  the  Yellow  tavern,  near  Richmond, 
in  which  General  Stuart  was  mortally  wounded.  On  the  12th,  they 
engaged  the  head  of  Sheridan's  column,  at  Meadow  bridge,  on  the 
Chickahominy,  but,  overwhelmed  by  the  weight  of  superior  num 
bers,  were  compelled  to  withdraw.  In  the  execution  of  this  order, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Randolph,  a  former  captain  of  the  Black  Horse, 
was  instantly  killed.  A  braver  and  more  beloved  officer  never  per 
ished  on  the  field. 

On  Grant's  arrival  near  Richmond,  a  desperate  engagement 
occurred  near  Harris'  shop,  in  which  the  Southern  cavalry  behaved 
with  great  gallantry,  fighting  for  many  hours  as  infantry,  and  for 
the  greater  part  of  the  day  resisted  and  obstructed  the  advance  of 
Grant's  whole  army,  until  Lee  had  time  to  get  his  troops  up  from 
his  line  of  battle  and  deliver  the  heavy  blow  which  the  next  day  he 
inflicted  on  the  Federal  army  at  the  Second  Cold  Harbor.  In  this 
sanguinary  engagement  the  Black  Horse  lost  more  than  half  the 
men  taken  into  action. 

Soon  after,  at  Trevellyann's  Station,  General  Hampton  fought, 
perhaps,  the  bloodiest  cavalry  fight  of  the  war,  in  which  the  Fourth 
Virginia  Regiment  behaved  with  conspicuous  gallantry,  sustaining 
again  a  heavy  loss.  Sheridan  was  now  compelled  to  retire  upon  the 


THE  BLACK  IIORSE  CAVALRY.  Gil 

main  body,  harassed  by  the  Confederate  cavalry,  by  whom  he  had 
been  completely  foiled  in  his  attempt  upon  the  communications 
leading  to  Richmond  by  way  of  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad  and 
James  River  canal.  Returning  to  Lee's  army,  the  Black  Horse  were 
occupied  in  arduous  picket  duty,  and  engaged  in  daily  skirmishes, 
taking  part,  also,  in  the  overthrow  of  Wilson's  cavalry  raiders. 

In  August,  1864,  General  Fitz  Lee's  cavalry  division  was  sent 
to  reinforce  Early  in  the  Valley,  who  had  fallen  back  after  his  cam 
paign  against  Washington.  In  the  fight  at  Waynesborough  the 
Black  Horse  was  the  leading  squadron  of  the  Fourth  Regiment,  and 
was  especially  complimented  by  General  Early.  After  driving  the 
enemy  through  the  town,  the  Confederate  cavalry  halted  on  a  hill 
in  the  western  suburbs,  when  an  officer  in  the  Union  service,  Captain 
J.  A.  Bliss,  faced  his  squadron,  and,  placing  himself  at  its  head, 
ordered  a  charge.  But  his  men  follo\yed  not  their  gallant  leader. 
He,  not  looking  to  see,  or,  as  it  appeared,  caring  whether  he  was 
accompanied  by  his  command,  dashed  alone  into  the  midst  of  the 
Black  Horse.  Xo  one  fired  at  him,  the  men  not  wishing  to  kill  so 
brave  an  officer.  With  his  sabre  he  wounded  several  of  the  com 
mand,  and  some  one  knocked  him  from  his  horse,  and  might  have 
killed  him  but  for  the  interposition  of  Captain  Henry  Lee,  a  brother 
of  Fitz  Lee,  who,  observing  the  dismounted  officer  to  make  the 
Masonic  sign,  went  to  his  assistance. 

During  this  campaign,  and  after  the  affair  just  mentioned, 
George  W.  Martin  and  -  -  Campbell,  of  the  Black  Horse,  with  a 
member  of  the  First  Virginia  Regiment,  were  returning  from  a 
scout  late  in  the  evening.  It  was  raining,  and  the  soldiers  had  their 
oilcloths  thrown  over  their  shoulders,  which,  in  a  great  measure, 
concealed  their  uniform.  On  looking  back,  they  saw  three  mounted 
men  coming  up  behind  them,  whom  they  inferred  were  Union 
soldiers,  as  they  were  in  the  rear  of  Sheridan's  forces.  Drawing 
and  cocking  their  pistols,  they  rode  slowly,  that  they  might  be 
overtaken.  The  Federals — for  such  the  party  were — had  had  their 
suspicions  aroused,  and  also  prepared  for  the  fight.  As  soon  as  they 
came  alongside  of  them,  the  scouts  wheeled  and  demanded  a  sur 
render,  when  they  were  fired  upon  by  their  opponents.  They 
proved  to  be  Lieutenant  Meiggs,  of  Sheridan's  staff,  and  two 
orderlies.  Lieutenant  Meiggs'  shot  passed  through  Martin's  body, 
but  he  braced  himself,  returned  the  fire,  and  killed  MeWs.  The 

o£r> 

other  two  scouts  captured  one  of  the  orderlies.  The  other  made  his 
escape,  and  reported  to  Sheridan  that  his  party  had  been  bush 
whacked,  who,  in  retaliation,  ordered  the  burning  of  every  house 


C12  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

in  a  radius  of  five  miles.  Joshua  Martin  was  carried  to  the  house 
of  a  farmer,  where  he  was  tenderly  nursed  until  sufficiently  recovered 
to  return  to  his  home  in  Fauquier.  After  the  war  closed,  General 
Meiggs,  believing  that  his  son  had  been  assassinated,  sought  to  have 
Martin  arrested  and  tried  by  a  court-martial  for  murder ;  but  when 
the  facts,  as  above  stated,  were  certified  to  him  by  Captain  A.  D. 
Payne,  the  matter  was  dropped,  for  Lieutenant  Meiggs  had  been 
slain  in  open  and  legitimate  war.  George  W.  Martin  is  now  at 
home,  a  prosperous  agriculturist,  and  one  of  the  most  respected 
citizens  in  the  community  in  which  he  resides. 

In  the  month  of  December,  the  Black  Horse  was  ordered  into 
Hardy  county,  and  performed  hazardous  but  thankless  service 
among  the  "Swamp  Dragoons,"  as  the  disloyal  element  in  that 
county  named  itself.  They  suffered  severely  from  cold,  but  con 
sumed  large  quantities  of  pork  and  apple  brandy,  in  which,  at  that 
season,  that  inhospitable  region  abounds. 

Returning  from  this  duty,  the  command  proceeded  to  Richmond, 
where  it  remained  until  the  beginning  of  the  final  act  in  this  stupen 
dous  tragedy.  They  fought  side  by  side  with  their  brethren  of  the 
cavalry  at  Five  Forks,  who  never  displayed  a  more  indomitable  spirit 
than  in  these  closing  scenes  of  the  war.  They  were  in  the  saddle  day 
and  night,  marching  and  fighting  without  food,  and  without  sleep, 
in  the  vain  endeavor  to  protect-  the  Confederate  trains  from  the 
swarming  hordes  of  the  enemy's  cavalry.  At  High  bridge,  the 
Black  Horse  shared,  with  their  comrades  of  Fitz  Lee's  Division,  the 
last  rays  of  glory  that  fell  on  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  cap 
turing  an  infantry  brigade,  and  slaying  its  commander  on  the  field. 
Near  Farmville,  the  cavalry  repulsed  a  division  of  Gregg's  cavalry, 
which  came  upon  them  unawares,  and  nearly  succeeded  in  capturing 
General  Lee.  But,  instead,  in  this  collision,  General  Gregg  was 
taken  prisoner.  On  April  9th,  General  Fitz  Lee  was  ordered  to 
hold  the  road  from  Appomattox  Court-House  to  Lynchburg,  which 
he  did,  in  spite  of  repeated  efforts  by  the  enemy's  cavalry  to  wrest 
it  from  him,  until  a  flag,  conveying  the  intelligence  of  a  truce, 
compelled  him  to  pause  in  his  advance  upon  the  enemy.  Thus, 
sword  in  hand,  the  -Black  Horse,  which  had  formed  the  nucleus  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  was  found  at  the  post  of  duty  and 
of  danger  when  that  army  of  tattered  uniforms  and  bright  muskets 
surrendered  to  overwhelming  numbers  and  resources.  Of  this  army 
it  might  be  said:  "Vital  in  every  part,  it  could  only  by  annihilation 
die."  The  division  of  General  Fitz  Lee  did  not  surrender  until 
some  time  afterward ;  but,  being  cut  off  from  the  main  body  of  the 


THE  BLACK  HORSE  CAVALRY.  613 

army,  the  Black  Horse  patiently  awaited  tlie  approach  of  night,  and, 
under  its  friendly  cover,  sought  their  various  homes,  which,  four 
years  before,  they  had  left  to  light  for  and  protect.  But  the  com 
mand  was  again  collected  at  the  Fauquier  Springs,  by  order  of 
Lieutenant  Ficklin,  Captain  A.  D.  Payne  being  then  a  prisoner  of 
war.  They  had  resolved  to  repair  to  Johnston's  standard,  which 
was  still,  as  they  thought,  flying  in  North  Carolina.  But  the  writer 
of  this  article  repaired  to  their  rendezvous,  and  informed  Lieutenant 
Ficklin  that  General  Johnston,  too,  had  surrendered,  and  that  the 
cause  for  which  they  had  all  fought  had  been  lost.  The  Black 
Horse  Cavalry  was  then  disbanded,  on  the  margin  of  the  same  river 
on  which  it  had  been  organized,  and  but  two  miles  lower  down  the 
stream. 

The  Black  IIo.rse  Cavalry  may  now  be  found  settled,  for  the 
most  part,  in  their  native  seat.  Lower  Fauquier,  as  diligent  in  peace 
as  they  were  courageous  and  faithful  in  war.  But  members  of  the 
command  may  be  found  scattered  among  the  States,  assiduous,  in  all 
the  fields  of  enterprise,  to  catch  the  golden  smiles  of  fortune.  Of 
the  Black  Horse  it  may  be  said,  as  it  was  said  of  Cromwell's  Iron 
sides,  except  that  they  tread  the  higher  walks  of  life :  "  That,  in 
every  department  of  honest  industry,  the  discharged  warriors  pros 
pered  beyond  other  men;  that  none  were  charged  with  theft  or 
robbery ;  that  none  were  heard  to  ask  an  alms ;  and  that  if  a  baker, 
a  mason,  or  a  wagoner  attracted  notice  by  his  diligence  or  sobriety, 
lie  was,  in  all  probability,  one  of  Oliver's  old  soldiers." 


DEATH  OF  GENERAL  JOHN  H.  MORGAN. 


BY    IT.    V.    KEDFIELD. 
[Socond  article.] 


IT  is  a  singular  fact  that 
nearly  two-thirds  of  the  able- 
bodied  white  men  of  East 
Tennessee  enlisted  in  the 
Federal  army  and  fought  the 
war  through  on  the  side  of 
the  Union.  Singular,  I  say, 
because  northward,  in  Ken 
tucky,  the  Southern  cause  had 
more  aid  and  encouragement 
than  in  East  Tennessee  ;  while 
Virginia,  on  the  eastern  boun 
dary,  wras  nearly  unanimously 
Confederate,  as  well  as  Geor 
gia  and  Alabama  upon  the 
southern  border  and  Middle 
Tennessee  upon  the  west.  How  is  this  to  be  accounted  for  ?  What 
strange  freak  made  East  Tennessee  so  loyal  to  the  government,  while 
upon  all  sides,  North,  East,  South,  and  West,  she  was  surrounded  by 
the  hosts  in  rebellion?  That  Kentucky  was  partially  loyal,  we  can 
account  for  only  because  of  her  geographical  position,  making  her 
more  a  Western  than  a  Southern  State ;  but  here  is  East  Tennessee, 
bordering  upon  the  Cotton  States,  and  allied  to  them  by  every 
interest,  yet  taking  up  arms  for  the  Union  with  as  much  alacrity  as 
though  she  bordered  upon  Lake  Erie  instead  of  the  Cotton  States. 
For  illustration,  take  the  two  counties  of  Marion  and  Franklin,  lying 
together,  the  former  in  the  division  of  the  State  known  as  East  Ten 
nessee  and  the  latter  in  Middle  Tennessee,  Marion  bordering  upon  the 
Georgia  and  Alabama  line  and  Franklin  upon  that  of  Alabama.  The 
people  of  these  two  counties  were  identical  in  interest,  and  no  argu 
ment  could  reach  one  that  did  not  apply  to  the  other.  Yet,  wrhen 
the  issue  came  these  two  counties  stood  as  far  apart  as  the  poles. 
Marion  voted  for  the  Union  until  the  last,  when  ballots  were  super- 
(614) 


DEATH  OF  GENERAL  JOHN  H.  MORGAN.  615 

ceded  by  bullets,  while  Franklin  unanimously  voted  to  take  the  State 
out  of  the  Union.  Indeed,  at  the  June  election,  1861,  there  was  but 
one  vote  cast  for  the  Union  in  that  county !  And  so  furious  were  the 
people  in  the  cause  that  they  held  a  sort  of  convention,  passed  a  so- 
called  ordinance  of  secession,  and  declared  Franklin  county  out  of 
the  Union  in  advance  of  the  State's  action !  The  first  regiment 
raised  upon  Tennessee  soil  was  raised  there — that  of  Colonel  Peter 
Turney — which  hurried  off  to  Virginia,  twelve  hundred  strong, 
before  the  State  had  formally  "  seceded."  A  capital  command  was 
this,  going  forth  amid  the  huzzas  arid  plaudits  of  the  people,  but 
never  returning  again  as  a  regiment.  A  fragment  came  back — that 
was  all.  But  in  the  adjacent  county  of  Marion,  how  different  was 
the  feeling  of  the  people !  A  majority  were  for  the  Union,  and 
neither  the  firing  upon  Sumter  or  the  President's  proclamation  could 
shake  their  allegiance  to  the  old  government.  And  when  it  came  to 
the  test  and  every  able-bodied  man  had  to  go  into  one  army  or  the 
other,  a  majority  of  the  citizens  of  Marion  made  their  way  north 
ward  and  entered  the  Federal  ranks. 

Although  East  Tennessee  had  a  population  of  only  about  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand,  she  put  twenty-one  cavalry  regiments 
into  the  Union  army  and  eight  infantry  regiments.  Of  this  number 
twelve  were  organized  as  cavalry  and  the  rest  as  mounted  infantry, 
which  is  the  same.  In  this  there  is  no  account  taken  of  the  Tennes- 
seeans  who  enlisted  in  Kentucky,  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois  regi 
ments,  of  whom  there  were  thousands.  The  policy  of  the  government 
in  mounting  so  large  a  proportion  of  the  Tennessee  troops  was  to  get 
the  benefit  of  their  gallant  horsemanship.  Accustomed  from  early 
youth  to  horseback  exercise  they  excelled  in  that  branch  of  service. 
Some  of  the  best  cavalry  in  the  service  was  from  Tennessee.  The 
Tennessee  troops  in  the  Union  army  are  without  a  historian.  There 
has  been  no  extended  narratives  of  their  battles  and  exploits.  And 
to  this  day  it  is  not  generally  known  in  the  North  how  great  the  aid 
the  national  cause  received  from  the  strong  arms  of  the  Tennessee 
Unionists.  Had  all  the  border  slave  States  taken  the  course  of  East 
Tennessee,  the  war  would  not  have  lasted  a  year.  But  south  of  the 
Ohio  and  the  Potomac  there  was  no  territory,  not  even  Eastern 
Kentucky  or  Western  Virginia,  the  population  of  which  was  as 
loyal  to  the  government  as  that  of  East  Tennessee.  Virginia  proper, 
lying  eastward  and  northward  of  this  section,  was  so  true  to  the  Con 
federacy  that  the  whole  State  did  not  furnish  five  hundred  white 
men  to  the  Union  army.  Of  course,  in  this  estimate,  I  do  not  include 
what  is  known  as  Western  Virginia,  or  any  part  of  it.  For  the  year 


616  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ending  May  1st,  1866,  the  records  show  that  nearly  fifteen  thousand 
white  Tennesseeans  were  mustered  out  of  the  Union  army  and 
eighty-five  Virginians !  Why  this  vast  difference  in  sentiment  in 
communities  of  the  same  blood,  institutions,  habits,  customs,  and 
interests  ? 

A  detail  of  the  exploits  of  the  Tennessee  troops  in  the  Union 
army  would  fill  volumes ;  but  so  far  from  a  single  volume  on  the 
subject,  there  has  never  been  anything  like  a  connected  narrative. 
The  Tennessee  troops  were  fighters,  rather  than  writers,  and  they 
left  little  record  of  their  transactions.  It  was  Tennessee  troops  who 
finally  routed  the  famous  cavalry  command  of  John  II.  Morgan  and 
killed  that  daring  raider.  He  vanquished  armies,  and  captured  more 
prisoners  on  single  raids  than  his  own  men  numbered ;  yet  a  strange 
fate  decreed  that  he  should  meet  his  fate  at  the  hands  of  Tennessee 
Unionists — the  Thirteenth  and  Ninth  Tennessee  Cavalry  regiments, 
aided  by  the  Tenth  Michigan.  This  brigade  killed  the  great  raider, 
and  effectually  broke  up  and  scattered  his  command.  In  the  garden  of 
Mrs.  Williams,  in  Greenville,  Tennessee,  a  plain  stone  is  set  on  the 
spot  where  Morgan  fell.  After  his  marvelous  escape  from  the  Ohio 
Penitentiary,  he  reorganized  his  command  and  entered  Kentucky 
again.  The  expedition  was  unfortunate,  and  he  returned  to  Vir 
ginia,  and  from  thence  operated  in  East  Tennessee.  lie  formed  a 
plan  to  attack  a  brigade  of  Tennessee  and  Michigan  troops  at  Bull's 
gap,  above  Knoxville.  On  the  3d  of  September  he  arrived  in 
Greenville,  his  command  camping  near  by,  and  a  portion  of  his  staff 
taking  up  their  quarters  at  the  residence  of  Mrs.  Williams.  This  is 
the  finest  residence  in  Greenville — a  large  double  brick  house,  not 
far  from  that  of  the  late  Andrew  Johnson,  but  much  larger  and 
finer  than  any  Johnson  ever  lived  in,  except  the  White  House.  It 
was  built  by  Dr.  Alexander  Williams,  who  died  a  few  years  before 
the  war,  and,  at  the  time  of  the  tragedy,  was  occupied  by  his  widow 
and  a  few  members  of  the  family.  Mrs.  Williams  is  now  dead,  but 
the  house  stands  just  as  it  did,  and  the  surroundings  are  almost  pre 
cisely  the  same  as  on  that  moist  and  gloomy  September  morning, 
in  the  year  1864,  when  the  roof  sheltered  John  II.  Morgan  the  last 
night  he  spent  on  earth.  I  have  passed  the  house  dozens  of  times, 
but  never  without  casting  my  eyes  on  the  spot  where  the  great  cav 
alryman  fell,  and  also  at  the  point  in  the  road  where  Private  Andrew 
Campbell  stood,  whose  unerring  bullet  pierced  the  heart  of  Morgan. 

Morgan  is  accused  of  carelessness  in  posting  himself  and  com 
mand,  for  the  night,  so  near  the  enemy,  and  witli  so  little  precau 
tion.  The  prime  cause  of  the  calamity  to  his  command  and  death 


DEATH  OF  GENERAL  JOHN  H.  MORGAN.  617 

of  himself  was  owing  to  the  fact  that  he  had  ridden  his  troops  very 
rapidly ;  they  were  worn  out,  and  the  pickets  on  the  east  side  of  the 
town  fell  asleep.  Colonel  Miller,  who  was  posted  near  Bull's  gap, 
did  not  know  of  the  presence  of  Morgan  in  that  part  of  the  country 
until  six  P.  M.,  September  3d.  It  is  said  that  a  woman  brought 
.him  the  news,  and  many  pictures  have  been  painted  of  her  rapid 
horseback  ride  from  Greenville  to  the  gap;  but  upon  a  recent  visit 
to  Greenville,  those  having  personal  knowledge  of  the  matter  denied 
that  there  was  ua  woman  in  it."  But,  however  this  may  be,  when 
the  news  came,  Colonel  Miller  and  General  Gilliam  held  a  short 
consultation,  and  the  command  was  ordered  to  be  in  readiness  to 
move.  At  eleven  o'clock  that  night,  in  the  midst  of  a  terrible 
thunder-storm,  which  fairly  drenched  the  soldiers,  the  Thirteenth 
Tennessee  moved  out  toward  Greenville,  by  way  of  the  Arnett  road. 
At  midnight  they  were  followed  by  the  rest  of  the  command, 
making  a  total  of  about  two  thousand  men,  fifteen  hundred  of  whom 
were  Tennesseeans.  The  storm  increased,  the  rain  fell  in  torrents, 
the  heavens  fairly  shook  with  rolling  thunder,  while  there  was  no 
light  other  than  the  flashes  of  lightning.  But  the  dark  column  of 
horsemen  moved  steadily  on,  and  John  Morgan  slept  his  last  sleep 
on  earth.  In  so  stormy  and  tempestuous  a  night  he  may  have  felt 
secure  from  intrusion,  be  the  enemy  ever  so  vigilant.  Just  before 
the  first  streak  of  dawn  the  advance  swung  around  in  rear  of  Mor 
gan's  command,  captured  the  pickets  who  were  asleep,  and  virtually 
got  between  Morgan  and  his  soldiers.  Sharp  fighting  ensued  and 
great  confusion.  At  the  opportune  moment  Colonel  Ingerton,  com 
manding  the  Thirteenth  Regiment,  sent  Companies  I  and  G  on  a 
bold  dash  into  town,  in  hopes  of  getting  the  great  cavalry  chieftain. 
It  was  not  yet  fairly  daylight,  and  the  Federals  had  all  the  advantage. 
These  companies  surrounded  the  Williams  house,  some  of  Company 
G  occupying  the  street  which  leads  from  the  depot  to  Main  street. 
The  first  intimation  Morgan  had  was  from  a  servant,  who  rushed  to 
his  room,  saying,  "'the  Yankees  are  coming!''  Morgan  did  not 
believe  it,  and  prepared  to  go  to  sleep  again.  Again  the  news  came, 
and  with  it  was  the  accompaniment  of  musketry  firing,  which  gave 
forth  no  uncertain  sound.  Looking  out  he  was  horrified  to  see  the 
enemy  around  the  house,  and  without  waiting  to  fully  dress  he  and 
Major  Gassett,  of  his  staff,  rushed  out  into  the  garden,  or  back  yard. 
Escape  seeming  to  be  cut  off  in  that  direction  they  ran  into  the 
cellar,  where  they  remained  a  few  moments.  Feeling  that  death  or 
capture  awaited  them  there,  and  observing  from  the  enemy's  move 
ments  that  their  whereabouts  was  known,  they  ran  out  into  the  gar- 


£18  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

den  again,  Gassett  concealing  himself  in  an  outhouse  and  Morgan 
attempting  to  hide  among  the  grape  vines.  His  white  shirt  betrayed 
him  as  he  crouched  behind  the  vines  and  posts.  Private  Andrew 
Campbell  saw  him  from  the  street,  not  over  fifty  yards  distant,  and 
fired,  hitting  Morgan  plump  in  the  breast,  and  killing  him  instantly. 
He  never  spoke.  Morgan's  friends  claim  that  he  was  foully  mur 
dered,  and  that  he  had  called  out  that  he  would  surrender.  Camp 
bell  says  that  he  was  trying  to  get  away,  and  making  no  motion  that 
looked  like  a  surrender.  The  soldiers  carried  the  body  of  Morgan 
to  the  street,  threw  it  across  a  horse  and  rapidly  returned  to  the 
main  column,  who  were  engaged  with  Morgan's  command,  which 
they  routed.  They  captured  two  cannon,  many  wagons,  and  prison 
ers,  and,  in  fact,  virtually  broke  up  Morgan's  command.  The  forces 
engaged  on  the  Union  side  were  the  Thirteenth  Tennessee  Cavalry, 
Colonel  Miller ;  Ninth  Tennessee  Cavalry,  Colonel  Brownlow,  and 
Tenth  Michigan,  Major  Newell.  So  complete  was  the  surprise  and 
rout  of  Morgan's  command  that  the  Federal  loss  was  but  two  killed 

O 

and  four  wounded. 

Morgan's  body  was  carried  on  a  horse  about  one  mile,  where  it 
was  laid  by  the  roadside,  and  afterward  turned  over  to  some  of  Mor 
gan's  friends,  who  came  for  it  with  a  flag  of  truce.  The  body  was 
carried  to  Abington,  Virginia,  and  buried,  and  soon  after  removed 
to  Richmond.  Whatever  became  of  Campbell  I  do  not  know.  He 
is  marked  on  the  muster  rolls  as  having  moved  to  Ohio.  Imme 
diately  after  the  victory,  he  was  promoted  to  second  lieutenant  in 
Company  E,  same  regiment,  by  General  Order  No.  95,  which  states 
that  the  promotion  is  made  as  "  a  reward  for  his  gallantry  in  the 
engagement  at  Greenville,  Tennessee,  on  the  4th  instant,  and  for 
his  success  in  arresting,  by  an  accurate  shot,  the  flight  of  General 
John  II.  Morgan,  one  of  our  country's  most  prominent  enemies." 


THE  MISTAKES  OF  GETTYSBURG. 


BY  GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET. 

[Second  article.] 


IN  my  first  article  I  declared 
that  the  invasion  of  Pennsyl 
vania  was  a  movement  that 
General  Lee  and  his  council 
agreed  should  be  defensive  in 
tactics,  while,  of  course,  it  was 
offensive  in  strategy ;  that  the 
campaign  was  conducted  on 
this  plan  until  we  had  left 
Chambersburg,  when,  owing 
to  the  absence  of  our  cavalry, 
and  our  consequent  ignorance 
of  the  enemy's  whereabouts, 
we  collided  with  them  unex 
pectedly,  and  that  General 
Lee  had  lost  the  matchless 
equipoise  that  usually  characterized  him,  and,  through  excitement 
and  the  doubt  that  enveloped  the  enemy's  movements,  changed  the 
whole  plan  of  the  campaign,  and  delivered  a  battle  under  ominous 
circumstances.  I  declared  that  the  battle  of  the  2d  was  not  lost 
through  the  tardiness  of  the  First  Corps,  but  through  the  failure  of 
the  troops  ordered  to  co-operate  to  do  so ;  that  there  was  no  order 
ever  issued  for  a  sunrise  attack ;  that  no  such  order  could  have  been 
issued,  and  that  the  First  Corps  could  not  possibly  have  attacked  at 
that  time;  that  when  it  did  attack  its  movement  was  weakened  by 
the  derangement  of  the  directing  brigade  of  support  under  General 
Wilcox,  and  was  rendered  hopeless  by  the  failure  of  E well's  Corps  to 
co-operate,  its  line  of  battle  having  been  broken  through  the  advice 
of  General  Early,  and  that  in  this  attack  Hood's  and  McLaws' 
Divisions  did  the  best  fighting  ever  done  on  any  field,  and  encoun 
tered  and  drove  back  virtually  the  whole  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
I  held  that  the  mistakes  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign  were : 

First,  the  change  of  the  original  plan  of  the  campaign,  which 
was  to  so  maneuvre  as  to  force  the  Federals  to  attack  us ;  second, 

(619) 


(520  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

that  if  the  plan  was  to  have  been  changed  at  all  it  'should  have  been 
done  at  Brandy  Station,  near  Culpepper  Court-House,  when  we  could 
have  caught  Hooker  in  detail,  and,  probably,  have  crushed  his  army ; 
third,  that  Stuart  should  never  have  been  permitted  to  leave  the 
main  route  of  march,  and  thus  send  our  army  into  the  enemy's 
country  without  cavalry  for  reconnoissance  or  foraging  purposes; 
fourth,  that  the  crushing  defeat  inflicted  on  the  advance  of  the 
Federal  army  in  the  casual  encounter  of  the  1st,  at  Willoughby's 
run,  should  have  been  pushed  to  extremities,  that  occasion  furnishing 
one  of  the  few  opportunities  ever  furnished  for  "  pursuit  pell-mell ; " 
fifth,  the  army  should  have  been  carried  around  to  Meade's  right  and 
rear  on  the  night  of  the  1st,  and  placed  between  him  and  his  capital, 
and  thus  forced  him  to  attack  us,  as  he  certainly  intended  doing ; 
sixth,  when  I  attacked  the  enemy's  left  on  the  2d,  Ewell  should  have 
moved  at  once  against  his  right,  and  Hill  should  have  threatened  his 
centre,  and  thus  prevented  a  concentration  of  the  whole  Federal 
army  at  the  point  I  was  assaulting ;  seventh,  on  the  morning  of  the 
3d  we  should  still  have  moved  to  the  right,  and  maneuvred  the 
Federals  into  attacking  us;  eighth,  the  assault  by  Pickett,  on  the 
3d,  should  never  have  been  made,  as  it  could  not  have  succeeded  by 
any  possible  prodigy  of  courage  or  tactics,  being  absolutely  a  hope 
less  assault.  These  points  I  supported  with  the  most  particular 
proof.  Not  a  single  one  of  them  has  been  controverted.  The  truth 
of  a  single  fact,  or  the  correctness  of  a  single  opinion  laid  down  in 
that  article,  has  not  been  disproved.  Very  few  of  them  have  been 
questioned — none  of  them  overthrown. 

The  first  point  that  demands  attention  is  the  number  of  forces 
on  each  side  engaged  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign.  In  my  first 
article  I  claimed  that  we  had  fifty-two  thousand  infantry,  and  the 
Federals  ninety-five  thousand  men ;  stating,  further,  that  those  were 
the  highest  figures  of  our  forces,  and  the  lowest  of  theirs.  General 
E.  R.  Dawes,  in  commenting  on  this  estimate,  disagrees  with  it  quite 
widely.  The  main  point  that  he  makes  is  to  quote  from  Swinton's 
"Army  of  the  Potomac,"  the  following  paragraph  (page  310) :  "  The 
number  of  infantry  present  for  duty  in  Lee's  army  on  the  31st  of 
May,  1863,  was  precisely  sixty-eight  thousand  three  hundred  and 
fifty-two.  I  learn  from  General  Longstreet  that,  when  the  three 
corps  were  concentrated  at  Chambersburg,  the  morning  report 
showed  sixty-seven  thousand  bayonets,  or  above  seventy  thousand  of 
all  arms."  This  statement  is  certainly  explicit,  but  there  are  discrep 
ancies  on  the  face  of  it  that  should  have  warned  a  cautious  and  capable 
writer  not  to  accept  it :  First,  any  one  at  all  familiar  with  the  history 


THE  MISTAKES  OF  GETTYSBURG.  621 

of  the  campaign,  or  even  the  leading  points  of  it,  must  have  known 
that  the  three  corps  of  the  army  were  never  "  concentrated  at  Cliam- 
bersburg  "  at  all ;  second,  it  is  well  known  that  any  organization  upon 
sixty-seven  thousand  bayonets  would  have  involved  an  infantry  force 
alone  of  "  over  seventy  thousand,"  and  thus  have  left  no  margin  in 
the  estimate  that  Mr.  Swinton  ascribes  to  me  for  the  other  arms  of 
the  service. 

If  General  Dawes  had  followed  Swinton's  narrative  closely,  he 
must  have  discovered  that  (page  3G5)  he  says :  4k  General  Lee's 
aggregate  force  present  for  duty  on  the  31st  of  May,  1863,  was 
sixty-eight  thousand  three  hundred  and  fifty-two.''  These  are  the 
precise  figures  that  he  gives,  on  page  310,  as  the  aggregate  of  the 
infantry  alone.  My  information  upon  this  subject  was  taken  from 
General  Lee's  own  lips.  lie  estimated  his  force  to  be,  including  the 
detachments  that  would  join  him  on  the  march,  a  trine  over  seventy 
thousand.  On  the  3()th  of  June,  or  the  1st  of  July,  he  estimated  his 
infantry  at  fifty-two  thousand  bayonets.  If  Mr.  Swinton  received 
any  information  from  me  on  the  subject,  he  received  this,  for  it  was 
all  that  I  had.  Since  I  have  read  the  report  of  the  Adjutant  General 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  lately  published,  I  am  inclined 
to  believe  that  General  Lee  included  in  his  estimate  two  brigades  of 
Pickett's  Division  (Jenkins'  and  Corse's)  which  were  left  in  Virginia, 
or  some  other  detachments  made  during  the  march.  If  this  surmise 
is  correct,  it  would  make  the  total  figures  considerably  less  than  I 
gave  them.  I  am  certain  the  real  strength  of  his  army  cannot  go 
above  the  number  given  in  my  first  article.  As  to  the  strength  of 
General  Meade's  army,  I  take  his  own  statement  for  that.  In  his 
evidence  taken  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War 
(page  337  of  their  report),  he  says:  "My  strength  was  a  little  under 
one  hundred  thousand — probably  ninety-five  thousand  men."  I  used, 
in  my  narrative,  the  lowest  figures  that  he  gave.  In  printing  the 
article,  it  is  made  to  appear  that  Meade  had  ninety-five  thousand 
infantry.  It  should  have  been  ninety-five  thousand  men.  This 
much  as  to  the  comparative  strength  of  the  two  armies.  It  is  the 
truth,  and  will  stand  as  history  that  Meade's  army  was  nearly  double 
that  of  Lee. 

In  my  first  article,  I  claimed  that  my  troops  fought  an  extraor 
dinary  battle  on  the  2d.  I  asserted  that  my  thirteen  thousand  men 
virtually  charged  against  the  whole  Federal  army,  encountered 
nearly  sixty-five  thousand  of  the  enemy,  and  broke  line  after  line 
of  fresh  troops,  until  at  length,  after  three  hours'  of  the  best  fighting 
ever  done,  they  found  themselves,  in  a  single  line  of  battle,  charging 


C22  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

fifty  thousand  Federals,  intrenched,  massed  on  Cemetery  Ridge. 
Then,  when  one-third  of  their  number  lay  in  their  bloody  track,  dead 
or  wounded,  and  they  were  exposed  in  front  and  flank  to  an  over 
whelming  fire,  and  their  supporting  brigades  had  gone  astray,  and 
there  was  no  sign  of  positive  or  strategic  co-operation  from  their 
comrades,  I  ordered  them  to  withdraw  to  the  peach  orchard  that 
they  had  wrested  from  the  Third  Corps  early  in  the  engagement. 
This  claim  has  been  severely  criticised.  It  can  be  established  by  the 
testimony  of  every  honest  and  well-informed  man  who  was  in  that 
battle.  But  I  relied  for  my  proof  upon  the  official  report  of  General 
Meade  himself.  He  made  this  report,  it  will  be  remembered,  think 
ing  that  the  whole  or  greater  part  of  Lee's  army  had  charged  his 
position  in  the  afternoon  of  the  2d.  He  says : 

The  Third  Corps  sustained  the  shock  most  heroically.  Troops  from  the 
Second  were  sent  by  Major  General  Hancock  to  cover  the  right  flank  of  the  Third 
Corps,  and  soon  after  the  assault  commenced.  *  *  *  The  Fifth  Corps,  most 
fortunately,  arrived,  and  took  position  on  the  left  of  the  Third.  Major  General 
Sykes,  commanding,  immediately  sending  a  force  to  occupy  Bound  Top  Ridge, 
•where  a  most  furious  contest  was  maintained,  the  enemy  making  desperate  but 
unsuccessful  attempts  to  secure  it.  Notwithstanding  the  stubborn  resistance  of 
the  Third  Corps,  under  Major  General  Birney  (Major  General  Sickles  having  been 
wounded  early  in  the  action),  superiority  of  number  of  corps  of  the  enemy  enabling 
him  to  outflank  its  advanced  position,  General  Birney  was  compelled  to  fall  back 
and  re-form  behind  the  line  originally  desired  to  be  held.  In  the  meantime,  per 
ceiving  the  great  exertions  of  the  enemy,  the  Sixth  Corps  (Major  General  Sedgwick) 
and  part  of  the  First  Corps,  to  which  I  had  assigned  Major  General  Newton,  par 
ticularly  Lockwood's  Maryland  Brigade,  together  with  detachments  from  the  Second 
Corps,  were  brought  up  at  different  periods,  and  succeeded,  together  with  the  gallant 
resistance  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  in  checking,  and  finally  repulsing,  the  assault  of  the 
enemy.  '  '•  During  the  heavy  assault  upon  our  extreme  left,  portions  of  the 

Twelfth  Corps  were  sent  as  reinforcements. 

To  make  this  specific  and  positive  proof  still  more  conclusive,  I 
may  add  the  testimony  of  General  Meade  given  before  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  in  which  he  says  (speaking  of  this  battle 
of  the  2d) :  "  My  extreme  right  flank  was  then  held  by  a  single  bri 
gade  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  commanded  by  General  Green."  Then 
the  troops  opposing  my  thirteen  thousand  men  (two  divisions  of  my 
corps)  were  as  f ollowrs :  Third  Corps,  eleven  thousand  eight  hundred 
and  ninety-eight ;  Fifth  Corps,  ten  thousand  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
six;  Sixth  Corps,  fifteen  thousand  four  hundred  and  eight;  Penn 
sylvania  Reserves,  four  thousand  five  hundred ;  Lockwood's  Mary 
land  Brigade,  two  thousand  five  hundred ;  total,  forty-four  thousand 
four  hundred  and  forty-two.  The  above  figures  are  taken  from  the 
Congressional  Report,  page  428.  To  these  figures  must  be  added 


THE  MISTAKES  OF  GETTYSBURG.  C23 

the  detachments  from  the  other  corps  enumerated  by  General 
Mea.de.  As  he  is  not  minute  in  his  statements,  I  have  no  accurate 
data  by  which  I  can  tell  precisely  what  these  ''detachments"  were. 
As  General  Meade  states,  however,  that  he  left  but  a  single  brigade 
to  guard  his  extreme  right,  and  as  he  had  no  use  for  troops  else 
where,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  other  corps  may  have 
sent  as  many  as  twenty  thousand  men,  other  than  those  enumerated 
above.  Indeed,  this  estimate  is  quite  low,  in  all  probability ;  because 
General  Meade  believed,  and  his  counselors  all  believed,  as  is  shown 
by  their  concurrent  testimony,  that  the  assault  made  by  my  handful 
of  heroes  wras  really  the  onset  of  the  whole  of  Lee's  army.  It  is  fair 
to  presume,  then,  that,  under  this  belief,  he  massed  everything  that 
he  could  get  his  hands  on  in  front  of  the  direct  attack.  lie  says  as 
much  as  this  when  he  says  he  left  "  only  a  single  brigade"  on  his 
right.  My  former  estimate,  therefore,  "'that  my  thirteen  thousand 
men  met  sixty-five  thousand  men  during  the  three  hours'  lighting 
that  afternoon,"  will  not  be  abandoned  until  the  report  of  General 
Meade,  and  the  figures  of  the  Congressional  Report,  shall  have  been 
overthrown;  conceding,  of  course,  to  the  technical  demand  of  his 
torical  statement  that  the  "detachments"  of  other  corps  sent  forward 
may  not  have  been  exactly  twenty  thousand  men. 

It  has  never  been  claimed  that  we  met  this  immense  force  of 
sixty-five  thousand  men  at  one  time ;  nor  has  it  been  claimed  that 
each  and  every  one  of  them  burnt  powder  in  our  faces.  But  they 
were  drawn  off  from  other  parts  of  the  field  to  meet  us,  and  were 
hurried  to  our  front  and  massed  there,  meaning  to  do  all  the  mischief 

O 

they  could.  If  some  of  them  did  not  shoot  us,  or  stick  us  with  their 
bayonets,  it  was  simply  because  they  could  not  shoot  through  the 
solid  blocks  of  their  own  troops,  or  reach  us  with  their  bayonets  over 
the  heads  of  their  comrades.  But  they  were  in  position  and  eager 
for  battle — ready  to  rush  down  upon  us  the  moment  the  line  next  in 
front  of  them  was  broken.  The  morale  of  their  presence  in  rein 
forcing  the  position  and  threatening  our  flanks  as  we  pressed  on,  was 
about  as  effective  as  their  actual  bloody  work  could  have  been.  As 
to  the  accounts  of  the  Cincinnati  Gazette  and  the  New  York  World  • 
they  were  not  given  as  documents  of  historical  record,  but  simply  as 
confirmatory  of  General  Meade's  statements,  which  are,  of  course, 
historical.  It  was  not  too  much  to  assume  that  the  representatives 
of  these  papers  would  know  what  Federal  corps  were  actively 
engaged  in  the  battle  of  the  2d.  They  both  confirmed  the  account 
given  by  General  Meade  in  the  belief  that  the  wrhole  of  the  Confed 
erate  army  wras  engaged  in  the  assault,  and  in  the  statement  that  very 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

nearly  the  whole  of  the  Federal  army  was  engaged  in  repelling  it. 
After  a  review,  therefore,  of  the  whole  situation,  and  a  careful 
reading  of  everything  that  has  been  published  since  the  appearance 
of  my  first  article,  I  am  confirmed  in  the  opinion  then  expressed  that 
my  troops  did,  on  that  afternoon,  "  the  best  three  hours'  fighting 
ever  done  by  any  troops  on  any  field." 

In  my  general  narrative  I  did  not  give  a  detailed  criticism  or 
account  of  the  tactical  movements  of  the  2d  for  two  reasons  :  First, 
my  newspaper  friends  admonished  me  that  my  article  had  grown 
quite  long,  and  that  it  was  already  clear  enough  to  satisfy  the  most 
skeptical  mind ;  second,  I  thought  that  my  allusions  to  time,  cause, 
and  effect  would  arrest  the  attention  of  those  who  had  misconceived, 
and  therefore  misrepresented  them,  and  that  they  wrould  hasten  to 
make  proper  explanation  and  corrections.  I  find  their  minds,  how 
ever,  so  filled  with  prejudice  and  preconceived  opinions,  that  it  seems 
imperative  I  should  explain  the  relations  of  our  tactical  moves  on  the 
2d,  and  force  a  confession  from  even  their  reluctant  mouths.  Having 
demonstrated  beyond  cavil  in  my  first  article  that  General  Lee  never 
ordered  a  sunrise  attack,  that  he  never  expected  one,  and  that  it  was 
physically  impossible  to  have  made  one,  I  shall  now  show  that  even 
if  one  had  been  made  it  could  not  have  bettered  the  result  that  was 
achieved  by  the  afternoon  attack.  It  wrill  be  proved  that  the  battle 
made  by  my  men  could  not  have  been  so  improved,  in  plan  or  exe 
cution,  as  to  have  won  the  day.  The  only  amendment  that  would 
have  ensued,  or  even  promised  victory,  was  for  Ewell  to  have 
marched  in  upon  the  enemy's  right  when  it  was  guarded  by  a  single 
brigade,  run  over  their  works  and  fall  upon  their  rear  while  I  engaged 
them  in  front,  and  while  Hill  lay  in  a  threatening  position  in  their 
centre.  Had  this  co-operative  movement  been  made  the  battle 
would,  in  all  probability,  have  been  ours.  As  it  wras,  no  disposition 
of  the  men  under  my  charge,  no  change  in  the  time,  or  method,  or 
spirit  of  the  assault,  could  have  changed  the  result  for  the  better. 

Let  us  briefly  review  the  situation  on  the  morning  of  the  2d. 
During  the  night  of  the  1st,  General  Sickles  rested  with  the  Third 
Corps  upon  the  ground  lying  between  General  Hancock's  left  and 
Round  Top,  General  Geary's  Division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  occu 
pying  part  of  the  same  line.  General  Meade  had  given  General 
Sickles  orders  to  occupy  Round  Top  if  it  were  practicable ;  and  in 
reply  to  his  question  as  to  what  sort  of  position  it  was,  General 
General  Sickles  had  answered :  "  There  is  no  position  there."  At 
the  first  signs  of  activity  in  our  ranks  on  the  2d,  General  Sickles 
became  apprehensive  that  we  were  about  to  attack  him,  and  so 


THE  MISTAKES  OF  GETTYSBURG.  625 

reported  to  General  Meade.  As  our  move  progressed,  his  apprehen 
sions  were  confirmed,  and  being  uneasy  at  the  position  in  which  his 
troops  had  been  left,  and  certain  that  he  was  about  to  receive  battle, 
he  determined  to  seize  the  vantage  ground  in  front  of  the  peach 
orchard.  Without  awaiting  for  orders,  he  pushed  forward  and  took 
the  position  desired.  Meanwhile,  the  reports  made  to  General 
Meade  drew  his  attention  to  our  part  of  the  field,  and  finally  he 
rode  out  just  in  time  to  see  the  battle  open.  It  will  be  seen,  there 
fore,  that  General  Sickles'  move,  and  all  the  movements  of  the 
Federal  left,  were  simply  seqnents  of  mine.  They  would  have  fol 
lowed  my  movements  inevitably,  no  matter  when  they  had  been 
made.  Had  the  attack  been  made  earlier  or  later  we  should  have 
seen  the  Federals  move  just  as  they  did,  and  with  the  same  results — 
except  that  if  I  had  attacked  earlier  I  should  have  had  Geary's 
Division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  in  my  immediate  front  in  additian  to 
the  Third  Corps.  This  would  certainly  have  been  the  effect  of  "  a 
sunrise  attack." 

Colonel  Tavlor,  in  referring  to  the  hour  of  my  battle  on  the  2d, 
says:  u  Hound  Top,  the  key  of  their  position,  which  was  not  occu 
pied  in  the  morning,  was  now  held  in  force/1  The  answer  to  this 
statement,  direct  and  authoritative,  is  at  hand.  General  Meade  says, 
in  ( Congressional  Report,  page  8J->2  :  ""  Immediately  upon  the  opening 
of  the  batteries  (which  began  the  battle)  I  sent  several  staff  officers 
to  hurry  up  the  column  under  General  Sykes  of  the  Fifth  Corps, 
then  on  its  way,  and  which  I  expected  would  have  reached  there  at 
that  time.  The  column  advanced  rapidly,  reached  the  ground  in  a 
short  time,  and  General  Sykes  was  fortunately  enabled,  by  throwing 
a  strong  force  upon  Round  Top  mountain,  where  a  most  desperate 
and  bloody  struggle  ensued,  to  drive  the  enemy  from  it,  and  secure 
our  foothold  upon  that  most  important  position.""  Even  the  Muses 
were  invoked  to  speed  this  helter-skelter  march  toward  the  knob  of 
ground  now  suddenly  grown  in  importance. 

"  On  to  the  Round  Top ! "  hailed  Sykes  to  his  men ; 
"On  to  the  Round  Top!"  echoed  the  glen. 
"  On  to  the  Round  Top  ! " 

In  my  former  narrative  I  showed  that  General  Meade  did  not 
appreciate  the  importance  of  this  position  until  the  battle  had  finally 
opened.  lie  had  ordered  Sickles  to  occupy  it  "  if  practicable  ; "  but 
it  was  not  occupied  in  force  when  my  battle  opened,  and  was  made 
strong  as  the  fight  progressed,  as  much  by  the  fragments  of  the 
enemy's  broken  lines,  that  took  shelter  behind  its  boulders,  as  by  any 
40 


626  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

definite  plan  to  seize  it.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  same  thing 
would  have  happened  had  the  battle  taken  place  either  earlier  or 
later.  The  force  stationed  there  when  the  battle  opened  had  been 
there  all  day,  and  was  wholly  inadequate  to  hold  it ;  hence  General 
Meade's  anxiety  to  hurry  up  additional  troops  after  the  battle  had 
opened,  and  his  congratulation  that  Sykes,  by  throwing  forward  "  a 
strong  force,"  was  enabled  to  drive  us  from  it  and  secure  it  to  the 
Federals.  But  why  go  further  with  these  details  ?  It  is  impossible 
that  any  sane  man  should  believe  that  two  of  my  divisions,  attacking 
at  any  hour  or  in  any  manner,  could  have  succeeded  in  dislodging 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  We  had  wrestled  with  it  in  too  many 
struggles,  army  against  army,  to  prefer,  in  sincerity,  any  such  claim. 
From  daylight  until  dark,  not  a  single  Confederate  soldier,  outside 
of  my  two  divisions  and  the  three  supporting  brigades,  was  advanced 
to  battle,  or  made  to  even  threaten  battle.  The  work  was  left 
entirely  with  my  men.  General  Ewell  dates  his  co-operative  move 
at  dusk.  General  Meade  says  it  was  at  eight  o'clock.  In  any  event 
it  was  after  my  battle  had  closed,  and  too  late  to  do  any  good. 
Hence  there  seems  to  be  no  place  for  honesty  in  the  speculation  that 
my  command  could  have  won  the  field  by  different  battle.  It  is 
equally  out  of  sense  to  say  that  if  my  attack  had  been  made  "  at 
sunrise,"  Ewell  would  have  given  me  the  co-operation  that  he  failed 
to  give  in  the  afternoon  when  the  attack  really  did  come  off.  His 
orders,  given  in  the  morning  after  it  was  decided  that  I  should  lead 
the  attack,  were  to  remain  in  line  of  battle,  ready  to  co-operate  with 
my  attack  whenever  it  should  be  made.  If  he  was  not  ready  in  the 
afternoon,  it  is  folly  to  say  that  he  would  have  been  ready  at  sunrise. 
My  opinion  of  the  cause  of  the  failure  of  the  battle  of  the  2d,  as 
given  at  the  time,  is  very  succinctly  stated  by  Colonel  Freeman  tie, 
on  page  138,  of  his  "  Three  Months  in  the  South."  He  says,  quoting 
me :  "  He  said  the  mistake  they  made  was  in  not  concentrating  the 
army  more  and  making  the  attack  on  the  2d  with  thirty  thousand 
men  instead  of  fifteen  thousand."  *  I  doubt  now  if  thirty  thousand 
men  could  have  made  a  successful  attack,  if  Colonel  Taylor  is  correct 
in  his  idea  as  to  the  manner  in  which  General  Lee  would  have  fought 
them.  He  says  that  General  Lee  ordered  that  the  column  should  go 
to  the  attack  with  its  right  flank  exposed  to  the  enveloping  forces  on 
the  Federal  left.  Under  this  disposition  I  do  not  think  thirty 
thousand  men  could  have  successfully  made  the  attack.  The  battle 


*  It  seems,  from  recent  publications,  that  my  column  of  attack  on  the  2d  was 
only  about  twelve  thousand.     It  was  given  me  as  lifteen  thousand  men  at  the  time. 


THE  MISTAKES  OF  GETTYSBURG.  G27 

should  not  have  been  made  under  the  circumstances.  We  should 
have  drawn  everything  up  on  the  night  of  the  1st,  and  made  a  quick 
move  by  our  right  flank  on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  so  as  to  seize  the 
Emmettsburg  road.  Had  we  done  this,  we  should  either  have  been 
attacked — the  very  thing  we  had  been  hoping  and  mourning  for — or 
we  should  have  dislodged  Meade  from  his  position  without  striking 
a  blow.  If  we  had  been  attacked,  we  should  have  certainly  repulsed 
it.  Had  Meade  deserted  his  position  without  striking  a  blow  in  its 
defense,  the  moral  effect  in  our  favor  would  have  been  tremendous. 
To  show  that  one  of  these  results  would  certainly  have  followed,  I 
quote  a  dispatch  sent  in  cipher  from  General  Meade  to  General 
Halleck  just  before  my  battle  on  the  2d.  The  dispatch  reads  :  "If 
not  attacked,  and  I  can  get  any  positive  information  of  the  enemy 
which  will  justify  me  in  doing  so,  I  will  attack.  If  I  find  it  hazardous 
to  do  so,  and  am  satisfied  that  the  enemy  is  endeavoring  to  move  to 
my  rear  and  interpose  between  me  and  Washington,  I  shall  fall  back 
on  my  supplies  at  "Westminster."  If,  however,  no  decisive  result 
had  followed  immediately  upon  the  flank  movement  that  should  have 
been  made  on  the  night  of  the  1st,  or  the  morning  of  the  2d,  the 
thirteen  days  that  elapsed  between  our  first  rencontre  and  our  re- 
crossing  of  the  Potomac  would  have  surely  given  time  and  opportu 
nity  for  different  work  and  greater  results  than  Avere  had  at  Gettys 
burg. 

It  is  conceded  by  almost,  if  not  quite,  all  authority  on  the  sub 
ject,  that  Pickett's  charge,  on  the  3d,  was  almost  hopeless.  We  had 
tested  the  enemy's  position  thoroughly  on  the  day  before,  and  with 
a  much  larger  force  than  was  given  to  Pickett.  We  had  every 
reason  to  believe  that  the  position  was  much  stronger  on  the  3d  than 
it  was  on  the  2<1.  The  troops  that  had  fought  with  me  the  day 
before  were  in  no  condition  to  support  Pickett,  and,  beside,  they 
were  confronted  by  a  force  that  required  their  utmost  attention. 
The  men  of  Generals  Pickett,  Pettigrew,  and  Trimble,  however, 
received  and  executed  their  orders  with  cool  and  desperate  courage. 
When  the  utmost  measure  of  sacrifice  demanded  by  honor  was  full 
they  fell  back,  and  the  contest  was  ended.  The  charge  was  disas 
trous,  and  had  the  Federal  army  been  thrown  right  upon  the  heels 
of  Pickett's  retreating  column,  the  results  might  have  been  much 
more  serious. 

In  this  connection  it  may  be  noted  that  the  Federal  line  in  front 
of  these  troops  was  not  broken  so  much  by  direct  assault  as  by  crushing 
in  the  lines  on  their  left.  General  Humphreys  was  forced  to  change 
front,  partially,  two  or  three  times  to  meet  threatened  flank  move- 


(528  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ments  against  him,  and  he  was  in  that  way  drawn  off  from  imme 
diate  connection  with  his  right.  The  skilful  handling  of  these 
troops,  commanded  by  General  A.  A.  Humphreys,  was  noted  at  the 
time,  and  has  been  particularly  noted  since  by  General  Humphries 
(of  Mississippi).  At  this  late  day  the  official  relations  of  General 
Lee  and  myself  arc  brought  into  question.  lie  is  credited  with 
having  used  uncomely  remarks  concerning  me,  in  the  presence  of  a 
number  of  subordinate  officers,  just  on  the  eve  of  battle.  It  is 
hardly  possible  that  any  one  acquainted  with  General  Lee's  exalted 
character  will  accept  such  statements  as  true.  It  is  hardly  possible 
that  any  general  could  have  been  so  indiscreet  as  to  have  used  such 
expressions  under  such  circumstances.  There  certainly  never  was, 
in  the  relations  between  General  Lee  and  myself,  anything  to  admit 
the  possibility  of  his  having  used  the  expression  attributed.  Our 
relations  were  affectionate,  intimate,  and  tender  during  the  whole 
war.  That  his  confidence  in  me  was  never  shaken,  there  is  the  most 
abundant  proof ;  but  I  cannot  be  tempted,  even  by  direct  misrepre 
sentations,  into  a  discussion  of  this  subject.  I  will  advert  to  one 
point  that  will  go  to  show  the  relations  that  existed  between  us.  It 
is  an  incident  of  the  second  battle  of  Manassas. 

When  the  head  of  my  column  reached  that  field  it  was  about 
twelve  o'clock  on  the  29th.  As  we  approached  the  field  we  heard 
sounds  of  a  heavy  battle,  which  proved  to  be  General  Jackson 
very  severely  engaged  with  the  enemy.  As  my  column  deployed 
on  the  field,  the  enemy  at  once  withdrew,  in  good  order,  however, 
and  took  up  a  strong  position  a  little  in  the  rear  of  where  the 
heaviest  fighting  had  been  going  on.  During  the  lull  that  succeeded, 
General  Lee  rode  up  to  where  I  was  and  told  me  that  he  had  deter 
mined  to  attack  the  position  taken  by  the  enemy,  and  indicated  his 
purpose  to  have  me  open  the  fight.  My  men  wrere  then  arranged 
for  battle,  but  I  asked  General  Lee  to  withhold  the  order  for  attack 
until  I  had  made  a  careful  reconnoissance,  and  determined  exactly 
how  the  troops  had  best  be  handled.  He  consented,  of  course,  to 
this,  and  I  went  forward  to  make  the  reconnoissance.  After  a  care 
ful  examination  of  the  ground,  I  rode  back  to  General  Lee,  and 
reported  that  the  position  was  very  strong  and  the  prospects  hardly 
such  as  to  warrant  the  heavy  sacrifice  of  life  that  a  serious  attack 
would  involve.  General  Lee  was  not  satisfied,  however,  but  seemed 
disposed  to  insist  upon  an  attack.  He  began  to  suggest  moves  by 
which  an  advantageous  assault  might  be  made.  Before  the  question 
was  at  all  decided,  a  dispatch  was  .received  from  General  Stuart, 
giving  us  notice  that  a  very  strong  column  was  moving  up  against 


THE  MISTAKES  OF  GETTYSBURG. 

my  right.  General  Lee  ordered  me  at  once  to  reinforce  that  part  of 
my  line  and  be  ready  to  repel  the  attack.  I  ordered  the  reinforcing 
column  to  the  march  anil  rode  out  rapidly  in  advance,  that  I  might 
see  precisely  what  was  needed.  The  threatening  column  proved  to 
be  General  Fitz  John  Porter's  command.  After  seeing  it,  I  reported 
back  to  General  Lee  that  it  was  too  light  a  column,  in  my  opinion,  to 
mean  a  real  attack.  This  presumption  was  correct,  and  the  advance 
soon  halted  and  then  withdrew. 

General  Lee  then  recalled  the  question  of  an  immediate  attack 
upon  the  main  position  of  the  Federals.  I  was  thoroughly  convinced 
that  the  position  was  too  strong  to  be  taken  without  very  severe  loss, 
and  I  suggested  to  General  Lee  that  the  attack  be  postponed,  and 
that  we  make  a  forced  reconnoissance  just  at  nightfall,  and  that  we 
could  then  prepare  to  attack  at  daylight,  if  it  seemed  advisable  after 
thorough  investigation  to  make  the  attack  at  all.  lie  consented  very 
readily  to  this,  and  1  left  him  to  prepare  for  the  forced  reconnois 
sance.  The  reconnoissance  was  successfully  made  at  nightfall.  Dur 
ing  the  night  several  of  my  brigadiers  came  in  and  they  all  agreed  in 
reporting  the  position  very  strong.  At  about  midnight  Generals 
Hood  and  Evans,  and  possibly  one  or  two  others,  came  to  my  head 
quarters  and  made  similar  reports,  expressing  apprehensions  as  to  the 
result  of  the  attack.  Everything  developed  by  this  closer  reconnois 
sance  went  to  confirm  the  impression  made  upon  me  by  my  recon 
noissance  during  the  day.  I,  therefore,  determined  not  to  make  the 
attack,  and  ordered  my  troops  back  to  the  original  line  of  buttle. 

The  next  day  the  Federals  advanced  airainst  General  Jackson  in 

J 

very  heavy  force.  They  soon  made  the  battle  so  severe  for  him  that 
he  was  obliged  to  call  for  reinforcements.  At  about  three  P.  ]\L, 
while  the  battle  was  raging  fiercely,  I  was  riding  to  my  front,  when 
I  received  a  note  from  Generals  Hood  and  Evans,  asking  me  to  ride 
to  a  part  of  the  field  where  they  were  standing.  I  changed  my 
course  and  hurried  to  the  point  indicated.  I  found  them  standing 
upon  a  high  piece  of  ground,  from  which  they  had  full  view  of  the 
battle  made  against  Jackson  AVe  could  see  the  solid  masses  of  the 
Federals  forming  for  a  charge  against  Jackson's  weakening  lines. 
They  were  gathered  in  immense  force,  and  it  seemed  impossible 
that  Jackson's  thin  lines  could  withstand  the  onset.  The  Federals 
moved  forward  steadily,  sur^in^  on  in  solid  blocks,  headed  directly 

«/   7  O         O  «/ 

for  Jackson's  lines.  Just  then  a  courier  arrived  in  great  haste  with 
orders  from  General  Lee  for  me  to  hurry  to  the  assistance  of  Jack 
son.  It  was  in  the  very  crisis  of  the  battle.  I  had  very  serious 
doubts  about  beinir  able  to  reach  General  Jackson  in,  time  to  be  of 


G30  AXNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

any  service  to  him.  1  had  no  doubt,  however,  that  I  could  impede 
or  paralyze  the  immense  mass  of  men  that  was  pressing  steadily  to 
his  overthrow.  We  were  standing  on  the  flank  of  the  advancing 
columns.  They  swept  on  at  right  angles  to  our  line  of  vision.  They 
were  within  easy  artillery  range,  and  I  felt  certain  that  a  heavy  enfi 
lading  fire  poured  unexpectedly  into  their  charging  columns  would 
disconcert  and  check  it.  Instead  of  moving  to  reinforce  Jackson 
therefore,  I  sent  dispatches  for  batteries  to  hurry  to  where  I  was. 
In  an  exceedingly  short  time  Captain  Wiley's  six-gun  batteries  came 
dashing  up  at  full  gallop,  the  horses  covered  with  foam,  and  the  men 
urging  them  forward.  They  were  wheeled  into  position  and  directed 
against  the  moving  flank  of  the  enemy.  The  range  was  fair,  and  as 
the  six  guns  flashed,  the  heavy  shot  went  ploughing  through  the  solid 
flank  of  the  Federals,  doing  terrible  damage. 

The  result  was  as  anticipated.  The  line  faltered  for  an  instant, 
started  again,  hesitated,  re-formed,  and  pressed  forward,  and  then,  as 
a  rear  broadside  was  poured  into  them,  broke  ranks  and  retired 
slowly,  sullenly,  and  doggedly.  General  Jackson  did  not  pursue, 
and  the  Federals  halted  after  moving1  back  a  short  distance,  and 
arranged  to  re-form  their  ranks  and  renew  the  charge.  As  soon  as 
they  started,  however,  they  were  obliged  to  face  against  General 
Jackson.  This  exposed  them,  of  course,  to  our  enfilading  fire.  We 
now  had  several  batteries  in  position,  and  as  soon  as  the  lines  had 
taken  shape  and  started  on  their  second  assault,  we  poured  a  perfect 
hail  of  balls  into  their  flanks  and  scattered  them  again.  Although 
discomfited,  they  w^ere  not  broken,  but  retired  with  their  slow,  angry, 
sullen  step.  When  they  had  gone  beyond  the  fair  range  of  our  bat 
teries  they  halted,  and  tried  to  form  again  for  the  third  assault.  I 
now  determined  to  end  the  matter,  feeling  that  I  had  an  easy  victory 
in  my  grasp.  I,  therefore,  ordered  every  battery  to  be  in  readiness, 
and  drew  my  men  up  for  a  charge,  designing  to  throw  them  into  the 
broken  ranks  of  the  enemy  as  soon  as  my  artillery  had  dispersed 
them.  The  Federals  moved  forward  once  more.  When  they  wrere 
fairly  in  range  every  gun  was  opened  upon  them,  and  before  they 
had  recovered  from  the  stunning  effect,  I  sprung  every  man  that  I 
had  to  the  charge,  and  swept  down  upon  them  like  an  avalanche. 
The  effect  was  simply  magical.  The  enemy  broke  all  to  pieces.  I 
pushed  my  men  forward  in  a  pell-mell  pursuit,  hoping  to  reach  the 
main  Federal  lines  at  the  same  time  with  their  retreating  forces. 
We  succeeded  in  this  and  drove  the  enemy  back,  pursuing  them 
until  fully  ten  o'clock  at  night.  In  the  meanwhile,  I  received  a 
note  from  General  Lee.  lie  had  heard  my  guns,  and  at  once  sup 
posed  I  had  thought  it  best  to  relieve  Jackson  in  a  different  manner 


THE  MISTAKES  OF  GETTYSBURG.  G31 

from  that  indicated  by  his  orders.  lie,  therefore,  wrote  me  that  if 
Iliad  "  found  any  thing  better  than  reinforcing  Jackson,  to  pursue 
it."  I  mention  this  incident  simply  to  show  the  official  relations 
that  existed  between  General  Lee  and  myself.  As  to  our  personal 
relations  I  present  two  letters  throwing  light  upon  that  subject. 
One  is  from  Colonel  AV.  II.  Taylor,  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  and 
the  other  is  from  General  Lee  himself  : 

HEADQUAKTEES  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

April  26th,  1864. 

My  Dear  General  :  —  I  have  received  your  note  of  yesterday,  and  have  consulted 
the  General  about  reviewing  your  command.  He  directs  me  to  say  that  he  has 
written  to  the  President  to  know  if  lie  can  visit  and  review  the  army  this  week, 
and,  until  his  reply  is  received,  the  General  cannot  say  when  he  can  visit  you.  He 
is  anxious  to  see  you,  and  it  will  give  him  much  pleasure  to  meet  yon.  and  your 
corps  once  more.  He  hopes  soon  to  he  able  to  do  this,  and  I  will  give  you  due  notice 
when  lie  can  come.  I  really  am  beside  myself,  General,  with  joy  of  having  you 
back.  It  is  like  the  reunion  of  a  family. 

Truly  and  respectfully  yours, 

W.  II.  TAYLOR,  A.  A.  G. 

To  GENERAL  LONGSTREET. 


LEXINGTON,  YA.,  March  9th, 

Hit/  Dear  General:  —  Your  son  Garland  handed  me,  a  few  days  since,  your  letter 
of  the  loth  of  January,  with  the  copies  of  your  reports  of  operations  in  Mast  Tennes 
see,  the  Wilderness,  etc.,  and  of  some  of  my  official  letters  to  you.  I  hope  you  will 
be  able  to  send  me  a  report  of  your  operations  around  Suffolk  and  Richmond  previ 
ous  to  the  evacuation  of  that  city,  and  of  any  of  my  general  orders  which  you  may 
be  able  to  collect.  Can  you  not  occupy  your  leisure  time  in  preparing  memoirs  of 
the  war.  Every  officer  whose  position  and  character  would  give  weight  to  his 
statements,  ought  to  do  so.  It  is  the  only  way  in  which  we  can  hope  that  fragments 
of  truth  will  reach  posterity.  Mrs.  Long-street  will  act  as  your  amanuensis.  I  am 
very  sorry  that  your  arm  improves  so  slowly.  I  trust  that  it  will,  eventually,  be 
restored  to  you.  You  must  present  my  kindest  regards  to  Mrs.  Longstreet.  I  hope 
your  home  in  Xew  Orleans  will  be  happy,  and  that  your  life,  which  is  dear  to  me, 
will  be  long  and  prosperous. 

Most  truly  yours, 

R.  E.  LEE. 

There  is  one  point  to  which  I  call  especial  attention.  The 
friends  of  Colonel  J.  B.  Walton,  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  First 
Corps,  think  that  in  my  first  an  inferential  injustice  was  done  to  that 
gentleman.  Colonel  Walton  was  an  officer  of  great  worth,  and  at 
all  times  had  the  confidence  of  his  commanding  officers,  and  it  is  with 
pleasure  that  I  correct  what  certainly  was  an  unintentional  derogation 
of  his  quality.  It  is  true  that  in  part  of  my  first  narrative  there  were 
sentences  subject  to  the  erroneous  impression  that  Colonel  Walton 
was  not  in  full  command  of  the  artillery  of  the  First  Corps  at  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg.  My  orders,  however,  as  well  as  my  instructions, 


032  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

quoted  in  another  part  of  the  narrative,  were  addressed  to  Colonel 
J.  B.  Walton,  as  Chief  of  Artillery,  and  show  conclusively  that  he 
was  in  command  on  that  day.  Colonel  Alexander  figured  more 
prominently  in  the  correspondence  that  passed  between  myself  and 
the  artillery,  simply  because  I  had  consulted  personally  with  Colonel 
Alexander  on  these  points  before  the  battle  opened,  and  because  he 
was  most  directly  interested  in  the  handling  of  the  artillery  massed 
at  the  peach  orchard,  and  under  cover  of  which  Pickett  was  to  make 
his  charge.  Colonel  Walton  was  a  brave  and  capable  officer,  and  I 
regret  that  my  narrative  was  so  construed  as  to  reflect  upon  his  fair 
and  spotless  record. 

There  were  two  or  three  trifling  inaccuracies  in  my  first  account 
of  this  battle  which  need  correction :  The  scout,  upon  whose  infor 
mation  the  head  of  our  column  was  turned  to  the  right,  reported  at 
Chambersburg  on  the  night  of  the  28th  of  June.  It  is  printed  the 
29th.  Several  orders  that  I  issued  on  the  1st  of  July,  and  so  dated, 
appear  under  the  date  of  the  18th.  The  real  strength  of  Pickett's 
Division  was  four  thousand  five  hundred  bayonets.  It  was  printed 
five  thousand  five  hundred.  In  the  paragraph  where  I  stated  that 
General  Meade  anticipated  my  attack  of  the  3d,  and  told  General 
Hancock  that  he  intended  to  throw  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  against 
its  flanks  when  it  was  made,  it  is  printed  that  he  gave  this  infor 
mation  in  the  "evening,"  when,  of  course,  it  should  have  been 
"  morning." 

I  have  now  done,  for  the  present,  with  the  campaign  of  Gettys 
burg.  What  I  have  written  about  it  has  been  compelled  from  me 
by  a  desire  on  the  one  hand  to  have  future  historians  properly 
informed  upon  the  most  important  movement  of  the  war,  and  a 
necessity  on  the  other  hand  of  correcting  important  mis-statements 
made  ignorantly  or  maliciously  concerning  it.  I  have  written 
nothing  that  was  not  supported  by  abundant  proof,  advanced  no 
opinions  not  clearly  justified  by  the  facts.  As  disastrous  as  the 
results  of  that  battle  were,  and  as  innocent  as  I  was  of  bringing 
them  upon  my  people,  I  accepted  my  share  of  the  disaster  without 
a  murmur,  and  cheerfully  bore  the  responsibility  of  it  as  long  as 
there  was  a  possibility  of  injuring  the  cause  we  were  engaged  in  by 
a  discussion  of  the  points  involved.  I  should  probably  have  never 
written  a  line  concerning  the  battle,  had  it  not  been  for  the  attempt 
of  the  wordy  soldiers  to  specifically  fix  upon  me  the  whole  burden 
of  that  battle — their  rashness  carrying  them  so  far  as  to  lead  them  to 
put  false  orders  in  the  mouth  of  our  great  captain,  and  charge  me 
with  having  broken  them.  To  disprove  these  untrue  assertions,  and 
to  give  the  world  the  truth  concering  the  battle,  then  became  what 


THE  MISTAKES  OF  GETTYSBURG.  633 

I  considered  an  imperative  duty.  I  repeat  that  I  regret  most  deeply 
that  this  discussion  was  not  opened  before  the  death  of  General  Lee. 
If  the  charges  so  vehemently  urged  against  me  after  his  death  had 
been  preferred,  or  even  suggested,  in  his  lifetime,  I  do  not  believe 
thev  would  have  needed  any  reply  from  me.  General  Lee  would 
have  answered  them  himself,  and  have  set  history  right.  But,  even 
as  the  matter  is,  I  do  not  fear  the  verdict  of  history  on  Gettysburg. 
Time  sets  all  things  right.  Error  lives  but  a  day — truth  is  eternal. 

There  is  an  incidental  matter  to  which  I  shall  refer  in  this  con 
nection.  It  is  in  regard  to  a  statement  made  by  Mr.  Swinton.  In 
his  "  Ultimo  Suspiro,''  he  gives  the  history  of  a  meeting  which  he 
says  took  place  on  the  7th  of  April,  1805,  between  General  Lee  and 
his  leading  officers.  lie  says  that  this  meeting  was  a  private  council, 
and  that  the  officers  united  in  advising  General  Lee  to  surrender  on 
that  day — two  days  before  the  surrender  took  place  at  Appomattox. 
In  describing  that  meeting,  he  does  me  the  grave  injustice  of  putting 
my  name  among  the  officers  who  gave  General  Lee  this  advice.  The 
truth  of  the  matter  is,  I  never  attended  any  such  meeting.  1  had 
no  time  to  have  done  so.  I  was  kept  incessantly  busy  in  the  lield 
during  the  days  preceding  the  surrender  at  Appomattox.  All  night 
long  of  the  1st  we  marched  with  Fields'  Division  from  Richmond 
to  Petersburg,  reaching  that  point  at  early  dawn  on  the  2d.  I  at 
once  went  to  General  Lee's  headquarters.  I  found  him  in  bed  in 
his  tent.  "While  I  was  sitting  upon  the  side  of  his  couch,  discussing 
my  line  of  march  and  receiving  my  orders  for  the  future — this  invol 
ving  a  march  on  the  Five  Forks — a  courier  came  in  and  announced 
that  our  line  was  being  broken  in  front  of  the  house  in  which  General 
Lee  had  slept.  I  hurried  to  the  front,  and  as  fast  as  my  troops  came 
up  they  were  thrown  into  action  to  check  the  advance  of  the  Federals 
until  night  had  come  to  cover  our  withdrawal.  ^Ve  fought  all  day, 
and  at  night  again  took  up  our  march,  and  from  that  time  forward 
until  the  surrender,  we  marched,  and  fought,  and  hungered,  stagger 
ing  through  cold,  and  rain,  and  mud,  to  Appomattox — contesting 
every  foot  of  the  way,  beset  by  overwhelming  odds  on  all  sides.  It 
was  one  constant  fight  for  days  and  days,  the  nights  even  giving  us 
no  rest.  "When  at  length  the  order  came  to  surrender,  on  the  9th,  I 
ordered  my  men  to  stack  their  arms,  and  surrendered  four  thousand 
bayonets  of  Fields'  Division — the  only  troops  that  General  Lee  had 
left  me.  I  also  turned  over  to  General  Grant  one  thousand  three 
hundred  prisoners  taken  by  the  cavalry  and  by  my  troops  while  on 
the  retreat.  As  to  the  conference  of  officers  on  the  7th,  I  never 
attended,  and,  of  course,  did  not  join  in  the  advice  it  gave  to  General 
Lee.  Mr.  Swinton  has  been  clearly  misinformed  upon  this  point. 


THE  FIRST  CAVALRY. 


BY  CAPTAIN  JAMES  II.  STEVENSON. 


"WiiEN  the  war-cloud  suddenly 
burst  over  Charleston  harbor, 
in  the  early  dawn  of  that  mem 
orable  12th  of  April,  the  loyal 
people  of  the  North  found  the 
national  existence  threatened 
by  armed  and  organized  trea 
son,  without  adequate  prepa 
ration  to  meet  the  impending 
danger.  It  was  supposed,  how 
ever,  that  seventy-five  thou 
sand  militia  would  be  able  to 
quell  the  insurrection  in  a  very 
short  time,  and  President  Lin 
coln  issued  his  proclamation 
calling  out  that  number  of 
men  to  serve  for  a  period  of  three  months.  This  levy  was  soon 
raised ;  but  the  people,  having  been  thoroughly  aroused  to  the 
danger  which  threatened  the  Union,  continued  to  form  regiment 
after  regiment  of  volunteers,  in  anticipation  of  their  services  being 
needed.  Some  even  began  to  organize  companies  for  the  cavalry 
arm  of  the  service,  but  they  were  regarded  as  altogether  visionary. 
The  government  threw  cold  water  upon  the  cavalry  movement,  and 
plainly  intimated  that  it  could  manage  the  rebels  without  that  arm. 
Nothing  discouraged,  "Young  America"  persisted  in  sounding 
"  Boots  and  Saddles,"  and  many  young  men  were  found  anxious  to 
have  a  tilt  with  the  "chivalry"  on  the  "sacred  soil"  on  horseback. 
Very  soon,  the  government  began  to  think  that  a  regiment  of  volun 
teer  cavalry  might  be  of  some  service,  and,  accordingly,  the  following 
circular  was  issued : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON,  May  1st,  1861. 
To  THE  GOVERNORS  OF  THE  SEVERAL  STATES,  AND  ALL  WHOM  IT  MAY  CONCERN  : 

I  have  authorized  Colonel  Carl  Schurz  to  raise  and  organize  a  volunteer  regi 
ment  of  cavalry.     For  the  purpose  of  rendering  it  as  efficient  as  possible,  he  is 
(634) 


THE  FIRST  CAVALRY.  035 

instructed  to  enlist  principally  such  men  as  have  served  in  the  same  arm  before. 
The  government  will  provide  the  regiment  with  arms,  but  cannot  provide  the 
horses  and  accoutrements.  For  these  necessaries  we  rely  upon  the  patriotism  of 
the  States  and  the  citizens,  and  for  this  purpose  I  take  the  liberty  of  requesting  you 
to  afford  Colonel  Schurz  your  aid  in  the  execution  of  this  plan. 

(Signed)  SIMON  CAMERON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

On  the  3d  of  May,  Colonel  Schurz  passed  through  Philadelphia, 
when  he  heard  of  some  gentlemen  engaged  in  organizing  a  regiment 
of  cavalry,  and  to  these  he  made  known  his  authority,  and  requested 
them  to  unite  with  him.  These  gentlemen  thought  the  government 
would  soon  call  for  more  cavalry,  and,  therefore,  declined  to  join 
Colonel  Schurz,  except  one  of  the  lieutenants,  rained  "William  II. 
Boyd,  to  whom  Colonel  Schurz  gave  authority  to  raise  a  company 
for  his  regiment.  This  was  the  first  company  of  volunteer  cavalry 
duly  authorized  to  he  raised  for  the  war. 

At  that  time,  there  was  a  troop  composed  of  some  of  the  hest 
young  men  of  (iermantown  and  vicinity,  all  mounted,  armed,  and  fully 
equipped  for  active  service,  undergoing  a  thorough  course  of  drill 
at  Chestnut  Hill,  under  the  instructions  of  James  JI.  Stevenson,  who 
had  just  returned  from  California,  after  serving  a  term  of  enlistment 
as  sergeant  in  the  First  Tinted  States  Dragoons.  AVillinm  Uotch 
Wister,  Esq.,  was  captain  of  the  troop,  and,  on  hearing  of  Colonel 
Schurz's  authority,  he  visited  "Washington  to  try  and  have  his  men 
accepted  as  part  of  Schurz  \s  regiment.  On  his  return,  the  following 

note  was  received : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  June  14th,  1861. 
CAPTAIN  WILLIAM  ROTCII  WISTER, 

Philadelphia: 

Dear  Kir  : — This  department,  I  am  instructed  by  the  Secretary  to  say  to  you, 
will  accept  your  light  horse  company,  to  he  attached  to  the  regiment  oi'  cavalry 
being  formed  to  serve  for  three  years,  or  during  the  war,  if  ready  to  lie  so  mustered, 
and  will,  in  that  event,  furnish  the  holsters,  pistols,  and  swords,  but  not  the  uni 
forms,  horses,  or  equipments. 

Very  respectfully, 
(Signed)  J.  P.  SANDERSON, 

Chief  Clerk. 

They  felt  very  much  elated  at  this ;  but  there  was  still  an 
obstacle  in  the  way.  The  government  would  not  muster  in  a  man 
unless  a  fully  organized  company,  with  a  minimum  aggregate  of 
seventy-nine  men,  were  presented  to  the  mustering  officer.  Captain 
Wister  and  his  gay  troop  rode  all  over  the  country,  among  the 
farmers'  sons,  in  quest  of  recruits  ;  but  all  his  efforts  failed  to  raise 
the  requisite  number  of  men  who  were  able  and  willing  to  find  their 
own  horses  and  equipments,  notwithstanding  that  the  government 


636  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

had  offered  to  pay  the  troopers  forty  cents  per  day  for  their  use  and 
risk ;  with  the  proviso,  however,  that,  in  case  the  trooper  lost  his 
horse  in  any  way,  he  must  furnish  another,  or  serve  on  foot.  This 
proviso  was  the  straw  that  broke  the  camel's  back.  After  three 
months  spent  in  drilling,  and  in  unavailing  efforts  to  fill  up,  Captain 
Wister's  troop  disbanded,  on  the  30th  of  June,  and  its  members 
sought  service  in  other  commands. 

In  the  meantime,  Colonel  Schurz  had  gone  to  ISTew  York,  and 
had  succeeded  in  raising  four  companies  of  Germans  who  had  seen 
service  in  the  cavalry  of  Europe.  And  here,  also,  he  was  joined  by 
six  companies  of  Americans,  which  had  been  organized  in  hopes  of 
being  accepted  by  the  government.  A  company  from  Michigan  also 
joined  him,  which,  with  Boyd's  Philadelphia  company,  completed 
the  regiment.  About  this  time  Colonel  Schurz  was  appointed 
Minister  to  Spain,  and  some  trouble  was  then  experienced  in  getting 
a  suitable  commander.  At  last  Major  Andrew  T.  McKeynolds,  a 
Michigan  lawyer,  who  had  seen  service  in  the  cavalry  in  Mexico, 
was  accepted  by  the  government  in  lieu  of  Colonel  Schurz,  and 
things  again  looked  favorable.  lS"o  one  knew  how  the  men  were  to 
be  mounted  and  equipped.  The  several  States  had  made  no  efforts 
to  comply  with  the  request  of  the  War  Secretary ;  the  men,  with  few 
exceptions,  were  unable  to  mount  and  equip  themselves,  and  things 
had  about  come  to  a  stand-still.  It  was  even  feared  that  the  organi 
zation  could  not  be  kept  together,  as  the  men  were  not  mustered 
into  service.  On  the  10th  of  July  the  government  came  to  its 
senses,  and  an  order  was  issued  requiring  the  proper  departments  to 
furnish  horses  and  equipments  to  companies  of  volunteer  cavalry 
when  ready  to  be  mustered  into  service ;  and  on  the  19th  of  July 
Captain  Boyd's  company  was  mustered  in  at  Philadelphia  by  Major 
Ruff,  the  United  States  mustering  officer.  The  company  had  ap 
peared  before  him  to  be  mustered  in  on  the  16th,  but  wrere  rejected 
because  they  lacked  one  man  of  the  requisite  number.  The  officers 
of  the  company  were :  Captain,  William  II.  Boyd ;  First  Lieutenant, 
William  W.  Hanson ;  and  Second  Lieutenant,  James  II.  Stevenson 
(he  who  had  been  drilling  Captain  Wister's  troops  at  Chestnut  Hill). 
On  the  22d  of  July,  Boyd's  company  arrived  at  Washington,  amid 
the  excitement  caused  by  the  Union  repulse  at  Bull  run  the  pre 
vious  day.  That  night  they  listened  to  horrifying  tales  of  the  san 
guinary  deeds  performed  by  the  "Black  Horse  Cavalry"  on  that 
disastrous  field,  but  it  only  seemed  to  stimulate  the  boys  with  a 
desire  to  measure  swords  with  horsemen  so  renowned. 


THE  FIEST  CAVALRY.  637 

They  had  not  long  to  wait,  for,  on  the  18th  of  August,  not  quite 
one  month  from  the  date  of  their  muster  into  service,  Boyd's  com 
pany  were  sent  on  a  scout  toward  Mount  Vernon.  AVliile  they  were 
feeling  their  way  through  a  large  woods,  in  the  vicinity  of  Polrick 
church,  they  suddenly  came  upon  a  squadron  of  the  famous  "Black 
Horse  Cavalry"  drawn  up  in  line  on  a  broad  road  ready  to  receive 
them.  Captain  Boyd  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  his  company,  and 
at  once  commanded  it  to  "  charge  !  "  The  boys  answered  witli  a  yell, 
and  dashed  upon  the  foe,  who  confidently  expected  to  see  them  run 
at  the  very  sight  of  such  an  array.  So  sudden  and  so  unexpected 
was  the  onset,  that  the  enemy  had  only  time  to  tire  one  volley  before 
the  "blue  jackets"  were  upon  them,  when,  marvelous  to  relate,  they 
broke  and  fled  in  confusion.  Bovd's  men  pursued  them  several  miles, 
putting  two  of  them  hors  du  combat,  and  then  returned  to  Alexandria 
to  report  to  General  Franklin  what  they  had  done.  The  General 
was  delighted,  and  at  once  notified  General  McClellan,  who  reviewed 
the  company  on  the  22d  of  August,  and  complimented  Captain  Boyd 
and  his  officers  and  men  for  their  gallant  conduct.  The  charm  was 
broken,  and  that  company  never  afterward  had  any  dread  of  the 
Confederate  cavalry.  In  this  charge.  Captain  Boyd  lost  one  man 
killed,  Jacob  Erwin,  who  is  now  buried  in  the  Odd  Fellows'  Ceme 
tery,  in  Philadelphia.  lie  was  the  first  cavalryman  killed  in  the 
rebellion,  and  this  was  the  first  charge  made  by  volunteer  cavalry. 
So  much  for  Pennsylvania. 

Bovd's  company  was  then  attached  to  General  Franklin's  head 
quarters,  and  was  the  pet  of  the  whole  division  commanded  by  that 
gallant  soldier.  When  the  regiment  to  which  the  company  belonged 
was  authorized  to  be  raised,  the  government  supposed  it  would  not 
require  any  more  volunteer  cavalry,  and  that  regiment  was  to  be 
known  as  the  First  United  States  Volunteer  Cavalry.  But  when  it 
was  determined  to  call  out  a  large  force  of  this  arm,  the  government 
declined  to  have  anything  to  do  with  volunteers,  and  this  regiment 
found  itself  without  a  patron.  At  this  juncture  a  controversy  arose 
between  Governor  Morgan,  of  JSTew  York,  and  Governor  Curtin,  of 

O          ' 

Pennsylvania,  as  to  the  proprietorship  of  the  regiment,  which  was 
decided  in  favor  of  Xew  York,  she  having  raised  ten  out  of  the 
twelve  companies.  TVe  had  been  called  the  ''Lincoln  Cavalry"  up 
to  that  time ;  but  after  that  we  were  known  as  the  First  Xew  York 
(Lincoln)  Cavalry.  Captain  Boyd  then  made  several  efforts  to  get 
his  company  transferred  to  a  Pennsylvania  regiment,  but  without 
success.  Governor  Curtin  had  designated  the  company  as  the 
"  Tenth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  "  daring  the  controversy  with  Gov- 


G3S  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ernor  Morgan,  and  Pennsylvania  never  had  a  regiment  to  fill  the 
vacancy  left  for  Boyd's  men. 

The  company  remained  with  General  Franklin  throughout  the 
Peninsular  campaign,  rendering  valuable  services.  By  its  bold 
conduct,  and  timely  warning,  it  saved  Franklin's  right  flank  at 
Savage's  Station :  and,  after  hard  service  in  the  battle  of  White 

o 

Oak  Swamp,  it  covered  the  retreat,  at  midnight,  to  the  James  river. 
It  rendered  good  service  at  Malvern  Hill,  and  cleared  the  road  of 
teams  on  the  following  day,  so  that  the  artillery  and  ambulances 
could  pass.  A  company  of  Rush's  Lancers  took  its  place  at  General 
Franklin's  headquarters,  at  Harrison's  Landing,  when  ordered  to 
proceed  with  the  regiment  to  join  Burnside  at  Fredericksburg.  It 
marched  with  that  officer  to  Antietam,  arid  won  laurels  at  Hyatt  s- 
town,  Maryland,  just  before  that  battle,  and  at  WilHamsport,  at  its 
close,  where  several  of  its  members  were  wounded  by  grapeshot 
while  charging  upon  a  battery.  In  Western  Virginia,  it  made  its 
mark  among  linboden's  men,  helping  to  capture  the  camp  of  that 
bold  partisan  on  two  different  occasions.  In  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
under  Milroy,  it  performed  many  bold  deeds,  in  company  with  the 
regiment,  while  lighting  against  Mosby,  Gilmore,  and  Imboden. 
Here  Captain  Boyd  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  major,  and  Lieu 
tenant  Stevenson,  who  had  been  adjutant  of  the  regiment  and  acting 
assistant  adjutant  general  of  the  cavalry  brigade,  was  promoted  to 
be  captain  of  Boyd's  company. 

Just  then,  General  Lee  slipped  away  from  Hooker  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  en  route  for  Gettysburg,  and  suddenly  confronted  Milroy  at 
Winchester.  The  First  New  York  Cavalry  were  at  Berryville,  and 
were  compelled  to  retire  before  the  advance  of  Rodes'  Division,  of 
Ewell's  Corps.  A  brigade  of  rebel  cavalry  pursued  and  overtook 
them  at  the  Opequan,  but  the  First  New  York  "  cleaned  them  out " 
nicely,  killing  and  wounding  over  fifty  of  them,  and  causing  them 
to  retire  from  the  field.  When  Milroy  found  he  was  surrounded  by 
Lee's  army,  he  sent  for  a  bold  officer  and  fifty  men  to  carry  a  dis 
patch  to  Martinsburg,  and  Major  Boyd  was  detailed  with  his  old 
company.  They  knew  every  cow-path  in  the  Valley,  and  succeeded 
in  flanking  the  rebel  force  then  between  Winchester  and  Martinsburg, 
and  sent  the  first  intelligence  to  Baltimore  and  Washington  that  Lee's 
army  was  at  Winchester.  That  night,  a  dispatch  arrived  at  Martins 
burg  for  Milroy,  and  three  men  of  Boyd's  company  volunteered  to 
take  it  through.  Their  names  were  Oliver  Lumphries,  John  V. 
Harvey,  and  George  J.  Pitman,  all  sergeants.  After  several  hair 
breadth  escapes,  they  arrived  in  the  beleaguered  town  at  midnight, 


THE  FIRST  CAVALRY.  639 

and  Milroy  called  a  council  of  war.  It  was  determined  to  spike  tlie 
guns,  destroy  the  artillery  ammunition,  leave  everything  on  wheels 
behind,  and  cut  a  way  through  the  enemy's  lines  to  Martinsburg  or 
Harper's  Ferry.  The  disaster  of  that  day  is  too  well  known  to  require 
a  recital  of  it  here. 

Major  Boyd  fought  the  advancing  enemy  at  Martinsburg,  while 
our  wagon  train,  which  had  gone  from  Berryville  to  that  place,  got 
well  under  way,  and  then  he  followed  it  to  Williamsport,  Maryland. 
The  enemy  followed  closely,  and  Boyd  was  compelled  to  tight  and 
fall  back,  and  then  fight  again,  in  order  to  save  the  train,  which  he 
succeeded  in  doing,  and  conducted  it  in  safety  to  Ilarrisburg,  Penn 
sylvania.  Then  lie  began  a  system  of  partisan  warfare,  dashing  upon 
the  enemy  in  front  and  on  both  flanks,  causing  them  to  think  there 
was  a  large  force  in  their  front,  and  preventing  them  from  doing 
much  mischief  that  they  otherwise  would  have  done,  and  helped  to 
save  the  State  capital  from  the  invaders.  From  the  1.5th  of  June, 
when  they  left  Winchester,  to  the  15th  of  July,  this  company  was 
never  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy,  and  seldom  a  day  passed  without 
their  having  a  tight.  They  captured  many  prisoners,  and  a  vast 
amount  of  property,  beside  saving  untold  thousands  to  the  people 
of  the  Cumberland  Valley.  At  Greencastle,  Pennsylvania,  the 
company  attacked  Jenkins'  rebel  brigade,  and  here  they  lost 
William  II.  llilil,  who  was  the  lirst  soldier  killed  in  Pennsylvania 
during  the  war. 

For  his  services  in  this,  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  Governor 
Curtin  rewarded  Major  Boyd  with  the  Colonelcy  of  the  Twenty-first 
Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  and  commissioned  his  able  lieutenant,  ().  B. 
Knowles,  a  major  in  the  same  regiment.  Lieutenant  William  II. 
Boyd  and  Sergeant  E.  Knowles  were  also  transferred  to  the  Twenty- 
first— the  first  as  captain  and  the  other  as  adjutant  of  the  regiment. 
Captain  Stevenson  then  took  command  of  his  company,  and  under 
him  it  won  fresh  laurels  in  the  Shenandoah  V alley  after  Gettysburg. 
It  was  with  General  Sigel  in  the  battle  of  Xew  Market,  and  was  the 
last  to  leave  the  field.  It  led  the  advance,  under  General  Hunter, 
upon  Lynchburg,  and  greatly  distinguished  itself  in  the  battle  of 
Piedmont,  and  in  the  subsequent  fighting  during  Hunter's  retreat 
from  Lynchburg  over  the  Alleghanies  into  the  Kanawha  Valley. 
Again  at  Snicker's  gap,  Ashby's  gap,  and  Winchester,  under  General 
Crook,  this  company  played  a  conspicuous  and  noble  part.  And  at 
Moortield,  under  General  Averill,  it  formed  part  of  the  gallant  two 
hundred  of  the  First  Xew  York  (Lincoln)  Cavalry,  commanded  by 
Captain  Jones,  that  defeated  McCausland's  whole  brigade,  returning 


640  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

from  the  burning  of  Cliambersburg,  Pennsylvania.  It  served  under 
Averill  during  the  memorable  advance  of  General  Sheridan  against 
General  Early  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  took  part  in  every 
battle  'during  the  campaign.  In  the  battles  of  Opequan,  Fisher's 
Hill,  Brown's  gap,  and  Wier's  cave,  the  valiant  conduct  of  this  com 
pany  attracted  the  attention  of  all  who  beheld  it.  And  at  the  battle 
of  Nineveh,  when  Capeheart's  Brigade  attacked  and  defeated  Mc- 
Causland's  Division,  this  company  led  in  the  charge. 

When  Sheridan  set  out  from  Winchester  to  join  Grant,  his  way 
was  obstructed  by  the  rebels,  under  Rosser,  at  the  bridge  over  North 
river,  near  Mount  Crawford.  The  First  New  York  Cavalry,  under 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Battersby,  was  ordered  to  swim  the  river  a  mile 
above  the  bridge,  and  charge  the  rebels  in  flank ;  which  they  did  in 
fine  style — driving  them  out  of  their  works,  pursuing  them  about 
ten  miles,  capturing  prisoners,  guns,  and  wagons,  and  saving  the 
bridge  over  Middle  river.  For  this  General  Custer,  to  whose 
division  they  belonged,  complimented  them  in  person.  Next  day 
Custer  advanced  upon  Waynesborough,  where  Early's  forces  were 
intrenched,  and,  after  some  severe  fighting,  charged  the  works,  driv 
ing  the  enemy  out,  capturing  nearly  every  man,  and  all  the  guns  and 
material  of  war.  The  First  New  York  Cavalry  led  the  charge. 
Again  at  Dinwiddie  Court-House  and  Five  Forks,  the  regiment 
won  fresh  laurels  under  the  eyes  of  Sheridan  and  Custer.  At 
Sailor's  creek  the  First  New  York  (Lincoln)  Cavalry  led  the  charge 
over  the  enemy's  works,  capturing  General  Ewell  and  his  staff  and 
hundreds  of  prisoners,  beside  guns  and  battle-flags.  At  Appomattox 
Station  they  charged  with  Custer,  in  the  darkness,  and  took  hundreds 
of  prisoners,  many  guns  and  wagons,  beside  four  trains  of  stores, 
which  were  waiting  for  Lee's  hungry  army.  And  the  next  day  they 
were  dashing  forward  with  Custer  to  attack  the  enemy,  when  they 
were  stopped  by  news  of  the  surrender  of  Lee. 

When  the  regiment  re-enlisted  as  veterans,  in  1864,  Captain 
Stevenson  induced  his  men  to  be  credited  upon  the  quota  of  the 
Twentieth  Ward  of  Philadelphia,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
New  York  offered  much  larger  bounties  to  the  men,  and  had  offered 
the  captain  five  hundred  dollars  to  take  his  company  to  that  State. 
On  the  arrival  of  Company  C  in  Philadelphia,  on  veteran  furlough, 
the  Twentieth  Ward  Bounty  Fund  Committee  gave  them  a  hearty 
reception  in  the  old  North  Baptist  church,  Eighth  street,  above 
Master  street,  upon  which  occasion  the  ladies  of  the  ward  presented 
the  company  with  an  elegant  guidon,  and  Captain  Stevenson  was 
presented  with  a  sword,  sash,  and  belt.  The  company  participated 


THE  FIRST  CAVALRY.  641 

in  sixty  engagements  with  the  enemy  during  their  four  years'  of 
service,  and  the  little  guidon  above  mentioned,  which  is  now  in  pos 
session  of  Captain  Stevenson,  was  completely  riddled  with  bullets. 

It  may  not  be  amiss  to  state  that  not  only  was  the  present  Sec 
retary  of  the  Interior  our  first  colonel,  but  that  Charles  B.  Evarts,  a 
son  of  the  present  Secretary  of  State,  was  a  soldier  in  the  regiment. 
This  young  man  was  at  college,  but  reading  in  the  Xew  York  papers 
of  the  daring  and  seemingly  romantic  deeds  of  the  First  New  York 
(Lincoln)  Cavalry,  he  ran  away  from  school  and  enlisted  in  the  regi 
ment  as  a  private  soldier,  his  father  being  at  the  time  in  Europe, 
fie  served  faithfully  and  with  much  credit  during  the  severe  cam 
paign  of  1SG-1,  and  on  our  return  from  the  Lynchburg  raid  he  was 
commissioned  a  lieutenant  by  President  Lincoln  and  assigned  to  duty 
as  an  aide  on  the  staff  of  General  William  II.  Seward,  son  of  the  then 
Secretary  of  State. 


STONEWALL  JACKSON  AND  HIS  MEN. 


BY    MAJOR    II.    KYD    DOUGLAS. 


IT  was  on  the  field  of  Manas- 
sas,  a  bright  Sunday  afternoon, 
the  21st  of  July,  1S61.  The 
armies  of  McDowell  and 
Beauregard  had  been  grap 
pling  with  each  other  since 
early  morning,  and,  in  their 
mutual  slaughter,  took  no  note 
of  the  sacredness  of  the  day, 
nor  its  brightness.  In  Wash 
ington  General  Scott  was 
anxiously  awaiting  the  result 
of  his  skilful  plan  of  battle, 
and  General  Johnston  had 
come  down  from  the  Valley 
of  Virginia,  in  response  to 
Beauregard's  appeal — "If  you  will  help  me,  now  is  the  time." 
Hotly  had  the  field  been  contested,  and  the  hours  passed  slowly  to 
men  who  had  never  tasted  of  battle  before.  Wavering  had  been  the 
fortunes  of  the  day,  but  it  was  evident  the  advantage  was  with  the 
Federal  army,  and,  before  our  brigade  went  into  action,  it  seemed  to 
us  the  day  was  lost.  After  changing  position  several  times,  without 
fighting,  General  Jackson  learned  that  Bee  was  hard  pressed,  and  he 
moved  to  his  assistance,  marching  through  the  wounded  and  the 
stragglers,  who  were  hurrying  to  the  rear.  It  was  then  after  two 
o'clock,  and  the  General  formed  his  brigade  along  the  crest  of  the 
hill  near  the  Henry  House,  the  men  lying  down  behind  the  brow  of 
it,  in  support  of  the  two  pieces  of  artillery  placed  in  position  to  play 
upon  the  advancing  foe. 

General  Bee,  his  brigade  being  crushed  and  scattered,  rode  up 
to  General  Jackson,  and,  with  the  excitement  and  mortification  of 
an  untried  but  heroic  soldier,  reported  that  the  enemy  were  beating 
him  back. 
(642) 


STONEWALL  JACKSON  AND  HIS  MEN.  643 

"  Very  well,  General,  it  can't  be  helped,'1  replied  Jackson. 
"  But  how  do  you  expect  to  stop  them  ? " 
"  WV11  give  them  the  bayonet ! "  was  the  answer,  briefly. 
General  Bee  wheeled  his  horse,  and  galloped  back  to  his  com 
mand.     As  he  did  so,  General  Jackson  said  to  Lieutenant  Lee  of  his 
staff : 

"  Tell  the  colonel  of  this  brigade,  that  the  enemy  are  advancing  ; 
that  when  their  heads  are  seen  above  the  hill,  let  the  whole  line  rise, 
move  forward  with  a  shout,  and  trust  to  the  bayonet.  I  am  tired  of 
this  ]<>n<j  range  work" 

Li  the  storm  which  followed  Bee's  return  to  his  command,  he 
was  soon  on  foot,  his  horse  shot  from  under  him.  "With  the  fury  of 
despair  he  strode  among  his  men,  and  tried  to  rally  and  to  hold  them 
against  the  torrent  which  beat  upon  them  ;  and.  finally,  in  a  voice 
which  rivaled  the  roar  of  battle,  he  cried  out:  4*  ( )h,  men,  there  are 
Jackson  and  his  Virginians  standing  behind  you  like  a  xf<»«>  //v/// /'' 
Uttering  these  words  of  martial  baptism,  Bee  fell  dead  upon  the 
.field,  and  left  behind  him  a  fame  which  will  follow  that  of  Jackson 
as  a  shadow. 

It  would  be  but  the  repetition  of  history  to  mention,  at  length, 
the  movements  of  Jackson's  Brigade  that  day.  It  was  Bee  who  gave 
him  the  name  of  t%  Stonewall,"  but  it  was  his  own  Virginians  who 
made  that  name  immortal.  This  brigade  checked  the  victorious  tide 
of  battle,  but  to  turn  it  back  was  no  easy  labor.  Around  the  Henry 
House  and  its  plateau  the  contest  raged  with  renewed  violence  and 
vacillating  success  for  an  hour;  and  then  Jackson  led  his  men  in 
their  last  bayonet  charge,  and  pierced  the  enemy's  centre.  The 
timely  arrival  of  Kirby  Smith  and  Early  upon  their  flank,  finished 
the  work,  and  defeat  was  turned  into  a  rout.  General  Jackson  will 
be  forgiven  for  this  sentence  in  a  letter  to  a  friend  :  '"You  will  find, 
when  my  report  shall  be  published,  that  the  First  Brigade  was  to 
our  army  what,  the  Imperial  Guard  was  to  Xapoleou ;  through  the 
blessings  of  God  it  met  the  victorious  enemy,  and  turned  the  fortunes 
of  the 'day/' 

And  who  was  Stonewall  Jackson,  and  of  what  stock  ?  Although 
he  was  of  sterling  and  respectable  parentage,  it  matters  little,  for,  in 
historic  fame,  "he  was  his  own  ancestor."  And  it  is  well  enough 
that  Virginia,  who  gave  to  the  war  Robert  Edward  Lee,  of  old  and 
aristocratic  lineage,  should  furnish  Jackson  as  the  representative  of 
her  people.  On  the  21st  of  January,  1S24-,  in  Clarksburg,  among 
the  mountains  of  Western  Virginia,  was  born  this  boy,  the  youngest 
of  four  children ;  and,  with  no  view  to  his  future  fame,  he  was 


644  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

named  Thomas  Jonathan  Jackson.  It  was  a  rugged,  honest  name, 
but  is  no  cause  of  regret  that  it  is  now  merged  in  the  more  rugged  and 
euphonious  one  he  afterward  made  for  himself.  No  comet  was  seen 
at  his  "birth,  and  there  is  little  record  of  his  boyhood,  except  that  he 
was  left  an  orphan  when  he  was  three  years  old,  and,  being  penniless, 
had  a  hard  time  of  it  in  his  youth.  But  his  father  had  been  a  lawyer, 
and  he  was  taken  care  of  by  some  of  his  relatives.  At  sixteen,  he 
was  appointed  a  constable,  and  two  years  afterward  entered  "West 
Point  as  a  cadet.  He  graduated  in  1846,  went  to  Mexico,  and  served 
as  lieutenant  in  the  battery  of  Magruder — "Prince  John" — who 
afterward  served  under  Jackson  in  Virginia.  Jackson  was  twice 
breveted  for  gallantry,  and  returned  from  Mexico,  at  the  age  of 
twenty-four,  with  an  enviable  reputation  and  the  rank  of  major. 
He  served  a  while  in  Florida,  but  his  health  gave  way,  and  he  was 
compelled  to  quit  the  army.  In  1851  he  was  appointed  Professor 
in  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  at  Lexington.  lie  there  married 
a  daughter  of  Rev.  George  Junkin,  I).  D.,  who  was  President  of 
what  is  now  Washington  and  Lee  University.  Dr.  Junkin  was  an 
earnest  Union  man,  and,  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  war,  resigned 
his  position,  and  went  back  to  Pennsylvania ;  but  it  is  said  the  loyalty 
of  the  old  gentleman  was  not  proof  against  the  pride  he  felt  in  his 
famous  son-in-law.  Major  Jackson's  wife  soon  died.  lie  then 
married  a  daughter  of  Rev.  Dr.  Morrison,  another  Presbyterian 
clergyman,  of  Charlotte,  North  Carolina.  She  now  lives  in  Char 
lotte,  with  her  only  child,  Julia,  who  was  not  six  months  old  when 
her  father  died  at  Chancellorsville.  In  185T  Major  Jackson  went 
to  Europe.  While  in  France,  he  rode  on  horseback,  with  some 
French  officers,  over  the  field  of  Waterloo.  It  is  said  he  seemed 
perfectly  familiar  with  the  topography  of  the  ground  and  the 
maneuvres  of  the  two  armies,  and  sharply  criticised  one  of  the 
Emperor's  movements,  by  saying,  "  There's  where  Napoleon  blun 
dered.'  Such  presumption  was  unheard  of  since  the  time  the 
young  Corsican,  in  Italy,  criticised  the  venerable  Wurmser.  But 
what  seemed  effrontery  in  Bonaparte  was  genius  in  Napoleon,  and 
the  name  of  Stonewall  will  save  his  criticism. 

After  his  return  from  Europe,  Jackson  led  a  quiet  and  unob 
trusive  life  at  Lexington,  less  known  than  any  other  professor.  His 
delicate  health  forbid  much  social  enjoyment.  I  met  him  there  in 
18GO,  and  once  said  to  a  classmate  in  the  law  school,  who  had  been 
at  the  Institute : 

"  It  seems  to  me,  Terrill,  I'd  like  to  know  Major  Jackson  better ; 
there  is  something  about  him  I  can't  make  out." 


STONEWALL  JACKSON  AND  HIS  MEN.  645 

"Nobody  can;  but  it  wouldn't  pay,"  replied  "Bath."  "Old 
Jack's  a  character,  genius,  or  just  a  little  crazy,  or  something  of 
that  sort,  lie  lives  quietly,  and  don't  meddle  with  people  ;  but  he 
is  as  systematic  as  a  multiplication  table,  and  as  full  of  military  as 
an  arsenal.  Stiff,  you  see,  and  never  laughs,  but  kind-hearted  as  a 
woman  ;  and,  by  Jupiter,  he  teaches  a  nigger  Sunday-school.  But, 

t/  .I.  r^o  t/ 

mind  what  1  say,  if  this  John  Brown  business  leads  to  war,  he'll  be 
heard  from." 

Well,  it  did  lead  to  war,  and  Jackson  was  heard  from,  and 
Colonel  Ten-ill  fell  lighting  under  him. 

I  have  referred  to  Major  Jackson's  ill-health.  It  took  the  form 
of  dyspepsia,  and  once,  during  the  war,  he  told  me  he  had  suffered 
with  it  for  twenty  years,  and  he  knew  of  no  misery  which  attacked 
a  man  as  it  did,  physically,  mentally,  and  morally,  and  was  as  likely 
to  drive  one  to  suicide.  It  produced  in  him  that  simplicity  of  diet 
which  was  as  conspicuous  as  his  simplicity  of  manners,  lie  never 
was  a  hearty  eater,  but  often  ate  of  one  or  two  things  on  the  table 
plentifully,  eating  some  things  he  did  not  like,  and  liking  many 
things  he  did  not  eat.  In  the  army,  he  rarely  accepted  an  invitation 
to  dinner,  and  when  he  did,  it  was  generally  to  oblige  his  staff.  Ue 
once  said  to  me  that  he  believed  he  was  fonder  of  whisky  and  brandy 
than  any  man  in  his  army  ;  and  yet  he  never  tasted  it.  His  discipline 
commenced  with  himself,  and  controlled  his  appetite  as  firmly  as  he 
did  his  troops. 

In  face  and  figure,  Stonewall  Jackson  was  not  striking.  Above 
the  average  height,  with  a  frame  angular,  muscular,  and  fleshless,  he 
was,  in  all  his  movements,  from  riding  a  horse  to  handling  a  pen,  the 
most  ungraceful  man  in  the  army.  His  expression  was  thoughtful, 
and  generally  clouded  with  an  air  of  fatigue.  His  eye  was  small, 
blue,  and  in  repose  as  gentle  as  a  young  girl's.  With  high,  broad 
forehead,  small,  sharp  nose,  thin,  pallid  lips,  deep  set  eyes,  and  dark, 
rusty  beard,  he  was  not  a  handsome  man.  His  face  in  the  drawing- 
room  or  tent,  softened  by  his  sweet  smile,  was  as  different  from  itself 
on  the  battle-field  as  a  little  lake  in  summer  noon  differs  from  the 
same  lake  when  frozen.  "Walking  or  riding  the  General  was  ungainly  ; 

O  O  O  t/     " 

his  main  object  was  to  go  over  the  ground,  without  regard  to  the 
manner  of  his  going.  His  favorite  horse  was  as  little  like  Pegasus 
as  he  was  like  Apollo  ;  he  rode  boldly  and  well,  but  certainly  not 
with  grace  and  ease.  He  was  not  a  man  of  style.  General  Lee,  on 
horseback  or  off,  was  the  handsomest  man  I  ever  saw.  It  was  said 
of  Wade  Hampton,  that  he  looked  as  knightly  when  mounted  as  if 
he  had  stepped  out  from  an  old  canvas,  horse  and  all.  Brecken- 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ridge  was  a  model  of  manly  beauty,  and  Joe  Johnston  looked  every 
inch  a  soldier.  None  of  these  things  can  be  said  of  Jackson. 

Akin  to  his  dyspepsia,  and  perhaps  as  a  consequence,  was  his 
ignorance  of  music.  One  morning,  at  Ashland,  he  startled  a  young 
lady  from  her  propriety  by  gravely  asking  her  if  she  had  ever  heard 
a  new  piece  of  music  called  "  Dixie,"  and  as  gravely  listening  to  her 
while  she  sang  it.  lie  had  heard  it  a  thousand  times  from  the  army 
bands,  and  yet  it  seemed  new  to  him.  Judged  by  the  Shakespearean 
standard,  who  could  be  more  "  fit  for  treasons,  stratagems,  and  spoils  ? " 
And  yet  there  was  one  kind  of  music  which  always  interested  and 
delighted  him.  It  was  the  "  rebel  yell "  of  his  troops.  To  this  grand 
chorus  he  never  failed  to  respond.  The  difference  between  the 
regular  "  hurrah  "  of  the  Federal  army,  and  the  irregular,  wild  yell 
of  the  Confederates,  was  as  marked  as  the  difference  in  their  uni 
forms.  The  rebel  yell  was  a  peculiar  mixture  of  sounds,  a  kind  of 
weird  shout.  Jackson  was  greeted  with  it  whenever  he  made  his 
appearance  to  the  troops,  on  the  march  or  in  battle ;  and  just  as 
invariably  he  would  seize  his  old  gray  cap  from  his  head  in  acknowl 
edgment,  and  his  "little  sorrel,"  knowing  his  habit,  would  break 
into  a  gallop  and  never  halt  until  the  shout  had  ceased.  I  remember 
one  night,  at  tattoo,  this  cry  broke  forth  in  the  camp  of  the  Stone 
wall  Brigade,  arid  was  taken  up  by  brigades  and  divisions,  until  it 
rolled  over  field  and  wood  throughout  the  whole  corps.  The  General 
came  hastily  and  bareheaded  from  his  tent,  and  going  up  to  a  fence 
near  by,  he  leaned  upon  it  and  listened  in  quiet  to  the  rise,  climax, 
and  conclusion  of  that  strange  serenade,  raising  his  head  to  catch  the 
last  sound,  as  it  grew  fainter,  and  until  it  died  away  like  an  echo 
along  the  mountains.  Then  turning  toward  his  tent  lie  muttered, 
in  half  soliloquy,  "  That  was  the  sweetest  music  I  ever  heard." 

General  Jackson's  troops  and  his  enemy's  believed  he  never 
slept ;  the  fact  is,  he  slept  a  great  deal.  Whenever  he  had  nothing 
else  to  do,  he  went  to  sleep,  especially  in  church.  I  remember 
during  the  invasion  of  Maryland,  on  Sunday  night  he  rode  three 
miles  in  an  ambulance  to  attend  church  in  Frederick,  and  then  fell 
asleep  as  soon  as  the  minister  began  to  preach ;  his  head  fell  upon 
his  breast,  and  he  never  awoke  until  aroused  by  the  organ  ajid  choir. 
He  could  sleep  anywhere  and  in  any  position,  sitting  in  his  chair, 
under  fire,  or  on  horseback.  On  a  night  march  toward  Richmond, 
after  the  battles  with  McClellan,  he  was  riding  along  with  his  drowsy 
staff,  nodding  and  sleeping  as  he  went.  We  passed  by  groups  of 
men  sitting  along  the  roadside,  and  engaged  in  roasting  new  corn 
by  fires  made  of  fence-rails.  One  group  took  us  for  cavalrymen, 


STONEWALL  JACKSON  AND  HIS  MEN.  647 

with,  an  inebriated  captain,  and  one  of-  the  party,  delighted  at  the 
sight  of  a  man  who  had  found  whisky  enough  to  be  drunk,  sprang 
up  from  the  lire  and,  brandishing  a  roasting-ear  in  his  hand,  leaped 
down  into  the  road,  and  seizing  the  General's  horse,  cried  out:  UI 
say,  old  fellow,  where  the  devil  did  you  get  your  liquor  ?"  In  an 
instant,  as  the  General  awoke,  the  fellow  saw  his  mistake  ;  and  then 
bounding  from  the  road  he  took  the  fence  at  a  single  leap,  exclaim 
ing :  u(iood  God,  it's  old  Jack!''  and  disappeared  in  the  darkness. 
Yes,  General  Jackson  slept  a  great  deal,  but  he  was  never  caught 
napping. 

lie  gave  to  sleep  many  moments  which  other  men  would 
have  given  to  conversation,  lie  was  essentially  a  silent  man;  not. 
morose,  but  quiet.  He  smiled  often,  rarely  laughed,  lie  never  told 
a  joke,  but  did  not  discourage  them  in  others,  and  if  one  struck  his 
peculiar  fancy,  he  would  smile  in  mild  approval,  lie  did  not  live 
apart  from  his  stalf,  but  liked  to  have  them  about  him,  and  they 
were  nearlv  all  very  young  men.  Universally  polite  in  manner,  he 
encouraged  the  liveliest  conversation  among  them,  although  he  took 
little  part  in  it.  He  was  not  a  man  of  words;  they  seemed  to 
embarrass  him.  AVlien  he  had  ideas  he  put  them  into  action,  not 
into  language.  His  military  dispatches  were  as  brief  as  if  studied, 
like  the  one  lie  sent  after  the  defeat  of  Milroy  :  "God  blessed  our 
arms  with  victory  at  McDowell  yesterday."  lie  never  discussed  his 
plans;  indeed,  he  never  told  them.  The  next  officer  under  him 
never  knew  his  intention  nor  object.  He  never  volunteered  his 
opinion  to  his  superior,  nor  asked  advice  of  his  subordinates.  He 
was  as  self-reliant  as  he  was  silent,  and  believed  "he  walks  with 
speed  who  walks  alone."1  lie  was  reticent  to  a  fault.  "'If  my  coat 
knew  what  I  intended  to  do,  I'd  take  it  off  and  throw  it  away,"  was 
one  of  his  sayings.  This  reticence  often  led  to  embarrassment  and 
complaint  from  the  officer  next  in  command,  and  might  have  led  to 
disaster  in  case  of  his  death;  but  lie  evidently  thought  it  better  to 
run  that  risk  than  the  risk  of  having  his  plans  discovered.  lie  never 
called  a  council  of  war;  when  called  into  council  by  General  Lee, 
with  Longstreet  and  Stuart,  and  the  Hills,  he  let  the  others  do  the 
talking.  If  he  made  suggestions  he  did  it  briefly,  and  never 
attempted  to  sustain  them  by  argument.  lie  advised  the  flank 
movement  at  Chancellorsville,  which  resulted  in  the  defeat  of 
Hooker  and  his  own  death;  Avhen  it  was  vigorously  opposed  he  did 
not  defend  it.  General  Lee  adopted  it,  and,  as  at  other  times  when 
a  hazardous  movement  was  to  be  undertaken,  he  ordered  Jackson  to 
execute  it.  I  question  whether  he  could  have  discussed  his  plans 


648  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

satisfactorily  if  he  had  desired,  or  persuaded  any  one  of  the  wisdom 
of  those  unprecedented  and  eccentric  movements  of  his,  which 
violated  all  the  rules  of  war,  and  always  ended  so  brilliantly.  His 
reticence,  his  mystery,  were  necessities  of  his  nature,  as  much  as  the 
result  of  his  unparalleled  self-reliance ;  a  self-reliance  which  can  only 
be  appreciated  by  those  who  know  that  the  courage  necessary  to  go 
through  a  battle  is  not  to  be  compared  with  that  necessary  to  inaugu 
rate  it.  "Audacity,  audacity,  always  audacity,"  was  the  motto  of 
Danton.  So  thought  Jackson,  too.  After  the  defeat  of  Banks  at 
Winchester,  and  before  he  moved  forward  to  Harper's  Ferry,  he 
knew  that  McDowell  and  Fremont  were  moving  against  his  rear, 
and  what  their  design  was ;  and  yet  he  marched  boldly  into  the  trap 
prepared  for  him,  and  then  broke  it  into  pieces  and  escaped.  But 
as  a  soldier,  he  was  guided  by  another  principle  which  he  once  tersely 
expressed  thus :  "  Mystery,  mystery  is  the  secret  of  success."  This 
mystery  was  not  an  affectation;  it  was  a  policy,  a  conviction.  He 
was  compelled  to  take  his  staff  and  his  general  officers  into  his  confi 
dence,  and  when  he  did  so  he  did  it  without  reluctance  or  distrust. 
But  they  never  attempted  to  force  his  confidence,  and  once  he 
ordered  one  of  his  body-guard  to  be  dismounted,  and  "  put  under 
arrest  as  a  spy,"  for  repeating  to  him  an  ill-timed  question  about  the 
movements  of  a  division. 

His  most  popular  virtue  was  swiftness  of  execution.  "With  him 
action  kept  pace  with  design.  He  was  the  rapidest  mover  in  the 
South,  and,  from  the  very  outstart  of  the  war,  his  old  brigade  and 
division  were  known  as  "  Jackson's  foot  cavalry."  "  What  sort  of 
man  is  your  Stonewall,  anyway  ? "  said  one  of  Pope's  men  ;  "  are  his 
soldiers  made  of  gutta-percha,  or  do  they  run  on  wheels?"  And 
when  the  raid  once  began,  or  the  battle  had  been  joined,  he  never 
hesitated,  and  rarely  changed  his  first  plans.  He  sometimes  went  at 
his  object  with  such  apparent  recklessness  that  he  marched  into 
battle  by  the  flank,  and  commenced  the  fight  with  the  first  file  of 
four.  This  kind  of  movement  would  not  stand  the  test  of  military 
criticism,  but  it  always  succeeded.  "  The  fate  of  a  battle  is  the 
result  of  a  moment,  of  a  thought,"  said  Napoleon.  The  deplorable 
weakness  of  indecision,  which  has  wrecked  so  many  military  reputa 
tions,  was  unknown  to  Jackson.  Golden  opportunities  lost  have 
changed  many  a  shout  of  victory  into  a  cry  of  defeat,  and  from 
Carrick's  ford  to  Gettysburg  the  track  of  war  is  lined  with  the  graves 
of  brave  men  who  died  while  their  generals  were  deliberating.  In 
absolute  freedom  from  this  weakness,  Stonewall  Jackson  deserves  a 
place  by  the  side  of  Napoleon,  the  Archduke  Charles,  and  Frederick 
the  Great. 


STONEWALL  JACKSON  AND  HIS  MEN.  G49 

General  Jackson  was  never  elated  by  victory,  nor  depressed  by 
disaster.  It  might  be  said  of  him,  as  it  was  of  Massena :  "  He  was 
endowed  with  that  extraordinary  firmness  and  courage  which  seemed 
to  increase  in  excess  of  danger.  When  conquered,  he  was  as  ready 
to  fight  again  as  if  he  had  been  conqueror."  Always  victorious, 
with  one  exception,  General  Jackson  was  not  often  called  upon  to 
illustrate  this  virtue.  But  at  Strasburg,  when  he  determined  to 
wait  for  Winder,  as  Xapolcon  did  for  Xey  in  Russia,  while  Fremont 
and  Shields  were  closing  in  on  both  flanks,  and  escape  seemed  almost 
impossible,  his  face  was  as  pale  and  firm  as  marble,  his  thin  lips  shut, 
his  brow  thoughtful  and  hard;  or  at  second  Manassas,  where  his 
little  corps  struggled  for  hours  and  days  against  the  army  of  Pope, 
and  Longstreet  did  not  come;  when  the  sun  seemed  to  stand  still, 
and  night  would  not  fall,  Jackson  spoke  not  a  word  of  hope  nor 
fear.  If  he  sought  counsel  of  heaven,  he  asked  none  of  man,  and 
no  man  dared  offer  it.  Such  confidence  and  faith  were  contagious. 
His  soldiers  believed  he  could  do  anything  he  wished,  and  he  believed 
they  could  do  anything  he  commanded.  "Jackson's  men  will  follow 
him  to  the  devil,  and  he  knows  it,"  said  a  Federal  prisoner,  and  that 
was  the  philosophy  of  much  of  his  success. 

General  Jackson  was  the  wonder  of  the  press.  Xo  officer,  in 
either  army,  was  the  subject  of  so  many  newspaper  paragraphs,  and 
yet  he  knew  nothing  of  it,  for,  as  a  rule,  he  never  read  the  papers. 
Xo  great  man  of  this  century  has  gone  to  his  grave  so  marvclously 
ignorant  of  the  wideness  of  his  fame.  Regulating  his  conduct  with 
a  view  solely  to  his  proper  responsibility,  he  did  not  care  wlnit  the 
world  said  of  it,  and  never  looked  to  see.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  he  used  to  glance  over  the  papers  to  get  at  the  news,  but  when 
he  became  the  subject  of  their  praise  and  speculations  he  stopped 
even  that.  The  press,  which  proved  a  very  Maiiborongh  to  some 
generals,  had  no  effect  on  him.  He  had  no  war  correspondents,  and 
when  in  full  command  he  permitted  none  in  his  army,  if  he  kr.ew 
it.  lie  said  he  did  not  want  his  friends  to  know  his  movements, 
and  certainly  not  his  enemies.  lie  wished  no  pen  to  write  him  into 
fame.  It  was  said  the  press  of  the  Xorth  gave  Rosccrans  his  military 
reputation,  and  also  took  it  away.  They  had  no  such  chance  at 
General  Jackson.  lie  made  his  own  fame  ;  but  they  have  generously 
helped  to  make  it  world-wide  and  lasting. 

Rut  the  press  have  done  much  to  give  the  public  a  falre  impres 
sion  or  i.'.e  religious  side  of  Jackson'a  character.  lie  was  a  member 
of  the  Presbyterian  Church,  a  strictly  Christian,  liberal  gentleman. 
But  he  was  neither  bigot  nor  Pharisee.  lie  held  his  own  devotions 


050  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

in  secret.  He  made  no  parade  of  his  religion,  nor  pressed  his  creed 
upon  any  one.  lie  was  not  Cromwellian  in  this  regard  ;  he  believed 
other  paths  led  to  heaven  just  as  surely  as  the  one  he  was  traveling. 
On  his  staff  wrere  the  sons  of  clergymen  of  the  Episcopal,  Reformed 
and  Presbyterian  Churches,  and  some  others  who  were  very  much  in 
the  dark  as  to  their  religious  faith.  The  fact  is,  this  Presbyterian 
elder,  as  he  is  sometimes  called,  became  such  by  marriage.  The  first 
pravers  said  over  him  were  those  of  his  pious  Methodist  mother — 
although  it  appears  in  his  youth  he  was  not  more  pious  than  the 
average  young  man.  When  in  Mexico,  he  wras  nearly  persuaded  to 
be  a  Romanist.  lie  afterward  was  a  member  of  the  Episcopal 
Church,  and,  finally,  settled  down  in  the  Presbyterian  Church,  to 
which  his  wife  belonged.  When  the  Louisiana  Brigade  applied  for 
a  chaplain,  he  recommended  that  a  priest  be  sent  them,  because  a 
large  majority  were  Roman  Catholics.  His  own  devotedness  was 
illustrated  by  the  purity  of  his  life,  not  by  professions,  and  his  faith 
and  simplicity  were  well  known  to  his  troops.  lie  often  attended 
their  services  and  prayer-meetings,  night  or  day,  and,  kneeling  in  the 
midst  of  the  same  scarred  veterans  he  had  led  in  so  many  battles,  he 
led  them  in  prayer  to  the  Lord  of  Hosts.  When  he  was  thus  in 
camp,  all  noise  was  hushed.  Dropping  their  cards,  and  all  other 
amusements,  old  men  and  young  gathered  around  him,  standing  and 
kneeling,  with  uncovered  heads,  in  sacred  silence.  A  thousand  hands 
would  have  been  raised  to  smite  the  impious  wretch  who  dared  to 
scoff  when  Stonewall  Jackson  prayed. 

It  is  not  practicable  to  attempt  here  any  discussion  of  the  cam 
paigns  of  General  Jackson.  True,  his  career  was  very  short.  On 
May  2d,  1801,  he  took  command  at  Harper's  Ferry  as  colonel  in  the 
Virginia  service.  On  May  2d,  1863,  he  fell  at  Chancellorsville  as 
lieutenant  general  in  the  Confederate  army.  For  these  two  years  he 
monopolized  the  admiration  of  the  continent ;  never  blundered,  never 
failed,  and  perished  in  the  execution  of  his  greatest  achievement. 
No  wonder  his  success  bewilders  criticism.  Where  in  all  history  was 
great  renown  so  quickly  wron  ? 

It  is  an  interesting  study  to  follow  the  successive  steps  of 
Jackson's  military  career,  and  watch  his  development  as  occasion 
required.  There  is  no  more  exciting  page  in  the  annals  of  modern 
warfare  than  his  campaign  of  thirty  days  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 
Its  strategy,  battles,  and  results,  justify  the  tribute  paid  to  it  by 
Colonel  Crozet,  who  served  under  Napoleon,  and  pronounced  it 
"extra-Napoleonic."  In  Jackson's  military  life  there  was  no  dan 
gerous  precociousness.  He  never  sought  promotion,  but  never 


STONEWALL  JACKSON  AND  HIS  MEN.  651 

expressed  a  doubt  of  his  ability  to  manage  any  command  given  him. 
lie  put  forth  no  useless  strength.  "What  was  in  him  we  shall  never 
know,  for  he  went  to  the  grave  with  the  richness  of  the  mine  unex 
plored.  He  was  equal  to  each  new  occasion  as  it  arose,  and  in  his 
movements  there  was  no  monotony,  except  in  success.  Had  he  sur 
vived  Chancellors ville,  a  new  Held  of  trial  awaited  him.  Whether  it 
be  true  or  not,  as  stated,  that  the  order  had  been  written  assigning 
him  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  it  is  more  than 
probable  he  would  have  been  sent  to  take  command  of  that  unfortu 
nate  army.  Had  he  gone  there,  with  the  prestige  he  hud  gained  and 
the  hopes  he  would  have  inspired,  who  can  say  to  what  end  the  war 
would  have  been  prolonged.  Tims  the  shot  which  struck  Jackson 
crippled  both  armies  of  the  Confederacy,  and  from  that  day  it  tottered 
to  its  fall. 

I  can  only  refer  to  the  resignation  of  General  Jackson  in  Jan 
uary,  1$(J2,  by  which  the  Confederacy  nearly  lost  his  services.  This 
step  was  caused  by  the  insubordination  of  General  Loring,  who  now 
holds  a  command  under  the  Khedive  of  Egypt.  General  Loring  had 
served  in  Mexico  as  General  Jackson's  senior  in  rink,  and  he  was 
impatient  at  being  his  subordinate  in  Virginia.  l>eing  ordered  to 
Romney  by  General  Jackson,  after  the  "Hath  trip,''  he  prevailed  on 
the  "War  Department  to  countermand  the  order.  General  Jackson 
promptly  resigned,  and  there  was  at  once  a  storm.  The  army 
became  excited,  the  people  of  the  Valley  indignant ;  Jackson  was  cool 
and  immovable.  The  Governor  of  Virginia  interposed,  and  the 
Secretary  of  "War  yielded.  Loring  was  sent  elsewhere,  and  Jackson 
resumed  his  command,  and  this  was  the  last  time  the  War  Depart 
ment  ever  undertook  to  interfere  with  his  proper  authority. 

There  are  one  or  two  incidents  connected  with  the  campaigns 
of  General  Jackson  which  press  upon  me  for  recognition.  I  ought 
not  to  omit  to  say  a  word  in  justice  to  the  memory  of  Colonel  Miles, 
who  fell  just  before  the  surrender  of  Harper's  Ferry  to  General 
Jackson,  in  September,  1S(>2.  Indignant  and  chagrined  as  the  iXorth. 
justly  was  at  the  capitulation  of  eleven  thousand  troops,  and  the  sur 
render  of  such  immense  stores,  without  a  decent  defense,  it  sought 
to  make  a  holacaust  of  Colonel  Miles,  and  charged  him  with  both 
cowardice  and  treachery.  That  officer  died  with  his  face  to  the  foe, 
and  he  should  be  a  man  of  many  scars  who  calls  him  a  coward. 
Baser  still  was  the  charge  of  treachery,  for  baser  would  have  been 
the  crime.  It  was  said  he  had  communicated  with  General  Jackson, 
and  had  surrendered  according  to  their  agreement.  To  make  such  a 
charge  without  proof,  is  like  stoning  the  dead.  Having  been  very 


(Jo 2  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

closely  associated  with  General  Jackson  in  this  movement,  it  is  more 
than  improbable  that  any  serious  communication  could  have  passed 
between  him  and  Colonel  Miles  without  my  knowledge;  almost 
impossible  it  could  have  been  held  without  the  knowledge  of  some 
one  of  the  staff.  And  yet  no  one  at  headquarters  ever  heard  of  it ; 
no  one  in  our  army  ever  believed  it.  The  ungrateful  charge  cannot 
be  true.  Colonel  Miles  was  incompetent,  but  he  was  no  traitor.  He 
was  too  feeble  for  the  responsibility  which  fell  upon  him,  but  he  was 
too  true  to  his  commission  to  betray  his  army.  The  surrender  of 
Harper's  Ferry  was  a  deep  mortification  to  the  North.  If  the  charges 
were  true,  it  ought  to  be  greater. 

Scarcely  in  the  same  connection,  but  as  illustrative  of  the  cre 
dulity  of  people  during  the  war,  I  recall  attention  to  the  beautiful 
legend  of  Barbara  Fritchie.  There  are  few  things  among  Whit- 
tier's  poems  more  touching  than  this  story  of  the  war.  It  is  as 
tender  as  the  ballad  of  Maud  Muller — and  about  as  true.  It  seems 
like  iconoclasm  to  break  the  poetic  image  which  Mr.  Whittier 
has  carved,  and  if  he  had  not  thrown  his  chippings  over  Jackson's 
grave,  I  would  not  care  to  look  beyond  the  beauty  of  his  work. 
The  facts  are  few.  General  Jackson's  headquarters,  in  Maryland, 
were  three  miles  short  of  Frederick,  and,  except  when  he  passed 
through  it  to  leave  it,  he  went  into  the  city  but  once — on  Sunday 
night  to  church.  On  the  morning  he  left,  I  rode  with  him  through 
the  town.  He  did  not  pass  the  house  of  Barbara  Fritchie ;  nothing 
like  the  fiction  of  Mr.  Whittier  ever  occurred,  and  Stonewall  Jack 
son  and  that  historic  old  lady  never  saw  each  other  I  understand 
Mr.  Whittier  has  said  that  if  the  story,  as  he  told  it,  is  not  true,  it 
will  go  down  to  posterity  as  such,  until  it  gets  beyond  the  reach  of 
correction.  Exegi  monumentum — pardonable  loyalty,  questionable 
ambition.  It  may  be  suggested  with  diffidence,  that  the  name  of 
Stonewall  Jackson  will  live  as  long  as  that  of  Mr.  Whittier  and  .his 
poems,  and  history  will  teach  the  poet's  children  that  the  Army  of 
Virginia  did  not  make  war  upon  flags  when  waved  by  old  women. 

The  death  of  General  Jackson  was  characteristic  in  its  singu 
larity.  At  night,  when  the  battle  had  ended,  just  as  he  had  achieved 
what  he  believed  to  be  the  most  successful  movement  of  his  career, 
he,  whom  the  enemy  began  to  believe  both  invulnerable  and  invin 
cible,  fell  at  the  hands  of  his  own  people.  It  is  needless  to  repeat 
the  painful  story  of  his  wounding  and  death.  At  first  it  was  not 
believed  his  wounds  were  mortal,  and  the  army  thought,  in  the  lan 
guage  of  General  Lee :  "  Jackson  will  not — he  cannot  die."  But  it 
was  written.  Pneumonia  lent  its  fearful  aid  to  the  enemy,  and  on 


STONEWALL  JACKSON  AND  HIS  MEN.  653 

Sunday  afternoon  lie  closed  his  eyes  and  smiled  at  his  own  spoken 
dream — "Let  us  cross  over  the  river  and  rest  under  the  shade  of 
the  trees.'1  The  dream  thus  spoken  is  yet  unbroken ;  and  his  soul 
went  out  to  heaven,  uplifted  by  sighs  and  prayers,  rising  that  hour 
from  altar  and  cloister,  all  over  the  South,  for  his  recovery. 

On  Friday,  the  15th  of  May,  1803,  his  body  was  taken  for 
l)ii rial  to  his  home,  in  Lexington.  He  had  not  been  there  since  he 
left  it,  two  years  before,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Only  two 
years,  and  yet  how  like  romance  is  the  simple  story  of  his  growth  in 
fame.  And  now  he  lies  buried  as  he  directed,  "in  the  Valley  of 
Virginia,"  and  among  the  people  he  loved  so  well.  It  were  better 
so.  lie  could  not  have  saved  the  South,  and  it  was  merciful  that  he 
should  perish  first.  The  tender  memory  he  left  behind  him  in  the 
army,  and  the  stern  sense  of  duty  he  bequeathed  his  soldiers,  w-ill 
be  told  by  this  little  incident,  with  which  I  close  tins  unworthy 
sketch.  The  army  of  Lee  was  on  its  inarch  to  Gettysburg,  and  the 
commanding  general  had  given  strict  orders  for  its  discipline  in 
Pennsylvania.  An  officer  riding  to  camp  from  Chambersburg,  late 
at  night,  was  halted  by  the  outposts.  Having  neither  pass  nor  coun 
tersign,  in  his  dilemma  he  bethought  him  of  an  old  pass  in  his 
pocket-book,  signed  by  General  Jackson,  whose  recent  death  hung 
like  a  cloud  over  the  army.  He  found  it,  handed  it  with  confidence 
to  the  sentinel.  The  trusty  fellow  managed  to  read  it  by  the  light 
of  a  match,  and  as  he  did  so  he  seemed  to  linger  and  hesitate  over 
the  signature.  And  then,  as  the  light  went  out,  he  handed  it  back, 
and  looking  up  toward  the  stars  beyond,  he  said,  sadly  and  firmly : 
"  Captain,  you  can  go  to  heaven,  on  that  paper,  but  you  can't  pass 
this  post." 

To  Jackson's  death  this  whole  land  has  been  speedy  to  do  full 
justice.  In  this  tribute  there  has  been  no  Xortli,  no  South.  The 
one  admired  him  greatly,  the  other  loved  him  dearly.  And  coming 
from  over  the  sea,  it  is  said,  an  affectionate  friend  planted  on  his 
grave,  at  Lexington,  a  sprig  of  laurel  brought  from  the  grave  of 
Xapoleon.  This  was  most  lit ;  it  was  appropriate  that  the  greatest 
general  of  the  Old  World  should  welcome  to  the  tomb  and  immor 
tality  the  most  brilliant  soldier  of  the  Kew.  Prom  his  grave,  and 
from  kindred  others  Korth  and  South,  let  us  hope  that  the  true 
spirit  of  reconstruction,  in  justice,  prosperity,  and  peace,  will  come 
at  last. 


THE  FAMOUS  FIGHT  AT  CEDAR  CREEK. 


BY    GENERAL    A.    B.    NETTLETOX. 


in  1864,  with  Grant 
and  Meade  and  Sheridan  in 
the  East,  and  Sherman  and 
Thomas  in  the  West,  the 
National  army  closed  with 
the  Confederate,  it  was  in  a 
struggle  which  all  regarded 
as  the  final  one.  In  June, 
after  Grant  with  all  his 
available  force  had  besieged 
Richmond  and  Petersburg, 
Lee,  feeling  secure  behind 
his  fortifications,  detached  an 
army  of  twenty-five  thousand 
picked  troops  under  General 
Jubal  A.  Early,  including  the 
flower  of  his  Virginia  cavalry,  to  invade  the  North  by  way  of  the 
Shcnandoah  Yallcy,  threaten  Washington  from  the  rear,  and,  if  pos 
sible,  compel  Grant  to  retreat  from  the  James,  as  McClellan  had 
been  forced  to  do  two  years  before.  Hunter's  failure  at  Lynchburg, 
and  his  painful  retreat  through  the  wilderness  of  West  Virginia,  had 
left  a  virtually  open  road  for  Early's  force  to  the  boundary  of  Penn 
sylvania,  if  not  to  Washington,  and  this  open  road  Early  was  not  slow 
to  travel.  The  defeat  of  the  Union  provisional  force  at  Monocacy, 
the  appearance  of  the  rebel  infantry  before  the  western  defenses  of 
the  National  Capital  on  the  12th  of  July,  and  the  subsequent  burn 
ing  of  Chambcrsburg  by  Early's  cavalry,  under  McCausland,  had 
produced  a  very  considerable  civilian  panic,  attracted  the  anxious 
attention  of  the  whole  country,  and  convinced  Grant,  before  Peters 
burg,  that  decisive  measures  were  required  in  the  neighborhood  of 
the  Potomac  if  he  was  to  retain  his  grip  on  the  rebel  capital. 
Accordingly,  two  small-sized  infantry  corps  (Wright's  Sixth  and 
Emory's  Nineteenth)  were  dispatched  to  Washington  via  Fortress 
Monroe,  and  were  soon  followed  by  two  divisions  (the  Eirst  and 
(654) 


THE  FAMOUS  FIGHT  AT  CEDAR  CREEK.  G55 

Third)  of  the  already  famous  cavalry  corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  A  new  Middle  Department  was  erected,  and  General 
P.  II.  Sheridan,  as  its  commander,  was  given  his  first  opportunity 
to  earn  his  spurs  in  control  of  a  separate  army  and  an  independent 
campaign. 

l>y  the  middle  of  August,  the  armies  of  Sheridan  and  Early 
confronted  each  other  in  the  Valley  north  of  Winchester.  Then 
ensued  that  brilliant  campaign  of  the  Shcnandoah  which,  through  a 
score  of  minor  engagements,  resulted  in  the  thorough  defeat  of 
Early's  army  in  the  battle  of  Winchester,  or  the  Opeqnan,  on  Sep 
tember  19th,  followed  on  the  22<1  by  its  disastrous  rout  at  Fishers 
Hill,  and  its  confused  retreat  beyond  Staunton,  where  the  pursuit 
was  discontinued.  At  this  time  Sheridan  and  his  whole  victorious 
army  considered  the  enemy  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  as  thoroughly 
and  permanently  broken,  dispirited  and  disposed  of.  The  question 
asked  about  our  camp-fires  was:  Where  shall  we  be  sent  next?  <  >ur 
success  in  the  Valley,  coupled  with  Sherman's  victories  in  the  West, 
had  lighted  up  the  whole  horizon  and  given  the  nation  the  first  real 
glimpse  of  its  final  triumph  and  the  coming  of  peace.  P>ut  such 
troops  as  Sheridan  could  spare  was  needed  before  .Richmond,  and 
our  army  began  falling  back  toward  the  Potomac,  preparatory  to 
such  a  transfer.  During  our  return  march  the  rear  of  our  several 
columns  was  persistently  harassed  by  a  large  force  of  surprisingly 
active  cavalry,  under  General  T.  L.  Rosser,  who  provokingly  refused 
to  consider  himself  or  his  command  as  Jurrs  de  combat.  Among 
many  memories  of  hard  service,  those  who  were  among  Ouster's 
troopers  in  the  Valley  will  not  soon  forget  their  arduous  task  of  pro 
tecting  the  rear  of  a  victorious  army  against  the  onslaughts  of  the 
crushed  enemy's  horsemen ! 

After  several  days  of  this  annoyance,  and  on  the  night  of 
October  Sth,  near  Fisher's  Hill,  Sheridan  notified  General  Torbert, 
Ohief  of  Oavalry,  that  he  would  halt  the  army  there  for  twenty-four 
hours,  and  that  on  the  following  day  he  (Torbert)  must  face  about, 
and  k>  whip  the  enemy  or  get  whipped  himself."  Rosser's  saucy 
cavalry  numbered  about  three  thousand  effectives,  and  was  supported 
by  some  fifteen  hundred  infantry  and  two  batteries,  under  Generals 
L<  >max  and  Bradley  Johnston.  With  Merritt's  First  Division  deployed 
to  the  right  of  the  Valley  pike,  and  Ouster's  Third  extending  from 
Merritt's  right  westward,  across  the  back  road,  toward  the  Xorth 
mountain,  the  bugles  sounded  the  advance  early  on  the  morning  of 
the  Oth.  The  two  lines  of  battle  met  at  Tom's  creek,  and  one  of  the 
most  spirited  cavalry  engagements  of  the  war  speedily  ended  in  the 


656  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

capture  of  eleven  Confederate  cannon,  being  all  the  enemy's  artillery 
save  one  piece,  and  a  galloping  pursuit  of  the  defeated  force  con 
tinuing  twenty  miles  beyond  the  battle-field.  The  army  then, 
unmolested,  resumed  its  northward  march,  and  crossed  to  the  north 
side  of  Cedar  creek,  where  it  faced  about  toward  the  hypothetical 
enemy,  and  went  into  camp,  the  centre  of  the  infantry  resting  on 
the  Valley  pike.  The  Sixth  Corps  continued  on  to  Front  Royal,  on 
its  way  to  join  Grant  at  Petersburg.  The  three  cavalry  divisions 
took  their  positions  as  follows :  Merritt's  on  the  left  (east)  of  the 
infantry,  picketing  the  line  of  the  North  fork  Shenandoah  river; 
Custer's  on  the  right  of  the  infantry,  picketing  a  line  five  or  six 
miles  in  length,  and  extending  to  the  western  boundary  of  the 
Valley ;  Powell's  West  Virginia  Division  in  the  vicinity  of  Front 
Royal,  at  the  foot  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  connecting  with  Merritt's 
left. 

On  the  12th,  our  scouts  reported  that  Early's  reorganized 
infantry  force  had  advanced  to  Fisher's  Hill,  their  old  Gibraltar, 
six  miles  south  of  our  position  at  Cedar  creek,  which  unexpected 
intelligence  caused  Sheridan  to  halt  the  Sixth  Corps  near  Front 
Royal  to  await  developments.  At  this  juncture,  Lieutenant  General 
Grant  recommended  that  a  part  of  Sheridan's  force  should  establish 
a  strong  position  in  the  vicinity  of  Manassas  gap,  from  which  a  fresh 
campaign  against  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville  could  be  executed. 
To  this  Sheridan  demurred,  and,  on  the  13th  of  October,  he  was 
summoned  to  Washington,  by  Secretary  Stanton,  for  a  conference 
about  future  operations.  Having  decided  not  to  attack  Early 
immediately  in  his  strong  position  at  Fisher's  Hill,  and  having  no 
apprehension  of  his  taking  the  offensive,  Sheridan  started  for 
Washington,  on  the  16th,  and,  in  order  to  improve  the  time  during 
his  absence,  he  took  the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  force  with  him  to  Front 
Royal,  designing  to  send  it  on  a  raid  against  the  Virginia  Central 
Railroad  at  Charlottesville.  General  II.  G.  Wright,  as  the  senior 
officer,  was  left  in  command  of  the  main  army,  which  had  been 
rejoined  by  the  Sixth  Corps.  On  arriving  at  Front  Royal,  on  the 
evening  of  the  16th,  Sheridan  received  the  following  dispatch  from 
Wright: 

HEADQUAETEES  MIDDLE  MILITARY  DIVISION, 

October  16th,  1864. 
MAJOE  GENERAL  P.  H.  SHERIDAN, 

Commanding  Middle  Military  Division. 

General: — I  enclose  you  dispatch  which  explains  itself  (see  copy  following). 
If  the  enemy  should  be  strongly  reinforced  by  cavalry,  he  might,  by  turning  our 
right,  give  us  a  great  deal  of  trouble.  I  shall  hold  on  here  until  the  enemy's 


THE  FAMOUS  FIGHT  AT  CEDAR  CREEK.  657 

movements  are  developed,  and  shall  only  fear  an  attack  on  my  right,  which  I  shall 
make  every  preparation  for  guarding  against  and  resisting. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

H.  G.  WRIGHT, 

Major  General  Commanding. 
[Inclosurc.] 

To  LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  EARLY  : 

Be  ready  to  move  as  soon  as  my  forces  join  you,  and  we  will  crush  Sheridan. 

LOXGSTREET, 

Lieutenant  General. 

This  dispatch,  translated  by  our  signal  officers  from  the  rebel 
signal  Hag  on  Three-Top  mountain,  whether  genuine  or  a  ruse, 
seemed  to  betoken  activity  of  some  sort  on  the  part  of  the  Confed 
erates.  Sheridan  attached  to  it  sufficient  significance  to  induce  him 
to  abandon  the  raid  on  Charlottesville,  and  to  order  all  the  cavalry 
back  to  the  army  at  Cedar  creek,  with  the  following  message  to 
General  "Wright,  dated  the  evening  of  the  16th  : 

The  cavalry  is  all  ordered  back  to  you ;  make  your  position  strong.  If 
Longstreet's  dispatch  is  true,  he  is  under  the  impression  that  we  have  largely 
detached.  I  will  go  over  to  Augur,  and  may  get  additional  news.  Close  in  Colonel 
Powell,  who  will  be  at  this  point  [Front  Royal].  If  the  enemy  should  make  an 
advance,  I  know  you  will  defeat  him.  Look  well  to  your  ground,  and  be  well 
prepared.  Get  up  everything  that  can  be  spared.  I  will  bring  up  all  I  can,  and 
will  be  up  on  Tuesday,  if  not  sooner. 

On  the  same  night,  after  having  thus  provided  for  the  safety 
of  his  army,  Sheridan  himself,  escorted  by  the  Second  Ohio  Cavalry 
from  Ouster's  Division,  passed  on  to  Piedmont,  east  of  the  Blue  Ilidge, 
whence  he  took  cars  for  Washington. 

On  the  return  of  the  cavalry  to  the  army,  instead  of  being 
placed  in  its  former  position,  the  divisions  of  Merritt  and  Ouster, 
aggregating  nearly  eight  thousand  of  the  finest  mounted  troops  in  the 
world,  were  both  ordered  to  the  right  of  the  infantry,  where  "Wright 
anticipated  attack,  should  any  be  made,  while  Powell's  Division, 
instead  of  being  "  closed  in,"  as  directed  in  Sheridan's  last  message, 
was  left  in  the  neighborhood  of  Front  TV  oval,  near  the  eastern  margin 
of  the  Valley — its  attenuated  line  of  pickets  only  connecting  with  the 
left  of  the  infantry  along  the  river  front. 

It  was  no  longer  a  matter  of  indifference  where  the  cavalry  was 
placed.  For  the  first  time  during  the  war  the  Federal  cavalry  was 
really  raised  to  the  dignity  of  a  third  arm  of  the  service,  and  given 
its  full  share  in  the  hard  fighting,  heavy  losses,  and  great  victories 
under  the  leadership  and  discipline  of  Sheridan.  With  their  Spen 
cer  repeating-carbines,  their  expertness  in  transforming  themselves 
42 


£58  ANNALS  OF  TEE  WAR. 

on  occasion  from  troopers  into  foot  soldiers,  not  unfrequently  fight 
ing  rebel  infantry  behind  breastworks — added  to  the  celerity  of 
movement  and  audacity  of  spirit,  without  which  cavalry  is  well-nigh 
useless — Sheridan's  mounted  force  was  at  once  the  eye  and  the  right 
arm  of  his  fighting  column. 

Cedar  creek,  flowing  from  the  west  and  north,  joins  the  North 
fork  of  the  Shenandoali  near  Strasburg,  on  the  Yalley  pike.  About 
the  same  point  the  North  fork  turns  sharply  eastward  toward  the 
Blue  Ridge,  the  two  streams  thus  forming  a  partial  line  of  defense 
nearly  across  the  Valley.  In  the  bend  of  the  river  rises  the  bold 
front  of  Massanutten  mountain — the  northern  extremity  of  a  subor 
dinate  range  extending  southward  from  this  point  parallel  to  the 
Blue  Ridge,  and  dividing  the  Shenandoali  Yalley  lengthwise.  The 
Valley  pike,  the  race-track  of  armies,  arid  formerly  one  of  the  noblest 
highways  of  the  continent,  leads  southward  to  Staunton  and  beyond, 
and  northward  through  Winchester  to  the  Potomac. 

After  the  ceaseless  activity,  watchfulness  and  fighting  of  the 
Valley  campaign,  then  considered  at  an  end,  our  troops  found  the 
quiet  of  camp  life  a  luxury  to  be  appreciated.  Arrears  of  sleep 
were  to  be  made  up,  neglected  correspondence  revived,  wardrobes 
renovated,  and  toilets  attended  to.  Since  the  10th  of  October  this 
quiet  of  the  main  army  had  only  been  varied  and  amused  by  the 
invariable  day-break  skirmish  between  our  pickets  and  the  enemy's 
scouting  parties;  the  usual  grapevine  telegrams,  announcing  the 
wholesale  surrender  of  the  Confederacy  to  Grant ;  the  customary 
pleasantries  at  the  expense  of  the  hundred  day  troops,  who  were  so 
eager  to  get  to  the  front  and  smell  powder  before  their  term  expired  ; 
the  prevalent  wicked  offers  to  bet  that  "  Old  Jubal "  was  still  on  the 
retreat  toward  the  Gulf,  and  the  perennial  grumbling  about  rations, 
with  a  corresponding  alacrity  in  consuming  them. 

The  18th  of  October  in  the  Shenandoali  Valley  was  such  a  day 
as  few  have  seen  who  have  not  spent  an  autumn  in  Virginia ;  crisp 
and  bright  and  still  in  the  morning ;  mellow  and  golden  and  still  at 
noon ;  crimson  and  glorious  and  still  at  the  sun  setting ;  just  blue 
enough  in  the  distance  to  soften  without  obscuring  the  outline  of  the 
mountains,  just  hazy  enough  to  render  the  atmosphere  visible  with 
out  limiting  the  range  of  sight.  As  evening  closed  above  the  Valley 
the  soft  pleadings  of  some  homesick  soldier's  flute  floated  out  through 
the  quiet  camp,  while  around  a  blazing  camp-fire  an  impromptu  glee 
club  of  Ohio  boys  lightened  the  hour  and  their  own  hearts  by  singing 
the  songs  of  home.  An  unusually  large  letter  mail  arrived  that 
evening,  and  was  distributed  to  the  men,  which  reminds  me  that  the 


THE  FAMOUS  FIGHT  AT  CEDAR   CREEK.  659 

First  Connecticut  Cavalry,  belonging  to  Casters  Division,  had  a 
unique  and  pleasant  manner  of  announcing  the  arrival  of  a  mail; 
the  regimental  trumpeters,  constituting  a  sort  of  a  cornet  band, 
would  form  in  front  of  the  colonel's  tent  and  play  '"Home,  Sweet 
Home,"  sometimes  following  that  immediately  with  "The  Girl  I 
Left  Behind  Me." 

The  letters  were  all  read  and  their  contents  discussed,  the  flute 
had  ceased  its  complaining,  the  eight  o'clock  roll-call  was  over,  taps 
had  sounded,  lights  were  out  in  the  tents,  cook-tires  flickered  low, 
the  mists  of  the  autumn  night  gathered  gray  and  chill,  the  sentinels 
paced  back  and  forth  in  front  of  the  various  headquarters,  the  camp 
was  still — that  many-headed  monster,  a  great  army,  was  asleep. 
Midnight  came,  and  with  it  no  sound  but  the  tramp  of  the  relief 
guard  as  the  sergeant  replaced  the  tired  sentinels.  (  hie  o'clock,  and 
all  was  tranquil  as  a  peace  convention ;  two,  three  o'clock,  and  yet 
the  soldiers  slept.  At  four  the  silence  was  broken  by  sharp  tiring 
in  the  direction  of  our  cavalry  pickets,  toward  the  western  side  of 
the  Valley.  The  tiring  increased  in  volume,  suggesting  an  attack  in 
force  by  cavalry.  General  Custer  (than  whom,  by  the  way,  the  wars 
of  the  centurv  probably  have  not  developed  an  abler  leader  of  a 
cavalry  division)  quietly  dispatched  a  regiment  to  support  our  out 
posts  and  awaited  developments,  which  speedily  came.  Fifteen 
minutes  later  heavy  skirmish  tiring  was  heard  on  the  left  of  the 
infantry,  two  miles  from  where  our  cavalry  division  was  encamped. 
The  tiring  on  our  extreme  right  gradually  died  away  and  that  in 
front  of  the  infantry  line  rapidly  increased,  showing  that  the  move 
ment  on  our  right  had  been  a  feint,  while  the  real  attack  had  now 
begun  against  the  centre  and  left. 

u  Boots  and  saddles!*'  was  blown  from  division,  brigade,  and 
regimental  headquarters.  The  darkness  rang  with  the  blare  of 
bugles  and  the  si i outs  of  officers  hurrying  the  troopers  from  their 
dreams  to  their  horses.  The  rattle  of  musketry  in  front  of  the 
infantry  increased  to  heavy  volleys,  the  volleys  thickened  into  a 
continuous  roar,  and  now,  as  day  began  to  dawn,  the  deep  bass  of 
the  artillery  came  in  to  complete  the  grand  but  terrible  chorus  of 
battle.  The  cavalry  were  speedily  mounted  and  in  line  by  regiments, 
awaiting  orders.  Awaiting  orders  !  That  is  the  time  that  tries  the 
courage  of  the  bravest.  Once  in  the  heat,  and  hurry,  and  inspiration 
of  the  battle,  the  average  soldier  forgets  fear  in  the  excitement  of 
the  hour;  but  to  stand  at  a  safe  distance,  though  within  easy  sight 
and  hearing  of  the  conflict,  ready,  expectant,  every  nerve  strung, 
awaiting  the  word  of  command  to  march  into  the  hailstorm  of  death 


660  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

that  is  tlie  crucial  test.  It  is  at  sucli  a  time  that  all  the  mental 

struggle  involved  in  a  soldier's  death  is  undergone,  leaving  nothing 
but  the  mere  physical  pang  of  sudden  dying  to  complete  the  sacrifice. 

"  Glister's  Division  to  the  Centre ! "  was  the  laconic  command 
from  General  Wright ;  and  as  the  sun  was  rising,  our  four  thousand 
troopers,  with  accompanying  batteries,  marched  into  the  fight.  As 
we  came  into  full  view  of  the  field,  the  whole  sickening  truth  flashed 
upon  us — the  infantry  had  been  surprised  in  their  beds  by  Early's 
reinforced  army ;  our  best  artillery  was  already  in  the  hands  of  the 
Confederates  and  turned  against  us ;  thousands  of  our  men  had  been 
killed,  wounded,  or  captured  before  they  could  even  offer  resistance ; 
Sheridan's  victorious  and  hitherto  invincible  army  was  routed  and  in 
disorderly  retreat  before  a  confident,  yelling,  and  pursuing  enemy. 
The  roads  were  crowded  with  wagons  and  ambulances  hurrying  to 
the  rear,  while  the  fields  were  alive  with  wounded,  stragglers,  camp- 
followers,  and  disorganized  troops,  without  officers,  without  arms,  and 
without  courage — all  bent  on  being  the  first  to  carry  the  news  of  the 
disaster  back  to  Winchester.  A  brave  nucleus  of  the  army,  which 
had  not  shared  in  the  surprise  and  the  consequent  demoralization, 
was  fighting  with  determined  pluck  to  prevent  disaster  from  becom 
ing  disgrace.  The  timely  arrival  and  the  spirited  onset  of  the  cavalry 
soon  checked  the  pursuit  by  the  Confederates  arid  gave  time  for  our 
infantry  to  begin  re-forming  their  lines;  but  the  battle  and  the 
retreat  continued.  Two  regiments  of  cavalry  were  speedily  deployed 
across  the  country — well  to  the  rear — for  the  purpose  of  checking 
the  stampede  and  turing  back  the  flying  mob  of  panic-stricken 
infantrymen ;  but  the  attempt  was  fruitless  and  was  soon  abandoned. 
Our  two  divisions  of  cavalry  deployed  in  heavy  lines  to  the  right 
and  left  of  the  Yalley  pike,  and  began  their  hot  day's  wrork  against 
rebel  infantry  and  artillery. 

At  nine  o'clock  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  troops  occupied,  and 
were  plainly  seen  plundering,  the  camps  where  the  Sixth  Corps  had 
slept  the  night  before ;  our  left  was  being  pressed  with  great  vigor 
by  a  flanking  force  which  seemed  determined  to  reach  the  pike,  and 
thus  strike  our  wagon  trains ;  General  Wright  had  unquestionably 
resolved  on  a  retreat  to  a  new  line  near  Winchester,  and  the  best  we 
hoped  for  was,  that  our  mounted  troops  could  so  protect  the  .retreat 
and  retard  the  pursuit,  as  to  prevent  the  annihilation  of  the  broken 
army  and  the  exposure  of  Washington.  The  universal  thought  and, 
in  varying  phrase,  the  spontaneous  utterance  was :  "  Oh  for  one  hour 
of  Sheridan."  The  unvarying  success  that  had  attended  our  leader 
in  all  his  campaigns;  the  instinctive  promptness  with  which  he 


THE  FAMOUS  FIGHT  AT  CEDAR  CREEK.  G61 

seemed  to  seize  the  key  of  every  situation,  however  difficult ;  the 
amazing  quickness  and  precision  with  which  he  formed  new  plans 
on  the  lield,  and  his  thunderbolt  method  of  executing  each  design  ;  his 
success  in  imparting  to  his  infantry  much  of  the  mobility  and  dash 
of  cavalry,  and  to  his  cavalry  much  of  the  coherency  and  steadiness 
of  infantry — all  these  had  combined,  in  spite  of  not  a  few  unheroic 
personal  traits,  to  give  his  army  unbounded  faith  in  his  leadership 
and  enthusiasm  for  the  man.  But  Sheridan  was  twenty  miles  away, 
at  Winchester,  where  he  had  arrived  the  day  before  from  Washing 
ton.  Meantime,  the  battle  and  the  day  wore  on  together.  The 
sulphurous  cloud  that  overhung  the  lield,  and  the  dense  volumes  of 
dust  that  rose  behind  the  wheeling  batteries  and  the  charging  troops, 
contrasted  grimly  with  the  sweet  light  of  that  perfect  October  (lav, 
as  it  could  be  seen  beyond  the  limits  of  the  battle-field.  At  noon, 
and  for  some  time  previously,  the  enemy  was  opposed  only  by  Mer- 
ritt's  and  ('lister's  cavalry  and  Getty's  Division  of  infantry,  with 
their  accompanying  batteries,  while  the  main  portion  of  the  Sixth 
Corps  was  more  than  two  miles  to  the  right  and  rear  of  Gettv, 
engaged  in  reorganizing,  and  the  Nineteenth  Corps  was,  in  turn,  to 
the  right  and  rear  of  the  Sixth. 

At  this  juncture,  those  of  us  who  were  stationed  near  the  Win 
chester  pike  heard,  far  to  the  rear  of  us,  a  faint  cheer  go  up,  as  a 
hurrying  horseman  passed  a  group  of  wounded  soldiers,  and  dashed 
down  that  historic  road  toward  our  line  of  battle.  As  he  drew  nearer, 
we  could  see  that  the  coal  black  horse  was  flecked  with  foam,  both 
horse  and  rider  grimed  with  dust,  and  the  dilated  nostrils  and  labor 
ing  breath  of  the  former  told  of  a  race  both  long  and  swift.  A 
moment  more  and  a  deafening  cheer  broke  from  the  troops  in  that 
part  of  the  field,  as  they  recognized  in  the  coming  horseman  their 
longed-for  Sheridan.  Above  the  roar  of  musketry  and  artillery, 
that  shout  arose  like  a  cry  of  victory.  The  news  flashed  from 
brigade  to  brigade,  along  our  front,  with  telegraphic  speed,  and 
then,  as  Sheridan,  cap  in  hand,  dashed  along  the  rear  of  the  strug 
gling  line,  thus  confirming  to  all  eyes  the  fact  of  his  arrival,  a  con 
tinuous  cheer  burst  from  the  whole  army.  Hope  took  the  place  of 
fear,  courage  the  place  of  despondency,  cheerfulness  the  place  of 
gloom.  The  entire  aspect  of  things  seemed  changed  in  a  moment. 
Further  retreat  was  not  longer  thought  of.  At  all  points  to  the  rear 
stragglers  could  be  seen  by  hundreds  voluntarily  rejoining  their 
regiments,  with  such  arms  as  they  could  hastily  find — order  seemed 
to  have  come  spontaneously  out  of  chaos,  an  army  out  of  a  rabble. 
[The  cannonade  of  the  early  morning,  when  the  battle  opened,  had 


662  ANXALS  OF  THE  WAX. 

been  attributed  by  Sheridan,  at  Winchester,  to  a  reconnoissance, 
which  he  knew  had  been  ordered  from  our  lines,  and  it  was  only 
when  the  head  of  the  column  of  fugitive  troops  and  baggage  wagons 
was  seen,  between  nine  and  ten  o'clock  A.  M.,  approaching  Win 
chester  "  with  appalling  rapidity,"  that  a  conception  of  the  real  situ 
ation  dawned  on  the  astounded  general,  and  promptly  started  him 
on  his  now  famous  "  ride  "  to  the  front.] 

The  enemy,  believing  the  continued  cheers  announced  the  arrival 
of  Federal  reinforcments,  became  more  cautious,  and  even,  like  our 
selves,  threw  up  temporary  breastworks.  Our  commander  instantly 
decided  to  hold  the  line  we  wTere  then  fighting  on,  and  sent  galloping 
orders  to  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Corps  to  hasten  up  to  our  sup 
port  before  the  enemy  should  attack.  By  two  o'clock  our  lines  were 
fully  re-formed,  the  various  infantry  divisions,  greatly  strengthened 
by  the  return  of  stragglers,  were  in  position,  and  the  cavalry  had 
been  sent  to  the  flanks — Ouster  to  the  right,  and  Merritt  to  the  left. 
Everything  now  indicated  that  we  should  be  able  to  hold  our  ground 
without  further  retreat.  By  this  time  Early,  apparently  satisfied 
that  we  had  received  no  reinforcements,  made  a  confident  and  per 
sistent  assault  upon  our  lines — obviously  determined  to  close  the  day 
with  our  final  rout,  and,  returning  the  courtesy  of  thirty  days  before, 
send  the  remnant  of  Sheridan's  army  "  whirling  through  Winchester." 
The  attack  was  repulsed  at  every  point.  This  defensive  success 
under  Sheridan's  leadership  perfectly  restored  the  courage  and  spirit 
of  the  army.  It  had  got  over  its  panic,  and  was  again  ready  for 
business. 

Shortly  after  this  attack  and  repulse,  report  came  from  the 
Front  Royal  pike,  which  wras  held  by  Powell's  cavalry,  that  a  strong 
column  of  rebel  infantry  was  inarching  past  our  left,  and  towrard 
Winchester — a  report  which,  although  proving  erroneous,  delayed  the 
execution  of  Sheridan's  quickly-formed  intention  to  attack  the  enemy 
and  save  the  day.  At  four  P.  M.  the  command  was  sent  along  the 
line  to  prepare  for  a  general  forward  movement.  Everything  was 
soon  ready ;  two  hundred  bugles  sounded  the  advance ;  all  our  artil 
lery  opened  on  the  enemy  with  shot  and  shell,  and  the  long  line  of 
cavalry  and  infantry  moved  steadily  forward  across  the  open  plain, 
under  a  heavy  fire,  toward  the  rebel  position,  with  a  coolness  and 
order  I  never  saw  surpassed  during  four  years'  of  service.  To  one 
who  had  seen  the  rout  and  panic,  and  loss  of  the  morning,  it  seemed 
impossible  that  this  wras  the  same  army.  The  enemy  was  evidently 
astonished  at  our  taking  the  offensive,  but  met  our  attack  with  con 
fident  coolness,  and  then  with  determined  fury.  As  soon  as  the 


THE  FAMOUS  FIGHT  AT  CEDAR   CREEK 

Confederate  infantry  was  fully  engaged  with  ours  in  the  centre,  tlie 
order  was  given  for  tlie  cavalry  divisions  to  charge  both  flanks  of  the 
enemy's  line.  The  bugles  sounded,  the  horses  caught  the  spirit  of 
the  hour,  and  pressed  forward  with  steady  but  resistless  speed  ;  seven 
thousand  troopers,  with  drawn  sabres,  sent  up  a  battle  yell  wild 
enough  to  wake  the  slain  over  whom  we  galloped,  and  we  were  in 
the  midst  of  that  grandest  of  martial  movements — a  genuine  cavalry 
charge. 

The  effect  was  magical.  The  enemy's  mounted  troops  first 
made  a  stout  resistance,  then  scattered  like  sheep  to  the  hills,  and  his 
infantry  line,  having  both  flanks  turned  back  upon  itself  by  our 
cavalry,  and  its  centre  crushed  by  a  final  magnificent  charge  of  our 
infantry,  broke  in  confusion,  and  started  southward  in  confused 
retreat.  Panic  seized  every  part  of  the  rebel  force;  infantry  vied 
with  artillery,  and  Loth  with  the  wagon  trains,  in  a  harum-scarum 
race  for  the  Cedar  creek  ford,  and,  as  the  sun  went  down,  the  army, 
which  at  daybreak  had  gained  one  of  the  most  dramatic  and  over 
whelming  victories  of  the  war,  was  a  frantic  rabble,  decimated  in 
numbers,  and  flying  before  the  same  army  it  had,  twelve  hours 
before,  so  completely  surprised  and  routed.  Our  cavalry  pressed  the 
pursuit  with  a  vehemence  and  success  that  astonished  even  the  much- 
expecting  Sheridan.  Merritt  on  the  left  of  the  pike,  and  (.'lister  on 
the  right,  met  with  no  opposition  from  the  scared  and  fugitive  mob 
of  mingled  "  horse,  foot,  and  dragoons."  The  pike  was  blockaded 
for  miles  with  cannon,  caissons,  ambulances,  and  baggage  wagons, 
which  our  troopers  easily  captured,  and  turned  backward  toward  our 
lines.  The  chase  continued,  with  constant  captures  of  prisoners  and 
war  material,  until,  near  the  foot  of  Fisher's  Hill,  the  dense  darkness 
enforced  a  truce  between  pursuers  and  pursued.  Both  infantry  and 
cavalry  returned  to  sleep  in  their  camps  of  the  night  before,  hungry 
and  half  dead  with  fatigue,  but  happy,  and  having  about  them,  as 
trophies  of  the  day's  work,  forty-five  pieces  of  captured  and  recap 
tured  artillery,  and  a  field  full  of  Avagons,  ambulances,  and  prisoners 
of  war.  This  ended  the  career  of  Early's  army.  As  an  army  it 
never  fought  another  battle— its  commander  never  again  attempted 
to  redeem  tlie  Shenandoah  Valley,  nor  to  invade  the  Xorth. 

This  free-hand  sketch  of  an  historical  military  episode,  taken 
from  the  point  of  view  of  a  participant  with  the  Union  cavalry,  and 
making  no  pretensions  to  microscopic  accuracy  of  detail,  suggests 
one  or  two  obvious  commentaries: 

.    FIRST.   The  skill,  the  courage,  and  the  self-command  with  which 
the  initial  part  of  Early's  movement  of  October  19th  was  planned 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  executed  could  not  well  be  surpassed.  To  move  a  fully  equipped 
army  of  infantry  and  artillery  on  a  still  night  along  the  front  of  a 
powerful  and  presumably  watchful  enemy,  twice  ford  a  considerable 
stream,  noiselessly  capture  or  "relieve"  the  hostile  pickets  on  the 
river  bank,  place  a  turning  force  on  the  enemy's  flank,  surprise  the 
bulk  of  the  hostile  army  in  bed,  and,  after  reducing  it  one-sixth  in 
numbers,  drive  it  in  pell-mell  retreat,  shelled  by  its  own  artillery,  re 
quires,  it  need  not  be  said,  some  of  the  very  highest  military  qualities 
in  both  commander  and  troops.  Whether  the  chief  credit  for  the 
achievement  is  due  to  General  Early,  or  to  his  subordinate,  General 
Gordon,  is  a  question  of  personal,  rather  than  of  public,  interest. 

SECOND.  The  negligence  which  could  expose  Sheridan's  victori 
ous  army  to  the  possibility  of  such  a  surprise,  humiliation  and  rout, 
especially  after  the  distinct  warning  of  three  days  before,  stands 
without  explanation,  and  without  excuse.  Forty-one  hundred  men 
killed  and  wounded  are  a  heavy  price  to  pay  for  the  failure  to  keep 
one's  eyes  open,  and  make  a  timely  reconnoissance. 

THIRD.  Early's  neglect  to  relentlessly  press  his  advantage  during 
the  forenoon  of  the  19th,  before  Sheridan  reached  the  field,  and  while 
there  was  in  his  immediate  front,  for  much  of  the  time,  only  one 
battered  division  of  infantry  and  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  indicates 
that  he  was  overcome  with  causeless  timidity  in  the  hour  of  his 
greatest  triumph — an  experience  not  uncommon  to  commanders 
whose  persistent  courage  (not  personal  bravery)  in  the  open  field 
does  not  equal  their  genius  for  unusual  strategic  enterprises. 
Several  of  Early's  most  intelligent  subordinates  attribute  the  fatal 
delay  to  three  things — their  commander's  willingness  to  let  well 
enough  alone ;  the  profound  respect  of  Early's  army  for  Sheridan's 
cavalry,  which  had  never  been  surprised,  and  never  known  defeat, 
and  the  impossibility  of  preserving  discipline  among  the  destitute 
Confederate  soldiers  so  long  as  there  was  anything  to  plunder  in  the 
captured  Federal  camps.  The  last-named  cause  receives  grim  con* 
firmation  from  the  fact  that,  on  repossessing  the  battle-field  of  the 
morning,  we  found  that  hundreds  of  the  Union  slain  had  been 
stripped  to  entire  nudity — the  writer  having  counted  sixty-three 
instances  of  this  in  riding  hurriedly  across  a  single  section  of  the  plain. 

FOURTH.  Stripped  of  all  poetic  glosses,  and  analyzed  after 
fourteen  years  of  peace,  when  nil  admimri  seems  to  have  become 
the  motto  of  all,  the  result  achieved  by  Sheridan's  matchless  general 
ship,  after  he  reached  his  shattered  army  on  the  field  of  Cedar  creek— 
as  an  illustration  of  the  wonderful  influence  of  one  man  over  many, 
and  an  example  of  snatching  a  great  victory  from  an  appalling 
defeat — still  stands  without  a  parallel  in  history. 


GENERAL  STUART  IN  CAMP  AND  FIELD. 


BY    COLONEL    JOIIX    ESTEX    COOKE. 


THE  famous  General  "Jel>" 
Stuart  was,  perhaps,  tlie  most 
picturesque  figure  moving  on 
tlie  great  arena  of  the  late 
civil  war.  Young,  gay.  gal 
lant  ;  wearing  a  uniform  bril 
liant  with  gold  braid,  golden 
spurs,  and  a  hat  looped  up 
•with  a  golden  star  and  deco 
rated  with  a  black  plume; 
going  on  marches  at  the  head 
of  his  cavalry  column  with 
his  banjo-player  gavlv  thrum 
ming  behind  him;  leading 
his  troops  to  battle  with  a 
camp  song  on  his  lips;  here 
to-day  and  away  to-morrow,  raiding,  lighting,  laughing,  dancing,  and 
as  famous  for  his  gallantry  toward  women  as  for  his  reckless  courage. 
Stuart  was  in  every  particular  a  singular  and  striking  human  being, 
drawing  to  himself  the  strongest  public  interest  both  as  a  man  and  a 

o  O  1 

soldier.  ( )f  his  military  ability  as  a  cavalry  leader,  General  Sedgwick 
probably  summed  up  the  general  opinion  when  he  said  :  '*  Stuart  is 
the  best  cavalryman  ever  foaled  in  Xorth  America."  ( )f  his  courage, 
devotion,  and  many  lovable  traits,  General  Lee  bore  his  testimony  on 
his  death,  when  he  retired  to  his  tent  with  the  words:  "I  can  scarcely 
think  of  him  without  weeping/'  Stuart  thus  made  a  very  strong 
impression  Loth  on  the  people  at  large  and  on  the  eminent  soldiers 
with  whom  he  was  associated,  and  a  sketch  of  him  ought  to  interest, 
if  faithfully  drawn.  The  writer  of  this  paper  believes  it  is  in  his 
power  to  present  such  a  sketch,  having  enjoyed  his  personal  friend 
ship,  and  observed  him  during  a  large  part  of  his  career;  and  the 
aim  will  be  to  make  the  likeness  presented  as  accurate  as  possible  to 
the  original. 

"Up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Stuart's  life  was  scarcely  marked 
by  any  incident  of  interest,     lie  was  a  native  of  Patrick  county, 

(665) 


066  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Virginia,  and  came  of  a  family  of  high  social  position  and  some  dis 
tinction.  Having  graduated  at  West  Point,  he  served  for  some  years 
as  a  lieutenant  in  the  United  States  army,  and  when  it  was  obvious 
that  Virginia  would  secede,  he  resigned  his  commission  and  came  to 
his  native  State,  where  he  was  put  in  command  of  the  First  Regi 
ment  of  Cavalry,  operating  on  the  Upper  Potomac.  He  had  been 
prominent,  at  this  time,  in  only  one  scene  attracting  public  attention. 
This  was  in  1859,  at  Harper's  Ferry,  where  he  was  directed  by 
General,  then  Colonel,  R.  E.  Lee  to  summon  John  Brown  to  sur 
render.  He  recognized  Brown,  then  passing  as  "Captain  Smith," 
as  soon  as  the  engine-house  door  was  half  opened,  as  an  old  acquaint 
ance  in  Kansas,  and  advised  him  to  surrender,  which  Brown  declined 
doing,  adding,  "  You  know,  lieutenant,  we  are  not  afraid  of  bullets," 
when  Stuart  stepped  aside,  and  the  attack  and  capture  of  the  old 
marauder  followed. 

In  a  sketch  so  limited  as  the  present,  it  is  impossible  to  more 
than  refer  to  the  main  points  in  Stuart's  career  as  a  soldier.  From 
the  first,  his  cavalry  operations  were  full  of  fire  and  vigor,  and 
General  J.  E.  Johnston,  under  whom  he  served  in  the  Valley,  called 
him  "the  indefatigable  Stuart."  He  became  famous  for  his  gayety, 
activity,  and  romantic  exploits,  and  after  fighting  all  day  would  dance 
nearly  all  night  at  some  hospitable  house.  He  wore  at  this  time  his 
blue  United  States  army  uniform,  and  a  forage  cap  covered  with  a 
white  "  havelock,"  resembling  a  chain  helmet,  which  made  his  head 
resemble  that  of  a  knight  of  the  days  of  chivalry ;  arid  at  the  head 
of  his  troopers,  as  they  moved  through  the  spring  forests,  he  was  a 
romantic  figure.  "When  Johnston  crossed  the  mountains,  Stuart 
covered  the  movement  with  very  great  skill,  charged  the  Zouaves  at 
Manaseas,  held  the  outposts  afterward  toward  Alexandria,  and 
brought  up  the  rear  when  Johnston  fell  back  to  the  Rapidan,  sub 
sequently  taking  a  prominent  part  in  the  obstinate  battles  on  the 
Chickahominy.  Just  preceding  these  battles  he  made  his  remark 
able  march,  with  about  fifteen  hundred  cavalry,  entirely  around 
General  McClellan's  army,  originating  thus  the  system  of  cavalry 
"  raiding,"  which  afterward  proved  so  fatal  to  the  South. 

The  ability  and  energy  displayed  in  these  movements  gained 
for  him  the  commission  of  major  general,  and  from  that  time,  to  his 
death,  he  remained  Chief  of  Cavalry  of  General  Lee's  army.  When 
the  Confederate  forces  advanced  northward  in  the  summer  of  1862, 
Stuart's  cavalry  accompanied  the  column,  and  took  part  in  all  the 
important  operations  of  that  year — on  the  Rapidan,  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  the  Second  Manassas,  Sharpsburg,  and  Fredericksburg.  In 


GENERAL  STUART  IX  CAMP  AND  FIELD.  667 

these  bustling  scenes  Stuart  acted  with  immense  energy  and  enthu 
siasm,  laying  broad  and  deep  his  reputation  as  a  cavalry  officer.  By 
incessant  fighting,  and  an  ardor  and  activity  which  seemed  to  pass 
all  bounds,  lie  had  by  this  time  won  the  full  confidence  of  General 
Lee.  His  rank,  in  the  estimation  of  General  Jackson,  was  as  high. 
This  will  be  understood  from  what  took  place  in  May,  1803,  at 
Chancellors ville.  "When  Jackson  was  disabled,  and  Stuart  assumed 
command,  and  sent  to  ascertain  Jackson's  views  and  wishes  as  to  the 
attack  on  the  next  morning,  the  wounded  commander  replied  :  u  Go 
back  and  tell  General  Stuart  to  act  on  his  own  judgment,  and  do 
what  he  thinks  best.  I  have  implicit  confidence  in  ///»//"- — an 
expression  for  which  my  authority  was  his  brave  Adjutant  General, 
Colonel  Pendleton,  and  which  ought  to  be  sufficient  to  make  the 
reputation  of  any  soldier.  Stuart's  attack  with  Jackson's  Corps  on 
the  next  morning  fully  justified  this  confidence.  His  employment 
of  artillery  in  mass  on  the  Federal  left,  went  far  to  decide  this  critical 
action.  At  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  in  the  preceding  December, 
the  same  masterly  handling  of  his  guns  had  protected  .Jackson's  right 
toward  the  Massaponnax,  which  was  the  real  key  of  the  battle  ;  and 
in  these  two  great  actions,  as  on  the  left  at  Sharpsburg,  Stuart 
exhibited  a  genius  for  the  management  of  artillery  which  would 
have  delighted  Xapoleon.  In  the  operations  of  lsr>3,  culminating 
at  Gettysburg,  he  was  charged  with  misconception  or  disobedience 
of  orders  in  separating  himself  from  the  main  column,  although  he 
protested  to  me,  with  the  utmost  earnestness  and  feeling,  that  he 
had  been  guilty  of  neither.  Then  the  hurried  and  adventurous 
scenes  followed,  when  General  Lee  attempted,  in  October,  1863,  to 
cut  off  General  Meade  at  Manassas,  when  the  cavalry  was  the  only 
arm  which  effected  anything,  and  General  Kilpatrick  was  nearly 
crushed  near  Bucklands — the  brief  campaign  of  Mine  Run — and  the 
furious  wrestle  between  Lee  and  Grant  in  the  Wilderness,  in  May, 
1864:.  "When  General  Grant  moved  toward  Spottsylvania  Court- 
House,  it  was  Stuart  who,  according  to  Northern  historians,  so 
obstructed  the  roads  as  to  enable  General  Lee  to  interpose  his  army 
at  this  important  point.  Had  this  not  been  effected,  Richmond,  it 
would  seem,  must  have  fallen  ;  Stuart  thus  having  the  melancholy 
glory  of  prolonging,  for  an  additional  year,  the  contest,  ending  only 
in  April,  1865.  His  death  speedily  followed.  General  Sheridan 
turned  against  him  his  own  system,  organized  on  the  Chickahominv. 
in  June,  1862.  The  Federal  horse  pushed  past  Lee's  army  to  sur 
prise  Richmond ;  Stuart  followed  in  haste,  with  such  small  force  of 
cavalry  as  he  could  collect  on  the  instant.  The  collision  took  place 


CGS  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

at  Yellow  tavern,  near  Richmond,  and  in  the  engagement  Stuart 
was  mortally  wounded,  and,  two  or  three  days  afterward,  expired. 

The  death  of  the  famous  cavalryman  produced  a  deep  and 
painful  sensation,  in  some  degree  akin  to  that  produced  by  the  death 
of  Jackson.  The  Southern  people,  indeed,  had  become  accustomed 
to  couple  together  the  three  great  names,  Lee,  Jackson,  and  Stuart, 
valuing  each  for  his  peculiar  qualities.  Ko  comparison  is  intended 
to  be  made  between  these  three  distinguished  soldiers ;  but  it  is 
interesting  to  notice  how  sharply  contrasted  they  were  in  character, 
and  how  peculiarly  each  was  fitted  for  the  sphere  in  which  he  moved, 
and  his  special  functions.  Lee,  the  head  and  front  of  the  struggle, 
was  the  born  commander-in-chief,  fitted  for  the  conception  of  great 
campaigns,  ever  wide  awake,  a  man  of  august  dignity  by  nature, 
calm,  suave,  grave,  taking  good  and  evil  fortune  with  the  same 
imposing  serenity ;  in  person,  one  of  the  most  noble  and  graceful 
men  of  his  epoch,  and  the  finest  rider  in  the  Southern  army;  in 
character,  simple,  pure,  patient,  binding  to  himself  both  the  love 
and  respect  of  men.  Jackson  was  the  infantry  leader,  the  "  right 
arm "  to  execute  what  Lee  conceived ;  in  person  not  graceful,  in 
manner  silent,  reserved,  and  often  abrupt ;  cautious  in  council,  but 
rapid  and  terrible  in  execution,  going  to  battle  with  muttered  prayers 
on  his  lips,  leaving  all  to  Providence,  but  striking  with  all  the  power 
of  his  arm  to  do  his  own  part,  and  in  many  ways  resembling  the 
Ironsides  of  Cromwell.  Stuart,  on  the  contrary,  was  the  cavalier, 
essentially  belonging  to  the  class  of  men  who  followed  the  fortunes 
of  Charles  I. — ardent,  impetuous,  brimming  over  with  the  wine  of 
life  and  youth,  with  the  headlong  courage  of  a  high-spirited  boy, 
fond  of  bright  colors,  of  rippling  flags,  of  martial  music,  and  the 
clash  of  sabres ;  in  all  the  warp  and  woof  his  character  an  embodi 
ment  of  the  best  traits  of  the  English  cavaliers — not  of  their  bad 
traits.  Although  his  utter  carelessness  as  to  the  impression  he 
produced  subjected  him  to  many  calumnies,  it  is  here  placed  on 
record,  by  one  who  knew  his  private  life  thoroughly,  and  was  with 
him  day  and  night  for  years,  that  he  was,  in  morals,  among  the 
purest  of  men — a  faithful  husband,  absolutely  without  vices  of  any 
description,  and,  if  not  demonstrative  in  his  religious  views,  an 
earnest  and  exemplary  Christian.  His  love  for  his  wife  was  deep 
and  devoted ;  and  on  the  death  of  his  little  daughter,  Flora,  he  said 
tc  me,  with  tears  in  his  eyes :  "I  shall  never  get  over  it." 

When  one  day  some  person  in  my  presence  indulged  in  sneers 
at  the  expense  of  "  preachers,"  supposing  that  the  roystering  young 
commander  would  echo  them,  Stuart  said,  coldly:  "I  regard  the 


GENERAL  STUART  IN  CAMP  AND  FIELD.  G69 

Christian  ministry  as  tlie  noblest  work  in  which  any  human  being 
can  engage."  lie  never  touched  spirits  in  any  form  during  his 
whole  life,  having  promised  his  mother,  he  told  me,  that  he  would 
not ;  did  not  use  tobacco  even  ;  never  uttered  anything  approaching 
an  oath,  or  touched  cards,  or  indulged  in  any  one  of  the  vices  sup 
posed  to  l)e  habitual  with  soldiers.  In  spite  of  all,  however,  those 
who  hated  or  envied  him,  called  him  a  drunkard  and  a  libertine. 

Stuart  naturally  attracted  most  attention  in  his  military  character, 
and  I  am  satisfied  that,  as  time  passes  on,  and  the  circumstances  of 
the  late  struggle  are  better  known,  his  reputation  as  a  soldier  will 
steadily  increase.  His  youth,  gayety,  and  apparent  thoughtlessness^ 
his  song-singing,  his  rattling  banjo — all  were  against  him  in  the 
estimation  of  grave  people  in  black  coats,  who  could  not  or  would 
not  believe  that  this  kk  mere  boy"  was  by  birth  a  soldier — even  a  great 
one.  Successful  soldiership  requires  a  peculiar  organization,  which 
is  neither  that  of  the  statesman,  the  orator,  the  writer,  and  the 
thinker.  What  is  demanded  is  the  genius  of  the  man  born  to  lead, 
direct,  and  act — often  on  sudden  emergency,  and  as  though  from 
instinct.  Stuart  was,  by  nature,  intended  to  lead  and  command  men. 
lie  took  his  place  at  the  head  of  troops  as  by  right,  and  his  followers 
felt  that  he  was  entitled  to  lead  them,  without  sharing  in  that 
unthinking  admiration  which  lie  generally  aroused.  I  had  the  con 
viction  forced  upon  me,  after  observing  him  in  his  earliest  campaigns, 
that  he  was  a  thorough  soldier.  He  had  the  instinctive  power  of 
penetrating  his  enemy's  design,  an  eye  consummate  in  the  choice  of 
ground  for  lighting  on,  with  cavalry,  infantry,  or  artillery;  and, 
while  reckless,  apparently,  in  attacking,  knew  well  when  he  ought  to 
retreat.  The  success  of  his  retreats,  indeed,  from  positions  of  the 
most  hazardous  character,  will  probably  remain  his  greatest  claim  to 
good  soldiership — at  least  they  so  impressed  me  while  closely  observ 
ing  how  they  were  accomplished  oil  many  occasions  in  Virginia, 
Maryland,  and  Pennsylvania. 

His  personal  bearing  on  the  field  was  peculiar.  lie  was  rarely 
excited  by  anything,  though  he  exhibited  all  the  ardor  of  a  young 
soldier  while  actually  fighting,  and  often  crossed  swords  like  a  com 
mon  sabieur.  As  frequently,  however,  he  remained  quiet,  appearing 
to  be  indulging  in  reflection.  In  very  dangerous  and  critical  situa 
tions  I  have  seen  him  throw  his  leg  over  the  pommel  of  the  saddle, 
drum  upon  his  knee  carelessly,  and  then  give  his  orders  so  quietly 
that  it  was  difficult  to  believe  that  it  was  "touch  and  go"  whether 
he  would  extricate  his  command,  or  be  cut  to  pieces.  Any  question 
of  his  personal  fate  obviously  never  entered  his  mind — a  common 


6 TO  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

trait,  it  may  be  said,  with  soldiers ;  but  Stuart  evidently  possessed 
the  additional  merit  of  being  able  to  think  with  entire  calmness, 
while  the  air  around  him  was  full  of  bullets,  and  shells  were  bursting 
over  and  around  him.  In  a  cavalry  charge,  however,  the  thinker 
disappeared,  and  he  became  the  actor.  He  went  in  front  of  his 
men,  at  a  gallop,  with  immense  joy,  ardor  and  elan.  His  face 
glowed,  he  was  full  of  laughter,  and  often  roared  out,  in  his  gay, 
sonorous  voice,  some  one  of  his  favorite  ballads.  This  eccentric 
habit  attracted  the  attention  of  Jackson's  men  at  Chancellorsville — 
men  habituated  to  the  gravity  and  prayers  of  their  wounded  leader. 
Stuart  led  Jackson's  Corps  against  General  Hooker's  intrenchments, 
with  drawn  sabre  and  floating  plume,  singing  "  Old  Joe  Hooker, 
will  you  come  out  of  the  Wilderness !  " 

He  had  the  genius  to  understand  what  an  enemy  ought  to,  and 
probably  would  do — in  proof  of  which  I  remember  that  he  said  to 
me,  in  the  winter  of  1862:  "The  next  battle  will  be  near  Chancel 
lorsville,"  where  it  accordingly  took  place,  nearly  six  months  after 
ward  ;  but  he  was  as  great  as  an  executive  officer  as  in  council,  if 
not  greater.  I  am  sure  that  he  loved  fighting  in  person,  from  the 
ardor  of  his  blood,  his  high  health,  and  natural  excitability  and 
impetuosity.  He  would  certainly  have  made  an  excellent-  private, 
and  told  me,  when  there  was  some  question  of  virtually  superseding 
him,  that,  if  they  did  so,  he  wrould  enlist.  The  War  Office  might 
deprive  him  of  his  commission,  he  said,  or  force  him  to  resign  ;  but 
there  was  one  thing  they  could  not  do — prevent  him  from  going 
into  the  ranks  with  his  sabre  as  a  private  of  the  Confederate  States 
army,  which,  he  added,  he  certainly  should  do.  I  am  certain  that 
he  would  have  followed  this  course  at  once,  and  not  in  the  least  from 
any  feeling  of  "  spite."  He  produced  upon  me  the  impression  of 
being  more  thoroughly  and  completely  devoted  to  the  cause  in  which 
he  was  fighting  than  any  other  person,  without  exception,  with  whom 
I  was  thrown  during  the  war.  His  faith  in  the  justice  of  the  struggle 
was  absolute,  and  he  never,  to  my  knowledge,  had  one  moment's  doubt 
as  to  the  result  of  the  war.  His  words  and  actions  invariably  indi 
cated  the  most  unswerving  conviction  that  the  South  was  fighting  in 
the  holiest  of  causes,  and  must  achieve  her  independence.  His  duty, 
therefore,  was  plain.  He  would  do  his  best,  count  his  life  as  nothing, 
and  stand  or  fall  as  heaven  decreed.  He  said  to  me  :  "  I  never  expect 
to  come  out  of  this  war  alive  ;"  and  though  he  was  undoubtedly  ambi 
tious,  immensely  so  even,  and  void  of  glory,  he  ought  to  have  credit 
for  the  nobler  motive — love  of  the  cause,  and  devotion  to  it,  even  to 
the  death. 


GENERAL  fiTUAXT  JAT  CAMP  AND  FIELD.  071 

The  object  of  this  sketch  is  chiefly  to  draw  the  likeness  of 
General  Stuart  as  he  appeared  in  the  familiar  scenes  of  the  camp ; 
as  this  familiar  phase  of  any  human  being  is  generally  the  most 
characteristic  and  suggestive  ;  but  the  subject  of  his  genius  as  a 
soldier  ought  not  to  be  dropped  without  some  reference  to  the 
estimate  placed  upon  him  by  those  best  able  to  judge  him  truly. 
General  Lee  unquestionably  regarded  him  as  a  cavalry  commander 
of  the  first  order  of  merit,  and  attached  the  very  highest  value  to  his 
co-operation  in  the  campaign.  The  estimates  of  General'  Lee,  either 
of  friend  or  foe,  were  calm,  impartial,  and  rarely,  if  ever,  affected  in 
the  least  degree  by  private  feeling.  Thus,  he  esteemed  the  late 
General  Meade  very  highly  as  a  soldier,  declaring  that  he  was  the 
best  officer  of  the  Federal  army,  and  had  ''given  him  more  trouble 
than  any  of  them."  An  estimate  which  he  precisely  reversed  in  the 
case  of  General  Sheridan,  whose  ability  as  a  cavalry  officer  he  con 
sidered  very  small.  His  opinion  of  Stuart  may  be  seen  in  his 
reports,  but  was  plainest  to  those  who  observed,  at  close  view,  how 
much  he  counseled  with  and  trusted  to  him.  The  cavalry,  under 
their  ardent  young  leader,  were  the  eyes  and  ears  of  his  army  in 
every  campaign;  and  although  Lee  would  not  officially  censure 
Stuart,  it  seems  plain  that,  right  or  wrong,  he  regarded  the  defeat 
at  Gettysburg  as  in  some  measure  due  to  the  absence  of  Stuart,  to 
whom  he  had  always  looked  for  prompt  and  reliable  information  of 
the  movements  of  the  enemy.  Finally,  when  Stuart  fell,  in  May, 
18C4,  and  Lee  said  that  he  could  scarcely  think  of  him  without 
weeping,  the  acute  grief  of  the  great  soldier  for  a  man  he  had  loved 
so  much  was  certainly  mingled  with  deep  regret  for  the  loss  of  the 
soldier  whose  services  were  so  important  to  him  in  the  critical  con 
dition  of  affairs  at  the  moment. 

In  camp,  in  bivouac,  on  the  march,  and  "off  duty"  everywhere, 
Stuart  was  a  striking  personage.  Some  human  beings  are  only 
notable  on  great  occasions,  in  imposing  attitudes  gotten  up  for  the 
emergency,  and  once  back  in  private,  living  their  every  day  lives,  are 
commonplace  and  uninteresting.  This  was  far  from  being  the  case 
with  Stuart.  There  was  about  the  man  a  perennial  interest  as  vivid 
with  those  who  saw  him,  hour  by  hour,  as  with  strangers  glancing  at 
him  in  his  splendid  uniform  at  the  head  of  his  column,  or  leading  a 
charge.  The  ardor,  mirth,  and  romance  of  the  man  in  his  public 
phase,  were  all  natural,  and  as  characteristic  of  him  in  private  with 
friends  and  staff  officers  as  on  the  field  before  the  eyes  of  the  world. 
He  had  an  immensely  strong  physique,  and  unfailing  animal  spirits 
--loved  song,  laughter,  jesting,  rough  practical  jokes,  and  all  the 


(572  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

virile  divertisements  of  camp.  His  surroundings  were  all  in  unison 
with  his  youthful  love  of  movement,  incident,  and  adventure.  He 
rarely  settled  down,  unless  compelled  to  do  so,  in  any  formal  head 
quarters.  "Here  to-day  and  away  to-morrow,"  might  have  been 
considered  one  of  his  maxims.  Thus  his  quarters  were,  except  in 
winter,  the  most  impromptu  affairs.  A  canvas  "  fly  "  stretched  over 
a  pole,  the  horses  affixed  to  the  boughs  of  the  forest  near,  saddled 
and  champering  their  bits,  the  red  battle-flag  rippling  in  the  brilliant 
sunshine,  couriers  going  and  coming,  the  staff  grouped  around,  wait 
ing,  booted  and  spurred,  for  the  order  to  mount,  which  they  knew 
might  come  at  any  moment,  and  from  the  canvas  tent  the  song  or 
laughter  of  Stuart  busy  at  his  desk,  from  which  he  would  rise  from 
time  to  time  to  come  to  the  opening,  yawn,  throw  a  jest  at  some  one, 
and  then  return  to  his  work — such,  in  brief  outline,  were  these  first 
bivouacs  of  Stuart,  who  always  moved  in  "  light  marching  order," 
that  is  to  say,  with  his  blanket  behind  his  saddle,  and  his  hat,  gloves, 
and  sabre  beside  him ;  a  true  cavalier,  ready  at  all  moments  to  be  up 
and  away. 

With  his  staff  officers,  Stuart  was  perfectly  familiar,  and  more 
like  a  "  big  boy "  among  a  group  of  small  ones,  than  a  general 
enthroned  among  subordinates.  It  was  his  delight  to  jest  at  the 
expense  of  each  and  all,  and  he  was  perfectly  willing  that  they 
should  jest  at  him  in  return.  His  humor  was  often  rough,  uncere 
monious — that  of  the  cavalryman ;  but  he  was  not  guilty  of  the 
smallness  of  becoming  irritated  if  he  was  retorted  on  in  kind.  He 
seemed  cordially  to  hate  ceremony,  and  wholly  ignored  his  rank  in 
his  military  family,  though  at  times  he  was  exceedingly  imperious. 
If  on  such  occasions,  however,  he  thought  that  he  had  wounded  any 
one,  he  would  speedily  regret  it,  put  his  arm  around  the  individual, 
laugh,  and  say,  "Come,  old  fellow,  get  pleased.  I  never  joke  with 
any  one  unless  I  love  them." 

This  was  the  boy  speaking  through  the  man's  lips ;  indeed, 
there  was  a  pervading  spirit  of  boyishness  about  Stuart  which  made 
it  impossible  to  be  permanently  angry  with  him,  however  rough  his 
jest  at  one's  expense.  He  was,  in  the  interval  of  all  this  gayety,  an 
exceedingly  hard  worker,  and  a  very  stern  disciplinarian.  One  of 
his  humorous  orders  to  his  inspector  general  was :  "  Cry  aloud — 
spare  not — show  my  people  their  transgressions !  "  And  he  never 
hesitated  to  compel  obedience  to  his  orders,  and  to  throw  the  whole 
weight  of  his  official  displeasure  against  any  officer  of  his  command, 
however  high  his  rank.  With  a  very  warm  and  kind  heart,  he  had 
little  of  the  softness  of  disposition  which  induces  reluctance  to  punish 


GENERAL  STUART  IX  CA3IP  AXD  FIELD.  073 

neglect  of  duty.     This  latter  trait  is  said  to  have,  in  some  measure, 
characterized  General  Lee.     It  did  not  characterize  Stuart,     lie  was 
a  very  stern  man  where  he  had  convinced  himself  that  there  was 
wilful   opposition  to  his  orders,  or  even  a  failure,  from  negligence, 
to  comply  with  them.     From  this  resulted  a  very  excellent  state  of 
discipline,  generally,  and  a  wholesome  indisposition  to  act  in  opposi 
tion  to  his  known  wishes,  or  brave  his  displeasure.     He  had  none  of 
the  mock  dignity  of  small  men  in  command,  and  spoke  and  acted 
with  entire  naturalness.     Often  his  utterances  were  full  of   rouirh 
humor.     Having  reported  to  him,  on  one  occasion,  that  a  force  of 
Federal  cavalry  had  crossed   the  Rappahannock  below  Fleetwood, 
and  were  drawn  up  on  the  southern  bank,  I  received  from  him  the 
order:  "Well,  tell  Colonel  Beale  to  ft'ck  into  \nt,  and  jam  \'in  riy/tt 
(»'<'/'  tlic  riccr."     At  Fredericksburg,  in  the  evening,  when  one  of 
his  officers  sent  a  courier  to  ask  how  the  battle  was  goinjj,  his  answer 
was:   "Tell  him  Jackson  has  not  advanced,  but  I  have,  and  that  I 
am  going  on,  crowding  \:)/i  -irt't/t  artillery"     AVhile  conversing  with 
him,  one  day,  in  regard  to  his  hazardous  expedition  around  General 
McClellairs  army,  on  the  Chickahominy,  I  said  that,  if  attacked  while 
crossing  below,  he  would  certainly  have  been  obliged  to  surrender, 
when  his  reply  was  :  ".Xo,  one  other  course  was  left — to  die  game  I"1 
In  these  straightforward  and  unceremonious  utterances,  Stuart  ex 
pressed  his  character,  that  of  the  hard-fighting  cavalryman,  revealed 
as  he  worded  it  on  another  occasion — to  "go  through,  or  die  ti'i/'ni<j" 
Returning  to  him  as  he  appeared  in  camp,  it  may  be  said  that  he  was 
both  a  lovable  and  a  provoking  person — lovable  from  the  genuine 
warmth  of  his  character,  and  provoking  from  the  apparent  disregard 
of  the  feelings  of  those  around  him,  or,  at  least,  from  his  proneness 
to  amuse  himself  at  any  and  everybody's  expense.    AVhen  the  humor 
seized  him,  he  laughed  at  nearly  everybody.      General  Lee  he  inva 
riably  spoke  of,  as  he  treated  him,  with  profound  respect;  but  he 
even  made  merry  with  so  great  a  man  as  Jackson,  or  a  Old  Stone 
wall,"  as  he  affectionately  styled  him.     The  two  distinguished  men 
seemed  to  have  a  sincere  friendship  for  each  other,  which  alwavs 
impressed   me    as   a  very  singular  circumstance  indeed ;    but  so  it 
was.     They  were  strongly  contrasted  in  character  and  temperament, 
for  Stuart  was  the  most  impulsive  and  Jackson  the  most  reserved 
and  reticent  of  men.     But  it  was  plain  that  a  strong  bond  of  mutual 
admiration  and  confidence  united  them.     Jackson  would  visit  Stuart, 
and  hold  long  confidential  conversations  with  him,  listening  to  his 
views  with  evident  attention ;  and  Stuart  exhibited,  on  the  intelli- 

43 


674  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

gence  of  this  great  man's  death,  the  strongest  emotion.  "  It  is  a 
national  calamity,"  he  said,  in  a  voice  of  the  deepest  feeling. 

Our  recollections  of  human  beings  generally  attach  to  some 
particular  locality  with  which  we  associate  them,  and  the  writer  of 
these  pages  returns  in  memory,  when  thinking  of  Stuart,  more 
especially  to  his  quarters  near  Fredericksburg  in  the  winter  of  1862, 
which  he  humorously  styled  "  Camp  No  Camp."  Here,  with  his 
tent  pitched  under  shelter  of  a  pine  thicket,  and  his  horses  picketed 
near — for  ]ie  believed  that  exposure  hardened  them — with  a  slender 
little  AVhitworth  gun  posted  like  a  graceful  watch-dog  in  front,  and 
surrounded  by  his  mirthful  young  staff  officers,  Stuart  passed  the 
long  months  of  the  winter  succeeding  the  hard  battle.  Jackson's 
quarters  were  at  "  Moss  Keck,"  some  miles  down  the  river,  and  they 
exchanged  visits  often — Stuart  making  merry  over  all  things,  and 
not  sparing  even  the  grave  and  devout  "  Stonewall,"  whose  eyes 
would  twinkle  at  his  companion's  jests.  Jesting,  indeed,  seemed  to 
be  a  necessity  of  Stuart's  nature.  Mirth  and  humor  burst  forth  from 
this  strong  nature  as  a  flower  bursts  from  its  stalk.  At  "  Camp  No 
Camp  "  the  days  and  nights  were  full  of  song  and  laughter.  Stuart's 
delight  was  to  have  his  banjo-player,  Sweeney,  in  his  tent ;  and  even 
while  busily  engaged  in  his  official  correspondence,  he  loved  to  hear 
the  gay  rattle  of  the  instrument,  and  the  voice  of  Sweeney  singing 
"  J'ine  the  Cavalry,"  "  Sweet  Evelina,"  or  some  other  favorite  ditty. 
From  time  to  time  he  would  lay  down  his  pen,  throw  one  knee  over 
the  arm  of  his  chair,  and  call  his  two  dogs — two  handsome  young 
setters,  which  he  had  brought  across  the  Rappahannock — or  falling 
back,  or  utter  some  jest  at  the  expense  of  his  staff.  As  frequently 
he  would  join  in  the  song,  or  volunteer  one  of  his  own — his  favorite 
being  "  The  Bugles  Sang  Truce,"  "  The  Dew  is  on  the  Blossom," 
and  some  comic  ballads,  of  which  the  one  beginning  "  My  Wife's  in 
Castle  Thunder,"  was  a  fair  specimen.  These  he  roared  out  with 
immense  glee,  rising  and  gesticulating,  slapping  his  staff  officers  on 
the  back,  and  throwing  back  his  head  while  he  sang,  and  almost 
always  ending  in  a  burst  of  laughter. 

These  personal  traits  of  an  eminent  man  are  recorded  with  the 
view  of  presenting  him  to  the  reader  just  as  he  appeared — precisely 
as  a  painter  drawing  his  likeness  would  present  his  low,  athletic 
figure,  his  heavy  brown  beard,  his  flowing  mustache,  his  lofty  fore 
head,  finely-outlined  nose,  and  blue  eyes  as  penetrating  and  brilliant 
as  an  eagle's.  This  personnel  of  the  man  was  a  large  part  of  him,  so 
to  speak.  You  could  never  dissociate  the  genius  of  the  soldier  from 
the  appearance  of  the  individual.  If  ever  human  being  looked  his 


GENERAL  STUART  IN  CAMP  AND  FIELD.  675 

character,  it  was  Stuart,  in  his  short  fighting  jacket,  heavy  with  gold 
braid,  his  lingo  gauntlets,  and  boots  reaching  to  the  knees,  his  hat 
with  its  black  feather,  his  sabre  and  pistol,  his  rattling  spurs,  and  his 
gay,  alert,  off-hand  bearing  as  of  one  ready  to  mount  in  an  instant 
and  take  part  in  a ''light  or  frolic."  Youth,  high  health,  humor, 
courage — unthinking  resolve,  indeed,  to  "  do  or  die  " — were  revealed 
in  every  trait  and  every  movement  of  the  individual.  Here  was 
plainly  a  powerful  military  machine  with  all  the  wheels  in  perfect 
order,  and  to  be  relied  upon  for  any  work,  however  arduous.  One 
of  his  letters  to  me  was  signed,  "Yours  to  count  on"  and  this  truth 
fully  expressed  the  character  of  the  man.  General  Lee  knew  well 
that  Stuart  Avould  never  allow  indolence  or  procrastination  to  stand 
in  the  way  of  obedience  to  an  order — that  he  was  what  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  called  a  "  two-o'clock-in-the-morning  man,"  ready  at  any 
instant  for  any  work ;  and  it  was  this  combination  of  a  powerful 
physique,  unfailing  promptness,  mid  military  genius  which  made 
the  services  of  the  soldier  so  invaluable.  In  activity,  energy,  and 
acumen,  Stuart  was,  I  am  convinced,  the  first  cavalry  leader  of  his 
epoch,  and  among  the  most  remarkable  of  any  epoch.  When  lie 
fell,  there  were  eminent  men  to  take  his  place — leaders  as  devoted, 
hard  lighting,  and  faithful — but  no  other  could  precisely  fill  the 
vacuum.  With  the  death  of  Jackson  and  Stuart,  in  May,  18^3,  and 
May,  ISfi-l,  something  seemed  wanting  which  could  not  be  supplied. 
When  these  two  men  disappeared,  the  great  conflict  appeared  gloomy 
and  hopeless. 

The  familiar  sketch  here  presented  of  this  eminent  man,  has 
given  the  reader,  I  trust,  a  tolerably  distinct  conception  of  the  char 
acter  and  appearance  of  the  individual — the  writer's  aim  having  been 
to  leave  the  record  of  events  in  the  career  of  tie  soldier  to  the  his 
torian,  paying  chief  attention  to  the  characteristics  of  tJie  man.  The 
likeness  is  at  least  accurate  as  far  as  it  goes,  and  has  this  merit,  that 
it  is  based  on  intimate  personal  association  with  the  personage  whose 
portrait  is  traced.  The  traits  of  Stuart's  character  were  as  obvious 
as  those  of  his  personal  appearance.  All  was  on  the  surface.  Foibles 
he  had — a  hasty  temper,  an  imperious  will,  a  thirst  for  glory,  the 
love  of  appearance,  and  a  susceptibility  to  flattery  that  all  observed  ; 
but  there  his  faults  ended.  To  counterbalance  these  weaknesses,  he 
was  honest,  true,  devoted,  generous,  as  brave  as  steel,  and  faithful  to 
his  principles  and  his  religious  profession.  The  controlling  instinct, 
I  believe,  of  his  whole  nature  was  to  do  his  duty  "  up  to  the  hilt  r  —to 
use  one  of  his  OM'n  phrases — and  in  the  performance  of  this  duty  he 
disregarded  all  personal  considerations.  lie  fell  defending  the 


CTG  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

capital,  in  a  desperate  struggle,  and  came  to  his  death  by  reckless 
exposure  of  himself — his  only  thought  having  been  to  accomplish 
his  end.  And  as  his  life  had  been  one  of  earnest  devotion  to  the 
cause  in  which  he  believed,  so  his  last  hours  were  tranquil,  his  confi 
dence  in  the  mercy  of  Heaven  unfailing.  When  he  was  asked  how 
he  felt,  he  said,  "Easy,  but  willing  to  die,  if  God  and  my  country 
think  I  have  done  my  duty."  His  last  words  were :  "  I  am  going 
fast  now ;  I  am  resigned.  God's  will  be  done."  As  he  uttered  these 
words  he  expired. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SIIIL01L 


BY    COLOXKL    WILLS    DE    IIASS. 


-. 


THE  Ctli  of  April,  18fi2, 
a  day  fraught  with  momen 
tous  issues  for  the  future  of 
the  American  Republic.  Tlie 
evening  of  the  5th  had  wit- 
nessed  the  concentration  of  a 
great  army,  whose  leaders 
had  boastiugly  declared  in 
the  pride  of  their  strength 
should,  on  the  coining  morn, 
overwhelm  and  destroy  the 
army  of  the  Union  which  lay 
encamped  in  conscious  secu 
rity  around  the  wilderness 
church  of  Shiloh!  At  no 
period  during  our  prolonged 
and  sanguinary  civil  war  was  the  Union  more  imperiled  than  on  that 
eventful  Saturday  evening.  The  battle  of  Shiloh  was  the  first  de 
cisive  and.  pre-eminently,  the  most  important  of  the  war.  Defeat 
then  would  have  been  the  greatest  disaster  that  could  have  befallen 
the  arms  of  the  Union.  The  country  can  never  know  the  full  danger 
of  that  hour,  and  the  pen  of  the  historian  can  never  portray  the  peril 
which  hung  over  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  Congress  received 
the  announcement  of  events  then  culminating  in  "profound  silence," 
the  official  dispatch  of  victory  declared  it  was  "the  hardest  battle 
ever  fought  on  this  continent,''  the  President  proclaimed  a  day  of 
fasting  and  prayer  for  the  great  deliverance  by  this  and  other  achieve 
ments  of  our  arms ;  but  the  peril  of  the  army,  the  severity  of  the 
battle,  and  the  magnitude  of  the  victory  will,  perhaps,  never  be  fully 
known  or  appreciated.  General  Grant  says,  in  his  report :  ''There 
was  the  most  continuous  firing  of  artillery  and  musketry  ever  heard 
on  this  continent  kept  up  until  nightfall ;  "  and  the  Southern  accounts 
describe  it  as  the  ''most  sanguinary  battle  in  history,  in  proportion 
to  the  numbers  engaged."  We  propose  to  give  a  succinct  and 

(677) 


678  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

impartial  recital  of  the  principal  facts  and  incidents,  now  passed  into 
history,  of  that  great  struggle  for  the  Union.  With  a  brief  retro 
spect,  I  will  pass  to  the  consideration  of  my  subject. 

The  fall  and  winter  campaigns  of  1861-62,  had  made  manifest 
that  a  decisive  blow  must  be  struck  in  the  Southwest  or  the  cause  of 
the  Union  materially  suffer.  The  new  department  commanders — 
General  Buell  in  that  of  Ohio,  and  General  Ilalleck  in  that  of  Mis 
souri — united  their  energies,  and  the  capture  of  those  important 
strongholds,  Forts  Donelson  and  Henry,  rapidly  followed.  These 
successes  led  on  to  other  operations.  With  the  opening  spring  it 
was  resolved  to  follow  up  the  retreating  armies  of  the  Confederacy 
and  strike  an  effective  blow  in  the  neighborhood  of  Corinth,  Mis 
sissippi,  where  it  was  known  that  the  most  formidable  defenses  were 
in  course  of  construction.  In  February,  a  new  district  was  formed, 
called  West  Tennessee,  and  by  order  of  General  Ilalleck,  General 
Grant  was  appointed  to  its  command,  with  headquarters  in  the  field. 
The  most  strenuous  exertions  were  made  to  organize  a  force  of  suffi 
cient  strength  to  meet  and  overcome,  in  connection  with  the  army 
of  General  Buell,  the  Confederate  forces  at  Corinth.  The  Tennessee 
expedition  was  ordered  to  rendezvous  at  Paducah,  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Tennessee  river,  and  every  available  Western  regiment  was 
hurried  forward  to  join  it.  With  how  much  haste  this  was  done,  I 
may  mention  that  my  own  regiment,  which  had  already  received 
orders  to  join  General  Rosecrans  in  Western  Virginia,  had  the  order 
countermanded  and,  without  arms,  were  hurried  forward  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Tennessee  river.  Steamers  great  and  small  were  put 
into  requisition,  and  by  the  10th  of  March,  a  fleet  of  formidable 
strength  was  ready  to  ascend  the  Tennessee.  About  this  time  arose 
a  dilemma.  General  Grant,  as  alleged,  on  account  of  some  dissatis 
faction  with  the  Donelson  affair,  was  ordered  to  remain  at  Fort 
Henry  and  to  turn  the  command  over  to  General  Charles  F.  Smith, 
an  officer  of  the  regular  army,  with  few  equals  in  or  out  of  the 
service.  It  was  this  officer  to  whom  all  agree  in  giving  the  honor 
of  saving  the  day  at  Donelson.  The  expedition  steamed  up  the 
Tennessee  and  reached  the  point  known  as  Pittsburg  Landing,  two 
hundred  and  twenty  miles  from  Paducah,  our  (Sherman's)  division 
going  into  camp  at  Shiloh  Church  on  the  18th  and  19th  of  March. 
Savannah,  ten  miles  below,  was  selected  as  the  headquarters  of  the 
commanding  general.  The  division  of  General  Lew  Wallace  was 
landed  at  Crump's,  four  miles  above  Savannah,  and  the  other  five 
divisions  of  McClernand,  Smith,  Hurlbut,  Sherman,  and  Prentiss, 
disembarked  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  which  consisted  of  a  warehouse, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH.  679 

grocery,  and  one  dwelling.  It  was  a  point  whence  roads  led  to 
Corinth,  Purely,  and  the  settlements  adjacent.  It  appeared  to  have 
been  regarded  as  of  some  importance,  in  a  military  view,  by  the  Con 
federates,  for  after  the  fall  of  Donelson  they  erected  a  battery  on  the 
high  bluff  overlooking  the  landing,  and  General  Cheatham  occupied 
Shiloh  as  a  military  camp. 

The  country  is  undulating  table-land,  the  bluffs  rising  to  the 
height  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet  above  the  alluvial.  Three 
principal  streams  and  numerous  tributaries  cut  the  ground  occupied 
by  the  army,  while  many  deep  ravines  intersect,  rendering  it  the 
worst  possible  battle-ground.  The  principal  streams  are  Lick  creek, 
which  empties  into  the  Tennessee  above  the  landing;  Owl  creek, 
which  rises  near  the  source  of  Lick  creek,  flows  southeast,  encircling 
the  battle-field,  and  falls  into  Snake  creek,  which  empties  into  the 
Tennessee  below  the  landing,  or  about  three  miles  below  Lick  creek. 
The  country  at  the  period  referred  to  was  a  primeval  forest,  except 
where  occasional  settlers  had  opened  out  into  small  farms.  The 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  lay  within  the  area  indicated,  extending 
three  and  a  half  miles  from  the  river  and  nearly  the  same  distance 
north  and  south.  Much  discussion  has  arisen  as  to  whom  belongs 
the  credit  of  the  great  central  movement,  of  which  the  Tennessee 
expedition  was  the  initiation  and  Sherman's  march  the  culmination  ; 
and  in  connection  with  this  no  little  crimination  and  recrimination 
has  been  indulged  by  particular  officers  as  to  the  military  judgment 
displayed  in  landing  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  on  the  west  side  of 
that  river.  The  disposition  of  the  army,  neglect  of  proper  fortifica 
tions  and  general  want  of  precautionary  measures,  have  been  subjects 
of  free  discussion  and  condemnation.  Whether  just  or  not,  can  here 
after,  perhaps,  be  better  determined.  General  Sherman  says  the 
camp  was  chosen  by  General  Smith,  and  by  his  orders  he  (Sherman 
and  Hurlbut)  took  position.  lie  further  says  :  "  I  mention  for  future 
history  that  our  right  flank  was  well  guarded  by  Owl  and  Snake 
creeks,  our  left  by  Lick  creek,  leaving  us  simply  to  guard  our  front. 
Xo  stronger  position  was  ever  held  by  any  army.''' — (Record  of  court- 
martial^  Memphis,  Tenneswe,  Auf/nst,  1802.) 

When  the  writer  reached  Shiloh  (April  2d)  he  found  the  impres 
sion  general  that  a  great  battle  was  imminent.  Experienced  officers 
believed  that  Beauregard  and  Johnston  would  strike  Grant  or  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  before  Buell  could  unite  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio.  We  found  the  army  at  Shiloh  listless  of  danger,  and  in  the 
worst  possible  condition  of  defense.  The  divisions  were  scattered 
over  an  extended  space,  with  great  intervals,  and  at  one  point  a  most 


680  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

dangerous  gap.  Not  the  semblance  of  a  fortification  could  be  seen. 
The  entire  front  was  in  the  most  exposed  condition.  One  or  two 
sections  of  batteries  at  remote  points,  no  scouts,  no  cavalry  pickets, 
a  very  light  infantry  picket  within  one  mile  of  camp,  were  all  that 
stood  between  us  and  the  dark  forest  then  filling  with  the  very  flower 
of  the  Southern  army.  To  my  inexperienced  judgment,  all  this  ap 
peared  very  strange,  and  I  communicated  these  views  to  our  brigade 
commander,  who  expressed  himself  in  the  same  spirit,  but  remarked 
that  he  was  powerless.  One  day's  work  in  felling  trees  would  have 
placed  the  camp  in  a  tolerable  state  of  defense.  The  men  were 
actually  sick  from  inaction  and  over-eating.  A  few  hours'  active 
exercise  with  the  axe  and  shovel  would  have  benefited  their  health, 
and  might  have  saved  their  camp  from  destruction,  with  thousands 
of  valuable  lives.  This  would  have  produced  a  much  better  morale 
effect  than  the  neglect  which  had  been  urged  as  the  reason  why  the 
camp  was  not  protected !  It  wras  surprising  to  see  how  speedily  the 
same  men  cut  down  trees  and  erected  works  of  defense  on  the 
approach  to  Corinth.  A  little  of  the  vigilance  then  used  would 
have  saved  life,  property  and  reputation  at  Shiloh.  That  a  grave 
military  error  was  committed  in  disposing  the  army  and  neglecting 
the  proper  defenses  at  Shiloh,  there  can  be  no  question.  If  General 
Smith  erred  in  selecting  the  ground  or  disposing  the  troops,  who  was 
responsible  when  that  officer  lay  prostrate  on  his  death-bed  ? 

General  llalleck  had,  in  general  orders,  directed  the  camp  to  be 
fortified,  and  supposed  this  had  been  done,  for,  in  his  first  dispatch 
from  St.  Louis,  announcing  the  battle,  he  says :  "  The  enemy  attacked 
our  works  at  Pittsburg,  Tennessee,  yesterday,  and  were  repulsed  with 
heavy  loss."  We  do  not  appear,  however,  as  the  censor,  simply  the 
historian,  whose  province,  although  not  always  pleasant,  should  be 
guided  by  the  line  of  duty,  truth,  and  justice.  It  shall  be  our  endea 
vor  to  avoid  partisan  issues  and  confine  this  statement  to  plain,  his 
torical  facts.  Thursday,  the  3d,  being  quite  unwell,  remained  in  my 
tent.  On  Friday,  made  and  received  few  visits,  and  in  afternoon 
witnessed  the  first  "speck  of  war."  A  small  detachment  of  the 
Fifth  Ohio  Cavalry,  with  a  portion  of  the  Seventieth  Ohio  Infantry, 
made  a  short  reconnoissance  and  fell  in  with  the  advance  of  the 
Confederate  army.  "We  lost  a  few  men  ;  killed  and  captured  half  a 
dozen  of  the  enemy.  Of  the  wounded  was  an  intelligent  non-com 
missioned  officer,  who  died  during  the  night.  This  officer  communi 
cated  information  that  the  entire  Confederate  army  had  advanced 
from  Corinth,  and  were  to  attack  us  on  the  following  (Saturday) 
morning.  This  information,  of  such  vital  importance  to  our  army, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SIIILOH.  681 

was  disregarded,  and  we  slumbered  on  the  very  verge  of  a  volcano. 
"It  was  expected,"  says  General  Beauregard,  "we  should  be  able  to 
reach  the  enemy's  lines  in  time  to  attack  them  early  on  tin1-  ffth 
instant.  In  consequence,  however,  of  the  bad  condition  of  the 
roads  from  late  heavy  rains,  the  army  did  not  reach  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  enemy  until  late  on  Saturday  afternoon.  It  was  then 
decided  the  attack  should  be  made  on  the  next  morning  at  the  earliest 
hour  practicable."  On  Saturday  morning  an  order  was  issued  by 
General  Sherman  to  cut  a  road  from  Owl  creek,  in  front  of  the 
church,  to  an  old  cotton-field,  three-fourths  of  a  mile  east  of  our  camp. 
The  creek  was  securely  bridged,  and  the  road  cut  of  sufficient  width 
to  admit  the  passage  of  our  army  on  its  anticipated  march  to  Corinth  ! 
About  two  o'clock  "P.M..  Colonel  Jesse  Ilildebrand,  commanding 

O 

Third  Brigade,  Sherman's  Division,  to  which  my  regiment  was 
attached,  invited  me  to  accompany  Colonel  I  Auckland,  commanding 
Fourth  Brigade,  same  division,  Colonel  Cockerel,  Seventieth  Ohio 
Volunteers,  and  one  or  two  other  officers,  on  a  short  recoimoissance. 
We  had  not  advanced  half  a  mile  from  cam])  when  we  were  met  by 
squads  of  the  fatigue  party  sent  out  to  cut  the  road,  with  the  startling 
intelligence  that  the  rebel  cavalry  were  in  considerable  force  in  the 
wood  immediately  across  the  old  cotton-field.  Our  pickets  extended 
to  the  line  of  the  field.  "We  rode  to  a  position  commanding  the 
wood  referred  to,  and  with  a  glass  saw  the  enemy  in  considerable 
force.  AVe  afterward  learned  they  were  Forrest's  cavalry,  and  their 
commander,  riding  a  white  horse,  Avas  plainly  visible. 

It  was  manifest  their  object  was  not  to  attack,  but  watch  our 
movements,  and  prevent  the  advance  of  the  reconnoitering  parties. 
The  officers  (Ilildebrand  and  Buckland)  remained  some  time,  then 
returned  to  camp  to  report  the  situation  to  General  Sherman,  and 
get  their  respective  commands  in  readiness,  as  both  anticipated  an 
attack.  Remaining  under  orders  to  watch  the  movements  of  the 
enemy,  the  afternoon  wore  away.  Before  leaving  it  was  deemed 
expedient  to  strengthen  the  picket  line  with  three  additional  com 
panies,  charging  them  not  to  advance,  not  to  bring  on  an  engagement, 
but  watch  closely  all  movements  of  the  enemy  during  the  night,  and 
report  promptly  the  approach  of  attack.  That  evening  a  free  inter 
change  of  opinion  took  place  at  our  tent,  where  General  Sherman 
called  while  we  were  at  tea.  The  full  particulars,  which  have  been 
hurriedly  recited,  were  detailed.  lie  was  incredulous  that  an  attack 
was  meditated — believed  they  were  only  present  to  watch  our  move 
ments  ;  said  news  had  been  received  that  evening  that  Buell  would 
join  us  in  forty-eight  hours,  and  then  we  would  advance  on  Corinth. 


032  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

General  Sherman's  positive  manner  of  littering  liis  opinions  had  the 
effect  to  quiet  the  apprehensions  of  some  of  the  officers  present,  bin 
others  were  not  satisfied.  The  principal  officers  of  the  Third  and 
Fourth  Brigades,  and  Fifth  Ohio  Cavalry,  commanded  by  a  son-in-law 
of  the  late  President  Harrison,  were  convinced  that  attack  was  at  hand. 
Letters  written  that  night  by  officers  could  be  produced  to  show  the 
feeling  pervading  the  camp  of  the  Seventy-seventh  Ohio.  Thus 
stood  matters  on  that  eventful  Saturday  night.  Colonel  Ilildebrand 
and  myself  occupied  the  same  tent ;  it  stood  adjacent  the  primitive 
little  church  which  was  destined  to  fill  so  important  a  page  in  our 
country's  annals.  Colonel  Ilildebrand,  not  feeling  well,  retired 
early,  but  I  remained  up  late  writing  letters,  and  preparing  for  the 
morrow.  The  men  were  ordered  to  stack  arms  in  front  of  their 
tents,  prepared  to  advance  or  repel  attack,  and  that  if  firing  were 
heard  during  the  night  to  remain  quiet — await  the  long-roll  or  bugle- 
call.  Every  soldier  in  the  regiment  felt  that  a  battle  was  imminent ; 
in  an  hour  the  whole  camp  was  asleep.  How  unconscious  of  danger 
lay  the  army  of  the  Union  that  night !  Outside  of  the  immediate 
brigades  named,  few  dreamed  of  danger ;  but  their  visions  were  of 
home  and  the  loved  ones  who  looked  so  fondly  for  their  return ;  but, 
alas!  how  hopeless  to  thousands,  who,  that  night,  slept  their  last 
sleep  on  earth. 

On  our  front — in  the  depth  of  the  dark  forest — how  different 
the  scene !  At  midnight,  stepping  from  my  tent,  beneath  the 
shadow  of  that  quiet  church,  I  listened  for  a  premonition  of  the 
coining  storm.  But  all  was  still  save  the  measured  tread  of  the 
sentinel,  and  the  gentle  whispers  of  the  genial  night  breeze,  Xo 
sound  came  from  the  distant  wood ;  no  camp-fires  shed  their  lurid 
light  against  the  walls  of  living  green ;  no  drum-beats  or  bugle-blasts 
were  heard,  for  quietness  reigned  by  imperious  command  throughout 
the  rebel  camps.  Those  who  slept  dreamed  of  booty  and  glory,  for 
Beauregard  had  assured  them  that  they  should  sleep  in  the  enemy's 
camp  to-morrow  night,  eat  well-baked  bread  and  meat,  and  drink 
real  coffee.  It  is  also  alleged,  of  the  same  commander,  that  he 
declared  he  would  water  his  horse  on  Sunday  evening  in  the  Ten 
nessee,  or  another  place  where  water  is  supposed  not  to  be  very 
abundant.  He  did  not  redeem  either  of  the  latter  promises,  but  he 
did  the  first.  Long  before  early  dawn  on  that  calm,  Sabbath  morn, 
the  rebel  army  had  breakfasted,  and  stripped  for  the  bloody  work 
before  them.  Their  blankets,  knapsacks,  etc.,  were  laid  aside,  their 
only  incumbrance  being  their  arms,  haversacks,  and  canteens.  The 
latter,  it  has  been  asserted,  were  filled  with  "  powder  and  whisky," 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH.  683 

which,  of  course,  is  a  popular  delusion.  Certain  it  is,  however,  they 
fought  with,  the  desperation  of  men  inflamed  with  something  more 
stirring  than  Yankee  hatred  and  Southern  patriotism.  Bv  three 
o'clock  they  were  on  the  move.  At  daybreak  General  A.  (Sidney 
Johnston  said  to  General  Beanregard:  "Can  it  be  possible  they  are 
not  aware  of  our  presence?"  "It  can  scarcely  be  possible,"  replied 
the  latter;  "they  must  be  laying  some  plan  to  entrap  us."  General 
Johnston  commanded,  with  Beauregard  second  in  command.  With 
us  the  latter  was  regarded  as  chief  commander,  as  it  was  his  army 
that  lay  at  Corinth,  and  he  it  was  whom  we  supposed  we  would  have 
to  fight. 

General  Johnston,  after  evacuating  Xashville,  moved  his  army 
with  all  possible  dispatch  to  Corinth,  declaring,  as  a  recent  biographer 
of  this  great  military  genius  asserts,  with  almost  the  spirit  of  prophesy, 
that  the  decisive  battle  in  the  Southwest  would  be  fought  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Shiloli  church.  This,  the  biographer  asserts,  was 
not  sheer  guessing,  but  the  result  of  clear  and  close  calculation. 
[General  Ilurlbut  recently  informed  me  that  it  has  only  been  a  few 
months  since  he  learned,  from  a  son  of  General  Johnston,  the  real 
plan  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  as  arranged  by  his  father.]  The  united 
armies  of  Johnston  and  Beauregard  numbered  about  fiftv  thousand 
men,  and  constituted  the  fighting  material  of  the  Confederate  army, 
commanded  by  the  most  experienced  officers — Johnston,  Beauregard, 
Bragg,  Ilardee,  Polk,  Cheatham,  Bivckenridge — and  a  long  list  of 
subordinate  commanders,  presenting  an  array  of  names  that  ought  to 
infuse  confidence  in  any  army.  With  their  united  forces  it  was 
"determined,"  says  General  Beauregard  in  his  report,  "to  assume 
the  offensive,  and  strike  a  sudden  blow  at  the  enemy  in  position 
under  General  Grant,  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  at  Pitts- 
burg,  and  in  the  direction  of  Savannah,  before  lie  was  reinforced  by 
t/te  enemy  under  General  HueU,  then  known  to  be  advancing  via 
Columbia.  By  a  rapid  and  vigorous  attack  on  General  Grant,  it  was 
expected  he  would  be  beaten  back  into  his  transports  on  the  river  or 
captured,"  etc.  The  disposition  of  the  forces  of  General  Grant,  who, 
on  account  of  the  continued  illness  of  General  Smith,  and  an  expla 
nation  with  General  Ilalleck,  was  ordered,  March  14th,  to  assume 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  were  as  follows:  General 
Sherman  occupied  the  extreme  front  at  Shiloh  church;  Generals 
Prentiss  and  Ilurlbut  lay  on  the  left ;  Generals  McClernand  and  W. 
II.  L.  Wallace  on  the  right  and  rear.  The  form  of  the  encampment 
was  a  semi-circle  with  its  greater  arc  on  the  left.  Two  roads  led 
from  the  landing  to  Corinth,  distant  twenty  miles — one  by  the  way 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  the  cliurcli,  and  the  other  through  General  Prentiss'  camp,  inter 
secting  the  road  from  Hamburg,  seven  miles  further  up  the  river. 
These  troops,  particularly  the  advance  division  under  Sherman,  were 
mostly  fresh  from  the  recruiting  camps,  and  wholly  unpracticed,  even 
in  the  simplest  company  maneuvres.  Many  of  the  regiments  were 
not  supplied  with  arms  until  their  departure  up  the  Tennessee. 
This  was  the  case  with  my  own  regiment.  With  such  disadvantages 
we  went  into  the  great  battle  of  Sunday. 

At  gray  dawn,  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  Lieutenant  Burriss, 
of  Captain  Sisson's  company,  Seventy-seventh  Ohio  Volunteers — a 
regiment  recruited  from  the  border  counties  of  Western  Virginia 
and  Ohio — came  to  brigade  headquarters  and  communicated  the 
intelligence  that  the  enemy  were  gathering  in  great  force.  He  was 
sent  back  with  orders  to  Captain  Sisson  to  maintain  the  picket  line, 
but  if  attacked  to  retire  in  order,  holding  the  enemy  in  check.  We 
heard  dropping  shots  over  the  whole  of  our  immediate  front  and 
tolerably  brisk  firing  on  the  left,  in  the  direction  of  General  Prentiss. 
As  Colonel  Hildebrand  was  not  well,  he  was  advised  to  remain  quiet, 
and  I  would  report  the  facts  to  General  Sherman,  whose  headquar 
ters  were  about  four  hundred  yards  to  our  rear.  In  a  few  minutes 
Captain  Sisson  reached  camp,  confirming  all  his  lieutenant  had  com 
municated,  and  adding  that  the  enemy  swarmed  in  the  old  cotton- 
field  already  referred  to ;  that  he  had  watched  them  from  the  moment 
he  discerned  a  man,  and  felt  confident  they  were  gathering  for  an 
attack.  They  had  already  commenced  firing  on  our  pickets,  and 
believed,  from  the  rapid  firing  on  Prentiss'  line,  that  he  had  been 
attacked  in  force.  Captain  Sisson  returned  to  his  command,  and 
the  writer  went  at  once  to  General  Sherman's  headquarters.  lie 
was  met  at  his  tent.  The  facts  related  were  communicated,  and  for 
some  minutes  we  listened  to  the  firing.  The  General  appeared  to 
be  in  doubt  as  to  attack,  but  ordered  the  brigade  into  readiness  for 
action. 

Returning  to  regimental  headquarters,  the  men  were  found 
promptly  responding  to  the  long-roll  and  preparing  for  action.  Par 
taking  of  a  hasty  breakfast,  they  fell  into  line.  The  morning  was 
bright,  warm,  and  genial.  Although  early  spring  in  that  luxuriant 
Southern  clime,  nature  had  robed  herself  in  a  rich  mantle  of  green ; 
the  woods  were  vocal  with  feathered  songsters,  and  the  air  redolent 
of  perfume  from  bud  and  wild  flower.  The  swamp  lily,  with  its 
brilliant  petals,  contrasted  beautifully  with  the  deep  green  foliage 
and  spotless  blossom  of  the  American  cornus.  The  scene  was  alto 
gether  lovely,  save  where  man,  by  his  unlicensed  passions,  was 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOIL  685 

spreading  death  and  desolation.  It  was  now  about  half-past  six 
o'clock.  The  fire  on  onr  front  grew  hotter  and  nearer.  The  regi 
ment  was  in  line.  Colonel  llildebrand  was  pressed  to  join  in  a  cup 
of  coffee,  remarking  that  it  would  better  lit  him  for  duty,  when,  in 
the  very  act  of  taking  the  coli'ee,  a  shot  from  the  enemy's  gun,  un- 
ltiiJx:t'c'l  tn  tltd  road  u'C-  cut  tlic  day  l><'f<n*e,  in  full  view  of  our 
camp,  told  us,  as  it  crashed  through  the  trees  over  our  tent,  that  the 
battle  had  opened!  Colonel  llildebrand  said:  u  Colonel,  aid  me 
with  the  brigade  ;  send  the  major  with  the  regiment ;  ride  at  once 
to  the  Fifty-third  and  form  them  into  line.''  The  Fifty-third  Ohio 
was  alluded  to,  which  constituted  part  of  our  brigade.  Their  camp 
was  across  a  ravine  to  the  left  of  the  Fifty-seventh  Ohio,  and  some 
distance  from  brigade  headquarters.  It  was  here  where  General 
Sherman  rode  early  in  the  opening  of  the  battle  and  lost  his  orderly 
• — shot  by  Lis  side — in  the  ravine  near  the  camp  of  the  Fifty-third. 
It  may  be  here  stated  that  ISliiloh  church  stood  on  the  brow  of 
a  sloping  hill,  at  the  base  flowing  Owl  creek.  To  the  left  of  the 
chapel  were  the  camps  of  the  Seventy-seventh  and  Fifty-seventh 
Ohio.  The  brigade  headquarters  were  immediately  to  the  right  of 
the  church.  The  wood  had  been  cut  for  camp  use  from  a  consider 
able  portion  of  the  hillside  fronting  the  church.  Down  this  hill 
front,  in  the  direction  of  Owl  creek,  the  Fifty-seventh  and  Seventy- 
seventh  ( )hio  were  thrown,  and  also  a  portion  of  the  Fourth  Brigade. 
Taylor's  battery  had  a  good  position  to  the  right  of  the  church,  and 
was  ordered  to  unlimber  for  action.  The  Fifty-third  formed  in 
their  own  camp,  which  was  an  old  peach  orchard.  They  were  sup 
ported  by  AVaterhouse's  battery. 

The  hour  was  now  about  seven  o'clock,  and  the  battle  opened 
with  great  fury.  The  enemy  advanced  to  the  attack  of  our  forces 
by  three  distinct  lines  of  battle.  The  first,  according  to  General 
Beauregard's  report,  "extended  from  Owl  creek  on  the  left  to  Lick 
creek  on  the  right,  a  distance  of  about  three  miles,  supported  by  the 
third  and  the  reserve."  The  lirst  line  was  commanded  by  General 
J I ardee,  supported  by  General  Bragg;  the  second  line  by  Generals 
Bragg  and  Polk,  and  the  third  by  General  Breckenridge.  These 
lines  were  separated  from  five  to  eight  hundred  yards.  General 
Bcauregard  was  on  the  left,  General  Johnston  on  the  right.  Standing 
in  front  of  Sliiloh  chapel,  looking  down  into  the  dark  wood  from 
which  issued  the  deep  roar  of  heavy  cannon  and  the  sharp  rattle  of 
musketry,  scarcely  a  man  was  visible;  but  as  the  unclouded  sun  fell 
on  their  burnished  arms  the  whole  scene  became  lighted  up,  pre 
senting  a  panorama  most  effective,  and  one  which  can  never  be 


(5S6  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

forgotten  by  those  who  witnessed  it.  The  lines  closed  steadily  on 
us,  the  enemy  moving  forward  at  all  points.  Squadrons  of  cavalry 
had  been  thrown  out  on  both  wings  to  drive  in  the  Union  pickets. 
Ilardee  had  deployed  his  forces  in  lines  of  brigades,  with  their  bat 
teries  in  the  rear.  Against  these  well-disciplined  troops  did  our  raw 
regiments  contend.  Onward  came  the  surging  masses,  backward  fell 
our  lines;  then  rallying  would,  by  a  terrific  fire,  check  the  shouting 
legions  in  gray !  Checked  again  and  again,  they  still  pressed  forward. 
'  The  keen  eye  of  Ilardee  soon  detected  the  wide  gap  between  Sherman 
and  Prentiss.  This  gap — more  than  a  mile  in  width — General 
Sherman  says  was  left  to  be  occupied  by  part  of  BuelFs  troops.  It 
almost  proved  to  be  an  open  highway  to  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the 
Union  lines.  General  Ilurlbut  has  recently  informed  the  writer  that 
he  was  opposed  to  flanking  movements  which  might  jeopard  his  own 
command.  Into  this  gap  he  pushed  several  brigades  commanded  by 
Gibson,  Anderson,  Pond,  and  others,  and  attempted  to  sweep  round 
on  Sherman's  left.  The  camp  of  the  Fifty-third  Ohio  having  been 
gained  and  three  of  Waterhouse's  guns  captured,  the  line  near 
Sherman's  headquarters  was  enfiladed  and  driven  back  in  confusion. 
McClernand  promptly  supported  Sherman,  but  seeing  the  fianking 
movement  of  Ilardee,  I  was  ordered  to  hurry  up  reinforcements. 
Meeting  an  advancing  column,  I  found  on  inquiry  it  was  General 
Smith's  Division,  commanded  by  General  "W.  II.  L.  Wallace,  of 
Illinois.  lie  was  advised  of  the  attempted  flank  movement,  and 
requested  to  change  his  line  of  march  in  the  direction  indicated. 
That  gallant  officer  adopted  the  suggestion,  and  ordered  a  brisk 
movement  in  the  direction  indicated.  lie  soon  fell  mortally 
wounded. 

Half  an  hour  after  we  separated  he  engaged  the  enemy,  and  the 
most  terrific  firing  heard  during  the  day  came  from  that  quarter. 
The  force  encountered  was  Ruggles'  Division  of  Bragg's  Corps.  He 
requested  that  a  battery  should  be  sent  to  him.  Captain  J.  AY. 
Powell,  with  great  promptness,  took  position,  and  remained  in  com 
mand  of  his  battery  until  his  right  arm  was  shot  off.  This  gallant 
officer  is  the  distinguished  Major  Powell,  in  charge  of  the  geogra 
phical  and  geological  survey  of  the  Rocky  mountain  region.  As  a 
scientist  he  is  doing  good  service,  as  he  did  as  a  soldier  in  the  wilder 
ness  of  Tennessee.  He  was  a  meritorious  officer,  and  his  success  in 
the  field  of  science  has  been  great.  It  is  hoped  that  Congress  will 
give  him  ample  means  to  carry  out  his  enlarged  views  in  the  depart 
ment  to  which  he  has  been  assigned.  General  Grant,  it  may  be 
stated  in  explanation,  his  headquarters  being  at  Savannah,  did  not 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH.  6S7 

reach  the  battle-ground  "before  ten  o'clock.  He  doubted  for  a  time 
that  it  was  an  attack,  but  the  continuous  and  heavy  firing  convinced 
him  otherwise,  and  steam  was  ordered  on  his  flag-vessel,  the  Tigress. 
Up  to  the  hour  named  we  were  without  a  general  commander.  The 
fighting  was  irregular  and  miscellaneous.  Each  division  commander 
had  quite  as  much  as  he  could  do  to  attend  to  his  own  defenses  or 
aid  those  in  advance.  The  subordinate  commanders  felt  that  much 
depended  on  themselves,  and  the  men  realized  the  vital  importance 
of  doing  their  whole  duty.  As 'a  distinguished  clergyman  said  in 
his  sermon  on  the  Sabbath  following  the  battle,  the  u  lighting  was 
done  by  march,  not  brain!"  The  army  really  did  not  know  when 
it  was  whipped.  A  prominent  Confederate  officer  afterward  said  : 
"You  were  thoroughly  beaten  on  Sunday,  but  did  not  know  it." 
This  was  literally  true. 

The  battle  went  on  hour  by  hour.  The  Union  army  was  steadily 
beaten  back  at  all  points.  The  great  leader  of  the  Confederates  had 
fallen,  for  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  as  great  a  military  genius  as 
the  country  has  produced.  His  deatli  was  caused  by  a  Minnie  ball 
severing  the  femoral  artery  at  about  half-past  two  o'clock.  This  was 
a  most  critical  point.  Breekenridge's  reserves  had  been  ordered  up. 
Johnston  said :  u  I  will  lead  these  Kentuckians  and  Tennesseeans 
into  the  light,"  and,  waving  his  sword,  pressed  forward  to  take  a 
certain  position,  which  they  did  gain — but  their  brave  leader  was 
gone !  The  death  of  Johnston  caused  a  brief  pause.  Thirty  minutes 
were  probably  consumed  in  Beauregard  taking  command,  and  these 
were  precious  moments  for  the  Union  army.  It  enabled  our  shat 
tered  ranks  to  close  up  and  prepare  for  the  next  assault.  It  came. 
Beauregard,  concentrating  all  his  energies  in  the  moment,  exclaimed, 
as  the  brigades  filed  by  him :  u  Forward,  boys,  and  drive  them  into 
the  Tennessee!"  His  purpose  was  to  gain  the  river,  capture  our 
transports,  and  destroy  our  army.  One  or  more  deep  ravines,  with 
marshy  approaches,  intervened.  These  must  be  crossed.  In  the 
meantime  some  heavy  siege  guns,  which  lay  on  the  hill  at  the  land 
ing,  had  been  wheeled  into  position ;  a  battery  of  Parrotts  had  also 
been  prepared  for  action.  A  few  trees  were  felled,  some  bales  of 
hay  and  a  few  barrels  filled  with  earth,  afforded  slight  protection  to 
the  gunners.  But  there  was  a  determined  feeling  in  the  army  not  to 
be  driven  into  the  river.  An  officer,  now  no  more,  who  did  valiant 
service  on  that  bloody  field,  well  expressed  this  feeling.  When  asked 
what  he  intended  doing  if  pressed  to  the  water,  replied  :  "  Give  them 
these  twelve  shots  and  take  the  consequences."  In  addition  to  the 
siege  guns  and  Parrotts,  the  two  wooden  gunboats,  "  Tyler "  and 


688  ANXALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

"  Lexington,"  lay,  one  at  the  mouth  of  the  principal  ravine  and  the 
other  a  short  distance  below. 

The  Union  army  had  been  pressed  back  within  half  a  mile  of  the 
Tennessee.  A  desperate  and  final  struggle  was  now  to  be  made. 
About  four  o'clock,  after  half  an  hour's  comparative  quiet,  the  deep- 
mouthed  guns  again  opened ;  the  roll  of  musketry  was  heard  in  con- 
tinuous  volleys,  the  wild  tumult,  the  wierd  shriek,  the  crashing 
timber,  all  bespoke  the  terrible  conflict.  The  battle-ground  has 
become  fearfully  contracted ;  the  enemy's  shell  fall  into  the  river 
and  explode  amid  the  transports!  Another  advance  is  ordered. 
The  shattered  brigades  of  Beauregard  enter  the  ravine  and  close  up 
on  the  contracted  lines,  protected  by  the  siege  guns.  "  Three  differ 
ent  times,"  reports  one  of  the  commanders,  "  did  we  go  into  that 
'valley  of  death,'  and  as  often  were  we  forced  back."  Another 
reports :  "A  murderous  fire  was  poured  into  us  from  masked  bat 
teries  of  grape  and  canister  and  also  from  rifle-pits."  General  Bragg 
ordered  General  Chalmers  to  drive  us  into  the  river  at  all  hazards. 
In  vain  did  this  brave  Carolinian,  who  sacrificed  his  own  life  and  a 
large  portion  of  his  command,  attempt  to  do  so.  The  concentrated 
fire  of  the  Union  army,  aided  by  the  formidable  natural  barriers, 
prevented  the  execution  of  Beauregard  and  Bragg' s  humane  orders ! 
Gradually  the  firing  ceased.  The  Sabbath  closed  upon  a  scene 
which  had  no  parallel  on  the  Western  Continent.  The  sun  went 
down  in  a  red  halo,  as  if  the  very  heavens  blushed  and  prepared  to 
weep  at  the  enormity  of  man's  violence.  Xight  fell  upon  and 
spread  its  funereal  pall  over  a  field  of  blood  where  death  held  unre 
strained  carnival !  Soon  after  dark  the  rain  descended  in  torrents, 
and  all  through  the  dreary  hours  of  that  dismal  night  it  rained 
unceasingly.  The  groans  of  the  dying,  and  the  solemn  thunder  of 
the  gunboats  came  swelling  at  intervals  high  above  the  peltings  of 
the  pitiless  storm. 

General  Beauregard  redeemed  his  promise,  and  slept  in  the 
camp  of  the  Union  army  that  night.  That  officer,  we  have  reason 
to  believe,  occupied  our  tent  that  Sabbath  night.  He  says :  "  I 
established  my  headquarters  at  the  church  at  Shiloh,  in  the  enemy's 
encampment"  etc.  His  dispatches  were  written  on  a  desk  in  one  of 
the  Union  tents.  Our  tent  was  the  only  one  thus  provided.  These 
facts  are  mentioned  as  not  of  much  historical  importance,  but  simply 
as  incidents  of  the  day.  It  was  known  through  all  of  Sunday  that 
General  Buell  was  hurrying  on  with  all  possible  dispatch.  That 
officer,  with  two  of  his  corps  commanders,  Kelson  and  Crittenden, 
had  reached  General  Grant's  headquarters  on  the  hill  at  the  river  by 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH.  689 

half-past  four  o'clock.  An  hour  after,  portions  of  their  commands 
had  crossed,  and  were  climbing  the  steep  river  hanks  to  take  part  in 
the  last  desperate  struggle  of  Sunday.  The  appearance  of  Buell's 
advance,  in  the  dark  hours  of  that  terrible  Sabbath  afternoon,  was 
a  spectacle  the  most  inspiriting  that  despairing  men  ever  looked 
upon.  As  they  filed  across  the  broad  bottoms  of  the  Tennessee, 
with  colors  flying,  and  filling  the  vale  with  their  shouts  of  encour 
agement,  the  most  despairing  felt  that  the  day  was  not  entirely  lost. 
Language  is  inadequate  to  express  the  sublime  emotions  which  spring 
from  the  presence  of  a  succoring  army.  What  the  "  eagles  of  Des- 
saix  were  to  Consular  France,  the  banners  of  Buell  were  to  the  arms 
of  the  Union,"  as  his  gallant  army  surged  onward  to  the  red  field  of 
Shiloh  !  General  Sherman,  at  a  recent  interview,  informed  me  that 
when  Buell  inquired  the  force  and  condition  of  the  Army  of  Ten 
nessee,  and  was  answered — showing  fifteen  thousand  men,  with  the 
division  of  Lew  Wallace,  not  engaged  on  Sunday — and  Buell  assured 
him  that  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  would  be  ready  to  co-operate  in  an 
offensive  movement  on  Monday,  it  was  then  and  there  determined 
to  make  a  determined  advance  early  on  the  morrow. 

Monday  morning,  at  six  o'clock,  the  combined  forces  of  Grant 
and  Buell  moved  against  the  enemy.  General  BuelFs  fresh  troops, 
with  the  division  of  Lew  Wallace,  not  engaged  on  Sunday  (i0/cy, 
may,  perhaps,  never  be  known),  pressed  the  enemy  at  all  points. 
Steadily  the  army  of  the  Union  regained  our  camps,  and  by  noon  a 
signal  victory  had  been  achieved.  Beauregard  withdrew  his  forces 
in  good  order,  and  pursuit  was  not  continued  beyond  Shiloh  church. 
Tuesday,  the  8th,  General  Sherman  determined  to  pursue.  With 
two  brigades  from  his  own  division,  two  from  Buell' s  army  (Generals 
Garfield  and  Wood),  and  two  regiments  of  cavalry,  he  proceeded  from 
Shiloh  in  the  direction  of  Corinth.  At  the  distance  of  a  little  over 
a  mile,  we  came  upon  the  advance  camp  of  the  enemy,  on  Saturday 
night.  Everywhere  along  our  line  of  march  remains  of  the  retreating 
army  were  noticed.  Fresh  graves  were  all  around  ;  the  dead,  dying, 
and  wounded  lay  in  tents,  old  houses,  and  upon  the  ground.  We 
were  marched  to  a  point  about  four  and  a  half  miles  from  the  church, 
when  our  videttes  informed  us  the  rebel  cavalry  were  directly  ahead, 
concealed  in  ravines,  and  behind  a  long  row  of  tents.  General  Sher 
man  ordered  skirmishers  thrown  out,  deploying  companies  A  and  B 
of  my  own  regiment,  when  orders  were  given  to  the  Seventy-seventh 
to  support  skirmishers.  The  regiment  was  led  within  fifty  yards  of 
the  line  of  tents.  The  ground  was  an  old  cotton-field,  partly  covered 
by  fallen  trees ;  hence  the  name  of  the  engagement,  "  Fallen  Tim- 
44 


690  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ber."  The  field  was  skirted  by  heavy  wood.  Almost  immediately 
the  enemy's  skirmishers  opened  fire,  and  the  writer  realized  that  he 
was  an  object  of  particular  mark.  A  fierce  yell  filled  the  air,  and 
the  rebel  cavalry  came  up  from  ravine  and  behind  tents  as  thick  as 
they  could  ride.  I  ordered  the  men  to  up  and  fire,  which  order  had 
scarcely  been  executed  when  the  entire  line  was  ridden  down,  the 
men  sabred  and  shot  by  a  force  ten  times  superior  to  our  own.  The 
dash  was  one  of  the  boldest  of  the  war,  and  the  loss  sustained  over 
one-third  of  my  command.  The  promptness  of  Colonel  Hildebrand, 
in  ordering  up  the  other  regiments  of  his  brigade,  I  think  saved  the 
day,  and  the  commanding  general  and  staff  from  capture.  An  officer 
of  his  staff  (McCoy)  was  ridden  down,  and,  as  General  Sherman 
assured  me,  he  narrowly  escaped.  I  regard  this  statement  due  the 
memory  of  a  brave  and  meritorious  officer. 

The  dead  were  buried  on  the  spot ;  the  wounded  removed  to 
camp ;  the  rebel  camp  destroyed,  with  a  large  amount  of  property, 
and  this  was  the  last  of  the  fighting  at  Shiloh.  The  losses  sustained 
by  both  armies  exceeded  the  frightful  number  of  twenty-five  thou 
sand  men.  Four  years  after  the  battle,  a  writer,  visiting  Shiloh  and 
Corinth,  gave  a  hideous  picture  of  the  condition  of  things.  He 
stated  that  twelve  thousand  Confederate  soldiers  lay  unburied  on 
the  two  fields !  After  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  General  Grant  ordered 
the  dead  of  both  armies  to  be  buried.  The  inhumation,  however, 
consisted  of  little  more  than  a  thin  covering  of  earth,  which  the 
heavy  rains  have  long  since  washed  off,  and  the  remains  of  brave 
men,  who  periled  all  for  their  country's  sake,  lie  exposed  to  the 
elements*.  This  fact  is  disgraceful  to  the  government  and  the 
people,  and  should  be  remedied  with  the  least  possible  delay. 
Instead  of  squandering  means  over  idle  parades,  it*  should  be  our 
duty  and  pleasure  to  give  the  bleaching  bones  of  our  gallant  dead 
the  rites  of  decent  burial.  Regarding  this  as  fitting  opportunity,  it 
is  respectfully  and  earnestly  suggested  that  Congress  adopt  some 
measure  for  the  preservation  of  the  remains  at  Shiloh — that  a 
cemetery  be  established,  and  graves  properly  marked ;  also,  that  the 
church  at  Shiloh  be  rebuilt  as  a  national  memorial ! 

As  the  church  that  was  at  Shiloh  has  passed  into  history,  a  brief 
description  may  not  be  uninteresting.  It  was  a  small,  unpretending 
edifice,  of  hewn  logs,  and  occupied  the  brow  of  a  hill,  with  a  com 
manding  prospect.  It  was  built  in  1849-50  by  Rev.  Jacob  J.  Wolff, 
a  local  minister  of  the  Methodist  Church.  It  was  not  a  costly  edifice ; 
uo  massive  architrave  was  there;  no  stained  windows  or  carved 
lintels;  but  these  were  not  essential  to  the  simple-minded  people 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH.  691 

who  worshiped  in  it,  and  who  worshiped  before  they  had  a  church 
in  the  grand  old  woods,  which  we  know  u  were  God's  iirst  temples." 
The  cl lurch  at  Shiloli  had  two  doors  and  one  window,  which  was 
without  glass.  Of  pulpit  and  seats  none  were  visible,  as  the  Confed 
erate  General  Cheatham  had  removed  them  for  camp  use  previous  to 
our  occupancy.  Before  the  battle  the  flooring  boards  were  being 
rapidly  converted  into  coffins  for  Union  soldiers.  After  the  battle 
it  was  used  as  a  hospital  up  to  the  time  the  army  advanced  on 
Corinth.  A  guard  was  placed  over  it  so  long  as  any  portion  of  our 
camp  was  maintained ;  but  no  sooner  had  the  guard  been  removed 
than  the  vandalism  of  curiosity-hunters  utterly  demolished  the  struc 
ture,  and  carried  off  the  last  remnant  of  a  log. 

Before  closing  I  may  be  expected  to  answer  one  question :  Was 
the  a/')nij  at  8/t'tloh  surprised  ?  It  has  already  been  shown  what 
was  the  condition  of  things  on  the  5th,  and  surely  no  one  will  say 
that  the  Third  Brigade  of  Sherman's  Division  was  surprised.  The 
same  may  be  said  of  the  Fourth  Brigade,  and  the  principal  officers 
of  the  Fifth  Ohio  Cavalry;  but  here  exceptions  cease.  The  whole 
of  that  army,  with  individual  exceptions,  in  addition  to  those  named, 
were  surprised.  There  was  a  general  feeling  that  an  attack  was 
imminent,  but  that  it  would  come  on  Sunday  morning,  April  (>th, 
few  believed.  As  to  where  the  responsibility  and  censure  belong,  is 
one  of  those  open  questions  which  may  be  difficult  to  settle.  General 
Grant's  biographer,  Professor  Coppc,  discussing  this  point,  says :  k'At 
the  outset  our  troops  were  shamefully  surprised."  For  want  of  these 
precautions  (proper  fortifications,  etc.),  continues  the  same  biographer, 
"  we  were  surprised,  driven  back  from  every  point  in  three  great 
movements  of  the  enemy,"  etc.  This  is  saying  too  much,  and  can 
not  be  justified.  Another  point  demands  brief  remark.  How  much 
had  Buell  to  do  with  saving  the  honor  of  the  nation  at  Shiloli? 
Certain  facetious  writers  have  asserted  that  "Providence,  the  gun 
boats,  and  Buell  saved  the  day."  In  reply,  we  have  to  say  that  the 
first  of  these  had  much  to  do  with  the  national  honor,  the  second 
very  little,  and  the  third  very  considerable.  But  whether  the  day 
would  have  been  lost  without  his  timely  co-operation;  whether  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  would  have  been  able,  as  asserted  by  Sher 
man,  to  take  the  offensive  on  the  morrow;  whether  the  presence  of 
Buell's  fresh  troops  inspirited  the  shattered  brigades  of  Grant,  and 
dispirited  those  of  Beauregard,  are  points  to  be  well  considered. 

It  is  certainly  in  bad  taste  to  charge  the  first  day's  operations  at 
Shiloh  a  '"Second  Bull  Run  disaster,"  and  that  the  commanding 
officers  ought  to  have  been  "  shot ; "  and  it  is  alike  to  be  condemned 


(592  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

to  deny  credit  to  En  ell's  army  for  the  gallant  and  timely  aid  afforded 
on  Monday.  Let  justice  be  rendered  where  it  belongs.  Impartial 
history  will  accord  to  both  armies  their  full  credit.  In  my  dispas 
sionate  judgment,  no  men  could  have  done  better  than  Grant's  army 
did  on  Sunday.  Veterans  could  not  have  withstood  the  solid  lines 
and  unbroken  fire  which  girdled  them  throughout  that  long  and 
terrible  day.  It  is  true  there  was  disorder,  and  many  brigades  on  the 
front,  after  hours  of  incessant  lighting,  did  give  way ;  but  the  men 
were  not  whipped — only  disheartened.  Some  obloquy  has  been 
thrown  on  certain  Ohio  troops.  This  was  both  unjust  and  cruel. 
No  men  could  have  stood  better  against  a  wall  of  fire  than  those 
Western  troops,  fresh  from  the  plough  and  the  shop.  The  Confed 
erate  dead  wrho  lay  over  that  field  on  Sunday  night  told  how  severe 
had  been  the  fire,  and  dreadful  the  carnage,  inflicted  by  the  sturdy 
men  of  the  West. 

The  charge  that  the  officers  were  derelict  is  also  unjust.  That 
grave  military  errors  were  committed  in  the  disposition  of  the  camp, 
and  the  exercise  of  proper  precaution,  has  been  shown ;  but  that 
they  were  remiss  on  the  field  is  not  true.  General  Grant,  after 
reaching  the  field,  was  active,  and  his  presence  gave  confidence.  The 
division  commanders  were  untiring  in  their  efforts ;  General  Sherman 
particularly  distinguished  himself,  and  by  his  presence  and  bravery 
greatly  inspirited  the  men.  McClernand,  Hurlbut,  and  others  did 
effective  service.  General  Prentiss,  wTho  was  captured  with  part  of 
his  division,  contended  bravely  with  an  overpowering  force  before 
he  succumbed.  The  brigade  commanders  displayed  great  courage, 
coolness  and  skill.  The  same  may  be  said  of  regimental  command 
ers,  and  down  to  the  lowest  non-commissioned  officers. 

If  the  army  had  not  behaved  well,  where  would  it  have  been 
when  darkness  closed  the  scene?  It  has  been  assumed  by  those 
inimical  to  officers  engaged  at  Shiloh,  that  the  army  was  utterly 
demoralized  and  routed  from  any  definite  line.  This  is  untenable. 
Sherman's  line  of  battle  wras  never  wholly  destroyed.  Sixteen  years 
have  elapsed  since  that  day  of  carnage  and  disaster.  Quietness 
reigns  over  the  field  then  crimson  by  the  best  blood  of  the  nation, 
and  peace  has  been  proclaimed  throughout  the  land.  Shiloh  rests 
in  its  primitive  solitude.  May  its  maimed  and  riven  forests  never 
more  be  stirred  by  the  breath  of  war,  nor  its  peaceful  sleepers  be 
disturbed  by  the  tread  of  contending  hosts.  The  great  battle 
ground  of  the  war,  let  it  be  erected  into  a  holy,  hallowed  cemetery, 
where  the  heart  of  the  nation  can  offer  homage  to  the  memory  of 
her  brave  sons  who  gave  up  their  lives  that  the  nation  might  survive. 


THE  CAREER  OF  GENERAL  A.  P.  HILL. 


BY    IIOX.    WILLIAM    E.    CAMERON. 


_     © 


THE  numerous  biographers  of 
Lee  and  Jackson  are,  perhaps, 
responsible  for  the  remarka 
ble  fact  that  no  history  of  A. 
P.  Hill  has  yet  been  given  to 
the  public.  Any  adequate 
life  of  the  Confederate  com- 

mander>  or  of  llis  fr'-emust 
lieutenant,  so  necessarily  in 
volves  constant  presentation 
of  the  deeds  wrought  by  one 
no  less  lofty  in  character, 
steadfast  in  purpose,  and  ter 
rible  in  battle  than  either,  that 
we  may  not  be  surprised  if  the 
general  public  has  thus  far 
been  satisfied  with  the  frequent  recurrence  of  his  name  and  deeds  in 
the  pages  of  Dabney,  Cooke,  McCabe,  Randolph,  and  others.  l>ut 
it  is  not  just  to  one  who,  in  any  other  association,  would  have  been 
facile-  princeps  /  of  whom  it  may  truthfully  be  said  that  he  was 
a  determining  factor  in  every  important  battle  of  the  campaigns  in 
the  East,  that  his  achievements  should  serve  the  one  purpose  of 
magnifying  others,  or  that  he  should  be  seen  only  in  the  reflected 
light  of  stars  of  larger  magnitude. 

Measured  by  the  standards  which  men  apply  to  the  claimants  of 
mastership  in  Avar,  Hill  was  not  a  great  commander.  Such  have  not 
come  in  troops,  nor  in  triplets,  upon  any  age  or  stage  of  the  world  ; 
and  the  late  American  conflict,  while  prolific  of  good  soldiers,  and 
developing  among  a  people  inured  to  peace  a  wonderful  aptitude  for 
fighting,  formed  in  this  respect  no  exception  to  the  experience  of 
centuries.  If  that  stern  clash  of  antagonistic  prejudices  and  con 
tending  interests  produced,  on  either  side,  a  genius  family  comparable 
to  that  of  Frederick  or  of  Marlborough,  there  was  but  one — and  he 
fell  before  either  friend,  or  foe,  or  fate,  had  found  the  limit  of  his 

(693) 


(591  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

power.  What  lie  did  will  survive  as  rivaling  the  best  exploits  of  the 
most  renowned  in  arms,  and  Jackson  stands  among  captains  as 
Shelley  among  poets — enlarged  by  death  into  the  perfection  of 
promise.  But  he  stands  alone,  so  far  as  this  country  is  concerned. 

Nor  would  any  judicious  admirer  of  General  Hill  (and  this 
paper  is  written  from  a  standpoint  of  affectionate  appreciation)  insti 
tute  any  comparison  between  his  qualities  of  leadership  and  those  of 
General  Lee.  Their  respective  positions  well  suited  and  well 
describes  their  distinctive  capacities.  The  one  possessed  all  the 
characteristics  of  great  military  talent,  and  fell,  by  temperament 
alone,  just  short  of  genius  ;  the  other  had  some  of  those  characteris 
tics,  pluck,  endurance,  executive  ability,  and  magnetism  in  perfection ; 
but  some,  as  readiness  of  intuition  and  resource,  were  his  in  less 
degree ;  and  some,  as  broadness  of  strategic  vision,  he  lacked.  But 
his  tasks  were  no  mere  mechanic  registrations  of  the  will  of  another ; 
nor  was  that  sphere,  in  which,  he  was  great,  contracted ;  nor  was  his 
success  on  many  hazardous  fields  attained  otherwise  than  by  a  longer 
exercise  of  that  individual  discretion  without  which  no  man  can 
maneuvre  men.  If  he  had  no  part  in  ordering  the  movements  of 
armies,  he  was  laden  always  with  a  large  share  of  the  responsibility 
of  making  those  movements  successful ;  and  if  it  was  not  his  to 
create  the  plans  of  battle,  it  was  often  his,  after  those  plans  had  been 
disarranged  by  adverse  circumstances,  or  thwarted  by  the  short 
comings  of  others,  so  to  wield  the  forces  at  his  disposal  as  to  turn 
the  doubtful  scale  of  battle.  It  was  asked  of  Napoleon,  at  St. 
Helena,  during  a  discussion  of  the  merits  of  his  marshals,  whether 
Ney  would  have  been  equal  to  the  command  of  an  independent 
army.  " I  do  not  know,"  was  the  reply ;  "he  could  never  be  spared 
to  make  the  experiment." 

Ambrose  Powell  Hill  was  born  in  Culpepper  county,  Virginia, 
in  the  year  1825.  The  "American  Encyclopedia"  curtly  says,  in 
continuance  of  the  life  then  begun,  that  he  graduated  at  West  Point 
in  the  class  of  1847 ;  served  in  Mexico ;  resigned  in  March,  1861,  a 
commission  as  lieutenant  in  the  United  States  Topographical  Engi 
neers  ;  entered  soon  after  the  Confederate  service.  At  the  battle  of 
Manassas  he  wras  colonel  of  the  Thirteenth  Virginia  Infantry ;  was 
subsequently  promoted  to  be  a  brigade,  division,  and  corps  com 
mander,  and  was  killed  in  front  of  Petersburg,  on  April  2d,  1865. 
And  this  is  correct  so  far  as  it  goes — there  is  no  better  way  of  not 
knowing  a  man  than  to  gaze  upon  his  bare  skeleton. 

When  Hill  reported  to  Richmond,  in  the  spring  of  1861,  the 
authorities  were  in  the  full  tide  of  experiment,  both  as  to  men  and 


THE  CAREER   OF  GENERAL  A.  P.  HILL.  695 

affairs.  It  is  no  wonder  that  there,  as  in  Washington,  the  posts  of 
honor  and  responsibility  should,  at  first  (with  few  exceptions),  have 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  a  set  of  superannuated  worthies,  or  that  the 
early  employment  of  those  who  were  thereafter  to  be  the  leaders  of 
their  respective  sides  should  seem  ludicrously  small,  in  the  light  of 
subsequent  events.  Jackson  was  given,  in  the  outset,  the  humble 
position  of  major  of  engineers ;  Malione  was  ordered  to  take  charge 
of  the  quartermasters'  supplies  in  Virginia.  Hill  was  first  created  a 
lieutenant  colonel,  but,  shortly  afterward,  was  assigned,  with  full 
grade,  to  the  Thirteenth  Infantry,  and  was  ordered  to  the  Upper 
Potomac,  where,  under  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  was  forming 
the  army  that  afterward  turned  the  scale  at  Manassas.  The  cam 
paign  of  that  column  was  one  of  bloodless  maneuvres,  though 
Colonel  Hill  received  honorable  mention  for  the  conduct  of  a  small, 
but  successful,  expedition  against  the  Federal  advance  at  Romney. 
Nor  in  the  engagement  at  Manassas,  which  shortly  ensued,  was 
anything  developed  but  the  gallantry  of  the  troops,  and  of  their 
commanders.  It  was  only  when  the  Southern  army  was  confronted 
with  McClellan's  host  on  the  Peninsula  that  opportunities  for 
distinction  were  fairly  offered  to  the  capable  and  brave.  II  ill's 
bearing  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  and  the  collisions  that  pre 
cluded  settlement  in  the  lines  around  Richmond,  marked  him  for 
early  promotion.  On  the  2(>th  of  February,  isi'd,  he  was  appointed 
brigadier  general,  and  assigned  the  First,  Seventh,  Eleventh,  and 
Seventeenth  regiments  of  Virginia  infantry;  and  on  May  25th  lie 
was  commissioned  major  general,  and  placed  in  command  of  the 
brigades  of  J.  E.  Anderson,  Gregg,  Pender,  Branch,  Field,  and 
Archer.  Soon  was  his  fitness  for  this  perilous  distinction  to  be 
tested. 

It  will  not  comport  with  the  limits  of  this  sketch  to  attempt 
anything  resembling  a  report  of  the  various  engagements  from 
which  General  Hill  drew  steady  acquisitions  of  fame  as  a  brilliant 
chief  of  division.  That  will  only  be  accurately  done  when  the 
history  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  shall  come  to  be  written. 
But  a  partial  exception  must  be  made  in  regard  to  the  initial  steps 
of  his  career,  betokening,  as  they  did,  the  fiery  energy  and  uncon 
querable  endurance  that  ever  afterward  distinguished  his  course 
upon  the  field  of  battle.  He  strode  across  the  threshold  of  war  as 
though  upon  familiar  ground,  and  in  all  the  perilous  crises  of  after 
days,  though  experience  added  to  the  thoroughness  of  his  dispositions, 
and  the  celerity  of  his  attack,  his  qualities  of  vigor  and  boldness,  of 
cool  determination,  and  unflinching  obstinacy,  never  shone  brighter 
than  in  the  Seven  Days'  Fight  around  Richmond. 


696  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

General  Lee  had  just  succeeded  Johnston  in  command  of  the 
Confederate  army ;  McClellan  was  gathering  his  strength  for  the 
long-promised  spring  upon  Richmond ;  Stuart  had  swooped,  with 
his  bold  troopers,  from  the  Chickahominy  to  the  James;  Jackson 
was  sweeping  down  from  the  Valley  to  add  Blucher's  vim  to 
Wellington's  attack  upon  the  young  Napoleon  !  It  was  the  eve  of 
the  mighty  conflict  which  for  seven  days  surged  and  thundered 
around  the  Southern  capital ;  and  to  the  grand  game,  in  which  life, 
and  death,  and  national  existence  were  to  be  the  stakes,  there  came, 
on  either  side,  troops  whose  mettle  was  yet  to  be  thoroughly  tested, 
and  officers  to  whom,  with  few  exceptions,  belonged,  as  yet,  only  the 
name  of  generals.  In  the  fearful  ordeal  how  many  passed  scathless 
through  the  storm  of  shot  and  shell,  and  yet  went  down,  no  more  to 
rise?  Reading  over,  now,  the  roster  of  both  armies,  one  wonders 
what  became  of  men  who  brought  to  those  scenes  such  magnificent 
reputations,  and  who  left  them  never  more  to  protrude  their  over 
estimated  heads  above  the  surface  of  events.  Here  was  the  first 
great  winnowing  field,  and  the  guns  were  great  threshing-machines, 
before  which  the  chaff  and  the  wheat  were  separated  as  though  by 
magic.  But  from  the  pounding  process  came  also  forth  the  fair, 
round  grain,  that  was  henceforth  to  be  the  sustenance  and  reliance 
of  Union  and  Confederacy. 

Lee's  plan  of  attack  contemplated  the  turning  of  McClellan's 
right  flank  by  Jackson's  movement  through  Hanover.  A.  P.  Hill 
was  stationed  on  the  left  of  the  Confederate  lines,  fronting  the 
Federal  intrenchments  at  Mechanicsville,  and  was  expected  to  await 
the  uncovering  of  his  front  by  Jackson  and  D.  H.  Hill,  and  then  to 
cross  the  Chickahominy  and  sweep  to  the  right,  down  that  wTing  of 
McClellan's  army  which  rested  on  the  north  side  of  the  river.  The 
morning  of  the  26th  of  June  was  fixed  as  the  time  when  the  flank 
ing  column  should  arrive  upon  the  field,  but  General  Jackson  was 
delayed  by  ignorance  of  the  country  and  the  inefficiency  of  his 
guides,  and  only  came  in  sight  of  the  enemy's  position  at  a  late  hour 
in  the  afternoon.  Then»he  found  the  bridge  across  Tattopottamoy 
creek  destroyed,  and  was  forced,  while  repairing  it,  to  content  him 
self  with  an  artillery  fire  upon  the  Federal  camps.  But  at  the  sound 
of  this  cannonading  Hill  sent  his  front  brigades  into  action,  captured 
with  a'dash  the  works  in  front  of  Mechanicsville,  swept  over  and  down 
the  river,  carrying  all  before  him  until  the  fortifications  on  Beaver 
Dam  creek  barred  further  progress  and  night  fell  upon  his  impatient 
energy.  At  early  dawn  a  new  assault  was  made  and  sustained  with 
great  gallantry  but  unsupported  for  two  hours,  at  the  end  of  which, 


THE  CAREER   OF  GENERAL  A.  P.  HILL.  697 

General  Jackson  having  crossed  above,  a  general  charge  dislodged 
the  enemy  and  completed  the  success  which  Hill  had  so  brilliantly 
inaugurated.  The  bridges  of  Beaver  Dam  having  been  restored, 
Jackson,  reinforced  by  the  division  of  D.  If.  Hill,  took  a  large  swing 
to  the  left  to  turn  the  next  stronghold  of  the  enemy  between  Games' 
mill  and  new  Cold  Harbor,  while  A.  P.  Hill,  supported  by  Long- 
street,  moved  by  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  to  take  that 
position  in  front. 

This  direct  march  brought  the  Confederates  about  noon  on  the 
27th  within  sight  of  the  now  desperate  foe.  A  range  of  hills  behind 
Ponhite  creek,  and  covering  New  Bridge,  which  was  the  remaining 
communication  between  McClellan's  divided  forces,  had  been  fortified 
in  the  most  elaborate  manner.  Three  lines  of  infantry  in  rifle-pits 
occupied  the  rising  slope,  and  the  ridge  was  crowned  with  ft  eld- 
pieces  so  posted  as  to  sweep  every  approach.  The  assault  must  be 
made  through  an  opening  four  hundred  yards  in  width,  and  the 
natural  difficulties  were  increased  by  abattis  along  the  whole  extent 
of  the  line,  while  the  advancing  columns  were  exposed  to  a  sweep 
ing  tire  from  the  heavy  batteries  on  the  south  side  of  the  Chu-ka- 
hominy.  Desperate  seemed  the  attempt,  but  flill  formed  his  columns 
and  prepared  again  to  bear  the  brunt  of  battle.  At  two  o'clock  Jack 
son,  who  should  before  now  have  appeared  in  rear  and  flank  of  Cold 
Harbor,  was  still  missing.  Again  such  trivial  cause  as  the  bad  hear 
ing  of  a  courier  had  destroyed  the  success  of  a  grand  combination 
and  given  the  enemy  time  and  notice.  Every  moment  seemed  an 
hour  while  standing  on  the  brink  of  that  desperate  venture  and  list 
ening  in  vain  for  the  guns  that  should  tell  of  Jackson's  arrival.  At 
last  General  Lee  decides  that  time  is  even  more  important  than  co 
operation,  and  If  ill's  brave  division  is  again  launched  forth  alone  to 
contend  with  half  of  McClellan's  army.  Sent  in  with  admirable 
vigor,  the  troops  pass  the  abattis,  leap  the  ravine,  rush  over  the 
intermediate  lines  upon  the  slope,  and  scramble  breathless  into  the 
very  mouths  of  the  guns  that  crown  the  ridge. 

For  two  mortal  hours  of  agony  this  fearful  work  continues. 
Again  and  again  these  superb  troops  clamber  up  and  dash  them 
selves  against  the  sides  of  this  artificial  Gibraltar,  and  each  time 
they  recoil  with  shattered  ranks  from  the  determined  fire  of  the 
enemy.  "  f fill's  single  division  fought,"  says  General  Lee,  "  with 
the  impetuous  courage  for  which  that  officer  and  his  troops  are  dis 
tinguished."  Still  the  incessant  shower  of  missiles  from  the  forts  on 
the  eminence,  still  the  crash  and  bustle  of  the  enfilading  batteries 
across  the  stream.  The  slaughter  has  been  terrific ;  some  of  If  ill's 


(598  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

brigades  were  broken ;  and  at  four  o'clock,  though  Longstreet  had 
thrown  his  fine  division  in  upon  the  right,  and  Hood's  Texans  and 
Law's  Mississippians  were  surpassing  heroism  in  their  magnificent 
disregard  of  death,  the  fortune  of  the  day  remained  with  McClellan. 
But  Hill  re-formed  his  shattered  lines  and  still  fought  on  close  under 
the  frowning  brow  of  the  hostile  intrenchments.  And  now,  through 
the  swampy  woodland  to  the  left  rings  a  cheer  and  the  rattle  of 
musketry.  It  passes  like  wine  through  the  veins  of  the  men  of 
whom  one  bloody  morning  has  made  veterans.  Jackson,  with 
defiant  energy,  had  rectified  the  blunders  of  his  guides,  and  is  on 
the  field.  Now  the  obstinate  foe  is  beset  on  every  side.  But  even 
yet  victory  wavers  in  the  balance.  The  Federals  make  stout  resist 
ance  even  to  the  impetuous  legions,  fresh  and  used  to  triumph,  of 
Jackson  and  the  elder  Hill.  It  is  almost  dusk,  and  yet  the  tenacity 
of  the  assailed  is  more  than  equal  to  the  desperate  courage  of  their 
assailants.  At  last  comes  the  supreme  moment.  Jackson  sweeps,  in 
one  of  his  resistless  moods,  upon  the  rear;  Hill  puts  forth  one  last 
imperious  effort  for  the  centre,  and  on  the  right  Wood  and  Law 
make  up  their  minds  to  win.  They  all  succeed.  The  Federals  pour 
madly  back  across  the  river.  Now,  if  a  Jackson,  or  Hill,  or  Long- 
street  were  on  the  thither  flank,  McClellan  would  be  in  deadly  toils ! 
But  on  the  Confederate  right  sloth,  if  not  timidity,  prevailed.  Mc 
Clellan,  floundering  through  the  White  Oak  swamp,  on  the  one  road 
which  offered  him  passage  to  the  James,  was  not  intercepted.  Again 
Hill  and  Longstreet  come  upon  his  rear  and  lock  with  him  in  deadly 
combat  at  Frazier's  farm  ;  but  the  clutch  that  should  be  upon  his 
throat  is  wanting.  At  Malvern  hill  he  is  forced  to  time  and  do 
battle  again ;  but  the  grand  scheme  of  envelopment  has  failed. 

Hill's  was  now  a  household  name  throughout  the  South,  and 
the  army  christened  his  command  "  The  Light  Division,"  and  lavished 
upon  it  unselfish  praise.  But  no  time  was  given  to  the  younger 
commander  nor  his  men  to  rest  upon  these  laurels.  Already,  while 
McClellan  was  gathering  up  the  bruised  fragments  of  his  grand 
army  at  Berkeley,  the  Federal  Government,  not  dismayed  by  disaster, 
was  organizing  a  new  movement  upon  Richmond.  From  the  Army 
of  the  Mississippi,  where  he  had  won,  in  easy  circumstances,  some 
incipient  reputation,  General  John  Pope  was  called  to  measure 
swords  with  Lee.  The  remains  of  the  armies  sent  into  the  Valley 
originally  under  Fremont,  Banks,  Shields,  and  McDowell,  were 
moved  forward  upon  Culpepper  Court-House  with  the  design  of 
seizing  upon  Gordonsville.  This  force  of  sixty  thousand  men,  pre 
ceded  by  the  boastful  declarations  of  their  leader,  advanced  without 


THE  CAREER  OF  GENERAL  A.  P.  HILL.  699 

interruption  until  a  point  eight  miles  south  of  Culpepper  was 
reached.  There  it  encountered  General  Jackson,  who  had  been 
dispatched  with  Swell's  and  Hill's  divisions,  and  his  own  under 
Ganeral  Taliaferro,  to  resist  this  new  combination ;  and  on  the  9th 
of  August  the  battle  of  Cedar  run  was  fought,  resulting  in  a  deci 
sive  repulse  to  the  Federal  van-guard  of  twenty-eight  thousand  men 
under  General  Banks.  About  the  same  time  General  Lee  detected 
the  transfer  of  McClellan's  forces  from  the  Lower  James  to  the 
Potomac,  and  at  once  set  the  remainder  of  his  army  in  motion  for 
the  Rappahannock — hoping  to  overwhelm  Pope  while  the  bulk  of 
his  reinforcements  were  yet  en  'route.  Leaving  McLaws,  D.  II.  Hill, 
and  Walker  in  front  of  Richmond,  General  Lee  joined  Jackson  with 
the  divisions  of  Longstreet,  Jones,  Hood,  and  II.  II.  Anderson  on 
the  19th  of  August,  and  on  the  same  day  Pope,  in  the  meantime 
strengthened  by  Reno's  corps,  of  Burnside's  army,  commenced  a  full 
retreat  for  the  north  branch  of  the  Rappahannock.  Jackson,  Hill, 
and  Ewcll  were  at  once  started  in  eager  pursuit,  striking  for  the 
upper  fords  of  the  Rappahannock,  in  order  to  pass  upon  the  flank 
of  the  enemy,  and  having  for  an  objective  point  Manassas  Junction. 
Longstreet,  in  the  meantime,  occupied  Pope's  attention  at  the  fords 
along  the  river,  delaying  him  with  threatening  demonstrations  to 
gain  time  for  Jackson's  establishment  well  in  his  rear.  The  march 
of  the  latter,  for  the  flrst  four  days,  was  a  continual  skirmish.  At 
Warrenton  Springs,  the  enemy  were  found  in  force,  and  it  was  found 
necessary  to  amuse  him  there  while  a  still  larger  detour  to  the  left 
should  be  made.  On  the  25th,  Longstreet  occupied  the  ford  at  that 
point,  and  Jackson,  now  free  from  embarrassment,  moved  swiftly 
northward,  crossed  the  Bull  Run  mountains  at  Thoroughfare  gap, 
and,  on  the  night  of  the  26th,  effected  the  capture  of  Manassas 
Junction,  with  Trimble's  Brigade  of  Stuart's  cavalry.  He  was  now, 
with  three  divisions,  directly  across  the  path  of  Pope  to  Washington, 
and  was  destined  through  the  two  following  days  to  sustain,  unaided, 
the  onsets  of  a  vast  army.  First,  on  the  27th,  the  attack  fell  upon 
Ewell,  who  had  been  left  at  Bristow  Station.  Finding  from  the 
constant  pouring  in  of  fresh  troops  that  the  whole  Federal  army  was 
upon  him,  that  officer  skilfully  withdrew  to  Manassas.  That  night 
Jackson  formed  his  little  army  across  Pope's  line  of  advance,  his 
left  on  Bull  run,  his  right  resting  on  Thoroughfare  gap,  through 
which  Longstreet's  march  was  anxiously  expected.  This  position 
was  full  of  peril,  and  the  masses  of  the  enemy  were  now  hastening 
up  to  increase  its  imminence.  McClellan's  corps  were  now  arriving 
upon  the  ground,  and  unless  Longstreet  should  soon  appear,  the 


700  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

game  would  grow  desperate.  But  nobly  did  Hill,  Ewell,  and  Talia- 
ferro  respond  to  the  demands  of  their  chief.  First  on  one  and  then 
the  other  the  unequal  battle  fell.  Taliaferro  and  Ewell  were 
wounded  while  gallantly  encouraging  their  jaded  troops  to  fresh 
efforts.  Hill  attacked  with  great  spirit  the  head  of  the  enemy's 
column,  which  was  seeking  to  interpose  between  the  Confederates 
and  Alexandria. 

The  night  of  the  28th  found  both  armies  resolute  in  their  posi 
tions.  The  next  morning  Pope  was  ready  to  overwhelm  Jackson. 
At  ten  o'clock  his  batteries  opened  on  the  right  and  the  final  strug 
gle  seemed  to  be  at  hand.  But  now  Longstreet's  columns,  urged  on 
by  tales  of  Jackson's  need,  begin  to  file  through  Thoroughfare  gap, 
and  soon  the  Confederate  right  was  strengthened  with  these  brigades. 
And  now  once  more  Hill  and  his  light  division  were  to  fill  the  place 
of  glory.  At  two  o'clock  the  enemy  moved  in  masses  upon  the 
railroad  embankments  forming  Jackson's  left,  and  here  Hill  waged, 
against  overwhelming  odds,  the  fiercest  contest  of  that  fierce  cam 
paign.  The  Federals  fought  with  persistent  gallantry.  Six  times 
they  pushed  with  superhuman  courage  up  to  the  very  face  of  the 
fire.  Once  they  broke  over  a  cut  in  the  raihvay,  found  a  gap  in  the 
line  and  fought,  hand-to-hand,  with  their  opponents.  It  was  a  battle 
of  giants.  For  seven  hours  the  combat  lasted,  and  not  until  every 
round  of  ammunition  had  been  exhausted,  and  night  was  gathering 
about  the  scene  of  slaughter,  did  Hill  yield  his  position  to  the  troops 
of  Ewell — sent  to  relieve  his  exhausted  brigades.  In  the  final 
engagement  of  the  30th  of  August,  again  the  heat  and  burden  of 
the  day  fell  upon  the  Confederate  left,  and  though  on  one  occasion, 
late  in  the  day,  the  reserves  of  the  army  (Anderson's  Division)  were 
ordered  up  to  reinforce  that  portion  of  the  line,  ere  they  came  into 
action,  the  obstinate  valor  of  Hill,  Early,  and  Trimble  had  repulsed 
the  enemy,  and  Anderson  was  sent  to  the  right  to  take  front  in 
Longstreet's  attack.  That  night  Pope  hurried — dismayed  and  un 
done — into  the  fortifications  on  the  Potomac.  A  new  chapter  in 
the  war  was  about  to  be  written  in  letters  of  blood. 

The  Sharpsburg  campaign  was  now  opened  by  the  advance  of 
Jackson  into  Maryland.  Later,  when  that  officer  recrossed  into 
Virginia,  to  effect  the  capture  of  Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry, 
A.  P.  Hill  was  still  in  the  front  of  the  advance.  In  the  attack  on 
the  latter  place  his  division  made  the  assault,  and  were  the  first  to 
enter  the  town.  After  the  surrender  Hill  was  left  to  dispose  of  the 
prisoners  and  captured  stores,  while  Jackson  hastened  back  to  Sharps- 
burg,  where  Lee,  with  Longstreet  and  D.  II.  Hill,  was  beset  by 


THE  CAREER   OF  GENERAL  A.  P.  HILL.  ^01 

McClellan's  entire  army.  lie  arrived,  not  a  moment  too  soon,  to 
find  his  chief  in  perilous  straits.  It  was  the  morning  of  the  10th  of 
September.  General  Lee  had  drawn  up  Longstreefs  and  13.  II. 
Hill's  Divisions,  hoth  much  reduced  hy  the  recent  desperate  contests 
at  South  mountain,  on  a  range  of  eminences  overhanging  Antietam 
creek.  In  his  front  six  full  corps  of  Federal  troops.  Jackson,  with 
seven  thousand  men,  formed  the  left  of  Hill,  and  Walker — coming 
down  from  Harper's  Ferry — prolonged  the  right  of  Long-street. 
During  this  evening  the  Federals  crossed  the  Antietam  creek,  and 
made  a  heavy  onslaught  upon  the  Confederate  left  centre,  under 
General  Hood,  hut  were  repulsed.  The  real  work  was  not  to  be 
until  the  morrow.  At  dawn,  on  the  27th,  McClellan  opened  his 
batteries  upon  the  Confederate  left,  and,  just  at  sunrise,  poured 
Hooker's,  Mansfield's,  and  Simmer's  Corps  upon  Jackson's  thin  line. 
For  several  hours  Jackson  sustained  this  attack,  but  at  length  his 
men  were  pressed  back,  and  Early  and  Hood  were  left  alone  to 
maintain  that  flank  of  the  army.  At  this  critical  juncture  General 
McLaws  came  on  the  field,  and,  aided  by  General  Walker,  who  had 
been  hurriedly  withdrawn  from  the  right,  succeeded  in  re-establish 
ing  affairs,  and  pushing  the  enemy  back  to  his  original  position.  In 
the  meantime,  the  centre  was  also  heavily  pressed,  and  13.  11.  Hill 
was  fully  employed  in  guarding  his  front  from  a  series  of  impetuous 
and  well-sustained  assaults.  At  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  McClel 
lan,  releasing  his  efforts  on  the  left  and  centre,  moved  in  large  force 
against  the  right  of  Longstreet's  position,  where  a  bridge  over  the 
Antietam  was  defended  by  two  small  regiments  under  General 
Toombs.  For  a  time,  so  stoutly  fought  the  Confederates,  the  issue 
of  this  movement  seemed  doubtful,  but  after  repulsing  several  sharp 
attacks  Toombs'  line  was  forced  back,  and  the  Federals  swarmed 
across  the  creek,  threatening  to  accomplish  a  complete  victory.  The 
enemy,  turning  to  the  right,  had  broken  through  Jones'  Division, 
captured  a  battery,  and  were  sweeping  on  with  wild  enthusiasm. 

But  at  the  moment  of  crisis  brought  also  the  means  of  meeting 
it.  Opportunely,  as  if  summoned  by  the  lamp  of  Aladdin,  now 
came  in  full  swing  across  the  fields  Hill  and  his  "  light  division." 
Called  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  save  the  day,  eighteen  miles  the 
gallant  fellows  had  marched  under  the  burning  sun  since  morning, 
and  now  they  marched  as  though  fresh  from  bivouac.  Throwing 
his  batteries  to  the  front,  and  opening  a  rapid  fire  upon  the  deploying 
masses  of  the  enemy,  Hill  grasped  the  situation  at  a  glance,  and  made, 
without  halting,  his  dispositions.  The  Federal  column,  sweeping 
obliquely  upon  Jones'  right,  had  exposed  its  own  flank;  Toombs, 
who  had  rallied  his  regiments,  was  ordered  to  fall  upon  it,  while 


702  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Hill  hurled  Archer's  fine  brigade  full  in  the  face  of  the  advancing 
foe ;  Gregg's  and  Branch's  Brigades  were  thrown  in  with  a  like 
swift  fierceness ;  and  before  these  combined  onsets  the  Federals  first 
wavered,  and  then  gave  way.  And  Hill  swept  on,  triumphant  from 
the  first,  regaining  the  lost  batteries,  regaining  the  lost  ground,  never 
halting  until  the  enemy  were  forced  back  across  the  Antietam,  the 
bridge  re-occupied,  and  the  day  saved ;  for  with  this  charge  of  Hill 
and  his  two  thousand,  as  terrible  as  any  ever  delivered  by  the  Old 
Guard,  with  Ney  for  a  leader,  and  under  the  eye  of  Napoleon,  ended 
McClellan's  efforts  to  break  Lee's  lines  at  Sharpsburg.  On  the 
retreat  from  Maryland,  Hill  brought  up  the  rear,  and  at  Shepherds- 
town  inflicted  upon  the  enemy,  in  repulse  of  a  night  attack  made 
upon  Pendleton's  artillery,  such  fearful  loss  as  effectually  put  an  end 
to  pursuit.  In  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  Hill  held  the  right  of 
the  Confederate  position,  and  was  hotly  engaged ;  and  at  Chancel- 
lorsville,  where  he  was  wounded,  about  the  same  time  that  Jackson 
fell,  his  record  as  a  major  general  closes. 

In  May,  1863,  General  Lee  formed  three  corps  d'armee,  from 
the  troops  then  composing  the  army  of  Northern  Virginia,  assigning 
to  the  command  of  each  a  lieutenant  general.  Under  Longstreet 
was  the  First  Corps,  composed  of  the  divisions  of  McLaws,  Pickett, 
and  Hood;  the  Second,  under  Ewell,  comprised  the  divisions  of 
Early,  Rodes,  and  Johnson  ;  while  to  Hill  was  given  the  Third,  with 
R.  II.  Anderson,  Iletli,  and  Fender  as  major  generals.  The  com 
mands  of  the  last  two  were  formed  from  Hill's  own  light  division, 
with  the  addition  to  Fender  of  Pettigrew's  Brigade,  and  to  Ileth 
of  the  Mississippi  regiments,  newly  brigaded,  under  Joseph  R. 
Davis.  To  this  larger  field  Hill  brought,  unimpaired,  the  qualities 
which  had  distinguished  him  as  a  division  commander ;  his  promo 
tion  came  at  the  suggestion  of  Lee,  who  had  long  since  taken  his 
measure,  and  ascertained  his  worth ;  and  the  troops  had  learned  to 
repose  absolute  confidence  in  his  leadership.  Henceforth  his  place 
was  to  be  at  the  right  hand  of  the  great  commander,  now  bereft  of 
the  aid  of  Jackson.  In  the  dark  days  that  followed,  casualty  and  the 
necessities  of  war  called  Longstreet  and  Ewell  away  from  Lee,  but 
Hill  was  ever  at  his  side.  Nor  was  the  constancy  of  this  trusted 
lieutenant  ever  shaken,  or  his  high  courage  ever  broken.  Fate  and 
death  overtook  this  gallant  soul  at  last ;  but  fear  or  doubt  never. 

At  Gettysburg,  with  Ileth  and  Fender,  he  opened  the  engage 
ment,  winning  a  decided  victory  over  the  corps  of  Reynolds  and 
Howard,  and  capturing  the  town.  In  the  retreat,  his  columns  again 
were  in  the  rear.  At  the  Wilderness,  with  Ileth  and  Wilcox,  he 
kept  back  for  hours  the  combined  forces  of  Getty,  Birney,  Mott, 


THE  CAREER  OF  GENERAL  A.  P.  HILL.  703 

Gibbon,  and  Barlow,  inflicting  upon,  them  terrible  loss,  and  main 
taining  his  position  against  repeated  assaults  in  front  and  flank  until 
night  put  an  end  to  the  deadly  contest,  and  until  time  had  been 
gained  for  the  march  of  Longstreet  and  Anderson  to  the  rescue. 
Throughout  the  ceaseless  warfare  that  attended  the  shifting  of 
Grant's  army  to  the  banks  of  the  James,  Hill  was  always  to  the 
fore,  and  always  gave  a  good  account  of  himself  and  his  men.  At 
Petersburg,  throughout  the  so-called  siege,  he  held  the  right,  or 
marching,  flank  of  the  army,  and  was  constantly  engaged.  It  was 
his  strong  hand  that  sent  the  Federal  columns  so  often  staggering 
back  from  their  movements  against  Lee's  communications.  It  was 
Hill's  Corps  that  rolled  Warren's  line  up  like  a  scroll  on  the  TTeldon 
Railroad.  It  was  Hill,  with  Ileth  and  Wilcox,  who  overcame  that 
bold  Captain  Hancock  at  Reams'  Station.  It  was  II  ill  who,  with 
Mahone's  Division,  sent  Hancock  and  Warren  reeling  for  support 
from  Hatcher's  run.  Everywhere  and  always,  Hill  was  in  the  post 
of  danger  and  won  glory.  Steadfast,  alert,  valiant,  he  never  put  his 
harness  off,  and  always  wore  it  well. 

Through  that  last  winter  Hill's  face  and  form  became  familiar 
sights  to  the  troops.  He  was  constantly  on  the  lines,  riding  with 
firm,  graceful  scat,  looking  every  inch  a  soldier.  Like  General  Lee, 
he  was  rarely  much  attended.  One  staff  officer  and  a  single  courier 
formed  his  usual  escort,  and  often  he  made  the  rounds  alone.  Of 
ordinary  height,  his  figure  was  slight  but  athletic,  his  carriage  erect, 
and  his  dress  plainly  neat.  His  expression  was  grave  but  gentle,  his 
manner  so  courteous  as  almost  to  lack  decision,  but  was  contradicted 
by  a  rigidity  about  the  mouth  and  chin,  and  bright,  flashing  eyes 
that  even  in  repose  told  another  tale.  In  moments  of  excitement  he 
never  lost  self-control  nor  composure  of  demeanor,  but  his  glance 
was  as  sharp  as  an  eagle's,  and  his  voice  could  take  a  metallic  ring. 
Of  all  the  Confederate  leaders,  he  was  the  most  genial  and  lovable 
in  disposition.  In  all  his  career  he  never  advanced  a  claim,  or  main 
tained  a  rivalry.  The  soul  of  honor  and  of  generosity,  he  was  ever 
engaged  in  representing  the  merits  of  others;  if  he  ever  displayed  a 
symptom  of  insubordination,  it  was  when  the  government  failed  or 
delayed  to  recognize  the  services  of  some  soldier  to  whom  he  thought 
promotion  due.  When  news  came  of  his  death,  there  was  not  a  man 
in  the  corps  who  did  not  feel  that  he  had  lost  a  friend. 

On  the  2d  of  April,  1805,  Grant  made  an  advance  upoii  the 
riirht-centre  of  the  lines  in  front  of  Petersburg;  and,  breaking 
through  in  heavy  force,  threw  back  upon  the  right  the  larger  portion 
of  the  two  divisions  of  Hill's  Corps,  then  occupying  the  trenches. 
General  Hill,  whose  headquarters  were  in  the  suburbs  of  the  city, 


704:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

was  thus  cut  off  from  his  command.  Mounting  rapidly,  he  set  out, 
accompanied  by  a  single  courier,  to  break  through  the  pickets  of  the 
enemy,  and  rejoin  his  scattered  troops.  Dissuasion  was  attempted, 
but  he  repelled  it,  and  dashed  off  at  full  speed.  General  Ord,  in  the 
meanwhile,  had  thrown  forces  in  the  direction  of  the  river,  and  Hill, 
spinning  across  the  path  of  these,  came  suddenly  upon  a  group  of 
sharpshooters.  Their  summons  to  surrender  was  met  by  a  charge 
toward  them ;  the  next  moment  the  fatal  shot  was  fired,  and  dead 
oil  the  outposts  fell  A.  P.  Hill. 

No  history  of  him  has  yet  been  written ;  no  stone  marks  his 
resting-place  in  Hollywood  Cemetery.  If  the  memories  of  war  are 
to  be  perpetuated,  not  forgotten  should  he  be — that  Virginia  soldier 
who  never  lost  a  post  that  duty  gave  him  to  defend,  and  who  never 
failed  to  crown  an  attack — if  not  with  success — with  the  blood-red 
crown  of  terrible  endeavor.  In  what  has  been  here  written  there  is 
but  the  faintest  outline  of  his  brilliant  campaigns.  From  Richmond 
to  Chancellorsville,  Hill's  "  Light  Division  "  was  either  in  the  van  as 
charging  column,  or  came  later  into  action  as  the  well-chosen  forlorn 
hope.  At  Sharpsburg,  in  the  gathering  dusk  of  a  doubtful  field — 
when  the  left  wing  wras  barely  standing,  the  centre  hardly  resistant, 
the  right  already  overwhelmed — with  his  worn  and  his  numerically 
weak,  but  invincible  column,  Hill  struck  the  exultant  enemy,  swept 
the  debatable  ground,  gave  courage  to  a  despirited  army  by  his  ever 
advancing  musketry,  and  saved,  wrhat  bid  fair  to  be,  a  day  of  decisive 
defeat.  Follow  him  to  the  Potomac,  thence  to  Rappahannock,  to 
the  Wilderness,  throughout  the  wasting  and  wonderful  struggle  from 
the  Mattaponi  to  Petersburg — the  record  of  battles  won,  of  positions 
saved,  of  guns  and  prisoners  captured,  gives  Hill  an  emphatic  claim 
to  a  soldier's  fame.  His  death  illustrates  the  character  of  his  soldier 
ship.  Not  as  some  of  his  equals  in  rank  did  his  fidelity  fall  under 
the  certainty  of  disaster ;  but  manfully  and  well,  in  the  very  hour 
of  defeat,  he  gave  himself  a  sacrifice  to  one  of  the  few  remaining 
chances  of  saving  the  army. 

The  dead  leaders,  upon  whom  the  world  has  lavished  honors, 
leaned  upon  Hill  as  strong  men  upon  a  staff,  and  were  not  disap 
pointed.  And  it  is  memorable  and  remarkable  that  Lee  and 
Jackson — the  magnet  and  meteor  of  the  Confederacy — should,  in 
their  dying  moments,  have  given  their  last  earthly  thoughts,  their 
last  coherent  utterances,  to  this  brave  soldier  and  steadfast  patriot. 
In  the  paroxysm  of  death,  General  Lee  called  on  Hill  "  to  move  for 
ward  ; "  and,  when  Jackson  was  crossing  the  river  to  seek  the  shade 
of  the  trees,  his  last  words  were  :  "  Tell  A.  P.  Hill  to  prepare  for 
action." 


THE  WAR'S  CARNIVAL  OF  FRAUD. 


BY  COLOXEL  IIEXRY  S.  OLCOTT. 


MINE  is  tlie  most  repulsive 
task  that  any  one  of  the 
writers  of  this  series  of  An 
nals  will  have  assigned  to 
him.  All  the  others  have 
their  stories  to  tell  of  the 
clang  of  arms,  the  marshaling 
of  armies,  the  thrilling  epi 
sodes  of  personal  danger  and 
suffering,  the  political  vicissi 
tudes  of  the  might v  struggle. 
To  me  comes  the  duty  of 
showing  the  corruption  that 
festered  beneath  the  surface. 
The  eve  kindles,  the  pulse 
leaps,  the  imagination  fires 
with  their  narratives  of  martial  deeds;  but  what  I  shall  say  will 
make  writer  and  reader  alike  deplore  the  baseness  of  human  nature, 
which  most  displays  itself  in  times  of  national  calamity.  Gladly 

L         *;  »/  i/ 

would  I  leave  my  tale  untold,  and  suffer  the  official  record  of  my 
experience  to  lie  in  the  archives  of  the  government  undisturbed, 
like  a  loathsome  corpse  in  a  dishonored  grave.  But  a  history  of  the 
Rebellion  which  should  not  embrace  this  chapter  would  be  no 
history  worthy  of  the  name  ;  and  so,  as  no  one  can  serve  as  my 
substitute,  I  comply  with  the  editors  request. 

I  passed  at  the  front  the  first  year  of  the  war,  joining  the 
Burnside  expedition  at  Annapolis,  participating  at  the  capture  of 
Ixoanoke  Island,  the  battle  of  Xewbern,  the  siege  and  capture  of 
Fort  Macon,  the  battles  on  the  Rappahannock  during  Pope's  retreat, 
and  other  military  operations.  Exposure  to  malaria  finally  disabled 
me  with  fever,  and  I  was  obliged  to  return  home  from  Washington, 
where  my  horse  stood  ready  saddled  for  a  start  the  next  morning 
with  General  Burnside  to  join  Hooker  with  our  jSlnth  Corps.  I 
recovered  after  two  months,  and,  while  convalescent,  was  first 
45  (705) 


706  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

intrusted  with  the  responsible  duties  which  occupied  my  whole 
attention  subsequently  until  the  close  of  the  war,  and  for  some  nine 
months  longer. 

By  this  time,  November,  1862,  the  government  had  expended 
many  millions  of  dollars,  and  the  little  army  of  twenty  thousand 
men  that  we  had  when  Sumter  was  fired  upon  had  been  increased 
to  hundreds  of  thousands.  The  initial  Confederate  act  of  war  not 
only  forced  upon  us  the  gigantic  work  of  transforming  an  industrial 
people  into  soldiers,  but  of  arming  and  equipping  them  as  well. 
Tliis  was  the  harder  task  of  the  two.  Men  there  were  by  the 
hundred  thousand,  ready  to  take  the  field ;  but,  to  uniform  them, 
cloth  had  to  be  woven,  leather  tanned,  shoes,  clothing,  and  caps 
manufactured.  The  canvas  to  shelter  them  had  to  be  converted 
from  the  growing  crop  into  fabrics.  To  arm  them  the  warehouses 
and  armories  of  Europe,  as  well  as  of  this  country,  had  to  be 
ransacked.  All  considerations  of  business  caution  had  to  be  subor 
dinated  to  the  imperious  necessity  for  haste.  If  it  wras  the  golden 
hour  of  patriotism,  so  was  it  equally  that  of  greed,  and,  as  money 
was  poured  by  the  million,  by  the  frugal,  into  the  lap  of  the 
government,  so  was  there  a  yellow  Pactolus  diverted  by  myriad 
streamlets  into  the  pockets  of  scoundrels  and  robbers — official  and 
otherwise.  The  public  necessity  was  their  opportunity,  and  they 
made  use  of  it. 

The  rush  of  men  to  the  front  left  the  War  Office  no  time  to  be 
nice  over  details ;  so  that,  as  the  volume  of  administrative  business 
overflowed  the  bureau  machinery  for  its  supervision,  things  were, 
in  a  measure,  suffered  to  take  their  course.  An  unhealthy  tone 
pervaded  everything;  speculation  was  the  rule — conservatism  the 
exception.  "We  floated,  on  a  sea  of  paper,  into  a  fool's  paradise. 
Contractors,  bloated  wTith  the  profits  on  shoddy,  rode  in  emblazoned 
carriages,  which,  a  little  while  before,  they  wrould  have  been  glad  to 
drive  as  hirelings;  and  vulgar  faces  and  grimy  fingers  were  made 
more  vulgar  and  coarse  with  the  glare  of  great  diamonds.  Intrigue 
held  the  key  to  the  kitchen-stairs  of  the  White  House,"  shaped 
legislation,  sat  cheek  by  jowl  with  Congressmen,  and  seduced  com 
missioned  officers  from  the  strict  path  of  duty.  Our  sailors  were 
sent  to  sea  in  ships  built  of  green  timber,  which  were  fitted  with 
engines  good  only  for  the  junkshop,  and  greased  with  "sperm"  oil 
derived  from  mossbunkers  and  the  fat  of  dead  horses.  For  one 
pound  of  necessary  metals,  one  yard  of  fabric,  one  gallon  of  liquid, 
the  price  of  two  was  paid.  Our  soldiers  were  given  guns  that  would 
not  shoot,  powder  that  would  only  half  explode,  shoes  of  which  the 


THE   WAR'S  CARNIVAL   OF  FRAUD.  707 

soles  were  filled  with  shavings,  hats  that  dissolved  often  in  a  month's 
showers,  and  clothing  made  of  old  cloth,  ground  up  and  fabricated 
over  again. 

In  the  navy  yards  there  was  a  system  of  corrupt  bargains  be 
tween  the  public  servants  and  contractors,  under  which  goods  of 
inferior  quality  and  short  of  quantity  were  accepted  as  of  the  lawful 
standard  and  count;  public  property  was  purloined  and  carried  off 
in  open  daylight ;  scores  of  superfluous  men  were  quartered  on  the 
pay  rolls  by  politicians ;  navy  agents  colluded  with  ring  contractors 
to  buy  of  them  all  supplies  at  highest  market  rates  on  an  agreement 
for  a  fifteen  per  cent,  commission,  and  clerks  in  the  yards,  for  a  con 
sideration,  would  slip  the  pay  requisitions  of  these  ring  thieves  from 
the  bottom  to  the  top  of  the  pile  that  awaited  the  official  certificate 
of  approval,  so  that  they  might  draw  their  money  at  once,  to  the 
prejudice  of  honest  dealers.  There  was  no  such  thing  as  the  taking 
of  a  general  account  of  stock — not  even  a  keeping  of  the  accounts 
by  double  entry.  The  old  regular  officers  in  charge  of  bureaus, 
high  toned  and  unsuspicious,  were  nattered  into  a  fatal  sense  of 
security  by  subordinates  bound  body  and  soul  to  thieves. 

In  the  military  arsenals,  the  same  rottenness  prevailed.  Here 
and  there  were  to  be  found  public  servants  without  a  moral  ulcer 
within  their  breasts.  But  such  were  annoyed  and  hampered  in  the 
execution  of  duty,  overridden,  too,  often  by  positive  orders  from 
superiors  to  receive  supplies  not  up  to  army  standard,  and,  when  too 
obstinate,  were  removed  to  posts  less  desirable.  The  army  standards 
were  themselves  debased  under  the  plea  of  an  exigency.  In  the 
lettings  of  contracts,  a  fair  competition  was  frustrated  by  the  trans 
parent  conspiracy  of  bidders,  who  would  put  in  absurdly  low  propo 
sals  under  fictitious  names,  and  then  bid  themselves  at  the  highest 
price  that,  from  surreptitious  information  received,  they  knew  would 
throw  out  honest  competitors  and  secure  them  the  contract.  Their 
profits  were  calculated  to  come  out  of  the  delivery  of  inferior 
articles  of  skimped  measure  to  government  inspectors,  with  whom 
they  had  an  understanding.  Presents  of  horses,  carriages,  jewelry, 
wines,  cigars,  and  friendly  help  toward  promotion,  though  passing 
under  a  politer  name  than  bribery,  effected  the  same  results  as  though 
they  had  not.  Every  artifice  that  rascally  ingenuity  could  devise, 
and  clever  men  and  women  carry  out,  was  resorted  to  to  procure  the 
brigadier's  stars  or  the  colonel's  eagles  for  ambitious  incompetents. 
The  sacredest  secrets  of  our  government  were  sold  to  the  enemy; 
loud-mouthed  hypocrites  trafficked  across  the  lines;  the  very  medi 
cines  for  the  sick  were  adulterated,  and  dishonest  gains  were  made 


708  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

out  of  the  transportation  of  the  wounded.  Nay,  so  vile  was  the 
scramble  for  money,  so  debasing  its  influence,  that  our  dead  heroes 
were  followed  into  the  very  grave  by  the  plundering  contractor,  wrho 
cheated  in  the  coffin  that  was  to  hold  the  sacred  dust,  and  amassed 
fortunes  by  supplying  rotten  head-stones  in  defiance  of  accepted 
stipulations.  "What  shall  we  call  this  wretched  episode  of  national 
history  but  a  Carnival  of  Fraud  ?  This  was  the  Augean  stable  to 
cleanse  which  the  broom  of  authority  was  placed  in  my  hands. 

Of  all  this  I  knew  nothing  in  November,  1862,  when  Secretary 
8  tan  ton  first  applied,  through  the  United  States  Marshal  at  New 
York,  for  my  services.  There  had  been  much  talk  and  a  good  many 
wholesome  truths  told  by  the  Democratic  papers,  but  my  experience 
had  been  in  the  field,  and,  besides,  it  was  not  the  likely  thing  for 
Democratic  papers  to  be  seen  about  the  camps  in  North  Carolina. 
Of  one  or  two  specific  cases  of  fraud,  the  members  of  the  Burn- 
side  expedition  had  been  forced  to  have  a  very  accurate  knowl 
edge.  We  lay  in  Hatteras  Inlet  a  whole  month,  waiting  upon 
McClellan's  movements  in  Virginia,  so  as  to  co-operate  with  him. 
Of  water  we  had  a  sufficient  supply,  but  the  contractor  had  put  it 
in  cheap  barrels,  that  had  contained  kerosene  oil,  and  our  stomachs 
turned  against  it.  When  the  order  came  to  move  upon  Roanoke 
Island,  we  attempted  to  cross  the  "  swash,"  the  great  shoal  that  lies 
between  the  ocean  beach  and  Albernarle  Sound,  but  scarcely  a  vessel 
could  be  dragged  through  the  channel,  even  by  two  powerful  tugs, 
until  it  had  been  emptied  of  everything  portable ;  the  agents,  in 
structed  to  hire  vessels  of  a  certain  draught  only,  had  accepted  others 
that  drew  two  or  three  feet  more  of  water  at  exorbitant  rates — some, 
if  I  remember  aright,  at  one  thousand  dollars  per  day  !  Conversing 
with  Burnside  as  the  vessel  we  were  on  stuck  fast  half  way  over  the 
swash,  I  offered  to  send  an  account  of  this  infamy  to  the  Northern 
press  and  denounce  the  responsible  parties  by  name.  But  he  pro 
tested,  saying  that  as  he  would  reap  the  credit  of  success,  so  he  ought 
to  take  the  blame  of  failure.  It  was  his  fault  and  none  other  that 
such  vessels  had  been  taken,  and  as  commander  of  the  expedition  it 
was  his  business  to  have  seen  that  the  agents  did  their  duty.  The 
man's  character,  at  least  as  I  have  always  known  it,  is  expressed  in 
that  sentiment. 

The  occasion  of  my  employment  was  the  giving  of  a  Delmonico 
dinner  by  a  German  Israelite  to  a  distinguished  company  of  guests. 
The  host  was  one  Solomon  Kohnstamm,  who  had  accumulated  a 
fortune  of  over  a  quarter  of  a  million  in  the  importing  business  at 
New  York,  and  enjoyed  the  reputation  of  a  giver  of  good  dinners 


THE   WAR'S  CARNIVAL   OF  FRAUD.  709 

and  a  jolly  sort  of  fellow  in  general.  In  an  evil  hour  lie  took  to  dis 
counting  the  vouchers  of  recruiting  officers,  cheated,  was  suspected, 
in  danger  of  arrest,  and  as  a  grand  coup  of  diplomacy  had  spread  the 
feast  in  question  and  bidden  to  it  every  civil  and  military  official 
in  the  Xew  York  district  who,  under  any  contingency,  might  have 
a  hand  in  arresting  or  prosecuting  him  criminally.  I  will  spare  the 
blushes  of  men  now,  as  then  prominently  before  the  public  eye,  by 
not  mentioning  the  names  of  Kohnstamm's  guests.  His  frauds  had 
come  under  the  surveillance  of  the  United  States  Marshal,  and  the 
circumstances  of  the  dinner  alarmed  the  authorities,  who  saw  through 
the  trick  and  feared  the  ends  of  justice  might  be  defeated.  I  was,  as 
I  have  said,  convalescent  at  this  time,  and  getting  ready  to  return  to 
the  front  at  a  very  early  date,  when  I  received  a  notification  that  my 
services  to  examine  the  papers  in  this  case  of  Kohnstamm  were 
required.  The  Marshal  told  me  that  I  would  be  free  to  leave  for 
the  army  within  a  fortnight  at  farthest,  and  that  the  amount  of 
fraud  was  supposed  to  be  within  twenty-five  thousand  dollars ;  in 
place  of  which  my  service  was  continued  more  than  three  years. 
The  frauds  of  Kohnstamm  turned  out  to  be  some  three  hundred 
thousand  dollars,  and  the  little  local  examination  of  a  single  case 
grew  into  a  general  inspection  of  arsenals  and  navy  yards  as  con 
nected  with  the  equipment  and  clothing  of  the  land  and  naval  forces. 

The  vouchers  discounted  by  Kohnstamm  were  the  bills  of  land 
lords  for  the  lodging  and  board  of  recruits  for  volunteer  regiments 
prior  to  their  muster  into  the  United  States  service.  They  were 
certified  by  the  ranking  officer  of  the  regiment  and  by  the  company 
officer  engaged  in  the  recruiting.  After  muster  the  men  were  duly 
taken  on  the  regimental  rolls,  and  the  quartermaster  was  then  legally 
empowered  to  issue  to  them  tents,  rations,  and  clothing.  These  neces 
sary  costs  of  organization  were  at  first  defrayed  cither  out  of  the  Union 
Defense  Committee's  fund  or  advanced  by  the  officers  of  regiments 
and  their  friends  out  of  their  private  means. 

Kohnstamm's  crime  consisted  in  his  procuring  from  landlords — 
generally  German  saloon-keepers — their  signatures  to  blank  vouchers, 
which  he  would  have  filled  up  by  his  clerks  for,  say,  one  or  two  thou 
sand  dollars  each,  and  then  either  get  unprincipled  commissioned 
officers  to  append  their  certificates  for  an  agreed  price,  or,  cheaper 
still,  forge  them.  By  this  device  he  drew  over  three  hundred  thou 
sand  dollars  from  the  "  Mustering  and  Disbursing  Office  "  in  Kew 
York,  of  which  sum  the  greater  proportion  was  in  due  time  ascer 
tained  by  me  to  be  fraud.  The  examination  of  all  these  accounts 
was  a  work  of  time  and  laborious  and  patient  research,  as  may  be 


710  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

imagined.  It  was  also  necessary  to  proceed  with  the  greatest  pru 
dence,  for  only  a  few  days  after  my  taking  the  papers  in  hand  Secre 
tary  Stanton,  acting,  as  soon  became  evident,  upon  erroneous  reports, 
caused  the  offender  to  be  arrested  and  lodged  in  Fort  Lafayette. 
Kohnstamm  was  a  Democrat,  except,  of  course,  in  business  matters, 
and  a  rich  importer  of  thirty  years'  standing ;  had  plenty  of  money, 
spent  it  liberally,  and  had  but  just  given  his  grand  dinner  at  Del- 
moiiico's.  No  wonder,  then,  that  his  arrest  should  have  excited  a 
bitter  feeling  against  the  War  Department  in  the  minds  of  people 
who  knew  nothing  whatever  of  his  offenses.  There  was  a  Demo 
cratic  Governor  at  Albany,  a  Democratic  Mayor  at  New  York,  a 
Democratic  District  Attorney,  and  Democrats  on  the  grand  jury. 
It  came  to  my  ears  that  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  United  States 
Marshal,  and  myself,  were  to  be  indicted  for  resisting  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  under  the  alleged  unconstitutional  act  of  Congress 
suspending  the  same.  It  was  an  emergency  demanding  a  bold 
course;  so  with  the  consent  of  the  department,  I  went  myself 
before  the  grand  jury  with  my  papers,  and  offered  to  answer  any 
questions  that  might  be  asked  of  me.  The  result  was  a  vote  of 
commendation  for  what  had  been  done,  and  all  danger  of  indictment 
was  removed.  I  pursued  the  same  course  with  Governor  Seymour 
and  the  District  Attorney  with  equally  satisfactory  results,  and  then 
the  trump  card  was  played  of  giving  the  facts  to  the  press,  which 
was  only  too  willing  to  publish  them,  and  never  subsequently,  to 
my  recollection,  interfered  with  my  official  labors. 

This  adroit  and  epicurean  criminal  employed  the  best  counsel 
at  our  bar,  and  enjoyed  all  the  immunity  from  annoyance,  after  his 
release  from  Fort  Lafayette,  that  one  so  circumstanced  could  expect. 
But  that  there  were  thorns  in  his  bed  of  roses  is  beyond  a  doubt. 
In  due  time,  he  was  held  in  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars 
bail  in  a  civil  suit,  and,  after  a  three  weeks'  session  with  me,  the 
grand  jury,  under  the  lead  of  the  late  James  W.  Beekman,  brought 
in  forty-eight  bills  of  indictment  against  him.  Failing  to  get  the 
required  security,  he  lay  two  months  in  the  House  of  Detention, 
after  which  his  bail  was  reduced,  and  he  was  liberated  from  confine 
ment.  I  found  so  many  obstacles  to  getting  him  to  trial  that,  finally, 
the  Secretary  caused  a  resolution  of  inquiry  to  be  introduced  in  the 
Senate  by  Mr.  Wilson,  which  settled  the  business.  The  case  was 
peremptorily  moved  on,  and  that  venerated  jurist,  Judge  Samuel 
Nelson,  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  the  excuses  of  counsel,  and  ordered  the 
District  Attorney  to  open  for  the  prosecution.  Out  of  the  forty- 
eight  indictments  one  had  to  be  selected  on  the  spur  of  the  moment, 


THE  WAR'S  CARNIVAL  OF  FRAUD.  Til 

and  the  court  would  only  permit  us  to  introduce  testimony  about 
seven  others,  to  show  the  seienter,  or  guilty  knowledge.  Accord 
ingly,  eight  cases  of  palpable  forgery  were  designated,  the  trial 
proceeded  (May  17th,  1801),  and,  on  the  21st,  the  jury,  after 
deliberating  only  twenty  minutes,  brought  in  a  verdict  of  guilty. 
The  court  promptly  sentenced  him  to  ten  years'  imprisonment,  at 
hard  labor,  at  Sing  Sing,  and  the  rich  Kolmstamm  made  his  exit 
from  the  busy  scene  of  his  tradings  and  his  triumphs. 

So  unexpected,  but  so  welcome,  was  this  result  to  the  Scretary 
of  War  that,  upon  receiving  the  news,  lie  telegraphed  back  a  charac 
teristic  message,  which,  as  I  recall  it,  was  as  follows : 

O     ?  ' 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  May  21st,  1SG4. 
COLONEL  H.  S.  OLCOTT,  New  York : 

I  heartily  congratulate  you  upon  the  result  of  to-day's  trial.  It  is  as  im 
portant  to  the  government  as  the  winning  of  a  battle. 

EDWIX  M.  8TAXTOX, 

Secretary  of  War. 

Since  I  have  anticipated  events  somewhat,  to  give  a  connected 
history  of  the  Kolmstamm  case,  it  may  as  well  be  said  here  that  the 
civil  suit  was  duly  prosecuted  to  a  successful  issue,  and  a  large  sum 
of  money  paid  over  to  the  Treasury  by  the  trustees  of  the  felon's 
estate.  As  a  farce  after  the  tragedy,  naturally  followed  his  pardon 
by  President  Johnson,  after  two  years'  imprisonment,  upon  the 
petition  of  the  usual  string  of  wealthy  and  influential  Xew  Yorkers, 
who  so  often  give  their  signatures  to  papers  of  this  kind  without 
proper  consideration. 

In  December,  1862,  being  in  Washington,  the  Assistant  Secre 
tary  of  War  handed  me,  for  examination,  a  claim  for  above  three 
thousand  dollars,  which  had  been  collected  by  one  D'Utassy,  colonel 
of  the  Garibaldi  Guard,  a  Xew  York  volunteer  regiment,  upon  his 
affidavit  that  it  was  correct.  I  found  it  to  be  a  total  fraud,  the  very 
signatures  upon  the  sub- vouchers  being  forged.  The  delinquent  was 
court-martialed,  convicted,  and  sentenced  to  the  penitentiary.  The 
inquiry  into  this  and  the  Kolmstamm  cases  developed  such  an 
astonishing  condition  of  moral  obliquity  among  contractors  and 
regimental  officers  that  the  Secretary  of  War  took  prompt  measures 
to  bring  the  guilty  to  punishment.  Several  commissioned  officers 
were  dismissed  the  service,  and  a  number,  among  them  two  officers 
of  the  regular  army,  were  handed  over  to  the  civil  authorities  for 
prosecution.  The  Adjutant  General  also  availed  of  my  help,  sending 
me  claims  filed  for  payment,  that  I  might  report  my  opinion  of  their 
validity ;  and  various  practical  suggestions  from  me,  for  the  ref orma- 


712  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

tion  of  abuces  in  local  bureau  management,  were  favorably  received 
and  acted  upon.  By  the  time  that  six  months  had  elapsed,  I  had 
examined  some  two  hundred  witnesses,  taken  two  thousand  folios  of 
testimony,  and  all  idea  of  my  being  relieved  from  this  unwelcome, 
though  necessary,  duty  had  been  abandoned.  The  department 
threw  upon  me  more  and  more  responsibility,  but,  it  must  be  con 
fessed,  accompanying  it  with  a  more  than  ample  discretionary 
authority,  thus  affording  me  the  highest  proofs  of  the  Secretary's 
satisfaction,  and  stimulating  me  to  deserve  its  continuance.  At  the 
date  of  my  second  semi-annual  report  to  the  War  Department,  I 
had,  in  the  preceding  six  months,  made  inspections  in  ten  States ; 
taken  testimony  in  twenty-four  cities  and  towns,  beside  camps  and 
military  posts  ;  examined,  with  assistance,  eight  hundred  and  seven 
teen  witnesses,  written  five  hundred  and  fifty-three  letters,  and 
traveled  over  nineteen  thousand  miles. 

With  a  department  behind  him  whose  chiefs  approved  his 
course,  it  was  no  very  difficult  affair  for  a  non-partisan  officer  to 
effect  reforms  by  the  display  of  impartial  severity.  Old  standards 
had  been  departed  from ;  they  had  to  be  re-established.  The  old 
statutes  of  peace  times  were  inadequate  to  meet  new  exigencies  ; 
new  ones  had  to  be  enacted.  Politicians  had  saddled  their  dishonest 
parasites  upon  the  country;  it  was  for  us  to  convict  these  of  their 
crimes,  and  warn  their  patrons  to  nominate  no  more  such.  And  so 
it  happened  that,  throughout  the  entire  term  of  my  Commissioner- 
ship  of  the  War  Department,  every  reasonable  suggestion  that 
experience,  in  my  particular  department,  warranted  my  making  in 
the  direction  of  reform,  was  unhesitatingly  adopted  by  Mr.  Stanton, 
and  the  successive  Assistant  Secretaries  with  wrhom  I  had  the  honor 
and  pleasure  to  be  brought  into  relation — Messrs.  P.  II.  Watson, 
C.  A.  Dana,  and  Thomas  T.  Eckert.  These  suggestions  covered  the 
passage  of  laws  by  Congress,  the  reformation  of  standards  for  army- 
supply  contracts,  the  suspension  of  contractors'  vouchers  and  certifi 
cates,  new  regulations  for  the  procurement  of  supplies,  new  methods 
of  inspection,  transportation,  and  chartering,  the  transfer  and  removal 
of  influential  officers,  and  other  particulars  which  it  is  not  necessary 
to  specify. 

At  the  East  and  North  the  army  frauds  were  principally  in 
manufactured  articles  ;  at  the  West  and  Southwest  in  animals,  forage 
and  transportation.  I  had  comparatively  little  to  do  with  the  Ord 
nance  Bureau,  and  will,  therefore,  leave  the  curious  reader  to  glean 
from  the  papers  of  the  day,  and  the  records  of  Congress,  a  compre 
hensive  idea  of  the  swindling,  greater  or  less,  that  the  necessities  of 


THE  WAR-S  CARNIVAL   OF  FRAUD.  f!3 

our  government  obliged  it  to  submit  to.  But  of  the  Quartermaster's 
Department  I  am  as  competent,  perhaps,  as  any  one  else  to  speak. 
On  the  5th  of  August,  18C>3,  I  received  an  order  to  inspect  the 
Quartermaster  and  Commissary  Departments  of  the  Military  Depart 
ment  of  the  Ohio,  which  included  the  States  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  and 
Kentucky.  Major  General  Burnside  was  in  command,  with  head 
quarters  at  Cincinnati.  Upon  reporting  there  my  first  care  was  to 
cause  to  be  prepared  by  the  chief  quartermaster  a  complete  list  of 
all  contracts  awarded  within  a  certain  period,  with  the  names  of  the 
bidders  at  each  letting.  With  this  as  a  guide  it  was  a  simple  matter 
to  learn  what  fraud  had  been  practiced,  for  I  had  only  to  direct  my 
orderlies  to  serve  a  summons  upon  each  disappointed  bidder  to  report 
at  headquarters  and  testify,  when  the  whole  chicanery  was  invariably 
exposed.  The  regular  dealers  and  responsible  merchants  were  always 
to  be  found  among  this  class,  and,  when  satisfied  the  "War  Depart 
ment  was  really  in  earnest,  and  would  throw  the  market  open  to  fair 
competition,  they  would  tell  the  honest  truth.  Thus  I  discovered 
within  forty-eight  hours  that  by  a  corrupt  conspiracy  between  a  gov 
ernment  purchasing  agent,  an  inspector,  a  Cincinnati  contractor,  and 
an  Indianapolis  horse  dealer,  and  Republican  politician,  the  United 
States  had  boon  systematically  robbed  of  one  million  dollars  in  the 
purchase  of  horses  and  mules,  at  the  Cincinnati  corral,  during  the 
preceding  year.  My  duties  were  greatly  lightened  by  the  prompt 
and  efficient  co-operation  of  the  Department  Adjutant  General,  and 
Judge  Advocate — Captain  AV.  P.  Anderson,  and  Major  Henry  L. 
Burnett. 

At  Louisville  frauds  alike  shameful  had  been  perpetrated  in  the 
purchase  of  animals,  while  one  Black — a  captain  and  assistant  quarter 
master,  who  boasted  much  of  his  influence  with  Secretary  Stanton, 
and  whom  I  especially  gratified  that  official  by  bringing  before  a 
court-martial — had  not  only  connived  at  the  fraudulent  adulteration 
of  grain  by  his  contractors,  but  absolutely  stood  by  to  see  it  done, 
and  handled  a  shovel  himself.  This  unconscionable  rascal  in  uniform 
was  convicted  of  the  crime,  and  sentenced  to  "be  dismissed  the  ser 
vice  of  the  United  States,  with  loss  of  all  pay  and  allowances  due  or 
to  become  due;  to  pay  a  fine  of  ten  thousand  dollars,  and  to  be 
imprisoned  at  such  place  as  the  commanding  general  shall  designate 
for  the  period  of  two  years." 

The  delinquent  horse,  mule,  hay,  grain,  and  other  contractors  in 
the  Department  of  the  Ohio  were  thoroughly  punished  by  fines  and 
imprisonment,  and  thenceforward  the  government  was  enabled  to 
obtain  supplies  at  fair  prices,  and  of  good  quality.  This  result,  it 


714  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

should  be  noticed,  was,  in  a  peculiar  degree,  owing  to  the  ability, 
zeal,  and  industry  of  Judge  Advocate  Burnett,  whose  services  were 
appropriately  recognized  by  the  Secretary,  by  promoting  him  succes 
sively  to  colonel  and  brigadier  general. 

^any  will  recollect  the  great  interest  that  was  felt,  in  the  year 
1863,  in  the  matter  of  the  chartering  of  steam  and  other  vessels  at 
Fortress  Monroe,  in  consequence  of  the  discovery  that  a  certain 
very  influential  Republican  Senator  of  the  United  States  had  accepted 
a  fee  of  three  thousand  dollars  from  the  harbor  master  of  that  mili 
tary  post,  while  lying  under  charges  in  the  Old  Capitol  Prison. 
There  had  been  some  very  acrimonious  passages  between  the  Senator 
and  Secretary  Stanton,  the  former  peremptorily  demanding  the  pris 
oner's  unconditional  release  (without  mentioning  the  fact  of  the  fee), 
the  latter  refusing.  As  a  compromise  it  was  finally  agreed  that  I 
should  be  ordered  to  Fortress  Monroe  to  prepare  the  case  for  speedy 
trial,  and  the  necessary  instructions  were  sent  me  from  the  depart 
ment.  I  found  plenty  of  fraud,  but  more  to  lay  at  the  doors  of 
others  who  had  chartered  vessels  at  the  North,  than  at  that  of  the 
prisoner.  Enough,  however,  of  probable  cause  was  connected  with 
him  to  induce  his  being  tried  before  a  military  commission,  over 
wThich  Brigadier  General  Isaac  I.  Wister,  of  Philadelphia,  presided, 
and  his  conviction  followed. 

In  my  "  Third  Semi- Annual  Report  to  the  "War  Department," 
in  reporting  this  case,  I  used  this  language : 

Evidence  was  elicited  tending  to  show  that  the  abuses  of  which  the  commis 
sion  complained  extend  over  the  whole  seaboard.  The  government  has  been  in  the 
habit  of  paying  ruinous  prices  for  the  charter  of  vessels,  some  of  which  have  been 
perfectly  unseaworthy.  The  precious  lives  of  officers  and  men,  and  public  property 
to  the  value  of  millions  of  dollars,  have  been  intrusted  to  rotten  steamboat  hulks, 
and  greedy  speculators  and  middlemen  have  been  paid  for  their  use  prices  of  the 
most  extortionate  nature. 

I  have  referred  above  to  the  loyal  support  constantly  given  me 
by  Secretary  Stanton.  One  instance  will  suffice  by  way  of  example. 
The  Provost  Marshal  on  Major  General  Schenck's  staff,  at  Baltimore, 
had  been  guilty  of  scandalous  conduct,  which  was  at  last  brought  to 
the  Secretary's  notice  by  a  brigadier  general  of  volunteers,  who  pre 
ferred  formal  charges.  Through  the  Judge  Advocate  General  I 
received  the  Secretary's  order  to  investigate  the  charges  and  recom 
mend  what  action  should  be  taken.  The  result  was  the  officer's 
arrest,  confinement  in  the  Old  Capitol,  his  subsequent  trial  by  court- 
martial,  conviction  of  theft  and  perjury,  and  his  sentence  to  the 
Albany  Penitentiary,  where  he  served  out  his  term,  if  my  memory 


THE  WAR'S  CARNIVAL   OF  FRAUD.  715 

is  not  at  fault.  The  commanding  influence  of  General  Sclienck  in 
Congress,  and  the  persistent  interference  of  the  Congressional  dele 
gation  from  the  culprit's  native  State,  gave  Mr.  Stanton  much  trouble. 
He  was  beset  with  petitions,  remonstrances  and  personal  appeals,  but 
to  no  purpose.  At  last  the  Governor  of  the  State  came  himself  to 
Washington,  and,  in  company  with  its  Senators  and  Representatives, 
proceeded  to  the  War  Department  and  vainly  coaxed  the  iron-willed 
chief  to  relent.  "  When  you  can  show  me  that  Colonel  Olcott  has 
furnished  me  with  false  testimony,  or  exceeded  the  limits  of  justice 
in  his  recommendations,  then  I  will  release  your  man  and  put  mine 
in  his  place,"  was  his  reply.  Thus  bafHed,  one  testy  Congressman 
lost  his  temper  and  used  a  more  peremptory  tone,  whereupon  Mr. 
Stanton,  rising  and  giving  way  to  his  wrath,  threatened  to  put  the 
member  in  the  Old  Capitol  if  he  said  another  word,  and  the  stormy 
interview  was  abruptly  terminated.  I  have  the  story  from  the  lips  of 
the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  who  was  present. 

In  the  case  of  a  contractor  for  transporting  wounded  soldiers 
through  the  city  of  Xew  York,  it  was  found  that  the  government 
had  been  defrauded  in  both  transportation  and  the  cooked  rations 
supplied,  but  on  each  of  a  pile  of  uncollected  vouchers  found  in  his 
desk  when  he  was  arrested  by  the  general  commanding,  was  the 
official  certificate  of  the  medical  director  that  "  this  account  is  cor 
rect  and  just,  and  that  the  services  were  rendered  by  my  order,  and 
that  they  were  necessary  for  the  public  service."  Comparison  of 
them  with  the  medical  director's  own  books  showed  at  a  glance  the 
fraud.  For  instance,  on  May  30th,  18(38,  a  charge  was  made  by  the 
contractor  u  for  nursing  and  subsisting  three  hundred  and  fifty  men 
from  the  steamer  Cosmopolitan  and  delivering  them  at  David's 
Island."  But  the  hospital  books  in  the  office  of  the  medical  director, 
who  certified  to  the  correctness  of  the  account,  showed  that  on  that 
day  only  ninety-seven  men  arrived  at  the  island !  The  scamp  was 
found  guilty  before  a  court-martial,  after  several  hundred  witnesses 
had  been  examined,  and  was  sent  to  the  penitentiary  for  a  term  of 
ten  years.  A  radical  reform  in  this  branch  of  service  was,  of  course, 
the  most  substantial  fruit  of  the  department's  investigation. 

The  responsible  officers  of  the  War  Department  were  all  over 
worked.  From  the  Secretary  down  there  was  no  exception.  Each 
crowded  at  least  three  years'  proper  work  into  one  year,  and  some  of 
us  four  or  five.  It  was  all  I  could  do,  though  working  night  and 
day,  Sundays  and  all,  and  with  one,  two,  and  at  times  three  and  four 
stenographers  to  help  me,  to  keep  ahead  of  my  work.  Again  and 
again  I  urged  the  organization  of  a  special  bureau  to  have  charge  of 


716  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  execution  of  the  acts  of  Congress  against  fraud  and  malfeasance, 
and  in  a  measure  combine  the  duties  and  powers  of  the  Judge  Advo 
cate  and  Inspector  General.  For  this  was  what  my  own  office  had 
grown  into,  and  there  was  more  work  than  a  dozen  officers  could 
thoroughly  accomplish.  "  It  is  a  curious  anomaly,"  I  said,  in  one 
of  my  reports  to  the  department,  "that  a  government  disbursing 
one  billion  of  dollars  annually,  has  no  organized  system  for  the 
prevention  and  punishment  of  frauds,  its  effects  in  this  direction 
having  been  entirely  spasmodic  and  irregular.  I  am  firmly  con 
vinced  that  a  bill  containing  provisions  calculated  to  remedy  this 
evil  would  meet  with  the  cordial  support  of  the  whole  people,  with 
out  regard  to  political  party."  What  was  true  in  1864  is  equally  so 
in  1878,  and  to-day  the  creation  of  a  respectable  and  responsible 
inspection  bureau,  clothed  with  large  discretionary  powers,  would, 
in  the  hands  of  an  honorable  and  courageous  commissioned  officer, 
do  incalculable  good. 

While  Philadelphia  set  a  bright  example  of  patriotic  devotion 
during  the  war,  and  poured  out  her  resources  in  unstinted  measure 
for  her  country's  salvation,  yet  it  is  true  that  vast  frauds  were  perpe 
trated  in  that  city.  These  extended  to  tents  and  other  canvas  goods, 
clothing,  shoes,  and  stores  of  various  kinds.  In  the  two  years 
preceding  my  inspection  of  the  Schuylkill  Arsenal  the  disburse 
ments  of  the  quartermaster  had  exceeded  two  hundred  million 
dollars,  and  at  that  time  were  running  on  at  the  rate  of  from  seventy 
million  dollars  to  eighty  million  dollars  annually.  To  inquire  into 
so  vast  a  business  I  was  obliged  to  take  it  up  by  divisions;  so,  as 
nearly  as  practicable,  I  took  testimony  and  inspected,  seriatim,  canvas 
goods  (including  tents,  paulins,  wagon-covers,  knapsacks,  and  haver 
sacks),  leather  and  manufactures  of  leather,  cloth,  and  clothing,  and 
miscellaneous  articles.  The  same  old  results  ensued;  inspectors, 
contractors,  manufacturers,  and  middlemen,  were  arrested,  commis 
sioned  officers  displaced  ;  trials  were  followed  by  convictions,  fines, 
and  assessed  damages ;  new  inspectors  were  appointed,  new  standards 
established,  and  abuses  were  reformed.  The  close  of  the  war  found 
me  with  this  work  only  half  completed,  and  so  some  great  culprits, 
military  and  civilian,  escaped  the  just  punishment  of  their  offenses, 
to  figure  as  noisy  politicians  and  be  looked  up  to  as  successful  men 
of  affairs  \  The  archives  of  the  War  Department  have  many  an  ugly 
secret  smothered  in  its  pigeon-holes,  and,  heaven  knows !  it  will  not 
be  myself  who  will  disturb  them ;  there  is  stench  enough  in  the  air 
without  this  carrion. 


THE   WAR'S  CARNIVAL  OF  FRAUD.  717 

I  was  unfortunate  enough  (or  fortunate,  as  some  might  have  it, 
though  I  did  not  see  it  in  that  light)  to  have  so  commended  myself 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Xavy  by  my  work  for  the  War  Department 
that,  February  6th,  ISG-i,  he  applied  to  Secretary  Stanton  for  my 
detail  to  him  for  temporary  service.  Receiving  my  orders,  I  reported 
to  Mr.  Welles  a  few  days  later ;  and,  on  the  16th,  was  officially  com 
missioned  as  "  Special  Commissioner  of  the  Xavy  Department." 
Mr.  Welles  had  some  suspicion  that  there  were  abuses  in  his  navy 
yards  needing  correction,  but  no  very  detinite  information.  A  con 
tractor,  named  Henry  D.  Stover,  had  been  convicted  by  court- 
martial  of  an  attempt  to  defraud  the  government  in  some  trilling 
matter  of  sheet  copper,  and  I  was  ordered  to  visit  and  confer  with 
him  in  Fort  Lafayette.  I  found  him  uncommunicative  and  evasive, 
and  goon  departed.  Upon  reflection,  I  concluded  that  the  better  course 
was  to  take  the  sworn  testimony  of  our  most  responsible  business 
men,  who  would  assuredly  lay  bare  existing  abuses,  if  any  existed. 
I  first  summoned  Mr.  William  E.  Dodge,  Jr..  and  then,  upon  his 
recommendation,  other  dealers  in  metals.  As  Mr.  Dodge's  affidavit 
presents,  in  a  condensed  form,  the  facts  about  the  system  of  navy 
contracts  that  flourished  everywhere,  it  will  be  instructive  to  present 
extracts  in  this  connection. : 

Our  facilities,  says  ho,  lor  supplying  metals  to  the  government  are  almost 
unlimited.  We  have  not,  in  one  instance  which  I  can  now  recall,  furnished  or  sold 
tiny  thing  to  the  Navy  Department  ;  but,  according  to  the  usages  of  the  trade,  have 
sold  through  brokers  to  a  comparatively  limited  extent.  We  have  not  been  able  to 
transact  business  with  the  department  without  sacrificing  self-respect !  "We  have 
made  several  attempts  to  trade  with  the  department  in  a  fair,  liberal  spirit,  without 
caring  to  realize  any  profit,  except  barely  enough  to  cover  expenses.  We  have 
never  bid,  except  in  reply  to  telegrams  received  from  the  Xavy  Department  direct, 
and  have  been  invariably  underbid  by  parties  without  standing  or  respectability 
among  merchants.  In  fact,  so  satisfied  were  we  that  our  offers,  however  liberal 
they  might  be,  would  not  result  in  business,  that  we  finally  were  obliged  to  decline 
to  enter  the  list  against  the  set  of  disreputable  characters,  who  seemed  to  have 
secured  the  favor  of  the  department !  It  is  a  matter  of  personal  knowledge  with  us 
that  the  leading  houses  of  New  York  entertain  the  same  views.  It  is  also  generally 
understood  that  some  of  our  best  houses,  dealing  in  metals  which  have  a  fixed  value 
like  gold  or  silver,  and  which  are  liable  to  all  the  fluctuations  incident  to  the  times, 
have  been  obliged  to  wait  three  or  four,  five,  or  even  six  months  for  their  money ; 
while  other  houses,  of  no  standing  or  reputation,  have  got  their  money  for  immense 
sales  within  two  or  three  days ! 

With  such  a  start,  the  sequel  was  not  difficult  to  foresee.  Be 
fore  two  days  had  passed  the  whole  villainy  was  exposed.  Within 
ten  days  General  Dix,  under  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  acting 
at  the  instance  of  Secretary  Welles,  had  arrested  every  member  of 


718  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR, 

this  infamous  ring  of  contractors  and  middlemen,  and  turned  over 
their  books  and  papers  to  me  for  examination.  I  employed  additional 
clerks,  had  ledgers,  invoice,  letter,  requisition,  check  and  deposit 
books  analyzed,  and  one  of  the  great  sensations  of  the  day  was  the 
reading  to  the  United  States  Senate  by  Mr.  Grimes,  of  Iowa,  of  a 
tabulated  exhibit  of  Stover's  profits  on  oil  contracts  during  one  year. 
Without  having  bought  a  gallon  of  "best  winter  strained  sperm  oil," 
such  as  his  contracts  called  for  (and  despite  his  taking  the  same  at 
one  dollar  per  gallon,  when  the  market  price  stood  at  two  dollars), 
he  had  realized  a  profit  of  one  hundred*  and  seventeen  thousand 
dollars  on  the  year's  transactions !  What  he  had  supplied  to  the 
Brooklyn  yard  was  horse  fat,  menhaden,  and  other  stinking  fish  oils, 
etc.  The  inspectors  who  passed  it,  and  the  engineers  who  used  it, 
can  best  explain  why  it  happened. 

Regular  dealers,  as  Mr.  Dodge  tells  us,  in  oil,  in  sheet  copper, 
in  block  and  plate  tin,  spelter,  timber,  machinery,  boiler  felting, 
clothing,  and  every  description  of  naval  supplies,  were  crowded  out 
of  competition  by  these  dishonest  middlemen,  and  a  general  demor 
alization  of  public  officials  prevailed.  My  experience  in  the  Wai- 
Department  made  me  wary  about  beginning  a  campaign  against  such 
a  rich  and  formidable  ring  of  contractors  as  I  immediately  discovered 
to  exist,  without  full  assurance  of  the  support  of  the  department. 
This  came  in  the  shape  of  the  following  letter : 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  February  18th,  1864. 

Sir : — Your  letter  of  the  17th  instant  is  received.  Unless  otherwise  directed, 
from  information  which  you  shall  obtain,  you  can  pursue  the  course  deemed  most 
advisable  from  your  experience.  The  department  has  no  political  object  in  these 
inquiries.  The  Secretary  has  directed  me  to  carry  forward  this  matter  in  conjunction 
with  yourself,  and  I  have  never  been  in  political  life.  You  may  rest  assured,  and 
such  information  may  be  given  to  witnesses,  that  the  guilty  will  be  exposed  and 
punished  without  regard  to  influence  or  position. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

[Signed]  G.  V.  FOX, 

Assistant  Secretory  of  the  Navy. 

To  COLONEL  H.  S.  OLCOTT,  Special  Commissioner,  Navy  Department. 

No  one  could  ask  more.  In  fact,  no  subordinate  ever  had  a 
more  honorable,  untiring,  prompt  or  patriotic  superior  than  I  found, 
for  the  next  year  and  a  half,  in  Assistant  Secretary  Fox.  An  attempt 
was  made  at  one  time  to  make  political  capital  out  of  an  alleged 
expression  of  his  in  a  letter  to  me,  that  a  certain  naval  court-martial 
"was  organized  to  convict."  The  only  thing  Mr.  Fox  ever  said  (in 
response  to  my  particular  request  that  the  court  to  try  these  New 


THE  WAR'S  CARNIVAL  OF  FRAUD.  719 

York  cases  should  be  composed  of  none  but  high-toned  and  fearless 
officers,  without  any  political  bias  or  aspiration)  was,  that  I  need  not 
fear  but  that  the  guilty  would  be  convicted,  and  punished  if  proven 
guilty.  His  official  letter  of  February  18th,  now  first  published, 
shows  the  whole  attitude  of  the  Xavy  Department  toward  this  ques 
tion  of  abuses  and  toward  myself. 

Senator  Hale,  of  Xew  Hampshire,  from  his  place  in  the  Senate 
openly  charged  Mr.  Fox  with  having  instructed  me  to  inquire  into 
his  business  relations,  and  of  having  made  use  of  the  expression 
above  referred  to ;  but  in  a  document  communicated  to  the  Senate 
by  Secretary  AVelles,  in  compliance  with  a  resolution,  Mr.  Fox  thus 
emphatically  put  his  foot  upon  the  falsehood.  Addressing  the 
Secretary  of  the  Xavy,  he  says : 

In  obedience  to  your  orders  to  cause  to  be  investigated  the  alleged  fraudulent 
transactions  of  all  persons  amenable  to  this  department,  the  services  of  Colonel  H. 
S.  Olcott  were  temporarily  obtained.  This  officer  is  attached  to  the  War  Depart 
ment,  is  familiar  with  such  investigations,  and  enjoys  in  an  eminent  degree  the  con 
fidence  of  that  department.  '  *  The  allegation  that  I  had  said  to  him  that 
the  Xavy  Department  had  organized  courts  to  convict,  is  not  true.  I  said  some 
thing  like  that  of  the  recent  law,  passed  by  Congress,  requiring  contractors  to  be 
tried  by  court-martial. 

I  will  not  burden  with  details  the  present  historical  retrospect. 
Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  same  gang  of  scamps  supplied  the  Wash 
ington,  Philadelphia,  and  Xew  York  Xavy  Yards.  Their  programme 
was  simple,  but  effectual.  Under  the  regulations,  a  contractor  who 
had  faithfully  complied  with  the  terms  of  a  contract,  was  entitled  to 
the  first  consideration  of  the  navy  agent  (the  purchaser  of  supplies 
in  the  open  market  at  each  naval  station,  the  paying  officer  through 
whom  all  money  passed  to  contractors)  when  extra  supplies  had  to  be 
obtained  in  open  market.  The  ring  thief  had  only  to  collude,  in  each 
transaction,  with  three  men  to  have  everything  as  he  could  desire :  1. 
The  master-workman,  upon  whose  recommendation  the  Xavy  Depart 
ment's  annual  estimates  of  the  supplies  that  would  be  needed  in  that 
shop  are  based.  2.  The  inspector,  who  must  pass  upon  the  goods 
delivered,  and  was  officially  supposed  to  reject  such  articles  as  were 
scant  in  measure  or  weight,  or  inferior  in  quality.  3.  The  navy  agent, 
dispenser  of  patronage,  golden  fountain  of  riches.  Other  minor 
potential  obstructionists  had,  of  course,  to  be  disposed  of;  but  a 
little  money,  a  good  deal  of  soft  talk,  unlimited  liquor,  and,  occa 
sionally,  some  pressure  from  superiors,  went  a  long  way.  Thus, 
practically,  the  master-workman  would  estimate  for  not  above  ten 
per  cent,  of  the  supplies  he  was  morally  certain  would  be  required 


720  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAE. 

in  his  shop ;  the  inspectors  would  see  sperm  oil  in  horse  fat,  two 
whole  boxes  of  tin  plates  in  the  two  halves  of  one  box  that  had  been 
sawed  in  two  and  fitted  with  an  extra  side  each,  pure  "  Banca "  or 
"Lamb  and  Flag"  tin  in  ingots  of  an  equal  mixture  of  tin  and  lead; 
and  the  benevolent  navy  agent,  on  a  "divy"  of  fifteen  per  cent., 
would  order  of  his  pal  the  other  ninety  per  cent,  at  open  market 
prices,  and  throw  in  all  additional  orders  that  fortune  might  put  it 
in  his  way  to  give  out !  And  this  was  what  I  found  in  New  York. 
The  contractors  were  all  convicted ;  arrests  and  removals  were  plen 
tiful  in  the  Brooklyn  yard ;  Navy  Agent  Henderson  was,  December, 
1864,  indicted  eight  times  by  the  grand  jury,  gave  bail  in  thirty-two 
thousand  dollars,  was  tried  and  escaped  because  the  government  could 
not  prove  wlietJier  it  was  II.  D.  Stover  or  his  book-keeper  who  had 
paid  him  (Henderson)  the  fifteen  per  cent,  commission  in  the  trans 
action,  which  was  the  subject  of  the  indictment  we  had  elected  to  try. 
We  proved  the  general  agreement,  the  payments  in  gross  of  fifteen 
per  cent,  on  all  Stovers'  open  purchase  orders,  the  deposit  of  the 
money  in  Henderson's  bank,  and  its  deduction  each  time  from 
Stover's.  But  the  Secretary  had  confidingly  accepted  Stover  as 
State's  witness,  and  was  cheated  when  the  pinch  came !  The  other 
seven  indictments  were  not  tried.  One  experiment  with  such  wit 
nesses  was  enough. 

Things  were  bad  enough  at  New  York,  but,  if  anything,  worse 
at  Philadelphia.  Discovery  was  brought  about  by  an  honest  dealer, 
named  Barstow,  sending  to  the  Navy  Department,  for  examination, 
four  cases  of  thirty-two  ounce  sheathing  copper,  that  he  had  bought, 
in  good  faith,  of  a  responsible  firm,  but  which  was  of  the  kind  rolled 
at  the  Washington  Navy  Yard.  The  copper  was  easily  traced  back 
to  one  Harris,  keeper  of  a  sailors'  boarding-house,  and  a  man  of  bad 
repute  at  the  time.  He  was  arrested  by  General  Cadwallader,  for 
account  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  lodged  in  Fort  Mifflin. 
A  political  striker  named  Anthony  Hale — "  Tony  "  Hale — employed 
as  a  boss  carter  in  the  yard,  was  next  arrested,  and  then  one  tiling 
brought  on  another  until,  before  I  was  through,  thirty-one  prisoners 
were  in  military  custody.  The  arrests  were  effected  by  Mr.  Benja 
min  Franklin,  chief  of  detective  police,  whose  services  the  Mayor 
placed  at  my  disposal.  A  more  untiring  and  faithful  officer  I  never 
encountered  than  Mr.  Franklin.  Besides  the  man  Harris,  the  prison 
ers  were  the  Naval  Constructor,  first  assistant  engineer,  timber 
inspector,  master  plumber,  caulker,  joiner,  blacksmith,  laborer  and 
painter,  the  clerk  of  the  yard,  his  chief  clerk  and  check  clerk,  three 
clerks  of  the  storekeeper,  the  master  caulker's  clerk,  a  quarterman 


THE   WAR'S  CARNIVAL  OF  FRAUD.  721 

laborer,  a  quart erman  joiner,  two  qnartermen  plumbers,  four  receivers 
of  stolen  property,  six  contractors,  and  one  purser's  steward.  A 
pretty  lot  of  patriots  and  Republicans,  indeed ! 

A  few  days  of  continement  in  military  prison  brought  on  a  con 
tagion  of  repentance,  confession  and  supplication.  My  time  was 
taken  up  in  hearing  revelations  of  their  rascalities  from  the  cowardly 
culprits,  whose  friends,  ignorant  of  what  was  going  on,  were  besieging 
my  offices  with  petitions  for  their  release,  and  making  my  feelings 
cheerful  with  threats  of  personal  violence  conveyed  by  anonymous 
letters.  The  press  overran  with  sensational  articles,  which  I  was  too 
busy  to  read,  and  Congressmen  became  interested  to  a  degree  in  the 
affairs  of  my  commission.  But  it  is  only  fail'  to  say  that  not  one 
newspaper  thundered  against  the  u  arbitrary  arrests ''  of  the  govern 
ment;  all  united  in  expressing  the  hope  that  offenders  might  be 
brought  to  punishment.  Nor  did  the  Congressmen  intercede  or 
throw  any  impediments  in  my  way. 

Large  recoveries  of  stolen  copper,  pitch,  rosin,  and  other  public 
property  were  made.  Some  fifteen  hundred  barrels  of  naval  stores 
had  been  carted  out  of  the  yard  by  Hale  in  broad  daylight,  and,  to 
say  nothing  of  copper  bath-tubs,  brass  filings,  and  other  .smaller 
things,  the  thieves  had  removed  a  steam  engine  bodily,  and  sold  it 
to  a  junk  dealer.  Some  sixty  thousand  and  odd  dollars  in  money 
and  property  were  placed  in  my  hands  as  restitutions,  and  by  me 
turned  over  to  the  commandant  of  the  yard.  As  usual,  there  were 
trials,  convictions,  and  pardons,  and  the  several  cases  presented 
features  of  comedy,  tragedy,  or  farce,  as  it  happened.  There  lies 
before  me  now,  in  a  file  of  old  documents,  the  certified  memorandum 
of  property  given  up  by  a  poor  young  clerk  who  had  been  ruined  by 
the  richest  of  the  .New  York  gang  of  contractors — one  Charles  TV7. 
Scofield.  This  young  man  had  a  wife  lying  dangerously  ill ;  she 
needed  delicacies  which  his  poverty  denied  her,  when  the  contractor 
came,  as  the  victim  said  to  me,  ''like  an  angel  out  of  heaven,"  and 
presented  him  with  fifty  dollars  as  an  act  of  "  pure  friendship."  Xo 
favors  were  asked  at  the  time  except  that  he  would  look  after  the 
contractor's  goods,  and  see  that  they  were  duly  inspected.  But  soon 
afterward  something  was  asked — that  short  deliveries  of  goods  might 
not  be  noticed,  nor  too  close  an  inspection  of  them  made.  In  return 
for  which  service  (which  he  was  assured  was  rendered  at  every  other 
yard)  the  clerk  should  receive  half  the  contractor's  profits  on  the  over 
charges.  The  sick  wife's  needs  settled  the  matter,  and  the  clerk 
turned  up  at  last  in  prison.  His  contrition  being  sincere,  the  Secre 
tary  permitted  him  to  make  restitution,  and  be  released  from  confme- 
46 


722  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

ment.  lie  gave  into  my  keeping  nearly  four  thousand  dollars  in 
United  States  bonds,  and  was  released  on  his  parole.  I  found 
employment  for  him,  and,  at  last  accounts,  he  was  living  an  honest 
life.  Scofield  was  tried  by  court-martial,  convicted,  and  sentenced 
to  be  imprisoned  and  pay  a  fine  of  twenty  thousand  dollars. 

There  were  abuses  in  the  Kittery,  Boston,  and  Portsmouth 
yards  also ;  but  I  need  not  go  into  particulars,  since  it  would  but  be 
to  repeat  the  same  disgusting  tale  of  treason,  perjury,  conspiracy, 
theft,  and  greed.  The  Secretary,  no  less  than  Mr.  Fox  and  myself, 
was  weary  of  these  arrests;  and,  atter  taking  some  months  to  turn 
it  over  in  his  mind,  Mr.  Welles  at  last  approved  a  plan  I  presented 
him,  at  the  instance  of  Mr.  J.  P.  Yeeder,  my  chief  assistant  in  the 
naval  investigations,  for  the  thorough  reorganization  of  the  affairs 
of  the  navy  yards.  My  argument  was  that  a  system  of  book-keeping 
that  was  adequate  to  the  wants  of  a  vast  commercial  business  like 
that  of  the  house  of  A.  T.  Stewart  &  Co.,  or  II.  B.  Claflin  &  Co., 
was  good  enough  for  a  navy  yard,  where  each  ship  was  a  customer, 
each  master  workman  the  head  clerk  of  a  department,  the  paymasters 
cashiers,  the  Navy  Department  principal  creditor,  and  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  book-keeper-in-chief.  I  proposed  that  we  should 
begin  with  the  taking  of  an  account  of  stock,  create  the  new  office 
of  chief  accountant,  open  invoice-books  like  those  of  merchants,  and 
not  only  devise  a  self-maintaining  system  of  checks  of  one  bureau 
upon  another,  and  both  upon  the  navy  agent,  but  have  a  page  for 
each  transaction,  where  its  complete  history,  from  beginning  to  end, 
should  be  seen  at  a  glance.  Such  unheard-of  innovations  upon  naval 
routine  could  not,  of  course,  be  lightly  approved ;  but  at  last  the 
order  came,  and  I  was  given  the  JBoston  yard  to  try  the  experiment 
in.  I  hired  a  competent  book-keeper,  had  a  suitable  set  of  books 
made  under  Mr.  Yeeder's  directions,  overrode  all  opposition  of 
officers  and  clerks,  and,  at  the  expiration  of  the  first  quarter, 
handed  the  Secretary  the  first  trustworthy  balance-sheet  of  a  navy 
yard  that  had  ever  been  seen.  The  credit  for  it  is  all  due  to  my 
assistants. 

The  result  was  so  satisfactory  that  the  department  ordered  the 
new  system  applied  to  all  the  yards  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  which 
was  done — Philadelphia  following  next  after  Boston,  and  then  New 
York  and  the  others.  Thus  the  primary  object. of  all  our  labors  was, 
apparently,  effected  in  the  bringing  about  of  a  reformation,  of  which 
individual  arrests  were  but  painful  incidents.  I  was  more  than  glad 
when,  the  war  having  closed,  my  resignation  of  the  special  commis- 
sionership  of  the  Navy  Department  was  finally  accepted,  after  a 


THE   WAR'S  CARNIVAL   OF  FRAUD.  723 

delay  of  some  months  in  considering  the  question.  I  was  permitted 
to  suggest  the  new  office  of  Inspector  of  the  Navy  Department,  and 
Mr.  Veeder  was  appointed  to  the  berth.  But  that  amiable  and  non- 
combative  old  gentleman  was  soon  forced,  by  the  powerful  influences 
arrayed  against  him,  to  retire,  and  since  that  time,  as  I  learn,  the  old 
routine  has,  in  a  large  degree,  been  re-established.  Contractors  and 
employes  whom  I  convicted  have  been  restored  to  favor,  and  a  series 
of  scandals  is  now  being  investigated  by  the  present  Congress. 

My  temporary  detail  to  the  Navy  Department  had  not  at  all 
relieved  me  of  my  War  Department  duties.  Quite  the  contrary  ; 
it  seemed  as  though  the  more  I  had  to  do  in  the  former  held  of 
labor  the  greater  were  the  calls  upon  me  in  the  latter.  A  sub 
committee  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  visiting 
my  Xew  York  offices  one  day,  found  the  desks,  chairs,  and  iloor 
covered  with  the  business  papers  of  the  navy  ring,  a  dozen  clerks 
assorting  and  analyzing  them,  and  I  taking  depositions  about  army 
frauds  in  an  adjoining  room.  They  had  come  there  to  investigate  my 
doings,  at  the  instance  of  complaining  contractors;  but  a  half  hour's 
observation  amply  sufficed,  and  thev  returned  to  Washington,  and 
reported  that  if  I  asked  for  the  whole  power  of  Congress  1  ought 
to  have  it,  for  at  least  two  departments  of  the  government  were 
rotten  with  fraud. 

My  narrative,  as  may  rcadilv  be  conceived  from  what  has  been 
given  above,  might  be  indefinitely  extended.  But  I  have  not  the 
heart  to  expatiate  longer  upon  this  chapter  of  national  infamy.  It 
is  my  deliberate  conviction,  based  upon  the  inspection  of  many 
bureaus,  and  the  examination  of  some  thousands  of  witnesses,  in 
every  walk  of  life,  that  at  least  twenty,  if  not  twenty-five,  per  cent, 
of  the  entire  expenditures  of  the  government  during  the  Rebellion, 
were  tainted  with  fraud.  That  is  to  say,  that  over  seven  hundred 
million  dollars  were  paid  to  public  robbers,  or  worse  than  wasted, 
through  improvident  methods.  If  the  loss  of  the  money  were  the 
only  thing  to  be  deplored,  it  would  be,  comparatively,  a  trifling 
affair;  for  this  country  has  boundless  resources,  and  unprecedented 
recuperative  capacities.  But  every  dollar  of  this  ill-spent  treasure 
contributed  toward  a  demoralization  of  the  people,  and  the  sapping 
of  ancient  virtues.  Let  any  one  who  surveys  the  present  condition 
of  public  morals  dare  deny  that  we  have  made  long  strides  toward 
the  overthrow  of  the  Republic  since  1.SG1. 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN. 


BY    COLONEL   "WILLIAM    ALLAN. 


AFTER  the  disastrous  termina 
tion  of  Braddock's  campaign 
against  Fort  Duquesne,  in 
the  summer  of  1756,  Colonel 
George  Washington,  to  whom 
was  intrusted  the  duty  of  pro 
tecting  the  Allegheny  frontier 
of  Virginia  from  the  French 
and  Indians,  established  him 
self  at  Winchester,  in  the 
lower  Shenandoah  Valley,  as 
the  point  from  which  he  could 
best  protect  the  district  as 
signed  to  him.  Here  he  sub 
sequently  built  Fort  Loudoun, 
and  made  it  the  base  of  his 
operations.  A  grass-grown  mound,  marking  the  site  of  one  of  the 
bastions  of  the  old  fort,  and  Loudoun  street,  the  name  of  the  prin 
cipal  thoroughfare  of  the  town,  remain,  to  recall  an  important 
chapter  in  colonial  history.  It  was  this  old  town  that  Major  General 
T.  J.  Jackson  entered  on  the  evening  of  November  4th,  1861,  as 
commander  of  the  "  Valley  District,"  and  established  his  headquarters 
within  musket  shot  of  Fort  Loudoun.  He  had  been  made  major 
general  on  October  7th,  for  his  services  at  the  first  battle  of 
Manassas,  and  was  now  assigned  to  this  important  command  because 
of  the  expectations  formed  from  his  capacity,  as  well  as  from  the 
fact  of  his  acquaintance  with  the  country.  His  district  embraced 
the  territory  bounded  north  by  the  Potomac,  east  by  the  Blue  Ridge, 
and  west  by  the  Alleghenies.  Born  and  reared  in  Western  Virginia, 
and  filled  with  a  patriot's  devotion  to  the  land  of  his  birth,  he  had 
manifested  a  strong  desire  to  be  employed  in  the  operations  in  that 
region,  and  liad  cherished  the  ambition  of  freeing  his  former  home 
from  hostile  domination.  The  Confederates,  during  the  summer, 
had  in  that  region  been  unsuccessful.  General  Robert  Garnett  had 

(724) 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S   VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  725 

been  forced  to  retreat  by  General  McClellan,  and  had  then  met 
defeat  and  death  at  Carrick's  ford,  on  Cheat  river,  July  18th.  This 
gave  the  Federals  the  control  of  the  greater  part  of  Virginia,  west  of 
the  Alleghenies,  and  the  subsequent  efforts  of  Generals  Floyd  and 
Wise,  and  still  later,  of  General  Lee,  availed  only  to  prevent  further 
encroachments  of  the  enemy — not  to  regain  the  lost  territory. 

When,  therefore,  General  Jackson  assumed  command  of  the 
Valley  of  Virginia,  the  enemy  had  possession  of  all  the  State  north 
of  the  Great  Kanawha,  and  west  of  the  Alleghenies,  and  had  pushed 
their  outposts  into  that  mountain  region  itself,  and  in  some  cases 
eastward  of  the  main  range.  Thus  General  Kelly  had  captured 
Romney,  the  county-seat  of  Hampshire  county,  forty  miles  west  of 
Winchester,  and  now  occupied  it  with  a  force  of  five  thousand  men. 
This  movement  gave  the  Federals  control  of  the  fertile  valley  of  the 
south  branch  of  the  Potomac.  Another,  though  much  smaller 
force,  occupied  Bath,  the  county-seat  of  Morgan  county,  forty  miles 
due  north  of  Winchester,  while  the  north  bank  of  the  Potomac  was 
everywhere  guarded  by  Union  troops.  The  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad  was  open  and  available  for  the  supply  of  the  Federal  troops 
from  Baltimore  to  Harper's  Ferry,  and  again  from  a  point  opposite 
(Hancock)  westward.  The  section  of  about  forty  miles  from 
Harper's  Ferry  to  Hancock,  lying  for  the  most  part  some  distance 
within  the  Virginia  border,  had  been  interrupted  and  rendered 
useless  by  the  (.'on federates,  but  this  gap  was  now  supplied  by  the 
Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal,  which  was  open  all  the  way  from  Cum 
berland,  Maryland,  to  Georgetown,  in  the  District  of  Columbia. 
The  plan  of  operations  that  Jackson  had  conceived  for  regaining 
West  Virginia  was  to  move  along  the  .Baltimore  Railroad  and  the 
turnpikes  parallel  to  it,  and  thus  enter  West  Virginia  at  the  north 
eastern  end.  In  this  way  he  could  turn  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy's 
forces,  place  himself  on  their  communications  and  force  them  to 
evacuate,  or  fight  under  circumstances  of  his  own  selection.  Having 
seen  how  his  predecessors  had  been  hampered,  in  trying  to  operate 
from  Staunton  westward,  by  the  difficult  and  inaccessible  nature  of 
the  country,  composed  almost  entirely  of  mountains  destitute  of 
supplies,  and  penetrated  by  nothing  but  indifferent  wagon  roads,  he 
was  anxious  to  try  a  mode  of  approach,  which,  if  more  exposed  to 
the  enemy,  had  the  advantage  of  being  easier,  by  lying  through  a 
much  more  populous  and  cultivated  region,  of  affording  to  some 
extent  the  use  of  a  railroad  for  supplies,  and  which  would  soon  place 
him  in  the  midst  of  some  of  the  most  fertile  parts  of  West  Virginia. 
In  order  to  carry  out  this  scheme,  he  asked  for  his  old  brigade,  which 


726  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

had  been  left  at  Manassas,  and  that  all  the  forces  operating  along  the 
line  of  the  Alleghenies,  southwest  of  Winchester,  and  lately  com 
manded  by  General  Lee,  should  be  concentrated  under  his  command. 
This  would  have  given  him  fifteen  thousand  or  sixteen  thousand 
men,  the  least  force  with  which  he  thought  it  possible  to  undertake 
so  bold  an  enterprise. 

His  wishes  were  complied  with  in  part.  His  own  brigade  was 
promptly  sent  to  him,  and  one  of  the  brigades  of  Loring's  troops 
(General  Loring  had  succeeded  General  Lee)  reached  him  early  in 
December.  Subsequently  two  more  brigades,  under  General  Loring 
himself,  were  added,  but  all  these  troops  only  increased  the  small 
force  of  three  thousand  State  militia,  which  he  had  assembled  in  the 
district  itself,  to  about  eleven  thousand  men.  The  greater  part  of 
General  Loring's  force  did  not  arrive  at  Winchester  until  Christmas, 
thus  preventing  any  important  movements  during  November  and 
December.  But,  meantime,  Jackson  was  not  idle.  lie  spent  the 
time  in  organizing,  equipping,  and  drilling  the  militia  and  the  scat 
tered  cavalry  commands,  which  he  consolidated  into  a  regiment 
under  Colonel  Ashby,  and  sent  expeditions  against  the  Chesapeake 
and  Ohio  Canal,  by  breaking  which  he  annoyed  the  enemy,  and 
interrupted  an  important  line  of  communication.  By  the  last  week 
in  December,  all  the  troops  that  the  War  Department  thought  it 
judicious  to  spare  him  had  arrived,  and,  though  the  season  was  far 
advanced,  he  determined  at  once  to  assume  the  offensive.  The  win 
ter  had  so  far  been  mild,  the  roads  were  in  excellent  condition,  and 
though  his  force  was  not  large  enough  for  the  recovery  of  West 
Virginia,  important  advantages  seemed  within  reach.  The  forces 
and  positions  of  the  enemy  opposed  to  Jackson  at  the  beginning  of 
1862  were  as  follows :  General  Banks,  commanding  the  Fifth  Corps 
of  McClellan's  army,  with  headquarters  at  Frederick,  Md.,  had  six 
teen  thousand  effective  men,  the  greater  part  of  whom  were  in 
winter  quarters,  near  that  city,  while  the  remainder  guarded  the 
Potomac  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  Williamsport ;  General  Rosecrans, 
still  holding  command  of  the  Department  of  West  Virginia,  had 
twenty-two  thousand  men  scattered  over  that  region,  but  was  con 
centrating  them  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad.  He  says,  in 
his  testimony  (see  Report  of  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
1865,  Volume  III.): 

On  the  6th  of  December,  satisfied  that  the  condition  of  the  roads  over  the 
Alleghcnies  into  Western  Virginia,  as  well  as  the  scarcity  of  the  subsistence  and 
horse  feed,  would  preclude  any  serious  operations  of  the  enemy  against  us  until  the 
opening  of  the  spring,  I  began  quietly  and  secretly  to  assemble  all  the  spare  troops 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  T27 

of  the  department  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  under 
cover  of  about  five  thousand  men  I  had  posted  at  Romney,  with  the  design  of 
obtaining  General  McClcllan's  permission  to  take  nearly  all  these  troops  and  sud 
denly  seize,  fortify  and  hold  Winchester,  whereby  I  should  at  once  more  effectually 
cover  the  northeastern  and  central  parts  of  Western  Virginia,  and  at  the  same  time 
threaten  the  left  of  the  enemy's  position  at  Manassas,  compel  him  to  lengthen  his 
line  of  defense  in  front  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  throw  it  farther  south. 

This  plan  of  Rosecrans  was  foiled  by  Jackson's  movement. 

On  the  1st  of  January,  1862,  the  latter  left  Winchester  at  the 
head  of  about  ten  thousand  men,  and  moved  toward  Bath,  in  Mor 
gan  county.  The  fine  weather  of  the  preceding  month  changed  on 
the  very  first  night  of  the  expedition,  and  a  terrible  storm  of  sleet 
and  snow  and  cold  set  in,  which,  for  the  next  three  weeks,  subjected 
the  troops  to  the  severest  hardships,  and  finally  forced  their  com 
mander  to  suspend  his  forward  movement.  At  first  the  troops 
marched  cheerfully  on  in  spite  of  cold  and  sleet.  Bath  was  evacu 
ated,  but  General  Lander,  who,  within  a  day  or  two  had  superseded 
Rosecrans,  hurried  reinforcements  to  Hancock  in  time  to  prevent 
Jackson  from  crossing  the  Potomac.  Jackson,  having  made  a  de 
monstration  against  Hancock,  did  what  damage  was  possible  to  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  placed  himself  between  Lander, 
at  Hancock,  and  Kelly,  at  Romney,  moved  toward  the  latter  place 
as  fast  as  the  icy  roads  would  permit.  Kelly  did  not  await  his 
approach  but  hastily  retired,  and,  on  January  14th,  Jackson  entered 
Romney.  Here,  though  the  weather  and  roads  grew  worse,  the 
Confederate  leader  had  no  intention  of  stopping.  He  arrived  at 
Cumberland  and  preparations  were  at  once  began  for  a  movement 
on  Xew  Creek  (now  called  Keyser),  but  when,  the  orders  to  march 
were  given  the  murmuring  and  discontent  among  his  troops,  espe 
cially  among  those  which  had  recently  come  under  his  command, 
readied  such  a  pitch  that  he  reluctantly  abandoned  the  enterprise, 
and  determined  to  go  into  winter  quarters.  Leaving  Loring  and  his 
troops  at  Romney,  he  returned  with  his  old  brigade  to  Winchester 
and  disposed  his  cavalry  and  militia  commands  so  as  to  protect  the 
whole  border  of  the  district. 

This  expedition,  though  it  had  cleared  his  district  of  the  foe, 
and  effectually  broke  up  the  all  plans  of  the  enemy  for  a  winter 
campaign  against  Winchester,  was  disappointing  to  Jackson  as  well 
as  to  the  public.  Though  believing  that  results  had  been  obtained 
which  outweighed  all  the  suffering  and  loss,  he  was  conscious  that 
winter  and  the  lack  of  cordial  support  had  prevented  the  accom 
plishment  of  far  more  important  ends.  But  this  did  not  lower  his 
self-reliance  or  diminish  his  clear-sightedness.  The  discontent  among 


728  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

the  troops  left  at  Romney  resulted,  on  tlie  31st  of  January,  in  an 
order  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  sent  without  consultation,  to  with 
draw  Luring  from  that  place.  Jackson  obeyed  the  order,  and  at 
once  resigned,  on  the  ground  that  sucli  interference,  by  the  depart 
ment  at  Richmond,  with  the  details  of  military  affairs  in  the  field, 
could  only  lead  to  disaster.  After  explanations,  and  upon  the  urgent 
request  of  Governor  Letcher  and  General  J.  E.  Johnston,  he  with 
drew  the  resignation.  Subsequently  there  was  no  desire  on  anybody's 
part  to  interfere  with  him.  For  the  next  month  Jackson  remained 
quietly  at  Winchester.  General  Loring  and  all  his  troops  that  were 
not  Virginians  were  ordered  elsewhere,  and  in  order  to  induce  re- 
enlistments,  furloughs  were  freely  granted.  The  Confederate  force 
was  in  this  way  reduced  to  about  four  thousand  men,  exclusive  of 
militia. 

With  the  1st  of  March  opened  the  great  campaign  of  1862,  in 
Virginia,  in  which  Jackson  was  to  bear  so  prominent  a  part.  In 
other  sections  of  the  Confederacy  fortune  favored  the  Federal  cause, 
and  the  Union  armies  were  on  the  full  tide  of  success.  On  the  8th 
of  February  Roanoke  Island  fell,  on  the  16th  Fort  Donelson,  on  the 
26th  Nashville,  and  on  the  27th  the  evacuation  of  Columbus  (Ken 
tucky)  was  begun.  These  successes  made  the  Federal  administration 
impatient  to  push  forward  operations  in  Virginia.  At  the  urgent 
representation  of  General  McClcllan,  President  Lincoln  had  yielded 
his  favorite  plan  of  campaign — an  advance  against  the  Confederate 
lines  at  Manassas — and  had  reluctantly  consented  to  the  transfer  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  Fort  Monroe,  and  its  advance  thence  on 
Richmond.  Before  he  would  allow  McClellan,  however,  to  begin 
the  transfer,  the  Potomac  river,  below  Washington,  must  be  cleared 
of  Confederate  batteries,  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  must  be 
recovered  and  protected,  and  all  the  approaches  to  Washington  must 
be  made  secure.  To  fulfil  a  part  of  these  conditions,  Banks'  and 
Lander's  commands  were  ordered  forward,  and  on  February  24th 
General  Banks  occupied  Harper's  Ferry.  Soon  after  McClellan 
began  the  movements  on  his  other  wing  that  were  preparatory  to  an 
attack  on  the  Confederate  batteries  along  the  Lower  Potomac.  These 
indications  of  activity  announced  to  General  Johnston  that  the  time 
hud  come  for  carrying  out  his  plan — already  determined  upon — of 
iv t  ivating  behind  the  Rappahannock.  On  the  7th  of  March  he  began 
the  withdrawal  of  his  army,  and  by  the  llth  all  the  infantry  and 
artillery  east  of  the  Blue  ridge  had  reached  the  new  position. 

Jackson,  meanwhile,  remained  at  Winchester,  watching  closely 
the  advance  of  Banks,  and  doing  what  was  possible  to  impede  it. 
General  Johnston  thus  describes  the  duty  assigned  to  him : 


STONEWALL  JACKSOX'S   VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  729 

After  it  had  become  evident  that  the  Valley  was  to  be  invaded  by  an  army' 
too  strong  to  be  encountered  by  Jackson's  Division,  that  officer  was  instructed  to 
endeavor  to  employ  the  invaders  in  the  Valley,  but  without  exposing  himself  to 
the  danger  of  defeat,  by  keeping  so  near  the  enemy  as  to  prevent  him  from  making 
any  considerable  detachment  to  reinforce  McClellan,  but  not  so  near  that  he  might 
be  compelled  to  light. 

At  tliis  time  Jackson's  entire  force  did  not  amount  to  four 
thousand  men,  exclusive  of  the  remnants  of  the  militia  brigades, 
which  were  not  employed  any  more  in  active  service.  It  consisted 
of  the  five  regiments  of  his  old  brigade,  now  under  Garnet,  of  three 
regiments  and  one  battalion  under  Burks,  and  of  two  regiments  under 
Fulkerson.  He  had  also  five  batteries  and  Ashby's  regiment  of 
cavalry.  General  Banks  had  his  own  division,  under  Williams,  and 
Shields'  (late  Lander's  troops)  Division,  now  incorporated  in  his  corps. 
Two  brigades  of  Sedinvick's  were  also  with  him  when  he  crossed  the 

£7>  O 

Potomac.  On  the  1st  of  April  the  strength  of  Banks'  corps,  embracing 
Shields,  is  given  by  General  McClellan  at  twenty-three  thousand 
three  hundred  and  thirty-nine,  including  three  thousand  six  hundred 
and  fifty-two  cavalry,  and  excluding  two  thousand  one  hundred  rail 
road  guards.  If  Sedgwick's  Brigades  continued  with  him  in  his 
advance  on  Winchester  his  entire  force  was  over  twenty-five  thousand. 
Jackson  sent  his  stores,  baggage  and  sick  to  the  rear,  but  continued 
to  hold  his  position  at  Winchester  to  the  last  moment. 

Banks  occupied  Charlestown  on  the  2<>th  of  February,  but  only 
reached  Stephenson's,  four  miles  north  of  Winchester,  on  March  7th. 
Here  Jackson  drew  up  his  little  force  in  line  of  battle  to  meet  him,  but 
the  Federals  withdrew  without  attacking.  The  activity  of  Ashby,  and 
the  boldness  with  which  Jackson  maintained  his  position,  impressed  his 
adversary  with  greatly  exaggerated  notions  of  his  strength.  Banks 
advanced  in  a  cautious  and  wary  manner,  refusing  to  attack,  but 
pushing  forward  his  left  wing  so  as  to  threaten  Jackson's  flank  and 
rear.  By  the  llth  of  March,  the  movement  had  gone  so  far  that  it 
was  not  longer  safe  for  the  Confederates  to  hold  Winchester.  Jack 
son  remained  under  arms  all  day  waiting  an  attack  in  front,  but  none 
was  made,  and  late  in  the  afternoon  he  ordered  trains  and  troops  into 
camp  near  the  south  end  of  the  town.  By  some  mistake  the  trains 
went  on  six  miles  further,  and  the  troops  had  to  follow.  Jackson, 
called  a  council  of  his  chief  officers — the  first  and  last  time,  it  is  to 
bo  believed,  that  he  ever  summoned  a  council  of  war — to  meet  after 
dark  in  Winchester,  and  proposed  to  them  a  night  attack  upon 
Banks.  His  proposition  was  not  approved,  and  he  learned  then  for 
the  first  time  that  the  troops  were  already  six  miles  from  Winchester 


^30  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

and  ten  from  the  enemy.  The  plan  was  now  evidently  impracticable, 
and  he  withdrew  from  the  town,  which  was  occupied  by  the  Federals 
on  the  next  day  (March  12th).  The  Confederates  continued  to  retreat 
slowly  to  Woodstock,  Mount  Jackson  (forty  miles  in  rear  of  Win 
chester),  and  Shields'  Division  was  thrown  forward  in  pursuit  to 
Strasburg  on  the  17th. 

The  retirement  of  Jackson,  and  the  unopposed  occupation  of  the 
Lower  Valley  by  Banks,  relieved  General  McClellan  of  all  fears  in 
that  direction,  and  induced  him,  in  pursuance  of  President  Lincoln's 
requirement  that  Manassas  Junction  and  the  approaches  to  Washing 
ton  from  that  direction  be  securely  held,  to  send  the  following  instruc 
tions  to  Banks,  on  March  16th  : 

Sir : — You  will  post  your  command  in  the  vicinity  of  Manassas,  intrench  your 
self  strongly  and  throw  cavalry  pickets  out  to  the  front.  Your  first  care  will  "be  the 
rebuilding  of  the  railway  from  Washington  to  Manassas,  and  to  Strasburg,  in  order 
to  open  your  communications  to  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  As  soon  as  the 
Manassas  Gap  Railway  is  in  running  order,  intrench  a  brigade  of  infantry,  say  four 
regiments,  with  two  batteries,  at  or  near  the  point  where  the  railway  crosses  the 
Shenandoah.  Something  like  two  regiments  of  cavalry  should  be  left  in  that 
vicinity  to  occupy  Winchester,  and  thoroughly  scour  the  country  south  of  the  rail 
way  and  up  the  Sheuandoah  Valley.  '  :  Occupy  by  grand  guards  Warrenton 
Junction  and  Warrenton  itself.  *  *  *  Some  more  advanced  point  on  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  Railroad.  *  *  * 

In  compliance  with  these  instructions,  Shields'  Division  was  re 
called  from  Strasburg,  and  Williams'  Division  began  its  movement 
toward  Manassas  on  the  20th  of  March. 

On  the  evening  of  the  21st,  Ashby  reported  that  the  enemy  had 
evacuated  Strasburg.  Jackson,  divining  that  this  meant  a  withdrawal 
toward  Washington,  at  once  ordered  pursuit  with  all  his  available  force. 
The  whole  of  his  little  army  reached  Strasburg  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
22d,  the  greater  part  after  a  march  of  twenty-two  miles.  Meantime 
Ashby  was  following  close  behind  the  retreating  enemy,  and  late  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  22d,  as  Jackson  was  entering  Strasburg,  Ashby 
was  attacking  the  Federal  pickets,  one  mile  south  of  Winchester. 
After  the  skirmish,  Ashby  camped  for  the  night  at  Kernstown, 
three  miles  south  of  Winchester.  General  Shields,  who  commanded 
the  troops  Ashby  had  attacked,  and  who  was  himself  wounded  in  the 
skirmish,  had  displayed  but  a  small  part  of  his  force ;  and  this  fact, 
combined  with  information  gotten  from  within  the  Federal  lines, 
misled  the  Confederates.  The  last  of  Williams'  Division,  of  Banks' 
Corps,  had  left  on  the  morning  of  the  22d  for  Manassas,  but  Shields' 
Division  of  three  brigades  still  remained.  The  reports  brought  out 
led  Ashby  to  believe  that  all  but  one  brigade  had  gone,  and  that  it 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  731 

expected  to  leave  for  Harper's  Ferry  the  next  day.  This  informa 
tion,  transmitted  to  Jackson,  caused  the  latter  to  push  on  with  all 
haste  the  next  morning.  At  daylight  he  sent  three  companies  of 
infantry  to  reinforce  Ashby,  and  followed  with  his  whole  force.  lie 
reached  Kernstown  at  two  P.  M.,  after  a  march  of  fourteen  miles. 
General  Shields  had  made  his  dispositions  to  meet  attack,  by  advanc 
ing  Kimball's  Brigade  of  four  regiments  and  Damn's  Artillery  to  the 
vicinity  of  Kernstown.  Sullivan's  Brigade  of  four  regiments  was 
posted  in  rear  of  Kimball,  and  Tyler's  Brigade  of  five  regiments, 
witli  Broadhead's  cavalry,  was  held  in  reserve.  Ashby  kept  up  an 
active  skirmish  with  the  advance  of  Shields'  force  during  the  fore 
noon. 

But,  though  thus  making  ready,  the  Federal  generals  did  not 
expect  an  attack  in  earnest.  Shields  says  he  had  the  country,  in 
front  and  flank,  carefully  reconnoitred  during  the  forenoon  on  the 
23d  of  March,  and  the  officers  in  charge  reported  "no  indications  of 
any  hostile  force  except  that  of  Ashby."  Shields  continues  : 

I  communicated  this  information  to  Major  General  Banks,  who  was  then  with 
me,  and,  after  consulting  together,  we  both  concluded  that  Jackson  could  not  be 
tempted  to  hazard  himself  so  far  away  from  his  main  support.  Having  both  come 
to  this  conclusion,  General  Banks  took  his  departure  for  Washington  (being  already 
under  orders  to  that  effect).  The  officers  of  his  staff,  however,  remained  behind, 
intending  to  leave  for  Centreville  in  the  afternoon. 

"When  Jackson  reached  Kernstown,  his  troops  were  very  weary. 
Three-fourths  of  them  had  marched  thirty-six  miles  since  the  pre 
ceding  morning.  lie,  therefore,  gave  directions  for  bivouacking,  and 
says : 

Though  it  was  very  desirable  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  leaving  the  Valley, 
yet  I  deemed  it  best  not  to  attack  until  morning.  But,  subsequently  ascertaining 
that  the  Federals  had  a  position  from  which  our  forces  could  be  seen,  I  concluded 
that  it  would  be  dangerous  to  postpone  the  attack  until  the  next  day,  as  reinforce 
ments  might  be  brought  up  during  the  night. 

Jackson,  therefore,  led  his  men  to  the  attack.  His  plan  was  to 
gain  the  ridge  upon  which  the  Federal  right  flank  rested,  turn  that 
flank,  and  get  command  of  the  road  from  Kernstown  to  Winchester, 
in  the  enemy's  rear.  He  gained  the  top  of  the  ridge,  but  Shields  was 
able  to  hold  him  in  check  until  Tyler's  Brigade  and  other  troops 
could  be  hurried  to  that  flank,  when  Jackson,  in  turn,  became  the 
attacked  party.  For  three  hours  of  this  Sunday  afternoon  the  san 
guinary  and  stubborn  contest  continued.  The  left  half  of  the  Con 
federate  line  was  perpendicular  to  the  ridge;  the  right  half,  which 
was  mainly  composed  of  artillery,  ran  along  the  ridge  to  the  rear,  and 


732  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

was  thus  at  right  angles  to  the  other  part.  The  brunt  of  the  Federal 
attack  was  borne  by  the  centre;  near  the  angle  presented  by  that 
part  of  the  line.  Fulkerson's  Brigade,  holding  the  extreme  Confed 
erate  left,  firmly  maintained  his  position,  but  the  centre  was  thinned 
and  worn  out  by  the  persistent  Federal  attacks,  until  General 
Garnett,  whose  brigade  was  there,  deeming  it  impossible  to  hold  his 
position  longer,  ordered  a  retreat.  This,  of  course,  caused  the  retreat 
of  the  whole,  which  was  effected  with  the  loss  of  two  disabled  guns, 
and  from  two  to  three  hundred  prisoners. 

Jackson's  whole  force  at  this  time  consisted  of  three  thousand 
and  eighty-seven  infantry,  of  which  two  thousand  seven  hundred  and 
forty-two  were  engaged  in  the  battle  of  Kernstown ;  of  twenty-seven 
guns,  of  which  eighteen  were  engaged,  and  of  two  hundred  and 
ninety  cavalry.  General  Shields  states  his  force  at  seven  thousand, 
of  all  arms.  The  total  Confederate  loss  was  nearly  seven  hundred. 
The  Federal  is  put  by  General  Shields  at  less  than  six  hundred. 

Weary  and  dispirited  was  the  little  army  which  had  marched 
fourteen  miles  in  the  morning  to  attack  a  force  more  than  double  its 
own,  and  which  had  for  three  hours  wrestled  for  victory  in  so  vigor 
ous  a  fashion  as  to  astonish  and  deceive  the  enemy.  Baffled  and 
overpowered,  it  slowly  retraced  its  path  for  six  miles  more,  and  sank 
to  rest.  In  the  fence  corners,  under  the  trees,  and  around  the  wagons 
the  soldiers  threw  themselves  down,  many  too  weary  to  eat,  and  forgot, 
in  profound  slumber,  the  trials,  dangers,  and  disappointments  of  the 
day.  Jackson  shared  the  open  air  bivouac  with  his  men,  and  found 
the  rest  that  nature  demanded  on  some  fence  rails  in  a  corner  of  the 
road.  Next  morning  he  crossed  to  the  south  side  of  Cedar  creek,  and 
gradually  retired  before  the  advancing  enemy  once  more  to  Mount 
Jackson. 

The  bold  attack  of  Jackson  at  Kernstown,  though  unsuccessful, 
led  to  many  important  results.  Its  first  effect  was  the  recall  of  the 
Federal  troops  then  marching  from  the  Yalley  toward  Manassas. 
General  Shields  says : 

Though  the  battle  had  been  won,  still  I  could  not  have  believed  that  Jackson 
would  have  hazarded  a  decisive  engagement  so  far  from  the  main  body  without 
expecting  reinforcements.  So,  to  be  prepared  for  such  a  contingency,  I  set  to  work 
during  the  night  (after  the  battle)  to  bring  together  all  the  troops  within  my  reach. 
I  sent  an  express  after  Williams'  Division,  requesting  the  rear  brigade,  about 
twenty  miles  distant,  to  march  all  night,  and  join  me  in  the  morning.  I  swept  the 
forts  and  routes  in  my  rear  of  about  all  their  guards,  hurrying  them  forward  by 
forced  marches,  to  be  with  me  at  daylight.  *  *  *  General  Banks,  hearing  of  our 
engagement  on  his  way  to  Washington,  halted  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  with  remark 
able  promptitude  and  sagacity  ordered  back  Williams'  whole  division,  so  that  my 


STONEWALL  JACKSON- S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  T33 

express  found  the  rear  brigade  already  en  route  to  join  us.  The  General  himself 
returned  forthwith,  and  after  making  me  n  hasty  visit,  assumed  command  of  the 
forces  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  This  pursuit  was  kept  up  until  they  reached 
Woodstock. 

Thus  the  design  of  McClellan  to  post  Banks'  Corps  at  Centre- 
ville  (sec  letter  of  March  16th)  became  impracticable,  and  that  body 
of  over  twenty  thousand  troops  was  thought  necessary  to  guard 
against  the  further  movements  of  Jackson's  two  thousand,  and  the 
imaginary  reinforcements  with  which  they  supplied  him.  This  battle, 
too,  no  doubt  decided  the  question  of  the  detachment  of  Blenker's 
Division  of  ten  thousand  men  from  McClellan,  and  its  transfer  to 
Fremont,  recently  placed  in  command  of  the  Mountain  Department, 
which  embraced  West  Virginia.  While  en  route  from  Alexandria 
to  join  Fremont,  Blenker\s  Division  was  to  report  to  Banks,  and 
remain  with  him  as  long  as  he  thought  any  attack  from  Jackson 
impending.  A  few  days  later  the  sensitiveness  of  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment  to  the  danger  of  Washington,  excited  anew  by  Jackson's 
movements,  led  to  the  detachment  of  McDowell's  Corps.  McClellan 
had  left  over  seventy  thousand  men  for  the  defense  of  Washington 
and  its  approaches,  and  yet,  after  Kernstown,  President  Lincoln  felt 
so  insecure  that,  on  April  ftd,  he  countermanded  the  order  for  the 
embarkation  of  McDowell's  Corps,  and  detained  it  in  front  of  Wash 
ington,  and  so  deprived  McClellan  of  the  finest  body  of  troops  in  his 
army.  Thus  Jackson's  bold  dash  had  effected  the  object  of  General 
Johnston  in  leaving  him  in  the  Valley,  in  a  way  far  more  secure  than 
either  of  them  could  have  expected. 

The  next  month  was  to  Jackson  one  of  comparative  inaction. 
Having  slowly  retreated  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Shenandoah,  near 
Mount  Jackson,  he  spent  the  next  few  weeks  in  resting  and  recruit 
ing  his  forces.  The  militia  of  the  adjoining  counties  had  already 
been  called  to  the  field,  but  this  resource  was  superseded  on  the  10th 
of  April  by  the  passage  of  the  Conscription  Act.  The  time  for 
reorganizing  the  regiments  was  near  at  hand.  Xew  officers  were  to 
be  elected.  The  ranks  were  filling  up  under  the  impetus  given  to 
volunteering  by  the  conscription  bill.  The  weather  during  the  first 
half  of  April  was  very  raw  and  cold,  and  during  the  whole  month 
was  exceedingly  rainy.  All  these  causes  rendered  cpiet  very  accept 
able  to  the  Confederates.  Xor  was  the  enemy  in  haste  to  disturb 
them.  Banks  was,  on  April  -ith,  placed  in  independent  command 
of  the  Department  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  McDowell  of  the  country 
between  the  Blue  ridge  and  the  Rappahannock,  while  Fremont  was 
in  command  from  the  Alleirhenies  westward.  These  were  all  made 


734:  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

independent  of  McClellan,  and  of  each  other.  General  Banks  fol 
lowed  Jackson  but  slowly.  He  reached  Woodstock  on  April  1st, 
and  having  pushed  back  Ashby's  cavalry  to  Edinburg,  five  miles 
beyond,  he  attempted  no  further  serious  advance  until  the  17th. 
He  then  moved  forward  in  force  and  Jackson  retired  to  Harrison- 
burg,  where  he  turned  at  right  angles  to  the  left,  and  crossing  the 
main  fork  of  the  Shenandoah  at  Conrad's  store,  took  up  his  position 
at  the  western  base  of  the  Blue  ridge  mountains,  in  Swift  Run  gap. 
This  camp  the  Confederates  reached  on  the  20th  of  April,  and  here 
they  remained  through  ten  days  more  of  rain  and  mud. 

Meantime,  the  advance  of  McClellan  up  the  Peninsula  had  begun 
in  earnest.  General  J.  E.  Johnston  had  transferred  the  mass  of  his 
army  to  the  front  of  Richmond,  and  had  taken  command  there  in 
pei-son.  Swell's  Division  alone  remained  on  the  Rappahannock  to 
watch  the  enemy  there,  and  to  aid  Jackson  in  case  of  need.  This 
division  was  now  near  Gordonsville,  and  a  good  road  from  that 
point  through  Swift  Run  gap  placed  it  within  easy  reach  of  Jackson. 
The  latter,  conscious  of  his  inability  with  five  or  six  thousand  men 
(his  force  had  nearly  doubled  since  Kernstown  by  the  return  of  fur- 
loughed  men  and  by  new  enlistments)  to  resist  in  the  open  country 
the  advance  of  Banks,  had  availed  himself  of  the  nature  of  the 
country  to  take  a  position  where  he  could  be  attacked  only  at  great 
disadvantage,  and  yet  might  threaten  the  flank  or  rear  of  the  advanc 
ing  column  if  it  attempted  to  pass  him.  The  main  Shenandoah 
river  covered  his  front — a  stream  not  easily  fordable  at  any  time, 
and  now  swollen  by  the  spring  rains.  The  spurs  of  the  mountains, 
as  they  run  out  toward  this  river,  afford  almost  impregnable  positions 
for  defense,  his  flank  could  only  be  turned  by  toilsome,  exposed 
marches,  while  good  roads  led  from  his  rear  to  General  Ewell. 
Thus,  secure  in  his  position,  Jackson  at  the  same  time  more  effectu 
ally  prevented  the  further. advance  of  the  Federal  column  than  if  he 
had  remained  in  its  front.  For  he  held  the  bridge  over  the  Shenan 
doah  and  wras  but  a  day's  march  from  Harrisonburg,  and  should 
Banks  venture  to  move  forward  toward  Staunton,  he  was  ready  to 
hurl  the  Confederate  forces  against  his  enemy's  flank  and  rear. 
General  Banks,  at  Harrisonburg,  was  in  the  midst  of  a  hostile  country, 
and  already  one  hundred  miles  from  the  Potomac,  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
with  which  a  long  line  of  wragon  communication  had  to  be  main 
tained.  To  push  on  to  Staunton,  with  Jackson  on  his  flank  or  rear, 
was  virtually  to  sacrifice  his  present  line  of  communication  with  no 
practicable  substitute  in  view;  to  attack  the  Confederates  on  the 
slopes  of  the  mountains,  with  even  a  greatly  superior  force,  was  to 
risk  defeat. 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  735 

On  the  2Stli  of  April,  Jackson  applied  to  General  Lee,  then 
acting  as  commander-in-chief  under  President  Davis,  for  a  reinforce 
ment  of  five  thousand  men,  which  addition  to  his  force  he  deemed 
necessary  to  justify  him  in  marching  out  and  attacking  Banks.  Is  ext 
day  he  was  informed  that  no  troops  could  be  spared  to  him  beyond 
the  commands  of  Ewell  and  of  Edward  Johnson,  the  latter  of  whom 
was  seven  miles  west  of  Staunton,  at  West  View,  with  one  brigade. 
Jackson  at  once  decided  upon  his  plan  of  campaign,  and  the  very 
next  day  began  to  put  it  in  execution.  This  campaign,  so  successful 
and  brilliant  in  its  results,  and  now  so  renowned,  shows  in  its  con 
ception  the  strong  points  of  Jackson's  military  genius,  his  clear, 
vigorous  grasp  of  the  situation,  his  decision,  his  energy,  his  grand 
audacity.  It  recalls  the  Italian  campaign  of  1706,  when  Xapoleon 
astonished,  baffled  and  defeated  the  armies  of  Beaulieu,  Wurmser, 
and  Alvin/y  in  succession.  Jackson  was  now,  with  about  six  or  seven 
thousand  men,  at  the  base  of  the  Blue  ridge,  some  thirty  miles  north 
east  of  Staunton.  Ewell,  with  an  equal  force,  was  in  the  vicinity  of 
Gordonsville,  twenty-live  miles  in  his  rear,  and  east  of  the  mountains. 
Edward  Johnson  was  seven  miles  west  of  Staunton  with  three  thou 
sand  live  hundred  men.  Such  was  the  Confederate  position.  On 
the  other  hand,  Banks,  with  the  main  body  of  his  forces,  of  about 
twenty  thousand  men,  occupied  Ilarrisonburg,  twelve  or  fifteen 
miles  in  Jackson's  front.  Schenck  and  Milroy,  commanding  Fre 
mont's  advance  of  six  thousand  men,  were  in  front  of  Edward  John 
son,  their  pickets  already  east  of  the  Shcnandoah  mountain  and  on 
the  Ilarrisonburg  and  Warm  Spring  turnpike.  Fremont  was  pre 
paring  to  join  them  from  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  witli  ten 
thousand  men — making  the  total  of  Fremont's  force  some  fifteen 
thousand  men.  McDowell,  with  thirty  thousand  men,  had  drawn 
away  from  the  Upper  Rappahannock,  and  was  concentrating  at 
Fredericksburg.  This  movement  of  McDowell  had  released  Ewell 
and  left  him  free  to  aid  Jackson,  who,  with  a  force  of  about  sixteen 
thousand  men  (including  Ewell  and  Edward  Johnson),  had  on  his 
hands  the  thirty-five  thousand  under  Banks  and  Fremont,  The 
Warm  Springs  turnpike  afforded  Banks  a  ready  mode  of  uniting 
with  Milroy  and  Schenck,  in  which  case  Staunton  would  be  any  easy 
capture.  Fremont  was  already  preparing  to  move  in  that  direction. 
Jackson  determined  to  anticipate  such  a  movement,  if  possible,  by 
uniting  his  own  force  to  that  of  Johnson,  and  falling  upon  Milroy 
.while  Ewell  kept  Banks  in  check.  Then  he  would  join  Ewell  and 
with  all  his  strength  attack  Banks. 


736 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 


To  accomplish  tins,  Ewell  was  ordered  to  cross  the  mountain 
and  occupy  the  position  Jackson  had  held  for  ten  days  at  Swift  Run 

o-ap thus  keeping  up  the  menace  on  Banks'  flank.  As  Ewell 

approached,  Jackson  left  camp  on  the  30th  of  April,  and  inarched 
up  the  east  bank  of  the  Shenandoah  to  Port  Republic.  Ko  partici 
pant  in  that  march  can  ever  forget  the  incessant  rain,  the  fearful 
mud,  the  frequent  quicksands  which  made  progress  so  slow  and 
toilsome.  More  than  two  days  were  consumed  in  going  fifteen  miles. 
Meantime,  Ashby  was  demonstrating  against  the  enemy  and  keeping 
Jackson's  line  close,  to  prevent  information  from  getting  through. 
At  Port  Republic,  the  army  turned  short  to  the  left,  left  the  Shenan 
doah  Valley  altogether,  crossed  Brown's  gap  in  the  Blue  ridge,  and 
marched  to  Mechanic's  River  Station,  on  the  Virginia  Central  Rail 
road  ;  thence,  by  road  and  rail,  it  was  rapidly  moved  to  Staunton, 
and  by  the  evening  of  May  5th  it  had  all  reached  that  point.  The 
movement  by  this  devious  route  mystified  friends  as  well  as  foes. 
One  day  is  given  to  rest,  and  on  the  next  Jackson  hurries  forward, 
unites  Johnson's  troops  with  his  own,  drives  in  the  Federal  pickets 
and  foraging  parties,  and  camps  twenty-five  miles  from  Staunton. 
On  the  morrow  (May  8th)  he  pushes  on  to  McDowell,  seizes  Sit- 
tlington's  hill,  which  commands  the  town  and  camp  of  the  enemy, 
and  makes  his  dispositions  to  seize  the  road  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy 
during  the  night.  But  Milroy  and  Schenck  have  united,  and  seeing 
their  position  untenable,  make  a  fierce  attack  in  the  afternoon  to 
retake  the  hill  and  cover  their  retreat.  For  three  or  four  hours  a 
bloody  struggle  takes  place  on  the  brow  of  Sittlington's  hill.  The 
Federals,  though  inflicting  severe  loss,  are  repulsed  at  every  point, 
and  at  nightfall  quietly  withdraw.  They  light  their  camp-fires  and, 
in  the  darkness,  evacuate  the  town.  They  retreat  twenty-four  miles 
to  Franklin,  in  Pendleton  county,  where  they  meet  Fremont,  ad 
vancing  with  the  main  body  of  his  forces.  Jackson  follows  to  this 
point ;  has  found  it  impossible  to  attack  the  retreating  foe  to  advan 
tage,  and  now  deems  it  unadvisable  to  attempt  anything  further  in 
this  difficult  country  with  his  ten  thousand  men  against  Fremont's 
fourteen  thousand  or  fifteen  thousand.  Screening  his  movements 
from  Fremont  with  cavalry,  he  turns  back  (May  13th),  marches  rapidly 
to  within  seventeen  miles  of  Stannton,  then  turns  toward  Ilarrison- 
burg,  and  dispatches  General  Ewell  that  he  is  on  his  way  to  attack 
Banks  with  their  united  forces. 

Meantime,  important  changes  have  taken  place  in  the  disposition 
of  the  Federal  troops  in  the  Valley.  McClellan  is  calling  for  more 
troops  and  complaining  that  McDowell  is  withheld.  The  latter, 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S   VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  ^37 

having  gathered  Abercrombie's  and  other  scattered  commands  from 
the  country  in  front  of  Washington  into  a  new  division,  to  replace 
those  sent  to  McClellan,  now  lies  at  Fredericksbnrg,  impatient  to 
take  part  in  the  movement  on  Richmond.  Banks,  hearing  of  E well's 
arrival  in  the  Yalley,  fears  an  attack  from  him  and  Jackson  com 
bined,  and  retires  from  Ilarrisonburg  to  Xew  Market.  Jackson's 
inaction  for  some  weeks,  and  now  his  movement  to  West  Virginia, 
reassures  the  Federal  administration,  and  Shields,  with  more  than 
half  of  Banks'  force,  is  detached  at  Xew  Market,  and  ordered  to 
Fredericksburg  to  swell  McDowell's  Corps  to  over  forty  thousand 
men.  Banks  is  left  with  only  some  seven  thousand  men,  and  falls 
back  to  Strasburg,  where  he  fortifies.  lie  assumes  a  defensive  atti 
tude  to  hold  the  Lower  Valley  and  to  cover  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad.  These  movements  of  the  enemy  had  nearly  disarranged 
Jackson's  plans.  Upon  the  march  of  Shields  toward  Fredericksbnrg, 
General  J.  E.  Johnston,  commanding  in  chief  in  Virginia,  thought 
it  time  to  recall  Ewell  to  meet  the  new  danger  thus  threatened,  and 
the  orders  reached  Ewell  while  Jackson  was  yet  one  day's  march 
short  of  Ilarrisonburg.  After  conference  with  Ewell,  Jackson  took 
the  responsibility  of  detaining  him  until  the  condition  of  affairs 
could  bo  represented  to  General  Johnston,  and,  meantime,  they 
united  in  a  vigorous  pursuit  of  Banks. 

Ash  by  has  followed  close  on  Banks'  heels,  and  now  occupies  his 
outposts  with  constant  skirmishing,  while  he  completely  screens 
Jackson.  The  latter,  having  marched  rapidly  to  Xew  Market,  as  if 
about  to  follow  the  foe  to  Strasburg,  to  attack  him  there,  suddenly 
changes  his  route,  crosses  the  Massanutten  mountains  to  Luray,  where 
Ewell  joins  him,  and  pours  down  the  narrow  Bage  Valley,  by  forced 
inarches,  to  Front  Royal.  This  place  is  about  one  hundred  and 
twenty  miles  (by  Jackson's  route)  from  Franklin,  and  the  Confed 
erates  reached  it  on  May  23d,  ten  days  after  leaving  Franklin.  This 
village  (Front  Royal)  is  held  by  about  one  thousand  men  under 
Colonel  Kenly,  of  the  First  Maryland  (Federal)  regiment,  who  has 
in  charge  the  large  stores  there  gathered,  and  the  important  railroad 
bridges  on  the  Shenandoah.  This  force  also  covers  the  flank  and 
rear  of  Banks'  position  at  Strasburg.  Kenly  is  taken  by  surprise, 
makes  what  resistance  he  can;  is  forced  across  the  bridges  he  vainly 
attempts  to  destroy,  and  flies  toward  Winchester.  Jackson,  too  im 
patient  to  wait  for  his  tried  infantry,  places  himself  at  the  head  of 
a  few  companies  of  cavalry  and  pushes  after  the  foe.  lie  overtakes, 
attacks,  and  disperses  Kenly's  force,  and  iu  a  few  moments  four-fifths 

47 


~3S  AXXALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  it  arc  killed,  wounded  or  prisoners.  Exhausted  nature  can  do  no 
more.  Weary  and  foot-sore,  the  soldiers  lie  down  to  rest. 

General  Banks,  amazed  at  this  irruption,  by  which  his  flank  is 
turned  and  his  communications  threatened,  begins,  during  the  night, 
a  precipitate  retreat  to  Winchester.  Jackson  anticipates  this,  and 
presses  on,  the  next  morning,  to  Middletown,  a  village  between 
Strasburg  and  Winchester,  to'find  the  road  still  filled  with  Federal 
trains  and  troops.  Capturing  and  scattering  these  in  every  direc 
tion,  he  follows  on  after  the  main  body,  which  has  already  passed 
him  toward  Winchester.  lie  overhauls  them  in  the  afternoon, 
pushes  Banks'  rear  guard  before  him  all  night,  and,  having  given 
but  one  hour  to  rest,  at  daylight,  on  the  25th  of  May,  reaches 
Winchester,  to  find  the  Federal  forces  drawn  up  across  the 
approaches  to  the  town  from  the  south  and  southeast.  The  main  part 
of  Banks'  army  occupies  the  ridge  on  which  the  battle  of  Kernstown 
had  been  fought,  but  at  a  point  two  miles  further  north,  while  another 
part  held  the  Front  Royal  road,  on  which  Ewell,  with  a  part  of  his 
division,  was  advancing.  A  vigorous  attack  is  at  once  made  by  the 
Confederates,  which,  for  a  short  time,  is  bravely  resisted ;  but  the 
Federal  lines  begin  to  yield,  and  seeing  himself  about  to  be  over 
whelmed,  Banks  retreats  through  Winchester.  Jackson  presses 
closely,  and  the  Federals  emerge  from  the  town  a  mass  of  disordered 
fugitives,  making  their  way,  with  all  speed,  toward  the  Potomac. 
The  Confederate  infantry  followed  for  several  miles,  capturing  a 
large  number  of  prisoners,  and  had  the  cavalry  been  as  efficient,  but 
few  of  Banks'  troops  would  have  escaped.  Banks  halts  on  the  north 
side  of  the  Potomac,  and  Jackson  allows  his  exhausted  men  to  rest 
at  Winchester.  Thorough  and  glorious  was  Jackson's  victory.  In 
forty-eight  hours  the  enemy  had  been  driven  between  fifty  and  sixty 
miles,  from  Front  Royal  and  Strasburg,  to  the  Potomac,  with  the 
loss  of  more  than  one-third  of  his  entire  strength.  His  army  had 
crossed  the  latter  river  a  disorganized  mass.  Hundreds  of  wagons 
had  been  abandoned  or  burned.  Two  pieces  of  artillery,  and  an 
immense  quantity  of  quartermaster,  commissary,  medical,  arid  ord 
nance  stores  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  victor.  Some  twenty- 
three  hundred  prisoners  were  taken  to  the  rear  when  Jackson  fell 
back,  beside  seven  hundred  and  fifty  wounded  and  sick  paroled,  and 
left  in  the  hospitals  at  Winchester  and  Strasburg>  making  a  total  of 
about  three  thousand  and  fifty. 

A  day  is  given,  according  to  Jackson's  custom,  to  religions 
services  and  thanksgiving,  and  another  to  rest,  and  on  the  third  he 
is  again  moving  toward  Harper's  Ferry,  in  order,  by  the  most 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  739 

energetic  diversion  possible,  to  draw  away  troops  from  Richmond. 
How  well  lie  effected  this,  a  glance  at  the  Federal  movements  will 
show.  As  above  stated,  the  quiet  that  succeeded  Kernstown,  the 
advance  of  Banks  far  into  the  Valley,  and  the  movement  of  Jackson 
to  West  Virginia  had  calmed  the  apprehensions  of  the  Federal 
administration,  for  the  time,  in  regard  to  Washington,  and  the 
urgent  requests  of  McClellan  and  McDowell,  that  the  latter1  s  corps 
should  be  sent  forward  from  Fredericksbnrg  toward  Richmond, 
were  listened  to.  Shields  was  detached  from  Banks,  and  sent  to 
McDowell,  and,  on  May  17th,  the  latter  was  ordered  to  prepare  to 
move  down  the  Fredericksbnrg  Railroad,  to  unite  with  McClellan 
before  Richmond.  On  Friday,  May  23d,  the  very  day  of  Jackson's 
attack  at  Front  Royal,  President  Lincoln  and  Secretary  Stanton 
went  to  Fredericksbnrg  to  confer  with  General  McDowell,  found 
that  Shields  had  already  reached  that  point,  and  determined,  after 
consultation,  that  the  advance  should  begin  on  the  following  Mon 
day  (May  20th).  McClellan  was  informed  of  the  contemplated 
movement,  and  instructed  to  assume  command  of  McDowell's  Corps 
when  it  joined  him.  This  tine  body  of  troops,  moving  from  the 
north  against  the  Confederate  capital,  would  have  seized  all  the 

roads  entering  the  citv  from  that  direction,  and  would  have  increased 

o  « 

McClellan's  available  force  by  from  forty  to  fifty  per  cent.  There 
was  strong  reason  to  expect  that  this  combined  movement  would 
effect  the  downfall,  of  Richmond. 

The  Federal  President  returned  to  Washington  on  the  night  of 
the  23d  to  await  the  .result.  He  there  received  the  rirst  news  of 
Jackson's  operations  at  Front  Royal  the  preceding  afternoon.  The 
first  dispatches  indicated  only  an  rm important  raid,  and  McDowell 
was  directed  by  telegraph  to  leave  lys  ''least  effective"  brigade  at 
Fredericksbnrg,  in  addition  to  the  forces  agreed  upon  for  the  occu 
pation  of  that  town.  Later,  on  the  24th,  the  news  from  Banks 
became  more  alarming,  and  General  McDowell  was  dispatched  that : 

General  Fremont  lias  been  ordered  by  telegraph  to  move  from  Franklin  on 
Harrisonburg,  to  relieve  General  Banks,  and  capture  or  destroy  Jackson  and  E  well's 
forces.  You  are  instructed,  laying  aside,  for  the  present,  the  movement  on  Kich- 
mond,  to  put  twenty  thousand  men  in  motion  at  once  for  the  Shenandoah,  moving 
on  the  line,  or  in  advance  of  the  line,  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad.  Your  object 
will  be  to  capture  the  forces  of  Jackson  and  Ewell,  either  in  co-operation  with 
General  Fremont,  or,  in  case  want  of  supplies  or  of  transportation  interferes  with 
his  movements,  it  is  believed  that  the  force  with  which  you  move  will  be  sufficient 
to  accomplish  the  object  alone.  *  *  * 

The  following  was  sent  to  General  McClellan  at  four  P.  M.  on 
May  2ith: 


74:0  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

In  consequence  of  General  Banks'  critical  position,  I  have  been  compelled  to 
suspend  General  McDowell's  movements  to  join  you.  The  enemy  are  making  a 
desperate  push  on  Harper's  Ferry,  and  we  are  trying  to  throw  Fremont's  force,  and 
part  of  McDowell's,  in  their  rear.  ^  LINCOLN 

Next  day  the  news  from  Banks  seems  to  have  greatly  increased 
the  excitement  in  Washington.  The  following  telegrams  were  sent 
to  General  McClellan  (May  25th)  by  President  Lincoln  : 

The  enemy  is  moving  north  in  sufficient  force  to  drive  Banks  before  him,  in 
precisely  what  force  we  cannot  tell.  He  is  also  threatening  Leesburg  and  Geary, 
on  the  Manassas  Gap  Eailroad,  from  both  north  and  south,  in  precisely  what  force 
we  cannot  tell.  I  think  the  movement  is  a  general  and  concerted  one,  such  as 
could  not  be  if  he  was  acting  upon  the  purpose  of  a  very  desperate  defense  of 
Richmond.  I  think  the  time  is  near  when  you  must  either  attack  Richmond  or 
give  up  the  job  and  coine  to  the  defense  of  Washington.  Let  me  hear  from  you 
immediately. 

A  later  one  reads : 

Your  dispatch  received.  Banks  was  at  Strasburg  with  about  six  thousand 
men,  Shields  having  been  taken  from  him  to  swell  a  column  for  McDowell  to  aid 
you  at  Richmond,  and  the  rest  of  the  force  scattered  at  various  places.  On  the  23d, 
a  rebel  force  of  seven  to  ten  thousand  men  fell  upon  one  regiment  and  two  compa 
nies  guarding  the  bridge  at  Front  Royal,  destroying  it  entirely,  crossed  the  Shenan- 
doah,  and,  on  the  24th  (yesterday),  pushed  to  get  north  of  Banks  on  the  road  to 
Winchester.  Banks  ran  a  race  with  them,  beating  them  into  Winchester  yesterday 
evening.  This  morning  a  battle  ensued  between  the  two  forces,  in  which  Banks 
was  beaten  back  into  full  retreat  toward  Martinsburg,  and  probably  is  broken  up 
into  a  total  rout.  Geary,  on  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  just  now  reports  that 
Jackson  is  now  near  Front  Royal,  with  ten  thousand,  following  up  and  supporting, 
as  I  understand,  the  force  now  pursuing  Banks;  also^-that  another  force  of  ten 
thousand  is  near  Orleans,  following  on  in  the  same  direction.  Stripped  bare  as  we 
are  here,  it  will  be  all  we  can  do  to  prevent  them  crossing  the  Potomac  at  Harper's 
Ferry  or  above.  We  have  about  twenty  thousand  of  McDowell's  force  moving  back 
to  the  vicinity  of  Front  Royal,  and  Fremont,  who  was  at  Franklin,  is  moving  to 
Harrisonburg.  Both  of  these  movements  are  intended  to  get  in  the  enemy's  rear. 
One  more  of  McDowell's  brigades  is  ordered  through  here  to  Harper's  Ferry.  The 
rest  of  his  forces  remain,  for  the  present,  at  Fredericksburg.  We  are  sending  such 
regiments,  in  dribs,  from  here  and  Baltimore  as  we  can  spare,  to  Harper's  Ferry, 
supplying  their  places,  in  some  sort,  by  calling  in  the  militia  from  the  adjacent 
States.  We  also  have  eighteen  cannon  on  the  road  to  Harper's  Ferry,  of  which 
arm  there  is  not  a  single  one  yet  at  that  point.  This  is  now  our  situation.  If 
McDowell's  force  was  now  beyond  our  reach,  we  should  be  utterly  helpless.  Ap 
prehensions  of  something  like  this,  and  no  unwillingness  to  sustain  you,  has  always 
been  my  reason  for  withholding  McDowell's  force  from  you.  Please  understand 
this  and  do  the  best  you  can  with  the  forces  you  have. 

The  exaggeration  of  this  dispatch  shows  the  panic  produced. 
Jackson  had  no  troops  at  Orleans,  or  anywhere  east  of  the  ridge 
(except  a  little  cavalry),  and  his  entire  force,  which  was  all  with  him, 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  7^1 

was  about  fifteen  thousand  or  sixteen  thousand.  This  dispatch  shows, 
however,  that  Jackson  was,  for  the  time,  not  only  occupying  all  the 
troops  in  and  around  Washington,  together  with  Fremont's  forces, 
but  was  completely  neutralizing  the  forty  thousand  under  McDowell, 
and  thus  disconcerting  McClellan's  plans. 

But  if  the  skill,  celerity,  and  daring  of  Jackson  are  illustrated 
in  his  movement  against  Banks,  these  qualities  shine  out  far  more 
brilliantly  in  his  retreat  from  the  Potomac,  and  in  his  battles  at  Port 
Republic.  He  moved  to  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  28th  of  May,  and 
spent  the  29th  in  making  demonstrations  against  the  force  that  had 
been  rapidly  gathered  there,  but  which  was  too  strongly  posted  to  be 
attacked  in  front,  Time  did  not  allow  a  crossing  of  the  river  and 
an  investment  of  the  place.  The  large  bodies  of  troops  which  the 
Federal  administration  was  hastening  from  every  direction  to  over 
whelm  him,  were  already  closing  in.  McDowell,  with  twenty 
thousand  men,  was  hurrying  toward  Front  Royal  and  Strasburg,  and 
Fremont,  now  awake  to  the  fact  that  his  enemy  had  pushed  him 
back  into  the  mountains,  and  then  slipped  away  to  destroy  his  col 
league,  was  moving  with  his  fourteen  thousand  or  fifteen  thousand 
men  toward  Strasburg.  General  Saxton  had  seven  thousand  Federal 
troops  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  Ranks  was  taking  breath  with  the 
remnants  of  his  command  (some  three  thousand  or  four  thousand 
men)  at  Williamsport,  Maryland.  Thus,  over  forty  thousand  men 
were  gathering  to  crush  Jackson,  whose  strength  was  now  not  over 
fifteen  thousand.  On  the  morning  of  May  ?>oth  he  began  his  retreat 
by  ordering  all  his  troops,  except  Winder's  Brigade  and  the  cavalry, 
to  fall  back  to  Winchester.  Xor  was  he  an  hour  too  soon,  for  before 
he  reached  that  town  McDowell's  advance  had  poured  over  the 
Blue  ridge,  driven  out  the  small  guard  left  at  Front  Royal,  and 
captured  the  village. 

The  condition  of  affairs  when  Jackson  reached  Winchester,  on 
the  evening  of  May  3<>th,  was  as  follows:  The  Federals  were  in 
possession  of  Front  Royal,  which  is  but  twelve  miles  from  Strasburg, 
while  Winchester  is  eighteen.  Fremont  was  at  Wardensville,  dis 
tant  twenty  miles  from  Strasburg,  and  had  telegraphed  President 
Lincoln  that  he  would  enter  the  latter  place  by  live  P.  M.  the  next 
day.  The  mass  of  Jackson's  forces  had  marched  twenty-five  miles 
to  reach  Winchester,  and  his  rear  guard,  under  Winder  (after  skir 
mishing  with  the  enemy  at  Harper's  Ferry  for  part  of  the  day),  had 
camped  at  Halltown,  which  is  over  forty  miles  distant  from  Stras 
burg.  The  next  day  (Saturday,  May  31st)  witnessed  a  race  for 
Strasburg,  which  was  in  Jackson's  direct  line  of  retreat,  but  it  was 


742  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

very  different  in  character  from  the  race  of  the  preceding  Saturday. 
Orders  were  issued  for  everything  in  the  Confederate  camp  to  move 
early  in  the  morning.  The  two  thousand  three  hundred  Federal 
prisoners  were  first  sent  forward,  guarded  by  the  Twenty-first  Vir 
ginia  Regiment;  next  the  long  trains,  including  many  captured 
wagons  loaded  with  stores ;  then  followed  the  whole  of  the  army 
except  the  rear  guard,  under  Winder. 

Jackson  reached  Strasburg  on  Saturday  afternoon  without  mo 
lestation  and  encamped,  thus  placing  himself  directly  between  the 
two  armies  that  were  hastening  to  attack  him.  Here  he  remained 
for  twenty-four  hours,  holding  his  two  opponents  apart  until  Winder 
could  come  up,  and  the  last  of  the  long  train  could  be  sent  to  the 
rear.  Winder,  with  the  Stonewall  Brigade,  had  marched  thirty-five 
miles  on  Saturday,  and  by  Sunday  noon  had  rejoined  the  main  body. 
Meantime,  Shields  and  McDowell  had  been  bewildered  at  Front 
Royal  by  the  celerity  of  Jackson's  movements,  and  had  spent  Satur 
day  in  moving  out  first  toward  Winchester  and  then  on  other  roads, 
and  finally  in  doing  nothing.  Fremont  had  stopped  five  miles  short 
of  Strasburg,  on  Saturday  night,  and  on  Sunday  wTas  held  in  check 
by  Ashby,  supported  by  part  of  Ewell's  Division.  On  Sunday 
McDowell,  despairing  of  "  heading  off  "  Jackson,  sent  his  cavalry  to 
unite  with  Fremont,  at  Strasburg,  in  pursuing  the  Confederates,  and 
dispatched  Shields'  Division  up  the  Luray  Yalley,  with  the  sanguine 
hope  that  the  latter  might,  by  moving  on  the  longer  and  worse  road, 
get  in  the  rear  of  Jackson,  who,  with  a  day's  start,  was  moving  on 
the  shorter  and  better.  On  Friday  morning  Jackson  was  in  front  of 
Harper's  Ferry,  fifty  miles  in  advance  of  Strasburg ;  Fremont  was 
at  Moorefield,  thirty-eight  miles  from  Strasburg,  with  his  advance 
ten  miles  on  the  way  to  the  latter  place ;  Shields  wras  not  more  than 
twenty  miles  from  Strasburg  (for  his  advance  entered  Front  Royal, 
which  is  but  twelve  miles  distant,  before  midday  on  Friday),  while 
McDowell  was  following  with  another  divison  within  supporting 
distance.  Yet  by  Sunday  night  Jackson  had  marched  a  distance  of 
between  fifty  and  sixty  miles,  though  encumbered  with  prisoners 
and  captured  stores,  had  reached  Strasburg  before  either  of  his 
adversaries,  and  passed  between  their  armies,  while  he  held  Fremont 
at  bay  by  a  show  of  force,  and  blinded  and  bewildered  McDowell  by 
the  rapidity  of  his  movements. 

Now  followed  five  days  of  masterly  retreat.  The  failure  of 
McDowell  to  attack  him  at  Strasburg  caused  Jackson  to  suspect  the 
movement  of  his  forces  up  the  Page  or  Luray  Yalley.  McDowell 
himself  did  not  go  beyond  Front  Royal,  but  sent  Shields'  Division  to 


STOXEWALL  JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  743 

follow  Jackson.  The  road  up  the  Page  Talley  runs  along  the  east 
side  of  the  main  Shenandoah  river,  which  was  then  impassible  except 
at  the  bridges.  Of  these  there  were  but  three  in  the  whole  length  of 
the  Page  Valley,  two  opposite  Xew  Market,  but  a  few  miles  apart, 
and  a  third  at  Conrad's  store,  opposite  Harrisonburg.  Jackson 
promptly  burned  the  first  two,  and  thus  left  Shields  entirely  unable 
to  harass  his  Hank  or  impede  his  march.  Haying  thus  disposed  of 
one  of  the  pursuing  armies,  he  fell  back  before  Fremont  by  moderate 
stages,  intrusting  the  protection  of  his  rear  to  the  indefatigable 
Ashby.  As  Fremont  approached  Harrisonburg,  on  the  6th  of  June, 
Jackson  left  it.  Instead  of  taking  the  road  via  Conrad's  store  to 
Swift  Run  gap,  as  he  had  done  when  retreating  before  Banks,  in 
April,  he  now  took  the  road  to  Port  Republic,  where  the  branches  of 
the  main  Sbenandoah  unite.  He  next  sent  a  party  to  burn  the 
bridge  at  Conrad's  store,  which  afforded  the  last  chance  of  a  union  of 
his  adversaries  short  of  Port  Republic.  The  bridge  at  the  latter 
place,  together  with  a  ford  on  the  south,  near  the  smaller  of  the 
tributaries  which  there  form  the  Shenandoah,  gave  him  the  means  of 
crossing  from  one  side  to  the  other,  which,  by  the  destruction  of 
the  other  bridges,  he  had  denied  to  his  enemies. 

And  now  came  the  crowning  act  of  his  compaign.  When  his 
enemies  were  already  closing  in  on  his  rear  with  overwhelming  force 
he  had,  with  wonderful  celerity,  passed  in  safety  between  them,  lie 
had  continued  his  retreat  until  they  were  now  drawn  one  hundred 
miles  from  the  Potomac.  A  large  fraction  of  his  pursuers  had  given 
up  the  chase,  and  were  off  his  hands.  P>anks  had  only  conic  as  far 
as  Winchester.  Saxton,  from  Harper's  Ferry,  had  only  followed  the 
rear  guard  under  Winder  for  part  of  one  day,  and  then  went  into 
camp  "exhausted,"  as  he  states.  McDowell,  with  two  divisions,  had 
remained  at  Front  Royal  when  Shields  moved  toward  Lnray,  the 
latter  officer  undertaking,  with  one  of  his  divisions,  to  "clean  out  the 
Yalley."  Hence  Jackson  had  now  hut  Fremont's  forces,  about  equal 
to  his  own  in  number,  pressing  on  his  rear,  while  Shields  was  making 
his  toilsome  way  up  the  Page  Valley,  and  was  a  day  or  two  behind. 
By  laying  hold  of  the  bridges  he  had  placed  an  impassable  barrier 
between  his  two  pursuers,  and  now  he  occupied  the  point  where  their 
two  routes  converged.  Xo  further  to  the  rear  would  the  Shenandoah 
serve  as  a  barrier  to  their  junction,  for  south  of  Port  Republic  its 
headwaters  are  easily  fordable.  Here,  too,  was  Brown's  gap  near 
at  hand,  an  easily  defended  pass  in  the  Blue  ridge,  and  affording  a 
good  road  out  of  the  Valley  in  case  of  need.  In  this  position  Jack 
son  determined  to  stand  and  light  his  enemies  in  detail. 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

On  Friday  the  footsore  and  weary  Confederates  went  into  camp 
at  different  points  along  the  five  miles  of  road  that  intervened 
between  Port  Royal  and  Cross  Keys,  the  latter  a  point  half  way 
between  the  former  village  and  Martinsburg.  The  skirmish  on  that 
day,  in  which  Fremont's  cavalry  was  severely  punished,  is  memorable 
because  in  it  fell  Turner  Ashby,  the  generous,  the  chivalric,  the  high- 
toned  knight — who,  as  commander  of  his  horse,  had  so  faithfully  and 
gloriously  contributed  to  Jackson's  achievements.  The  next  day  was 
given  to  rest,  and  sorrow  for  the  loss  of  Ashby  replaced  all  other  feel 
ings  for  the  time.  But  brief  the  time  for  sorrow.  War  gives  much 
space  to  the  grand  emotions  that  lead  to  heroic  doing  or  heroic  bearing, 
but  is  niggardly  in  its  allowance  to  the  softer  feelings  of  sadness  and 
grief.  As  Ashby  is  borne  away  to  his  burial,  all  thoughts  turn  (once 
more)  to  the  impending  strife.  Fremont  was  advancing.  He  had  been 
emboldened  by  the  retreat  of  the  Confederates,  and  failing  to  com 
prehend  the  object  of  Jackson's  movements,  pushed  on  to  seize  the 
prey  which  he  deemed  to  be  now  within  his  grasp.  His  troops  were 
all  up  by  Saturday  night,  and  his  dispositions  were  made  for  attack 
on  Sunday  morning,  June  8th.  But,  though  Fremont  was  thus  close 
at  hand,  while  Shields,  detained  by  bad  roads  with  his  main  body, 
was  yet  twelve  or  fifteen  miles  off  on  the  east  side  of  the  river,  yet 
the  opening  of  the  battle  on  Sunday,  June  8th,  was  made  by  a  dash 
of  Shields'  cavalry,  under  Colonel  Carroll,  into  Port  Republic.  They 
had  been  sent  on  a  day's  march  in  advance,  and  meeting  but  a  small 
force  of  Confederate  cavalry,  had  driven  them  pell-mell  into  Port 
Republic,  dashed  across  South  river  after  them,  seized  and,  for  a  few 
minutes,  held  the  bridge  over  the  larger  stream.  Jackson  had  just 
passed  through  the  village  as  they  entered  it.  Riding  rapidly  to  the 
nearest  infantry  regiment  north  of  the  bridge,  he  put  himself  at  the 
head  of  it,  quickly  retook  the  bridge,  captured  two  cannon,  and  drove 
these  adventurous  horsemen  back.  They  retired  two  or  three  miles 
with  their  infantry  supports,  and,  as  the  bluffs  on  the  west  side  of 
the  river  commanded  the  roads  along  the  east  side,  a  battery  or  two 
kept  them  inactive  for  the  remainder  of  the  day.  It  was  at  this  time 
that  Shields,  from  Luray,  was  dispatching  Fremont  as  follows : 

June  8th— 9.30  A.  M. 

I  write  by  your  scout.  I  think  by  this  time  there  will  be  twelve  pieces  of 
artillery  opposite  Jackson's  train  at  Port  Kcpublic,  if  he  has  taken  that  route.  Some 
cavalry  and  artillery  have  pushed  on  to  Waynesboro  to  burn  the  bridge.  I  hope  to 
have  two  brigades  at  Port  Republic  to-day.  I  follow  myself  with  two  other  brigades 
from  this  place.  If  the  enemy  changes  direction  you  will  please  keep  me  advised. 
If  he  attempts  to  force  a  passage,  as  my  force  is  not  large  there  yet,  I  hope  you  will 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  745 

thunder  down  on  his  rear.     Please  send  back  information  from  time  to  time.     I 
think  Jackson  is  caught  this  time. 

'  Yours,  sincerely, 

JAMES  SHIELDS. 

Meanwhile,  Fremont  had  marshaled  his  brigades,  and  was  press 
ing  on  in  brilliant  array  to  "  thunder  down  "  on  his  adversary's  rear. 
To  General  Ewell  and  his  division  had  Jackson  assigned  the  duty  of 
meeting  the  foe.  His  other  troops  were  in.  the  rear,  and  nearer 
Port  Royal,  to  watch  movements  there  and  to  assist  General  Ewell 
if  necessary.  Ewell  was  drawn  up  on  a  wooded  ridge  near  Cross 
Keys,  with  an  open  meadow  and  rivulet  in  front.  On  a  parallel 
ridge  beyond  the  rivulet  Fremont  took  position.  The  latter  first 
moved  forward  his  left,  composed  of  Blenker's  Germans,  to  the 
attack.  They  were  met  by  General  Trimble,  one  of  E well's  briga 
dier's,  with  three  regiments  of  his  brigade.  He  coolly  withheld  his 
fire  until  the  Germans  were  close  upon  him.  Then  a  few  deadly 
volleys  and  the  attack  is  broken,  and  the  Federal  left  wing  bloodily 
and  decisively  repulsed.  That  sturdy  old  soldier,  General  Trimble, 
having  been  reinforced,  presses  forward,  dislodges  the  batteries  in 
position  in  his  front,  and  threatens  the  overthrow  of  Fremont's  left 
wing.  While  this  last  is  not  accomplished,  the  handling  Blenker 
has  received  is  so  rough  as  completely  to  paralyze  the  remainder  of 
Fremont's  operations.  The  attack  on  centre  and  right  become  little 
more  than  artillery  combats,  and  by  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  Fre 
mont  withdraws  his  whole  line.  E  well's  force  was  about  six  thousand 
and  his  loss  two  hundred  and  eighty-seven  ;  Fremont's  force  twice  as 
great  and  his  loss  over  six  hundred  and  fifty. 

About  the  time  of  Fremont's  repulse,  General  Tyler,  with  one 
of  Shields'  infantry  brigades,  reached  the  position  near  Lewistown, 
to  where  Colonel  Carroll  and  his  cavalry  had  retired  in  the  morning. 
But  so  strong  was  the  position  held  by  the  Confederate  batteries  on 
the  west  bank  of  the  river,  that  Tyler  felt  it  impossible  to  make  any 
diversion  in  favor  of  Fremont,  and  with  his  force  of  three  thousand 
men  remained  idle. 

Jackson,  emboldened  by  the  inactivity  of  Shields'  advance,  and 
the  easy  repulse  of  Fremont,  conceived  the  audacious  design  of  attack 
ing  his  two  opponents  in  succession  the  next  day,  with  the  hope  of 
overwhelming  them  separately.  For  this  purpose  he  directed  that 
during  the  night  a  temporary  bridge,  composed  simply  of  planks, 
laid  upon  the  running  gear  of  wagons,  should  be  constructed  over 
the  South  river,  at  Port  Republic,  and  ordered  Winder  to  move  his 
brigade  at  dawn  across  both  rivers  and  against  Shields.  Ewell  was 


7^6  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

directed  to  leave  Trimble's  Brigade  and  part  of  Pattern's  to  hold 
Fremont  in  check,  and  to  move  at  an  early  hour  to  Port  Royal  to 
follow  Winder.  Taliaferro's  Brigade  was  left  in  charge  of  the  bat 
teries  along  the  river,  and  to  protect  Trimble's  retreat  if  necessary. 
The  force  left  in  Fremont's  front  was  directed  to  make  all  the  show 
possible,  and  to  delay  the  Federal  advance  to  the  extent  of  its  power. 
The  Confederate  commander  proposed,  in  case  of  an  easy  victory 
over  Shields  in  the  morning,  to  return  to  the  Harrisonburg  side  of 
the  river  and  attack  Fremont  in  the  afternoon.  In  case,  however, 
of  delay,  and  a  vigorous  advance  on  Fremont's  part,  Trimble  was  to 
retire  by  the  bridge  into  Port  Eepublic  and  burn  it,  to  prevent  his 
antagonist  from  following. 

Jackson  urged  forward  in  person  the  construction  of  the  foot 
bridge  and  the  slow  passage  of  his  troops  over  the  imperfect  struc 
ture.  When  Winder's  and  Taylor's  Brigades  had  crossed  he  would 
wait  no  longer,  but  moved  forward  toward  the  enemy,  and  when  he 
found  him,  ordered  Winder  to  attack.  The  Federal  General  Tyler 
had  posted  his  force  strongly  on  a  line  perpendicular  to  the  river, 
his  left  especially  in  a  commanding  position  and  protected  by  dense 
woods.  Winder  attacked  with  vigor,  but  soon  found  the  Federal 
position  too  strong  to  be  carried  by  his  brigade  of  twelve  hundred 
men.  Taylor  went  to  his  assistance,  but  met  with  a  stubborn  resist 
ance  and  varying  success.  Winder  was  forced  back  until  other  troops 
came  up  and  enabled  him  once  more  to  go  forward.  Jackson,  find 
ing  the  resistance  of  the  enemy  so  much  more  stubborn  than  he  had 
expected,  and  that  his  first  attack  had  failed,  determined  to  concen 
trate  his  whole  force  and  give  up  all  intention  of  recrossing  the  river. 
He,  therefore,  sent  orders  to  Trimble  and  Taliaferro  to  leave  Fre 
mont's  front,  move  over  the  bridge,  burn  it,  and  join  the  main  body 
of  the  army  as  speedily  as  possible.  This  was  done.  Before  his  rear 
guard  had  arrived,  however,  a  renewed  attack  in  overwhelming  force 
on  Tyler  had  carried  his  position,  captured  his  battery,  and  compelled 
him  to  retreat  in  more  or  less  disorder.  The  pursuit  continued  for 
eight  miles ;  four  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners  and  six  guns  were  cap 
tured,  and  two  hundred  and  seventy-five  wounded  paroled  in  the 
hospitals  near  the  field.  I  have  seen  no  official  statement  of  the 
Federal  loss,  but  the  above  was,  of  course,  the  greater  part  of  it. 
Jackson's  total  loss  was  eight  hundred  and  seventy -six. 

Fremont  had  advanced  cautiously  against  Trimble  in  the  fore 
noon,  and  had  followed  as  the  latter  withdrew  and  burnt  the  bridge. 
By  this  last  act  Fremont  was  compelled  to  remain  an  inactive  spec 
tator  of  the  defeat  of  Tyler.  General  Fremont  thus  describes  the 
scene  when  he  reached  the  river : 


STONEWALL  JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  74.7 

The  battle  which  had  taken  place  upon  the  further  bank  of  the  river  was 
wholly  at  an  end.  A  single  brigade,  in  fact,  two,  sent  forward  by  General  Shields 
had  been  simply  cut  to  pieces.  Colonel  Carroll  had  failed  to  burn  the  bridge.  Jack 
son,  hastening  across,  had  fallen  upon  the  inferior  force,  and  the  result  was  before 
us.  Of  the  bridge  nothing  remained  but  the  charred  and  smoking  timbers.  Beyond, 
at  the  edge  of  the  woods,  a  body  of  the  enemy's  troops  was  in  position,  and  a  bag 
gage  train  was  disppearing  in  a  pass  among  the  hills.  Parties  gathering  the  dead 
and  wounded,  together  with  a  line  of  prisoners  awaiting  the  movement  of  the  rebel 
force  near  by,  was  all,  in  respect  to  troops,  of  either  side  now  to  be  seen. 

Thus  the  day  ended  with  the  complete  defeat  of  the  two  brigades 
under  Tyler.  Gallant  and  determined  had  been  their  resistance,  and 
Jackson's  impetuosity  had  made  his  victory  more  difficult  than  it 
otherwise  would  have  been.  In  sending  in  \Yinder' s  Brigade  before 
its  supports  arrived,  he  had  hurled  this  body  of  troops  against  more 
than  twice  their  number.  Taylor  next  attacked,  but  the  repulse  of 
Winder  enabled  the  Federal  commander  to  concentrate  his  forces 
against  Taylor,  and  drive  him  from  the  battery  he  had  taken.  It 
was  then  that  Jackson  renewed  the  attack  with  the  combined  forces 
of  three  brigades,  and  speedily  forced  the  enemy  from  the  field. 
The  Confederate  trains  had  been  moved  in  the  course  of  the  day 
across  South  river  toward  Brown's  gap,  and  during  the  afternoon 
and  night  the  Confederates  returned  from  the  battle-field  and  pursuit, 
to  camp  at  the  foot  of  this  mountain  pass.  It  was  midnight  before 
some  of  them  lay  down  in  the  rain  to  rest.  This  double  victory 
ended  the  pursuit  of  Jackson.  Fremont,  on  the  next  morning,  began 
to  retreat,  and  retired  sixty  miles  to  Strasburg.  Shields,  so  soon  as 
his  broken  brigades  rejoined  him,  retreated  to  Front  Royal,  and  was 
there  transferred  to  Manassas. 

The  battles  of  Cross  Keys  and  Port  Republic  closed  the  Yalley 
campaign  of  1862.  Just  three  months  had  passed  since  Jackson,  with 
about  four  thousand  troops  badly  armed  and  equipped,  had  fallen 
back  from  Winchester  before  the  advance  of  Banks,  with  twenty- 
five  thousand  men.  So  feeble  seemed  his  force,  and  so  powerless  for 
offense,  that  when  it  had  been  pushed  forty  miles  to  the  rear,  Banks 
began  to  send  his  force  toward  Manassas  to  execute  his  part  of 
"covering  the  Federal  capital"  in  McClellan's  great  campaign. 
While  a  large  part  of  the  Federal  troops  is  on  the  march  out  of  the 
Yalley,  and  their  commander  is  himself  en  route  from  Winchester  to 
Washington,  Jackson,  hastening  from  his  resting  place,  by  a  forced 
inarch,  appears  most  unexpectedly  at  Kernstown,  and  hurls  his  little 
army  with  incredible  force  and  fury  against  the  part  of  Banks'  army 
which  is  yet  behind.  lie  is  mistaken  as  to  the  number  of  the  enemy. 
Three  thousand  men,  worn  by  a  forced  march,  are  not  able  to  defeat 
the  seven  thousand  of  Shields.  After  a  fierce  struggle  he  suffers  a 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

severe  repulse,  but  lie  makes  such  an  impression  as  to  cause  the 
recall  of  a  strong  force  from  McClellan  to  protect  Washington.  The 
Federal  administration  cannot  believe  that  he  has  attacked  Shields 
with  a  handful  men. 

Falling  back  before  his  pursuers,  he  leaves  the  main  road  at 
ILirrisonburg  and  crossing  over  to  Swift  Run  gap,  he  takes  a  position 
in  which  he  cannot  be  readily  attacked,  and  which  yet  enables  him 
so  to  threaten  the  flank  of  his  opponent  as  to  effectually  check  his 
further  progress.  Here  he  gains  ten  days'  time  for  the  reorganization 
of  his  regiments,  the  time  of  service  of  most  of  which  expired  in 
April ;  and  here,  too,  the  return  of  furloughed  men,  and  the  accessions 
of  volunteers,  doubles  his  numbers.  Finding  that  no  more  troops 
could  be  obtained  besides  those  of  Ewell  and  Edward  Johnson,  he 
leaves  the  former  to  hold  Banks  in  check  wrhile  he  makes  a  rapid  and 
circuitous  march  to  General  Edward  Johnson's  position,  near  Staun- 
ton.  Uniting  Johnson's  force  with  his  own,  he  appears  suddenly  in 
front  of  Milroy,  at  McDowell,  only  eight  days  after  having  left  Swift 
Run  gap.  He  has  marched  one  hundred  miles  and  crossed  the  Blue 
ridge  twice  in  this  time,  and  now  repulses  Milroy  and  Schenck,  and 
follows  them  i>p  to  Franklin.  Then,  finding  Fremont  within  support 
ing  distance,  he,  on  May  14th,  begins  to  retrace  his  steps,  marching 
through  Harrisonburg,  New  Market,  Luray,  Ewell  joining  him  on 
the  road,  and  swelling  his  force  to  sixteen  thousand  men,  and,  on  May 
23d,  unexpectedly  appears  at  Front  Royal  (distant  by  his  route  nearly 
one  hundred  and  twenty  miles  from  Franklin),  and  surprises  and 
completely  overwhelms  the  force  Banks  has  stationed  there.  Next 
day  he  strikes  with  damaging  effect  at  Banks'  retreating  column, 
between  Strasburg  and  Winchester,  and  follows  him  up  all  night. 
At  dawn  he  attacks  him  on  the  heights  of  Winchester,  forces  him 
from  his  position,  and  drives  him  in  confusion  and  dismay  to  the 
Potomac,  with  the  loss  of  immense  stores  and  a  large  number  of 
prisoners.  Resting  but  two  days,  he  marches  to  Harper's  Ferry, 
threatens  an  invasion  of  Maryland,  and  spreads  such  alarm  as  to 
paralyze  the  movement  of  McDowell's  four  thousand  men  at  Freder- 
icksburg,  and  to  cause  the  concentration  of  half  of  this  force,  together 
with  Fremont's  command,  on  his  rear.  The  militia  of  the  adjoining 
States  is  called  out ;  troops  are  hurried  to  Harper's  Ferry  in  his  front ; 
more  than  forty  thousand  troops  are  hastening,  under  the  most  urgent 
telegrams,  to  close  in  around  him.  Keeping  up  his  demonstrations 
until  the  last  moment,  until,  indeed,  the  head  of  McDowell's  column 
was  but  twelve  or  fourteen  miles  from  his  line  of  retreat,  at  a  point 
nearly  fifty  miles  in  his  rear,  he,  by  a  forced  march  of  a  day  and  a 
half,  traverses  this  distance  of  fifty  miles,  and  places  himself  at 


STONEWALL  JA  CKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  749 

Strasburg.  Here  lie  keeps  Fremont  at  bay  until  his  long  train  of 
prisoners  and  captured  stores  has  passed  through  in  safety,  and  his 
rear  guard  closed  up.  Then  he  falls  back  before  Fremont,  while  by 
burning  successively  the  bridges  over  the  main  fork  of  the  Shcnan- 
doali,  he  destroys  all  co-operation  between  his  pursuers.  Having 
retreated  as  far  as  necessary,  he  turns  off  from  ITarrisonburg  to  Port 
Republic,  seizes  the  only  bridge  left  south  of  Front  Royal  over  the 
Shenandoah,  and  takes  a  position  which  enables  him  to  fight  his 
adversaries  in  succession,  while  they  cannot  succor  each  other.  Fre 
mont  first  attacks,  and  is  severely  repulsed,  and  next  morning 
Jackson,  withdrawing  suddenly  from  his  front,  and  destroying  the 
bridge  to  prevent  his  following,  attacks  the  advance  brigades  of 
Shields,  and  completely  defeats  them,  driving  them  eight  or  ten  miles 
from  the  battle-field. 

A  week  of  rest,  and  Jackson,  having  disposed  of  his  various 
enemies,  and  effected  the  permanent  withdrawal  of  McDowell's  Corps 
from  the  forces  operating  against  Richmond,  is  again  on  the  march, 
and  while  Banks,  Fremont  and  McDowell  are  disposing  their  broken 
or  battled  forces  to  cover  Washington,  is  hastening  to  aid  in  the 
great  series  of  battles  which,  during  the  last  days  of  June  and  the 
early  ones  of  July,  resulted  in  the  defeat  of  McClellan's  army  and 
the  relief  of  the  Confederate  capital. 

I  have  thus  tried  to  give  you,  fellow  soldiers  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  an  outline  of  one  of  the  most  brilliant  pages  of 
our  history.  Time  has  not  permitted  me  to  dwell  on  the  great 
deeds  which  crowded  those  few  months,  or  to  characterize,  in  fitting 
terms  of  panegyric,  the  mighty  actors  in  them.  I  have  attempted 
nothing  beyond  a  simple  and  carefully  accurate  statement  of  the 
facts.  This  may  help  to  clear  away  from  one  campaign  the  dust 
and  mould  which' already  gathers  over  the  memories  of  the  great 
struggle.  It  may  do  more.  It  may,  by  touching  the  electric  chord 
of  association,  transport  us  for  the  time  into  the  presence  of  the 
majestic  dead,  and  of  the  mighty  drama,  the  acting  of  which  was 
like  another  and  higher  life,  and  the  contemplation  of  which  should 
tend  to  strengthen,  elevate,  ennoble.  It  is  wise  in  our  day — it  is 
wise  always — to  recur  to  a  time  when  patriotism  was  a  passion; 
when  devotion  to  great  'principles  dwarfed  all  considerations  other 
than  those  of  truth  and  right ;  when  duty  was  felt  to  be  the  sublimest 
word  in  our  language ;  when  sacrifice  outweighed  selfishness  ;  when 
human  virtue  was  equal  to  human  calamity.  Among  the  heroes  of 
that  time  Jackson  holds  a  high  place — a  worthy  member  of  a  worthy 
band — aye,  of  a  band  than  which  no  land  in  any  age  can  point  to  a 
worthier. 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  RAID. 


BY    COLONEL    J.    E.    M  GOWAN. 


Tins  writing  was  suggested 
by  the  perusal  of  a  sketch 
of  the  Morgan  raid  of  1863, 
by  General  Basil  W.  Duke, 
printed  in  the  WEEKLY  TIMES 
of  April  Tth,  1877.  I  have  fol 
lowed  the  thread  of  his  nar 
rative,  when  necessary  to  the 
continuity  of  my  story,  ac 
cepting,  without  question,  his 
account  of  what  his  own  forces 
did,  and  adding  to  its  value 
by  corroborating  it  when  I 
could.  I  have  corrected,  where 
their  historical  importance 
seemed  to  demand  it,  his 
errors  as  to  the  numbers  and  movements  of  the  forces  which  followed 
and  captured  Morgan's  command.  The  summer  of  1863  opened  on 
a  favorable  outlook  for  the  Federal  forces  in  the  departments  south 
of  the  Ohio.  They  had  been  recruited  from  the  "six  hundred 
thousand  more"  who  went  afield  in  August  and  September,  1862. 
The  new  levies  had  been  weeded  of  worthless  material  by  a  severe 
winter's  work — guarding  lines  of  communication,  or  facing  the 
enemy  under  Grant,  Burnside,  or  Rosecrans.  Stone  River,  though  a 
"  drawn  battle,"  resulted  in  a  considerable  balance  to  the  credit  of 
the  "  invader,"  who  held  the  field,  fortified  it  and  kept  his  lines  open 
by  rail  and  wagon  train  to  the  Ohio  river.  These  armies  were,  in 
short,  on  the  1st  of  June,  1863,  strong  in  numbers,  in  vigorous 
health,  full  of  confidence,  thoroughly  disciplined  and  splendidly 
IM  I  nipped.  Grant's  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  had  been  reorganized  into  corps,  and  had  become  well 
used  to  that  system.  The  scattered  troops  in  Kentucky  were  being 
placed  on  the  same  basis  by  Burnside,  who  commanded  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Ohio,  with  headquarters  at  Cincinnati.  On  the  10th  of 

(750) 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  BAJD.  751 

June  it  was  announced  in  general  orders  that  the  army  of  occupa 
tion  in  Kentucky  had  been  consolidated,  for  active  service,  into  the 
Twenty-third  Army  Corps,  under  command  of  Major  General 
George  L.  Ilartsuff.  This  corps  numbered,  of  all  arms,  about 
twenty-four  thousand  men. 

The  army  headquarters  at  Washington  had  planned  to  move 
these  three  forces  as  near  simultaneously  as  possible,  and  by  pressing 
the  enemy  heavily  on  all  sides  at  once,  prevent  him  from  dividing 
any  one  of  his  defensive  forces  to  reinforce  another.  Grant  was 
already  pushing  Pemberton  into  his  forts  at  Vicksburg.  Burnside 
and  Ilosecrans  were  to  move  on  parallel  lines,  the  first  toward  Knox- 
ville,  the  second  toward  Chattanooga.  It  was  a  most  favorable 
moment  to  strike  directly  into  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy.  Bragg 
had  weakened  himself  to  strengthen  Johnston  in  his  vain  endeavor 
first  to  prevent,  and  then  to  raise  the  siege  of  Vicksburg.  Burnside 
and  his  troops  concentrated  near  the  Tennessee  line.  His  cavalry 
was  thrown  well  forward.  lie  waited  the  signal  from  Murfreesboro 
t<>  move  southward  in  concert  with  Rosecrans.  Buckner  held  East 
Tennessee  feebly.  It  was  one  of  those  supreme  opportunities  that 
occur  in  all  great  wars,  which,  if  siezed  in  a  strong  hand  and  wielded 
with  vigor,  can  be  so  improved  as  to  end  the  strife  in  one  heavy, 
short,  and  sharp  campaign.  A  competent  military  critic,  looking  at 
the  situation  from  to-day,  would  probably  conclude  that,  had  these 
three  armies  been  controlled  by  one  master  of  right  qualities,  he 
would  have  brought  the  campaign  to  a  glorious  end  by  autumn,  and 
brushed  the  Confederacy  out  of  Tennessee,  Xorth  Georgia,  Alabama, 
and  Mississippi,  if  indeed  he  had  not  so  weakened  it  that  the  whole 
structure  would  have  tumbled  into  ruin  before  the  dawn  of  1S6-A. 
But  we  had  no  such  man  at  the  head  of  Southwestern  military 
affairs.  They  were  in  the  hands  of  three  commanders,  entirely  inde 
pendent  of  each  other,  and  probably  jealous  of  each  other.  These 
chiefs  had  no  very  high  opinion  of  General  Ilalleck,  the  nominal 
commander-in-chief  at  army  headquarters,  and  this  last  sentiment  of 
the  generals  was  indulged  in  by  all  ranks  in  their  several  armies. 
It  was  a  different  task  to  disconcert  plans  made  by  or  for  the  heads 
of  armies  thus  situated  from  that  which  would  have  been  necessary 
to  break  the  back  of  one  of  Grant's  campaigns  a  year  later.  lie 
had  ample  authority,  and  the  rugged  will  to  enforce  his  orders.  But 
speculate  as  we  may  about  "what  might  have  been,"  history  will 
record  the  fact  that  the  nicely  fixed  plan  for  a  grand  co-operative 
campaign  of  the  three  armies  mentioned  was  completely  balked,  that 
one  of  them  came  to  grief  and  well-nigh  to  destruction  at  Chicka- 


752  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

maujja,  while  another  was  bottled  up  in  a  half -starved  state,  and  that 
Grant's  forces  alone  achieved  anything  but  disaster  until  they  were 
placed  under  one  head  the  following  November.  For  this  fortunate 
escape  of  the  Confederacy  from  a  stunning  blow,  that  government 
was  indebted,  first,  to  the  divided  councils  of  their  enemies,  and, 
second,  to  General  John  II.  Morgan's  dash,  enterprise,  and  courage. 

About  the  middle  of  June,  Morgan  appeared  in  the  Cumberland 
river  valley,  on  the  south  bank,  at  the  head  of  a  picked  division  of 
cavalry  and  a  battery,  aggregating  about  two  thousand  five  hundred 
men.  lie  maneuvred,  or  rather  marched  along  the  river,  up  and 
down,  now  approaching  the  stream,  and  now  disappearing  in  some 
back  valley.  The  last  week  in  June  he  kept  out  of  sight  of  the 
river,  and  was  so  profoundly  quiet  that  the  Federal  commanders, 
who  had  been  watching  him  closely  for  ten  days,  concluded  he  had 
returned  to  Bragg's  main  column  near  Tullahoma.  They  were  sure, 
then,  that  their  first  surmise,  that  he  had  come  into  the  valley  to 
recruit  his  stock  on  its  fine  pastures,  was  correct.  All  vigilance 
north  of  the  river  was  slackened.  Yidettes  along  the  bank  were 
recalled  and  sent  to  their  several  commands.  The  cavalry,  under 
Ilobson  and  Woolford,  was  permitted  to  scatter  about  the  country, 
the  better  to  enable  men  and  horses  to  be  fed.  The  force  nearest 
the  river  was  at  Tompkinsville,  twenty  miles  from  Burksville,  the 
county  town  of  Cumberland  County,  Kentucky,  a  few  miles  south 
of  which  Morgan  lay,  holding  his  command  very  still  and  watching 
a  chance  to  make  a  crossing.  lie  waited  until  the  2d  of  July.  The 
river  had  been  swollen  of  late  by  heavy  rains.  It  was  out  of  its 
banks,  a  broad,  swift,  muddy  torrent,  over  which  the  Confederate 
chieftain  put  his  command  on  rafts  made  of  log  canoes,  overlaid 
with  fence  raik  It  was  one  of  the  boldest  undertakings  of  the 
war,  and  the  skill  with  which  it  was  executed  was  equaled  by  the 
pluck  which  conceived  and  carried  it  through.  "When  Morgan  had 
nearly  finished  his  crossing,  one  of  Hobson's  regiments,  by  mere 
accident,  ambled  within  reach  of  his  strong  outposts,  a  mile  from 
the  ferry,  which  provoked  a  lively  skirmish,  the  Federals  being 
soundly  whipped.  And  now,  when  the  raiders  were  at  full  speed 
on  their  northward  journey,  our  commanders  began  to  have  an 
inkling  that  these  fellows  had  come  into  the  valley  of  the  Cumber 
land  for  something  else  than  grass. 

On  the  evening  of  the  3d,  the  rebels  struck  Woolford,  with  the 
First  Kentucky  Cavalry,  and  scattered  him  to  the  right  and  left  near 
the  village  of  Columbia.  On  the  4th,  they  made  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  to  capture  Colonel  O.  M.  Moore,  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Michi- 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND   OHIO  RAID.  753 

gan  Infantry,  and  a  small  garrison  of  his  regiment  at  Green  river 
bridge.  After  losing  more  than  one-fifth  as  many  men  as  Moore 

o  ~  >J 

had  with  him,  Morgan  called  off  his  assaulting  column  and  rode 
round  the  bridge,  fording  the  stream  below.  On  the  5th,  the  raiders 
took  Lebanon  by  assault.  The  post  was  defended  by  the  Tweiity- 
tirst  Kentucky  Infantry,  Colonel  Hanson,  who  made  a  gallant  resist 
ance.  In  the  iinal  assault  on  this  post,  a  younger  brother  of  the 
Confederate  general  was  killed,  lie  was  a  favorite  with  his  elder 
kinsman,  who,  in  his  wild  wrath  at  the  boy's  death,  for  once  forgot 
what  was  due  to  prisoners  of  war,  and  soiled  his  record  by  wreaking 
a  mean  revenge  on  the  officers  he  had  captured,  lie  ordered  Colonel 
Hanson  and  his  officers  to  be  u  double-quicked  "  in  front  of  a  squadron 
of  cavalry  with  drawn  sabres  six  miles  north  of  Lebanon  to  a  village, 
where  he  directed  them  to  be  paroled.  This  brutal  order  was  brutally 
executed.  It  is  due  Morgan's  memory  to  say  that  the  order  was 
given  under  peculiar  excitement,  and  that,  though  I  served  two 
years  with  troops  which  came  in  contact  with  him  a  score  of  times, 
the  one  just  related  is  the  only  instance  of  Morgan's  abuse  of 
prisoners  which  ever  came  to  my  cars  in  such  form  as  to  justify 
belief  in  its  truthfulness.  On  the  evening  of  the  Oth,  the  raiders 
crosssed  the  Louisville  and  Xashville  Railway,  near  Shepherdsville, 
north  of  Lebanon  Junction.  They  stopped  a  passenger  train,  went 
through  the  passengers  and  mails  in  free-and-easy  style,  and  then 
having  passed  the  last  fortified  post  on  their  route  northward, 
pushed  for  the  Ohio.  The  force  sent  in  advance  to  seize  boats  with 
which  to  cross  into  Indiana,  secured  two  large  steamers  on  the 
morning  of  the  Sth,  and  when  Morgan  reached  Brandenburg  at  noon 
these  transports  awaited  him. 

Meantime,  the  whole  of  Burnside's  army  had  been  recalled  from 
its  line  in  the  south  of  Kentucky,  and  had  been  pushed  rapidly 
toward  the  northern  border.  Every  available  trooper  was  put  in 
pursuit.  General  IL  M.  Judah,  commandant  Third  Division, 
Twenty-third  Army  Corps,  heard  of  Morgan's  crossing  of  the  Cum 
berland  in  his  tent,  at  Glasgow,  late  on  the  night  of  the  2d.  AVith 
his  staff  and  a  small  escort  he  hastily  rode  to  within  a  few  miles  of 
Burksville  that  night.  Judah  and  Hobson  held  a  short  council ;  the 
scattered  cavalry  was  speedily  concentrated,  and  Hobson  took  com 
mand  of  that  portion  which  made  the  chase  direct  astern,  and  he 
gathered  into  his  command  all  the  loose  cavalry  on  his  route.  Judah, 
with  the  Fifth  Indiana,  the  Fourteenth  Illinois,  the  Eleventh  Ken 
tucky,  a  section  of  Henshaw's  Illinois  Battery  and  a  section  of  three- 
inch  Rodmans,  manned  by  troopers  of  the  Fifth  Indiana,  set  out  on 
48 


75i  AXNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

an  interior  line  of  the  arc  on  which  Morgan  moved.  Arcl  though 
his  force  was  delayed  almost  an  entire  day  in  effecting  a  crossing  of 
Green  river,  which  was  swollen  by  late  rains,  it  reached  Elizabeth- 
town,  on  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad,  on  the  evening  of 
the  7th — the  day  before  Morgan  got  to  Brandenburg.  From  Eliza- 
bethtown  Judah  marched  west  to  Litchh'eld,  a  village  on  the  "  old 
Hartford  "  road,  the  only  practicable  route  of  escape  for  raiders  if 
they  failed  to  make  a  crossing  at  Brandenburg. 

There  is  plenty  of  internal  and  external  evidence  to  show  that 
Burnside  intended  that  Morgan  should  cross  the  river  and  run 
through  Southern  Indiana  and  Southern  Ohio.  The  Federal  gen 
eral's  plan  had  been  all  thrown  away  by  the  necessity  to  pursue  the 
raiders,  and  protect  his  supplies  and  communications ;  and  he  very 
naturally  might  conclude  that  the  best  compensation  for  this  sacrifice 
was  to  give  the  "Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle"  of  Indiana,  and  the 
Yallandighainmers  of  Ohio,  a  touch  of  the  quality  of  their  Southern 
friends.  To  one  who  was  in  a  position  to  know  pretty  well  what  was 
afoot  at  headquarters,  it  looked  very  much  as  if  Burnside  was  first 
intent  on  inducing  the  Confederates  to  visit  the  Northern  States, 
and,  second,  that,  failing  in  this,  he  would  not  let  them  return  South 
without  a  tight  with  forces  sufficient  to  whip  and  break  in  pieces, 
if  not  capture,  the  command.  All  the  Federal  dispositions  were, 
apparently,  made  with  these  two  objects  in  view,  and  the  troops  and 
gunboats  acted  precisely  as  if  they  were  carrying  out  the  programme. 
It  was,  also,  regarded  that  his  invasion  of  the  North  rendered  his 
capture  morally  certain. 

I  am  of  opinion  that  either  orders  were  issued  to  the  troops  and 
gunboats  not  to  prevent  Morgan  from  entering  Indiana,  or  that  the 
commanders  of  both  the  naval  and  land  forces  manifested  gross 
carelessness  and  want  of  enterprise  at  that  point  in  the  pursuit, 
neither  of  which  characterized  their  operations  at  any  other  time 
from  the  3d  of  July,  when  the  chase  began,  to  the  26th,  when  it 
closed.  I  think  it  is  clear,  from  Duke's  account  of  the  crossing  at 
Brandenburg,  that  the  master  of  the  gunboat  "Elk''  offered  the 
rebels  very  "  judicious "  resistance.  Duke  says :  "A  single  well- 
aimed  shot  from  her  wrould  have  sent  either  of  the  boats  to  the 
bottom,  and  caused  the  loss  of  every  man  on  board."  But  it  does 
not  look  as  if  Lieutenant  Fitch,  who  commanded  her,  cared  to  do 
more  than  annoy  and  delay,  withal  hindering,  Morgan's  enterprise 
in  beginning  a  campaign  "  on  Yankee  soil,"  thus  giving  Ilobson  and 
Judah  advantages  in  the  pursuit  which  rendered  the  final  capture  of 
the  rebels  more  certain.  But,  whatever  may  have  been  the  orders 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  RAID.  755 

to  the  gunboats,  I  know  that  General  Judah,  on  whose  staff  I  was 
serving  as  provost  marshal,  could  have  reached  Brandenburg  nearly, 
if  not  quite,  as  soon  as  Morgan  did.  I  am  pretty  clear  that  the 
Confederates,  what  with  the  "Elk"  and  her  consort  on  the  river, 
and  fifteen  hundred  troopers  and  four  field-pieces  on  land,  to  oppose 
them,  would  have  had  a  very  lively  time  in  initiating  their  visit 
to  the  people  of  Southern  Indiana.  And  whether  or  not,  as  ])uke 
savs,  the  gunboat  "could  have  become  mistress  of  the  situation  if 
well  and  boldly  handled/'  she  and  her  mate,  had  they  been  supple 
mented  by  our  forces  of  ''horse  marines"  on  land,  could,  with  such 
aid,  have  scattered  the  raiders  in  flying  fragments,  if  the  attack  had 
been  made  when  the  crossing  was  partially  done,  or  forced  a  precipi 
tate  retreat  by  striking  before  the  ferrying  begun.  During  the  whole 
day  in  which  Morgan  was  crossing  the  Ohio,  Judah  lay  within  six 
hours1  march  of  him  to  the  south.  Whatever  Burnside's  intentions 
were  in  the  premises,  Morgan  succeeded,  during  twelve  hours  of 
intense  anxiety  and  hard  work,  in  placing  his  force  on  the  Indiana 
shore;  and  probably  desiring  to  imitate,  as  near  as  he  could  with 
the  appliances  at  hand,  another  celebrated  invader,  at  midnight  of 
the  Sth  the  two  large  steamers  which  he  used  were  set  on  lire,  and, 
with  full  head  of  steam  on,  were  sent  down  the  stream.  By  this 
lurid  light,  seemingly  kindled  to  wantonly  intensify  the  wrath  and 
increase  the  exertions  of  his  foes,  the  invader  began  his  perilous 
march  on  Northern  ground. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th,  Judah  marched  his  force,  with 
haste,  back  to  Elizabethtown,  where  men  and  horses  were  loaded  on 
trains  and  carried  to  Louisville.  There  the  cars  were  exchanged  for 
steamboats,  and  our  column  was  all  at  the  Cincinnati  wharf  on  the 
morning  of  the  14th.  We  were  fitted  out  with  a  fleet  of  steamers, 
and,  leisurely  waiting  until  Morgan  passed  the  citv,  we  started  up 
the  river,  under  orders  to  keep  as  near  abreast  of  the  enemy  as 
practicable,  and  not  to  land  until  we  were  certain  of  reaching 
Buffing-ton  ford  about  the  same  time  the  raiders  did.  We  steamed 
slowly  up  the  Ohio,  sending  boats  ashore  from  the  headquarters' 
steamer  every  few  hours  to  get  reports  of  scouts  and  citizens  on  the 
movements  and  whereabouts  of  Morgan.  We  landed  at  Portsmouth 
on  the  evening  of  the  10th,  and  had  some  trouble  in  convincing  the 
loyal  people  of  that  town  that  they  ought,  in  consideration  of  liberal 
compensation  in  cash,  to  furnish  us  a  sufficient  train  to  carry  our 
extra  baggage  and  ammunition.  A  little  coaxing,  emphasized  in 
special  cases  by  resolute-looking  fellows  with  drawn  sabres,  was 
successful.  At  nightfall  I  drove  up  in  front  of  the  shabby  old 


750  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

hotel,  for  the  general's  inspection,  a  dozen  wagons.  With  vigilant 
guarding,  we  kept  them  a  couple  of  days,  and  found  them  a  tolerably 
efficient  transportation  force,  though  the  men,  mostly  owners  of  the 
teams  and  wagons  they  managed,  were  ten  times  as  great  cowards 
as  the  average  army  mule-driver — a  statement  some  old  soldiers  will 
he  inclined  to  question,  as  they  will  hardly  helieve  in  greater  cowardice 
than  that  displayed  hy  the  nohle  corps  of  patriots  referred  to.  We 
struck  out  over  the  knobs  that  night,  in  a  northeasterly  direction,  in 
order  to  reach  the  old  Pomeroy  stage  road  in  the  morning  at  Port 
land,  on  the  Sciota  Valley  Railroad,  by  the  time  Morgan  should 
cross  the  road  at  Jackson,  a  few  miles  further  north.  We  reached 
Portland  at  sunrise.  Smoke  was  rising  over  Jackson,  and  we  were 
not  long  in  ascertaining  that  it  proceeded  from  the  depot,  which 
some  foolish  vandals  of  Morgan's  had  fired,  thus  revealing  his  where 
abouts  to  his  pursuers  more  accurately  than  they  could  otherwise 
have  ascertained  it. 

And  now  began,  on  the  morning  of  July  17th,  the  most  exciting 
part  of  this  exciting  expedition.  The  rebels  knew  we  were  neck  and 
neck  with  them.  They  knew  Hobson  was  pursuing  them  in  the 
rear  with  the  eagerness  of  a  bloodhound.  They  knew  their  only 
chance  of  escape  lay  in  reaching  the  fords  some  time  in  advance  of 
both  pursuers.  They  had  the  advantage  of  distance  on  Judah — the 
road  they  traveled  being  several  miles  shorter  than  his,  which  fol 
lowed  the  bends  of  the  river. 

From  the  morning  of  the  17th,  on  to  the  final  encounter,  we 
were  constantly  within  reach  of  and  feeling  Morgan's  right  fiank  and 
rear.  John  O'Xeil,  since  of  Fenian  and  Canadian  border  fame,  then 
a  lieutenant  in  the  Fifth  Indiana  Cavalry,  was  intrusted  with  the 
task  of  harassing  the  raiders,  and  keeping  the  Federal  commander 
informed  of  all  the  enemy's  movements.  O'Neil  was  an  ideal  Irish 
dragoon,  impetuous,  brave,  prudent.  lie  did  some  as  effective  scout 
ing  and  skirmishing  with  his  command  of  fifty  picked  men  along  the 
bluffs  of  the  Ohio  on  the  two  last  days  of  the  great  raid,  as  any  officer 
did  during  the  war.  As  the  raiders  advanced  they  were,  beside 
being  harassed  by  O'Neil,  harried  by  citizen  militia,  who  felled  trees 
across  the  road  to  halt  the  column,  and  that  done  poured  in  deadly 
volleys  from  rifles  and  shot-guns  from  secure  perches  on  the  steep 
hillsides.  The  Confederate  officers  and  men  said  the  resistance  and 
annoyance  by  militia  on  their  march  of  over  three  hundred  miles  of 
northern  territory  was  nowhere  so  stubborn  and  effective  as  on  the 
last  day,  from  near  Pomeroy  to  their  last  encampment  on  the  Ohio, 
between  Buffington  and  Blennerhasset  shoals,  though  a  good  deal  in 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  EAID. 

this  line,  attributed  to  the  militia  by  Duke,  was  the  work  of  < 
and  his  fifty  troopers.  In  the  rear  of  Pomeroy,  O'Xeil  made  a  par 
ticularly  spirited  onset  upon  the  Confederates,  in  which  he  was  aided 
by  a  small  squad  of  soldiers  Avho  were  home  on  furlough,  and  hap 
pening  to  hear  of  Morgan's  movements,  armed  with  such  weapons  as 
were  at  hand,  and  went  out  to  give  him  some  trouble.  In  this  affair 
several  Confederates  were  wounded,  as  we  learned  next  dav,  and  at 
least  two  were  killed. 

AVe  learned,  while  resting  and  feeding  at  Pomeroy,  Saturday 
evening,  that  late  rains  in  the  mountains  of  Pennsylvania  had  swelled 
the  Ohio,  and  rendered  the  fords  at  Blennerliasset  and  Buffing-ton 
uncertain,  and,  for  any  but  a  person  who  knew  them  intimately, 
dangerous.  The  Confederates  learned  this,  to  their  dismay,  late  that 
night  or  early  next  morning.  They  had  a  party  of  men  inspecting 
the  fords  all  night,  and  they  reported  that  an  attempt  to  cross  would 
be  attended  with  great  hazard.  Morgan  seemed  to  agree  with  this 
conclusion  for  he  went  into  camp  late  on  the  night  of  the  18th, 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  above  Buirington,  and  as  soon  as  they  could 
see  he  set  some  men  to  work  calking  some  old  natboats  found  near 
the  island.  Some  of  his  men  tried  Blennerliasset,  and  failed  to  get 
across.  Then  a  party  was  sent  to  dislodge  a  battery  planted  by  some 
militia  so  as  to  command  Buffington.  They  found  the  little  redoubt 
deserted,  and  the  guns  were  discovered  at  the  foot  of  the  river  bank 
where  the  prudent  garrison  pitched  them  before  retreating.  Then 
a  squadron  tried  Buffington  ford,  and  several  were  drowned.  Their 
guide,  a  former  drover,  who  lived  near  by  and  was  impressed  into 
the  service,  told  me  the  same  day  that  he  purposely  misled  the  Con 
federates  into  a  deep  eddy,  lie  said  seventeen,  with  their  horses, 
perished.  Then  a  strong  picket  line,  with  a  considerable  reserve  in 
support,  the  whole  dismounted,  was  so  stationed  as  to  cover  the  ford, 
and  the  Confederates  awaited  results. 

While  the  rebels  were  making  ineffectual  attempts  to  cross  the 
river,  Judah's  column  was  inarching  in  inky  darkness  from  Pomeroy 
to  Buffington.  The  road  is  as  crooked  as  a  ram's  horn,  and  has 
innumerable  roads  and  lanes  leading  from  it  at  all  sorts  of  appreciable 
and  inappreciable  angles.  Those  who  made  that  march  will  not 
likely  forget  it  while  memory  lasts  them.  At  each  of  the  by-roads 
it  was  necessary  to  station  a  sentry  from  the  advance — Major  Lyle's 
Battalion  of  the  Fifth  Indiana — the  sentry  being  instructed  to  point 
the  right  road  to  the  head  of  the  column  when  it  came  up.  Gener 
ally  these  sentries,  two  minutes  after  the  officer  gave  them  their 
orders,  were  fast  asleep.  Their  horses  would  walk  away  in  search  of 


T58  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

something  to  graze  or  browse.  The  officer  at  the  head  of  the  com 
mand,  thus  left  to  his  own  judgment,  several  times  took  the  wrong 
road. '  The  moment  the  men  were  halted  the  majority  of  them  would 
lean 'forward  on  their  horses'  necks  and  fall  dead  asleep.  The  task 
of  rousing  them,  turning  about  the  artillery  which  was  twice  involved 
in  these  blunders,  and  getting  back  on  the  right  track  was  not  a 
pleasant  one,  especially  when  the  troops  were  jammed  into  a  lane 
barely  wide  enough  to  hold  them,  and  the  high  fences  on  either  hand 
reinforced  by  impenetrable  hedges  of  briars  and  underbrush.  An 
officer  who  could  get  from  the  foot  to  the  head  of  such  a  solid  column 
of  stupid  somnolency  without  blaspheming,  must  be  a  man  of  rare  ' 
self-control.  I  remember  to  have  had  my  boots,  a  new  and  stylish 
pair,  ruined,  and  my  spurs  dragged  off  in  such  a  tedious  expedition, 
and  when  my  work  was  accomplished  I  had  worn  out  my  sword,  and 
trampled  a  half-dozen  poor  fellows  half  to  death,  whose  tumble  from 
their  horses  was  not  enough  to  wake  them  from  their  deep  slumbers, 
and  whom  ;t  was  impossible  for  one  to  see  at  a  few  feet  distant,  so 
dense  was  the  darkness.  Finally  the  general,  with  a  volley  of  pro 
fanity  by  way  of  special  emphasis,  ordered  Lyle  to  place  three  men 
at  every  by-road,  and  to  order  those  who  remained  awake  to  take 
those  who  fell  asleep  under  guard  to  headquarters,  where  they  were 
to  be  punished  by  some  infliction  just  short  of  decapitation.  But 
despite  mishaps  and  delays  we  arrived,  as  day  was  dawning,  Sunday 
morning,  July  19th,  on  the  top  of  a  high  bluff,  a  mile  and  a  half 
from  Buffington  ford,  the  road  ahead  of  us  leading  directly  to  that 
point.  A  dense  fog  hung  over  the  river  and  its  shores,  which  was 
all  that  prevented  the  hostile  forces  from  having  a  full  view  of  each 
other.  The  bottom  of  the  river  where  our  road  crossed  it  is  fully  a 
mile  wide,  and  tapers  almost  to  a  point  a  mile  and  a  half  above, 
where  the  road  by  which  the  rebels  reached  their  position  passes 
close  to  the  water's  edge,  and  under  a  steep,  high  bluff.  The  Con 
federates  were  stretched  out  along  a  range  of  low  hills,  their  left 
resting  near  and  so  as  to  cover  a  retreat  through  this  narrow  passage. 
Our  position  was  not  more  than  three-fourths  of  a  mile  from  Morgan's 
right,  with  some  broken  and  low  woods  between. 

The  command  had  halted,  the  staff  and  escort  were  dismounted 
and  waiting  to  hear  from  O'Xeil,  who  was,  as  we  supposed,  feeling 
his  way  along  the  river  bank  in  the  fog,  he  having  taken  a  road 
which  lay  close  to  the  bank  on  the  last  ten  miles  of  the  march. 
While  thus  loitering  and  maledicting  the  fog,  a  staff  officer  ap 
proached,  having  in  charge  a  colored  man  who  was  terribly  fright 
ened.  He  said  he  had  just  got  away  from  the  rebels.  He  told  us 


MORGAN'S  IXDIAXA  AXD  OHIO  RAID.  759 

where  they  were,  when  they  got  there,  how  their  force  were  disposed, 
where  their  wagon  train  lay,  what  they  had  been  about  during  the 
night.  The  general  at  once  began  a  raking  cross-examination  of 
the  frightened  creature,  and,  as  a  natural  consequence,  the  witness 
stumbled.  At  once  he  was  called  a  liar,  and  his  story  set  down  as 
sheer  romance  and  the  result  of  fright.  The  general  refused  to  listen 
further  to  the  man's  story,  and  declared  the  whole  of  it  improbable, 
as  he  was  certain  Morgan  must  be  near  Blennerhasset,  several  miles 
above.  Staff  officers  interposed  in  vain  with  the  plea  that  the 
fellow's  story  was  sustained  by  every  reasonable  probability.  "We 
were  silenced  with  the  sneering  dictum  that  niggers  were  natural 
liars,  and  that  no  sane  officer  would  believe  one  unless  he  knew  of 
his  own  knowledge  that  the  story  was  true.  Some  of  us  may  have 
thought  that  General  Judah  should  have  known  the  truth  of  the 
man's  story,  but  military  discipline  forbade  us  putting  such  thoughts 
into  words.  We  were  not  long  to  remain  ignorant  of  our  enemy's 
whereaborts.  Lieutenant  Armstrong,  of  the  Fourteenth  Illinois 
Cavalry,  was  sent  for.  The  general  directed  him  to  proceed  with 
his  company — forty-five  men — toward  the  river.  The  lieutenant 
was  not  ordered  to  load  his  pieces,  nor  given  the  slightest  hint  to  be 
prepared  for  a  sudden  meeting  with  the  enemy.  Behind  Armstrong's 
company  rode  the  general  and  stalf,  and  behind  them,  and  close  upon 
their  heels,  was  Captain  Ilenshaw  with  a  piece  of  artillery.  The  road, 
after  Ave  descended  the  hills,  was  a  narrow  lane  bordered  on  each  hand 
by  wheat  fields,  in  which  the  grain  was  standing  in  shocks.  The 
fences,  which  were  high,  were  not  let  down  ;  no  kind  of  precaution 
was  taken  against  a  surprise,  though  the  fog  was  so  dense  the  men 
could  barely  see  from  head  to  foot  of  the  small  company,  and  the 
advance,  where  it  had  moved  the  regulation  distance  ahead  of  the 
companv,  was  lost  to  view  in  the  white  gloom.  To  round  up  and 
make  complete  in  all  its  parts  this  splendid  exhibition  of  tactical 
skill,  our  main  body  was  left  lying  about  loose  and  too  far  from  the 
river  to  support  us  in  any  sudden  emergency  at  that  point,  where 
one  was  likely  to  arise. 

We  had  approached  within  six  hundred  yards  of  the  ford  when 
a  gust  of  air.  hot  as  the  breath  of  an  oven,  come  down  the  valley; 
the  fog  lifted  with  nearly  as  great  celerity  as  a  stage  curtain  can  be 
run  up.  Our  party  had  no  time  to  "take  in  the  beautiful  scenery 
disclosed  to  our  view,"  mostly  because  a  strong  skirmish  line  in  gray 
jackets,  on  foot,  and  not  more  than  a  hundred  yards  to  our  left  and 
front,  was  made  visible  to  our  eyes  by  the  sudden  letting  in  of  sun 
light  on  that  particular  spot.  The  fellows  were  not  long  in  making 


700  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

themselves  heard  and  felt.  On  the  instant  the  two  parties  discovered 
each  other,  our  force  received  a  rattling  volley  from  a  hundred  car 
bines.  The  effect  of  this  on  a  trap  in  a  narrow  line,  moving  by  the 
flank  in  fours,  carbines  carelessly  dangling,  may  be  imagined  by  those 
who  have  "  been  there."  The  first  effect  was  a  recoil ;  and  when  the 
rebels,  reinforced  by  their  reserves,  dropped  their  carbines  after  the 
tirst  shot  and  charged  us  on  a  run,  firing  their  pistols  and  yelling 
like  devils,  the  recoil  degenerated  into  a  scrambling,  rushing,  tumb 
ling  panic.  The  postillions  on  the  lead  horses  of  Henshaw's  gun 
were  killed  by  the  first  shot.  The  team  to  the  gun  and  limber  chest 
was  hopelessly  entangled  in  a  moment,  forming  an  ugly  barricade  in 
the  lane  behind  the  staff,  escort,  and  Armstrong's  company.  It  was 
a  comical  panic — as  seen  from  a  later  hour,  when  our  nerves  and 
wrath  had  settled  and  cooled — to  those  of  the  staff  who  had  persisted 
in  saying  to  the  general  that  we  were  going  into  a  trap.  We  enjoyed 
seeing  him  "getting  out,"  as  he  lay  on  the  opposite  side  of  his  horse's 
neck  from  the  direction  in  which  the  leaden  compliments  were  coming 
—that  is,  we  enjoyed  looking  back  upon  this  scene  and  laughing  at  it. 
While  it  was  being  enacted,  we  were  looking  out  each  for  himself, 
and  striving  to  get  out  of  what  we  considered  a  disgraceful  dilemma. 

The  result  of  this  short  interview  with  the  enemy  was  not  calcu 
lated  to  flatter  our  vanity.  We,  the  general  included,  had  learned 
that  it  was  not  safe  to  disregard  all  precautions  dictated  by  the  rules 
of  war  and  common  sense  and  prudence,  when  we  had  such  men  as 
Morgan,  Duke,  and  Johnson  for  enemies,  however  jaded  and  toil- 
worn  they  and  their  men  might  be.  We  lost  a  half-dozen  men 
killed  and  wounded.  Captain  E.  C.  Kise,  Assistant  Adjutant 
General,  and  Captain  Ilenshaw,  were  captured;  Lieutenant  Fred 
W.  Price,  of  the  staff,  was  wounded,  and  our  gun  was  carried  off  by 
the  rebel  skirmishers.  And  beside,  and  worse  than  all,  we  had  made 
ourselves  utterly  ridiculous  and  lost  immensely  on  our  stock  of  pride 
and  self-respect.  By  the  time  this  affair,  which  did  not  occupy  more 
than  twenty  minutes,  was  over,  the  fog  had  entirely  disappeared,  and 
Morgan's  lines  were  within  easy  view  of  our  forces  on  the  hill. 

"Business"  was  now  the  order.  The  Fifth  Indiana,  Colonel 
Butler,  was  ordered  to  move  down  the  road  from  which  all  had  just 
been  stampeded.  Throwing  out  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers,  dis 
mounted,  the  regiment  advanced  briskly,  forming  a  line  as  soon  as 
the  ground  would  permit.  The  Fourteenth  Illinois  followed  close 
in  the  rear  as  a  reserve.  The  Eleventh  Kentucky  made  a  detour  to 
the -right,  and  swung  around  to  form  on  Butler's  right.  When  this 
movement  was  well  under  way,  I  heard,  as  I  rode  in  advance  of  the 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  EAID.  7G1 

left  of  the  Fifth,  a  rattling  skirrnisli  fire,  and  looking  in  the  direction 
of  the  river,  I  saw  O'^eil,  at  the  head  of  his  company,  dashing  over 
fences  and  ditches,  and  driving  the  enemy's  guard  from  the  ford 
pell-mell.  The  sight  was  inspiriting  in  the  extreme.  The  entire 
line,  which  was  by  this  time  fully  formed,  dashed  ahead  and  drove 
the  enemy's  advance  back  to  his  main  force.  In  this  dash  two  of 
Morgan's  guns  were  captured  and  the  one  his  men  had  taken  from 
us  was  recaptured.  Our  four  pieces  were  in  position,  and  in  less 
than  five  minutes  after  the  lirst  shot  was  tired  we  were  engaging  the 
enemy  all  along  his  line,  and  our  guns  were  pouring  into  his  left 
and  centre  a  storm  of  case  shot  at  a  range  of  less  than  a  half  mile. 
We  steadily  pressed  upon  the  rebels,  crowding  them  back  toward 
the  point  where  the  river  road  runs  over  a  narrow  strip  and  close  to 
the  bluff.  A  small  force  could  hold  that  pass  against  a  much  larger 
one.  We  hoped  Ilobson  was  on  the  river  road  above,  and  that  he, 
or  the  gunboat  uElk,''  which  was  steaming  up  the  stream  and  pitch 
ing  schrapnel  into  the  Confederates,  would  be  able  to  head  them  off 
and  turn  them  back  upon  us.  The  tight  was  spirited  and  lasted 
about  one  hour.  The  enemy  was  nearly  out  of  ammunition.  !No 
men  could  have  behaved  better  than  they  did  in  their  circumstances. 
About  (J.oO  Ilobson's  battery  opened  on  the  Confederate  rear 
guard  beyond  the  hills,  and  then  the  break  began.  Morgan,  at  the 
head  of  a  portion  of  his  command,  rode  through  the  narrow  pass 
near  the  river,  and  made  his  way  to  Blennerhasset  shoal.  lie  crossed 
the  river,  being  well  mounted,  and  several  men  followed  him.  He 
had  not  more  than  reached  the  Virginia  shore  whon  the  '''Elk" 
rounded  a  bend  in  the  river  and  opened  on  those  who  were  trying  to 
follow  their  leader.  Morgan  rode  back  to  the  Ohio  side  under  tire 
of  the  boat's  bow  gun  and  rejoined  his  comrades.  On  that  Sunday 
forenoon  about  one  thousand  of  the  raiders  were  captured,  with  the 
entire  wagon  train  and  a  battery  of  four  10-pounder  Parrott  guns. 
That  train  was  probably  the  most  unique  collection  of  vehicles  ever 
assembled  for  the  transport  of  military  supplies  and  baggage.  It 
contained  every  sort  of  four-wheeled  concern;  old,  lumbering  omni 
buses,  a  monstrous  two-story  pedler's  wagon,  a  dozen  or  more  hack 
ney  coaches  used  as  ambulances,  a  number  of  barouches,  top  buggies 
and  open  buggies,  and  several  ordinary  express  wagons  and  farm 
wagons.  And  the  loads  most  of  them  contained  were  as  little 

O 

suggestive  of  military  service  as  the  wagons.  If  there  was  ever  a 
thing  in  the  dry  goods,  grocery,  drug,  confectionery,  or  fancy  goods 
line  not  to  be  found  in  those  carriages,  my  memory  failed  to  suggest 
the  missing  article  when  I  passed  the  train  under  an  official  inspec- 


762  AXXALS  OF  THE  WAS. 

tion.  Boots  and  shoes  for  men  and  women  and  children  were 
everywhere.  One  barouche,  in  which  a  citizen  who  had  been  im 
pressed  as  a  guide,  told  me  Morgan  rode  all  night  and  all  the  day 
before,  had  a  pair  of  ladies'  fine  kid  boots  suspended  by  their  tiny 
silk  lacings  from  one  of  the  posts  which  supported  the  top.  The 
field  where  was  the  first  rebel  line  of  battle,  and  the  ground  just  in 
rear  of  it,  showed  ecpally  with  the  train  the  ability  of  Mohan's 
command  as  u  foragers."  The  camp  was  on  a  series  of  low  ridges, 
and  the  battle-field  was  thickly  studed  with  shocks  of  wheat,  and 
both  were  literally  strewn  with  every  imaginable  article  of  men's 
and  women's  wear.  I  was  with  the  skirmish  line  which  first  advanced 
into  this  field,  where  the  enemy  had  lightened  themselves  by  aban 
doning  most  of  their  plunder,  and  well  remember  a  tall  trooper's 
unsoldierly  performance  in  running  his  sabre  through  a  bolt  of  calico 
which  some  Confederate  had  pitched  into  a  wheat  shock,  and  then 
cantering  ahead  with  the  line,  while  the  gaudy-colored  print  streamed 
along  the  ground  and  flapped  over  obstacles  many  yards  in  his  rear. 
A  good  many  of  our  men's  homes  lay  along  the  rebel  line  of  march 
in  Indiana  and  Ohio,  and  the  sights  I  have  described  did  not  impress 
them  with  a  solemn  belief  that  the  citizens  of  the  Confederacy  were 
the  only  people  who  had  a  right  to  apply  the  epithet  "  vandal "  to 
their  enemies. 

The  troops  which  captured  a  fraction  of  Morgan's  command  at 
Buffington,  were  those  which  had  pursued  him  from  Kentucky.  As 
there  had  been  no  company  reports  possible  from  the  3d  of  July,  it 
is  not  possible  to  more  than  approximate  the  number  Judali  and 
Ilobson  commanded  that  day.  The  two  never  had  more  than  five 
thousand  with  them  at  any  point  of  the  chase.  To  estimate  their 
losses  by  sickness  and  other  causes,  during  those  seventeen  days, 
would  be  putting  it  within  the  truth.  Their  joint  forces  were  about 
double  Morgan's  in  this  final  struggle,  not  more.  When  Morgan 
returned  to  the  hostile  Ohio  shore  he  gathered  a  few  hundred  of  "his 
men  about  him,  hoping,  probably,  to  make  them  a  reorganizing 
nucleus  for  his  little  army.  He  struck  out  toward  the  interior, 
making  a  considerable  detour  to  avoid  Hobson's  lines.  But  if  he 
expected  to  be  reinforced  by  the  balance  of  his  command,  he  was 
disappointed.  Those  he  left  behind  were  entirely  surrounded,  and 
out  of  ammunition.  The  fords  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Federal 
forces,  and  all  hope  of  final  escape  was  gone.  The  officers  wisely 
siirrendered  and  made  an  end  of  their  hardships.  Morgan  continued 
his  flight  until  he  was  literally  run  down,  as  a  fox  is  run  down  by 
hounds,  and  captured  near  Salinesville,  a  village  in  the  southern  part 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  SAID.  YG3 

of  Colmnbiana  county,  on  the  2fith.  The  force  which  pursued  him 
from  Buffington  was  a  semi-brigade  under  Colonel  B.  IT.  Bristow, 
of  the  Eighth  Kentucky  Cavalry,  an  officer  noted  for  his  indomitable 
grip,  and  regarded  as  the  most  relentless  and  persistent  pursuer  in  all 
our  forces.  He  did  not,  as  Duke  says,  " surround"  Morgan,  in  the 
usual  accepted  meaning  of  that  term  among  soldiers.  lie  rode  onto 
him — tread  off  his  tail  and  rear,  as  it  were — and  finally  rode  over 
and  through  him,  scattered  his  men  right  and  left,  and,  turning 
about,  faced  the  flying  raiders  and  forced  them  to  halt  and  succomb. 
Thus  ended  the  boldest,  the  only  really  successful  raid  of  the 
war  on  either  side.  The  capture  and  destruction  of  Morgan's  com 
mand  were  trifling  losses  to  the  Confederacy  compared  to  advantages 
it  gained  by  his  operations.  He  destroyed  no  supplies  ;  hardly  touched, 
let  alone  injured,  our  lines  of  communication;  captured  nothing  of 
any  moment  to  him  or  anybody,  save  some  forage,  food,  a  miscella 
neous  collection  of  merchandise,  and  a  comical  wagon  train.  But 
he  delayed  the  invasion  of  East  Tennessee  three  months,  lie  thus 
broke  the  plan  of  co-operation,  and  delayed  Rosecrans  at  Murfrees- 
boro,  i-ivinii'  Brau^  time  to  get  back  the  men  he  had  loaned  Johnston. 

/  o  o  r?^D  o 

Instead  of  a  strong  joint  movement,  Burnside  and  Kosecrans  found 
all  they  could  attend  to  as  each  approached  his  objective.  The  latter 
was  so  late  in  pressing  his  enemy  into  decisive  action  that  that  enemy 
had  time  to  obtain  reinforcements  from  Lee  and  Chattanooga;  and  in 
stead  of  being  a  base  from  which  the  Federal  army  dictated  terms  to 
a  quarter  of  the  Confederate  territory,  came  near  being  that  army's 
coffin.  Had  Morgan  been  readily  beaten  back  from  Kentucky  in  a 
crippled  condition,  Burnside  would  have  met  Rosecrans  at  Chatta 
nooga  by  the  20th  of  July;  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  would  not 
have  been  fought ;  the  war  would  have  been  abbreviated,  how  much? 
General  Duke  treats  Judah  and  Burnside  as  separate,  inde 
pendent  commanders.  He  says:  "Burnside  was'" — in  June,  1803 — 
"concentrating  in  Kentucky  a  force  for  the  invasion  of  Tennessee, 
variously  estimated  at  from  twenty  to  more  than  thirty  thousand 
men.''  Further  on,  he  says :  ••'  It  was  estimated  that  on  the  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee  border  there  were  at  least  ten  or  twelve 
thousand  Federal  troops  under  command  of  General  Judah — live 
thousand  of  which  were  excellent  cavalry.''  -Again:  u  Bragg' s  chief 
object  was  to  delay  Judah  <m<l  Burnside — the  latter  especially — to 
retard  tJtdr  advance  and  junction  with  Rosecrans,"  etc.  Very  little 
research  would  have  enabled  the  general  to  present  the  real  relation 
between  these  officers,  and  the  truth,  as  to  the  troops  they  com 
manded,  is  surely  not  difficult  to  come  at.  Judah  was  a  subordinate 


ANXALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

of  Burnside's,  being  lowest  in  rank  of  all  the  brigadiers  in  the 
department.  He  commanded  a  division  in  the  Twenty-third  Army 
Corps,  which  corps  and  "Burnside's  force"  for  active  field  duty 
were  at  that  time  identical.  He  was  not  only  a  subordinate,  but  out 
of  favor  at  headquarters,  and  was  given  a  meaner  and  less  important 
part  to  play  in  the  pursuit  of  Morgan  than  any  officer  of  his  rank. 
In  the  invasion  of  East  Tennessee,  which  began  some  time  after  the 
destruction  of  Morgan's  force,  General  Judah  was  denied  any  post- 
being  sent  into  retirement  by  Burnside  on  account  of  what  his 
superiors  considered  his  blunders  on  the  Morgan  campaign.  The 
"ten  or  twelve  thousand  troops  on  the  Tennessee  border  under 
Judah  "  consisted  solely  of  his  dvision,  made  up  of  three  brigades- 
two  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry,  and  two  batteries.  He  had  less 
than  six  thousand  men  for  duty  when  Morgan  crossed  the  Cum 
berland.  General  Duke  says : 

At  Pomeroy,  where  we  approached  the  river  again,  a  large  force  of  regular 
troops  appeared,  but,  although  our  passage  by  the  place  was  one  sharp,  continuous 
skirmish,  we  prevented  them  from  gaining  a  position  that  would  have  forced  us 
into  decisive  combat.  *  '  General  Morgan  knew  that  he  would  be  attacked 

on  the  following  day.  He  at  once,  and  correctly,  conjectured  that  the  troops  which 
had  been  at  Pomeroy  were  a  portion  of  the  infantry  which  had  been  sent  from 
Kentucky  to  intercept  us,  and  that  they  had  been  brought  by  the  river  from  Cin 
cinnati  to  Pomeroy. 

Judah's  command  arrived  at  Pomeroy  about  the  middle  of  the 
afternoon  of  that  day.  There  was  not  an  infantry  soldier  in  the 
town  from  the  time  we  got  there  until  we  left.  We  went  into  the 
town  slightly  ahead  of  Morgan's  advance.  By  order  of  the  general, 
I  purchased  forage  for  our  horses  of  Hon.  V.  B.  Horton.  The 
command  lay  and  rested  and  fed  until  nearly  night.  The  "  sharp, 
continuous  skirmish,"  mentioned  by  Duke,  was  with  O'Neil's  squad 
of  fifty  men  and  a  few  soldiers,  not  more  than  a  score,  who  happened 
to  be  home  on  furlough.  I  was  with  O'Neil  a  part  of  the  evening, 
and  am  not  surprised  that  General  Duke  thought,  at  the  time,  that 
he  was  "  a  host,"  for  he  certainly  made  the  most  possible,  both  of 
show  and  noise,  out  of  his  limited  force.  But  I  am  surprised  that 
the  general  should  set  down  such  an  error  of  fact  as  veritable 
history.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  General  Morgan  should 
have  fallen  into  the  error  of  "conjecturing"  that  a  large  infantry 
force  had  been  sent  by  river  from  Cincinnati  to  intercept  him,  first 
at  Pomeroy,  and,  failing  there,  higher  up ;  but  General  Morgan's 
historian  should  not  set  down  "conjectures"  unless  they  are  borne 
out  by  the  facts.  Morgan's  men  were  so  worn  down  that  they  could 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND   OHIO  RAID. 

not  do  very  effective  scouting,  hence  his  information  as  to  our  forces 
and  movements  was  limited,  and,  it  also  seems,  erroneous. 

General  Duke's  error  regarding  the  number  and  character  of  our 
forces  at  Pomeroy  on  the  18th,  is  duplicated  in  some  particulars,  and 
thrown  into  the  shade  in  others,  by  his  curious  account  of  the  affair 
near  Buffington  ford  on  the  lt)th.  Telling  what  happened  after  our 
advance  was  stampeded,  the  General  says:  u  The  Federal  infantry, 
eight  or  ten  thousand  strong,  instantly  deployed  and  advanced, 
flanked  by  three  regiments  of  cavalry.  Two  pieces  of  our  battery 
were  taken  at  the  first  onset.  *  ••  Upon  the  level  and  un 

sheltered  surface  of  this  river  bottom  we  were  exposed  to  a  tremend 
ous  direct  and  cross-fire  from  twelve  or  thirteen  thousand  small-arms, 
and  fifteen  pieces  of  artillery."  I  was  in  the  whole  affair,  from  first 
to  last,  only  ceasing  my  active  work  in  the  field  wlien  night  came  on, 
and  I  was  ordered  to  find  guards  for  a  large  number  of  prisoners.  I 
was  in  the  little  tilt  which  resulted  in  capturing  two  of  the  Confed 
erate,  and  recapturing  our  cannon.  I  was  from  end  to  end,  and 
through  and  through  Judah's  lines  all  that  forenoon,  and  fell  in  witli 
Hobson's  forces  about  one  P.  M.  If  there  was  a  single  infantry 
soldier  engaged  I  failed  to  see  him.  I  was  utterly  unable  to  procure 
an  infantry  guard  for  my  prisoners  that  night — though  "by  order  of 
the  general  commanding"  I  had  plenary  power — and  I  had  to  put 
my  jaded  cavalry  provost  guard  on  duty.  The  next  day  I  had  to  put 
up  with  a  squad  of  Cincinnati  militia — who  arrived  on  the  20th — as 
guards  for  a  large  party  of  Confederate  officers.  They  turned  out 
to  be  a  first-rate  set  of  men  for  the  duty,  being  all  ex-soldiers  who 
had  been  discharged  on  account  of  wounds  and  sickness.  AVe  had 
four  pieces  of  artillery.  The  gunboat  "Elk"  carried  live,  three  of 
which  she  could  bring  to  bear  on  the  enemy's  lines.  Xeither  we  nor 
the  uElk"  fired  a  cannon  after  Ilobson  attacked.  All  of  that 
infantry  and  several  of  these  cannon  were  in  General  Duke's  eye. 

Xone  of  our  regular  infantry  came  above  Cincinnati,  and  the  few 

&  «/ 

militia  who  found  their  way  so  far  as  Buffington  arrived  the  day 
after  the  fight  and  capture. 

General  Duke  puts  the  force  at  Green  river  bridge — which  his 
forces  failed  to  capture — at  six  hundred.  There  were  just  one  hun 
dred  and  sixty  men  reported  for  duty  to  Colonel  Moore  that  morning 
by  his  post  adjutant.  They  were  behind  a  hastily-constructed,  but 
strong,  parapet,  in  front  of  which  they  had  made  an  ugly  abattis,  by 
cutting  down  trees.  Artillery  could  not  be  brought  to  bear  on 
Moore's  position,  and  Colonel  Johnson,  who  was  ordered  by  Morgan 
to  take  it  by  storm,  could  only  charge  in  a  narrow  front  through 


706  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

several  hundred  yards  of  the  abattis  on  horseback,  as  to  dismount  and 
Jay  siege  would  take  too  much  time.  After  a  few  foolhardy  attempts, 
and  the  loss  of  thirty  or  more  men  killed,  the  Confederates  left 
Moore  to  celebrate  the  balance  of  the  4th  of  July  in  more  peaceful 
style.  It  may  be  humiliating  to  Morgan's  chief  officers  to  admit  that 
a  paltry  squad  repulsed  repeatedly,  with  heavy  loss,  their  crack  bri 
gade  ;  but  history  is  not  a  record  of  the  historian's  feelings,  nor  is  it 
such  incidents  as  glory  a  party,  or  faction,  or  people.  It  is  a  cold 
blooded  truth,  and  the  whole  truth,  or  of  no  value.  With  the  excep 
tions  here  noted,  General  Duke's  account  of  the  raid  is  a  very  correct 
one.  lie  is  particularly  felicitous  in  pointing  out  the  success  of 
Morgan's  strategy  at  and  previous  to  his  crossing  the  Cumberland. 
Had  he  been  in  our  camps,  and  an  habitue  of  our  headquarters,  he 
could  not  have  more  effectually  set  forth  the  complsteness  of  the 
deception  of  our  generals  as  to  the  movements  and  intentions  of 
their  enemy.  And  this  capacity  to  deal  in  facts,  and  this  ability  to 
correctly  conjecture  what  passes  in  the  mind  of  an  enemy  with  only 
his  minor  acts  for  a  basis,  makes  blundering  inexcusable  in  matters 
which  are  either  of  record  or  easily  verified  as  to  all  their  details  by 
living  witnesses. 

Colonel  R.  A.  Alston,  chief  of  Morgan's  staff,  was  captured  on 
the  evening  of  the  5th  of  July,  on  the  road  from  Lebanon  to  Bards- 
town,  together  with  an  escort  of  twenty  men,  by  Lieutenant  Ladd, 
of  the  Kinth  Michigan  Cavalry,  and  seven  men.  Alston  and  his 
escort  were  riding  some  distance  in  Morgan's  rear.  Ladd,  who  was 
scouting,  came  upon  them  just  after  dark.  He  concealed  himself  in 
the  bushes  at  the  roadside,  and,  by  various  devices,  completely  fooled 
the  Confederates  as  to  the  size  of  his  force  until  he  had  them  dis 
armed.  Alston,  who  was  a  brave  officer,  was  terribly  chagrined,  but, 
on  his  word  of  honor,  he  took  his  men  to  Lexington,  the  nearest 
military  post,  and  surrendered  the  next  day. 

Major  Dan  McCook,  paymaster,  a  gentleman  probably  sixty-five 
years  old,  but  hale  and  much  younger  in  appearance,  accompanied 
General  Judah  from  Cincinnati  as  a  "  volunteer  aid."  Major  McCook 
was  the  father  of  the  celebrated  family  of  generals  and  colonels,  the 
two  most  noted  of  whom  were  Major  General  A.  McDowell  McCook 
and  Brigadier  General  Robert  L.  McCook.  Robert  was  killed  in  the 
fall  of  1862,  in  Southern  Tennessee,  while  riding  ahead  of  his  com 
mand  in  an  ambulance.  He  was  quite  ill  at  the  time,  had  turned  the 
active  direction  of  the  march  over  to  the  senior  colonel,  and  was 
riding  in  advance  to  keep  out  of  the  dust  and  noise  of  the  column. 
Under  these  circumstances  his  ambulance  was  attacked  by  a  scouting 


MOEGAX'S  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  RAID.  707 

party  under  a  Captain  Gurley,  of  the  Confederate  cavalry.  He 
refused  to  surrender;  a  fight  ensued,  and  General  McCook  was 
killed.  It  was  charged  and  believed  among  our  forces  that  Gurley 
was  a  "bushwhacker'1  after  the  pattern  of  Champ  Ferguson  and 
Gatewood.  The  old  gentleman  hud  heard  that  the  slayer  of  his  sun 
was  with  Morgan,  and  his  object  in  accompanying  the  pursuing  col 
umn  was  to  find  and  punish  him  for  the  deed,  and  he  had  no  doubt 
of  succeeding  in  his  undertaking.  He  was  constantly  pushing  him 
self  into  the  most  dangerous  places.  He  was  with  our  skirmishers 
buck  of  1*011101-0}',  on  the  18th,  and  gave  the  officers  a  good  deal  of 
trouble  to  keep  him  from  uselessly  exposing  himself  to  danger,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  betraying  the  weakness  of  our  line  to  the  ciicinv. 

On  the  morning  of  the  10th,  the  Major  insisted  on  going  with 
the  vidette  in  front  of  Lieutenant  Armstrong's  company.  I  advised 
him  not  to  go,  and  other  officers  pointed  out  to  him  the  fact  that  he 
did  nut  know  Gurley,  and  that  no  one  in  our  command  had  any 
persuiial  knowledge  of  him.  At  a  bright  rill  of  water,  which  runs 
through  a  dent  in  the  river-bottom,  a  mile  from  Buffington  ford,  the 
stall'  halted  to  let  their  horses  drink,  and  give  the  advance  party  time 
to  ride  ahead.  AYhen  the  vidette  rode  up  the  bank  of  the  creek  the 
old  Major  joined  it,  his  eye  flashing  and  his  cheeks  flushed  with 
excitement.  In  return  of  our  remonstrances,  he  swept  a  muck 
salute,  and  dashed  out  of  siirht  into  the  fo£,  his  fine  sorrel  charter 

O  O?  c7> 

seeming  to  partake  of  the  spirit  of  his  master.  The  little  party  he 
was  with  rode  almost  into  the  Confederate  skirmish  line  before 
either  saw  the  other.  He  and  one  soldier  of  the  vidette  were  killed 
at  the  first  fire.  Major  McCook's  body  was  pierced  by  three  balls. 
His  horse,  watch,  and  Henry  rifle  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

I  should,  probably,  add  here  that  Captain  Gurley  was  captured 
with  others  of  Morgan's  forces;  that  he  was  taken  to  Xashville,  tried 
by  military  commission  for  the  murder  of  General  McCook;  that  he 
admitted  the  killing  by  his  men  ;  that  he  proved  himself  a  regularly 
commissioned  officer  of  the  Confederate  Government ;  that  the  court 
which  tried  him  decided  that  the  killing  was  a  legitimate  act  of  war; 
that  the  decision  was  confirmed  by  President  Lincoln,  and  that  Gur 
ley  then  became  an  ordinary  prisoner  of  war,  and  was  exchanged 
with  the  others. 

On  board  the  steamer  that  carried  General  Judah  and  staff  from 
Buffington  to  Cincinnati  were  one  hundred  and  thirteen  Confederate 
officers.  Among  these  was  one  whom  I  have  cause  to  remember, 
though  his  name  has  faded  from  my  memory.  How  or  where  he 
got  them  I  never  cared  to  inquire,  but  he  was  dressed  in  a  dainty, 


763  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

neat-fitting  suit  of  black  broadcloth,  with  silk  tie  and  patent-leather 
boots  to  match.  His  face  was  fitted  up  with  a  rather  thin  aquiline 
nose,  a  firm  mouth,  kept  resolutely  closed,  and  a  pair  of  keen  black 
eyes.  Under  his  hat  was  a  symmetrical  head,  adorned  with  a  heavy 
suit  of  black,  slightly  curly,  hair.  He  wore  a  full  beard,  which  was 
long,  black,  and  very  curly.  He  was  decidedly  a  "  sharp  "-appearing 
fellow,  and,  withal,  not  bad-looking,  and  of  both  these  facts  he 
seemed  to  have  full  knowledge.  Something  in  his  bearing  told  us 
he  intended  to  give  us  the  slip,  and  all  watched  him  intently.  When 
the  boat  neared  Cincinnati,  a  patrol  was  sent  below  with  orders  to 
clear  the  main  deck  of  prisoners — sending  them  above.  This  done, 
guards  were  stationed  on  the  stairs,  with  orders  not  to  allow  any  one 
to  pass  up  or  down  except  by  permission  of  the  officer  of  the  day. 
We  landed  at  the  foot  of  Broadway,  and  there  was  a  great  crowd 
on  the  wharf.  My  handsome  captain  had,  somehow,  eluded  the 
guard  sent  to  clear  the  main  deck.  He  took  advantage  of  the 
commotion  among  the  mob  on  shore  to  step  down  the  stage-plank 
while  some  of  our  officers  were  mounting  their  horses.  He  said  to 
the  officer  in  charge  of  the  guard,  which  was  standing  with  ranks 
open  to  receive  the  prisoners,  that  he  was  an  officer  of  the  boat. 
Naturally,  he  was  believed.  Slipping  through  the  rank  011  his  right, 
he  mingled  with  the  crowd  at  once,  and  made  his  wray  to  and  round 
the  railway  offices  on  the  corner  of  Front  and  Broadway.  lie  entered 
the  first  barber's  shop  he  came  to,  had  his  hair  trimmed  close,  his 
beard  cut  down  to  an  inch  in  length,  and  shaved  into  a  "  Burnside  " — 
a  fashionable  cut  among  the  "nobs"  at  that  time.  This  done,  he 
stepped  into  a  clothing  store,  secured  a  wide-brimmed  straw  and  a 
long  linen  duster,  ordering  his  silk  tile  to  be  sent  to  the  Spencer 
House,  whither  he  repaired,  and,  secure  in  his  disguise,  drank  and 
chatted  with  our  officers  until  evening,  when  he  took  the  mail  boat 
for  Louisville.  At  Louisville  he  "had  a  good  time,"  after  which  he 
left,  mounted  on  a  fresh  horse,  for  Bragg' s  army.  Whether  he  ever 
reached  his  destination  or  not  I  do  not  know.  I  gather  all  the  facts 
related  in  this  incident,  after  he  left  the  boat,  from  a  letter  the 
captain  had  printed  in  the  Louisville  papers  on  the  eve  of  leaving 
on  his  southward  journey.  He  wound  up  with  a  graceful  tender 
of  thanks  to  Captain  D.  W.  II.  Day,  and  others  of  the  staff,  for  their 
kind  treatment ;  regretted  that  he  had  to  leave  us  in  unceremonious 
style;  was  sorry  we  could  not  have  made  the  "grand  round"  of 
Louisville  with  him ;  but,  really,  his  engagements  called  him  South, 
and  we  must  excuse  him— we  must,  indeed.  We  read  his  good- 
natured  banter  with  a  laugh,  and  said  he  deserved  his  good  luck. 


MORGAN'S  INDIANA  AND  OHIO  RAID.  769 

My  knowledge  of  Ilobson's  movements  is  limited,  but  it  was 
not  a  very  eventful  ride  his  command  liad.  In  fact,  they  never  once 
touched  the  enemy  until  after  Jndah  attacked  him  at  Buffington, 
and  then  the  stern-chasers  did  their  whole  duty,  not  only  taking 
most  of  the  raiders  captured  round  Buffington,  but  following  those 
who  got  off  with  Morgan,  and,  finally,  making  a  clean  sweep  of  the 
fleeing  remnant.  The  endurance  displayed  by  that  part  of  Morgan's 
command  which  was  last  captured,  and  by  their  captors,  has  few 
precedents  in  modern  warfare.  They  were  in  the  saddle  almost  day 
and  night  for  twenty-four  days,  and  no  one,  except  those  who  have 
experience  of  it,  knows  how  terribly  wearing  such  work  and  such 
nervous  straining  is. 


49 


THE  BURNING  OF  CIIAMBERSBURG. 


BY    GENERAL   JOHN   M  CAUSLAND. 


THE  wanton  destruction  of 
the  private  property  of  citi 
zens  of  Virginia,  by  the  orders 
of  General  Hunter,  a  Federal 
commander,  may  be  consid 
ered  as  one  of  the  strongest 
reasons  for  the  retaliation,  by 
Early's  order,  upon  the  city 
of  Chambersburg.  Andrew 
Hunter  lived  in  the  county 
of  Jefferson,  near  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  was  a  relative  of 
General  Hunter ;  A.  K.  Bote- 
ler  and  E.  J.  Lee  also  lived 
in  the  same  vicinity.  No 
reasons  that  I  have  ever  heard 
have  been  given  for  the  burning  of  their  houses.  Governor  Letcher's 
property  was  in  Lexington,  Virginia ;  the  Military  Institute  was  near 
Lexington,  also.  I  do  not  think  that  any  better  reasons  can  be  given 
for  the  destruction  of  these  properties  than  could  have  been  given 
if  General  Hunter  had  destroyed  every  house,  barn,  or  other  build 
ing,  that  was  standing  and  in  good  order,  upon  his  line  of  march 
from  Staunton  to  Lynchburg.  The  property  of  J.  T.  Anderson  was 
in  the  county  of  Botetourt,  and  located  near  the  banks  of  James 
river,  at  Buchanan.  Mrs.  Anderson  and  a  lady  relative  were  the  only 
occupants  at  the  time.  I  destroyed  the  bridge  across  James  river  to 
retard  Hunter  in  his  march  upon  Lynchburg,  and  it  detained  him 
with  his  army  for  two  days,  during  which  time  he  occupied  this 
house  as  his  headquarters.  He  promised  the  ladies  protection,  and 
after  his  departure,  an  officer  and  some  soldier^  returned  with  a 
written  order  from  him  to  destroy  everything  about  the  premises. 
A  few  days  afterward,  as  General  Hunter  was  passing  another  Vir 
ginia  mansion,  a  lady  asked  him  why  he  destroyed  the  magnificent 
home  of  Colonel  Anderson.  He  replied,  "that  Virginia  women 

(770) 


THE  BURNING  OF  CHAMBERSBURG. 

were  worse  traitors  than  their  husbands,  and  he  w^nld  burn  the 
houses  over  their  heads  to  make  them  personally  and  immediately 
experience  some  punishment  for  their  treason ; "  and  on  another 
occasion  said  to  a  lady,  that  he  would  "  humble  the  Virginia  women 
'before  he  left  the  State."  I  could  enumerate  many  other  acts  of 
actual  destruction,  and  threats  and  acts  of  wanton  violence  on  the 
part  of  Hunter,  all  of  which  went  to  make  up  public  sentiment  that 
prevailed  at  the  time  in  Virginia,  and  which  required  the  military 
authorities  to  take  some  steps  to  prevent  their  recurrence  in  future, 
besides  stopping  the  useless  destruction  that  was  then  going  on. 
But  what  I  have  given  is  considered  sufficient  to  explain  the  reasons 
why  the  city  of  Chambersburg,  in  Pennsylvania,  was  destroyed. 

It  may  be  considered  as  indispensable  to  give  the  location  of 
the  forces  composing  the  Union  and  Confederate  armies  during  the 
latter  part  of  the  month  of  July,  180-1,  in  order  to  properly  under 
stand  the  raid  that  was  made  into  the  State  of  Pennsylvania,  and 
which  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  Chambersburg.  Hunter's  army 
(Union)  was  scattered  along  the  northern  bank  of  the  Potomac  river, 
in  Maryland,  from  near  Hancock  to  Harper's  Ferry,  the  main  body 
being  near  the  latter  place.  Early's  army  (Confederate)  was  located 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  same  river  with  its  main  body  near  Mar- 
tinsburg.  Each  army  had  its  cavalry  on  the  flanks.  My  command 
was  on  the  left  of  Early's  army,  and  I  think  that  Averill's  cavalry 
was  located  opposite  to  me — at  least  a  portion  of  it  was  there.  When 
I  speak  of  cavalry,  in  the  course  of  this  sketch,  I  am  aware  that  the 
term  is  not  properly  applied;  and,  as  far  as  the  Confederate  troops 
which  I  commanded  were  concerned,  they  were  badly  armed,  badly 
mounted,  and  worse  equipped — in  fact,  they  were  mostly  mounted 
militia.  The  men  would  have  made  good  soldiers  if  there  had  been 
time  to  discipline  them,  and  arms  and  equipments  to  have  furnished 
them.  The  horses  were  nearly  all  worn  out,  and  there  was  no  supply 
to  draw  others  from.  We  attempted  to  get  horses  in  Pennsylvania, 
but  found  them  removed  from  the  line  of  march,  and  we  had  no 
time  to  look  for  them  elsewhere. 

In  July,  1804,  the  cavalry  brigade  which  I  commanded  was 
encamped  near  the  Potomac  river,  in  the  county  of  Berkeley,  West 
Virginia,  It  made  the  advance  post  of  the  army  under  General 
Early,  that  was  guarding  the  approaches  into  Virginia  through  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  On  the  28th  of  July,  I  received  an  order  from 
General  Early  to  cross  the  Potomac  with  my  brigade  and  one  under 
General  Bradley  T.  Johnston,  and  proceed  to  the  city  of  Chambers- 
burg,  and  after  capturing  it  to  deliver,  to  the  proper  authorities,  a 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

proclamation  which  he  had  issued,  calling  upon  them  to  furnish  me 
with  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  gold,  or  five  hundred  thousand 
dollars  in  greenbacks,  and  in  case  the  money  was  not  furnished  I  was 
ordered  to  burn  the  city  and  return  to  Virginia.  The  proclamation 
also  stated  that  this  course  had  been  adopted  in  retaliation  for  the 
destruction  of  property  in  Virginia,  by  the  orders  of  General  Hunter, 
and  specified  that  the  houses  of  Andrew  Hunter,  A.  K.  Boteler,  E. 
J.  Lee,  Governor  Letcher,  J.  T.  Anderson,  the  Virginia  Military 
Institute,  and  others  in  Virginia,  had  been  burned  by  the  orders  of 
General  D.  Hunter,  a  Federal  commander,  and  that  the  money 
demanded  from  Chambersburg  was  to  be  paid  to  these  parties  as  a 
compensation  for  their  property.  It  appears  that  the  policy  of 
General  Early  had  been  adopted  upon  proper  reflection ;  that  his 
orders  were  distinct  and  final,  and  that  what  was  done  on  this  occa 
sion  by  my  command  was  not  the  result  of  inconsiderate  action  or 
want  of  proper  authority,  as  was  alleged  by  many  parties  at  the 
North,  both  at  the  time  and  since  the  close  of  the  war. 

On  the  29th  of  July,  the  two  cavalry  brigades  that  were  to  make 
the  dash  into  Pennsylvania,  by  turning  the  right  of  Hunter's  army, 
were  assembled  at  or  near  Hammond's  mill,  in  Berkeley  county, 
West  Virginia.  During  the  night  the  Federal  pickets  on  the  north 
ern  side  of  the  Potomac  were  captured,  and  the  troops  crossed  just 
at  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  30th,  and  moved  out  and  formed 
the  line  of  march  on  the  National  road.  Major  Gilmer  drove  the 
Federal  cavalry  from  the  small  village  of  Clear  Spring,  and  pushed 
on  toward  Hagerstown  to  create  the  impression  that  the  rest  of  the 
troops  were  following.  At  Clear  Spring  we  left  the  National  road 
and  turned  north  on  the  Mercersburg  road.  We  reached  Mercers- 
burg  about  dark,  and  stopped  to  feed  our  horses,  and  to  give  time  for 
the  stragglers  to  come  up.  After  this  stop  the  march  was  continued 
all  night,  notwithstanding  the  opposition  made  at  every  available 
point  by  a  regiment  of  Federal  cavalry.  Major  Sweeney,  with  his 
cavalry  battalion,  kept  the  roads  clear,  and  we  reached  Chambersburg 
at  daylight  on  the  31st.  The  approach  to  the  town  was  defended 
only  by  one  piece  of  artillery  and  some  irregular  troops  that  were 
soon  driven  off,  and  the  advance  of  our  force  took  possession  of  the 
town.  The  main  part  of  the  two  brigades  was  formed  in  line  on  the 
high  ground  overlooking  the  town.  I  at  once  went  into  the  place 
with  my  staff,  and  requested  some  of  the  citizens  to  inform  the  city 
authorities  that  I  wanted  to  see  them.  I  also  sent  my  staff  through 
the  town  to  find  out  where  the  proper  officials  were,  and  inform  them 
that  I  had  a  proclamation  for  their  consideration.  Not  one  could  be 


THE  BURNING   OF  CHAMBERSBURG.  773 

found.  I  then  directed  the  proclamation  to  be  read  to  many  of  the 
citizens  that  were  near  me,  and  requested  them  to  hunt  up  their 
officers,  informing  them  I  would  wait  until  they  could  either  find 
them,  or  by  consultation  among  themselves  determine  what  they 
would  do.  Finally,  I  informed  them  that  I  would  wait  six  hours, 
and  if  they  would  comply  with  the  requisition  their  town  would  be 
safe ;  and  in  case  they  did  not  it  would  be  destroyed  in  accordance 
with  my  orders  from  General  Early.  After  a  few  hours  of  delay 
many  citizens  came  to  me — -some  were  willing  to  pay  the  money, 
others  were  not,  I  urged  them  to  comply  with  such  reasons  as 
occurred  to  me  at  the  time,  and  told  them  plainly  what  they  might 
expect,  I  showed  to  my  own  officers  the  written  instructions  of 
General  Early,  and  before  a  single  house  was  destroyed  both  the 
citizens  and  the  Confederate  officers  that  were  present  fully  under 
stood  why  it  was  done,  and  by  whose  orders.  After  waiting  until 
the  expiration  of  the  six  hours,  and  finding  that  the  proclamation 
would  not  be  complied  with,  the  destruction  of  the  town  was  begun 
by  firing  the  most  central  blocks  first,  and  after  the  inhabitants  had 
been  removed  from  them.  Thus  the  town  was  destroyed,  and  the 
inhabitants  driven  to  the  hills  and  fields  adjacent  thereto.  ~No  lives 
were  lost  by  the  citizens,  and  only  one  soldier  was  killed,  and  he  was 
killed  after  the  troops  left  the  vicinity  of  the  place.  About  noon 
the  troops  were  re-formed  on  the  high  ground  overlooking  the  town, 
where  the  most  of  them  had  been  posted  in  the  early  morning,  and 
the  return  to  the  Potomac  was  begun  shortly  afterward.  A\re 
encamped  at  McConnelsburg  that  night,  and  reached  the  river  the 
next  day,  at  or  near  Hancock,  Maryland. 

In  confirmation  of  what  I  have  written  Major  Gilmer  says  in 
his  book,  '"Four  Years  in  the  Saddle,"  page  210:  "lie  showed  me 
General  Early  s  order."  General  Early,  in  his  "Memoir,"  page  57, 
says :  "A  written  demand  was  sent  to  the  municipal  authorities,  and 
they  were  informed  what  would  be  the  result  of  a  failure  or  refusal 
to  comply  with  it,"  On  page  59  he  says:  "On  the  30th  of  July, 
McCaushmd  reached  Chambersburg,  and  made  the  demand  as 
directed,  reading  to  such  of  the  authorities  as  presented  themselves 
the  paper  sent  by  me."  Colonel  AY.  E.  Peters,  who  commanded  one 
of  the  regiments  in  Johnston's  Brigade,  when  the  burning  com 
menced  came  and  asked  me  if  the  burning  was  being  done  by  my 
orders.  I  showed  him  the  order  of  General  Early,  and  he  was  satis 
fied,  and  proceeded  to  carry  out  the  order  as  was  being  done  by 
other  regiments  of  his  brigade.  In  this  expedition  the  troops  passed 
through  more  than  one  hundred  miles  of  hostile  territory,  executed 


774 


ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 


all  orders  that  were  issued  with  promptness  and  regularity,  and  never 
have  I  heard  of  any  complaints  of  acts  unauthorized  by  their  superior 
officers.  I  think  that  these  facts  will  show  that  this  entire  expedition 
was  planned  and  executed  in  accordance  with  the  orders  of  superior 
officers  of  competent  authority  to  order  it,  and,  moreover,  that  it  was 
an  act  of  retaliation  perfectly  justified  by  the  circumstances,  and  was 
at  all  times  kept  clearly  within  the  rule  governing  civilized  warfare. 
Vattel  in  his  "  Law  of  Nations,"  lays  down  the  following  rule, 
and  it  may  not  be  inappropriate  to  quote  it  in  order  that  many 
persons,  who  may  read  what  is  said  about  the  destruction  of  Cham- 
bcrsburg,  may  have  the  opinion  of  a  standard  authority  upon  such 
proceedings : 

A  civil  war  breaks  the  bonds  of  society  and  governments,  or  at  least  suspends 
their  force  and  eifect.  It  produces  in  the  nation  two  independent  parties  who  con- 
eider  each  other  as  enemies,  and  acknowledge  no  common  judge.  Those  two  parties, 
therefore,  must  necessarily  be  considered  as  thenceforward  constituting,  at  least  for 
a  time,  two  separate  bodies,  two  distinct  societies.  Though  one  of  the  parties  may 
have  been  to  blame  in  breaking  the  unity  of  the  State,  and  resisting  the  lawful 
authority,  they  are  not  the  less  divided  in  fact.  Besides,  who  shall  judge  them? 
Who  shall  pronounce  on  which  side  the  right  or  the  wrong  lies  ?  On  earth  they 
have  no  common  superior.  They  stand,  therefore,  in  precisely  the  same  predicament 
as  two  nations  who  engage  in  a  contest,  and  being  unable  to  come  to  an  agreement, 
have  recourse  to  arms.  This  being  the  case,  it  is  evident  that  the  common  laws  of 
war— those  maxims  of  humanity,  moderation  and  honor  commonly  observed — ought 
to  be  observed  by  both  parties  in  every  civil  war.  For  the  same  reasons  which 
render  the  observance  of  those  maxims  a  matter  of  obligation  between  State  and 
State,  it  becomes  equally  and  even  more  necessary  in  the  unhappy  circumstances  of 
the  two  incensed  parties  lacerating  their  common  country.  Should  the  sovereign 
conceive  he  has  a  right  to  hang  up  his  prisoners  as  rebels,  the  opposite  party  will 
make  refusals;  or,  to  destroy  their  country,  they  will  retaliate.  The  Duke  of  Alva 
made  it  a  practice  to  condemn  to  death  every  prisoner  he  took  from  the  Confeder 
ates  in  the  Netherlands.  They,  on  their  part,  retaliated,  and  at  length  compelled 
him  to  respect  the  law  of  nations  and  the  rules  of  war  in  his  conduct  toward  them. 

The  above  the  rule  and  example  of  nations,  and  applying  it  to 
this  case,  I  think  that  any  one  can  understand  it. 


THE  BALTIMORE  RIOTS. 


BY    FREDERIC    EMORY. 


THE  Baltimore  riots  of  April 
ISth  and  19th,  1861,  and  the 
disorders  which  followed 
them  were,  next  to  the  con 
flict  at  Fort  Snmter,  the  most 
exciting  and  significant  of  the 
events  which  preceded  the 
general  outbreak  of  hostili 
ties  between  the  North  and 
the  South.  President  Lincoln 
and  his  Cabinet  were  seri 
ously  inconvenienced,  the 
North  was  aroused,  the 
leaders  of  the  new  Confed 
eracy  were  led  to  entertain 
hopes  of  valuable  assistance 
from  the  Border  States,  and  a  formidable  obstacle  was  interposed  to 
the  active  prosecution  of  those  military  measures  which  the  govern 
ment  at  Washington  had  decided  upon.  The  attack  upon  the  Massa 
chusetts  troops  was,  in  another  sense,  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
events  of  the  civil  war ;  for,  unlike  similar  disturbances  elsewhere, 
it  was  largely  participated  in  by  the  friends  of  order  and  the  enemies 
of  secession.  Parodoxical  as  the  statement  may  appear,  the  riots  of 
April,  1801,  were  the  work  mainly  of  the  strong  Union  element  in 
Baltimore.  The  sentiment  of  the  best  men  of  the  city  was  over 
whelmingly  opposed  to  secession ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  just 
as  strenuously  opposed  to  coercion.  The  people  of  Baltimore  loved 
the  old  flag ;  but  they  loved  their  brethren  of  the  South,  also  ;  and, 
when  it  was  proposed  to  whip  them  back  into  the  Union,  even  the 
most  ultra  anti-secessionists  were  roused  into  angry  opposition  to  the 
passage  of  Northern  troops  southward. 

It  is  easy  to  prove  by  actual  occurrences  in  this  city  at  the  time 
that  the  feeling  here  was,  as  I  have  said,  overwhelmingly  against 
secession.  On  the  10th  of  January,  1861,  in  answer  to  a  call  pub- 

(775) 


~76  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

lished  in  the  newspapers,  a  mass  meeting  was  held  at  the  Maryland 
Institute  for  the  adoption  of  measures  favorable  to  the  perpetuation 
of  the  Union  of  the  States.  This  meeting  was  one  of  the  largest 
and  most  enthusiastic  which  had  ever  been  held  in  the  city.  Every 
available  spot  was  occupied,  and  the  officers  and  speakers  comprised 
some  of  the  best  citizens  of  Baltimore,  among  them  Keverdy  John 
son,  Governor  Bradford,  and  Judge  Pearre.  Subsequently,  another 
mass  meeting  was  held  of  citizens  in  favor  of  restoring  the  constitu 
tional  union  of  the  States,  in  which  the  Hon.  K.  M.  McLane,  Mr. 
S.  Teackle  Wallis,  Hon.  Joshua  Yansant,  Dr.  A.  C.  Eobinson,  and 
other  well-known  Southern  sympathizers  took  an  active  part.  Even 
as  late  as  April  12th,  when  the  siege  of  Fort  Sumter  had  begun,  and 
only  one  week  before  the  riot,  two  men  were  assaulted  and  mobbed, 
one  on  Baltimore,  the  other  on  South  street,  for  wearing  a  Southern 
cockade.  On  Sunday,  April  14th,  five  days  only  before  the  riot,  a 
secession  flag  was  displayed  from  the  mast  of  the  Fanny  Crenshaw 
lying  at  Chase's  wharf,  but  was  hauled  down  by  a  party  of  men  from 
tl  \v  city,  who  boarded  the  vessel.  The  flag  was  run  up  again,  however, 
but  the  vessel  had  to  be  placed  under  the  protection  of  the  police 
authorities.  These  facts  go  to  show,  in  the  almost  utter  absence  of 
manifestations  to  the  contrary,  that  Baltimore  was  not  at  that  time  a 
secessionist  city ;  and,  had  the  subsequent  policy  of  the  government 
been  one  of  conciliation,  instead  of  coercion,  it  is  doubtful  whether 
serious  trouble  would  have  resulted. 

Notwithstanding  the  strong  Union  feeling  which  prevailed  in 
Baltimore,  there  was  a  decided  under-current  of  sympathy  for  the 
South.  This  was  to  be  expected.  Baltimore  has  always  been  a 
Southern  city  in  feeling,  customs,  and  associations.  The  population 
is  largely  made  up  of  immigrants  from  Virginia  and  North  Carolina, 
while  the  rural  population  of  Maryland,  particularly  of  the  lower 
counties,  is  Southern  in  methods  of  life,  sympathies,  social  habits, 
amusements,  as  that  of  any  of  the  Southern  States.  The  slave- 
holding  element,  too,  were  excited  over  the  prospective  loss  of  their 
slaves.  Still,  there  were  very  few  who  were  disposed  to  go  the 
length  of  opposition  to  the  General  Government,  and  those  few 
were  overawed  and  held  in  check  by  the  strong  anti-secession  ele 
ment.  The  secession  element,  however,  was  aggressive,  sometimes 
boisterous,  and  never  failed  to  take  advantage  of  any  accident  or 
mistake  which  was  calculated  to  inflame  the  passions  of  the  more 
moderate  men.  They  were  unintentionally  assisted  in  their  schemes 
by  President  Lincoln  himself,  whose  secret  passage  through  Balti 
more  was  undoubtedly  the  result  of  a  misconception.  When  they 


THE  BALTIMORE  RIOTS.  777 

were  informed  that  the  President  had  slipped  through  the  city 
incognito,  citizens  of  all  shades  of  opinion  resented  it  as  an  unde 
served  reflection  upon  the  city.  The  act  at  once  suggested  the 
thought  that  the  government  regarded  the  city  of  Baltimore  with 
suspicion  and  hostility,  and  did  more  than  anything  else  to  create  a 
bad  feeling  toward  the  administration.  Arrangements  were  made 
by  the  city  authorities  for  the  reception  and  entertainment  of  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  in  this  city,  and,  it  is  safe  to  say,  that  Mr.  Lincoln 
might  have  passed  through  Baltimore  without  fear  of  molestation. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  riot  Avas  an  outburst  of  the 
rougher  classes,  or,  as  some  have  alleged,  simply  a  rebel  demonstra 
tion.  On  the  contrary,  the  rioters  were  composed  of  three  distinct 
elements,  two  'of  which  were  distinctly  respectable,  while  the  third, 
a  very  small  one  by  the  way,  was  composed  of  young  men  aiid  boys — 
some  of  them  roughs,  but  many  of  them  respectable  in  their  connec 
tions — Avho  were  attracted  to  the  scene  by  the  noise  and  excitement. 
The  first  and  most  influential  class — the  class,  in  fact,  without  whose 
encouragement  and  assistance  the  disturbance  would  have  been  almost 
impossible — was  composed  of  sober,  intelligent  men,  many  of  them 
Union  sympathizers,  who  were  knocked  clear  off  their  balance  by  the 
announcement  that  Northern  troops  were  marching  on  the  city.  This 
class  had  hitherto  restrained  the  most  aggressive  of  the  Southern 
sympathizers ;  but,  having  always  been  opposed  to  coercion,  were 
infuriated  by  the  announcement  that  the  ^Northern  troops  were  actu 
ally  invading  "  the  sacred  soil  of  Maryland."  The  second  class  was 
composed  of  more  advanced  Southern  sympathizer 3,  together  with 
the  few  extremists  who  were  openly  in  favor  of  coercion.  Of  this 
class  the  most  prominent  were  the  late  Judge  T.  Parkin  Scott,  then 
prominent  at  the  bar,  and  William  Byrne,  the  famous  politician  and 
gambler.  Byrne  was  the  recognized  head  of  that  class  which  advo 
cated  armed  resistance  to  the  passage  of  the  troops  from  the  first, 
and,  with  his  companions,  did  inconceivable  damage  by  loud  talk 
and  bravado.  He  was,  at  the  time,  the  most  influential  man  in 
Baltimore  with  that  large  class  of  hot-headed  young  men,  ward 
politicians,  gamblers,  "floaters,"  idlers,  etc.,  who  are  to  be  found  in 
every  large  city.  A  man  of  good  address  and  strong  sense,  kind  and 
liberal,  he  carried  with  him  a  large  clientele  of  adventurous  spirits. 
Mr.  Scott  represented  the  soberer,  but  not  less  aggressive,  wing  of 
the  extremist  faction. 

One  of  the  most  curious  features  of  the  riot  was  the  attitude  of 
the  city  and  State  governments.  The  city  government  was  largely 
composed  of  ardent  Southern  men,  but,  at  the  same  time,  men  who 


778  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAE. 

were  sober  and  clear-headed  enough  to  see  that  a  collision  between 
the  Federal  authorities  and  the  citizens  of  Baltimore  could  not  but 
result  in  the  most  disastrous  consequences.  The  Mayor  of  Balti 
more,  at  the  time,  was  George  William  Brown,  now  Chief  Judge  of 
the  Supreme  Bench  of  that  city,  a  person  of  determined  courage 
and  impartial  judgment.  The  Marshal  of  Police  was  George  P. 
Kane,  a  man  of  inflexible  honesty  and  singleness  of  purpose  and 
great  determination.  To  these  two  men  must  be  ascribed  the  highest 
honor  for  their  strenuous  efforts,  in  the  great  part  successful,  to  pre 
vent  further  bloodshed  after  the  first  attack  at  the  Pratt  street  bridge. 
Had  they  been  notified  in  time  of  the  coming  of  the  troops,  it  is 
probable  that  the  riot  might  have  been  prevented  altogether.  It 
has  frequently  been  asserted  at  the  North  that  the  city  authorities 
wi-re  in  league  with  the  mob ;  but,  after  a  diligent  search,  I  think  I 
may  say,  with  perfect  truth,  that  Mayor  Brown  and  the  Chief  of 
Police,  notwithstanding  their  strong  Southern  sympathies,  did  every 
thing  in  their  power  to  prevent  bloodshed. 

The  Governor  of  Maryland,  Thomas  H.  Hicks,  was  a  Union 
man,  although  he  had  been  elected  as  a  Pro-slavery  Know-Nothing. 
His  loyalty  was  suspected  at  Washington,  but  he  lent  no  countenance 
whatever  to  the  proposed  resistance  to  the  "  Federal  invasion."  After 
the  event,  Governor  Hicks  was  the  first  man,  however,  to  suggest  the 
armed  resistance  which  he  afterward  deprecated  with  so  much  honor ; 
and,  in  this  connection,  I  cannot  forbear  printing  the  following  curi 
ous  document  written  by  him : 

STATE  OF  MARYLAND,  EXECUTIVE  CHAMBEK, 

ANNAPOLIS,  November  9th,  1860. 
HON.  E.  H.  WEBSTER. 

My  Dear  Sir  :—I  have  pleasure  in  acknowledging  receipt  of  your  favor  intro 
ducing  a  very  clever  gentleman  to  my  acquaintance  (though  a  Democrat).  I  regret 
to  say  that,  at  this  time,  we  have  no  arms  on  hand  to  distribute,  but  assure  you 
that,  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  your  company  shall  have  arms ;  they  have 
complied  with  all  required  of  them  on  their  part.  We  have  some  delay  in  conse 
quence  of  contracts  with  Georgia  and  Alabama  ahead  of  us,  and  we  expect,  at 
an  early  day,  an  additional  supply,  and  of  the  first  received  your  people  shall  be 
furnished.  Will  they  be  good  men  to  send  out  to  kill  Lincoln  and  his  men  ?  If 
not.  suppose  the  arms  would  be  better  sent  South.  How  does  late  election  sit  with 
you  ?  'Tis  too  bad.  Harford  nothing  to  reproach  herself  for. 
Your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  H.  HICKS. 

The  writer  became  conspicuously  "  loyal "  before  spring ! 
On  the  18th  of  April,  a  dispatch  was  received  in  Baltimore  from 
Ilarrisburg,  Pennsylvania,  announcing  that  the  Northern  Central 


THE  BALTIMORE  RIOTS.  779 

Railroad  had  been  requested  to  furnish  accommodations  for  the 
transportation  of  a  number  of  troops  through  Baltimore.  "When 
the  news  became  generally  known,  large  crowds  assembled  on  the 
street,  and  intense  excitement  reigned.  About  nine  o'clock  A.  M. 
a  meeting  of  the  military  organization  known  as  the  Maryland 
Xational  Volunteers  was  held  under  the  presidency  of  Mr.  T.  Par 
kin  Scott,  and  inflammatory  speeches  were  made.  At  two  o'clock 
two  trains,  containing  twenty-one  cars,  which  had  left  Ilarrisburg  at 
ten  minutes  after  eight  o'clock  that  morning,  arrived  in  Baltimore. 
There  were  six  companies  of  troops — two  of  United  States  Artillery 
from  St.  Paul,  commanded  by  Major  Pemberton,  two  from  Potts- 
ville,  Pennsylvania,  one  from  Reading,  Pennsylvania,  and  one  from 
Lewistown,  Pennsylvania,  the  latter  known  as  the  Logan  Guards. 
A  large  and  excited  crowd  had  assembled  at  the  depot  and,  previous 
to  the  arrival  of  the  troops,  occupied  itself  in  singing  '"Dixie's 
Land"  and  noisily  cheering  for  the  Confederacy.  As  the  troops 
disembarked,  they  were  pushed  and  hustled  by  the  crowd,  but  no 
one  wras  seriously  hurt.  Finally  the  line  of  march  was  taken  up  for 
Mount  Clare  station,  where  the  troops  were  to  re-embark  for  Wash 
ington. 

The  troops  were  accompanied  through  the  streets  by  the  crowd, 
which  guyed  and  hissed  them,  all  the  while  cheering  for  the  South 
ern  Confederacy  and  "Jeff"  Davis,  and  groaning  for  "Abe"  Lin 
coln.  The  troops  behaved  remarkably  well,  none  of  the  men 
showing  any  signs  of  annoyance  beyond  an  occasional  angry  look 
or  exclamation.  The  city  police  accompanied  them  and  succeeded 
in  holding  the  crowd  in  check.  When  the  troops  arrived  at  Mount 
Clare,  however,  the  crowd  became  more  aggressive.  The  troops 
were  subjected  to  numberless  indignities,  such  as  being  spit  upon, 
taunted,  hustled,  etc. ;  the  mob  all  the  while  indulging  in  wild  curses, 
groans,  and  yells,  with  threats  such  as  these :  "  Let  the  police  go  and 
we'll  lick  you!"  "Wait  till  you  see  Jeff  Davis!"  "We'll  see  you 
before  long!"  "You'll  never  get  back  to  Pennsylvania!"  etc.  Sev 
eral  of  the  more  adventurous  rioters  caught  some  of  the  soldiers  by 
the  coat  tails  and  jerked  them  about,  while  others  taunted  individ 
uals  in  the  ranks  about  their  appearance,  awkwardness,  etc,  It  was 
a  severe  trial  for  the  Pennsylvania  volunteers,  but  they  passed 
through  the  ordeal  with  commendable  nerve  and  courage. 

As  the  train  was  leaving  the  station,  a  stone  was  thrown,  by 
some  one  in  the  mob,  into  one  of  the  cars,  and,  with  a  wild  yell,  the 
mob  rushed  after  the  slowly  receding  train.  They  were  checked, 
however,  by  the  city  police,  who  behaved  admirably  throughout. 


780  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

Later  that  afternoon,  a  disturbance  occurred  in  the  central  part  of 
the  city,  and  a  crowd  of  some  two  thousand  people  assembled,  but 
were  dispersed  by  the  police  after  several  persons  had  been  slightly 
hurt.  The  same  evening,  an  immense  assemblage  of  people  gathered 
in  front  of  Taylor's  building,  on  Fayette  street,  where  a  State's 
Rights'  Convention  of  Marylanders  was  being  held. 

Baltimore  was  now  at  fever  heat  of  excitement.  Business  was 
entirely  suspended  and  the  male  population  of  the  city  turned  out 
en  masse.  The  streets  were  crowded  all  day,  and  until  a  late  hour 
that  night  Baltimore,  or  Market  street  as  it  was  then  called,  was 
thronged  by  a  surging  mob,  which  was  thickest  at  the  newspaper 
offices  and  other  centres  of  information.  The  Union  sympathizers 
had  disappeared,  and  the  city  seemed  to  be  a  unit  in  opposition  to 
the  passage  of  Northern  troops  through  Baltimore.  The  staidest 
and  soberest  citizens  were  infected  by  it.  Men  who  all  along  had 
been  opposed  to  secession,  now  openly  advocated  armed  resistance, 
and  it  was  declared,  over  and  over  again,  in  the  most  public  manner, 
that  no  Northern  troops  should  be  permitted  to  enter  Baltimore,  or, 
if  they  did  enter,  to  leave  the  city  alive.  The  mob,  however,  was 
still  under  the  control  of  the  city  authorities — that  is  to  say,  the 
Mayor  and  Marshal  of  Police  retained,  in  spite  of  the  open  threats 
and  great  excitement,  sufficient  power  to  prevent  any  outbreak  of 
violence.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  authorities  at  Washington 
attempted  a  maneuvre  similar  to  that  by  which  Mr.  Lincoln  was  got 
through  Baltimore.  Finding  that  the  feeling  in  Baltimore  had 
become  intense,  and  suspecting  the  city  authorities  of  collusion  with 
the  mob,  the  government  directed  the  officer  in  command  of  the 
troops  en  route  for  Baltimore  to  proceed  to  that  city,  from  Philadel 
phia,  without  notice  to  the  authorities  of  Baltimore,  and  to  get 
through  as  quickly  as  he  could.  This  was  a  most  unfortunate  order, 
for  there  is  little  doubt  that  had  Mayor  Brown  been  notified  of  the 
expected  arrival  of  the  troops,  he  could  have  provided  for  their 
efficient  protection  by  the  police.  The  Mayor  and  Chief  of  Police 
were  not  only  not  notified,  but  were  kept  in  the  dark  as  to  the  move 
ments  of  the  troops— so  that  when  the  troops  reached  the  President 
street  depot,  they  were  completely  taken  by  surprise.  President 
Lincoln  and  his  advisers  are  not  to  be  blamed  for  not  taking  the 
Baltimore  authorities  into  their  confidence,  for  it  was  exceedingly 
difficult,  in  those  days,  to  tell  whom  to  trust  and  whom  not  to  trust, 
It  is  to  be  regretted,  however,  that  in  this  case  the  President  was 
over-cautious,  for  I  am  pursuaded  that,  had  the  police  of  Baltimore 
been  notified  in  time,  the  loss  of  life  might  have  been  avoided. 


THE  BALTIMORE  RIOTS.  781 

Early  on  the  morning  of  April  19th,  1861,  a  train  of  thirty-five 
cars  left  the  Broad  and  Washington  avenue  depot,  Philadelphia, 
having  on  board  twelve  hundred  troops  from  Boston,  Lowell,  and 
Acton,  Massachusetts,  and  known  as  the  Sixth  Massachusetts  Regi 
ment,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Edward  F.  Jones,  a  gallant 
soldier  and  courteous  gentleman  ;  and  a  regiment,  one  thousand 
strong,  from  Philadelphia,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  William 
F.  Small.  Nothing  was  known  in  Baltimore  of  their  departure  from 
Philadelphia,  but  about  eleven  o'clock  it  became  noised  abroad  that 
a  large  force  of  Federal  soldiers  had  arrived  at  President  street 
depot.  This  depot  is  in  the  southeastern  portion  of  the  city,  and  is 
connected  with  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  depot,  which  is  situated  in 
the  southwestern  section,  by  a  line  of  rail  along  Pratt  street — a  lead 
ing  thoroughfare — and  some  minor  streets.  It  was  necessary  for  the 
troops,  on  disembarking  at  President  street  depot,  either  to  march  to 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  depot  or  to  be  drawn  thither  in  the  cars  by 
horses.  The  news  of  the  arrival  of  the  troops  spread  like  wildfire, 
and  in  a  comparatively  short  time  an  immense  crowd  gathered  on 
Pratt  street,  with  the  intention  of  preventing  the  passage  of  the 
troops.  While  waiting  for  the  appearance  of  the  soldiers  the  crowd 
kept  itself  up  to  the  requisite  pitch  of  indignation  and  enthusiasm  by 
"groaning"  for  Lincoln,  Hicks,  and  the  Federal  Government,  and 
by  cheering;  Jefferson  Davis  and  the  Southern  Confederacy.  The 

•J  o  «/ 

first  intimation  had  by  the  city  authorities  that  the  troops  were  about 
to  enter  the  city  was  received  by  Mayor  Brown  about  ten  o'clock. 
Mr.  Brown  at  once  repaired  to  the  office  of  the  Police  Commis 
sioners,  but  found  that  the  Marshal  of  Police  had  already  gone  to 
Cainden  station,  where  he  had  concentrated  his  men  by  request  of 
the  railroad  authorities.  The  Mayor  at  once  followed  him  to  Cam- 
den  station,  and  on  arriving  there  found  him  posted  with  his  men 
prepared  to  put  down  any  attack.  L^nfortunately  the  mob  had 
gathered  not  at  Cainden  station  but  on  Pratt  street,  at  a  point  a  short 
distance  west  of  the  depot  where  the  troops  were  disembarking. 
Pratt  street  is  a  narrow  thoroughfare,  and  easily  capable  of  defense. 
The  strategical  position  of  the  mob  was  excellent  as  they  proceeded 
to  fortify  it. 

About  half -past  eleven  o'clock  a  car  drawn  by  horses  was  seen 
approaching,  and  was  greeted  by  the  mob  with  cheers  for  the  South. 
The  car,  and  eight  others  which  followed,  were,  however,  permitted 
to  pass  without  any  molestation,  except  the  usual  taunts  and  gibes  at 
the  occupants.  A  trivial  accident,  which  happened  to  the  tenth  car, 
let  loose  all  the  elements  of  disorder  in  the  mob,  and  precipitated  the 


782  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

fatal  conflict.  As  this  car  neared  Commerce  street  the  brake  was 
accidentally  thrown  out  of  gear,  and  the  car  stopped.  The  crowd 
took  advantage  of  the  mishap  at  once,  and  began  to  attack  the  occu 
pants  with  stones.  Windows  were  broken,  and  a  few  of  the  soldiers 
were  hurt,  but  not  seriously.  Finally  the  driver  of  the  car  became 
frightened,  lost  his  head,  and,  having  attached  his  team  to  the  other 
end  of  the  car,  started  to  haul  it  back  to  the  depot.  The  mob  fol 
lowed  the  car,  stoning  it  all  the  while,  but  the  driver  having  urged 
the  horses  to  a  run.  succeded  in  distancing  them.  A  large  portion 
of  the  mob,  however,  followed  it  into  the  depot. 

The  section  of  the  mob  which  remained  at  the  bridge  on  Pratt 
street  then,  under  the  advice  of  their  leaders,  many  of  whom,  as  I 
have  said,  were  well  known  citizens  of  Baltimore,  began  to  build  a 
1  Kirricade,  Paris  fashion.  They  commenced  by  digging  up  the  paving 
stones  and  the  railroad  track  for  a  distance  of  some  fifty  yards.  The 
stones  were  piled  up  with  the  iron  rails,  the  bridges  over  the  gutters 
wi-re  torn  up,  and  eight  large  anchors  which  were  found  on  the 
wharf  near  by  were  placed  on  the  barricade.  A  car  loaded  with  sand 
attempted  to  pass,  but  was  seized  by  the  rioters,  who  backed  it  up  to 
the  barricade,  and  emptied  the  sand  on  the  pile  of  stones  and  anchors. 
A  large  number  of  negroes  were  working  on  the  wharves  at  the 
time.  These  were  ordered  to  quit  work,  which  they  did  with  alacrity, 
and  were  directed  by  the  rioters  to  assist  them  on  the  barricade. 
They  complied  and,  as  Colonel  J.  Thomas  Scharf,  in  his  "  Chronicles 
of  Baltimore "  relates,  "  worked  away  with  a  will  for  Massa  Jeff 
Davis  and  de  Souf."  At  this  stage  of  the  proceedings  Mayor  Brown, 
who  had  hurried  from  Camden  Station,  arrived  on  the  scene.  "What 
followed  is  best  given  in  Mayor  Brown's  own  words : 

"  On  arriving  at  the  head  of  Smith's  wharf,"  he  says  in  his  official  report,  "  I 
found  that  anchors  had  been  piled  on  the  track  to  obstruct  it,  and  Sergeant  McComas 
and  a  few  policemen,  who  were  with  him,  were  not  allowed  by  the  mob  to  remove 
the  obstructions.  I  at  once  ordered  the  anchors  to  be  removed,  and  my  authority 
was  not  resisted." 

This,  in  my  judgment,  is  signal  proof  that  had  the  passage  of 
the  troops  been  intrusted  to  the  city  authorities,  it  might  have  been 
effected  in  safety,  as  the  Mayor  had  the  confidence  of  even  the 
extreme  secessionists.  In  the  meantime,  the  commander  of  the 
Massachusetts  troops,  finding  that  the  cars  would  not  be  permitted  to 
pass  through,  decided  to  disembark  his  men  and  force  a  passage  on  foot 
through  the  mob.  When  this  determination  was  announced,  some  con 
federates  of  the  Pratt  street  rioters  at  once  communicated  the  news  to 
them.  It  was  also  rumored  that  the  troops  had  decided  to  go  by  a 


THE  BALTIMORE  RIOTS.  783 

different  route  to  Camden  station.  A  portion  of  the  rioters  at  once 
started  to  head  them  off,  while  the  main  body  maintained  its  position 
on  Pratt  street.  A  large  crowd  assembled  at  the  depot  during  the 
disembarkation  of  the  troops,  and  here  several  exciting,  but  not  very 
sanguinary,  encounters  occurred  between  Unionists  and  secessionists 
in  the  crowd.  As  the  troops  descended  from  the  cars  they  were 
hooted,  jeered,  and  twitted.  They  succeeded,  however,  in  forcing 
their  way  to  the  footway,  which  extends  for  several  hundred  yards 
along  the  outer  edge  of  the  depot,  where  they  formed  in  double  lile 
and  awaited  the  orders  of  their  officers. 

At  this  point  a  man  appeared  bearing  a  Confederate  flag  at  the 
head  of  about  one  hundred  rioters.  His  appearance  was  the  signal 
for  wild  cheering.  A  rush  for  the  flag  was  made  by  several  Northern 
sympathizers  in  the  crowd,  and  the  flag-staff  was  broken.  One  of 
these  men  was  caught  by  the  flag-bearer  who,  with  his  companions, 
throttled,  and  would  have  killed  him,  but  for  the  interference  of  the 
police,  who  succeeded  in  bearing  him  awav.  The  shreds  of  the  flng 

O  t-  O 

were  caught  up  and  tied  to  the  flag-staff.  On  being  raised  again  they 
were  saluted  with  an  outburst  of  cheering.  The  men  surrounding 

O  O 

the  ling  then  began  to  taunt  the  troops,  and  declared  that  they  would 
be  forced  to  march  behind  it  to  the  Camden  depot.  Colonel  Jones 
gave  the  order  to  march,  and  the  troops  started.  The  men  surround 
ing  the  flag,  however,  planted  themselves  directly  in  front  of  the 
soldiers  and  refused  to  yield  an  inch.  The  troops  wheeled  about, 
but  found  themselves  surrounded  on.  all  sides,  and  were  unable  to 
move  in  any  direction.  Several  of  the  soldiers  were  hustled  away 
from  their  comrades,  and  would  have  been  roughly  used  by  the 
crowd  but  for  the  police,  who  succeeded,  with  great  difficulty,  in 
rescuing  them.  The  troops  again  endeavored  to  force  a  passage, 
and  this  time,  with  the  assistance  of  the  police,  they  succeeded.  As 
they  started,  however,  the  Confederate  flag  was  borne  to  the  front, 
and  they  were  compelled  to  march  for  several  squares  behind  this 
flag.  Too  much  praise  cannot  be  given  to  the  commander  or  men 
for  their  admirable  self-control  during  this  trying  episode. 

The  presence  of  the  Confederate  flag  was  the  immediate  cause 
of  the  sanguinary  street  fight  and  loss  of  life  which  followed.  Several 
Northern  sympathizers  in  the  mob,  exasperated  at  the  triumph  of  the 
flag-bearer  and  his  friends,  made  another  dash  for  the  flag,  but  were 

£}  O' 

defeated  and  pursued.  Some  of  them  took  refuge  in  the  ranks  of 
the  soldiers.  This  exasperated  the  citizens  against  the  soldiers,  and 
a  savage  attack  upon  the  latter  was  made  with  stones  and  other  mis 
siles.  One  of  the  soldiers,  William  Patch,  was  struck  in  the  back 


7$4  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

with  a  large  paving-stone,  and  fell  to  the  ground.  His  musket  was 
seized,  and  the  poor  wretch  was  brutally  beaten  by  the  rioters  before 
the  police  could  rescue  him.  When  Patch  was  seen  to  fall  Colonel 
Jones  gave  the  order  "double  quick "  to  his  men,  and  the  whole 
column  started  off  on  a  run,  ducking  and  dipping  to  avoid  the  stones. 
At  this  the  crowd  set  up  a  yell  of  derision  and  started  after  them  full 
tilt.  Two  soldiers  were  knocked  down,  while  running,  but  managed 
to  make  their  escape — one  of  them  with  the  assistance  of  the  police, 
While  the  foregoing  events  were  transpiring  in  and  near  Presi 
dent  street  depot,  an  immense  concourse  of  people  had  gathered  at 
the  barricade.  When  the  troops  appeared  in  full  run  a  great  shout 
was  raised,  and  the  head  of  the  column  was  greeted  with  a  shower 
of  paving-stones.  The  troops  faltered,  and  finally,  in  the  face  of  a 
second  shower  of  stones,  came  to  a  dead  halt.  The  patience  of  their 
commander  was  at  last  exhausted.  lie  cried  out  in  a  voice,  which  was 
heard  even  above  the  yells  of  the  mob,  "  Fire ! "  The  soldiers  leveled 
their  pieces  and  the  mob  seemed  to  pause,  as  if  to  take  breath.  The 
soldiers  fired.  A  young  man,  named  F.  X.  Ward,  now  a  well-known 
lawyer  of  this  city,  fell  pierced  by  a  ball.  A  hoarse  yell  of  fear  and 
rage  went  up  from  the  mob,  but  it  did  not  give  way.  The  troops 
fired  again  and  again,  and  the  crowd  wavering,  they  rushed  upon  them 
with  fixed  bayonets  and  forced  a  passage  over  the  barricade.  A  scene 
of  bloody  confusion  followed.  As  the  troops  retreated,  firing,  the 
rioters  rushed  upon  them  only  to  be  repulsed  by  the  line  of  bayonets. 
Some  of  the  rioters  fought  like  madmen.  Finally,  the  mob,  exas 
perated  by  their  failure  to  prevent  the  passage  of  the  troops,  made  a 
desperate  rush  upon  them,  and  one  young  man,  who  was  in  the  front 
rank  of  the  rioters,  was  forced  close  upon  the  soldiery.  One  of  the 
soldiers  raised  his  gun,  took  deliberate  aim  at  the  rioter  and  fired. 
The  cap  exploded,  but  the  gun  failed  to  go  off.  The  rioter  rushed 
forward,  seized  the  gun,  wrested  it  by  an  almost  superhuman  effort 
from  the  soldier's  grasp,  and  plunged  the  bayonet  through  the  man's 
shoulder.  During  the  firing  a  number  of  the  rioters  fell,  killed  and 
wounded.  At  the  intersection  of  Charles  and  Pratt  streets,  Andrew 
Bobbins,  a  soldier  from  Stoneham,  Massachusetts,  was  shot  in  the 
neck  by  a  rioter.  He  was  carried  into  a  drug  store  near  by,  and  was 
protected  from  the  mob.  At  Howard  street  a  strong  force  of  rioters 
from  Camden  station  met  the  troops  and  refused  to  yield.  The 
soldiers  fired  again  and  the  mob  gave  way.  The  soldiers  again 
started  at  the  double  quick  and  reached  Camden  station  without 
f  nrther  trouble.  Thirteen  cars  were  drawn  out,  and  the  soldiers  left 
the  depot  amid  the  hisses  and  groans  of  the  multitude.  One  of  the 


THE  BALTIMORE  RIOTS.  TS5 

most  remarkable  features  of  the  riot  was  the  persistency  and  courage 
with  .which  the  mob  hung  on  to  the  troops,  in  spite  of  the  continued 
firing.  Another  remarkable  feature  was  the  extraordinary  coolness 
and  forbearance  of  the  troops. 

Mayor  Brown,  during  the  progress  of  the  riot,  did  one  of  the 
bravest  tilings  on  record,  and  his  conduct  is  remembered  and  fre 
quently  quoted  in  Baltimore  to-day  as  a  conspicuous  example  of 
unselfish  devotion  and  courage.  After  ordering  the  removal  of  the 
anchors  at  the  barricade,  the  Mayor  made  his  way  to  Pratt  street 
bridge,  where  he  saw  the  troops  approaching.  lie  ran  at  once  to 
the  head  of  the  column,  the  people  crying  as  he  passed:  "Here 
comes  the  Mayor ! "  The  Mayor  shook  hands  with  the  officers  in 
command,  saying  as  he  did  so :  u  I  am  the  Mayor  of  Baltimore." 
lie  then  placed  himself  by  Colonel  Jones'  side,  and  marched  with 
him  for  several  squares,  begging,  warning,  and  commanding  the 
citizens  not  to  offer  any  violence.  In  the  excited  state  of  feeling  at 
the  time,  the  Mayors  conduct  was  as  plucky  as  anything  I  have  ever 
read  or  heard  of.  His  presence,  doubtless,  saved  a  great  deal  of 
bloodshed.  "When  the  Mayor  left  the  head  of  the  column,  Marshal 
Kane,  with  fifty  policemen  with  drawn  revolvers,  rushed  to  the  rear 
of  the  column,  formed  a  line  across  the  street,  and  succeeded  in 
keeping  back  the  mob.  This  was  one  of  the  most  exciting  episodes 
of  the  riot. 

The  list  of  the  killed  and  wounded  was  as  follows :  Soldiers 
killed — Addison  O.  Whitney,  a  young  mechanic,  of  Lowell,  Massa 
chusetts  ;  Luther  C.  Ladd,  another  young  mechanic,  also  from  Lowell ; 
Charles  A.  Taylor,  decorative  painter,  from  Boston,  and  Sumner  II. 
Xeedham,  a  plasterer  from  the  same  city — -L  A  number  of  soldiers 
were  wounded.  The  citizens  killed  were  :  Robert  W.  Davis,  Philip 
S.  Miles,  John  McCann,  John  McMahon,  William  R.  Clark,  James 
Carr,  Francis  Maloney,  Sebastian  Gill,  William  Maloney,  William 
Reed,  Michael  Murphy,  Patrick  Griffith— 12.  Wounded— Frank 
X.  Ward,  -  -  Coney,  James  Myers,  and  a  boy  whose  name  was  not 
ascertained — 1.  The  fact  that  more  of  the  troops  were  not  killed  is 
to  be  ascribed  to  the  fact  that  the  citizens  had  110  arms  except  paving- 
stones.  Many  more  of  the  citizens  were  wounded  beside  those 
whose  names  were  returned,  and,  perhaps,  some  more  were  killed. 
The  lower  classes  generally  concealed  their  injuries. 

The  death  of  Mr.  Robert  W.  Davis  was  one  of  the  most  tragic 

O 

incidents   of  the   day.     Mr.   Davis  was  a  member  of  the  firm  of 
Paynter,  Davis  &  Co.,  dry  goods  dealers,  on  Baltimore  street,  and 
one  of  the  most  prominent  citizens  of  Baltimore.     Early  on  the 
50 


-$G  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

morning  of  the  riot  lie  went  out  on  the  line  of  the  Baltimore  and 
•Ohio  Railroad,  a  short  distance  from  the  city,  for  the  purpose  of  look 
ing  at  some  land  which  he  thought  of  purchasing.  lie  was  standing 
near  the  railroad  track  with  some  friends,  among  whom  was  Mr. 
Thomas  W.  Hall,  Jr.,  a  prominent  journalist  and  lawyer  of  this  city, 
and  who  is  now  City  Solicitor  of  Baltimore.  Mr.  Davis  was  not 
.aware  that  there  had  been  a  riot  in  the  city,  and  as  a  car  containing 
the  .troops  came  by,  he  incautiously  shook  his  fist  at  them  in  mock 
•defiance.  A  soldier  in  the  car,  however,  mistaking  the  gesture  for 
•one  .oi  real  hostility  and,  probably,  thrown  off  his  balance  by  the 
fearful  occurrences  of  the  day,  raised  his  gun  and  fired.  The  unfor 
tunate  man,  who  had  been  laughing  and  chatting  with  his  friends  a 
moment  before,  fell  into  their  arms.  Mr.  Hall  asked  him  if  he  was 
hurt.  '"I  am  killed,"  was  all  he  said.  When  the  news  of  Mr.  Davis' 
.death  .reached  the  city,  it  added  fuel  to  the  flames. 

.Marshal  Kane's  three  hundred  and  fifty  policemen  were  almost 

powerjess  in  the  face  of  the  mob,  which  meanwhile  had  broken  into 

.all  the/gun  stores  in  town,  and  had  completely  gutted  them.    During 

the  afternoon,  Governor  Hicks  issued  an  order  for  the  assembling  of 

the  State  troops,  and  by  five  o'clock  quite  a  number  had  reported  for 

duty.     In  the  meantime,  however  (about  half-past  two),  news  reached 

the  rioters  that  the  renowned  Seventh  Regiment  from  New  York 

was  expected.     An  immense  mob  at  once  repaired  to  the  depot  and 

.surrounded  some  volunteers  from  Philadelphia,  who  were  found  to 

have  arrived  there.     The  windows  of  the  cars  were  smashed  with 

paving-stones,  and  a   number  of   the  Philadelphians  injured,  but 

none  of  them  seriously.     Marshal  Kane,  accompanied  by  Colonel  C. 

G.  Egerton,  a  personal  friend  and  well-knowrn  as  an  officer,  and  one 

of  the  militia  organizations,  appeared  on  the  scene  and  succeeded  in 

appeasing,  for  a  time,  the  passions  of  the  mob  by  announcing  that  it 

had  been  decided  that  the  troops  should  return  to  Philadelphia. 

The  mob,  believing  that  the  Marshal  would  act  toward  them  in  good 

faith,  withdrew.     Later,  however,  it  was  rumored  that  the  command 

was  about  to  force  a  passage  through  the  city,  and  with  a  howl  of 

disappointment,  the  rioters  again  repaired  to  the  depot.     This  time 

they  could  not  be  reasoned  with.     Rushing  pell-mell  upon  the  train, 

they  riddled  it  with  stones.     Some  twenty  of  the  volunteers  were 

badly  injured  about  the  head  and  body  by  being  struck  with  heavy 

stones.     The  soldiers  were,  with  considerable  difficulty,  removed  to 

some  freight  cars  near  at  hand,  where  tlxey  were  better  protected 

from  the  mob.     Over  one  hundred  of  the  soldiers  were  separated 

from  their  comrades  during  the  transfer,  but  were  rescued  by  the 


THE  BALTIMORE  EIOTS.  78 T 

police,  who  took  them  to  the  Eastern  station-house  for  safety.  A 
short  time  after  the  freight  train  was  backed  out  of  the  depot  and, 
finally,  the  soldiers  returned  to  Philadelphia,  rather  than  attempt  to 
force  a  passage  through  the  streets  of  Baltimore.  The  mob  was 
thus  victorious,  and  all  that  night,  and  for  several  days  after,  the 
riotous  element  was  practically  in  control  of  the  city. 

It  is  difficult  to  overestimate  the  strength  and  depth  of  the  pop 
ular  indignation  excited  by  the  riot  at  the  Xorth  For  days  after 
the  outbreak  the  newspapers  teemed  with  bitter  denunciation  of  the 
Baltimoreans,  whose  opposition  to  the  passage  of  the  troops  was 
generally  set  down  to  "pure  cussedness,"  and  all-prevailing  sympathy 
with  secession.  After  the  years  which  have  rolled  by  this  is  seen  to 
be  a  narrow  and  partisan  view  of  the  occurrence.  The  people  of 
the  Xorth  had  good  reason,  however,  to  think  that  henceforth  Balti 
more  must  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  enemy,  for  the  attack  upon  the 
Northern  troops  was  one  of  the  bloodiest  and  most  vindictive  out 
bursts  of  popular  feeling  on  record.  It  confirmed  all  that  had  been 
said  of  the  Baltimoreans,  and  lent  a  decided  color  of  reason  to  the 
President's  secret  passage  through  the  city. 

After  the  departure  of  the  Xorthern  troops,  the  police  depart 
ment  was  informed  that  a  freight  car  was  at  the  depot  containing  a 
large  quantity  of  arms  and  ammunition,  which  had  been  left  there 
by  the  Massachusetts  troops.  General  James  M.  Anderson  at  once 
repaired  to  the  depot,  and  with  a  large  force  of  policemen  took  pos 
session  of  the  car.  Subsequently  the  arms  and  accoutrements  were 
removed  and  appropriated  by  the  city  authorities,  who  used  them  in 
arming  the  citizens  and  militia  for  the  protection  of  the  city. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  riot  a  meeting  of  citizens  was  held  in 
Monument  Square,  at  which  the  Governor,  the  Mayor,  and  a  num 
ber  of  prominent  citizens  made  addresses,  counseling  moderation. 
The  indignation  of  the  populace,  however,  was  so  great  that  the 
efforts  at  pacification  met  with  little  encouragement.  Seeing  that 
the  temper  of  the  people  was  even  angrier  and  more  excited  than 
before,  the  authorities  decided  to  request  the  President  to  prevent, 
if  he  could,  the  further  passage  of  troops  through  the  town.  Accord 
ingly,  the  following  letter  was  dispatched  to  the  President : 

MAYOR'S  OFFICE,  BALTIMORE,  April  19th,  1861. 

Sir : — This  will  be  presented  to  you  by  the  Hon.  H.  Lennox  Bond,  George  "W. 
Dobbin,  and  John  C.  Brunc,  Esqs.,  who  will  proceed  to  Washington  by  an  express 
train,  at  my  request,  in  order  to  explain  fully  the  fearful  condition  of  affairs  in  this 
city.  The  people  are  exaspcrat-cd  to  the  highest  degree  by  the  presence  of  troops, 
and  the  citizens  are  universally  decided  in  the  opinion  that  no  more  should  be 
ordered  to  couie.  The  authorities  of  the  city  did  their  best  to-day  to  protect  both 


788  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

strangers  and  citizens,  and  to  prevent  a  collision,  but  in  vain ;  and  but  for  their 
great  efforts  a  fearful  slaughter  would  have  occurred.  Under  these  circumstances 
it  is  my  solemn  duty  to  inform  you  that  it  is  not  possible  for  more  soldiers  to  pass 
through  Baltimore  unless  they  fight  their  way  at  every  step.  I,  therefore,  hope  and 
trust,  and  most  earnestly  request,  that  no  more  troops  be  permitted  or  ordered  by 
th»-  government  to  pass  through  the  city.  If  they  should  attempt  it,  the  responsi 
bility  for  the  bloodshed  will  not  rest  upon  me. 

With  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

GEOKGE  WM.  BROWN, 

Mayor. 

To  His  Excellency,  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN,  President  United  States. 

It  is  easy,  from  the  foregoing,  to  obtain  an  idea  of  the  actual 
state  of  affairs  in  Baltimore  at  the  time,  for  Mayor  Brown,  to  my 
own  knowledge,  is  thoroughly  dispassionate,  and,  of  all  men,  one  of 
the  least  likely  to  over-state  a  case.  The  response  to  this  letter  was 
conveyed  through  a  dispatch  from  the  committee  sent  to  Washington 
by  the  Mayor,  as  follows : 

WASHINGTON,  April  20th,  1861. 
To  MAYOR  BROWN,  Baltimore: 

We  have  seen  the  President  and  General  Scott.  We  have  from  the  former  a 
letter  to  the  Mayor  and  Governor,  declaring  that  no  troops  shall  be  brought  through 
Baltimore  if,  in  a  military  point  of  view,  and  without  interruption  from  opposition, 
they  can  be  marched  around  Baltimore. 

H.  L.  BOND, 
J.  C.  BRUNE, 
G.  W.  DOBBIN. 

This  response  of  Mr.  Lincoln  was  very  unsatisfactory  to  the 
people  of  Baltimore,  although  it  is  difficult  to  see,  looking  back  upon 
it  from  this  point  of  time,  how  Mr.  Lincoln  could  have  unreservedlv 
promised  that  no  troops  should  pass  through  Baltimore.  It  was  of 
the  highest  importance  that  easy  and  rapid  communication  should  be 
maintained  with  the  North,  and  that  the  troops  should  be  forwarded 
as  rapidly  as  possible.  It  was  simply  asking  the  government  to  cut 
off  its  right  hand  to  request  that  it  should  not  continue  the  transpor 
tation  of  troops  through  Baltimore.  The  people  of  this  city,  how 
ever,  were  not  concerned  about  the  inconvenience  which  it  might 
cause  the  government.  They  were  agreed  on  one  point,  viz.,  that 
the  passage  of  troops  through  Baltimore  should  not  be  permitted 
under  any  consideration. 

In  response  to  the  general  sentiment,  Mayor  Brown,  on  Satur 
day  morning,  issued  the  following : 

MAYOR'S  OFFICE,  BALTIMORE,  April  20th,  1861. 

All  the  citizens  having  arms  suitable  for  the  defense  of  the  city,  and  which 
they  are  willing  to  contribute  for  the  purpose,  are  requested  to  deposit  them  at  the 
office  of  the  Marshal  of  Police. 

GEORGE  WM.  BROWN, 

Mayor. 


THE  BALTIMORE  RIOTS.  ?89 

The  promptness  and  heartiness  with  which  this  call  was  responded 
to,  showed  the  depth  of  the  popular  feeling  on  the  subject.  At 
nine  o'clock,  on  the  morning  after  the  riot,  the  City  Council  met  and 
appropriated  half  a  million  dollars  for  the  defense  of  the  city.  The 
directors  of  the  banks  also  met  on  the  same  morning  and  volunteered 
to  lend  the  city  half  a  million  dollars  at  once.  From  this  fact  alone 
it  may  be  seen  that  the  feeling  was  not  confined  to  a  clique  or  even 
a  small  majority  of  the  citizens.  Almost  every  respectable  citizen, 
whatever  his  political  convictions,  shared  in  the  earnest  opposition 
to  any  further  encroachment  upon  the  soil  of  Maryland  from  the 
Xorth.  Early  that  morning  the  Confederate  flag  had  been  displayed 
from  Taylor's  building,  the  rendezvous  of  the  Maryland  Guard,  and 
had  been  greeted  with  vociferous  cheers.  The  city  was  given  over 
to  excitement  throughout  the  day.  There  was  a  rumor  of  a  pro 
jected  raid  upon  Fort  McTIenry,  several  miles  below  the  city,  \vhere 
a  number  of  troops  were  quartered,  but  a  strong  military  force  was 
sent  out  by  the  civil  authorities  and  the  attack  was  prevented.  The 
populace  Avas  further  excited  by  the  arrival  of  companies  of  militia 
from  the  counties,  who  came  to  defend  the  city  against  the  ^Northern 
myrmidons.  About  half-past  two  o'clock  that  afternoon  the  mob 
broke  into  a  public  hall  belonging  to  the  German  Turners,  who  were 
supposed  to  be  Northern  in  their  sympathies.  The  furniture  was 
destroyed  and  a  large  quantity  of  liquor  which  was  found  there  was 
appropriated  by  the  crowd.  A  recruiting  office  was  opened  at  the 
City  Hall,  under  the  nose  of  the  Mayor,  and  large  numbers  of 
persons  enrolled  themselves  for  the  defense  of  the  city.  As  the 
men  were  enrolled,  they  were  formed  into  companies  of  forty  each. 
They  selected  their  own  officers,  and  joined  what  regiments  they 
pleased. 

There  is  little  doubt  that  the  formation  of  this  military  force 
prevented  untold  violence  and  bloodshed.  In  the  first  place,  it  gave 
the  hungry,  roving  mob  something  to  do,  and  thus  distracted  it  for 
the  time  being.  In  the  second  place,  it  brought  the  element  of  dis 
order  under  a  responsible  head,  and  gave  the  city  authorities  an 
opportunity  to  recover  themselves  and  to  reassert  their  authority. 
Had  the  mob  been  left  to  itself,  there  is  no  telling  what  might  have 
happened.  As  it  was,  the  city,  for  many  days,  was  in  imminent 
danger,  and  it  was  only  by  seeming  to  co-operate  with  the  riotous 
elements  that  the  Mayor  and  his  subordinates  were  enabled  to  pre 
vent  pillage  and  destruction. 

Partly  as  a  sop  to  the  multitude,  and  partly  to  prevent  the  pos 
sibility  of  any  immediate  recurrence  of  the  disturbance,  it  was 


790  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

decided  by  the  authorities  of  the  city  and  State  to  order  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  bridges  on  the  Philadelphia  road.  Accordingly,  on 
Saturday  night,  a  detachment  of  militia,  assisted  by  citizen  volun 
teers,  set  fire  to  several  railroad  bridges  on  the  line  of  the  Philadel 
phia,  Wilmington  and  Baltimore  Railroad  and  the  Northern  Central 
Railroad,  and  thus  effectually  prevented  any  further  passage  of 
troops.  Early  on  Sunday  morning,  the  news  reached  the  city  that  a 
large  force  of  military  were  encamped  at  Ashland,  on  the  Northern 
Central  Railroad,  about  fifteen  miles  from  Baltimore,  and  that  this 
force  would  advance  and  take  possession  of  the  city  during  the  day. 
The  most  intense  excitement  ensued.  The  congregations  left  the 
churches  en  masse,  and  in  a  comparatively  short  time  the  streets 
WITU  thronged  with  excited  men.  Had  the  troops  actually  attempted 
to  enter  Baltimore,  an  immense  loss  of  life  must  have  resulted,  for 
the  riotous  elements  were  inflamed  to  the  point  of  desperation.  The 
relatives  and  friends  of  the  men  who  had  been  killed  the  day  before 
were  particularly  anxious  to  "get  at"  the  troops,  and  the  bare 
announcement  to  the  citizens  that  twelve  Baltimoreans  had  been 
killed,  enraged  them  beyond  measure.  Fortunately,  however,  the 
troops  were  ordered  to  return  to  Ilarrisburg,  and  the  danger,  for  the 
time  being,  was  averted. 

For  days  after  this  occurrence  Baltimore  was  the  centre  of  war 
like  preparations.  It  was,  in  fact,  an  armed  camp.  Nearly  every 
citizen  capable  of  bearing  arms  presented  himself  for  enrolment,  and 
in  a  short  space  of  time  there  were  not  less  than  twenty  thousand  men 
under  arms.  There  were  not  enough  muskets,  of  course,  for  this 
large  force  and,  accordingly,  the  men  were  provided  with  pikes  until 
muskets  could  be  obtained.  I  haved  seen  in  a  Northern  city  two  of 
these  pikes  exhibited  as  a  curiosity.  The  person  in  charge  of  them — 
an  ordinarily  intelligent  man  by  the  way — informed  me  that  they 
were  Marshal  Kane's  pikes,  and  that  they  had  been  used  against  the 
Massachusetts  and  Pennsylvania  volunteers  on  the  memorable  19th 
of  April.  The  absurdity  of  the  declaration  will  appear  when  it  is 
stated — first,  that  Marshal  Kane  armed  the  mob  simply  in  order  to 
make  it  believe  that  the  authorities  were  in  sympathy  with  it,  and  pre 
vent  untold  mischief;  second,  that  Marshal  Kane  knew  that  so  long  as 
the  mob  was  kept  busy  drilling,  it  could,  to  a  certain  extent,  be  held 
in  control ;  third,  that  the  idea  of  the  authorities  was  that,  by  pacify 
ing  the  mob,  a  few  days  could  be  obtained,  and  it  might  thus  be 
possible  to  take  such  steps  as  would  effectually  prevent  any  recur 
rence  of  the  trouble ;  fourth,  that  Marshal  Kane's  pikes  were  never 
used  against  the  Northern  soldiers  at  all. 


THE  BALTIMORE  RIOTS.  791 

From  the  19th  of  April  until  the  13th  of  May,  Baltimore  was 
practically  a  Confederate  town — a  wedge  of  disaffection  between 
the  Xorth  and  the  South.  President  Lincoln  and  his  Cabinet  were 
greatly  annoyed  by  this  fire  in  the  rear,  and  it  was  decided  that  the 
city  must  be  reduced  to  submission  as  soon  as  possible.  The  Presi 
dent  and  his  advisers  wisely  concluded,  however,  to  allow  things  to 
remain  as  they  were  until  the  excited  passions  of  the  multitude  had 
subsided.  After  the  retreat  of  the  volunteer  troops  from  Ashland, 
the  city  was  placed  under  patrol,  guard-houses  were  established,  and 
every  precaution  was  taken  to  prevent  a  surprise.  Colonel  Isaac  E. 
Trimble,  who  afterward  became  a  general  in  the  Confederate  service, 
was  placed  in  command  of  the  ununiformed  volunteers,  and  took 
possession  of  the  Xorthern  Central  Railroad  depot,  where  a  regular 
camp  was  established.  A  curious  feature  of  the  preparations  for 
defense  was  the  tender,  on  the  part  of  several  hundred  colored  men, 
of  their  services  "  against  the  Yankees  !  "  The  Mayor  thanked  them 
for  the  offer,  and  informed  them  that  their  services  would  be  called 
for  if  required. 

Colonel  linger,  of  the  regular  army,  afterward  general  under 
Lee,  who  had  been  for  some  time  in  command  of  the  arsenal  at 
Pikes ville,  a  village  near  Baltimore,  was  in  the  city  during  all  these 
troublous  times,  and,  being  a  prime,  social  favorite  of  the  young 
men  about  town,  was  approached  for  advice  and  assistance.  The 
old  colonel,  who  was  decidedly  Southern  in  his  sympathies,  and,  in 
fact,  went  South  shortly  afterward,  did  a  great  deal  to  avert  serious 
trouble.  lie  was  a  splendid  old  fellow — a  high  liver,  witty,  good- 
humored,  and  a  fine  old-school  officer.  It  was  he  who  suggested  the 
arming  and  drilling  of  the  mob  as  the  best  means  of  keeping  them 
employed  and  out  of  trouble.  He  was  full  of  sadness,  however,  at 
the  prospect  before  him,  and  when  some  of  the  young  swells  came 
to  him  bubbling  over  with  indignation  and  sectional  fervor,  lie  would 
cry  out :  "Ah,  boys,  you'll  get  enough  of  this  before  you're  through  !  " 

In  this  connection,  General  linger  said  to  the  city  authorities : 
"If  we  don't  give  these  fellows  plenty  to  do,  gentlemen,  they  will 
give  us  plenty  to  do!"  And  he  was  right.  Baltimore  had,  at  that 
time,  one  of  the  worst  elements  with  which  any  city  was  ever 
afflicted.  There  was  a  certain  class  of  men  which  lived  and  fattened 
on  disorder.  Tor  a  number  of  years  the  city  had  been  the  prey  of 
brutal  ruffians,  who  controlled  the  elections,  and  conducted  them 
selves  exactly  as  they  pleased.  You  have  probably  heard  of  the 
"Plug-Uglies"  and  "Kip-Raps"  of  Baltimore."  Well,  these  men 
had  been  cowed  by  the  election  of  a  reform  administration  ;  but  the 


792  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

same  spirit  animated  them  still  \vhicli  had  animated  them  before, 
when  they  openly  beat,  stabbed,  and  prodded  with  awls  every  citizen 
who  attempted  to  vote  according  to  his  own  mind.  When  the  19th 
of  April  disorder  broke  out,  this  element  began  to  show  its  head 
again — profiting  by  the  excitement  and  confusion  to  commit  ex 
cesses.  It  was  of  the  first  importance  that  these  people  should  be 
kept  out  of  mischief,  and  all  substantial  citizens,  whatever  their 
political  convictions,  were  agreed  that  the  only  way  of  keeping 
them  quiet  was  to  organize  them  into  companies,  put  them  under 
the  drillmaster,  and,  as  General  linger  suggested,  "give  them  plenty 
to  do."  To  the  government,  however,  this  action  of  the  city 
authorities  seemed  to  be  a  deliberate  note  of  defiance,  and  was, 
probably,  the  main  cause  of  the  bad  blood  and  suspicion  which 
afterward  were  found  to  exist. 

This  state  of  things  continued  for  nearly  a  month,  and  no 
enemy  having  appeared,  the  rebellious  elements  began  to  tire  of 
playing  soldier,  and,  as  had  been  expected,  began  to  disintegrate. 
In  a  few  days  more  the  "roughs"  were  completely  under  control, 
a  great  many  having  gone  off  to  Harper's  Ferry  to  join  General 
J.  E.  Johnston's  army  there,  and  the  city  authorities  had  resumed 
their  legitimate  influence.  The  arms  which  had  been  distributed 

O 

among  the  rioters  were  buried,  in  order  to  prevent  the  wholesale 
stealing  which  was  found  to  be  going  on,  and  also  to  prevent  them 
from  falling  into  the  hands  of  irresponsible  parties.  These  arms 
were  afterward  recovered  by  General  Butler,  who  pretended,  with 
an  immense  flourish  of  trumpets,  that  their  concealment  was  part  of 
a  rebel  plot  to  get  possession  of  the  city.  This  performance  was 
of  a  piece  with  several  others  of  the  doughty  warrior's  feats.  The 
people  of  Baltimore  were  very  much  excited  against  Butler,  for  his 
conduct  here  wras  marked  by  the  same  bravado,  the  same  overbearing 
u  loyalty,"  the  same  disingenuousness,  wrhich  characterized  his  "  mili 
tary  "  career  throughout  the  war.  While  lie  was  encamped  at  the 
Itelay  House,  seven  miles  from  Baltimore,  he  set  afloat  the  most 
absurd  stories — one  of  them  alleging  that  rebel  sympathizers  had 
poisoned  the  water  in  the  neighborhood,  and  another  that  the  Balti 
more  rebels  had  attempted  to  poison  his  men  with  strychnine.  One 
of  his  soldiers,  who  was  suddenly  taken  ill,  was  declared  to  have 
bi'i'ii  poisoned,  but  on  examination,  made  by  a  physician  sent  by  the 
authorities  of  Baltimore  city  to  investigate  this  particular  case,  it 
was  found  that  the  man  wras  a  person  of  intemperate  habits,  that  he 
had  been  very  imprudent  in  his  diet,  and  that  the  symptoms  were 
not  such  as  ordinarily  accompany  poisoning  by  strychnia.  Butler 


THE  BALTIMORE  RIOTS.  793 

also  ordered  the  arrest  of  a  number  of  persons  for  seditious  utter 
ances,  and  actually  issued  a  proclamation  "  concerning  one  Spencer," 
who  had  been  heard  to  express  disloyal  sentiments,  and  warning 
others  not  to  imitate  his  example.  The  General  seems  to  have  stood 
in  considerable  awe  of  the  Baltimore  mob,  although,  at  this  time,  the 
civil  authorities  had  regained  full  control  of  affairs.  The  following 

"  O 

letter  from  his  aide,  as  late  as  May  llth,  shows  that  an  attack  at  the 
Ilelay  House,  even  then,  was  feared : 

CAMP  AT  RELAY,  Saturday,  P.  M. 
To  MAYOR  BROWN  : 

Sir : — I  represent  General  Butler  at  this  camp  during  his  absence  at  Annapolis. 
I  have  received  intimations,  from  many  sources,  that  an  attack  on  us  by  the  Balti 
more  roughs  is  intended  to-night.  About  four  P.  M.  to-day  these  rumors  were  con 
firmed  by  a  gentleman  from  Baltimore,  who  gave  his  name  and  residence  in  Monu 
ment  street.  He  said  he  heard  positively  that  on  Saturday  night  the  attack  would 
take  place  by  more  than  a  thousand  men,  every  one  "sworn  to  kill  a  man"  before 
he  returned ;  a  portion  were  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle.  I  wish  you  to  guard 
every  avenue  of  your  city,  and  prevent  these  men  from  leaving  town.  They  are 
coming  in  wagons,  on  horses,  and  on  foot,  we  are  informed.  We  are  also  told  that 
a  considerable  force  is  approaching  from  the  west,  probably  Point  of  Rocks,  to  attack 
on  that  side,  and  co-operate  with  the  Baltimore  mob,  with  whom  they  have  constant 
communication.  Mr.  Clark,  whom  I  have  already  sent  to  you,  will  tell  something 
about  it.  It  may  be  all  a  sham,  but  the  evidence  is  very  cumulative,  and  from 
several  sources. 

EDWARD  G.  PARKER, 

Aide-de-Camp. 

It  was  all  a  sham.  The  attack  existed  only  in  the  fertile 
imaginations  of  General  Butler's  informants.  Quiet  had  for  some 
days  been  completely  restored  in  Baltimore.  A  number  of  the 
prominent  agitators  had  «;one  South,  and  the  riotous  element — what 

I  C3  O 

there  was  left  of  it — was  without  leaders.     On  the  night  of  the  13th 

O 

of  May,  General  Butler,  with  a  strong  force  of  volunteers,  moved 
from  the  Ilelay  House  to  Federal  hill — an  elevation  commanding 
the  harbor  of  Baltimore — and  took  possession. 

The  civil  authority  was,  of  course,  deposed;  the  administration 
of  affairs  was  handed  over  to  the  military,  and  for  several  weeks 
General  Butler  reigned  supreme.  Subsequently,  lie  was  removed 
to  new  fields  of  activity,  and  was  succeeded  in  turn  by  Generals 
Pix,  Wool,  and  Wallace.  The  only  trouble  which  the  government 
had,  subsequently,  in  Baltimore,  was  with  the  women— they  did  not 
yield  as  soon  as  the  men.  A  number  of  the  most  obstreperous  were 
imprisoned ;  fortifications,  barracks,  and  hospitals  were  erected,  and 
Baltimore,  for  the  remainder  of  the  war,  was  practically  a  Federal 
town. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  MASON  AND  SLIDELL. 


BY    K.  M.  IIUXTEE. 


Ox  the  8tli  of  November,  1S61,  the  capture  of  John  Slidell  and 
J.  M.  Mason,  the  commissioners  of  tlie  Southern  Confederacy  to 
England  and  France,  was  effected.  It  was  the  first  considerable  feat 
of  the  Federal  navy,  and,  two  weeks  afterward,  when  the  United 
States  steamer  "San  Jacinto"  landed  her  prisoners  in  Boston,  the 
daring  action  of  Captain  "Wilkes  became  the  prevailing  topic  of  the 
day,  and  superseded  in  interest  the  questions  that  grew  out  of  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson,  and  the  battles  and  the  strategic  movements 
of  our  army  on  land.  The  writer  was  an  eye-witness  of  the  seizure 
and  release  of  the  British  steamer  Trent,  and  the  capture  of  Slidell 
ami  Mason,  and  their  secretaries,  George  Eustis  and  J.  E.  McFarland. 
I  have  never  seen,  even  in  the  official  reports  of  Captain  Wilkes  and 
his  officers,  an  account  that  does  justice  to  the  facts  in  all  their  rela 
tions,  although  it  is  the  generally  admitted  fact  that,  at  the  time, 
there  was  less  exaggeration  in  the  publications  of  the  Northern 
papers  than  in  the  English  prints.  The  foreign  publications  were 
the  letters  of  the  officers  of  the  Trent,  Captain  Moir,  commanding, 
his  purser,  and  Commander  AYilliams,  of  the  Royal  Navy  Reserve, 
who  chanced  to  be  a  fellow-passenger  of  the  voyaging  emissaries. 
In  Captain  Moir's  report  to  Lord  Palmerston,  the  Premier,  he  says 
that  Captain  Wilkes  sent  an  order  (which  he  did  not)  to  him  to 
bring  his  ship  close  under  the  guns  of  the  American  sloop-of-war. 
These  matters  of  detail,  however,  are,  perhaps,  not  essential,  only 
inasmuch  as  the  truth  thereof  may  put  in  its  proper  light  the  con 
duct  of  the  officers  of  the  "  San  Jacinto." 

The  "San  Jacinto"  had  cruised  during  the  fall  months  on  the 
west  coast  of  Africa,  bearing  a  roving  commission,  and  keeping  a 
bright  lookout  for  the  privateer  "Sumter."  The  cruise  had  not 
resulted  in  anything  of  practical  benefit,  either  in  the  way  of  prize- 
money  to  the  crew  or  service  to  the  government,  and  the  1st  of 
October  beheld  her  steering  for  the  Spanish  Main,  with  her  crew 
and  officers  in  fine  spirits  and  eager  for  adventure.  Touching  at 
Cienfuegos,  news  was  received  that  Mason  and  Slidell  had  passed 
out  of  Charleston  in  the  blockade-runner  Theodora,  and  had  reached 
(794) 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  3IASOX  AXD  SLIDELL.  795 

Havana.  This  was  on  the  23d  of  October,  and  orders  were  at  once 
given  to  coal  ship.  The  order  was  executed  with  dispatch,  and  on 
the  20th  of  the  same  month  the  u  San  Jacinto"  was  again  in.  blue 
water  shaping  a  course  for  Havana.  I  am  afraid  that,  the  honor  of 
suggesting  the  capture  of  Mason  and  Slidell  must  be  awarded  to  our 
boatswain,  J.  P.  Grace.  On  the  evening  of  October  27th,  this  officer, 
while  pacing  the  lee  side  of  the  quarter-deck  with  another  warrant 
officer,  said,  in  a  tone  which  we  distinctly  heard  in  the  wardroom, 
that  the  two  chaps  themselves  ought  to  be  overhauled  wherever 
they  might  be,  and  the  ship  that  did  it  would  get  honor  that  would 
compensate  for  the  absence  of  prize-money  won  during  the  past  four 
months.  Two  days  afterward  wo  passed  under  the  frowning  guns 
of  Moro  Castle  and  anchored  in  Havana  harbor.  Xo  person  except 
the  officers  were  permitted  ashore,  and  it  was  required  that  they 
should  not  appear  in  uniform.  Tt  was  street  talk  at  the  time  that 
Mason  and  Slidell  had  made  the  hardest  part  of  their  journey  when 
they  passed  through  the  blockading  squadron  off  Charleston,  and  the 
opinion  prevailed  that  they  were  safe  from  interference  from  the 
United  States.  All  but  Captain  AVilkes  accepted  this  view  of  the 
case,  and  he  retained  his  views  within  himself.  Having  frequent 
occasion  to  visit  his  cabin  I  saw  that  he  was  deeply  engaged  in  the 
perusal  of  international  law  books,  from  which  he  was  taking  copious 
notes.  On  Xovember  1st,  Lieutenant  ,].  A.  Greer,  navigating  officer, 
brought  word  to  the  ship  that  Mason  and  Slidell,  with  their  secreta 
ries  and  families,  were  booked  for  England  by  the  steamer  Trent  to 
St.  Thomas,  and  thence  by  the  regular  "West  India  packet  to  South 
ampton.  The  next  day  we  went  to  sea,  touching  at  Key  TTest  on 
the  3d.  On  the  4th  we  returned  to  the  Cuban  coast,  and  cruising 
along  the  northern  shore  awaited  further  information  as  to  the  move 
ments  of  the  Confederate  representatives  from  Consul  General 
Schufeldt.  It  was  not  received,  and  orders  were  given  to  bear  away 
to  the  narrow  channel  of  old  Bahama,  through  which  the  Trent  must 
necessarily  pass  on  her  way  to  St.  Thomas.  The  point  selected  could 
not  have  been  chosen  to  better  advantage.  Between  the  coral  keys 
the  distance  across  the  channel  was  but  fifteen  miles,  and  no  ship 
could  pass  without  being  seen  by  our  topsail-yard  lookout.  Early  on 
the  morning  of  the  8th  the  ship  was  cleard  for  action. 

If  the  Trent  had  left  Havana  on  the  17th,  she  was  due  at 
the  point  where  we  were  waiting  on  the  8th.  The  distance  was  but 
two  hundred  and  forty  miles,  and  the  wind,  blowing  a  full  sail  breeze 
from  the  southwest,  should  place  the  Trent  under  our  guns  by 
noon.  The  calculations  were  made  with  exactness,  for  at  twenty 


79 G  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

minutes  to  twelve  o'clock  the  lookout  aloft  sang  out  "Sail  ho!" 
Lieutenant  K.  Randolph  Breese,  who  had  the  deck,  hailed  the  look 
out,  and  asked  for  her  direction.  "  Off  the  port  bow,  sir,"  came 
back  the  reply.  The  "  San  Jacinto  "  was  then  heading  north,  and 
presently  the  black  smoke  of  a  steamer  was  descried  from  our  decks. 
When  tiie  crew  was  piped  to  dinner,  the  mess-cloths  were  deserted, 
and  nearly  everybody  remained  on  deck,  watching  the  smoke,  until 
out  of  the  base  of  the  ascending  blackness  came  the  spars,  presently 
the  hull  and  full  shape,  of  the  steamship  Trent.  Until  that  moment, 
probably,  no  one  on  board  of  the  ship  knew  what  the  object  of  our 
waiting  was ;  but  as  soon  as  the  Trent  hove  in  sight,  and  her  identity 
was  decided,  there  was  no  doubt  of  our  mission.  Then  Captain 
AVilkes  called  Lieutenant  Fairfax  into  the  cabin,  and  gave  him  his 
instructions,  of  which  the  following  is  a  copy : 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  "SAX  JACINTO," 
AT  SEA,  November  8th,  1861. 

Sir : — You  "will  have  the  second  and  third  cutters  of  this  ship  fully  manned 
and  armed,  and  be  in  all  respects  prepared  to  board  the  steamer  Trent,  now  hove-to 
under  our  guns. 

On  boarding  her,  you  will  demand  the  papers  of  the  steamer,  her  clearance 
from  Havana,  with  the  list  of  passengers  and  crew. 

Should  Mr.  Mason,  Mr.  Slidell,  Mr.  Eustis,  and  Mr.  McFarland  be  on  board, 
you  will  make  them  prisoners,  and  send  them  on  board  this  ship  immediately,  and 
take  possession  of  the  Trent  as  a  prize. 

I  do  not  deem  it  will  be  necessary  to  use  force ;  that  the  prisoners  will  have 
the  good  sense  to  avoid  any  necessity  for  using  it ;  but  if  they  should,  they  must 
be  made  to  understand  that  it  is  their  own  fault.  They  must  be  brought  on  board. 
All  trunks,  cases,  packages,  and  bags  belonging  to  them  you  will  take  possession  of, 
and  send  on  board  the  ship.  Any  dispatches  found  on  the  persons  of  the  prisoners, 
or  in  possession  of  those  on  board  the  steamer,  will  be  taken  possession  of  also, 
examined,  and  retained  if  necessary. 

I  have  understood  that  the  families  of  these  gentlemen  may  be  with  them. 
If  so,  I  beg  you  will  offer  them,  in  my  name,  a  passage  in  this  ship  to  the  United 
States,  and  that  all  the  attention  and  comforts  we  can  command  are  tendered  them, 
and  will  be  placed  at  their  service. 

In  the  event  of  their  acceptance,  should  there  be  anything  which  the  captain 
of  the  steamer  can  spare  to  increase  the  comforts,  in  the  way  of  necessaries  or 
stores,  of  which  a  war  vessel  is  deficient,  you  will  please  to  procure  them.  The 
amount  will  b<>.  paid  by  the  paymaster. 

Lieutenant  James  A.  Grcer  will  take  charge  of  the  third  cutter,  which  accom 
panies  you,  and  assist  you  in  these  duties.  I  trust  that  all  those  under  your 
mnmiaiid,  in  executing  this  important  and  delicate  duty,  will  conduct  themselves 
with  all  the  delicacy  and  kindness  which  become  the  character  of  our  naval  service. 
I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

CHARLES  WILKES,  Captain. 
LIEUTENANT  D.  M.  FAIRFAX,  U.  S.  N.,  Executive  Officer  "  San  Jacinto." 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  MASON  AND  SLID  ELL.  797 

The  officers  detailed  to  go  in  the  boats  with  Lieutenant  Fairfax 
received  their  instructions,  and  Captain  Wilkes  walked  forward  to 
the  mainmast,  and  gave  the  order  "Beat  to  quarters."  It  was 
fifteen  minutes  after  one  o'clock  when  the  boats  were  called  away, 
Mr.  Fairfax  in  the  second  cutter,  and  Lieutenant  Greer  commanding 
the  third  cutter.  Before  the  boats  were  shoved  off,  the  Trent  had 
steamed  well  up  toward  the  "  San  Jacinto,"  and  was  in  mid-channel, 
when  the  gun  on  the  topgallant  forecastle,  loaded  with  a  round-shot, 
was  fired  in  a  line  across  the  bows.  Immediately  the  red  cross  of 
St.  George  went  fluttering  to  her  peak,  but  she  kept  011  her  course. 
"Put  a  shell  in  that  gun,"  called  out  Captain  "\Vilkes,  "and  let  it  go 
across  her  bows,  so  she  may  not  mistake  our  intention  this  time.7' 
The  shell  exploded  about  one  hundred  fathoms  ahead  of  the  steamer, 
and  immediately  her  engines  stopped,  and  she  roundcd-to  within  two 
hundred  feet  of  the  man-of-war,  and  under  the  muzzles  of  our  broad 
side,  that  would  have  sunk  her  at  the  word  "Fire!"  There  was 
much  confusion  on  the  mail  steamer,  and  the  passengers  could  be 
seen  running  about  the  decks  in  the  greatest  state  of  excitement. 
As  our  men  were  going  into  their  boats,  Captain  Moir,  of  the 
Trent,  hailed  us.  "What  do  you  mean,"  shouted  he,  "by  stopping 
my  ship  ?  and  why  do  you  do  it  with  shotted  guns,  contrary  to 
usage?"  Lieutenant  Brecse  sang  out,  in  reply  :  "We  are  going  to 
send  a  boat  on  board  of  you.  Lay-to." 

At  this  instant  the  order  to  shove  off  was  given  to  our  boats,  and 
the  second  and  third  cutters  went  dancing  over  the  blue  waves 
toward  the  Trent.  Lieutenant  Greer  pulled  up  to  the  port  gang 
way,  and  Mr.  Fairfax  went  to  the  starboard  side,  and  boarded  the 
ship  alone.  The  first  officer  met  him  as  he  came  up  the  side,  and 
asked  what  he  wanted.  "Are  you  the  master  of  this  ship,  sir?" 

"Xo,  sir;  first  officer." 

"I  would  like  to  see  the  captain;"  and  Captain  Moir,  at  this 
instant,  walked  out  of  his  cabin,  and  coming  forward  said,  in  angry 
tones :  "  How  dare  you  come  on  board  of  my  ship  I  What  right 
have  you  here?  This  is'  an  outrage  the  flag  there  (pointing  to  the 
red  cross  aloft)  will  make  you  pay  for." 

Lieutenant  Fairfax  bowed,  and  said :  "  I  have  instructions  to 
effect  the  arrest  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell,  and  their  secretaries, 
Messrs.  Eustis  and  McFarland.  I  have  information  that  they  are  on 
board,  and  I  would  like  to  sec  your  passenger  list." 

"  For  a  damned  impertinent,  outrageous  puppy,  give  me,  or 
don't  give  me,  a  Yankee.  You  go  back  to  your  ship,  young  man, 
and  tell  her  skipper  that  you  couldn't  accomplish  your  mission, 


798  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 


we  wouldn't  let  ye.  I  deny  your  right  of  search.  D'ye 
understand  that  ?  " 

"  I  am  sorry,"  quietly  returned  the  officer,  "  to  say  I  shall  use 
force  to  carry  out  my  orders,  and,  thanking  you,  sir,  for  your  advice, 
I  decline  to  return  to  the  ship  in  any  such  a  way  as  you  propose." 

The  passengers,  some  forty  or  fifty  in  number,  had  gathered  aft 
around  the  officer,  and  the  crew  also  stood  about.  As  Captain  Moir 
made  his  assertion  regarding  the  right  of  search,  the  passengers 
applauded,  and  a  young  lady,  whom  I  afterward  learned  was  Miss 
Slidell,  sprang  on  to  a  companion-way  skylight,  and  said:  "  Quite 
right,  captain  ;  very  right  !  " 

Lieutenant  Fairfax  then  came  to  the  side  of  the  ship  to  summon 
the  boat  crews,  but  the  tones  of  the  discussion  had  been  highly 
pitched,  and  his  call  had  a  response  before  he  made  it.  The  blue 
jackets,  twenty  in  number,  and  the  marines,  of  whom  there  were 
ten,  the  former  with  cutlasses  and  pistols,  and  the  marines  with 
muskets  and  bayonets,  sprung  aft  at  once.  A  detachment  was 
ordered  to  the  lower  deck,  and  the  rest  of  the  men  formed  in  a  line 
across  the  main  deck,  cutting  off  communication  from  abaft  the  main 
mast  to  the  forecastle.  During  this  movement  there  appeared  on  the 
deck  an  officer,  with  a  parrot-like  voice,  wearing  the  uniform  of  the 
Rcyal  navy.  Strutting  up  to  Lieutenant  Fairfax,  he  said:  "I  am 
the  Queen's  representative,  sir,  and  I  protest  against  this  unwarrant 
able  action  under  Her  Majesty's  flag,  and  on  the  deck  of  a  British 
ship."  The  lieutenant  paid  no  attention  to  this  speech,  delivered 
with  great  pomposity  of  manner,  but  turned  to  Captain  Moir,  and 
said  :  "  1.  ou  see  I  have  force  enough  to  carry  out  my  orders  ;  "  and 
at  this  juncture  Mr.  Slidell  and  Mr.  Mason  came  out  of  the  cabin 
and  stood  in  the  crowd.  Amid  cries  of  "  Piracy  !  "  "  Did  you  ever 
hear  of  such  an  outrage  ?  "  "  They  would  not  have  dared  to  do  it  had 
there  been  an  English  man-of-war  in  sight  !  "  Mr.  Slidell  stepped 
forward,  and  said:  "Do  you  wish  to  see  me?"  and  Mason,  just 
beside  him,  echoed  "  to  see  me  ?  "  Mr.  Fairfax  vainly  tried  to  induce 
them  to  accompany  him  to  the  "  San  Jacinto,"  and  as  they  positively 
refused  to  go,  he  said  :  "  Gentlemen,  you  may  as  well  prepare  to  go 
at  once,  peaceably  if  you  want  to,  but  by  force  if  necessary,  for  in 
twenty  minutes  you  shall  be  on  board  that  ship."  The  excitement 
was  intense,  and  cries  of  "  Shame  !  "  from  the  passengers,  in  shrill 
crescendo,  mingled  with  the  stern  tones  of  the  boarding  officers,  as 
they  ordered  the  men  on  guard  at  different  points  of  the  ship.  In 
three  minute.-.  Mason  and  Slidell,  having  the  while  stood  hesitating 
before  the  cabin,  turned  and  walked  into  their  state-rooms.  Mr. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  MASON  AND  SLIDELL.  799 

Fairfax  followed,  and  here  he  encountered  an  obstacle  in  the  person 
of  Miss  Slidell  who,  filling  the  doorway,  said  :  "  Mr.  Fairfax,  I  met 
you  as  a  gentleman  in  Havana  on  Thursday.  You  outrage  our  hos 
pitality  by  this  proceeding,  and  I  swear  to  heaven  you  shall  not  go 
into  this  cabin  to  my  father."  At  this  there  was  more  excitement, 
and  the  passengers  clustered  in  little  groups,  and  spoke  in  loud  tones. 
From  where  I  stood  I  saw  Mrs.  Slidell  approach  the  door  and  beg 
Mr.  Fairfax  to  go  away.  He  replied  :  "  Madam,  my  orders  are  im 
perative.  I  shall  obey  them ; "  and  just  then  Mr.  Slidell  began  a 
most  ungraceful  movement  out  of  the  window  of  his  cabin,  which 
opened  into  a  small  gangway. 

It  was  evident  that  Mr.  Slidell  was  scared,  perhaps  excited  is  a 
better  word,  for  his  fingers  twitched  nervously,  and  for  a  minute  or 
two  he  was  unable  to  speak.  Then  Mr.  Mason  came  out  of  his  cabin, 
and  Lieutenant  Fairfax  asked  him  if  he  was  ready  to  go  on  board 
the  "  San  Jacinto."  Mason  was  cooler  and  more  collected  than  his 
confrere,  and  replied  with  moderation  in  his  tone:  "Xo,  sir;  I 
decline  to  go  with  you."  Fairfax,  turning  to  his  own  officers,  said: 
"  Gentlemen,  lay  your  hands  on  Mr.  Mason,"  which  we  accordingly 
did.  Mr.  Mason  then  said:  "  I  yield  to  force."  Whereupon  Com 
mander  Williams  shouted:  "Under  protest,  Mr.  Mason,  under  pro 
test."  "  Yes,"  said  Mr.  Mason,  in  the  same  tone  as  before,  "  precisely, 
under  protest,"  and  then  walked  down  the  companion  ladder  to  the 
boat.  Meanwhile,  Mr.  Slidell  had  recovered  his  equanimity  to  an 
extent  which  enabled  him  to  say:  "I  will  never  go  on  board  that 
ship."  Mr.  Fairfax  took  him  by  the  collar,  Engineer  Houston  and 
Boatswain  Grace  taking  each  one  of  his  arms,  marched  him  to  the 
gangway;  Miss  Slidell  in  the  meantime  being  in  the  enjoyment  of 
an  aggravated  attack  of  hysterics.  Other  lady  passengers  were  sim 
ilarly  occupied,  while  the  gentlemen  on  board  the  ship  had  retreated 
in  sullen  silence  to  the  taffrail,  where  they  scowled  defiance  at  the 
boarding  party.  There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind  that,  had  the  Trent 
been  an  armed  ship,  she  would  have  manifested  a  resistance  of  no 
small  energy.  The  spirit  prevailing  on  her  decks  may,  without  any 
stretch  of  truth,  be  called  warlike.  Captain  Williams,  Royal  navy, 
who  was  in  charge  of  the  Central  American  and  Mexican  mails,  now 
came  out  of  his  cabin,  and  passing  to  Mr.  Charles  R  Dahlgren, 
master's  mate,  handed  him  an  unfolded  paper,  which  Mr.  Dahlgren. 
declined  to  receive.  Lieutenant  Fairfax  was  on  the  lower  deck,  and 
Captain  Williams,  finding  no  officer  who  would  accept  the  note, 
finally  shoved  it  in  his  pocket ;  subsequently,  it  fluttered  to  the  deck, 
and  a  marine  stationed  inside  the  cabin  door  secured  it,  and  after 


800  ANNALS  OF  THE  WAR. 

reading  handed  it  to  me.  I  presented  it  to  Captain  Wilkes,  but 
after  a  consultation  we  agreed  that  as  the  letter  had  no  signature, 
and  the  manner  in  which  it  reached  us  was  unofficial,  that  we  would 
consider  it  as  never  having  been  written.  Among  my  papers  I  found 
this  redoubtable  letter  recently,  and  the  following  is  an  exact  copy 
thereof : 

In  this  ship  I  am  the  representative  of  Her  Majesty's  Government,  and  I  call 
upon  the  officers  of  the  ship  and  passengers  generally  to  mark  my  words,  when,  in 
the  name  of  the  British  Government,  and  in  distinct  language,  I  denounce  this  an 
illegal  act ;  an  act  in  violation  of  international  laAv ;  an  act,  indeed,  of  wanton  piracy, 
which,  had  we  the  means  of  defense,  you  would  not  dare  to  attempt. 

Mr.  Eustis,  one  of  the  secretaries,  was  more  violent  than  either 
of  the  principals,  and  made  a  demonstration  in  the  direction  of 
striking  Lieutenant  Greer  with  his  fist.  He  passed  into  the  boat 
sans  ceremonie.  McFarland  had  previously  taken  his  seat  alongside 
of  Mr.  Slidell  in  the  stern-sheets  of  the  boat.  Our  object  having 
been  accomplished,  we  bade  the  Trent  good-bye,  first  bringing  the 
personal  effects  of  the  prisoners  to  the  "  San  Jacinto,"  and  we  wrere 
soon  headed  north,  our  mission  in  Bahama  channel  being  au  fait 
accompli. 

We  arrived  at  Port  Royal  too  late  to  take  part  in  the  attack. 
Having  been  ordered  home,  on  the  18th  of  November  we 
steamed  into  the  Narrows,  where  we  were  met  by  a  steam  tug,  on 
board  of  which  was  the  United  States  Marshal,  with  orders  to 
proceed  to  Boston  and  deliver  our  prisoners  at  Fort  Warren.  We 
did  not  anchor  until  the  21st,  and  the  cruise  of  the  "  San  Jacinto  " 
ended  when  we  deposited  the  Confederate  diplomats  in  the  case 
ments  of  that  prison. 

On  the  3d  of  December,  on  the  motion  of  Congressman  Odell, 
Slidell  and  Mason  were  ordered  into  close  confinement,  in  return  for 
the  treatment  that  Colonels  Wood  and  Corcoran  had  received  in 
Southern  prisons.  It  was  some  time  before  the  diplomatic  corres 
pondence  that  ensued  between  England,  France,  and  the  United 
States  was  made  public.  The  United  States  agreed  to  release  the 
prisoners,  but  declined  to  apologize  to  the  English  flag  for  an  alleged 
offense  where  none  was  intended.  Mason  and  Slidell  joined  their 
families  in  London  in  January,  1862,  and  their  further  actions  passes 
out  of  the  ken  of  the  writer. 


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